Gaviola vs People of the Philippines

(Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall
hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm
products.)
(Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is qualified if coconuts are taken
from the premises of a plantation.)
Facts:
With the land dispute issue between the parties, the court clearly identified the
demarcation of the properties involve therein. Having known of the said court decision,
the accused still gathered 1500 of coconuts from the land of Cleto Eusebio and was
convicted of qualified theft. On appeal, he invoked his honest belief that he owned the

land which negates intent to steal, an essential element of the felony of theft.
Issues:
Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that he had
intent to gain when the coconuts were taken upon his instruction.
Held:
Yes. In all cases where one in good faith takes anothers property under
claim of title in himself, he is exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile
or mistaken the claim may in fact be. And the same is true where the taking is on
behalf of another, believed to be the true owner. Still, if the claim is dishonest, a
mere pretense, it will not protect the taker. Gaviola cannot feign ignorance or
even unfamiliarity with the location, identity and the metes and bounds of the
properties involved as it is categorically stated clearly that the three parcels of
land are distinct and separate from each other. Hence, Gaviolas claim of good
faith in taking the coconuts is a mere pretense to escape criminal liability and
was guilty not only of simple theft but of qualified theft.

ALFONSO D. GAVIOLA, G.R. No. 163927

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
January 27, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 24413 affirming the ruling [2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Nava, Biliran, Branch 16, in Criminal Case No. N-1901, where petitioner
Alfonso Gaviola was convicted of qualified theft.
The antecedents are as follows:

On May 25, 1954, Elias Gaviola filed a complaint against Eusebio Mejarito in the
then Court of First Instance of Carigara, Leyte, for quieting of title with a plea for
injunctive relief. The suit involved a 40,500-square-meter parcel of coconut land
located in Barrio Calbani, Maripipi, Leyte, identified as Cadastral Lot 1301 and
covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 743.[3] The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 111. Eusebio, for his part, claimed ownership over the property.
On July 29, 1955, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the complaint and
declared Eusebio the lawful owner of the property. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing, the Court renders judgment dismissing the
plaintiffs complaint and declaring the defendants the absolute owners and entitled
to the possession of the disputed land. The preliminary injunction which was
granted by this Court through Judge Lorenzo Carlitos is ordered dissolved, with
costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.[4]

The decision became final and executory. On September 3, 1955, the trial court
ordered the sheriff to place Eusebio in possession of the property.[5] The sheriff
complied with the order on December 19, 1958.[6]
In the meantime, Eusebio died intestate and was survived by his son, Cleto. Elias
Gaviola also died intestate and was survived by his son, Alfonso.
Almost 30 years thereafter, on October 1985, Cleto filed a complaint against
Alfonso and four others for recovery of possession of a parcel of land and
execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 111. The property involved was located
on the north of Lot 1301 and covered by TD No. 1546. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. B-0600.
The plaintiff therein alleged that the houses of the defendants were located
in the property that had been adjudicated to his father, Eusebio Mejarito, in Civil
Case No. 111. He prayed that the court issue judgment as follows:
a) Ordering [the] immediate execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 111, against
defendants Segundo Gaviola and Alfonso Gaviola;
b) Ordering all defendants evicted from any portion of the land they presently
occupy as residential;
c) Ordering all defendants to pay rent in favor of the plaintiff with legal interests
imposed reckoned from June 1984 until full payment of what is due and/or until
their complete and absolute eviction from their respective residences which rent
liabilities when computed annually for each of them is in the sum of PESOS:
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency;
d) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of PESOS:
THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00), Philippine Currency, representing moral
damages;

e) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of PESOS:
TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00), Philippine Currency, representing
attorneys fee and litigation expenses.
Plaintiff prays for such relief and other remedies as may be just and
equitable in the premises.[7]

In their answer to the complaint, the defendants averred that the property in
which their houses were located is different from that which was adjudicated by
the court in Civil Case No. 111 to Eusebio Mejarito.
The parties could not agree on the identification and metes and bounds of the
parcel of land claimed and owned by the plaintiff and those claimed and owned by
the defendants. This impelled the court to appoint Bienvenido Ricafort, the Officerin-Charge of the sub-office of the Provincial Assessor, as Commissioner, to
resurvey the property subject of the complaint. A sketch of the property was
prepared, indicating the location of the plaintiffs lot (Lot 1301) and the parcel of
land where the house of Gaviola stood (Lot 1311). The Commissioner also
prepared a report[8] stating that the property adjudicated to Eusebio Mejarito in
Civil Case No. 111 was Cadastral Lot No. 1301, while that which belonged to Elias
Gaviola was Cadastral Lot No. 1311; and the old one-storey house of defendant
Alfonso Gaviola was located in the latter lot. The defendant did not object to the
report.[9]
On May 4, 1990, the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants in
Civil Case No. B-0600 and ordered the complaint dismissed. The court ruled that
the parcels of land occupied by the defendants, inclusive of Lot 1311, were
different from the property adjudicated to Eusebio Mejarito in Civil Case No. 111,
which is actually Lot 1301. The court also ruled that the plaintiff had no cause of
action for the execution of the courts decision in Civil Case No. 111 because such
decision had long been enforced, per report of the sheriff.[10]
Eusebio appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment
on September 18, 1992, affirming the decision of the RTC.[11] The appellate court
declared that the house of Alfonso Gaviola was located in Lot 1311 covered by TD
1611 under the name of Elias Gaviola. Cleto filed a petition for review
on certiorari with this Court, which was denied due course in a
Resolution[12] dated March 24, 1993. Thus, the CA decision became final and
executory. The trial court issued a writ of execution, a copy of which Sheriff
Ludenilo S. Ador served on the defendants on August 5, 1993.[13]
In the meantime, Cleto Mejarito left the Philippines and stayed in the United
States of America. He entrusted the land to the care of his nephew, Rafael Lozano.
At 7:00 a.m. on September 6, 1997, Jovencio Mejarito, a nephew of Cleto
Mejarito, and a barangay councilman, saw Gavino Gaviola, Rodrigo Gaviola and
Domingo
Caingcoy
climbing
the
coconut
trees
in Lot 1301.
Under the supervision of the spouses Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola, they

gathered 1,500 coconuts worth P3,000.00 from the coconut trees.[14] The Officer-inCharge of the Maripipi Police Station then filed a criminal complaint for qualified
theft against the spouses Gaviola and those who gathered the coconuts in the
municipal trial court.[15] In the meantime, the coconuts were entrusted to the care of
the barangaycaptain.
On February 6, 1998, an Information was filed with the RTC of Naval,
Biliran, against the spouses Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola for qualified theft. The
accusatory portion of the decision reads:
That on or about the 6th day of September 1997, at around 9 oclock in the
morning at Brgy. Calbani, Municipality of Maripipi, Province of Biliran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, and with intent to gain,
did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, deliberately took, harvested and
gathered one thousand five hundred (1,500) coconut fruits from the plantation of
Cleto Mejarito without the consent and authority of the latter, to the damage and
prejudice of the owner amounting to P3,000.00.
Contrary to Law.[16]

Alfonso admitted that the coconuts were taken upon his instructions, but insisted
that the trees from which they were taken were planted on Lot 1311, the property
he had inherited from his father, Elias Gaviola; the property of private complainant
Cleto Mejarito, Lot 1301, was adjacent to his lot. Alfonso testified that the
property was placed in his possession by the sheriff since August 5, 1993, and that
since then he had been gathering coconuts every three months without being
confronted or prosecuted by anybody.[17]He insisted that his claim was based on the
decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. B-0600, which was affirmed by the CA.[18]

On April 13, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment convicting Alfonso of qualified
theft. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Alfonso Gaviola y Dimakiling guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft; hereby imposing upon
him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Five (5) Years, Five (5)
Months and Ten (10) days of prision correccional, maximum period, as the
minimum, to Eight (8) Years and One (1) day of prision mayor, minimum, as the
maximum.
The accused shall pay the private complainant Cleto Mejarito, through his
duly authorized representative, exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00
and liquidated damages in the amount of P3,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[19]

The trial court ruled that the accused took the coconuts from the coconut trees
planted on Cadastral Lot 1301 which was owned by Cleto Mejarito, and not on his
own property,Lot 1311, as he claimed.
Alfonso Gaviola appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment,
on October 1, 2003, affirming the decision of the RTC. He then filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision, which the appellate court denied.
Alfonso, now the petitioner, raises the following issues in the instant petition: (1)
whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that he had intent to gain
when the coconuts were taken upon his instruction; and (2) whether he is liable for
exemplary and liquidated damages.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that the prosecution failed to prove animus
lucrandi (intent to gain) on his part. He asserts that he had been taking coconuts
from the property in broad daylight three times a year since August 5, 1993 on his
honest belief that he was the owner of the land where the coconut trees were
planted. He points out that it was only after he took coconuts on September 6,
1997 that he was charged of qualified theft.

Moreover, his honest belief that he owned the land negates intent to steal, an
essential element of the felony of theft. He argues that the RTC in Civil Case No.
B-0600 declared him to be the owner of the property where the coconut trees were
planted; the property was placed in his possession by the sheriff and, since then, he
had planted bananas and gathered coconuts from the coconut trees.
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that
the decision of the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, is in accord with the
evidence on record. The OSG maintains that under the decision of the then CFI in
Civil Case No. 111, the RTC in Civil Case No. B-0600 and that of the CA
affirming on appeal the RTCruling, the owner of Lot 1301, the property from
which the coconuts were taken, was Eusebio Mejarito, the private complainants
father.
We rule against the petitioner.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who,
with intent to gain but without violence, against or intimidation of persons nor
force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters
consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the
same to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of
another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by
him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass
is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its
owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other
forest or farm products.[20]

Thus, the elements of theft are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2)
that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to
gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things.[21]
The provision was taken from Article 530 of the Spanish Penal Code which
reads:
1. Los que con nimo de lucrarse, y sin violencia o intimidacin en las
personas ni fuerza en las cosas, toman las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad,
de su dueo.
2. Los que encontrndose una cosa perdida y sabiendo quin es su dueo se
la apropiaren con intencion de lucro.
3. Los daadores que sustrajeren o utilizaren los frutos u objeto del dao
causado, salvo los casos previstos en los artculos 606, num. 1., 2. y 3; 608, num.
1; 610, num. 1.; 611;613; segundo prrafo del 617 y 618. (Art. 437 del Cod. Penal
de 1850. Art. 379, Cdo. Franc. Art. 331, Codigo Brasil. Art. 151, Cod. Austr. Arts.
461 y 508, Cod. Belg. Art. 242, Cod. Alem. Arts. 422 y 423, Cod. Port. Art. 402,
Cod. Ital.)[22]

According to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is qualified if coconuts
are taken from the premises of a plantation:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding
article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or
if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or
fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

For one to be guilty of theft, the accused must have an intent to steal (animus
furandi) personal property, meaning the intent to deprive another of his
ownership/lawful possession of personal property which intent is apart from, but
concurrent with the general criminal intent which is an essential element of a
felony of dolo (dolos malus). The animo being a state of the mind may be proved
by direct or circumstantial evidence, inclusive of the manner and conduct of the
accused before, during and after the taking of the personal property. General
criminal intent is presumed or inferred from the very fact that the wrongful act is
done since one is presumed to have willed the natural consequences of his own
acts. Likewise, animus furandi is presumed from the taking of personal property
without the consent of the owner or lawful possessor thereof. The same may be
rebutted by the accused by evidence that he took the personal property under
a bona fide belief that he owns the property.[23]
In Black v. State,[24] the State Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that the open
and notorious taking, without any attempt at concealment or denial, but an avowal
of the taking, raises a strong presumption that there is no animus furandi. But, if

the claim is dishonest, a mere pretense, taking the property of another will not
protect the taker:
xxx In all cases where one in good faith takes anothers property under
claim of title in himself, he is exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile
or mistaken the claim may in fact be. And the same is true where the taking is on
behalf of another, believed to be the true owner. Still, if the claim is dishonest, a
mere pretense, it will not protect the taker.
The gist of the offense is the intent to deprive another of his property in a chattel,
either for gain or out of wantonness or malice to deprive another of his right in the
thing taken. This cannot be where the taker honestly believes the property is his
own or that of another, and that he has a right to take possession of it for himself
or for another, for the protection of the latter.[25]

In Charles v. State,[26] the State Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the belief
of the accused of his ownership over the property must be honest and in good faith
and not a mere sham or pretense.
In the present case, the trial court found the petitioners claim of having acted
in the honest belief that he owned Lot 1301 when he ordered the harvesting of the
coconuts barren of probative weight. The trial court ruled that the petitioner even
admitted in Civil Case No. B-0600 that the private complainants property was
separate from his:
The accused have put up a defense of ownership although from the records
of Civil Case No. B-0600, Alfonso Gaviola, et al., thru their counsel admitted that
from the evidence of Cleto Mejarito especially Exh. E, Writ of Execution, it
appears that the decision was already executed on December 22, 1958.
Further admitted that:
The southern boundary of the land of Elias Gaviola (Alfonso) is
stated as Melecio Gaviola. Actually the land of Melecio Gaviola is now
owned by plaintiff (Cleto Mejarito), the land having been adjudicated to
his predecessor-in-interest Eusebio Mejarito by virtue of Civil Case No.
111 (Exh. A) (See also Exh. 6, Tax Declaration No. 3437, reverse side).
Alfonso Gaviola could not have made a mistake to extricate themselves
from the ejectment, Cleto Mejarito wanted to pursue in Civil Case No. B-0600.
They submitted a well entrenched analyses as they concluded further; to
quote:
Finally, that these three parcels of lands are separate and distinct
from each other is confirmed by the cadastral survey were the lands of
plaintiff (Cleto Mejarito), of Elias Gaviola (Alfonso) and of Segunda
Gaviola, are denominated as Cadastral Lot Nos. 1301, 1311 and 1303,
respectively. Not only that, their definite locations and boundaries are
even delineated in the sketch prepared by the court-appointed
commissioner, which sketch is now marked as Exhibits H and series
(Memorandum of defendants Gaviolas dated April 13, 1989, in Civil
Case No. B-0600).

The general rule is that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party
making it and does not require proof; except when it is shown that the admission
was made through palpable mistake and (2) when shown that no such admission
was in fact made. (Atillo III vs. C.A. 266 SCRA 596).[27]

The findings of the RTC were affirmed by the appellate court. The wellentrenched rule is that the findings of facts of the trial court, affirmed by the
appellate court, are conclusive on this Court, absent any evidence that the trial
court and the appellate court ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts
and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would warrant a modification
or reversal of the outcome of the case. We have reviewed the records and find no
justification to modify, much less reverse, the findings of the trial and appellate
courts.
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance or even unfamiliarity with the
location, identity and the metes and bounds of the private complainants
property, Lot 1301, vis--visthat of his own, Lot 1311. Indeed, in his Memorandum
in Civil Case No. B-0600, petitioner as one of the defendants below, categorically
stated:
From the above enumeration or statement of boundaries, it is clear that
these three parcels of land are distinct and separate from each other, as the
following observations can be made:
1. land of plaintiff and Elias (Alfonso) Gaviola:
a. Both have the same northern boundary: Isabela Mejarito. But the same
can be explained by the fact that sometime in 1934 Isabela Mejarito,
through Pastor Armoela, sold the land now owned by Elias (Alfonso)
Gaviola to him. See Ex. 15. In fact, the first time that the land bought by
Elias Gaviola was declared in his name was in 1935 in Tax Dec. No.
2839 (Exh. 14) which cancelled in part Tax Dec. No. 1942 (Exh. 16) in
the name of Isabela Mejarito.
What caused the confusion (identical northern boundary of the lands of
plaintiff and Elias Gaviola) was that the northern boundary (Isabela
Mejarito) of the land of plaintiff was not adjusted accordingly despite the
sale. It should have been changed to Elias Gaviola to reflect the sale.
b. The southern boundary of the land of Elias Gaviola (Alfonso) is stated
as Melecio Gaviola. Actually the land of Melecio Gaviola is now owned
by plaintiff the land having been adjudicated to his predecessor-ininterest Eusebio Mejarito by virtue of Civil Case No. 111 (Exhibit A)
(See also Exh. 6, Tax Dec. No. 3437, reverse side)
2. land of plaintiff and Hermenegildo (Segundo) Gaviola:
a. The eastern boundary of the land of plaintiff is stated as Hermenegildo
Gaviola, father and predecessor-in-interest of defendant Segundo
Gaviola;
b. The western boundary of the land of Hermenegildo Gaviola (Exh. 31A) was previously declared as Melecio Gaviola. But after the case (Civil

Case No. 111, Exh. A), it was changed to Eusebio Mejarito, predecessorin-interest of plaintiff by virtue of said case. (Exh. 31-A and 30-A.
So it is now clear that the land of plaintiff is west of
the land of Hermenegildo Gaviola (now Segundo Gaviola), and that they
are two distinct and separate lands.
Indeed, that the lands of plaintiff, of Elias Gaviola (father of defendant
Alfonso), and of defendant Segundo Gaviola (now, but Hermenegildo Gaviola
before) are separate and distinct from each other is shown by the fact that they
have been covered by different sets of tax declarations since as early as 1906. It
should be noted that the tax declarations that cover each land do not merge with,
overlap, or cancel, each other. There appear apparent minor discrepancies but they
can easily be explained by two events: the sale of a portion of the land of Isabela
Mejarito to Elias Gaviola and the decision in Civil Case No. 111. If these two
events are considered, these apparent discrepancies vanish into thin air.
Finally, that these three parcels of lands are separate and distinct from
each other is confirmed by the cadastral survey where the lands of plaintiff, of
Elias Gaviola and of Segundo Gaviola, are denominated as Cadastral Lot Nos.
1301, 1311 and 1303, respectively. Not only that, their definite locations and
boundaries are even delineated in the sketch prepared by the court-appointed
commissioner, which sketch is now marked as Exhs. H and series, of
plaintiff. Also, the report to which the sketch is attached even states that the house
of defendant Alfonso Gaviola is located on the land of Elias Gaviola; and while
said report enumerates the houses located on the land of plaintiff, neither the
house of defendant Alfonso Gaviola nor of defendant Segundo Gaviola nor of the
other defendants are among those mentioned therein.[28]

Moreover, petitioners land is residential, while that of the private

complainant is coconut land. There are no coconut trees in the lot owned by
petitioner, nor is there evidence that he planted coconut trees on private
complainants property at any time, believing that it was his own land. Petitioner
could thus not have mistaken the property of the private complainant for that of his
own.
We further note that petitioner failed to adduce evidence to corroborate his
claim that, prior to September 6, 1997, he had gathered coconuts from the coconut
trees on the private complainants property three times a year, and that the latter or
his caretaker was aware thereof but failed to remonstrate.
In United States v. Villacorta,[29] the Court debunked the claim of the
appellant therein that he should not be held criminally liable for theft (larceny) for
honestly believing that he owned the land from which he took the paddy. That case
is on all fours with the present case, in that there was also a court ruling declaring
the private complainant therein as the owner of the land on which the paddy grew.
The Court therein ratiocinated as follows:
The attorney for the appellant in this court attempts to show that the
defendant could not be guilty of larceny, even though it be admitted that he took
and carried away the paddy in question, for the reason that he claimed to be the
owner of the land. That question had been decided against him by a court of
competent jurisdiction and he made no objection to said decision. After that
decision he could no longer claim that he was the owner of the land from which

he took and carried away the paddy, and moreover, it was shown during the trial
of the cause that Domingo Corpus, by his laborers, had actually planted the paddy
upon the land in question. It is difficult to understand upon what theory the
defendant could justify his claim that he was the owner of the paddy, after a final
decision had been rendered against him to the contrary, and when it was clearly
proven that he had not even planted it. The paddy had been planted by Domingo
Corpus upon land which a court of competent jurisdiction decided belonged to
him and had been harvested by him and piled upon the land at the time the
defendant entered the land and took and carried it away. The defendant neither
planted the paddy nor reaped it. The court decided, before he took and carried
away the paddy, that the land belonged to Domingo Corpus. The defendant must
have known that the paddy did not belong to him. In view of the litigation, he
must have known to whom it did belong.[30]

In fine, we find and so hold that the petitioners claim of good faith in taking
the coconuts from the private complainants land is a mere pretense to escape
criminal liability.
We rule that there is factual and legal bases for the award of P20,000.00 by
way of exemplary damages. Under Article 2230[31] of the New Civil Code,
exemplary damages may be awarded when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances. In this case, the petitioner is guilty not only of
simple theft but of qualified theft.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

Chapter Three
THEFT
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latters consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or
to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make
use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which
belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall
gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen
is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen
exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of
the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances
enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not
exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five preceding
subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing
stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or
the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or

large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a
fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
erruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (As amended by R.A. 120
and B.P. Blg. 71. May 1, 1980).
Art. 311. Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum. If the property stolen
be any property of the National Library or the National Museum, the penalty shall be arresto mayor
or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos, or both, unless a higher penalty should be provided under
other provisions of this Code, in which case, the offender shall be punished by such higher penalty.