Arigo vs. Swift G.R. No. 206510
Arigo vs. Swift G.R. No. 206510
Arigo vs. Swift G.R. No. 206510
result" of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a
generalized grievance." However, the rule on standing is a procedural
matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such
as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.
The Court has ruled in the landmark case of Oposa vs. Factoran the
"public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology is recognized
which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law." The declared that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it
is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. The Court further ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have
legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights; they can
do so in representation of their own and future generations.
2. YES. The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to
balance State sovereignty and the principle of freedom of the high seas. The
freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the oldest customary
principles of international law. The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State
sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which
are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive
economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or
less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is
located. Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the
Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules
of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the
territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. In the case of warships they
continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations
of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of
the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea
and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is
made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial
sea immediately.
Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or
other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss
or damage to the coastal State resulting from the noncompliance by a warship or other government ship operated for
non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or
with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of
international law.
Worthy to note is the policy statement given by President Reagan on
March 10, 1983 that the US will "recognize the rights of the other , states in
the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the convention [UNCLOS], so long
as the rights and freedom of the United States and others under
international law are recognized by such coastal states", and President
Clinton's reiteration of the US policy "to act in a manner consistent with its
[UNCLOS] provisions relating to traditional uses of the oceans and to
encourage other countries to do likewise." Since Article 31 relates to the
"traditional uses of the oceans," and "if under its policy, the US 'recognize[s]
the rights of the other states in the waters off their coasts,"' Justice Carpio
postulates that "there is more reason to expect it to recognize the rights of
other states in their internal waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this case."
3. NO. The waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for
issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17,
Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a
violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately. The Court holds
that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the
province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. The Court finds it unnecessary
at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed
absolute.