FSLRC Executive Summary 17-32

Government of India
___________________________________________
Report of the
Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission
Volume I: Analysis and Recommendations
March 2013
FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

New Delhi
22 March, 2013
Shri P. Chidambaram
Finance Minister
Government of India
New Delhi 110001
Dear Finance Minister,
The FSLRC presents its Report to the Government of India. The Report is in two parts: Volume I
text of the findings and recommendations and Volume II basic framework of a draft law.
The Commission did not release the Report in public domain since the mandate was to submit it
to the Government. However, given the high level of stake-holder interest on the subject and the need
for transparency, the Government may release the Report at the earliest.
Yours sincerely
B N Srikrishna
Chairman
M Govinda Rao*
Member
Dhirendra Swarup
Member Convener
Jayanth Varma
Member
P J Nayak
Member
Yezdi H Malegam
Member
K J Udeshi
Member
C K G Nair
Secretary
*Appointed Member of the 14th Finance Commission with effect from 04 February,
2013. Three Members of the FSLRC could not sign the Report. Shri C. Achuthan passed
away on 19th September, 2011; Justice Debi Prasad Pal is seriously ill and Joint Secretary,
Capital Markets (Nominee Member) could not attend the meetings due to other commitments.
Contents
Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
Introduction
1.1 FSLRC and its Mandate . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 Deliberations in the Commission . . . . . .
1.3 Interaction with experts and stake-holders
1.4 Working Group Process . . . . . . . . . . .
1.5 Analysis and assessment . . . . . . . . . .
v
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xiii
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1
1
2
2
4
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2 The tasks of financial law

2.1 Shifting away from a sectoral perspective
2.2 Adopting a principles-based approach . .
2.3 Approach to drafting . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4 Financial regulatory governance . . . . .
2.5 Ownership neutrality and competition . .
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11
12
13
14
15
17
3 Structure of the regulator

3.1 Selection of the regulators board . . . .
3.2 Composition of the board of the regulator
3.3 Functioning of the board . . . . . . . . .
3.4 Advisory councils of the regulator . . . .
3.5 Resource allocation of the regulator . . .
3.6 Performance assessment and reporting .
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21
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25
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4 Functions and powers of the regulator

4.1 Issuing regulations and guidelines . . .
4.2 Executive functions . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3 Administrative law and role of tribunals
4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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29
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37
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43
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48
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5 Consumer protection
5.1 Strategic picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2 Scope of the law . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3 Objectives and principles . . . . . . . . . .
5.4 Protections for all consumers . . . . . . .
5.5 Additional protections for retail consumers
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CONTENTS
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.9
Functions and powers of the regulator . .

Advisory council on consumer protection
Financial redress agency . . . . . . . . .
Competition law and policy . . . . . . .
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49
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50
53
6 Micro-prudential regulation
6.1 Rationale for micro-prudential regulation . . . . .
6.2 A non-sector-specific micro-prudential framework
6.3 Scope of micro-prudential regulation . . . . . . .
6.4 Powers of micro-prudential regulation . . . . . . .
6.5 Principles to guide the use of powers . . . . . . .
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55
55
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59
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7 Resolution
7.1 The problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.2 An effective resolution framework . . .
7.3 Objectives of the resolution corporation
7.4 Interaction between agencies . . . . .
7.5 Powers of the resolution corporation .
7.6 Resolution tools . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.7 Fund for compensation and resolution
7.8 Consequences of resolution . . . . . .
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69
69
70
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72
73
74
78
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8 Capital controls
8.1 Objectives of capital controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2 Current framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.3 Proposed framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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82
83
9 Systemic risk
9.1 The problem of systemic risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.2 Objectives and principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.3 Institutional arrangement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.4 The five elements of the systemic risk regulation process
9.5 Constructing and analysing a system-wide database . .
9.6 Identification of systemically important firms . . . . . .
9.7 System-wide measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.8 Inter-regulatory agency co-ordination . . . . . . . . . .
9.9 Crisis management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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97
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10 Financial inclusion and market development

99
10.1 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
10.2 Institutional architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
10.3 Principles that guide the use of measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
11 Monetary policy
11.1 Objective of monetary policy . .
11.2 Powers of the central bank . . .
11.3 The monetary policy process . .
11.4 The monetary policy committee
11.5 Accountability . . . . . . . . . .
11.6 Institutional structure . . . . . .
11.7 Temporary Liquidity Assistance
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103
104
104
105
106
107
107
108
CONTENTS
12 Public debt management

12.1 An independent public debt management agency . . . . . . . .
12.2 Structure of the public debt management agency . . . . . . . . .
12.3 Objectives and functions of the public debt management agency
12.4 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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111
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. 112
. 114
. 118
13 Foundations of contracts and property

13.1 The interaction of financial laws with other laws
13.2 Principles relating to certain contracts . . . . . .
13.3 Infrastructure Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13.4 Regulatory issues of Infrastructure Institutions .
13.5 Special provisions for Infrastructure Institutions .
13.6 Public issue and trade of securities . . . . . . . .
13.7 Market abuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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14 Financial regulatory architecture

14.1 Financial regulatory architecture as a distinct feature of financial law
14.2 Problems of the present arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14.3 Considerations that guide alternative architecture choices . . . . . .
14.4 A financial regulatory architecture suited for Indian conditions . . . .
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131
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. 132
. 132
. 133
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15 Transition issues
137
16 Summary of recommendations not embedded in the draft Code

16.1 Ownership neutrality and competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16.2 Parliamentary review of subordinate legislation . . . . . . . . .
16.3 Recommendations of Working Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16.4 Cross-border resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16.5 Systemic risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16.6 Transition issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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17 Conclusion
18 Notes of dissent
18.1 Note of dissent by J.R. Varma . .
18.2 Note of dissent by K.J. Udeshi .
18.3 Note of dissent by P.J. Nayak . .
18.4 Note of dissent by Y.H. Malegam
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128
141
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19 Annexes
19.1 Formation of the FSLRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19.2 List of consultants, researchers and other officials who assisted the Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19.3 List of invitees for interaction with FSLRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19.4 Issues for discussion with experts and stake-holders . . . . . . . . . . .
19.5 Interactions with authorities overseas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19.6 Working Group on insurance, retirement financing, and small savings . .
19.7 Working Group on payments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19.8 Working Group on securities
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19.9 Debt Management Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19.10 Working Group on banking
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19.11 Interactions by the Working Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19.12 External Reviewers and Experts who worked with the Research Team . .
19.13 Submissions to FSLRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
147
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160
162
163
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176
180
182
193
194
195
iii
Acronyms
AAA
ARC
ASIC
BOD
BOM
BSM
CAG
CCI
CCP
CEA
CEO
CERC
CERSAI
CFSA
CFTC
CFT
CPC
CRR
DEA
DICGC
DOP
DRAT
DRT
EPFO
EPF
ESIC
FATF
FCA
FDI
FDMC
FHC
FII
FMC
FMI
FRA
Aid, Accounts and Audits Division

Asset Reconstruction Company
Australian Securities and Investment Commission
Board of Directors
Board of Management
Bank Subsidiary Model
Comptroller and Auditor General of India
Competition Commission of India
Central Counter Party
Chief Economic Advisor
Chief Executive Officer
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
Central Registry of Securitisation Asset Reconstruction and Security
Interest of India
Committee on Financial Sector Assessment
Commodities Futures Trading Commission
Combating the Financing of Terrorism
Code for Civil Procedure, 1908
Cash Reserve Ratio
Department of Economic Affairs
Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation of India
Department of Post
Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal
Debt Recovery Tribunal
Employees Provident Fund Organisation
Employees Provident Fund
Employees State Insurance Corporation
Financial Action Task Force
Financial Conduct Authority
Foreign Direct Investment
Financial Data Management Centre
Financial Holding Company
Foreign Institutional Investor
Forward Markets Commission
Financial Market Intermediary
Financial Redress Agency
ACRONYMS
FSAT
FSA
FSDC
FSLRC
FVCI
GDP
GIC
GOI
HR
IBA
IMF
IRA
IRA
IRDA
KYC
LIC
MCA
MD
MPC
NABARD
NBFC
NCDRC
NHB
NOHC
NPA
NPS
NSSF
OTC
PDMA
PFRDA
PPF
PSB
PSU
QFI
QIB
RBI
RDDBFI
ROC
RRB
RTI
SARFAESI
SAT
SBI
SEBI
SEC
SIFI
SLR
SOP
TOR
UCB
vi
Financial Sector Appellate Tribunal

Financial Services Authority
Financial Stability and Development Council
Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission
Foreign Venture Capital Investor
Gross Domestic Product
General Insurnace Council
Government of India
Human Resources
Indian Banks Association
International Monetary Fund
Independent Regulatory Agency
Independent Regulatory Agency
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority
Know Your Customer
Life Insurance Corporation
Ministry of Company Affairs, Government of India
Managing Director
Monetary Policy Committee
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
Non-Banking Financial Company
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
National Housing Bank
Non-Operating Holding Company
Non Performing Asset
New Pension System
National Small Savings Fund
Over The Counter
Public Debt Management Agency
Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority
Public Provident Fund
Public Sector Bank
Public Sector Undertaking
Qualified Foreign Investor
Qualified Institutional Buyer
Reserve Bank of India
The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act,
1993
Registrar of Companies
Regional Rural Bank
Right to Information
The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act
Securities Appellate Tribunal
State Bank of India
Securities and Exchange Board of India
US Securities and Exchange Commission
Systemically Important Financial Institution
Statutory Liquidity Ratio
Standard Operating Procedure
Terms of Reference
Urban Cooperative Bank
ACRONYMS
UFA
UIDAI
UK FSMA 2000
UK
ULIP
UPSC
US
WG
WOS
Unified Financial Agency

Unique Identification Authority of India
UK Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000
United Kingdom
Unit Linked Insurance Plan
Union Public Service Commission
United States
Working Group
Wholly Owned Subsidiary
vii
Acknowledgement
When the Ministry of Finance approached me in early 2011 to chair a Commission on

financial sector legislative reforms, I was somewhat daunted by the magnitude of the
task. However, my hesitation disappeared when I saw the mandate of this body and the
list of experts being proposed as its members. The remit of the Commission was on an
extremely important national issue and the proposed members were renowned experts
from an eclectic mix of relevant areas. That diminished my trepidation and imbued me
with the confidence needed to take on the task.
Financial sector reforms affect everyone in the country and beyond, given the growing interface of our economy with the rest of the world. Dozens of legislations enacted
from the 1870s were the foundations of this important catalytic sector. Many of them
were enacted when financial economics was not born and the financial sector was at
its infancy. In the last 100 years financial policies and practices have undergone many
paradigm shifts. But its legal foundations, though amended in piecemeal fashion at
times, remained more or less static with serious fractures visibly harming the system.
These fault lines, once more or less hidden, are now evident openly in the form of lack of
legal clarity on responsibility and powers of regulators, inter-regulatory disputes, regulatorregulated court battles, adventurism of market participants and the growing shadow
banking and shadow financial sector. How do we address the new world of finance with
the institutions and the equipment from a non-financial era? How do we transform the
ossified institutional structures and outdated practices to suit contemporaneous needs?
How do we address the transition? These were some of the questions confronting us.
What complicated our task further was that the established global models were facing
serious crises of confidence as the world economy was passing through one of the most
turbulent periods in its economic-financial history. The revelations and lessons, particularly on regulatory models, emanating from the global financial crisis were intimidating
even to high profile experts in the domain.
Given the nation as the stake-holder base of the Commissions mandate, it was felt
imperative that we approach the issue with an open mind. Several expert committee reports were readily available to the Commission as a first step in helping our inquiry. We
acknowledge our intellectual indebtedness to the reports of the committees chaired by
M. Narasimham, R.H. Patil, Percy Mistry, Raghuram Rajan, D. Swarup, U.K. Sinha, among
others. In addition, the Commission, after a few rounds of internal deliberations, sought
the views of many more experts and major stake-holders. The Commission is grateful to
all of them who gracefully accepted our invite and frankly shared their views without being coloured by their institutional affiliations. While the full list is annexed to this Report,
I would particularly recall some of them. They include Dr. Shankar Acharya, Dr. Bimal
Jalan, Mr. Deepak Parekh, Dr. Vijay Kelkar, Dr. Raghuram Rajan, Dr. Percy Mistry, Dr. Viral
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Acharya, Dr. Avinash Persaud, the FSDC Sub-Committee [Dr. D. Subbarao, Prof. Kaushik
Basu, Mr. U.K. Sinha, Mr. Hari Narayan and Mr. Yogesh Agarwal], Mr. Ashok Chawla, Mr. R.
Gopalan, Mr. Rajiv Agarwal, Forward Markets Commission, among others. I also acknowledge the inputs provided by various industry associations such as FICCI, ASSOCHAM, and
IBA.
The Working Groups which were set up by the Commission to delve deeper into
sector-specific issues on banking, securities, public debt management, payments, insurance, pensions & small savings, carried the consultation/interaction process further.
The inputs provided by those experts also were invaluable. Each working group report,
chaired by a Member of the FSLRC with domain experts as Members, became a valuable
addition to the resource base of this Report. We appreciate the efforts of all in these
Working Groups.
I also acknowledge with great satisfaction the interactions we had with regulators,
policy makers and other experts in select jurisdictions Australia, Singapore, UK and
Canada. I am also grateful to Mr. Bill Shorten, Minister for Superannuation and Financial Services, Australia, the Indo-US Business Council, City of London and the US Federal
Reserve team who met with the Commission and shared their valuable thoughts. The
support of Mr. Matt Crooke, Ms. Eva George, Mr. Gideon Lundholm and others who helped
in organising these meetings is also appreciated.
Based on the broad contours of the framework emerging from our interactions, research and deliberations the Commission released an Approach Paper in October 2012.
We received a number of suggestions which were further deliberated upon and some of
them suitably incorporated in this final Report. The feedbacks were particularly helpful in
strengthening the internal consistency of the recommendations. We are grateful to those
who gave their views, particularly Dr. C. Rangarajan, the RBI, Department of Consumer
Affairs and several other experts.
The Commission could embark on its task soon after its Notification in March, 2011,
because of the timely logistical support provided by SEBI, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP), and National Institute of Securities Market (NISM). I value the
support provided by these organisations which helped the Commission to focus its efforts on its main task from the early days.
The task of the Commission has been quite onerous, but in discharging it every Member of the Commission lived upto his/her name and contributed substantively in shaping this Report. I appreciate and acknowledge the contribution of each Member of the
Commission and recall the insightful and animated deliberations in our meetings and
through electronic communications. I appreciate the additional responsibility willingly
discharged by Mr. Swarup as a mentor and advisor on organisational and critical technical issues. The role played by Dr. C.K.G. Nair, Secretary to the Commission, in designing and executing the structures and processes for the seamless functioning of the
Commission and his effective interventions in the deliberations in resolving complex issues was exemplary and deserves particular commendation. The untimely demise of Mr.
Achuthan was a great loss to all of us. We were handicapped by the poor health of Justice
(Dr.) Debi Prasad Pal during the latter half of our work. Dr. M. Govinda Rao, who was with
the FSLRC almost till finalising the Report joined the Fourteenth Finance Commission on
4th February 2013. Joint Secretary, Capital Markets (Nominee Member) could not attend
the meetings due to other commitments.
The Commission had the benefit of dedicated research teams set up by the NIPFP
and by the NISM. These teams worked as a single unit and Dr. Ajay Shah played the role
of an inspirational leader to the research teams, synchronising the various young minds
and their outputs into an organic whole and succinctly presenting issues before the Commission. I commend the efforts of Dr. Shah, Dr. Ila Patnaik and every other member of
this spirited group of young people who worked untiringly for about two years. I also
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
appreciate the efforts of the consultants of the Commission; Somasekhar Sundaresan,

Bobby Parikh and Rajsekhar Rao in guiding the research team on many issues as well as
contributing to the deliberations of the Commission.
A number of experts peer-reviewed the draft documents. K.P. Krishnan, Yesha Yadav,
M.S. Sahoo, Bindu Ananth and many others provided extensive support in reviewing the
drafts. I appreciate their help and useful suggestions.
Financial sector being a catalyst for the real sector growth has to be dynamic enough
to support the growth aspirations. The institutional framework laws, policies and organisations governing the financial sector should enable its orderly growth in tune with
such aspirations. A status-quo framework of a low level, fragmented financial sector supporting the current modest economic size of our nation is incapable and insufficient to
perform this aspirational role which our economic institutions should play for our future.
Further, such a framework encourages the growth of twilight zones like shadow banking
and other shadow financial entities leading to major issues of consumer protection and
systemic risk. Given this, the Commission was fully convinced of the need for disbanding
the sectoral thinking and incumbent organisational affiliations while designing a new institutional foundation for the aspiring, future Indian economy.
The findings and recommendations of the Commission are the result of distilled wisdom of dozens of high-calibre minds and extensive research on the financial sector laws,
policies and practices in India and some of the major jurisdictions abroad, the latter
mainly for focusing on post-crisis developments. Using these expert views, feedbacks,
research material and the expertise in the Commission, we debated and deliberated on
the most appropriate model for India taking the ground realities of the Indian system on
board. After all the model we build should be country-specific, tailored to our milieu; laws
cannot be formulated without a model, in the vacuum or in a fluid state. We were conscious of the fact that we were attempting something on a magnitude with perhaps no
parallel in independent India and legislative changes on a holistic scale are not a regular activity we can undertake. As such, our effort has been futuristic and expected to be
sustaining for decades, as institutional changes happen only in a matter of decades as
famously stated by Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson.
The suggested full-scale legislative reforms may look ambitious. The Commission
debated this issue at length and, despite many organisation-affiliated views, was fully
convinced that a full-scale revamp was needed as piecemeal amendments to the existing legislations were grossly inadequate for a rapidly growing and fast globalising Indian
financial sector. It was also clear to us that the foundations of modern financial legalregulatory structures should be erected during peaceful times rather than wait for a crisis
to unfold and then embark on a fire-fighting mode of institution building, which would
be muddled and fragile. The need for streamlining the laws and reducing the number of
regulatory authorities and giving them clear mandate was a common train of thought of
all the experts we consulted.
In brief, this Report is the result of enormous efforts put in by the Commission Members, Secretary, Consultants and Researchers and the intellectual inputs drawn from a
large number of experts and stake-holders. I gratefully appreciate and acknowledge all
these inputs and support, without which we would have had to settle for sub-optimal
outcomes.
New Delhi
22 March, 2013
B.N. Srikrishna
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Executive Summary
Mandate
The Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission was constituted by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, in March, 2011. The setting up of the Commission was
the result of a felt need that the legal and institutional structures of the financial sector
in India need to be reviewed and recast in tune with the contemporary requirements of
the sector.
The institutional framework governing the financial sector has been built up over a
century. There are over 60 Acts and multiple rules and regulations that govern the financial sector. Many of the financial sector laws date back several decades, when the
financial landscape was very different from that seen today. For example, the Reserve
Bank of India (RBI) Act and the Insurance Act are of 1934 and 1938 vintage respectively.
Financial economic governance has been modified in a piecemeal fashion from time to
time, without substantial changes to the underlying foundations. Over the years, as the
economy and the financial system have grown in size and sophistication, an increasing
gap has come about between the requirements of the country and the present legal and
regulatory arrangements.
Unintended consequences include regulatory gaps, overlaps, inconsistencies and
regulatory arbitrage. The fragmented regulatory architecture has led to a loss of scale
and scope that could be available from a seamless financial market with all its attendant benefits of minimising the intermediation cost. A number of expert committees have
pointed out these discrepancies, and recommended the need for revisiting the financial
sector legislations to rectify them. These reports help us understand the economic and
financial policy transformation that is required. They have defined the policy framework
within which reform of financial law can commence.
The remit of the Commission is to comprehensively review and redraft the legislations governing Indias financial system, in order to evolve a common set of principles for
governance of financial sector regulatory institutions. This is similar to the tradition of
Law Commissions in India, which review legislation and propose modifications.
The main outcome of the Commissions work is a draft Indian Financial Code which
is non-sectoral in nature (referred to as the draft Code throughout), which is in Volume II
of the report and replaces the bulk of the existing financial law.
Work process of the Commission

The Commission took a comprehensive, first principles approach to the task, rooting its
analysis and decisions in a conceptual analysis of financial regulation and review of expeFINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION
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rience till date. Some elements of the work process that are used in India in Law Commissions were utilised. The Commission embarked upon an intense two year process, which
started in April 2011. Three elements were emphasised in the work process. Commission has followed a consultative approach, reaching out into knowledge and perspective
across all elements of Indian finance. Commission has cultivated a multi-disciplinary approach, drawing on the fields of public economics, law, finance, macroeconomics and
public administration. Finally, Commission has drawn on the experiences of emerging
markets and developed jurisdictions in understanding how financial law and agencies
have been constructed worldwide.
The drafting of law in a democracy must necessarily give opportunities for all viewpoints to be heard. In addition, the drafting of law in finance involves considerable technical challenges. Over this two year period, more than 120 individuals participated in the
process of the Commission in various capacities. This has helped ensure that diverse
viewpoints fed into the debates of the Commission, and that the draft Code is characterised by technical soundness in terms of finance, economics, law, and public administration.
The tasks of financial law

The first set of questions that the Commission dealt with was about the purpose of the
financial legal framework. Regulation is not an end in itself; it exists in order to address
market failures. From this point of view, nine components were envisioned:
1. Consumer protection The Commission found that a mere buyer beware approach
is not adequate in finance; regulators must place the burden upon financial firms
of doing more in the pursuit of consumer protection. This perspective shapes interventions aimed at prevention (of inducing financial firms towards fair play) and
cure (redress of grievances).
2. Micro-prudential regulation When financial firms make promises to consumers,
e.g. the repayment of a bank deposit, regulators are required to monitor the failure
probability of the financial firm, and undertake interventions that reduce this failure
probability.
3. Resolution Micro-prudential regulation will diminish, but not eliminate, the failure
of financial firms. A specialised resolution capability is required, which swiftly and
efficiently winds down stressed financial firms, and protects the interests of small
customers.
4. Capital controls These are restrictions on cross-border activity on the capital account. The Commission has no view on the sequencing and timing of capital account liberalisation. The work of the Commission in this field was focused on placing the formulation and implementation of capital controls on a sound footing in
terms of public administration and law.
5. Systemic risk Micro-prudential regulation thinks about the collapse of one financial firm at a time. A very different point of view is required when thinking of the collapse of the entire financial system. Micro-prudential regulation is about the trees,
and systemic risk regulation is about the forest. It calls for measurement of systemic risk, and undertaking interventions at the scale of the entire financial system
(and not just one sector) that diminish systemic risk.
6. Development and redistribution Financial economic governance in India is charged
with the development of market infrastructure and processes, and with redistribution. These objectives have to be achieved through sound principles of public
administration and law.
7. Monetary policy Objectives, powers and accountability mechanisms have to be
setup for monetary policy.
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8. Public debt management A specialised framework on public debt management

has to be setup that takes a comprehensive view of the liabilities of Government,
and establishes the strategy for low-cost financing in the long run.
9. Contracts, trading and market abuse Certain adaptations to the foundations of
commercial law, surrounding contracts and property, are required to enable the
financial system. Alongside this, the legal foundations for the securities markets
are established.
The overall task of constructing financial law comprises the above nine elements,
and of establishing sound foundations of regulatory governance.
This problem statement differs considerably from approach taken by existing laws
in India, which are sector-specific. The existing laws deal with sectors such as banking,
securities and payments. The Commission analysed this issue at length, and concluded
that non-sectoral laws constitute a superior strategy.
As an example, a non-sectoral consumer protection law would lead to harmonisation
of the consumer protection across multiple sectors. If this approach were not taken, there
is the possibility of a certain sector having more lax standards of consumer protection
than another. Profit-seeking financial firms would rush to exploit the profit opportunities,
and distort the structure of the financial system.
In similar fashion, a non-sectoral micro-prudential law would ensure that similar reasoning about risk is applied all across the financial system. If micro-prudential regulation is done differently in different sectors, then profit-seeking financial firms will have
an incentive to portray activities as belonging to sectors where capital requirements are
weaker.
Non-sectoral laws are closely related to the idea of principles-based law. The draft
Code is non-sectoral principles-based law. Regulators will issue regulations, that will often be sectoral and often be rules-based. The advantage of this arrangement is that specific details of technology and market process are not embedded in the law. Over the
years, changes in technology and institutions would lead to modifications in regulations.
Timeless principles would be re-interpreted in the future by courts and the tribunal, which
would create case law. The Commission believes that the draft Code will, with no more
than minor modifications, represent the essence of financial law for many decades to
come. In this respect, the work of the Commission has taken Indian financial law closer
to its roots in the common law tradition.
At present, financial law in India is fairly complex. The drafting style used in most
current laws is relatively complex and thus unreadable to non-specialists. The Commission has tried to achieve a simple writing style for the draft Code. The unification of many
laws into a single draft Code has greatly assisted simplification. A single set of definitions
of terms is utilised across all 450 sections of the law. The entire draft Code is internally
consistent, and has a simple and logical table of contents. This emphasis on simplicity
would reduce the complexity faced by law-makers, bureaucrats, legal professionals and
finance practitioners in understanding the law and working within it.
The first task of financial law is to establish a clear strategy for the nine areas listed
above. The second task of financial law is to establish financial regulators.
In a liberal democracy, the separation of powers doctrine encourages a separation
between the legislative, executive and judicial functions. Financial regulators are unique
in the extent to which all three functions are placed in a single agency. This concentration
of power needs to go along with strong accountability mechanisms.
There is a strong case for independence of regulators. Independent regulators would
yield greater legal certainty. The quest for independence of the regulator requires two
planks of work. On one hand, independence needs to be enshrined in the law, by setting
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out many processes in great detail in the law. On the other hand, alongside independence
there is a requirement of accountability mechanisms.
The Commission has adopted five pathways to accountability. First, the processes
that the regulator must adhere to have been written down in considerable detail in the
draft Code. Second, the regulation-making process (where Parliament has delegated lawmaking power to regulators) has been established in the draft Code with great care, with
elaborate checks and balances. Third, systems of supervision have been established in
the draft Code with a great emphasis on the rule of law. Fourth, strong reporting mechanisms have been established in the draft Code so as to achieve accountability. Finally, a
mechanism for judicial review has been established for all actions of regulators through
a specialised Tribunal.
At present, laws and regulations in India often differentiate between different ownership or corporate structures of financial firms. The Commission has pursued a strategy of ownership-neutrality: the regulatory and supervisory treatment of a financial firm
would be the same, regardless of whether it is private India, foreign, public sector and
co-operative. This would yield a level playing field.
At present, many public sector financial firms (e.g. Life Insurance Corporation of India
(LIC), State Bank of India (SBI)) are rooted in a specific law. The Commission recommends
that they be converted into companies under the Companies Act, 1956. This would help
enable ownership-neutrality in regulation and supervision. This recommendation is not
embedded in the draft Code.
A related concern arises with co-operatives which fall within the purview of state Governments. The Commission recommends that State Governments should accept the authority of Parliament (under Article 252 of the Constitution) to legislate on matters relating
to the regulation and supervision of co-operative societies carrying on financial services.
This recommendation is also not included in the draft Code. The Commission proposes
that regulators may impose restrictions on the carrying on of specified financial services
by co-operative societies belonging to States which have not accepted the authority of
Parliament to legislate on the regulation of co-operative societies carrying on financial
services.
The footprint of regulation

As a first step in determining the appropriate form and extent of regulation for the Indian financial sector, the Commission began with an identification of the basic subject
matter of regulation - financial products and services. In the view of the Commission,
particular forms of dealings in financial products, such as securities, insurance contracts,
deposits and credit arrangements, constitute the rendering of financial services. This includes services such as, sale of securities, acceptance of public deposits, operating investment schemes and providing credit facilities. The Commission however recognises
that a principles-based approach to defining financial products and financial services
comes with the risk of unintentionally casting the net of regulation too wide. Therefore,
it was decided that financial regulation should apply to only those persons who are engaged in the business of carrying on financial services.
While proposing a list of financial products and services in the draft Code, the Commission is fully aware of the constant innovation in the field of finance. In order to ensure
that the law can keep pace with these changes, the draft Code empowers the Government
to expand the list of financial products and services, as required. At the same time, the
draft Code also allows the regulators to exclude specific financial services carried out by
specific categories of persons from the scope of financial services. Using this power the
regulator will be able to specify exemptions, e.g. for hedge funds that do not access funds
from more than a particular number of persons or investment firms that only advise their
related persons. In doing so, the regulator would of course be bound by the objectives
and guided by the principles set out under the draft Code.
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Structure of the regulator

Just as the draft Code does not differentiate between different sectors in the financial system, the draft Code establishes a single framework for regulatory governance across all
agencies. This is rooted in the fact that the requirements of independence and accountability are the same across the financial system. With small adaptations, this standard
framework is used in the draft Code for all agencies created therein.
The draft Code creates a series of obligations for the Government and for regulators.
The draft Code covers all functions of regulators, and defines the behaviour that is required from the regulator.
All regulators will have an empowered board. The Commission has drafted a precise
selection-cum-search process for the appointment of all members. Four kinds of members are envisioned: the chairperson, executive members including an administrative law
member, non-executive members and Government nominees. The role of each of these
kinds of members has been defined. The appointment conditions for board members
have been defined.
The draft Code establishes certain elements of the functioning of board meetings, so
as to ensure adequate oversight of the board over the organisation, and an emphasis on
transparency.
A general framework for establishing advisory councils, that will support the board,
has been created. This is sometimes invoked in the draft Code in constructing statutory
advisory councils. Apart from this, the board will be free to construct additional advisory
councils based on its needs.
The Commission envisages that fees charged to the financial system will fund all regulatory agencies. Financial regulation will, therefore, generally impose no burden upon
the exchequer. This will assist independence by giving regulators greater autonomy, and
help the creation of a specialised workforce.
Functions and powers of the regulator

The actual functioning of the regulator lies in three areas: regulation-making, executive
functions and administrative law functions. In each area, the draft Code defines the functioning of regulators with considerable specificity.
At present, in India, there is a confusing situation with regulators utilising many instruments such as regulations, guidelines, circulars, letters, notices and press releases.
The draft Code requires all regulators to operate through a small number of well defined
instruments only.
The first task of a regulator is that of issuing regulations. If laws are poorly drafted,
there is a possibility of excessive delegation by Parliament, where a regulatory agency is
given sweeping powers to draft regulations. The Commission has consistently sought to
define specific objectives, define specific powers and articulate principles that guide the
use of powers. Through this, regulation-making at the regulator would not take place in
a vacuum.
A structured process has been defined in the draft Code, through which regulationmaking would take place. The regulator would be required to articulate the objective
of the regulation, a statement of the problem or market failure that the regulation seeks
to address, and analyse the costs and benefits associated with the proposed regulation.
A systematic public consultation process is written into the draft Code. This structured
regulation-making process would reduce arbitrariness and help improve the quality of
regulations.
This structured regulation-making process requires a considerable expenditure of
time and effort at the regulator. This is commensurate with the remarkable fact that Parliament has delegated law-making power to a regulator. In an emergency, the regulator
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can issue regulations without going through the full regulation-making process. However,
these regulations would lapse within six months.
Alongside regulations, the draft Code envisages a process through which regulators can issue guidelines. Guidelines clarify the interpretation of regulations but do not,
themselves, constitute regulations. Specifically, violation of guidelines alone would not
constitute violation of the law.
At present, regulations are not subject to judicial review. The Commission envisages
an important process of judicial review of regulations. It would be possible to challenge
regulations either on process issues (i.e. the full regulation-making process was not followed) or substantive content (i.e. the regulation does not pursue the objectives, or exceeds the powers, or violates the principles, that are in the Act). The Commission believes
that these checks and balances will yield considerable improvements in the quality of
regulation-making in India.
Turning to executive functions, the draft Code has specifics about each element of the
executive powers. The first stage is the processing of permissions. A systematic process
has been laid down through which permissions would be given.
The second element is information gathering. Regulators require a substantial scale
of regular information flow from financial firms. The Commission envisages a single Financial Data Management Centre. All financial firms will submit regular information filings electronically to this single facility. This would reduce the cost of compliance, and
help improve data management within regulators.
Turning to penalties, the draft Code has a systematic approach where certain standard categories are defined, and principles guide the application of penalties. This would
help induce greater consistency, and help produce greater deterrence. A critical component of the framework for penalties is the mechanisms for compounding, which are laid
on a sound foundation, and consistently applied across the entire financial system.
Once an investigation has taken place, and the supervisory team within a regulator
believes there have been violations, the principles of public administration suggest that
the actual order should be written by disinterested party. At the level of the board, an administrative law member would have oversight of administrative law officers who would
not have any responsibilities within the organisation other than performing quasi-judicial
functions. A systematic process would operate within the regulator, where administrative
law officers and the administrative law member would be presented with evidence and
write orders.
The working of the regulator ultimately results in regulations and orders. These
would face judicial review at the Tribunal. The Commission envisages a unified Financial
Sector Appellate Tribunal (FSAT)that would hear all appeals in finance. A considerable
focus has been placed, in the draft Code, on the functioning of the registry of FSAT, so as
to achieve high efficiency.
Consumer protection
The work of the Commission in the field of consumer protection marks a watershed compared with traditional approaches in Indian financial law. It marks a break with the tradition of caveat emptor, and moves towards a position where a significant burden of consumer protection is placed upon financial firms.
The draft Code first establishes certain basic rights for all financial consumers. In
addition, the Code defines what is an unsophisticated consumer, and an additional set
of protections are defined for these consumers. The basic protections are:
1. Financial service providers must act with professional diligence;
2. Protection against unfair contract terms;
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3.
4.
5.
6.
Protection against unfair conduct;

Protection of personal information;
Requirement of fair disclosure;
Redress of complaints by financial service providers.
In addition, unsophisticated consumers have three additional protections:

1. The right to receive suitable advice;
2. Protection from conflicts of interest of advisors;
3. Access to the redress agency for redress of grievances.
The regulator has been given an enumerated set of powers through which it must
implement these protections. Alongside these objectives and powers, the regulator has
been given a set of principles that guide the use of the powers.
This framework of rights powers principles will shape the drafting of regulations.
Once this has been done, regulators are obliged to undertake supervisory actions to verify that regulations are being complied with. This goes along with enforcement and disciplinary actions.
This regulatory and supervisory strategy will yield considerable gains in consumer
protection, when compared with the present Indian practices. At the same time, there
will be certain consumers who are aggrieved. The Commission envisages a single unified Financial Redress Agency (FRA) which would serve any aggrieved consumer, across
all sectors. This would feature a low-cost process through which the complaint of the
consumer against the financial firm would be heard, and remedies awarded.
As with the FSAT considerable effort has been made by the Commission to obtain an
FRA that has high operational capabilities and thus imposes low transactions costs upon
all participants.
The FRA is important as a mechanism for addressing the unfair treatment of one
consumer. The FRA is also envisaged as a valuable measurement system, for the case
database of the FRA is a map that shows where the problems of consumer protection lie.
Hence, the Commission envisages a systematic process through which the analysis of
this data would feed back into improvements in regulation and supervision.
The Commission recognises that competition is a powerful tool for the protection
of consumers. The Competition Act enshrines a non-sectoral approach to competition
policy. The Commission has envisaged a detailed mechanism for better co-operation
between financial regulators and the Competition Commission through which there is
greater harmony in the quest for greater competition.
Micro-prudential regulation
The pursuit of consumer protection logically requires micro-prudential regulation: the
task of constraining the behaviour of financial firms so as to reduce the probability of
failure. When a financial firm makes a promise to a consumer, it should be regulated so
as to achieve a certain high probability that this promise is upheld.
The first component of the draft Code is a definition of the class of situations where
micro-prudential regulation is required. This is done in a principles-based way, focusing on the ability of consumers to understand firm failure, to co-ordinate between themselves, and the consequences of firm failure for consumers.
Regulators have five powers through which they can pursue the micro-prudential
goal: regulation of entry, regulation of risk-taking, regulation of loss absorption, regulation of governance and management, and monitoring/supervision. The draft Code specifies each of these powers in precise legal detail.
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Alongside this, it specifies a set of principles that guide the use of these powers.
Eleven principles have been identified that must be complied with. For example, principles require proportionality (greater restrictions for greater risk), equal treatment (equal
treatment of equal risk), and so on.
It is envisaged that regulators will pursue the micro-prudential objective by writing
regulations that utilise the five powers. At the same time, these regulations would have
to satisfy the ten principles.
In this framework, there may be broadly three grounds for appeal against regulations.
A regulation engages in micro-prudential regulation of an activity where micro-prudential
regulation is not required. A regulation utilises powers which are not prescribed in the
law. Finally, a regulation violates the principles which the regulator is required to follow.
Resolution
The Indian financial system has traditionally been dominated by public sector firms.
When consumers deal with a Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) bank or insurance company, for all practical purposes, they are dealing with the Government, and there is no
perceived possibility of failure. Over the last 20 years, however, India has increasingly
opened up entry into finance, and a new breed of private financial firms has arisen. These
firms can fail, and when this happens, it can be highly disruptive for households who were
customers of the failing firm, and for the economy as a whole.
Sound micro-prudential regulation will reduce the probability of firm failure. However, eliminating all failure is neither feasible nor desirable. Failure of financial firms is an
integral part of the regenerative processes of the market economies: weak firms should
fail and thus free up labour and capital that would then be utilised by better firms. However, it is important to ensure smooth functioning of the economy, and avoid disruptive
firm failure.
This requires a specialised resolution mechanism. A Resolution Corporation would
watch all financial firms which have made intense promises to households, and intervene
when the net worth of the firm is near zero (but not yet negative). It would force the closure
or sale of the financial firm, and protect small consumers either by transferring them to a
solvent firm or by paying them.
At present, for all practical purposes, at present, an unceremonious failure by a large
private financial firm in India is not politically feasible. Lacking a formal resolution corporation, in India, the problems of failing private financial firms are placed upon customers,
tax-payers, and the shareholders of public sector financial firms. This is an unfair arrangement.
Establishing a sophisticated resolution corporation is thus essential. Drawing on the
best international practice, the draft Code envisages a unified resolution corporation that
will deal with an array of financial firms such as banks and insurance companies. It will
concern itself with all financial firms which make highly intense promises to consumers,
such as banks, insurance companies, defined benefit pension funds, and payment systems. It will also take responsibility for the graceful resolution of systemically important
financial firms, even if they have no direct links to consumers.
A key feature of the resolution corporation will be speed of action. It must stop a financial firm while the firm is not yet bankrupt. The international experience has shown
that delays in resolution almost always lead to a situation where the net worth is negative, which would generally impose costs upon the tax-payer. The choice that we face
is between a swift resolution corporation, which will stop financial firms when they are
weak but solvent, and a slow resolution corporation which will make claims upon the
tax-payer. Hence, a sophisticated legal apparatus is being designed, for a resolution corporation that will act swiftly to stop weak financial firms while they are still solvent. The
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resolution corporation will choose between many tools through which the interests of
consumers are protected, including sales, assisted sales and mergers.
It is important to make a clear distinction between micro-prudential regulation and
resolution. Micro-prudential regulation and supervision is a continuous affair. Occasionally, when a firm approaches failure, resolution would come into action, and it would behave very differently from micro-prudential regulation. The resolution corporation would
be analogous to a specialised disaster management agency, which is not involved in everyday matters of governance, but assumes primacy in a special situation. The resolution
corporation will have close co-ordination with micro-prudential regulation. For strong
firms, the resolution corporation will lie in the background. As the firm approaches default, the resolution corporation will assume primacy.
The resolution corporation will charge fees to all covered entities, who benefit from
greater trust of unsophisticated consumers. This fee will vary based on the probability of
failure, and on the financial consequences for the resolution corporation of the event of
failure. This risk-based premium would help improve the pricing of risk in the economy,
and generate incentives for financial firms to be more mindful of risk-taking.
The first three pillars of the work of Commission consumer protection, micro-prudential regulation and resolution are tightly interconnected. All three are motivated by the
goal of consumer protection. Micro-prudential regulation aims to reduce, but not eliminate, the probability of the failure of financial firms. Resolution comes into the picture
when, despite these efforts, financial firms do fail.
Capital controls
India has a fully open current account, but many restrictions on the capital account are
in place. A major debate in the field of economic policy concerns the sequencing and
timing towards capital account convertibility. The Commission has no view on this question. The focus of the Commission has been on establishing sound principles of public
administration and law for capital account restrictions. A large array of the difficulties
with the present arrangements would be addressed by emphasising the rule of law and
by establishing sound principles of public administration.
In terms of creation of rules, it is envisaged that the Ministry of Finance would make
rules that control inbound capital flows (and their repatriation) and that RBI would make
regulations about outbound capital flows (and their repatriation). With RBI, the regulationmaking process would be exactly the same as that used in all regulation-making in the
Commission framework. With Ministry of Finance, the rule-making process would be substantially similar.
The implementation of all capital controls would vest with the RBI. The draft Code
envisages the full operation of the rule of law in this implementation.
Systemic risk
The field of financial regulation was traditionally primarily focused on consumer protection, micro-prudential regulation and resolution. In recent years, a fresh focus on the
third field of systemic risk has arisen. Systemic risk is about a collapse in functioning
of the financial system, through which the real economy gets adversely affected. In the
aftermath of the 2008 crisis, governments and lawmakers worldwide desire regulatory
strategies that would avoid systemic crises and reduce the costs to society and to the
exchequer of resolving systemic crises.
The problem of systemic risk requires a birds eye perspective of the financial system: it requires seeing the woods and not the trees. This is a very different perspective
when compared with the engagement of conventional financial regulation, which tends
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to analyse one consumer, one financial product, one financial market or one financial
firm at a time. The essence of the systemic risk perspective to look at the financial system
as a whole. This differs from the perspective of any one financial regulatory agency, and
particularly divergent from the perspective of any one sectoral regulator which is likely to
see that sector and not the overall financial system.
To some extent, systemic crises are the manifestation of failures on the core tasks of
financial regulation, i.e. consumer protection, micro-prudential regulation and resolution. If the three pillars of financial regulation would work well, many of the crises of the
past, and hypothetical crisis scenarios of the future, would be defused. Systemic risk in India will go down if institutional capacity is built for the problems of consumer protection,
micro-prudential regulation and resolution. However, it will not be eliminated.
First, despite the best intentions, errors of constructing the institutional framework,
and human errors, will take place. Second, even if all three pillars work perfectly, some
systemic crises would not be forestalled. This calls for work in the field of systemic risk,
as a fourth pillar of financial regulation.
While there is a clear case for establishing institutional capacity in these areas, it is
also important to be specific in the drafting of law. Unless systemic risk regulation is envisioned as a precise set of steps that would be performed by Government agencies, there
is the danger that systemic risk law degenerates into vaguely specified sweeping powers
with lack of clarity of objectives.
The Commission deeply analysed the problem of reducing the probability of a breakdown of the financial system. This requires understanding the financial system as a
whole, as opposed to individual sectors or firms, and undertaking actions which reduce
the possibility of a collapse of the financial system. Each financial regulator tends to focus
on regulating and supervising some components of the financial system. With sectoral
regulation, financial regulators sometimes share the worldview of their regulated entities.
What is of essence in the field of systemic risk is avoiding the worldview of any one sector, and understanding the overall financial system. In order to achieve this, Commission
envisages a five-part process.
The first step is the construction and analysis of a system-wide database. This effort,
which will be located at the Financial Stability and Development Council (Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC)), will analyse the entire financial system and not
a subset of it. The discussions at FSDC would communicate the results of this analysis to
all regulators, who would co-operate in proposing and implementing solutions.
The second step is the identification of Systemically Important Financial Institutions
(SIFIs). The analysis of the unified database, using rules which are agreed upon at FSDC,
will be used to make a checklist of SIFIs. These will be subjected to heightened microprudential regulation by their respective supervisors.
The third step is the construction and application of system-wide tools for systemic
risk regulation.
The fourth step is inter-regulatory co-ordination. Effective co-ordination across a
wide array of policy questions is an essential tool for systemic risk reduction.
Finally, the fifth step is crisis management. The Commission envisages the Ministry
of Finance as playing the leadership role in a crisis. Here, FSDC will only play a supporting
role.
Four of the five elements of the systemic risk process involve a leadership role at FSDC.
The Commission envisages that FSDC would be a new statutory agency, in contrast with
its relatively informal existence at present.
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Financial inclusion and market development

The development agenda in Indian financial economic policy comprises two elements:
(i) The development of market infrastructure and processes, and (ii) Redistribution and
financial inclusion initiatives, where certain sectors, income or occupational categories
are the beneficiaries.
The framework proposed by the Commission involves placing the first objective with
regulators and the second with the Government. The draft Code envisages regulators
undertaking initiatives in the first area. For the second area, the Government would issue
notifications in the Gazette, instructing regulators to impose certain requirements upon
stated financial firms. The Government would be obliged to make payments to firms to
reflect the costs borne by them.
The Commission felt that all initiatives of this nature in the pursuit of inclusion or of
development should be subject to systematic evaluation after a period of three years.
Decision making would be improved by a process of articulation of specific goals, followed by an evaluation of the extent to which these goals were met.
Monetary policy
The framework envisaged by the Commission features a strong combination of independence and accountability for RBI in its conduct of monetary policy.
The first stage lies in defining the objective of monetary policy. The Ministry of Finance would put out a Statement defining a quantitative monitorable predominant target. Additional, subsidiary targets could also be specified, which would be pursued when
there are no difficulties in meeting the predominant target.
The draft Code places an array of powers with RBI in the pursuit of this objective. Decisions on the use of these powers would be taken at an executive Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). The MPC would meet regularly, and vote on the exercise of these powers,
based on forecasts about the economy and the extent to which the objectives are likely
to be met.
The MPC would operate under conditions of high transparency, thus ensuring that
the economy at large has a good sense about how the central bank responds to future
events.
Alongside this core monetary policy function, RBI would operate a real time gross settlement system, that would be used by banks and clearing houses. It would also operate
mechanisms for liquidity assistance through which certain financial firms would be able
to obtain credit against collateral.
Public debt management agency

The management of public debt requires a specialised investment banking capability for
two reasons:
1. Debt management requires an integrated picture of all onshore and offshore liabilities of the Government. At present, this information is fragmented across RBI and the Ministry of Finance. Unifying this information, and the related debt management functions, will yield better decisions and
thus improved debt management.
2. A central bank that sells government bonds faces conflicting objectives. When RBI is given the
objective of obtaining low cost financing for the Government, this may give RBI a bias in favour
of low interest rates which could interfere with the goal of price stability.
In its entirety, the problem of debt management for the Government includes the
tasks of cash management and an overall picture of the contingent liabilities of the Government. These functions are integrated into a single agency through the draft Code.
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Contracts, trading and market abuse

The last component of financial law is the set of adaptations of conventional commercial law on questions of contracting and property rights that is required in fields such as
securities and insurance. Statutes as well as case laws have shaped the rules regarding
creation of financial contracts, transfer of rights, title or interest in such contracts and
enforcement of such rights. These developments have largely been sector specific.
The framework of the securities markets requires legal foundations for the issuance
and trading of securities. Issuance of securities requires three kinds of restrictions. At
the time of the issue, adequate information must be available for an investor to make an
informed decision about valuation. Once the trading commences, a continuous flow of
information must be available through which the investor can make informed decisions.
Finally, a set of rules must be in place through which all holders of a given class of securities obtain the identical payoffs. These three objectives would be achieved through
regulations.
Financial markets feature a important role for Infrastructure Institution. The rules
made by these organisations shape the design of financial markets to a substantial extent. The draft Code constrains the behaviour of Infrastructure Institutions in three respects:
1. Infrastructure Institutions are required to issue bye-laws and abide by them;
2. The objectives that these bye-laws must pursue are defined in the law;
3. They are required to obtain approval from the regulator for bye-laws.
The information about prices and liquidity that is produced by financial markets has
a public goods character. The draft Code has provisions that require dissemination of this
information. In addition, the falsification of this information is termed market abuse. The
draft Code defines market abuse and establishes the framework for enforcement against
it.
Financial regulatory architecture

We now turn to the financial regulatory architecture, or the division of the overall work of
financial regulation across a set of regulatory agencies. Many alternative structures can
be envisioned for the financial regulatory architecture. Parliament must evaluate alternative block diagrams through which a suitable group of statutory agencies is handed
out the work associated with the laws. These decisions could conceivably change over
the years.
At present, Indian law features tight connections between a particular agency (e.g.
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)) and the functions that it performs (e.g.
securities regulation). The draft Code does not have such integration. Changes in the
work allocation should not require changes to the underlying laws themselves. From
the outset, and over coming decades, decisions about the legal framework governing
finance would proceed separately from decisions about the financial regulatory architecture. This would yield greater legal certainty, while facilitating rational choices about financial regulatory architecture motivated by considerations in public administration and
public economics.
At present, India has a legacy financial regulatory architecture. The present work
allocation, between RBI, SEBI, Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA),
Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA) and Forward Markets Commission (FMC), was not designed. It evolved over the years, with a sequence of piecemeal
decisions responding to immediate pressures from time to time.
The present arrangement has gaps where no regulator is in charge such as the diverse kinds of ponzi schemes which periodically surface in India, which are regulated by
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
none of the existing agencies. It also contains overlaps where conflicts between laws has
consumed the energy of top economic policy makers.
Over the years, these problems will be exacerbated through technological and financial innovation. Financial firms will harness innovation to place their activities into the
gaps, so as to avoid regulation. When there are overlaps, financial firms will undertake
forum-shopping, where the most lenient regulator is chosen, and portray their activities
as belonging to that favoured jurisdiction.
An approach of multiple sectoral regulators that construct silos induces economic
inefficiency. At present, many activities that naturally sit together in one financial firm are
forcibly spread across multiple financial firms, in order to suit the contours of the Indian
financial regulatory architecture. Financial regulatory architecture should be conducive
to greater economies of scale and scope in the financial system. In addition, when the
true activities a financial firm are split up across many entities, each of which has oversight of a different supervisor, no one supervisor has a full picture of the risks that are
present.
When a regulator focuses on one sector, there are certain unique problems of public
administration which tend to arise. Assisted by lobbying of financial firms, the regulator
tends to share the aspirations of the regulated financial firms. These objectives often
conflict with the core economic goals of financial regulation such as consumer protection
and swift resolution.
In order to analyse alternative proposals in financial regulatory architecture, Commission established the following principles:
Accountability Accountability is best achieved when an agency has a clear purpose.
The traditional Indian notion, that a regulator has powers over a sector but lacks
specific objectives and accountability mechanisms, is an unsatisfactory one.
Conflicts of interest In particular, direct conflicts of interest are harmful for accountability and must be avoided.
A complete picture of firms A financial regulatory architecture that enables a comprehensive view of complex multi-product firms, and thus a full understanding of the
risks that they take, is desirable.
Avoiding sectoral regulators When a financial regulator works on a sector, there is a
possibility of an alignment coming about between the goals of the sector (growth
and profitability) and the goals of the regulator. The regulator then tends to advocate policy directions which are conducive for the growth of its sector. Such problems are less likely to arise when a regulatory agency works towards an economic
purpose such as consumer protection across all or at least many sectors.
Economies of scale in Government agencies In India, there is a paucity of talent and
domain expertise in Government, and constructing a large number of agencies is
relatively difficult from a staffing perspective. It is efficient to place functions that
require correlated skills into a single agency.
Transition issues It is useful to envision a full transition into a set of small and implementable measures.
The Commission proposes a financial regulatory architecture featuring seven agencies. This proposal features seven agencies and is hence not a unified financial regulator
proposal. It features a modest set of changes, which renders it implementable:
1.
2.
3.
4.
The existing RBI will continue to exist, though with modified functions.
The existing SEBI, FMC, IRDA and PFRDA will be merged into a new unified agency.
The existing Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) will be subsumed into the FSAT.
The existing Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation of India (DICGC)
will be subsumed into the Resolution Corporation.
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5. A new Financial Redressal Agency (FRA) will be created.

6. A new Debt Management Office will be created.
7. The existing FSDC will continue to exist, though with modified functions and a statutory framework.
The functions of each of these seven proposed agencies are as follows:
Reserve Bank of India It is proposed that RBI will perform three functions: monetary policy, regulation
and supervision of banking in enforcing the proposed consumer protection law and the proposed
micro-prudential law, and regulation and supervision of payment systems in enforcing these two
laws.
Unified Financial Agency The unified financial regulatory agency would implement the consumer
protection law and micro-prudential law for all financial firms other than banking and payments.
This would yield benefits in terms of economies of scope and scale in the financial system; it
would reduce the identification of the regulatory agency with one sector; it would help address
the difficulties of finding the appropriate talent in Government agencies.
This proposed unified financial regulatory agency would also take over the work on organised
financial trading from RBI in the areas connected with the Bond-Currency-Derivatives Nexus, and
from FMC for commodity futures, thus giving a unification of all organised financial trading including equities, government bonds, currencies, commodity futures and corporate bonds.
The unification of regulation and supervision of financial firms such as mutual funds, insurance
companies, and a diverse array of firms which are not banks or payment providers, would yield
consistent treatment in consumer protection and micro-prudential regulation across all of them.
Financial Sector Appellate Tribunal The present SAT will be subsumed in FSAT, which will hear appeals against RBI for its regulatory functions, the unified financial agency, decisions of the FRA
and some elements of the work of the resolution corporation.
Resolution Corporation The present DICGC will be subsumed into the Resolution Corporation which
will work across the financial system.
Financial Redressal Agency The FRA is a new agency which will have to be created in implementing
this financial regulatory architecture. It will setup a nationwide machinery to become a one stop
shop where consumers can carry complaints against all financial firms.
Public Debt Management Agency An independent debt management office is envisioned.
Financial Stability and Development Council Finally, the existing FSDC will become a statutory agency,
and have modified functions in the fields of systemic risk and development.
The Commission believes that this proposed financial regulatory architecture is a

modest step away from present practice, embeds important improvements, and will
serve India well in coming years.
Over a horizon of five to ten years after the proposed laws come into effect, it would
advocate a fresh look at these questions, with two possible solutions. One possibility is
the construction of a single unified financial regulatory agency, which would combine
all the activities of the proposed Unified Financial Authority and also the work on payments and banking. Another possibility is to shift to a two-agency structure, with one Consumer Protection Agency which enforces the proposed consumer protection law across
the entire financial system and a second Prudential Regulation Agency which enforces
the micro-prudential regulation law across the entire financial system. In either of these
paths, RBI would then concentrate on monetary policy.
These changes in the financial regulatory architecture would be relatively conveniently achieved, given the strategy of emphasising separability between laws which define functions, and the agencies that would enforce the laws. Over the years, based on a
pragmatic assessment of what works and what does not work, the Government and Parliament can evolve the financial regulatory architecture so as to achieve the best possible
enforcement of a stable set of laws.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The outputs of the Commission

The main result of the work of the Commission is the draft Indian Financial Code, a single unified and internally consistent draft law that replaces a large part of the existing
Indian legal framework governing finance. As has been emphasised earlier, the use of
simple English should help ensure that everyone connected with the field would be able
to understand the draft Code. This relatively large draft law which is comprised of 450
sections constitutes Volume II of the report. Volume 1 expresses the arguments that led
up to the key decisions embedded in the draft Code.
The Commission vigorously debated the ideas expressed in the draft Code over a
period of two years, in twenty four full-day meetings. In any law of 450 sections, there
are bound to be certain areas of disagreement. The five areas of disagreement within the
Commission, which are expressed in four dissent notes, are as follows:
1. Authorisation requirements: Prof. Jayanth Varma expresses concerns about the authorisation requirements for financial service providers.
2. Capital controls: Mrs. K. J. Udeshi, Dr. P. J. Nayak and Mr. Y. H. Malegam disagree
with allocation of responsibilities on capital controls between the Ministry of Finance and RBI.
3. The role of the Ministry of Finance: Dr. P. J. Nayak disagrees with the role envisaged
for the Ministry of Finance in draft Code especially the role of the FSDC.
4. Common-law tradition, principles-based law. Dr. P. J. Nayak expresses concerns
about the strategy of the Commission that has favoured a common law, principlesbased approach.
5. Regulation of Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC)s: Mr. Y. H. Malegam disagrees
with the allocation of regulatory responsibilities for NBFCs.
Conclusion
Financial economic policy is implemented by front-line agencies who are assigned functions by Parliament. The main purpose of financial law is to put these agencies on a
sound footing, with the trio of objectives, powers and accountability mechanisms. Commission has focused itself upon this task, of establishing a sound regulatory process.
Most policy debates in the field of finance pertain to the subordinated legislation that
is drafted by financial regulatory agencies. The work of Commission does not directly engage with these debates. As an example, Commission does not have a view on the timing
and sequencing of capital account liberalisation. Similarly, a large number of the recommendations of the Working Groups which studied individual sectors fall in the domain
of modifications to subordinated legislation. The work of Commission is focused on the
incentives in public administration that shape the drafting and implementation of subordinated legislation. As a consequence, while the Commission has fully taken cognisance
of the policy problems analysed by the expert committees of the last five years, and by
its own Working Groups, it does not directly address them.
When the proposals of Commission are enacted by Parliament, they will set in motion a modified set of incentives in public administration. Clear objectives in law, and
a sound regulation-making process, will improve the quality of subordinated legislation
that is issued by regulatory agencies. The emphasis on legal process in the laws drafted
by Commission will induce improved working of the supervisory process. A common consumer protection law will greatly benefit the users of financial services. These elements
will yield a gradual process of change.
The Commission is mindful that over the coming 25 to 30 years, Indian GDP is likely to
become eight times larger than the present level, and is likely to be bigger than the United
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
States GDP as of today. Over these coming years, there will be substantial changes in the
financial system. The technological change, and the financial products and processes
which will come into play, cannot be envisaged today.
The aspiration of the Commission is to draft a body of law that will stand the test
of time. The Commission has hence focused on establishing sound financial regulatory
agencies, which will continually reinterpret principles-based laws in the light of contemporary change, and draft subordinated legislation that serves the needs of the Indian
economy. This subordinated legislation, coupled with the jurisprudence built up at the
FSAT and the Supreme Court, will continually reflect the changing needs of the Indian
economy.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1. FSLRC and its Mandate
The Ministry of Finance, Government of India, constituted the Commission1 vide Resolution dated the 24th March, 2011, with a view to rewriting and cleaning up the financial
sector laws to bring them in tune with the current requirements. The Resolution, detailing the imposition and Terms of Reference (TOR) of the Commission, is in Annex 19.1.
The TOR are quite broad and cover a gamut of issues related to the financial sector in
India. Broadly, the Commission has been tasked with examining and reviewing the legislative and regulatory systems; the inter-play of jurisdictions of various regulators; the
issues relating to conflict of interest of regulators; the manner of drafting and implementation of subordinate legislation; the criteria and terms of appointment of senior officials
in the regulatory authorities and appellate systems of financial sector; clarifying the principles of legislative intent; the issues relating to independence and autonomy of regulators; re-statement and/or repeal of legislations on the basis of liberalisation and other
developments in the last two decades; the issues on data privacy and protection of consumers of financial services; the role of information technology and effectiveness of delivery of financial services; the recommendations made by expert committees in the past;
the issues relating to inter-state aspect of financial services infrastructure and any other
related issues; and evaluating the raison detre of the several laws governing the financial
sector, some of them as old as 140 years. Keeping them in context and fitting them to the
broad framework of the economys future requirements has been a daunting task. The
Commission was given a time-frame of twenty four months to complete this effort.
The Commission was set up at a time when the global economy was recovering from
the 2008 financial crisis. At the time, lessons from what went wrong and the possible options were being debated. These ideas and inputs were freshly available to the Commission. India escaped the crisis fairly unscathed; and therefore, the Commission did not
have to work on regulatory structures and laws in a fire-fighting mode, which is not an
appropriate way of building sustainable institutional structures. The Commission could,
therefore, assimilate the lessons from the crisis, and at the same time, think and construct a model relevant to the Indian context in a calm and detached manner supported
by quality research, extensive deliberations and detailed interaction with a host of experts
and stake-holders.
1 The terms Commission and the Commission are used interchangeably in this report
INTRODUCTION
1.2. Deliberations in the Commission

The Commission followed a multi-pronged approach in completing its task of preparing
this report, as well as in drafting laws. This included: scanning expert committee recommendations; extensive research; deliberations by the Commission; deliberations, in its
five Working Groups (WGs), on specific issues; interaction with several experts and stakeholders from the financial sector, as well as with financial policy makers, experts and regulators of select jurisdictions abroad. A team of consultants, researchers and other officials
assisted the Commission in its task; the list is given in Annex 19.2.
The objective has been to assemble a solid information base relating to the current
state of the economy and the financial sector, the institutional constraints, developments
elsewhere and to make an assessment of what is needed to institutionalise the structure
of the financial sector, in tune with the requirements of a fast growing economy. In its
inquiry, the Commission also tried to understand the reasons for the 2008 financial crisis and the lessons that may be followed for the future India, as her institutions have to
achieve the strength and maturity to withstand possible financial crises in the future.
The Commission had twenty four meetings over a span of two years. During the early
days itself, an approach towards completing its task was designed. It was decided that
the Commission would deliberate on the basic framework and the fundamental principles governing the financial sector and decide the same. Based on this framework and
principles, the WGs would delve deep into select sector-specific issues that require detailed analysis. Based on the deliberations and decisions in the Commission and its WGs,
draft documents would be prepared by the research team and debated further in subsequent meetings.
From the beginning, there had been a consensus that the Indian financial sector has
been operating at a low-level equilibrium, although in this world of small finance, it may
be doing reasonably well, according to established thinking. The Commission learned a
lot from the various expert committee reports already available on the Indian financial
sector. There was also unanimity that the trajectory had to be scaled up from this lowlevel equilibrium so that the financial sector effectively performs its catalytic role for a
new aspiring India, which is expected to reach the size of the 2012 Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of the USA (US$15 trillion) by 2025-30. While India wanted to avoid the path of runaway financial innovation and unmitigated risk-taking that led to the 2008 financial crisis,
which continues to threaten the global economy, there was unanimity that the Indian financial structure needs to grow considerably. To enable this, the institutional structure
needs to be revamped given that supporting laws are obsolete and organisational structures fragmented. In short, a consolidation of the financial sector laws and organisations
was an essential prerequisite for unleashing the potential of the financial sector and in
supporting the vaulting ambitions of the real sector.
1.3. Interaction with experts and stake-holders

Interactions with experts and stake-holders were held in parallel from the third meeting
of the Commission. The list of experts and entities that the Commission invited for interaction is in Annex 19.3. A broad list of issues and questions was given to these experts;
this list is in Annex 19.4. The Commission also interacted with policy makers, experts
and regulatory authorities in select jurisdictions abroad; the list is in Annex 19.5. Ideas
that emerged from these interactions have also been used in calibrating the position
and drawing the broad contours of the stand that the Commission has adopted in its
approach.
The broad themes emerging from these interactions are as follows:
2
INTRODUCTION
1. The legislative foundation of Indias financial sector is too complex and cumbersome. These legislations, of which many are outdated - with occasional, piecemeal
amendment, do not provide a holistic framework for the harmonious development
of the financial sector and its interplay with the needs of the economy. As such,
there is an urgent need for an overhaul of the legislative-regulatory framework of
the financial sector. However, there were different views with regard to the process
of consolidating and harmonising this framework. Some suggested a complete
overhaul, while a few suggested substantive surgery of the existing framework.
2. The regulatory architecture is too fragmented, leaving substantial scope for grey
areas and overlaps, capture, and bargaining. While many experts were agnostic
about the exact model to be adopted (from a single super-regulator to a dual structure of prudential regulation and conduct regulation to a limited number of functionally homogeneous regulators with a strong co-ordination mechanism), many
expressed the need for greater consolidation. Further, the legal-institutional framework should provide clarity of purpose, powers and functions, as well as a statutory
mechanism of accountability for the regulators. While many of the expert views
were for total or greater consolidation, the existing regulatory authorities argued
for status quo.
3. The current architecture is not conducive enough for addressing the issues emanating from the global context of financial development. Fragmented regulation
and regulatory responsibilities and lack of clarity would hinder both domestic and
global co-ordination efforts in addressing issues of contagion and global financial
shocks. There is a need for strengthening the fundamental architecture in addressing such issues, as well as for evolving a framework for dealing with systemic risk
and resolution. Though the tools for addressing these issues are still on the drawing board, some of the institutional structures available in select jurisdictions, such
as resolution framework, have proved to be essential for preserving the stability of
the financial system. A more streamlined structure is also needed for dealing with
financial issues related to terrorism and other connected issues, which are a major global concern that national authorities have to address through international
protocols.
4. There is a need for strengthening the consumer protection and grievance redress
mechanism in the financial sector. This is particularly important given the low level
of financial literacy, low penetration of financial services, absence of clear regulatory mandate on composite and complex products and on the roles of product
distributors and financial advisers. Given the complexity of these issues, the main
focus was on the necessity of placing consumer protection at the centre of the philosophy on financial regulation. This issue needs to be addressed both from the
preventive and curative sides; by the regulators, as well as the redress agency, respectively.
5. The current architecture encourages turf battles and conflicts of interest. This is
a result of the lack of clarity of functions of the various regulatory authorities, as
well as of assigning conflicting functions to the same regulatory agency. Despite
the explicit development objectives given to the sector-specific regulators, market
development has been far from satisfactory as is evidenced in the time-frame on
developing products and systems such as in the corporate bond markets. These
need to be improved by clarifying the statutory provisions, streamlining regulatory
architecture, and removing the conflicting functions from the mandate of some of
the regulators.
6. There have been various arguments on the issue of adopting a principles-based
approach to regulation, particularly as practised in some jurisdictions prior to the
global crisis. At the same time, there has been strong support for adopting a principles-based approach to primary legislations so that these legislations do not go for
INTRODUCTION
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
amendments frequently and, in the process, lead to regulatory uncertainties. It was

also argued that the primary legislation should provide a template for expanding
the basic principles into concrete regulations, which at times could be rules-based.
It was also argued that the limited regulatory capabilities available should be harmonised and consolidated to promote the skills for administering the principlesbased approach to regulation, rather than spreading such scarce skills across a
large number of entities with fragmented mandate. These principles and regulations should address the incentive issues fundamentally, so as to minimise financial market adventures, rather than micro-manage product structures and market
micro-structures.
While every regulator should encourage competition in their sector, the ultimate
responsibility of managing economy-wide competition issues should be left to the
Competition Commission. While this would help address many macro-level consumer issues, such micro-level issues should be addressed by the sector specific
regulators and the grievance redress fora/forum. There should be greater, and institutionalised, interface between the Competition Commission and sectoral regulators in promoting competition and competition practices and culture.
While there has been a view that the redress mechanism under the Consumer Protection Act has been functioning satisfactorily, there were also arguments that this
framework, as it exists today, is insufficient to deal with the growing complexities in
the financial sector. While some of the respondents argued for strengthening consumer redress mechanism in each sector under the aegis of the existing regulators,
there were also suggestions for consolidating the consumer redress mechanism by
means of a single redress agency for the financial sector.
While some of the arguments for retaining sector specific regulators favoured retention of commodity market regulation as a separate area, there were also arguments
that derivative markets are financial markets, there is growing financialisation of
even physical commodities, players in the system are the same, irrespective of the
underlying, and there is the need for consolidated regulation of organised trading
to be effective.
There were also strong views on the need for strengthening the corporate governance process of regulators the process of appointment, tenure, compensation
and overall skill formation and development of domain expertise. Regulatory expertise, it was felt, is in short supply and should be made a thrust area of focus.
Transplanting civil service structures to regulatory authorities is against the basic
premise of setting up independent regulatory authorities and a new culture should
be built alongside constructing new structures.
On issues related to transition arrangements, there were views which encouraged
a gradual transition and those which argued for a sudden shift. The former was
based on the premise that organisations and market entities take time to adjust to
new laws and regulations, while the latter argued that greater flexibility would lead
to bargaining for longer time-frame and in the process dilute the efforts towards
institutional restructuring.
1.4. Working Group Process

As stated in an earlier section, the Commission decided to multi-task its approach by a
parallel process of WGs. Five areas were identified for detailed analysis: (i) Banking, (ii)
Securities, (iii) Public Debt Management, (iv) Payment Systems, and (v) Insurance, Pensions & Small Savings. Each Working Group was chaired by a Member of the Commission.
Other Members were free to join any of the WGs as per their preference and attend any of
4
INTRODUCTION
the meetings. Secretary to the Commission was part of all WGs and acted as a link between the Commission and the WGs, as well as between the various WGs in harmonising
their approach and ideas in tune with the decisions of the Commission. The composition,
terms of reference, and recommendations of these five WGs can be found in Annex 19.6,
19.7, 19.8, 19.9 and 19.10.
Apart from the Chairperson, each WG comprised domain experts, who brought in considerable domain knowledge to the deliberations. All WGs were supported by the research
team of the Commission; the team provided substantive inputs and drafted documents.
Each WG had intensive deliberations and interacted with a number of stake-holders and
experts from various institutions; a list of these institutions is in Annex 19.11.
After substantive deliberations and interactions, each WG came out with sector-specific aspects on consumer protection, micro-prudential regulation, legal process, and other
aspects specific to the sector within the broad contours designed by the Commission.
The Chairpersons of the WGs presented their reports before the Commission. Their recommendations were debated, analysed and finally accepted by the Commission, with
appropriate modifications as deemed fit. The work of these WGs has been incorporated
in the relevant parts of this report. Prior to the review by the Commission, many of the
draft documents were peer reviewed by domain experts whose names are in Annex 19.12.
The drafts were also intensively scrutinised by sub-groups of the Commission.
1.5. Analysis and assessment

The Commission has been tasked with the mandate of reviewing and rewriting financial
sector legislations built up over a century. However, laws cannot be scripted in vacuum.
Laws have to support a certain policy-organisational framework. In the context of financial sector laws, the laws should support Indias financial sector structure and the delicate balance between the state policy and instruments and the market. The financial
sector is a catalyst supporting that economic framework. Therefore, while designing the
legislative framework for the financial sector, the contours of the financial sector, as well
as the contours of the macro economy need to be clearly understood and the linkages
harmonised for synergy.
After substantive deliberations and interactions, the Commission released an Approach Paper outlining the broad contours of the proposed financial sector institutional
framework. The feedback on this Approach Paper, received from various stake-holders
and the public, as well as, in general, through its website and correspondences (Annex
19.13), has also been analysed and incorporated into the analytical framework.
1.5.1. Long-term views on the Indian economy

Changes contemplated by the Commission are of high magnitude in terms of its impact
on institutions. As such, the recommendations of the Commission cannot be viewed in
a short-term framework, nor can the implementation and impact process be completed
within a short horizon. Therefore, the Commission has envisioned a medium- to longterm view on the Indian economy and tried to structure the requirements of the financial
sector in terms of laws and institutions to support this vision.
In 2012, the size of the Indian economy was about US$2 trillion. The economy is expected to grow at a moderately high pace, despite periodic fluctuations on account of
structural and cyclical reasons. Given the nominal growth rate in the vicinity of 15 per
cent, the nominal GDP would double in about 5 years and would reach about US$15 trillion by 2026. This was the size of the US economy in 2012. This implies that by around
2026, Indias GDP will be the size of the present day US GDP. There will be changes in the
INTRODUCTION
sectoral composition of GDP as well. Newer activities will enter the services and manufacturing sectors, making the primary sector smaller, implying a reduced share of agriculture
in the overall GDP. All this means a greater role of the financial sector through the need
for effective and qualitative financial intermediation. Even by keeping aside inclusion as
an objective, the financial sector is expected to grow manifold in terms of size, strength,
and efficiency to support the growing requirements of a fast growing economy. The small
world of finance that exists in India today, howsoever effective, will not be able to cater
to the requirements of the huge economic opportunities that would be unleashed by the
growth process. Therefore, even in static terms of assuming just normal growth as envisioned by the GDP growth rates, the financial sector needs to expand, innovate and experiment. The agenda of inclusion magnifies this need manifold.
1.5.2. Fragility of the current system

Through its own deliberations, research, and interactions with various experts, the Commission was convinced that the current regulatory financial structure of the Indian financial sector regulation is not only fragmented, but also fragile. This is evident from the fact
that there is no uniform philosophy of regulation; different regulators approach similar
issues in different ways. The financial sector lacks a uniform legal process, uniform appellate mechanism, and a uniform appointment process. This lack of coherence in the
philosophy of regulation is a fundamental weakness of the regulatory architecture.
The Commission also noted several instances where the independent/statutory regulatory authorities were considered similar to the field agencies of the executive; instructions are passed on to regulators as if they are extensions of the executive. This
blurred vision of agency structure needs to be corrected as statutory Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) are quite different from the traditional field agencies of the Government. The IRAs are statutorily empowered to perform the three functions of the state
regulation-making (legislation), administration (executive), and adjudication (quasi judicial) even at the perceived cost of blurring the principle of separation of powers embedded in the Constitution. This is a conscious decision taken by the Parliament in
empowering IRAs to help efficiently perform their task for which they were created. In
order to prevent regulatory excesses, minimise democratic deficit, and make the IRAs
restrict themselves to effectively performing their mandated responsibilities, an effective
accountability framework is to be provided in the statute itself. Thus, statutory autonomy
in performing their mandate and statutory accountability mechanisms are the balancing
pillars of the principal-agent relationship while designing the IRAs.
Some of the developments in the regulatory sphere of financial markets in India in
the last few years have raised doubts on the efficacy of the current model of delegation to
regulatory authorities. Increasing tensions between the Government and the regulators,
and between the regulators, has come to the fore during this period. These internecine
steps were the result of an imperfect balancing of autonomy and accountability and a
blurred picture on the type of principal-agent relationship. It dented the basic foundations of conditional delegation and the ability of the model to effectively regulate the
financial system.
Instances of such mutually conflicting postures adopted by regulators are many.
These include the oversight battle over Unit Linked Insurance Plans (ULIPs) between SEBI
and IRDA, the conflicts between SEBI and FMC on commodity based exchange traded
funds, the conflicts between FMC and Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC)
(even when the latter is a non-financial sector regulator) on electricity futures trading,
the conflicts between Competition Commission of India (CCI) and sector-specific regulators, the frequency with which regulated entities challenge the regulators, all of which
happened in the last few years, underlining the growing tensions and fissures in the
regulatory-institutional framework of financial sector regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
The difficulty in addressing financial sector regulation on a holistic basis has given
rise to a rapidly growing shadow financial sector. This includes shadow banking and
other shadow financial service providers who collect huge amounts of money from the
public, particularly the retail investors, leading to fundamental concerns on consumer
protection and at times generating issues of financial stability and systemic risk. There
have been increased incidences of such entities operating between the regulatory boundaries at their will, defrauding investors in the name of emus, plantations, and pyramid
formations. Unless issues of regulatory grey areas and governance are addressed early in
a systematic manner, all these issues are likely to aggravate in the future, given that innovations on products, practices and organisational structures very often happen outside
regulatory boundaries.
The setting up of the FSDC and the formation of the Commission itself has been a clear
recognition of the limitations of the existing statutory and organisational arrangements.
While the FSDC as an apex council for regulatory co-ordination and financial sector development, was an interim response, the Commission, mandated to rewrite and clean
up the financial sector legislations and architecture, was to provide the long-term institutional answer to the problems haunting the current institutional ethos of the financial
sector. This is what has been attempted in this report.
1.5.3. Financial inclusion and literacy

Financial inclusion is a major policy objective that India has been trying to achieve over
the years. The Commission has noted that inclusion, even in terms of basic banking accounts, has reached only about half the population; in terms of financial instruments
such as insurance and securities, inclusion is far limited. Though the level of inclusion
should depend on the type of financial products, financial services, such as basic banking
and pure insurance products, should reach almost all; other products, enabling risk management and income generation, should reach a sizeable population so that the benefits
of modern finance are available to a large part of the population.
The Commission debated issues emanating from mandated development and financial inclusion as a regulatory responsibility. While expert opinion is divided on the subject, the underlying line of thinking has been that regulatory mandating has to be avoided
because the regulatory approach should be to provide an enabling framework wherein
service providers would be able to use innovative approaches, including usage of modern
technologies, in achieving the desired macro objectives. Moreover, micro-level targeting
and licencing approaches may be too slow in achieving this objective.
1.5.4. Financial globalisation and lessons from the crisis

No major economy in the world today can be viewed in isolation from the rest of the
world. Given the size and the growing magnitude of interaction in terms of trade, services, and capital flows and the greater openness to globalisation, India is in a different
economic milieu today than it was two decades ago. India is virtually part of the world of
globalised finance and is learning to walk, negotiating the strong currents both positive
and negative, generated by the forces of financial globalisation.
Negative aspects of financial globalisation and run away innovations in certain parts
of the world resulted in the global financial crisis of 2008. The world has learnt a number
of lessons from this crisis. The Commission, through its research, interactions with regulatory authorities and experts from different parts of the world, and through Indias own
experience during the crisis, has understood the need for a carefully calibrated regulatory
approach to address the limitations of the market, particularly its tendency to travel too
fast and become too complex, both in terms of product and organisational innovations.
INTRODUCTION
The Commission has understood that the world has learnt the lessons of financial instability and therefore provided for an effective and continuous mechanism for addressing
issues of systemic risk, as well as, the need for addressing failures of individual entities
through resolution. The messages coming clear and loud from the financial crisis on the
need for more closely and effectively regulating the market, emphasis on systemic risk,
and an effective resolution framework have been factored into the recommendations of
the Commission.
1.5.5. Regulatory developments elsewhere

Following the financial crisis of 2008, there have been several efforts in some jurisdictions for strengthening, and in a few cases, recasting regulatory structures. These are
particularly pronounced in the case of the US and the UK, while other jurisdictions are
contemplating limited changes in strengthening the weaker links in their structures. The
Commission had extensive interaction with the officials and experts on the changes being
made in the UK, Canada, Australia, Singapore and limited dialogue with agencies such as
the US Fed and Indo-US Business Council. The most radical changes are being contemplated in the UK, where the super regulator, Financial Services Authority (FSA), has been
divided and the mandate relating to prudential regulation transferred to the Bank of England as its subsidiary and converting the FSA into a Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). Our
understanding of the reasons for this change was that FSAs focus on the market conduct
dimensions at the cost of relative neglect of the prudential dimension led to building up
of risks for the banking sector, which was not observed in time. In the case of Australia, on
the other hand, prudential regulation and conduct regulation had been divided and mandated to two distinct agencies (Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority and the Australian Securities Investment Commission) in their twin-peak model which was adopted
in the mid 90s. This model withstood the crisis relatively better. Similarly, in Canada, prudential regulation and conduct regulation has been placed in two different agencies, the
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions as well as the Financial Consumer
Agency. While the importance of treating prudential and conduct regulation distinctly in
these jurisdictions has been well understood, the Commission has not recommended a
similar approach in the Indian context because of the reason that the required regulatory
expertise is not yet available. Hence, the recommendation for the same regulator dealing with both prudential and market conduct aspects for the medium run, while in the
long run this could be modified depending on the experiences gained within this country
and elsewhere. The legal and statutory framework also tries to provide for easy changes
in regulatory mandate so that changes in functions would involve only limited statutory
changes.
1.5.6. Global co-ordination in the emerging context

Along with financial globalisation, complexities of financial regulation have also increased.
This became more complex after the crisis and following the adoption of greater scrutiny
of the concerns arising from terrorism-related financial activities. The new obligations
under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism
(CFT) regimes have necessitated co-ordination between domestic financial regulators
amongst all the jurisdictions and between the global co-ordinating institutions. Greater
co-ordination has also become imperative in the context of concerns on financial stability. The Commission is fully aware of the onus that these additional tasks would bring
upon domestic regulatory authorities as well as the enabling legal framework.
1.5.7. Harmonisation of laws

All the factors outlined in the previous sub-sections necessitate the need to redraft our
legislations and harmonise them. Our laws have been built up over a century and have
8
INTRODUCTION
been modified multiple times, creating newer and greater complexities. Sector-wise fragmentation and segmented approach to regulation further amplified these basic frictions.
There is also a lack of coherence in terms of their underlying philosophy, since these laws
had been enacted at different periods of time when financial sector needs were of a different type and nature. Many of these legislations are of pre-independence origin, where
the objective functions were also different from what is desirable for a modern interdependent economy.
Given these underlying factors about the vintage, philosophy, structure, and constraints of the regulatory framework, the existing framework cannot be used effectively
by a resurgent India, expecting to reach the size of current US economy in about two
decades. It cannot also be used to address issues emanating from financial globalisation
and for addressing the lessons learnt from the global crisis. It cannot address the requirements of a large, modern economy wherein the financial sector plays a significant role. It
cannot address issues of effective global co-ordination, both as a requirement for global
financial stability and supervisory requirement for combating terrorism and related financial issues. A fragmented approach, based on multiple laws and organisations, cannot
effectively include the excluded population into the modern financial sector. Given these
reasons, the Commission felt the need for a complete overhaul of the statutory framework. This involves repealing many of the statues, substantially amending another set of
legislations, and amending certain provisions in other related legislations.
1.5.8. Strengthening the regulatory framework

The existing regulatory environment in India is fragmented and complex. There are multiple regulators, each one tasked with a silo within the financial sector. Given the fluidity and the fungibility of financial markets, such a fragmented approach cannot possibly
achieve the results desired in terms of providing an organic unity to the sector in addressing domestic and global co-ordination, addressing financial development and inclusion,
and dealing with systemic stability and other concerns. In fact, the experience of regulatory co-operation in India has not been very encouraging and has witnessed escalation
of conflicts in the recent past. The Commission, therefore, feels that the fragmented approach to financial sector regulation in India has failed on many grounds, which need to
be corrected. But at the same time, learning from the global crisis and the consequential
regulatory rethinking in multiple jurisdictions, and the need for aligning the regulatory
requirements to our own milieu, the Commission deliberated the issue of appropriate
regulatory structure in detail.
CHAPTER 2
The tasks of financial law

The Commission has envisaged certain key components of the financial legal framework.
Each of these components is guided by a clear understanding of market failures. Regulation is not an end in itself; it exists in order to address market failures. The Commission
strongly feels that laws must be defined in terms of their economic purpose, rather than
in terms of the powers conferred upon regulatory agencies or in terms of the entities who
are affected by the law. This clarity on objectives is essential for obtaining accountability
in regulation. If an agency is given the objective of regulation, then accountability is lost,
because the agency will always be able to demonstrate that it has, indeed, regulated.
From this perspective, the tasks of financial law can be envisioned as the following
nine components:
1. Consumer protection: A prime motivation of all financial regulation is to protect consumers. The
relationship between financial firms and their customers is one where, many times, the outcomes
may harm customers. These problems are not sporadic or accidental; but are often rooted in
basic problems of information and incentives and will not be alleviated through financial literacy
campaigns. The central purpose of financial regulation is to intervene in the relationship between
financial firms and their customers, and address market failures. This requires a comprehensive
consumer protection framework that covers both the problem of prevention (interventions that
induce financial firms towards fair play) and cure (addressing consumer grievances).
2. Micro-prudential regulation: One element of protecting consumers is to constrain financial firms
to take lower risk, so as to improve the extent to which promises by a financial firm to a consumer
are upheld. This is the task of micro-prudential regulation. In addition to being motivated by
consumer protection, high quality micro-prudential regulation also reduces systemic risk. This
calls for a comprehensive micro-prudential framework.
3. Resolution: The best efforts of micro-prudential regulation will reduce, but not eliminate, the failure of financial firms. When such episodes arise, a specialised resolution capability is required
to ensure graceful winding up of a financial firm that has become unviable, and transition the
customers of the erstwhile firm. Under a formal arrangement such as this, a key difference that
will be induced by a resolution corporation will be reduced burden on tax payer resources by
failing financial firms. When a financial firm is healthy, it would face micro-prudential regulation,
while the resolution corporation would lie in the background. When the firm approaches failure,
it would increasingly face the resolution corporation. This requires the legal framework to create
a resolution corporation and set it in motion.
4. Capital controls: India now has an open current account, but many capital account restrictions
remain. The Commission agreed that the timing and sequencing of capital account liberalisation
should be chosen by policy makers in the future. The drafting of law needs to establish a sound
legal foundation for capital controls, with a focus on objectives and accountability in regulationmaking, and an emphasis on the rule of law. The regulations governing inward flows should
11
THE TASKS OF FINANCIAL LAW
be framed by the Central Government, in consultation with the RBI. The regulations governing
outward flows should be framed by the RBI, in consultation with the Central Government.
5. Systemic risk: Micro-prudential regulation focuses on one financial firm at a time. While this is
important in its own right, there is a requirement for an additional, and different, perspective
on risk of the financial system as a whole. This requires analysis of the entire financial system,
understanding the build-up of risk across all elements of the financial system, and undertaking
co-ordinated actions (through multiple regulatory agencies) to reduce the probability of a systemic crisis.
The terms financial stability and macro-prudential regulation are sometimes used in this discourse. The Commission has chosen to consistently use the phrases systemic risk and systemic
risk regulation as they lend greater clarity in communicating the problem and the task.
6. Development and redistribution: In addition to the above components of financial law, financial
economic governance in India is also charged with the objectives of development and redistribution. At the same time, these functions need to be placed on sound legal foundation.
7. Monetary policy: The conduct of monetary policy is covered by a law that establishes the central
bank and defines the triad of objectives, powers and accountability mechanisms.
8. Public debt management: A specialised framework on public debt management is needed to
cover the function of analysing the comprehensive structure of liabilities of the Government, and
embarking on strategies for minimising the cost of raising and servicing public debt over the longterm within an acceptable level of risk.
9. Foundations of contracts and property: A specialised framework setting out the foundations of financial contracts, and making adaptations to general commercial laws, is required for the proper
functioning of the financial system.
Each of these components is associated with a chapter in this report and a part in
the accompanying draft Indian Financial Code (draft Code).
2.1. Shifting away from a sectoral perspective

The discussion above has focused on nine areas of work:
I Consumer protection
I Micro-prudential regulation
I Resolution
I Capital controls
I Systemic risk
I Development
I Monetary policy
I Public debt management
I Foundations of contracts and property
The Commission has prepared a draft Code covering these nine areas. The draft Code
also contains a specialised law to address governance processes associated with regulators and other financial agencies, addressing the problems of independence and accountability. Putting these ten elements together, the draft Code constitutes a fairly comprehensive and unified treatment of financial law.
This strategy differs from the current Indian law, which is sectoral in nature. Current
laws are organised around sub-sectors of finance, such as securities or insurance or payments. The Commission debated this at length, and concluded that there was merit in
shifting to a non-sectoral approach. Laws must be animated by an economic purpose
and the market failures that they seek to address. Once this is done, the ideas apply
consistently across all sectors of finance. As an example, a well drafted micro-prudential
law would apply to all components of finance. A well drafted regulatory governance law
would apply to all financial agencies.
12
This is a superior approach from many points of view. Shifting away from sectoral
laws yields consistent treatment across sectors. It has become increasingly clear that the
lines that separate banking or insurance or mutual funds or pension fund management
are hard to define. Under this situation, if sectoral laws are applied, regulatory arbitrage
becomes feasible, where the same activity is portrayed as belonging in the sector where
the law is conducive to a higher profit rate. Non-sectoral laws that apply uniformly across
the financial system eliminate such inconsistencies of treatment. They also eliminate the
problems of gaps and overlaps.
While the draft Code proposed by the Commission is non-sectoral in nature, it is
likely that regulators will draft sector-specific subordinated legislation. For example, the
principles of consumer protection, embedded in the consumer protection part of the
draft Code, will be translated by multiple regulatory bodies into detailed regulations that
shape how consumers of banking or insurance are treated. The subordinated rules and
regulations will, however, have to be consistent with the broad principles laid down in
the primary law.
As an example, the term NBFC in India includes a wide array of activities. Rational
and consistent treatment of a broad class of firms requires a clear conceptual framework. The approach taken by the Commission emphasises that regulation should flow
from the economic and legal concern that the law seeks to address. It is useful to focus
on the regulatory concerns associated with the main NBFC activities: deposit-taking, raising capital through securities issuance, and lending to consumers and investment. Under the framework proposed by the Commission, all these activities would be analysed
through the objectives and powers contained in the draft Code under the parts on microprudential regulation, consumer protection and resolution. As an example, when a NBFC
gives a loan to a consumer, the regulatory focus would be on consumer protection. If a
NBFC does not take deposits, the nature of promises made to consumers changes, and
the micro-prudential regulatory strategy would be correspondingly different.
In this fashion, conceptual clarity about the purpose of regulation would help regulators understand the diverse array of financial firms and activities, and apply the suitable
regulatory instruments to each situation.
2.2. Adopting a principles-based approach

The Commission believes that there is value in harnessing Indias common law tradition,
where laws enacted by Parliament work at the level of high principles, and do not embed specific details. These relatively timeless principles are linked to the continuously
evolving world of technology, institutional arrangements and financial sector processes
through two methods: continuous revision of subordinated legislation that is drafted by
the regulator, and interpretation by the judiciary. This approach, which may be termed
an Occams razor applied to the field of law, has worked well with components of Indian
law such as the Evidence Act and the Contract Act, both of which were enacted in 1872,
and have largely stood the test of time.
In the field of finance, this implies a principles-based approach. Laws will articulate
broad principles that do not vary with financial or technological innovation. Regulators
will write subordinated legislation that could either be in the form of detailed prescriptive
rules or be principles-based, depending on the situation and the judgment of the regulator. Subordinated legislation will be frequently modified by regulators, through a process
defined by Parliament, and thus constantly adapt to financial and technological innovation. This combination of legislation and subordinated legislation yields a body of law
that evolves smoothly over time. For a contrast, if detailed features of financial products
13
and processes were embedded in law, the requirement of frequent amendments to the
law would hinder progress.
This approach also substantively improves the compliance culture. Under rulesbased regulation, there is the risk that financial firms set up complex harmful structures
that comply with the letter of the rules. The Commission recommends that laws should
hold financial firms to a higher standard: that of complying with the principles.
Central to common law is the role of judges. When laws are written in terms of principles, there would be legitimate disagreements about the interpretation of principles.
These are resolved by judges who build up the jurisprudence that clarifies what a principle means in the light of the continuous evolution of finance and technology. The workload of complex cases will go up, when we move towards a common law approach. The
Commission has decided to build on Indias success with the SAT, which will be subsumed
in a FSAT that will serve as an appellate authority for the entire financial system and will
also review validity of rules and regulations on the touchstone of principles-based law.
Rulings of the FSAT, and the Supreme Court, would build a living body of jurisprudence
alongside the principles-based laws recommended by the Commission.
2.3. Approach to drafting

In formulating the draft Code, the Commission surveyed drafting techniques adopted domestically and internationally. One option was to draft the provisions in the fashion that
readers of Indian law have been familiar with for years, that uses compound and archaic
words such as shall, notwithstanding and heretofore, or open-ended terms. Another
option was to adopt the internationally accepted plain and simple drafting technique,
which attempts to convey clear and precise meaning in simple English. It avoids usage of
complex, archaic phrases and legal jargon and aims to ensure that ideas are presented in
a logical and effective manner. It brings clarity to the reader and balances simplicity and
precision.
A drafting technique must be consistent with the objective that the draft intends to
convey. Sometimes, vague phrases might indeed convey the requisite meaning, while
on other occasions, a precise formulation is necessary. The draft Code has attempted to
balance these in the best possible manner, without compromising on the essence of the
law.
After much deliberation, the Commission decided to adopt the plain language technique, to the extent practical. The Commission believes that this is the best possible manner in which timeless principles can be articulated in the primary law and the intent can
be communicated clearly to the regulators.
Adopting plain language technique would lead to avoiding usage of traditionally accepted, well understood and judicially recognised phrases, but in the interest of clarity
and achieving international standards, this is a necessary bargain. It is expected that jurisprudence and interpretative meanings of new phrases would develop with time.
Plain language technique also advocates usage of gender neutral language. While
the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that words importing the masculine gender shall
be taken to include females, the Commission has deliberately steered clear of referring
to either, and sought to use language that is gender neutral, to the extent practical.
The following indicative list encapsulates the kind of standards that have been adopted in preparing the draft Code:
1. Active voice has been used to the extent possible.
2. Plain English words, and simple and short sentences have been used. For instance
14
I in case or if instead of in the event of;

I if or when instead of provided that; and
I within instead of with a period of, before the end of.
3. Archaic phrases have been avoided, to the extent possible, for instance, aforesaid,
thereof, best of knowledge, wherein, and shall.
4. Double negatives and complex sentences have been avoided to the extent possible.
5. The use of explanations, exceptions, non-obstante, notwithstanding and subject to clauses have been avoided to the extent possible.
6. Words in pairs have been avoided, particularly if one of the words convey the full
meaning, such as null and void, agreed and declared, force and effect, contravene and fail to comply, freed and discharged.
7. Vague words have been avoided, to the extent possible, for instance, public interest, as it may deem fit, good faith.
8. Latin and foreign words have been avoided, such as mutatis mutandis, ultra
vires, ex parte, and bona fide.
9. Use of un-numbered paragraphs have been avoided.
2.4. Financial regulatory governance

The bulk of the law that financial firms actually interact with is regulations and not the
primary legislation. In order to cope with the specialised technical demands of the field,
and the rapid pace of financial and technological innovation, the architecture that has
been adopted the world over consists of Parliament drafting laws that establish financial
regulators and set them in motion. The regulators then draft regulations, which embed
intricate market knowledge, and evolve rapidly.
The central task of financial law, then, consists of setting up regulators and ensuring
that they operate correctly. The Commission has made the sound structuring of financial regulators, and thus laying the foundation for a sound financial regulatory process, a
prime objective. The work of the Commission revolves around four themes: (a) Clarity on
objectives and avoiding conflicts of interest; (b) Precisely defined powers; (c) Operational
and political independence; and (d) Accountability mechanisms.
2.4.1. Independence of regulators

In recent decades, independent regulators have become an important part of the policy landscape in India and worldwide. There are four arguments in favour of having the
supervision and regulation of the financial sector done by regulatory agencies that are
independent of the Government:
1. The regulator is able to setup a specialised workforce that has superior technical knowledge;
2. This is assisted by modified human resource and other processes, when compared with the functioning of mainstream Government departments;
3. With such knowledge, and close observation of the industry, an independent regulator is able to
move rapidly in modifying regulations, thus giving malleability to laws; and
4. The presence of independent regulators improves legal certainty by ensuring that the regulatory
approach does not fluctuate with political changes.
Mere physical separation of the regulator from the Government is however not sufficient to ensure its independence. This needs to be accompanied by legal and administrative processes that clearly delineate the functioning of the regulator from the rest of
the Government.
15
In the normal functioning of Government, the three functions of regulation-making,

enforcement and adjudication are kept separate under the separation of powers doctrine. When the Parliament delegates these functions to the regulators, it places them in
the unique position of being mini-states with powers similar to the legislature, executive and judiciary all under a single entity. The Commission has strived to achieve greater
separation of powers in the functioning of the regulator, particularly by separating out
adjudication from other activities.
A well-structured, independent regulator needs to avoid two extremes. At one extreme is excessive delegation. As an example, if legislation sets up an independent regulator with the mandate of serving the public interest or improving the welfare of the
people of India, and arms it with sweeping powers, this would raise concerns about what
such an agency could do. At the other extreme is the issue of micro-management in the
legislation. If laws embed institutional details of markets, technology and financial sector activities, the key purpose of establishing independent regulators would be lost. To
avoid both these extremes, the Commission recommends that independent regulators
should be given precise objectives, and a specific toolkit of powers through which those
objectives are to be pursued, with the independence to decide the manner in which the
powers are to be used. Any action of the regulator will however remain subject to extensive mechanisms of accountability.
2.4.2. Accountability of regulators

As argued above, regulatory independence is essential to support the functioning of the
regulator as an expert body, and to ensure that regulation-making and enforcement do
not fluctuate with changes in political executives. But independence is not an unmixed
blessing: when unelected officials are given strong powers, this needs to be accompanied
by appropriate accountability mechanisms.
The Commission recommends that the substance of financial regulation is too minute
and dynamic to be legislated upon by Parliament, however, the process through which
financial regulation is to be effected should be clearly detailed in the law. Parliamentary
legislation should therefore incorporate high standards of procedure that the regulator
will be required to adhere to. Drawing on practical Indian experiences of the last twenty
years and global best practices, the draft Code embeds an array of mechanisms through
which independence of the regulator can be actually operationalised, and accountability
achieved.
The Commission has adopted the following pathways to accountability:
1. Setting out of clear objective standards of governance that the regulator must adhere to;
2. A well-structured regulation-making process with appropriate checks and balances to ensure
that all regulations are backed by thorough analysis of costs and benefits and are made through
an open consultative process;
3. A formal and transparent system of regulation and supervision, rooted in the rule of law, which
will include:
I Duty of the regulator to explain its actions to regulated entities and the public at large; and
I Requirements that regulatory actions and changes should be imposed with adequate prior
information to persons likely to be affected (unless inappropriate for a particular situation)
and should rarely be carried out without hearing the concerned parties;
4. Reporting requirements that mandate the regulator to disclose how it fared on pursuing its desired outcomes and at what cost; and
5. Placing the judicial oversight of the regulator in FSAT which will ensure greater scrutiny over the
actions of the regulator and with greater efficiency. Principles of efficiency and measurement of
performance will also be applied to the FSAT.
16
2.5. Ownership neutrality and competition

The Indian financial system has an array of firms: co-operatives, private Indian firms, foreign firms and public sector firms. The Commission envisages a regulatory framework
where governance standards for regulated entities will not depend on the form of organisation of the financial firm or its ownership structure. This will yield competitive neutrality. In this framework, the regulatory treatment of companies, co-operatives and partnerships; public and private financial firms; and domestic and foreign firms, will be identical.
2.5.1. Treatment of foreign firms

Whether or not, or the extent to which, participation by foreign firms should be allowed
in the financial sector is a policy matter to be determined by the Government. However,
once a decision to allow foreign participation in a particular financial market has been
made, there should be consistency in the regulatory treatment of foreign and domestic
participants performing similar functions or undertaking similar risks in the market.
For example, if the foreign investment policy for a particular sector permits wholly
owned foreign subsidiaries, the regulator must ensure that the net worth requirements,
capital adequacy norms, investment limits and all other regulatory interventions should
be the same for foreign subsidiaries and domestically owned firms.
Hence, the Commission recommends, under the capital controls framework of the
draft Code, that subject to control restrictions as prescribed, there should be full national
treatment for foreign firms.
2.5.2. Public sector financial institutions

The future of public sector financial firms is an important policy question which will shape
the contours of Indian finance. In coming decades, public sector financial firms are likely
to continue to be with us. The Commission has therefore identified three elements in the
treatment of these firms:
1. Public sector financial firms require effective regulation and supervision. If there are problems
with these firms, they impose costs upon the exchequer. Improvements in regulation and supervision will reduce the potential problems faced with public sector ownership.
2. At the same time, the draft Code emphasises the principles of equal treatment and a pro-competitive environment.
3. To the extent that competition concerns in the financial sector arise on account of existing laws
that confer special privileges on state-owned enterprises, the Commission recommends amendments to the laws to create a level playing field between regulated entities, irrespective of their
ownership structure.
The goal of achieving competitive neutrality in the financial sector necessarily involves a rethinking of laws such as the State Bank of India Act, 1955 and the Life Insurance
Corporation Act, 1956, that were enacted to create specific financial institutions. These
laws contain provisions that vary or exclude the applicability of general corporate and
financial laws to the institutions created under them. They also confer special privileges
as seen in the case of the explicit Government guarantee under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, for all sums assured under LIC policies. The existence of such a provision
in the law despite the entry of private insurers in the market induces an unfair competitive advantage in favour of LIC as many customers would tend to choose its policies over
those offered by private insurers on account of the Government guarantee.
The Commission therefore recommends the repeal or large scale amendment of all
special legislations that (a) establish statutory financial institutions; or (b) lay down specific provisions to govern any aspect of the operation or functioning of public sector financial institutions (see Table 2.1). The undertakings of all statutory institutions should
17
Table of Recommendations 2.1 List of statutory financial institutions

The following is a list of statutes that provide for the establishment of statutory financial institutions or contain special
provisions to govern the operation and functioning of public sector financial institutions:
1. The State Financial Corporations Act, 1951:
Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation; Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation; Madhya Pradesh Financial Corporation; North Eastern Development Finance Corporation; Rajasthan Finance Corporation; Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment
Corporation Limited; Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation; Delhi Financial Corporation; Gujarat State Financial Corporation;
The Economic Development Corporation of Goa; Haryana Financial Corporation; Jammu & Kashmir State Financial Corporation; Karnataka State Financial Corporation; Kerala Financial Corporation; Maharashtra State Financial Corporation; Odisha
State Financial Corporation; Punjab Financial Corporation; West Bengal Financial Corporation
2. The State Bank of India Act, 1955

3. The Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956
4. The State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959:
State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur; State Bank of Indore; State Bank of Mysore; State Bank of Patiala; State Bank of Travancore;
and State Bank of Hyderabad established under the State Bank of Hyderabad Act, 1956
5. The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970:

Central Bank of India; Bank of India; Punjab National Bank; Bank of Baroda; UCO Bank; Canara Bank; United Bank of India;
Dena Bank; Syndicate Bank; Union Bank of India; Allahabad Bank; Indian Bank; Bank of Maharashtra; and Indian Overseas
Bank
6. The General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972:

General Insurance Corporation of India; National Insurance Company Limited; New India Assurance Company Limited; Oriental Insurance Company Limited; and United India Insurance Company Limited
7. The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980:

Andhra Bank; Corporation Bank; New Bank of India; Oriental Bank of Commerce; Punjab and Sind Bank; and Vijaya Bank
8.
9.
10.
11.
The Export-Import Bank of India Act, 1981

The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development Act, 1981
The National Housing Bank Act, 1987
The Small Industries Development Bank of India Act, 1989
be transferred to ordinary companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and
their regulatory treatment should be identical as that applicable to all other financial
companies. This has previously been done in case of the following institutions which
were statutory corporations that were subsequently converted to companies under the
Acts mentioned below:
1. IFCI Limited (previously called the Industrial Finance Corporation of India) through the Industrial
Finance Corporation (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act, 1993;
2. Industrial Investment Bank of India Limited (previously called the Industrial Reconstruction Bank
of India) through the Industrial Reconstruction Bank (Transfer of Undertakings and Repeal) Act,
1997;
3. Unit Trust of India through the Unit Trust of India (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act, 2002;
and
4. IDBI Bank Limited (previously called the Industrial Development Bank of India) through the Industrial Development Bank (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act, 2003.
The Commission recognises that the repeal or large scale amendments of the statutes
identified in Table 2.1 is a long drawn process that may take some time for the Central Government to implement. However, there are certain specific provisions relating to winding up and liquidation of the concerned institutions under these laws that need to be
amended immediately to give effect to the resolution framework envisaged by the Commission. This is being done in part on resolution in the draft Code.
It has also been observed that certain financial activities that are owned and managed by Government agencies tend to fall outside the sphere of financial regulation although they are functionally identical to regulated financial activities. This includes fund
management services offered by the Employees Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO), insurance services of postal life insurance and the Employees State Insurance Corporation
(ESIC) and the various small savings products issued by the Government. To the extent
that these bodies are performing a social welfare function, it would not be practical or
18
desirable to apply all areas of financial regulation to them with the same rigour that is
used for private enterprises. However, the Commission recommends that there is a need
for proportional regulation of these activities, particularly in the field of consumer protection so that consumers are entitled to the same rights and protections irrespective of
the ownership status of the service providers.
Hence, the Commission recommends that:
1. The Government should formulate a plan for the review of the following laws and schemes, which
involve the provision of financial services directly by the Government or by agencies created by
it:
I The Government Savings Bank Act, 1873
I The Employees State Insurance Act, 1948
I The Coal Mines Provident Fund Act, 1948
I The Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952
I The Assam Tea Plantation Provident Fund Act, 1955
I The Jammu & Kashmir Employees Provident Fund Act, 1961
I The Seamens Provident Fund Act, 1966
I The Public Provident Fund Act, 1968
I Post Office Life Insurance Rules, 2011
2. The laws and schemes should be examined from the perspective of assessing the changes required in order to bring them within the purview of financial regulation and to ensure compatibility with the laws drafted by the Commission.
2.5.3. Treatment of co-operatives

In understanding the wide spectrum of the financial system in India, the Commission also
focused on the role of co-operative societies. The subject of co-operative societies falls
under Entry 32, List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, which provides
that the incorporation, regulation and winding up of these bodies falls within the purview
of the State Governments.
In addition, when co-operative societies engage in the business of financial services,
they need to be regulated and supervised by financial regulators in a manner that is commensurate with the nature of their business and the risks undertaken by them. Since financial co-operatives often cater to the needs of small households, the Commission is
of the view that such institutions should carry out their business under sound prudential regulation and resolution framework, with strong protections for their consumers and
appropriate safeguards to ensure that in the eventuality of their failure, the burden does
not fall upon tax payers. For this to be possible, the draft Code should apply in its entirety
to co-operative societies providing financial services, to the same extent as it would apply
to corporate entities.
Under the current laws, co-operative banks are subject to a system of dual regulation by the Registrars of Co-operative Societies in State Governments and the RBI, as the
banking regulator. This has resulted in operational and governance challenges in the regulation of co-operative banks that have been attempted to be addressed through memorandums of understanding entered into between the RBI and State Governments. The
Commission recommends that financial regulators should have statutory control over
the regulation and supervision of financial co-operatives, without having to rely on contractual arrangements with State Governments. This can be achieved under Article 252 of
the Constitution which allows two or more State Legislatures to pass a resolution accepting the authority of the Parliament to make laws for the State on any matter on which the
Parliament otherwise does not have the capacity to legislate. Using this provision, State
Governments could pass resolutions to transfer the power to make laws on the regulation
and supervision of co-operative societies carrying on financial services to the Parliament.
19
The grant of authorisation to carry on financial services is the prerogative of the financial regulator. The draft Code provides that while laying down the criteria for carrying
on a financial service, the regulator may specify the permissible forms of organisation
for a proposed financial service provider. The regulator may therefore decide that cooperative societies from States that have not allowed the Central Government to legislate
on the regulation and supervision of co-operative societies carrying on financial services:
1. will not be granted the authorisation to carry out certain financial services, such as banking or
insurance, which require intense micro-prudential regulation; or
2. will be granted authorisation to carry on specific financial services subject to certain limitations,
such as, restrictions on access to the real-time gross settlement and discount window facilities
provided by the central bank and exclusion from the protection of deposit insurance provided by
the resolution corporation.
The Commission therefore makes the following recommendations with respect to

co-operative societies:
1. In consonance with the recommendations on competitive neutrality, co-operative societies carrying on financial services should be subject to similar prudential regulation, consumer protection and resolution frameworks as other entities carrying on similar activities.
2. Using Article 252 of the Constitution of India, State Governments should accept the authority of
the Parliament to legislate on matters relating to the regulation and supervision of co-operative
societies carrying on financial services.
3. The regulator may impose restrictions on the carrying on of specified financial services by cooperative societies belonging to States whose Governments have not accepted the authority of
the Parliament to legislate on the regulation of co-operative societies carrying on financial services.
20
CHAPTER 3
Structure of the regulator
Government agencies are required to perform complex functions in eight areas in finance:
consumer protection, micro-prudential regulation, resolution of failing financial firms,
capital controls, systemic risk, development, monetary policy and debt management.
For these functions to be appropriately performed, well structured Government agencies
are required. This is sought to be achieved through a specialised and consolidated set of
provisions on regulatory governance in the draft Code.
The Commission believes that the requirements of independence and accountability
of financial regulators are the same across the financial system and hence it recommends
a unified set of provisions on financial regulatory governance for all areas of finance. The
objective of the proposed Code on regulatory governance is to create a series of obligations for the Government and for regulators. The Code will cover all functions of the
regulator and lay down the principles and standards of behaviour expected from the regulator. It will also provide for a system of monitoring the functions of the regulator with a
process to ensure that the regulator is fully transparent and they act in compliance with
the best practices of public administration. Table 3.1 captures the recommendations of
the Commission for the creation of an appropriate regulatory structure.
The Commission recommends that the structure of the regulator be standardised for
all financial regulators. However, there may be exceptions required in respect of certain
specific functions where the general regulatory processes may not apply. These exceptions to the general process law should be kept to the minimum and generally avoided.
3.1. Selection of the regulators board

Regulators in India are statutory entities headed by a board. It is the responsibility of the
Government to appoint the members on the board of the regulator. The Commission
believes that it is necessary to create a statutory system for selecting board members in a
fair and transparent manner. It is recommended that the Government should be aided in
this process by a professional search and selection committee. This will help ensure that
the selected members are competent persons with relevant knowledge and experience.
The Commission looked at various systems of selection committees present under
Indian laws along with the practice in other common law jurisdictions. Based on this
analysis, it recommends that the government should maintain a panel of experts who
will serve as members of the selection committee at all times. Their expertise would be
21
STRUCTURE OF THE REGULATOR
Table of Recommendations 3.1 Basic structure of the regulator

1. The regulator will be set up as a corporate entity;
2. It will have the powers of a body corporate, including the power to enter into contracts, employ persons,
acquire assets, hire agents and delegate certain functions to them; and
3. The regulatory organisation will be composed of three parts:
(a) Board of the regulator: responsible for oversight and governance of the regulator;
(b) Chairperson: will be the chief executive of the regulator and will chair its board; and
(c) Office of the regulator: comprising of the employees, agents and assets of the regulator.
Table of Recommendations 3.2 Selection of board members

1. The responsibility for appointing board members vests with the Government. While discharging this responsibility, the Government will be guided by the recommendations of a selection committee.
2. The selection committee will shortlist at least three candidates for every position and provide the list to the
Government.
3. The structure of the selection committee will be as follows:
(a) The members will be appointed out of a list of experts maintained by the Government at all times,
consisting of experts in the fields of finance, economics, law and public administration.
(b) It will consist of: a representative of the Government (who will serve as the chairperson), the chairperson of the regulator (and in the case of selection of the chairperson, another Government representative), and three experts from the list maintained by the Government.
(c) The majority of the members must be persons who are not related to the Government. This is to ensure
that the selection committee is not biased towards short listing only Government officials.
4. Merit will be the guiding principle for the appointment of board members. Therefore, if the pool of applicants
in a selection process is weak, the selection committee will have the right (after recording the reasons) to
suggest other names to be considered for selection. Nominations by any member of the selection committee
should be in writing, accompanied by a statement of competence and experience of the person.
5. The regulator must, in advance, inform the search and selection committee of any foreseeable vacancies
and it will be the duty of the selection committee to forward the names of short-listed candidates before the
vacancy arises, and give the Government reasonable time to make a decision.
utilised by rotation as and when appointments to the board are to take place. The selection system will be governed by the process provided in Table 3.2.
The selection procedure should be designed in a manner that achieves a balance between the requirements of flexibility and transparency. Therefore, the draft Code does not
lay down such level of detail that the selection committee is unable to shortlist deserving
candidates or takes too long to do so. At the same time, the integrity of the selection procedure will be protected by requiring that all short-listing and decision making are done
in a transparent manner - the committee should disclose all the relevant documents considered by it and prepare a report after the completion of the selection procedure. This
will include the minutes of the discussion for nominating names, the criteria and process of selection and the reasons why specific persons were selected. The committee
would however, not be required to disclose any discussion about candidates who were
not short-listed.
3.2. Composition of the board of the regulator

The Commission suggests that the Board of a regulator should have four types of members:
1. Chairperson - There will be one chairperson of the board of a regulator. He/she will be responsible
for the functioning of the board and the office of the regulator. He/she will also be responsible for
and empowered with the day-to-day management of the regulator. In the event the chairperson
is not available, the longest serving member of the board shall act as the chairperson.
2. Executive members - The chairperson will be accompanied by a set of executive members. Within
22
Table of Recommendations 3.3 Types of members on the board of the regulator

1.
2.
3.
4.
Chairperson of the board

Executive members, including a set of designated administrative law members
Non-executive members
Government nominees
this category of members, some persons will be designated as administrative law members. Administrative law members will be responsible for:
(a) Reviewing the performance and carrying out the oversight of a designated set of employees of the regulator, referred to as administrative law officers; and
(b) Reviewing the decisions taken by the administrative law officers.
The executive members will devote their entire time to the management of the regulator and will
not be permitted to take up any other employment during their appointment. These members
will be responsible for the oversight of the regulators personnel, except for administrative law
officers who will be monitored only by administrative law members.
3. Non-executive members - This category will consist of persons who are experts in the fields of
finance, law, economics, etc., and are appointed to the board on a part-time basis. They will
not be involved in the day to day functions of the regulator. Non-executive members may take
up other engagements but will have to manage conflict of interest issues when participating in
board meetings.
4. Government nominees - The Government will have the right to nominate ex-officio members
on the board of the regulator. These members will represent the perspective of their departments/ministries or other regulators in the functioning of the regulator.
The Commission believes that it is crucial for the draft Code on regulatory governance to lay down the functions and powers of each type of member on the board of
a regulator. Accordingly, the law will state that the chairperson and executive members
are responsible for the day to day functioning of the regulator. The role of the administrative law members will be to focus on the regulators adjudication and administrative law functions. Having a category of non-executive members is a continuation of the
present system of appointing part-time members on the boards of financial regulators.
Such non-executive members will provide two important benefits to the management of
the regulator:
1. Since they will not be employees of the regulator, it is expected that they will be neutral observers
in the functioning of the regulator and alert the Government of any violations of law by the regulator.
2. Such members should have expertise in finance and allied fields, and preferably also some experience in providing financial services. This will bring in expertise and information about the
financial sector to the board of the regulator.
Unlike ordinary civil servants, board members are appointed for a limited time and
do not have a guarantee of continued employment. Therefore, one of the crucial requirements of independence is that the members should be protected from pressure through
change in their terms of appointment.For this reason, the Commission recommends that
the draft code should provide the conditions of appointment of members - duration, entitlements, system of removal and conflicts of interests (see Table 3.4).
3.3. Functioning of the board

The functioning of the board of regulators should primarily be left to the rules and regulations formed by the regulator. However, in the interest of accountability, certain principles
must be laid down to govern the actions of the board. The Commission is of the opinion
that best practices of conducting the functions of deliberative bodies should be incorporated in the functioning of the regulator. The recommendations with regard to what
should be contained in the draft Code to govern board meetings is provided in Table 3.5.
23
Table of Recommendations 3.4 Appointment conditions for board members

1. Duration of employment: All members of a board (including the chairperson) would have a fixed term of five
years, subject to a retirement age for executive members. The age of retirement for executive members must
be equivalent to the age of retirement for the equivalent senior-most Government positions.
2. Protection of entitlements: The salaries and other entitlements of the members of the board should be fixed
by the Government. However, once they are set, they should not be varied to the detriment of the incumbent
members of the board, or require further approvals from the Government.
3. Terms of removal: The draft Code provides for both, the reasons for which a member may be removed and
the process by which removal will take place. This may be done for:
I Regular Reasons: Completion of term, reaching the prescribed age limit, declaration of insolvency
and conviction by a criminal court which involves imprisonment.
I Special Reasons: Incapacity (physical and mental), behaviour unbecoming of the position held, conviction by a criminal court which does not involve imprisonment and dereliction of duty. For removal
under special reasons to take place the Government should establish a judicial committee (under the
supervision of the Supreme Court), which will investigate whether removal is necessary on the suggested grounds and create a public report on the issue.
4. Re-appointment: Members of the board can be reappointed for another term of five years as members. This
provision will however not be available for the chairperson of the board who cannot be reappointed. There
will be no automatic re-appointments - the incumbent member will be considered by the selection committee alongside other prospective candidates. If the selection committee finds the member suitable, he/she will
be short-listed and the Government then may choose to reappoint such members. The Commission believes
that this will ensure that the tenure of members is not extended as matter of course.
Table of Recommendations 3.5 Law governing board meetings

The principles governing the following matters must be covered by the draft Code:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Frequency of meetings;
Quorum;
Method of taking and recording decisions;
Decisions without meetings;
Legitimacy of decisions; and
Conflicts of interest.
The Commission is of the view that very high regard should be given to the need for
transparency in the board meetings of the regulator. While there may be some specific
decisions or deliberations of the regulator which may have commercial implications and
may not be released immediately, this should not be unduly used as a reason to deviate from the general principle of transparency. The draft Code will therefore require the
regulators to be transparent about meetings as far as possible and when any information is kept confidential, reasons for doing so must be recorded. For instance, pending
investigations and queries about violations by a regulated entity should be kept outside
the purview of publication as they have an impact on the reputation on the institution
without a finding of violation of laws. However, the decisions of the regulator should be
published to provide information to the regulated entities on the standards of conduct
expected by the regulator.
There is also a need for a formal mechanism to evaluate the regulators compliance
systems. This will be achieved by setting up a review committee that will be comprised
only of non-executive members of the board (see Table 3.6).
3.4. Advisory councils of the regulator

The regulators will be responsible for regulating a large and rapidly developing financial
system in India consisting of a large number of stake-holders, including financial service
providers, intermediaries, consumers and other users of the financial system. It is not
possible to ensure that all these stake-holders are adequately represented at all times
24
Table of Recommendations 3.6 Role of the review committee

The Commission recommends that the non-executive members of the board of a regulator form a special committee
called the review committee. This committee will discharge the following functions:
1. Oversight of compliance of the regulator with the governing laws;
2. Maintaining whistle-blower policies about violations of process within the office of the regulator;
3. Ensuring that all board meetings are held in compliance with the law and all meetings are minuted and votes
are recorded by creating a report;
4. Creating a system to monitor compliance of the office of the regulator with the decisions of the board through
reporting systems; and
5. Reviewing all risk management policies of the board of the regulator.
The review committee will make its observations in a report which will be annexed to the annual report of the regulator. The objective of this procedure is to ensure greater transparency in the functioning of the board of the regulator.
at the level of the board of the regulator. In particular, it is extremely difficult to identify
persons who can represent the interests of the common Indian household. Similarly, special fields of financial service may require the regulator to gain expertise in specific areas,
such as, insurance, algorithmic trading, detailed analysis of data, etc. The Commission
proposes that these issues should be addressed by creating advisory councils to advise
the board of the regulator (see Table 3.7).
3.5. Resource allocation of the regulator

Financial sector regulation is a resource intensive function. The sophisticated character
of financial markets coupled with rapid innovations in products and processes make it
necessary for the regulator to have the capability and resources to keep pace with developments in the sector. The need for financial independence is one of the primary reasons
for creating an independent regulator it allows the regulator to have the required flexibility and human resources that are more difficult to achieve within a traditional government setup.
As the regulator is empowered to hold assets independently, it can create physical
infrastructure dedicated to the enforcement of financial regulations. These resources can
be scaled up and modified quickly. Being independent of the Government also allows the
regulator to develop its own recruitment criteria and processes, which are necessary for
mobilising required human resources. The Commission notes that the provisions governing financial independence of the regulators are wide and have worked till now. Therefore, the Commission is of the opinion that there is no need to substantially modify them.
The present financial laws allow regulators to charge fees from the regulated entities
to cover their costs of functioning. In certain cases the Government has also provided
Table of Recommendations 3.7 Advisory councils
The Commission recommends creation of advisory councils to advise the board of the regulator. The councils will
be created by the board of the regulator (unless specifically created by the law). The composition and functioning of
the advisory councils will be as follows:
1. Composition:
(a) Include experts in the field for which it has been created; and
(b) Include persons with relevant experience in the area of finance.
2. Functions:
(a) Inform the board about issues in the specific areas for which they have been constituted; and
(b) Create a report on all draft regulations published by the regulator stating the councils views.
25
Table of Recommendations 3.8 Principles governing regulators resources

1. The regulator should be funded through fees levied on the financial firms.
2. The regulator should have the freedom to allocate the resources in the manner that it considers most appropriate to meet its regulatory objectives.
3. The Government may loan money to the regulator to offset initial setting up costs. However, apart from this
the involvement of the Government in the financial matters of the regulator should be minimal.
initial grants or loans to regulators as a corpus to start their operations. Table 3.8 covers
the recommendations of the Commission on the principles governing the finances of the
regulator. It includes the recommendation that the regulator should be funded primarily
through fees.
Allowing the regulator to fund itself from fees collected from regulated entities has
the following advantages:
1. It ensures that financial stake-holders, who are the main beneficiaries of regulated markets, bear
the cost of regulation instead of the cost being spread across the entire budget of the Government.
2. It creates operational efficiency for the regulator. As the financial market grows, the number of
transactions and firms increase and that increases the resource flow into the regulator. In turn,
the regulator can increase its spending on enforcement, inspections and other functions which
help improve the confidence of users.
3. It helps achieve freedom from Government rules on pay and budgeting, and thus facilitates the
hiring of experts.
4. It helps address issues of conflict of interests in a context, where, in addition to other dimensions
of political economy, the Government is the owner of many regulated entities in the form of public
sector financial firms.
The Commission recognises that the power to impose fees on regulated entities
leads to cost on all consumers of financial services and therefore the draft Code provides
certain guiding principles on the charging of fees instead of simply empowering the regulator to make the collection (see Table 3.9). It is particularly important to ensure that the
imposition of fees should not impose an undue burden on regulated firms or transfer the
cost of regulating one class of firms or transactions to others. To pursue this policy, the
Commission recommends that regulators be empowered to charge three different types
of fees.
1. Flat fees for registration: This fee should be as small as possible to ensure that it does not
prevent entry of new financial firms.
2. Fees dependant on the nature of the transaction: This type of fee will vary depending on the
nature of financial business being carried out. For example, if the cost of regulating an insurance
firm is higher than the cost of regulating a brokerage firm, the fees levied on the insurance firm
should be higher.
3. Fees dependent on the number or value of transactions: This type of fee will vary depending
on the frequency and size of transactions. For example, a brokerage firm may have to pay fees
depending upon the number of transactions it carries out. Similarly, an insurance firm would be
charged depending on the number of insured contracts it executes.
As noted earlier, regulatory independence requires that the Governments right to

intervene in the financial matters of the regulator is kept at a minimal. The Commission
therefore recommends that the Government must only control the salary and perquisites
of the members of the board of the regulator. The board should in turn be responsible for
maintaining adequate staff and expertise to meet its statutory objectives within its financial capacity. The board should therefore be charged with the responsibility of designing
a set of Human Resources (HR) practices that are conducive to the accomplishment of its
regulatory objectives.
26
Table of Recommendations 3.9 Principles governing the charging of fees by the

regulator
The legal provisions empowering the regulator to charge fees will incorporate the following aspects:
1. The regulator should charge fees only to cover expenses and keep adequate reserves;
2. Fees should be charged only through regulations made after following the legislative processes specified in
the draft Code;
3. The regulator should clearly explain the fees it is charging and demonstrate that the fee is not disproportional
to the cost for the regulator;
4. Applying the principle of proportionality, the regulator should place higher financial burdens on firms that
have more transactions, and thereby increase its work load and functions; and
5. The regulator should break up the fees into different categories.
Table of Recommendations 3.10 Performance measurement and reporting

The allocation of resources by the regulator is intrinsically tied to the performance of the regulator. Therefore the
Commission recommends the following principles for the measurement of the regulators performance and financial
reporting:
1. The regulator should create two annual reports:
(a) Audited report which is comparable to traditional financial reporting; and
(b) Performance report which incorporates global best practice systems of measuring the efficiency of the
regulatory system.
2. The performance report should use modern systems of measuring each activity of the regulator as objectively
as possible.
3. Performance systems must require the regulator to create and publish performance targets.
4. All performance measures must be published in the annual report.
5. Performance measurement system should be reviewed every three years to incorporate global best practices.
3.6. Performance assessment and reporting

The Commission noted that the present system of financial accounting of the regulator
is focused primarily on the reporting of expenditures incurred by the regulator under various heads. This, according to the Commission, does not constitute a sufficient test of
the fulfilment of regulatory objectives or the assessment of the regulators performance.
Therefore, there is need to require regulators to adhere to a more comprehensive system
of measuring their performance.
Measurement systems for assessing the performance of regulators should include an
assessment of the regulators processes on metrics such as, the time taken for granting an
approval, measurement of efficiency of internal administration systems, costs imposed
on regulated entities and rates of successful prosecution for violation of laws. Adopting
such an approach would constitute a departure from the present system where most financial regulators focus on measuring the activities of regulated entities and financial
markets as a standard for their own performance. The Commission noted that while
these measurements are important, measurement of various activities undertaken by the
regulator will provide much greater transparency and accountability.
The measurement of activities of the regulator also needs to be tied with the financial resources spent by the regulator to carry out those activities. A system which merely
measures the expenses of the regulator was therefore considered to be inadequate and
the Commission recommends a move towards tying the measurement of regulatory activities and the expenditure incurred for it as a crucial link for improving regulatory governance. Accordingly, the Commission recommends the following measurement processes
for the regulator (Table 3.10):
1. Budgeting Process: This process will measure the allocation of resources by the regulator for
its different objectives and try to assess the regulators performance in pursuing each objective in
27
the most comprehensive manner possible. Emulating the performance measure based auditing
system used globally by financial regulators, this process will:
I relate the exercise of functions by the regulator with its expenses;
I require the regulator to create performance metrics and targets which it will be required to
achieve;
I help in tracking the regulators performance across financial years.
2. Financial Accounting: This will be the traditional accounting of expenses for the purposes of
maintaining financial control and audit, which is currently being done by financial regulators.
The financial accounts will be audited by the CAG.
28
CHAPTER 4
Functions and powers of the

regulator
The regulator acts like a mini-state in that it exercises legislative powers in the form of
drafting regulations that are binding on regulated entities; it acts as the executive in its
supervision and enforcement actions; and it performs a quasi-judicial function while assessing compliance with the law by regulated entities and compliance of processes by
the regulator while imposing penalties on them.
While giving these wide ranging powers to the regulators, the draft Code on regulatory governance needs to put in place appropriate checks and balances to ensure that
the powers are not misused and proper regulatory governance processes are followed in
every action taken by the regulator.
The Commission has identified the following areas for which regulatory governance
processes need to be clearly detailed in the draft Code:
1. Process for issuing regulations and guidelines;
2. Executive functions - granting permission to carry on financial activities, information gathering,
investigation, imposition of penalties and compounding of offences; and
3. Administrative law functions.
4.1. Issuing regulations and guidelines

The primary function of a financial sector regulator is to set down standards of behaviour
expected from regulated entities. This encompasses making regulations governing how
the regulated entities should interact with the regulator, consumers, financial markets
and other regulated entities. Regulations also guide the internal functions and actions of
regulated entities in the conduct of financial activities.
In a system governed by the rule of law, no action should be judged against unknown
standards. Therefore, before the regulator can carry out any supervision or adjudication
functions it has the responsibility to lay down in clear and unambiguous terms, the behaviour that it expects from regulated entities. While doing so, the regulator needs to
follow a structured process that allows all stake-holders to be fully informed of and participate in the regulation-making process.
Some existing regulators have already adopted the good practice of carrying out
public consultations in the course of making regulations. However, the Commission
29
FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE REGULATOR
noted that since this is not mandated by legislation, the processes employed are not
adequately rooted in a thorough analysis of the public administration problems faced
in the regulation-making process. In addition, as with most other aspects of the legal
process in Indian financial regulatory governance, the practices followed by different financial regulators differ in idiosyncratic ways.
The Commission has therefore identified detailed requirements to define the process
that the regulators should follow while making regulations and the mechanisms for the
judicial review of legislative powers exercised by regulators.
If laws do not define a fixed set of instruments that can be used by the regulator, the
same regulatory agency might adopt multiple regulatory instruments circulars, notices,
letters, regulations, guidelines, master circulars, press notes with similar outcomes but
differing regulation-making processes. To avoid this situation, the Commission recommends that the draft Code should clearly define the legislative powers of the regulator
and the instruments. The Commission recommends that the regulator should be empowered to issue only two types of instruments regulations and guidelines.
4.1.1. Process for making regulations

The draft Code must determine the process to be followed for the formulation of regulations, starting with the manner in which the drafting of regulations is to be initiated. Given
the wide impact of regulations, the Commission recommends that the regulation-making
process should be directly overseen by the board of the regulator. This will ensure that
the issues that require regulatory intervention are discussed and approved at the highest
level within the regulators organisation. Therefore, after the process of drafting regulations has been initiated within the regulator, it will have to be approved by the board of
the regulator before being published to the public for comments.
The Commission believes that effective public participation in the regulation-making
process is necessary to ensure that subsidiary legislations are responsive to the actual requirements of the economy. It will also help check and improve the information used and
analysis done by the regulator. Therefore, the Commission recommends that the details
of the process to be followed for carrying out consultations and receiving public comments should be laid down in the draft Code. Doing so will allow for the standardisation
of best practices and hence lead to a more structured system for making subordinate legislations. The expected overall impact is that regulations will become more responsive
to the needs of the financial system.
4.1.2. Emergency regulations

The Commission recognises that the regulator may sometimes be faced with an emergency situation that requires the rapid introduction of a new regulation. In such cases,
it may not be feasible for the regulator to follow the detailed regulation-making process
discussed above. Therefore, the draft Code envisages a separate emergency regulationmaking process, as outlined in Table 4.3.
The Commission recommends that the draft Code will require the regulator to carry
out the consultation process in two stages. The first stage will be the issuance of a set
of introductory documents to inform the public of the proposed regulations and provide
a system for giving comments (see Table 4.1). This will be followed by a requirement to
respond to the comments received by the regulator and the issuance of final regulations
(see Table 4.2).
4.1.3. Issuing guidelines

In a system of principles-based provisions that are to be interpreted and applied by the
regulator, there is a genuine need for clarifications and explanations. This would require
30
Table of Recommendations 4.1 Issuance of documents for public consultation

The regulator will have to publish the following documents in the process of formulating new regulations:
1. The draft regulations;
2. The jurisdiction clause to identify the legal provision under which the proposed regulations are being made,
and the manner in which the regulation is consistent with the principles in the concerned legislation(s). If
the parent legislation does not specifically refer to the subject matter of regulations, the regulator will have
to establish a logical connection between the subject matter and the empowering provision in the law. The
document must contain explanation on how the regulation stands vis-a-vis each of the relevant principles in
the part(s) of the draft Code from which the powers are being drawn;
3. A statement of the problem or market failure that the regulator seeks to address through the proposed regulations, which will be used to test the effectiveness with which the regulations address the stated problem.
The statement must contain:
I The principles governing the proposed regulations; and
I The outcome the regulator seeks to achieve through the regulation; and
4. An analysis of the costs and benefits of the proposed regulation. This is required because every regulatory
intervention imposes certain costs on regulated entities and the system as a whole. The Commission recommends that regulations be drafted in a manner that minimises these compliance costs.
In some cases where a pure numerical value based cost-benefit analysis is not possible, the regulator should
provide the best possible analysis and reasoning for its choice of intervention.
After publishing the above documents, the regulator will specify a designated time for receiving comments from the
public on the regulations and the accompanying documents. The draft Code will ensure that the time period and the
mode of participation specified by the regulator is appropriate to allow for widespread public participation.
Table of Recommendations 4.2 Process after receiving public comments

After the time specified for making comments has lapsed, it will be the responsibility of the regulator to:
1. Publish all comments received;
2. Provide reasoned general response to the comments received, and specific response to some comments if
there is requirement stipulated in the draft Code for such response;
3. Publish the review of the draft regulations carried out by the regulators advisory council;
4. Have the final regulations approved by the board of the regulator. In the interests of transparency, the Commission recommends that deliberations and voting by the board members should be available publicly; and
5. Publish the final regulations.
Table of Recommendations 4.3 Emergency regulation making

In emergency situations the regulator would be empowered to pass regulations without following the consultation
process and without conducting a cost-benefit analysis, subject to the following conditions:
1. Regulations passed under this provision will lapse after a period of six months; and
2. The regulator must publish a reasoned order for using this power.
the regulator to have the power to issue guidelines explaining the interpretation of the
regulator of laws and regulations. The Commission believes that allowing the regulator
to issue guidelines of this nature will constitute an important step in reducing uncertainty
about the approach that the regulator may take.
The mechanism of issuing guidelines should not be used to (in effect) make regulations without complying with the procedural requirements laid down for regulationmaking. For this reason, the draft Code clarifies that guidelines are merely recommendatory in nature and the violations of guidelines alone will not empower the regulator to
initiate enforcement action against regulated entities. Table 4.4 shows the recommendations of the Commission in relation to issuance of guidelines.
4.1.4. Accountability to the Parliament

Since the power to issue regulations is a legislative power delegated by the Parliament to
the regulators, regulations formulated by the regulator should be placed before the ParFINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION
31
Table of Recommendations 4.4 Issuance of guidelines

The law governing the issuance of guidelines should:
1. Require the regulator to clearly explain the connection between the guidelines and the principles and provisions in the Parliamentary law that the regulator seeks to enforce;
2. Ensure that the guidelines are not used as a mechanism to create substantially new regulations;
3. Allow guidelines to be issued without a cost-benefit analysis but subject to the consultation process under
which the draft guidelines will be issued for comments and responses of persons affected by the guidelines;
4. Clearly state that violation of guidelines alone would not constitute the violation of regulations or law; and
5. If regulated entities ask for the interpretation or application of law for a specific transaction, the regulator
should provide it for a reasonable fee.
Table of Recommendations 4.5 Judicial review of regulations

The Commission recommends that any challenge to a regulation framed by the regulator should be reviewed by the
appellate tribunal on the following grounds:
1. The regulations should have been made within the bounds specified by the law. This would include ensuring
compliance with the specific provision of law under which the regulation is made and the general objectives
and principles of the regulator;
2. The regulations should have been made in compliance with the process laid down in the law; and
3. The documents published along with the regulations should not have any substantive material defects,
which may be proved through expert evidence or data.
liament. This allows the Parliament to review whether the regulator, acting in its capacity
as an agent, has acted within its scope of authority while formulating the regulations.
The current system of review by the Parliament involves sending subordinate legislation (regulations made by the regulator in the present case) to a different committee than
the one which reviews laws presented to the Parliament. The Commission recommends
that it may be appropriate for these to be considered by the same committee.
4.1.5. Judicial review of regulations

At present, judicial review is largely limited to executive actions. However, the Commission recognises that it is equally important to have a mechanism that allows regulated
entities and others to question the regulations made by the regulator in exercise of its
legislative powers, if regulations exceed the mandate given to the regulator under the primary law or if the specified process for making regulations has not been duly followed.
The Commission therefore recommends that the process to challenge subsidiary legislation made by regulators should also be provided in the draft Code.
The first point of challenge of regulations would be before the FSAT, a specialised
tribunal that will be created for the financial sector as a whole. In addition to this, the
power of the Constitutional courts to review legislation would of course continue.
The judicial review of the regulation-making process by the appellate tribunal should
ideally provide a more detailed scrutiny than compliance with Constitutional provisions.
In the course of this process, the regulations should be checked for compliance on the
grounds mentioned in Table 4.5.
4.2. Executive functions

A major responsibility of any regulator involves the exercise of executive functions. This
includes inspections, investigations, enforcement of orders and processing of complaints.
The exercise of supervision and monitoring powers is fundamental to the effective enforcement of laws by the regulator. However, it is often seen that the manner of exercise
32
Table of Recommendations 4.6 General executive functions of a regulator

The Commission recognises that regulator must carry out certain general executive functions on a routine basis.
These include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Grant of approvals, including licensing or registration;

Inspections, which may be routine or special;
Proving violation of regulations to the judicial officers (by leading evidence);
In the case of successful prosecution before the administrative law department, suggesting enforcement actions; and
5. Compounding of offences with the involvement of the administrative law department.
of executive function may place an undue burden on regulated entities and financial markets.
Long pending investigations create uncertainty for businesses. When news of ongoing investigations leaks, it may inflict damage to the reputation of any financial firm.
Similarly, injunctions placed on businesses under investigation have strong economic
implications and should be placed for the shortest possible period. These problems can
be checked by putting in place legal measures that require investigations to be finished
within specified time, and kept confidential from the public.
The Commission notes that the overall approach of the draft Code should be to provide for strong executive powers, balanced with greater transparency and accountability,
to prevent abuse. Executive functions of regulator do not have standardised statutory
checks under present legislations. Therefore, the Commission recommends that adequate transparency requirements, checks and judicial oversight be placed on the exercise of executive functions by regulator. This will also reduce allegations of possible bias
and arbitrariness to the minimum.
It is also important to ensure that there is no overlap in the legislative and executive
functions of the regulator. The executive should not be allowed to issue instructions of a
general nature to all regulated entities or a class of regulated entities. Such instructions
should only be possible after the full regulation-making process has been followed.
Table 4.6 sets out the areas in which the Commission has made specific recommendations regarding the exercise of executive powers.
4.2.1. Permission and approvals

Granting permissions to start a business is the core function of any regulator. This is also
the first barrier to entry for new entrants to any business. Each new business permission
also increases the burden on the regulator as it increases the number of entities it has to
monitor. The draft Code must grant the regulator discretion to approve or reject applications. The Commission has decided that the power must be exercised in a manner guided
by regulations. As far as possible the discretion of the regulator should be guided through
an underlying duty to explain. The power of the regulator to reject applications should be
balanced with the requirement for allowing legitimate parties getting approvals in a time
bound manner for smoother functioning of the regulatory system. Table 4.7 summarises
the recommendations of the Commission for governing the procedure for disposing applications.
4.2.2. Information gathering

Regulator requires information about the activities of their regulated entities. It may also
require information from private sources and other government agencies. At present,
a diverse array of mechanisms are used by firms to submit information to regulatory
33
Table of Recommendations 4.7 Giving permission to carry out a business

The system of giving permission to new entities must be strictly governed by regulations and finished within a time
bound manner. The provisions must:
I
I
I
I
Provide a system for persons to apply for authorisation to provide financial services;
Ensure that all applications are accepted or rejected within a specified time;
Ensure that whenever an application is rejected, reasons for the rejection are provided; and
Provide that the regulator gives warning to the applicant before rejecting an application.
Table of Recommendations 4.8 Information gathering

The draft Code contains the following provisions on information gathering:
1.
2.
3.
4.
The regulator should have the power to collect information from regulated entities;
The regulator should have power to collect information from other government agencies;
Information should be collected in electronic format as far as possible; and
The regulator should publish information it generates (orders, decision, list of regulated entities) in the public
domain (apart from confidential information).
agencies. Harmonisation into a single mechanism for electronic submission of information will reduce the cost of compliance for firms and also reduce the cost of information
management for regulator. The Commission proposes to create a centralised database,
through which all the information is collected by regulator and other agencies. A more
detailed discussion on this centralised database can be found in the chapter on systemic
risk. Maintaining and analysing this information is an important indicator of violation of
provisions in many situations. Even at present, most regulators have the power to require
regulated entities to produce documents and information in normal course of regulation.
This power should be continued in the proposed legislation. Table 4.8 contains other details regarding information gathering powers.
The Commission also noted that the use of technology is crucial in the context of the
information gathering function. Using electronic systems will affect stake-holders in the
financial system in the following ways:
1. Regulator: Use of electronic data management will provide regulator with real-time information
about financial entities. It will also provide regulator with modern analytical systems to track
violations or risks. Toward this end, the Commission proposes to create a centralised database
that will use state-of-the-art data management systems to route regulatory data.
2. Regulated entities: Use of electronic reporting systems may reduce compliance costs for regulated entities. It will also allow regulated entities to provide information to the regulator in a
seamless manner.
3. Consumers: Access to records of the regulator about regulated entities in electronic format will
allow consumers to gain information quickly. It will also help consumers to access their own
records and check for financial frauds.
4.2.3. Investigations
It is important that the powers of investigation and enforcement are carried out in the
least arbitrary and the most effective manner. The Commission has noted that executive
functions in the financial market can have serious consequences. The information that
a firm is under investigation may cause undue panic in the market and even if the result of investigation is a positive outcome for the firm, the intervening period may cause
irreparable damage to the reputation and business of the firm. The system of investigations should therefore be such that it does not harm or unduly burden the entity under
investigation (see Table 4.9).
The Commission is of the opinion that the executive investigation process should be
carried out in:
34
Table of Recommendations 4.9 Investigations

The Commission recommends that investigations should be:
I
I
I
I
Carried out according to the written terms of investigation;

Carried out by an appointed investigator;
Finished within a time bound manner, unless extended by an administrative law officer; and
Carried out with least disruption to the function or reputation of a business.
The investigators empowered under the draft Code should have the power to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Require production of documents;

Require persons to answer questions;
Require co-operation of non-regulated entities in investigation; and
Require co-operation from other government agencies.
Table of Recommendations 4.10 Information-sharing between regulators

1. The draft Code should require the regulator to create a framework for sharing of information.
2. The electronic information framework of each regulator should be compatible with that of other regulator(s)
and agencies with which it regularly shares information.
3. The legal framework should have adequate checks and records to prevent misuse of informations.
1. A confidential manner so as to prevent panic before any finding; and

2. A time bound manner so as not to unduly burden the entity under investigation.
4.2.4. Sharing of information

Investigations are greatly assisted by a strong database providing details of the regulated
entities and the transactions they have undertaken. The Commission recognises that this
information may not be available at a single source. Hence, the Commission suggests
the creation of a single database, through which all information collected by regulator
(and other agencies in the financial sector architecture), will be routed (see the chapter
on systemic risk for a detailed discussion on this issue). Where regulator needs to obtain information from other regulator(s) or government agencies, the draft Code creates
a framework for sharing information between the agencies. Table 4.10 provides the system suggested by the Commission for sharing of information.
4.2.5. Consequence of violations

The Commission found that different regulators have different consequences for violations of laws and regulations enforced by them. This creates detriment to the rule of law
and increases uncertainty about violations.
The Commission recommends that:
1. The consequence of violations be standardised;
2. The way the consequence is determined be regulated by law;
3. Similar violations be treated with similar consequence; and
4. The consequence be proportional to the violation and the behaviour of the violator.
The Commission recommends that whenever a violation is detected the regulator

must determine which of the following conditions led to the violation:
1. The violation was a result of an informed intent to commit the violation;
2. The violation was a result of serious negligence of maintaining standards expected of a reasonable person carrying out the activity; or
3. The violation was a result of a mistake or was of a technical nature.
35
The Commission recommends that depending on the cause of the violation the regulator must apply the following consequences in increasing order:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Issuing a private warning;

Issue a public notice;
Require a corrective action applicable to the violation;
Impose a monetary penalty;
Suspend the permission to carry out certain transactions;
Permanently revoke the permission to carry out regulated activities; and/or
Institute criminal proceedings in appropriate courts.
4.2.6. Imposition of monetary penalties

The Commission noted that the present system of specifying statutory limits on the amount of penalties that can be imposed for any violation has a critical flaw it does not
ensure that a violator pays a fine higher than the gain made through the violation. This
is because it is impossible to predict the benefit a violator will gain by committing an
offence. The maximum limit on penalties is sometimes lower than the benefit gained by
the violator through violation. This leads to a situation where even if the violator is caught
and required to pay the fine, he or she may still emerge monetarily better off.
The Commission notes that the level of penalties should be an effective deterrent to
future violations and signal all other regulated entities that the potential of gain from violation will be outweighed by the penalty which will be applied in the case of detection
of the violation. This principle also acknowledges that all violators of any law are never
detected. Therefore, to act as a deterrence, the penalty should be a multiple of the illegitimate gain from the violation. The amount of penalty should also be dependent on
whether the action was deliberately done or due to reckless behaviour or due to negligence of the person.
The system of imposing financial penalties should be guided by the following principles:
1. The penalty system should require the violator to pay a multiple of the illegitimate gain made
from the violation;
2. Out of the penalty collected, the regulator should try to compensate any directly identifiable victims of the violations;
3. Any surplus at this point should be deposited with the Consolidated Fund of India;
4. In the event that there are no direct victims, the regulator must transfer all the penalty (after deducting administration costs) to the Consolidated Fund of India;
5. If there is no clearly identifiable illegal gain from the violation, the regulator must impose a
penalty that is a proportion of the income of the violator from financial activities; and
6. All systems of monetary penalties must be regulated by regulations that consider the magnitude
of the violations and the previous violations of the violator.
The doctrine of unjust enrichment allows the regulator to recover all the profit the
violator made from the violation. Unjust enrichment should be recovered, in addition to
the fine applied for violation of regulations. This should be recovered and then, if possible, distributed amongst persons who were adversely affected on account of the violation. Punitive damages create a deterrence for future violators who will know that in the
event that they are successfully prosecuted the penalty they will face will surely outweigh
the profits that they make. It requires the regulator to expressly impose fines which are
higher than the benefit gained out of the violation. This is usually carried out by providing penalties as a multiple of the amount of gain by the violator. The Commission found
that this principle has already been provided in some Indian legislations and should be
extended to the financial sector as a whole.
Table 4.11 summarises the recommendations of the Commission for creating a legal
system governing penalties.
36
Table of Recommendations 4.11 Requirement for proportional penalties

The regulator must ensure that the penalties deter potential violators in the future. It is impossible to ensure that all
violators are caught. However, violators must pay fines proportional to the damage and the illegal gain. The following
are the steps the regulator must follow:
I For each violation, the regulator must carry out an investigation on the illegitimate gain made by the violator;
I The regulator must make an effort to determine the amount of illegitimate gains made by the violator;
I The penalty will be a multiple of the illegitimate gain, but limited to a maximum of 3 times the illegitimate
gain;
I The regulator must compensate any direct victims of the violations if they can be ascertained; and
I The regulator must have regulations and processes for calculating and enforcing the fines.
Table of Recommendations 4.12 Compounding of offences

The system for compounding offences must:
I
I
I
I
I
Be guided by a policy set out by the regulator;

Have adequate checks and balances to prevent interference from external parties;
Be transparent to prevent allegations of favouritism;
Consider previous behaviour of the party; and
Consider whether the party itself offered compounding before any investigation was started.
4.2.7. Compounding of offences

The Commission believes that the system of compounding offences is important for reducing judicial burden and addressing minor violations, which are common in the financial sector. However, the system of compounding offences requires a standardised structure across all regulators which is not present as of date. The recommendations of the
Commission are provided in Table 4.12.
4.3. Administrative law and role of tribunals

In exercise of their supervisory and enforcement powers, regulators need to assess whether or not regulated entities have adequately complied with the provisions of financial
laws and in case of any detected breach, they have the power of impose appropriate
penalties. These wide ranging executive powers given to regulators necessarily need to
be balanced with proper systems governing the application of administrative law. Therefore, the Commission recommends that the exercise of quasi-judicial (administrative law)
functions by regulators needs to be carried out within the bounds of a sound legal framework that ensures the separation of administrative law powers from other powers of the
regulator.
In addition, there also needs to be a mechanism to review the actions taken by regulators in exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. Given the specialised character of financial markets and the complicated nature of issues involved, the Commission finds
that there is a strong case for having a dedicated appellate tribunal.
The Commission therefore makes specific recommendations in respect of the processes governing these two areas:
1. Administrative law functions carried out by the regulator: How the regulator separates and carries
out regulatory function within its organisation.
2. Judicial review by appellate tribunals: How the decisions of the regulator are reviewed through a
dedicated financial sector appellate tribunal.
4.3.1. Administrative law functions of the regulator

At the level of the regulators board, at least one executive member should be designated
37
Table of Recommendations 4.13 Requirement of administrative law officers

The system of administrative law functions requires:
I The board of the regulator will appoint one of its member as administrative law member;
I The creation of a special class of officers called administrative law officers; and
I While serving as administrative law officers, these persons shall not carry out other functions. This is necessary to maintain separation of their roles and responsibilities from the other staff members of the regulator.
Table of Recommendations 4.14 Judicial review of executive actions

The Commission recommends the following principles for application of administrative law by the regulator:
1.
2.
3.
4.
All investigations and internal processes should strictly conform to procedures of fairness;
Even minor non-compliance to procedure should be required to be adequately explained by the regulator;
Administrative law officers should act as disinterested third parties in a dispute; and
The decisions of administrative law officers will lead to the development of a body of cases similar to common
law jurisprudence.
Table of Recommendations 4.15 Procedure for administrative law functions

1. All decisions to impose penalty or decisions requiring any action against any regulated entity should be carried out by administrative law officers;
2. Administrative law officers should place the proposed decision of the executive and the material on which
the decision was arrived at, before the regulated entity through a notice called a warning notice;
3. The regulated entity must be allowed to respond before a decision is taken;
4. The decision of the administrative office must be a reasoned decision and should be provided to the regulated entity or other concerned person through a notice called the decision notice; and
5. The regulated entity may ask the administrative law member of the board to review the decision taken by the
administrative law officer.
as an administrative law member. Under the member, the regulator will maintain a class
of administrative law officers. The administrative law member will be responsible for
oversight of the functioning of the administrative law officers. Consequently, such member will not take active part in executive functions of the regulator and not be involved in
any investigation, inspection or similar other functions.
Like the administrative law members, the administrative law officers will also not be
involved in any investigation proceedings. This would, however, be achieved without
creating a wall of separation within the regulator administrative law officers would be
drawn from the general pool of employees of the regulator but as long as such persons are
involved in judicial functions they would not be involved in any other regulatory functions
(see Table 4.13).
4.3.2. Procedure for administrative law functions

The administrative law functions of the regulator are at two levels. The first level adjudication will be done by administrative law officers who will work inside the agency of the
regulator but will not be involved in executive functions. While exercising their functions,
the administrative law officers will examine the data and evidence collected by the regulators executive officers and will assess the appropriateness of their executive orders (see
Table 4.14).
Appeals from the orders of the administrative law officers will go to the administrative
law members of the board. This process will act as a performance review of the administrative law officers and also reduce the number of appeals to the tribunal by weeding
out flawed orders. Table 4.15 summarises the administrative law related processes of the
regulator.
38
Table of Recommendations 4.16 Approach to judicial review of regulatory actions

1. All functions including the quasi-judicial function of regulator should be subject to judicial review;
2. This review should be done through an appellate mechanism;
3. There should be a single dedicated appellate tribunal for the entire financial sector that will cover all financial
regulators;
4. The appellate tribunal will hear appeals against the decisions made by and the regulations framed by financial regulators;
5. The appellate tribunal will be funded by an appropriate fee from all regulated entities; and
6. The appellate tribunals structure is clearly detailed out in the draft Code.
The Commission is of the opinion that while the entire Code for Civil Procedure, 1908
(CPC) need not be followed by the administrative law officers and members, the draft
Code provides the basic rubric of the procedure of judicial determination and appeals.
Therefore, it will be the responsibility of the board of the regulator to create appropriate subsidiary legislation to establish the procedures to be followed for the discharge of
administrative law functions by the regulator.
4.3.3. Judicial review and appellate tribunals

The Commission recognises that actions taken by regulators can impose significant penalties and burden on regulated entities. Therefore, the rule of law requires that a clear judicial process be available to persons who seek to challenge regulatory actions. The needs
of a modern financial system require us to move beyond a system where appeals against
regulatory decisions can be made to an authority within the regulator or to the Government to the creation of a specialised FSAT. The appellate framework envisaged by the
Commission is outlined in Table 4.16.
4.3.4. Structure of the appellate tribunal

As regards the structure and functioning of the FSAT, the Commission finds that there is
need for clearly demarcating and concentrating on two important functions:
1. Judicial functions of the tribunal, which require persons with qualification and experience in law
and finance; and
2. Administrative functions of the tribunal, which include service of documents, collecting evidence,
accepting written submissions, managing dates for hearings and arguments.
The judicial functions of the tribunal requires expertise in various fields of law and finance. In order to satisfy the requirements of separation of powers envisaged in the Constitution, the Commission recommends that the tribunal must remain under the control
of judicial officers. This is also consistent with the present structure of tribunals in India.
Table 4.17 summarises the recommendations of the Commission in relation to the judicial
functions of the appellate tribunal.
4.3.5. Functioning of the tribunals registry

The present systems of management of courts and tribunals often involve mandating
the chief judicial officer of the court or the senior-most judge to be responsible for the
administration of the tribunal or court. This can interfere with the persons core appellate
functions by causing him or her to divert attention to administrative matters. In some
cases, this challenge has been addressed by appointing a separate registrar for the court
or tribunal.
The Commission recommends that the appellate tribunal should be supported by
an efficient registry which will be headed by a registrar having specialised management
39
Table of Recommendations 4.17 Judicial structure of tribunal

For creating a clear judicial structure for the appellate tribunal, the Commission recommends the following provisions:
1. The appellate tribunal will be headed by a presiding officer who is qualified to be a Judge of Supreme Court,
Chief Justice of a High Court, or has served for at least seven years as a Judge of a High Court;
2. The tribunal will have at least two members; the specific number of members of a tribunal will be determined
by the case load;
3. The members of the tribunal must have experience in the fields of finance, economics, accountancy and law;
4. The members may be formed into benches, in which case, each bench must have a person who is qualified
in law; and
5. There will be a statutory appeal available against the decisions of the appellate tribunal to the Supreme
Court.
Table of Recommendations 4.18 Rules of procedure for appellate tribunal

The appellate tribunal should devote attention to standardising the systems for:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Application of complaints and responses;

Implementation of temporary orders;
Introduction of evidence;
Hearing of arguments;
Determination of the case; and
Determination of the penalty.
skills who will be responsible for all the infrastructure and administrative functions of the
appellate tribunal. To ensure that the separate registry does not undermine the independence of the tribunal, the registrar should be under the supervision of the chief judicial
officer of the appellate tribunal.
The Commission recommends the following provisions relating to the registry of the
appellate tribunal to ensure its efficient functioning:
1. Developing details of procedure: The draft Code requires the appellate tribunal to formulate its
own regulations on procedure, and publish them so as to induce clarity amongst financial firms.
These regulations, on the areas mentioned in Table 4.18, should be formed by the appellate tribunal itself.
2. Using information technology: The processes of the appellate tribunal should be geared towards
using information technology to integrate its entire judicial functions into an electronic form.
The objective of the use of technology would be to reduce the cost of approaching the tribunal,
greater efficiency in the functioning of the tribunal and greater transparency in the performance
of the tribunal. Information technology should be used to reduce requirements for physical
travel, keeping paper records, and following up on compliance with orders.
3. Resources and reporting: The efficiency of the tribunals procedures need to be continuously
monitored and measured. The draft Code will help achieve this by specifying that the tribunal
must comply with accountability requirements through the production of detailed performance
statistics, annual reports and audit reports similar to that of regulators.
4.4. Conclusion
The functioning of regulatory agencies is a critical component of financial law. Regulatory
agencies are remarkable in featuring a combination of regulation-making power that is
delegated by Parliament, executive functions, and quasi-judicial functions. In addition,
there are sound reasons for favouring significant political and operational independence
in regulatory agencies. In order to obtain sound outcomes, the Commission has applied
meticulous care in clearly establishing unconflicted objectives, processes governing legislative and executive functions, bringing in an element of separation of powers for per40
forming quasi-judicial functions, and establishing an effective specialised mechanism for

substantive judicial review of regulations and orders.
The basic public administration challenge of establishing a regulatory agency does
not vary from one agency to the next. Hence, the Commission proposes a single and
consistent framework that is applied to all regulatory agencies.
41
CHAPTER 5
Consumer protection
5.1. Strategic picture

A well functioning financial system should allow individuals, households and enterprises
to efficiently allocate and manage their resources and protect themselves from risk, through the use of financial products and services. This involves complex interactions between consumers and financial service providers. At a first level, these interactions require the support of law to define and protect property rights and facilitate the enforcement of contracts.
However, the complexity of financial markets and the existence of market failures in
the form of information asymmetries, market externalities and differences in the bargaining powers of consumers and service providers, create the need for a higher standard of
protection for financial consumers. The need for financial consumers to be treated fairly
makes it appropriate to adopt a more intrusive approach to financial regulation, when
compared with most other fields.
Currently, the strategy in Indian finance is focused on the doctrine of caveat emptor:
let the buyer beware. Beyond protection from fraud and provisions to ensure full disclosure, consumers are generally left to their own devices. After extensive analysis and
debate on these questions, the Commission believes that to the extent that consumers
of financial services are more vulnerable than consumers of ordinary goods and services,
higher standards of protection ensured by special efforts of the State are justified.
The vulnerability of consumers reflects a major gap in Indian financial regulation,
which needs to be addressed. As such, the Commission recommends the adoption of a
consolidated, non-sector-specific, consumer protection framework for the entire financial system that will empower and require regulators to pursue consumer protection for
the financial activities regulated by them. In this context, the draft Code approaches the
problems of consumer protection on two fronts: prevention and cure.
Prevention requires regulation-making and enforcement across the entire financial
system from the viewpoint of consumer interests. For example, looking at questions of
remuneration and conflicts of interest, when a sales agent sells a financial product to a
household, and gets paid a fee by the producer of this financial product, is there a problem with conflicts of interest? How do we evolve a structure where the provider acts in the
best interest of the consumer? Regulators should be obliged to grapple with questions
such as these.
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CONSUMER PROTECTION
The consumer protection part of the draft Code has three components: an enumerated set of rights and protections for consumers, an enumerated set of powers in the
hands of the regulator, and principles that guide what power should be used under what
circumstances. The details of consumer protection would, of course, lie in the subordinated legislation to be drafted by financial regulators. Whether or not, for example, loads
and other conflicted remuneration structures should be banned is a question that would
need to be addressed by the regulator. The regulator will use its authority to develop
subordinate legislation which will adapt over the years to reflect financial innovation,
technological change, and the evolving nature of the Indian economy. Alongside this
regulation-making mandate, the regulator would also have supervisory roles to ensure
compliance with the law.
In India, so far, the financial regulatory structure has been defined by sector, with
multiple laws and often multiple agencies covering various sectors. This has led to inconsistent treatment, and regulatory arbitrage. Regulators have sometimes been lax in developing required protections out of notions of facilitating growth in the industry. These
problems would be reduced by having a single principles-based law which would cover
the entire financial system. The Commission believes that an overarching principlesbased body of law would allow regulatory flexibility, consistent treatment of consumers
across all aspects of their engagement with the financial system, fairness and ultimately
a more stable financial system.
Turning from prevention to cure, the Commission proposes the creation of a unified financial redress agency. The redress agency is expected to have front-ends in every district of India, where consumers of all financial products will be able to submit
complaints. Modern technology will be used to connect these front-ends into a centralised light-weight adjudication process. A well structured work-flow process will support speedy and fair handling of cases. Consumers will deal only with the redress agency
when they have grievances in any financial activity: they will not have to deal with multiple agencies.
The complaints brought before the redress agency will shed light on where the problems of consumer protection are being found, and thus suggest areas for improvement in
subordinated legislation. As such, a key feature of the redress agency will be the creation
of a feedback loop through which the computerised case database of the redress agency
will be utilised by the regulator to make better regulations on a systematic basis.
India needs a capable financial system, with sophisticated private financial firms.
However, the emergence of this financial system should not become a carte blanche for
clever financial firms who achieve undue influence with their regulators, to take unfair
Table of Recommendations 5.1 Framework on consumer protection
The draft Code contains a consolidated non-sector-specific financial consumer protection framework. It identifies
consumer protection as a key regulatory objective and contains the following preventive and curative components:
1. Preventive tools
I Certain protections are provided to all financial consumers.
I An additional set of protections are provided to unsophisticated or retail consumers.
I The regulator is given a list of enumerated powers which it can use in order to implement these protections.
I The regulator will be guided by a list of principles that should inform the exercise of its powers.
I The regulator has been given the power to supervise financial service providers and initiate enforcement and disciplinary actions.
2. Curative tools
I Creation of an independent financial redress agency to redress complaints of retail consumers against
all financial service providers.
I A research program, applied to the data emanating from the redress agency, will feed back to the
regulator and thus enable improvements in its work.
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CONSUMER PROTECTION
Table of Recommendations 5.2 Meaning of consumer and retail consumer

The terms consumer and retail consumer are defined in the draft Code to mean:
1. Consumer: A person who has availed, avails, or intends to avail a financial service or has a right or interest in
a financial product.
2. Retail consumer: A consumer that is an individual or an eligible enterprise, if the value of the financial product
or service does not exceed the limit specified by the regulator in relation to that product or service. The
regulator may specify different limits for different categories of financial products and services.
3. Eligible enterprise: An enterprise that has less than a specified level of net asset value or has less than a specified level of turnover. Each of these caps will be specified by the regulator.
advantage of customers. The present financial laws in India are vulnerable to such a
prospect. As such, the Commission believes that it is essential to place the function of
consumer protection at the heart of financial regulation (see Table 5.1).
5.2. Scope of the law

In some jurisdictions, the protections under financial laws are available only to consumers who are individuals or households, and often only when they use financial services for personal or household purposes. This helps in limiting the coverage of the law to
only the most vulnerable categories of users and avoiding regulatory intervention in markets involving sophisticated users. The Commission considered this position but found
that in the present state of development of the Indian financial sector and the sophistication levels of consumers, adopting a limiting definition could lead to undue exclusions. It
therefore opted for a wider definition of consumer, which includes any person who avails
a financial product or service, without regard to the persons legal status or the purpose
of use.
The draft Code empowers the regulator to classify consumers into different categories, based on their levels of sophistication, and issue subordinated legislations suited
to the needs of particular categories. In addition to giving this discretion to the regulator, the Commission agreed that the law itself should contain additional safeguards for
consumers who are identified as being most vulnerable and susceptible to abuse. This
category of persons, referred to as retail consumers, will include individuals and small and
medium enterprises, which are identified as eligible enterprises.
However, in order to exclude very high net worth individuals and enterprises undertaking large value transactions from its ambit, the category of retail consumers will be
limited to persons who acquire financial services for a consideration that is below a specified limit (see Table 5.2).
5.3. Objectives and principles

The objectives of consumer protection are to guard consumer interests and to promote
public awareness (see Table 5.3). While pursuing these objectives, the regulator will be
empowered to make regulations to determine the manner and extent to which the protections under the law will apply to the users of different financial products and services.
Table of Recommendations 5.3 Objectives
The consumer protection part of the draft Code will direct the regulator to pursue the twin objectives of:
1. Protecting and furthering the interests of consumers of financial products and services; and
2. Promoting public awareness in financial matters.
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CONSUMER PROTECTION
Table of Recommendations 5.4 Principles to guide the regulators

The regulator must consider the following principles while carrying out any functions or exercising any powers relating to consumer protection:
1. The level of protection given to a consumer and the level of responsibility on the financial service provider
should vary depending on:
I the level of sophistication of the consumer;
I the nature and degree of risk embodied in a financial product or service; and
I the extent of dependence of the consumer on the financial service provider.
2. Consumers should take reasonable responsibility for their decisions.
3. Any obligation imposed on a financial service provider should be consistent with the benefits expected from
such obligation.
4. Barriers to competition owing to adverse effects of regulatory actions should be minimised and there should
be competitive neutrality in the treatment of financial service providers.
5. The need to promote, and not hamper, innovation and access to financial products and services.
Table of Recommendations 5.5 Protections available to consumers

I Basic protections for all consumers:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Financial service providers must act with professional diligence;

Protection against unfair contract terms;
Protection against unfair conduct;
Protection of personal information;
Requirement of fair disclosure; and
Redress of complaints by the financial service provider.
I Additional protections for retail consumers:

7 Right to receive suitable advice;
8 Protection from conflict of interest of advisors; and
9 Access to the redress agency for redress of grievances.
The regulator will also be able to impose a range of requirements on financial service
providers, spanning from disclosure, suitability and advice requirements, regulation of
incentive structures, and more intrusive powers such as recommending modifications in
the design of financial products and services.
The Commission believes that regulatory powers should be used where they are
most required and in a least-distortionary manner. As such, guiding principles to inform
the choice and application of powers should accompany the grant of any broad range of
powers. These principles will require the regulator to pay special attention to diversity
in consumer profiles and differences in the kind of risks that different financial products
pose to consumers. Further, the principle of proportionality suggests that the intensity
of any obligation imposed on a financial service provider should be consistent with the
benefits that are expected to arise from imposing the obligation.
Currently, rapid expansion of financial access is a major policy goal of the Government. This requires significant leaps in innovations in financial products and processes,
and business models. These innovations will be fostered by two elements: higher levels
of competition and an appropriate regulatory climate that supports and enables innovation. Table 5.4 summarises the principles that are being stated in the draft Code to guide
the regulators on the subject of consumer protection.
5.4. Protections for all consumers

To be able to confidently participate in the financial markets, all consumers should be
provided with certain basic protections. In addition, a wider set of protections need to be
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CONSUMER PROTECTION
Table of Recommendations 5.6 Unfair contract terms

(a) An unfair term found in a financial contract that has not been negotiated between the parties will be void.
(b) Non-negotiated contracts include contracts in which the consumer has very little or no bargaining power compared to the financial service provider and standard form contracts.
(c) A term is unfair if it causes a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties, to the detriment
of the consumer. However, this will not include a term that:
I is reasonably required to protect the legitimate interests of the service provider;
I sets the basic terms of the financial contract, such as the price; or
I is required under any law or regulations.
(d) The court or redress agency may strike down a term for being unfair, while allowing the rest of the financial
contract to continue.
Table of Recommendations 5.7 Protection of personal information

Personal information means any information that relates to a person or permits the inference of a persons identity.
This includes demographic information such as the persons name and contact information; biometric information;
and transactional information about holdings and dealings in financial products and services. The draft Code provides for the following protections for personal information:
(a) A prohibition on collection of personal information beyond what is required for providing the relevant financial
service.
(b) A requirement to maintain confidentiality of personal information, unless the consumer has consented to the
disclosure or it is otherwise permitted by law.
(c) An obligation to maintain accurate, up-to-date and complete personal information, and to allow consumers
reasonable access to their personal information.
(d) Powers given to the regulator to specify additional requirements, exempt some financial service providers
from application of this protection and establish mechanisms to ensure that consumers can access their personal information.
available only to retail consumers. The Commission suggests six types of protections for
all consumers and three additional protections for retail consumers (see Table 5.5).
1. Right to professional diligence
Consumers should be assured that any interaction that they have with a financial service provider
will be carried out in good faith and in line with honest market practices. The level of diligence
expected from a provider will vary depending on the honest practices followed in that line of
business, the consumers knowledge and expertise level and the nature of risk involved in the
financial service.
2. Protection against unfair contract terms
Due to differences in the bargaining power of consumers and financial intermediaries, consumers
are often forced to accept unreasonable contractual terms that are not in their best interests.
To prevent this, the draft Code declares unfair terms in financial contracts that have not been
explicitly negotiated between the parties to be void (see Table 5.6).
3. Protection against unfair conduct
A consumers decision on whether or not to enter into a financial contract or the manner in which
to exercise any rights under a contract should be taken in a fully informed environment, free of
any undue influence. The draft Code therefore protects the consumer from any unfair conduct
that is geared towards unfairly influencing the consumers transactional decisions. This includes
situations where a consumers transactional decision is affected by:
(a) Misleading conduct: Knowingly providing consumers with false information or information
that is correct but is provided in a deceptive manner. Any failure to correct an evident and
important misapprehension on the part of the consumer will also be covered under the
law.
(b) Abusive conduct: Use of coercion or undue influence to influence a consumers transactional decisions.
4. Protection of personal information
Any information relating to an identifiable person belongs to that person and should be protected
from unauthorised use. Financial service providers will therefore be restrained from collecting,
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CONSUMER PROTECTION
using or disclosing any personal information belonging to consumers, except to the extent required for the purposes of carrying out their business or expressly permitted under the draft Code.
The draft Code also provides safeguards for consumers to be able to access their personal information held by service providers and ensure that the information is accurate and complete (see
Table 5.7).
5. Requirement of fair disclosure
Information asymmetry between consumers and financial firms affects the quality of financial
decisions made by consumers. This asymmetry needs to be addressed by imposing a positive
obligation on financial service providers to provide consumers with all the information that is
relevant for them to make informed decisions. This includes disclosures required to be made
prior to entering a financial contract and continuing disclosures regarding material changes to
previously provided information or the status or performance of a financial product.
Given the wide array of financial services being covered under the draft Code, the regulator may
find it useful to specify different disclosure requirements for various financial products and services. With this objective, the draft Code empowers the regulator to make differing provisions
regarding the types of information required to be disclosed, the manner in which disclosures
must be made and the appropriate time-periods for making required disclosures.
6. Redress of complaints
The Commission envisages a two-tier approach for the redress of consumer complaints: first at
the level of the financial service provider and subsequently at the level of the redress agency (for
retail consumers).
If a consumer is dissatisfied with a financial product or service, the consumer should first take up
the issue with the relevant financial service provider. For this purpose, the draft Code requires all
financial service providers to have in place an effective mechanism to redress complaints from
consumers. They will also be obliged to inform consumers about their right to seek redress and
the process to be followed for it. The regulator may supplement these requirements by laying
down specific details of the process to be followed by financial service providers to receive and
redress complaints.
In certain cases the regulator may also envisage an additional layer of grievance assessment to
take place after, or instead of, the service providers own grievance redress mechanism and before
the complaint goes to the redress agency. The stock exchange arbitration process would be an
example of such an arrangement.
5.5. Additional protections for retail consumers

The Commission believes that the following rights and protections should be available to
retail consumers over and above the protections available to consumers generally. These
protections are needed due to the generally low levels of knowledge and experience of
retail consumers.
1. Assessment of suitability
Retail consumers may often be in a situation where they are not able to fully appreciate the features or implications of a financial product, even with full disclosure of information to them. This
makes a strong case for a thorough suitability assessment of the products being sold to them.
The draft Code provides this protection by requiring that any person who advises a retail consumer in relation to the purchase of a financial product or service must obtain relevant information about the needs and circumstances of the consumer before making a recommendation to
the consumer (see Table 5.8).
2. Dealing with conflict of interests
One of the best ways to ensure good consumer protection is to align the incentives of financial
service providers with those of consumers and ensure that in case of a conflict, the interests of
consumers take precedence. The draft Code incorporates this principle of prioritising the interests of retail consumers over those of the provider. It also requires advisors to inform retail consumers about any conflicted remuneration they stand to receive, which may influence the advice
being given to the retail consumer. The regulator may, in addition, specify the nature, type and
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Table of Recommendations 5.8 Suitability assessment process

1. A person making a recommendation to a retail consumer about the purchase of a financial product or service
must make efforts to obtain correct and complete relevant information about the consumers personal circumstances. Advice given to the retail consumer must be based on due consideration of the relevant personal
circumstances.
2. If the advisor finds that the information is inaccurate or incomplete, the retail consumer must be warned
about the consequences of using such information.
3. If a retail consumer plans to avail a financial product or service that the advisor does not deem suitable, it is
the obligation of the advisor to clearly communicate the consequences to the retail consumer.
4. The regulator must specify the financial products or services that may be provided to retail consumers or a
class of retail consumers only after proper advice has been given to them. Suitability assessment should be
mandatory for those categories of products and services.
5. The regulator must take into account the following factors while making advice mandatory for any financial
product or service:
I the potential negative consequences to financial access due to the cost that will be imposed on financial service providers on account of suitability requirements; and
I the extent to which fair disclosures required under the law may suffice to enable retail consumers to
assess the suitability of the financial product or service for their purposes.
structure of benefits permitted to be received by an advisor for a particular financial product or

service.
5.6. Functions and powers of the regulator

The Commission recommends the creation of a single consumer protection framework
which will apply to all parts of the financial system. The consumer protection framework
may be implemented by one or more regulators, depending on the views of lawmakers
about financial regulatory architecture. While the financial regulatory architecture may
change, it is expected that the consumer protection framework would not.
The general functions of a regulator include: making regulations to carry out the purposes of the law; issuing guidance to financial service providers; supervising the conduct
of financial service providers to ensure compliance with the law; and taking appropriate
enforcement actions to deal with any violations.
The regulator will also be responsible for the existence of financial awareness programmes in order to meet the objective of promoting public awareness in financial matters. This will involve spreading awareness about the benefits of financial planning, protections available to consumers, and features and functions of financial products and services. If required, the regulator may also choose to establish a separate financial awareness body to pursue this function.
In exercise of its supervisory functions, the regulator will need to put in place appropriate arrangements for seeking relevant information from financial service providers,
imposing record-keeping requirements, conducting investigations, inspecting premises
and holding meetings with the officers of financial service providers. If the regulator has
reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of the law, it may initiate appropriate enforcement actions.
In addition to the general functions of rule-making, supervision and enforcement,
the draft Code will contain the following specific provisions:
1. Registration of individuals
Proper training and qualification of front line staff can be an effective tool for ensuring that the
protections envisaged by the law translate into actual practice. To achieve this, the draft Code
will require registration of all individuals who deal with consumers in connection with provision
of a financial product or service. This would include individuals who deal with consumers in
their capacity as financial service providers or as employees or representatives of financial service
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CONSUMER PROTECTION
providers. The regulator will specify the requirements and process for the registration of such
individuals as well as any code of conduct applicable to them.
2. Information on new products
The Commission believes that consumer protection regulation, as in other areas of law, should
be guided by the principle of allow-and-respond, instead of following the banned-until-permitted
approach. Accordingly, the draft Code does not require every financial product to be approved
by the regulator.
Financial service providers will be able to provide any financial product to consumers subject
to following a file and use process. This will require the regulator to make regulations to specify
the kind of information required by it on any new product that is proposed to be launched in
the market. A financial service provider will be required to file the specified information with
the regulator two months before the planned launch, so that the regulator may assess its risks
and merits and if required, make appropriate regulations. The regulator may seek additional
information about the product during the two month period but will not have the power to block
it from being launched after the expiry of that period.
3. Power to specify modifications
The regulator should be able to intervene in situations where certain features or aspects of a financial product or service are found to be harmful for consumers after it has been introduced in
the market. The draft Code therefore allows the regulator to specify modifications in the terms
and conditions of particular financial contracts or the process of delivering particular financial
services. The Commission however recognises that this is a very strong power and its frequent
use can cause undue hardships to financial service providers. Any such regulatory interventions
must therefore be accompanied by a statement explaining the other interventions that were
considered by the regulator to address the problem and the reasons why such interventions
were found to be inadequate. This statement is in addition to the regular requirements of the
regulation-making process.
5.7. Advisory council on consumer protection

In order to monitor and contribute towards the regulators consumer protection objectives, the Commission recommends the creation of an advisory council on consumer protection (see Table 5.9). The advisory council will be responsible for:
1. Making representations, in the form of advice, comments or recommendations, on the regulators
policies and practices;
2. Reviewing, monitoring, and reporting to the regulator on the effectiveness of its policies and practices; and
3. Creating reports stating its views on all draft regulations published by the regulator.
The regulator must take into account any representations or reports received by it
from the advisory council and provide a written response in cases where the regulator
disagrees with the views or proposals made by the council.
5.8. Financial redress agency

The Commission recommends the creation of a new statutory body to redress complaints
of retail consumers through a process of mediation and adjudication. The redress agency
will function as a unified grievance redress system for all financial services. To ensure
complete fairness and avoid any conflicts of interest, the redress agency will function independently from the regulators.
The financial redress mechanism proposed by the Commission will replace the existing financial sector-specific ombudsman systems such as the banking ombudsman and
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Table of Recommendations 5.9 Composition of the advisory council on consumer protection

1. The advisory council will consist of persons who are consumers or persons representing the interests of consumers.
2. The appointment of members of the council should also:
(a) give a fair degree of representation to experts in the fields of personal finance and consumer rights;
and
(b) take into account the need to ensure proper geographical representation from across the country.
Table of Recommendations 5.10 Composition of the redress agencys board

The general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs of the redress agency will vest in its board of
directors, which will be comprised of:
1. A chairperson to be appointed by the regulators through a selection process, in consultation with the Central
Government.
2. One official to be nominated by each of the regulators.
3. Four other members to be appointed by the regulators through a selection process.
the insurance ombudsman although retail consumers will continue to have the option
to approach other available forums, such as the consumer courts established under the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and regular courts. In the future, if the Government is of
the view that the redress agency has acquired sufficient scale and expertise to be able to
efficiently address all complaints from retail consumers, it will have the power to exclude
the applicability of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to retail consumers covered by the
redress agency.
In any case, once a retail consumer opts for a remedy before the redress agency, it
will not be permitted to institute fresh proceedings before another forum, either simultaneously or after a final order has been issued by the redress agency. Similarly, action
initiated before any other forum will bar any action before the redress agency.
The redress agency will be managed by a board of directors (see Table 5.10 for the
composition of the board). The agency will be funded through a combination of allocations from the Central Government, standard fees payable by all financial service
providers and a complaint-based fee that will be collected as and when a complaint is
brought against a financial service provider.
An effective dispute resolution body needs to be designed in a manner that ensures access, convenience, efficiency and speedy remedies. It needs to address two
kinds of difficulties: a scenario where a genuine consumer is not able to obtain redress,
and one where multiple cases are filed against a financial firm as a strategy of harassment. The Commission envisages the redress agency to function as a technologically
modern organisation that will carry out video hearings, digital handling of documents,
telephonic/online registration of complaints, maintenance of a high quality electronic
database and online tracking of compensation payments. To ensure that the processes
designed by the redress agency are in line with these requirements, the draft Code expressly requires the redress agency to put in place adequate systems, processes, technology and infrastructure to enable it to efficiently discharge its functions. The draft Code
also empowers the regulators to impose service level requirements on the redress agency
with measurable targets on matters such as the total cost to parties for proceedings before it, compliance cost for financial firms and time-periods for each step of the redress
process. The redress agency will be accountable for meeting these targets with a requirement to explain any failure to do so. These measures will compel the redress agency to
strive towards maximum efficiency in its processes and functioning.
The draft Code allows the redress agency the discretion to open offices anywhere in
the country. The Commission intends that the redress agency will use this power to set up
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Table of Recommendations 5.11 Outline of the redress agencys proceedings

The redress agency will follow the following steps while assessing complaints made to it by retail consumers:
1. Receipt of complaint: Complaints against financial service providers may either be submitted directly to the
redress agency (at any of its offices) or be submitted to the regulator, which will then forward it to the redress
agency.
2. Screening of complaints: The redress agency will screen all received complaints and may dismiss a complaint
during the screening process if the consumer has not made a complaint to the financial service provider
before approaching the redress agency; the complaint is prima facie frivolous, malicious or vexatious; or if
the matter is pending before, or has been adjudicated upon by, another competent authority.
3. Mediation: A complaint that is not dismissed during screening will be referred to a mediator who will assist
the parties to arrive at a voluntary settlement. If the mediation process fails, the complaint will proceed to
the adjudication stage, unless it is withdrawn by the retail consumer.
4. Adjudication: The redress agency will appoint independent skilled and qualified adjudicators, who will be responsible for investigating, considering and determining complaints. Unless an appeal is made, the decision
of the adjudicator will be final and binding on the parties.
5. Appeals: Appeals from a decision of the redress agencys adjudicators will go to the FSAT and appeals from
the appellate tribunal will go to the Supreme Court.
front-end offices throughout the country where retail consumers of all financial products
and services will be able to submit their complaints. Modern technology would then be
used to connect these front-ends into a centralised mediation and adjudication system
(see Table 5.11).
The redress agency will endeavour to arrive at an amicable settlement in a majority of the complaints through its mediation process. In cases where a settlement is not
achieved, the consumer may choose to withdraw the complaint from the redress agency,
failing which, it will be referred for adjudication. The adjudicator will hear the parties, examine the claim and pass a final order on the complaint after taking into account:
I the provisions of the draft Code on consumer protection and regulations made under it;
I the terms of the financial contract between the parties;
I any code of conduct applicable to the financial service provider; and
I prior determinations made by the redress agency on similar matters.
An order made by the adjudicator may provide for an award of compensation to the
retail consumer, subject to limits that will be specified by the regulators, or issue any other
directions that the adjudicator considers just and appropriate. A party that is dissatisfied
with the adjudicators orders will have the right to bring an appeal before the FSAT and
appeals from FSAT will lie before the Supreme Court.
The Commission sees strong complementarities in the roles of the redress agency
(curing grievances) and the regulators (preventing grievances). The complaints received
by the redress agency will shed light on areas where the problems of consumer protection are most prominent, and thus suggest areas for improvement in subordinated legislations. Hence, the draft Code seeks to ensure a feedback loop through which the redress
agency will use the FDMC to share information on complaints with the regulators on an
ongoing basis and the regulators will analyse the information received from the redress
agency and utilise it for improved regulation-making and systemic improvement.
Specifically, the information technology systems within the redress agency must create a high quality database about all aspects of all complaints that are filed with it. This
database must be analysed in order to shed light on the areas where there are difficulties
and thus feed back into better regulation and supervision. The research program which
studies this database should be a joint effort between the redress agency, regulators and
academic scholars, with release of datasets and research into the public domain. Over
the years, there should be a visible feedback loop where the hot spots of grievance that
are identified lead to modifications of regulation and supervision.
52
CONSUMER PROTECTION
Several provisions of the draft Code, specifically those relating to the creation and
operation of the redress agency, require co-ordination and co-operation between multiple regulators. In the event that the regulators are unable to arrive at a consensus on
such matters, within a reasonable period, the matter will be addressed through the FSDC.
5.9. Competition law and policy

The Commission recognises the major role of healthy competition in financial markets for
ensuring the best interests of consumers. While perfect competition alone will not protect the interests of consumers, greater competition, in tandem with a sound and wellfunctioning consumer protection framework, is undoubtedly a powerful tool to enhance
consumer welfare. The CCI is the leading, non-sectoral authority responsible for competition policy issues in India. The CCI has overlapping jurisdiction with many independent
regulators as it is charged with the duty of fostering greater competition in all areas of the
economy.
The Commission recommends a structured mechanism for interaction and co-operation between the CCI and financial regulators in the following ways:
1. Consultation for draft regulations
The CCI should review draft regulations issued by the regulator for public comments and provide its inputs on the potential competition implications, if any. The regulator must consider the
representation made by CCI before finalising the regulations. If the regulator disagrees with CCIs
views, it must provide written reasons.
2. Review of regulatory provisions
CCI must be empowered to monitor the effects on competition of any regulatory actions and
practices on an ongoing basis. If it determines that a regulatory action is unduly detrimental to
competition in a financial market, the CCI must submit a report on the issue to the regulator. The
regulator will be obliged to consider and respond to the report.
If the regulator and the CCI disagree on the course of action to be taken, the CCI will have the power
to direct the regulator to take specified actions to address the negative effects on competition
identified by the CCI.
3. Reference by CCI
The CCI must make a reference to the regulator if it initiates any proceedings involving a financial
service provider, and the regulator must respond with its views on the referred issue, within an
agreed period. In such cases, if the regulator believes that an action taken by the CCI may interfere
with the regulators objectives, the regulator may choose to nominate one non-voting member
on to the CCIs board to participate in proceedings relating to that matter.
4. Reference by the regulator
The regulator must report to the CCI about any conduct of financial service providers that appears
to it to be in violation the Competition Act, 2002 so that appropriate proceedings may be initiated
under that law.
5. Memorandum of understanding
The draft Code requires the CCI and the regulator to enter into a memorandum of understanding
to establish the procedures for co-operation between them, which may be modified by them
from time to time.
There is also a need for organised interaction between the CCI and the resolution
corporation in the context of non-voluntary mergers and acquisitions. The mechanisms
to address the likely effects of the resolution corporations actions on competition in the
relevant market is addressed in the draft Code under the part on resolution of financial
service providers.
53
CHAPTER 6
Micro-prudential regulation
Micro-prudential regulation refers to the regulation that governs safety and soundness of
certain financial service providers. The rationale, scope and extent of micro-prudential
regulation are primarily motivated by consumer protection concerns. Additionally, the
possibility of large numbers of financial service providers failing at the same time, or a
systemically important financial institution failing, can raise concerns about the stability and resilience of the financial system as a whole. Sound micro-prudential regulation
then, plays a role in mitigating systemic risk as well.
6.1. Rationale for micro-prudential regulation

Financial service providers have a vested interest in their health. However, their financial
health is not simply a matter of private concern, for a variety of reasons:
1. Governance failures within firms: Managers of a firm may not work in the best interests of shareholders - pursuant to the compensation structures of many organisations, managers may stand
to make huge profits if the firm does well and walk away if the firm collapses. In particular, highpowered incentives created by share ownership, stock options, or profit-linked bonuses are likely
to promote excessive risk-taking. Micro-prudential regulation is then a way of addressing the public good concerns raised by compensation structures and governance failures within a firm.
2. Moral hazard: Government rescue of failing financial service providers is inequitable because excessive risks taken by managers impose costs on tax payers at large. The possibility of such rescues induces moral hazard: managers have an incentive to increase risk knowing that tax payers
will bear the burden of any significant losses that arise. As such, micro-prudential regulation is
justified to constrain excessive risk-taking by financial service providers.
Market discipline, understood here as the process by which informed consumers

identify and avoid dealing with unacceptably risky financial service providers, can work
to prevent some financial firms from managing their risks badly, but even such discipline
is somewhat constrained by the following:
I Information asymmetry: It is often difficult for consumers to evaluate, before or after entering a
contract, how well a financial service provider is performing. There is noise in the information
available to consumers, and there are significant limitations to the ability of most consumers to
process and react to market information. While markets generate signals of financial soundness
in the prices of stocks and bonds, many consumers are not in a position to access and act on
such information. This is particularly the case with unsophisticated consumers. Most households
will not be involved in transactions of a size that would warrant large financial investments in
monitoring.
55
MICRO-PRUDENTIAL REGULATION

The objectives of micro-prudential regulation are:
1. To promote the safety and soundness of regulated persons; and
2. To thereby contribute to the stability and resilience of the Indian financial system.
This problem is most prominent in institutions that make balance sheet-based obligations to
consumers, and have opaque balance sheets, since the cost of information processing is highest.
With banks, due to information asymmetries, depositors may not know a bank is failing until it is
too late. Conversely, depositors may react to false alarms and trigger bank runs.
Weaknesses of market discipline exacerbate the governance problems of financial service providers. Managers are, then, more able to make decisions that yield short-term gains while reducing
the health of the financial service provider in the long run.
I Co-ordination problems: Consumers with low-volume transactions could ostensibly join forces
and develop mechanisms for monitoring while sharing costs. In practice, the likelihood of such
mechanisms emerging is low to the extent that those monitoring financial service providers
incur costs that all market participants benefit from. These public good problems create coordination problems for consumers which, in turn, lead to inadequate monitoring of financial
service providers.
I Market power: Financial service providers usually enjoy significant market power compared to
their consumers, and the latters ability to enforce corrective actions on the former is limited.
Market discipline does play an important role in ensuring safety and soundness of
many financial service providers, but it is often not enough. This inadequacy of selfregulation and market discipline becomes particularly problematic for financial service
providers making certain kinds of obligations, and financial service providers of systemic
importance.
The Commission notes that certain obligations are inherently more difficult to fulfil than other obligations. Debt repayment obligations - obligations that make specified
payments at specified times - are inherently more difficult to fulfil than obligations linked
to equity prices or firm profitability. Insurance obligations - which are contingent upon external events and which require payment, regardless of the financial health of the promising institution - also pose problems of fulfilment.
The Commission also notes that for certain kinds of financial service providers, if obligations are not fulfilled, there are adverse consequences for specific consumers. If bank
deposits are lost due to a bank failure, the consequences for consumers, whose savings
are deposited with the bank, will be quite adverse. If a large financial service provider
fails, the entire financial system, and the larger economy, may be adversely affected.
This combination of harsh consequences of failure, problems limiting self-regulation
and the ability of markets to ensure safety and soundness, and inherent difficulty of fulfilling certain obligations, creates a case for regulation organised around securing the safety
and soundness of certain financial service providers.
Fragile financial service providers, whether those taking bank deposits, issuing insurance contracts or otherwise, limit participation of households in the financial system in
line with the possibility of non-performance. This, in turn, diminishes the participation of
households in the financial system.
These challenges motivate micro-prudential regulation. The State needs to establish regulatory and supervisory mechanisms that intervene in the behaviour of firms, and
improve their safety and soundness. These mechanisms, if designed and implemented
properly, would act on behalf of consumers and society to reduce, though not eliminate,
the probability of firm failure. The objectives of micro-prudential regulation, as enunciated in the draft Code, are enumerated in Table 6.1.
The phrase safety and soundness needs to be interpreted in terms of the consequences
of failure rather than failure itself. If it is efficient to let the regulated persons fail or become insolvent, while the obligations to consumers are protected, the regulator should
56
let that happen. For example, if consumers funds are kept in a bankruptcy remote vehicle, it should be possible to let the regulated person fail, without significantly affecting
the interests of consumers. In the stock market, the success of clearing arrangements has
made possible a regulatory stance where many securities firms have failed with no adverse consequences to consumers. The construction of the resolution corporation thus
greatly changes how regulators would view failure.
For systemically important financial institutions, safety and soundness should be
taken to mean reducing the probability of firm failure, and for all other micro-prudentially
regulated persons, it should mean reducing the probability of the event of regulated person failing to meet the obligations made to consumers. The Commission recognises that
the acceptable probability of failure for regulated persons is not zero. However, if regulators are conferred with the objective of trying to minimise the probability of failure of
regulated persons, they may adopt an excessively restrictive approach that could result
in an adverse effect on competition or innovation in financial markets. This is not good,
particularly given the resolution mechanism being enshrined in the draft Code. Therefore, the Commission recommends that the regulators should work with the objective of
reducing the probability of failure of regulated persons and maintaining it at below an acceptable level. This acceptable level should be determined based on due consideration
of the principles enunciated in the draft Code.
Micro-prudential regulation must be distinguished from systemic risk regulation,
also called macro-prudential regulation (see Chapter 9). Sound micro-prudential regulation is, of course, an essential ingredient of reducing systemic risk. Yet micro-prudential
regulation focuses on one firm at a time, while systemic risk regulation involves the financial system as a whole. Micro-prudential regulation sees the proverbial trees to the forest
surveyed by systemic risk regulation.
6.2. A non-sector-specific micro-prudential framework

Micro-prudential regulation has often been a sector-wise concern. Some countries have
sector-specific laws, focusing on issues and instruments in the respective sectors. For example, micro-prudential regulation in India is conducted by various financial regulators,
operating in different sectors, through an array of relevant laws. In this context, the Commission recommends non-sector-specific micro-prudential provisions in the draft Code,
for the following reasons:
1. There is underlying similarity in financial contracts- they are all built from a small number of contingent claims or obligations. There are common principles that underpin the micro-prudential
regulation framework in different sectors, though specific risk-types to be addressed and the way
instruments are to be used may differ. For example, there is significant convergence between
the Basel II framework for banks and the European Unions Solvency II framework for insurance
companies. Unification of the law will yield more consistent treatment across apparently diverse
activities, which are actually constructed from a small set of core ideas.
2. As the financial system develops further, it will become increasingly difficult to draw sectorspecific lines on financial products and services being offered. A common set of principles guiding the regulation of the entire financial system will help minimise the potential for regulatory
gaps.
3. Once problems of competition policy are addressed, and competition in the financial system
heats up, easy sources of profit will be competed away. This will give firms a strong incentive
to pursue regulatory arbitrage. The use of a single set of principles, consistently applied across
different kinds of activities, will reduce the extent to which regulatory arbitrage might arise.
4. Sector-specific regulators administering different sets of provisions create the possibility of a race
to the bottom, where a sector regulator favours lax regulation in the interest of increasing the
growth of the sector. The presence of non-sector-specific provisions will help curtail such destructive regulatory competition.
57
Table of Recommendations 6.2 Scope of micro-prudential regulation

Micro-prudential regulation will apply to financial service providers that carry out specified activities or have been
determined to be systemically important. Those financial service providers that are deemed to be micro-prudentially
regulated are called regulated persons in the draft Code. The draft Code lays down the following tests for the regulator
to determine which activities should be subject to micro-prudential regulation, and to what extent:
1. The nature of the relationship between the regulated person and its consumers, including:
(a) the detriment caused to consumers if obligations are not fulfilled by the regulated person,
(b) the ability of consumers to access and process information relating to the regulated persons safety
and soundness, and
(c) the ability of consumers to co-ordinate among themselves to monitor the regulated persons safety
and soundness.
2. Inherent difficulties in fulfilling the obligations owed by a regulated person to its consumers.
5. Conversely, multiple regulators interpreting a single set of non-sector-specific provisions, can

generate healthy public debates. Such comparative discussions, across sectors, would not occur
in a climate conditioned by separate regulatory ecosystems. If there were separate laws, then
this comparative law discourse would not arise.
A unified set of non-sector-specific micro-prudential regulation provisions in the draft

Code will help create a consistent framework across the financial system. This would, in
turn, help in efficient allocation of capital owing to the substantial mitigation of regulatory gaps or arbitrage.
6.3. Scope of micro-prudential regulation

Since micro-prudential regulation is an expensive and intrusive form of regulation, the
Commission considers it important to ensure that micro-prudential regulation applies
only where it is required, and with intrusiveness that is proportional to the problem that
is sought to be addressed. All persons providing financial services, termed as financial
service providers, will require permission from the regulator to carry on the relevant financial activity. From this set of financial service providers, only a subset will be subjected to some or all micro-prudential provisions of the draft Code. This subset of microprudentially regulated financial service providers, referred to as regulated persons, will
be determined by the regulator based on the tests given in the draft Code. The tests
provided in the draft Code will also guide the regulator in deciding the extent to which
micro-prudential regulation should apply to different regulated persons (see Table 6.2).
The Commission recommends that financial service providers deemed to be systemically important should be subject to micro-prudential regulation. Though identification
of systemically important financial institutions will be made by the systemic risk regulator (FSDC), micro-prudential regulation of designated institutions will reside with their
respective regulators.
Usually the obligations intermediated and backed by the providers balance sheet,
where the provider carries market risk, would be micro-prudentially regulated with high
intensity, though not always. For example, for a provider with only a small number of
consumers, balance sheet-based obligations may often not attract high intensity regulation, to the extent that the ability of individual clients to assess the credit-worthiness of
that provider may be high. Providers making market-linked obligations, where the consumers are expected to hold the market risk, should typically not be micro-prudentially
regulated with high intensity, because the inherent difficulty of fulfilling the obligations
is low and the ability to assess credit-worthiness is high. Here also, retirement financing
funds offering defined contribution schemes, may be an exception on the basis of the
high level of adversity caused if the expectations are not met, and information asymmetries for investors at the time of purchase. Regulators will have to take positions on the
58
Table of Recommendations 6.3 Instruments of regulation

The powers of micro-prudential regulation are classified into the following functional categories:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Regulation of entry;
Regulation of risk-taking;
Regulation of loss absorption;
Regulation of governance, management and internal controls; and
Monitoring and supervision.
basis of comprehensive analysis of obligations made, relative levels of accountability to

markets and institutional health.
Certain financial service providers are not likely to come under micro-prudential regulation:
I Investment funds with a small number of typically large value investors, such as hedge funds,
venture capital funds, private equity funds, may not be subject to micro-prudential regulation,
unless they are systemically important. Though the adversity caused by failure of some of these
funds may be significant, information asymmetries and co-ordination failures are likely to be low
given the small number of investors, who are likely to be sophisticated.
I Small, semi-formal arrangements at local level, such as mutual savings arrangements, may not
be micro-prudentially regulated. Here, the local nature of the institutions should reduce information asymmetry and co-ordination failure, and make enforcement relatively easy for consumers,
even though the adversity caused in case of failure to meet the obligation may be quite high,
since many of these may be accepting members deposits.
6.4. Powers of micro-prudential regulation

Micro-prudential regulation has evolved significantly in recent decades. Internationally
accepted frameworks have undergone significant change over this period, and continue
to evolve. The Commission recommends a set of principles-based provisions to allow
regulation to adapt to changing circumstances and evolving scholarly and policy consensus on optimal structures of regulation.
The Commission has reviewed the range of micro-prudential powers used in India,
along with prominent international comparators, and suggests a functional categorisation as suggested below (see Table 6.3). The Commission recommends that the precise
mix of powers used, and that the manner of usage, evolve over time.
The regulator would only allow entry to those financial service providers that are
likely to be prudently managed. The regulator would also work to ensure that regulated
persons continue to be prudently governed and managed. Regulated persons would be
regulated in terms of their risk-taking and risk avoiding practices, as well as the loss absorbing buffers they put in place. The regulator could also impose requirements to ensure
business continuity and failure management in these persons. Regulated persons would
be monitored and supervised to ensure compliance, and to respond to issues specific to
any regulated person. Taken together, these components create the basis and framework
of the Commissions approach to micro-prudential regulation.
6.4.1. Regulation of entry

The creation of micro-prudentially regulated persons should proceed on the basis of conditions consistent with the micro-prudential framework (see Table 6.4), so that on day
one itself, an institution has low probability of failure. But there is a risk of excessive restrictions on entry that may impede competition and innovation.
59
Table of Recommendations 6.4 Regulation of entry

The regulator will have the following powers in connection with restricting entry:
1. Notifying pre-conditions for authorisation to carry on regulated activities;
2. Authorising to carry on regulated activities, which may include a process of automatic authorisation; and
3. Approving changes in the controlling interest of regulated persons.
If new firms can be created, existing firms can launch new products or services, and
entirely new business models can come about, the environment will be competitive and
dynamic. The pursuit of these objectives presents two puzzles: the legal framework
should allow only reliable and competent persons to deal with financial consumers, and
lack of existing regulations on a particular area should not hold back the emergence of
new business models.
The Commission, therefore, recommends a balanced approach, which is enshrined
in the draft Code.
1. Requirement for authorisation: Any person who seeks to carry out a financial service for the first time will need to be authorised by the regulator. This will not apply to a new product or service launched by existing financial service providers, if
the person is already authorised for that line of business. All new products can be
launched after following the file and use process.
2. Exemption: Representatives of authorised financial service providers need not seek
authorisation for the services for their principal has been given authorisation, as
long as the representative is only carrying out the activity with regards to those services on behalf of the principal. Through regulations, the regulator will have the
power to exempt, from the authorisation process, certain agencies of the government. The intent here is to exempt only those agencies that have a unique character, such as EPFO. This power should only be used as an exception, and does not
mean that other regulations will not apply to an agency exempt from the authorisation process.
3. Authorisation process: The manner and process of obtaining authorisation for financial services will vary depending on the type of activity that is proposed to be
carried out. A comprehensive authorisation process will apply to persons who want
to carry out regulated activities which are to be micro-prudentially regulated with
high intensity.
The need to promote innovation in the Indian financial system has been embedded
thus: where a person proposes to carry out a financial service that is not a regulated
activity, a simplified authorisation process will be applicable. Here, the regulator
has the flexibility to specify that the authorisation requirement may be satisfied
through an automatic process.
In either case, whether an activity is regulated or non-regulated, the authorisation
process will not allow the regulator to refuse authorisation merely on grounds that
the regulator does not have in place appropriate regulations to govern the proposed activity.
6.4.2. Regulation of risk-taking

This category of powers will empower the regulator to prescribe ways in which the regulated persons can avoid or reduce the risks they take (see Table 6.5). Regulator may
impose restrictions on how the regulated persons invests the funds - their own funds and
those of the consumers. In some cases, they may also impose restrictions on claims that
may be placed from the regulated persons over business on consumers funds. Regulator may also require adherence to certain business processes that reduce risks to the
60
Table of Recommendations 6.5 Regulation of risk-taking

The regulator will have the following powers in connection with reducing risks:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Regulating investments of own funds and consumers funds;

Regulating claims on consumers funds;
Regulating to foster business processes that reduce risks;
Regulating the valuation standards for assets and liabilities of regulated persons;
Regulating transactions with related persons; and
Regulating liquidity management.
Table of Recommendations 6.6 Regulation of loss absorption

The regulator will have the following powers in connection with absorbing losses:
1. Defining categories of capital resources, based loss absorbing capacities;
2. Prescribing the amount of different types of capital resources required to be held, and the solvency requirements;
3. Defining criteria for assessing compliance with capital resource requirements;
4. Defining how regulated persons should manage the capital resources, including the requirement to notify
the regulator while issuing certain capital instruments;
5. Regulating how the changes in values of assets and liabilities will be recognised; and
6. Mandating purchase of insurance from Resolution Corporation.
regulated persons. The draft Code also empowers the regulator to impose liquidity requirements on the regulated persons.
6.4.3. Regulation of loss absorption

These powers allow the regulator to require the regulated persons to keep capital resources and/or purchase insurance from resolution corporation for absorbing losses. Capital resources act as buffers that are typically used for covering unexpected losses arising
from under-performing investments or under-valuation of liabilities.
In conventional thinking, equity capital is thought to play this role. Loss absorption
functions can be provided by a variety of instruments not limited to equity capital. Different instruments have different loss absorption capacities, and these capacities may also
vary with time. Contingent capital has debt-like features, but can become equity-like loss
absorber depending on certain conditions. If there are instruments that require deep and
liquid markets, during times of crisis, this loss absorption capacity may be constrained.
The regulator will need to think about loss absorption capacities across different times,
and ensure that there are adequate buffers in place for normal times as well as for times
of crisis (see Table 6.6).
A mechanism of loss absorption being built in this framework recommended by the
Commission is the resolution mechanism, which presently does not exist in India. For
certain financial service providers, the regulator should mandate purchase of insurance
from resolution corporation, as a pre-condition for undertaking the activities they propose to undertake. For example, for banking service providers, the regulator may impose
a condition of getting their deposits insured upto a limit determined by the resolution
corporation.
6.4.4. Regulation of governance, management and internal controls

These instruments empower the regulator to prescribe standards for good governance.
Since the regulator shares the responsibility for achieving micro-prudential objectives
with the board and management of the regulated person, it is important that these persons are prudently governed and managed (see Table 6.7).
61
Table of Recommendations 6.7 Regulation of governance, management and internal

controls
The regulator will have the following powers in connection with improving governance and management:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Regulating norms of corporate governance;

Regulating the structure of management incentives;
Regulating risk management systems;
Regulating internal controls and internal audit;
Regulating appointment of qualified auditors and actuaries; and
Regulating outsourcing and appointment of agents.
Table of Recommendations 6.8 Monitoring and supervision

The regulator will have the following powers in connection with monitoring and supervision:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Mandating disclosures to consumers and the market;

Mandating reporting to the regulator;
Conducting on-site supervision;
Investigating powers; and
Developing the capability to conduct analytics on the information received from regulated persons and other
resources.
6.4.5. Monitoring and supervision of regulated persons

These instruments can be used to improve monitoring and supervision by regulators, as
well as, by market participants. The role of monitoring by market participants is complex. Since monitoring has a public good nature, the Commission proposes an approach
that not only allows regulators to facilitate monitoring by market participants, but also
empowers regulators to fulfil monitoring and supervisory functions on their own.
Monitoring and supervision can take many forms. Monitoring can involve disclosure
of annual statements and other reporting. Regulated persons may also be required to obtain, maintain and disclose a current credit rating from an approved credit rating agency
(see Table 6.8).
For regulated persons that are under the regulatory purview of more than one regulator, there should be a requirement for the regulators to co-operate to ensure optimal supervision. This may entail conglomerate supervision or supervision of a single regulated
person undertaking multiple activities. The Commission does not prescribe any specific mode of co-operation, and the regulators will be expected to develop co-operation
through mutual understanding and agreement.
6.5. Principles to guide the use of powers

Micro-prudential regulation, like all forms of regulation, imposes costs on the economy.
Regulation is optimal when it achieves a desired objective while imposing the smallest
possible distortion. As such, the draft Code enunciates principles that guide the use of
powers instead of being a simple grant of powers. (see Table 6.9).
Distortions can take various forms. For example, regulations that focus excessively on
products rather than underlying functions could encourage regulatory arbitrage between
various products. Two different products that achieve similar payoffs between risks and
rewards should be regulated in similar ways.
PRINCIPLE 1. Any obligation imposed on regulated persons should be proportionate to62
Table of Recommendations 6.9 Principles of micro-prudential regulation

The regulator must consider the following principles in discharging its functions and exercising its powers:
1. Any obligation imposed on regulated persons should be proportionate toI the nature, scale and complexity of the risks in the regulated activity being carried out; and
I the manner in which the regulated activity ranks on the factors stated in Table 6.2
2. Regulatory approach needs to take into account the feasibility of implementation by regulated persons and
supervision by the Regulator;
3. The need to minimise inconsistencies in the regulatory approach towards regulated activities that are similar
in nature or pose similar risks to the fulfilment of the Regulators objectives under this Act;
4. Any obligation imposed on regulated persons should be consistent with the benefits, considered in general
terms, which are expected to result from the imposition of that obligation;
5. The desirability of facilitating competition in the markets for financial products and financial services and
minimising the adverse effects of regulatory actions on competition in the financial sector;
6. The desirability of facilitating access to financial products and financial services;
7. The desirability of facilitating innovation in financial products and financial services;
8. The need to ensure that regulatory actions are carried out in a manner that is least detrimental to competitiveness of Indias financial system;
9. The need to take into account the long-term implications of regulatory actions, which will include a period
of at least five years following a regulatory action;
10. The need to minimise the pro-cyclical effects of regulatory actions; and
11. The requirement that persons who control and manage the affairs of regulated persons must share the responsibility of ensuring the safety and soundness of the regulated persons.
I the nature, scale and complexity of the risks in the regulated activity being carried
out; and
I the manner in which the regulated activity ranks on the factors stated in Table 6.2
This principle requires that regulatory instruments are used in a manner that is risk
sensitive; the intensity of regulation should be proportional to risk held by the regulated
person. For example, compare two banks with the same balance sheet size. One of them
is investing only in low risk assets, while the other is investing in high risk assets. A regulatory approach that is sensitive to the risks will impose different micro-prudential requirements on these two regulated persons, because they have different levels of risks to
their safety and soundness. Similarly, the factors listed in Table 6.2 translate the market
failures providing the rationale for micro-prudential regulation into tangible tests. These
tests can be used not just to determine where micro-prudential regulation will apply, but
also to decide the extent to which such regulation are to be applied. Regulation ought to
be proportional to the risks and market failures.
PRINCIPLE 2. Regulatory approach needs to take into account the feasibility of implementation by regulated persons and supervision by the Regulator.
The Commission notes that the regulatory approach should be modulated in light of
questions of feasibility for regulated entities and the capacity of regulators to supervise.
For example, consider buffers to absorb losses. Risk-weighted capital based on internal models is potentially the most sensitive to risk though also the most opaque from
the perspective of regulatory supervision. Simple leverage ratios are likely to be the least
risk sensitive though easiest for regulators to monitor and enforce. While laws should
not be constructed for regulatory convenience, the possibility of frustration of regulatory
objectives should be kept in mind.
Alternatively, consider institutional capability, including questions of regulated persons manipulating regulatory frameworks to their advantage. A regulated person using
the right internal models, and having access to sufficient data, could achieve fairly risk
sensitive capital buffers. Conversely, a regulated person using poor models or insufficient
data could fail to do so. Opacity raises the possibility of manipulation though regulation
63
cannot be designed with extreme examples in mind. Regulations framed from the perspective of malign institutions could lead to over-regulation just as the same framed with
only the most benign institutions in mind could lead to under-regulation.
Regulators will also need to take into account the possibility of developing robust
models, given data sufficiency constraints. Faulty modelling is a possible consequence
of poor data, drawn from illiquid or opaque markets. As such, the draft Code authorises
the regulator to consider alternative pathways and/or impose overall or risk-weighted
capital requirements.
The micro-prudential provisions in the draft Code will ask regulators to confront the
tradeoffs, and make wise decisions about the optimal regulation that is reasonably feasible for regulated persons to implement, and for the Regulator to monitor and supervise.
Over the years, accumulation of datasets and academic research will give feedback about
how certain initiatives have worked. Over the years, the financial system itself will evolve.
The combination of these factors will give a healthy evolution of the appropriate tradeoffs.
PRINCIPLE 3. The need to minimise inconsistencies in the regulatory approach towards
regulated activities that are similar in nature or pose similar risks to the fulfilment of the
Regulators objectives under this Act.
In the financial system, there are many ways of achieving the same objective. Products looking very different can be constructed that essentially fulfil the same function.
The only difference would be the way these products look, and the specific contracts they
comprise of. As an example, consider the number of ways of taking a levered position in
shares of companies in the index, all of which fulfil the same function:
1. Buy each stock individually on margin in the cash stock market.
2. Invest in an index fund and borrow from a bank to finance it.
3. Go long a future contracts on the index futures.
4. Go long an over-the-counter forward contract on the index.
5. Enter into a swap contract to receive the total return on the index and pay a fixed interest rate.
6. Go long exchange-traded calls and short puts on the index.
7. Go long Over The Counter (OTC) calls and short puts.
8. Purchase an equity-linked note that pays based on returns on the index, and finance it by a repo.
9. Purchase, from a bank, a certificate of deposit with its payments linked to returns on the index.
10. Borrow to buy a variable-rate annuity contract that has its return linked to the index.
Since these are functionally equivalent, each of these mechanisms would add the
same risk to the regulated person. Regulators need not treat this diverse array of possibilities with a sense of alarm, neither should they be blind to these possibilities. The choice
of a certain mechanism for fulfilling a function may depend on various factors, such as
differences in financial systems, constraints imposed by institutional form, technological constraints, various types of transaction costs, and so on. An institution should be
able to choose the best possible mechanism, given all the factors it chooses to consider.
However, with a healthy financial regulatory structure, differences in micro-prudential
regulation should not favour any one of these mechanisms over another.
If the regulators take a functional perspective towards risk, treating similar risks in
a similar manner, it would help reduce regulatory inconsistencies across products and
markets. This principle is likely to lead to efficient regulation, because it allows innovation and encourage competitive neutrality. It is also necessary because as system evolves
and opportunities to earn supernormal returns become difficult to find, regulatory arbitrage could be used to destabilise the system. Capital will flow towards sectors with less
expensive regulations and this can often involve inappropriate risk-taking.
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PRINCIPLE 4. Any obligation imposed on regulated persons should be consistent with the
benefits, considered in general terms, which are expected to result from the imposition of
that obligation.
The incentives of regulators are usually asymmetric in favour of excessive caution;
regulators may not get much credit for maintaining the safety and soundness, but are
likely to be subjected to much criticism if the number of failures cross an acceptable level.
Consequently, regulators may tend to be too cautious and impose excessive costs on
regulated persons and the economy.
PRINCIPLE 5. The desirability of promoting competition, access and innovation, and minimising the adverse effects of regulatory actions on competition, access and innovation.
Competition in financial markets is likely to have a significant positive impact on
growth. Competition and innovation often go hand in hand, since competition creates
the incentive for innovation. The strength of competition is likely to influence the efficiency of financial intermediation and the quality of financial products.
Certain instruments of micro-prudential regulation, such as licensing, may have a
direct impact on competition, innovation and access in the system. As an example, it is
possible to use rules for entry in ways that close down entry altogether for years on end.
Going beyond entry barriers, instruments such as capital requirements, if not properly
used, could impede innovation and access.
The Commission believes that competition and high quality micro-prudential regulation can go hand in hand. Indeed, the Commissions reading of research of international
contexts suggest that high quality supervision in banking enhances stability and competition. The Commission emphasises the pursuit of both goals: of high competition and
high quality micro-prudential regulation. A sound approach to regulation and supervision is an integral part of a pro-competitive stance, through which there is no adverse
impact on competition.
The Commission also asserts that safety and soundness can be pursued in a manner
that minimises impact on access, innovation and competition. For example, hypothetical situations could be imagined where simple leverage limits and risk-based systems of
capital adequacy achieve similar regulatory results though having a differential impact
on innovation and competition. The Commission recommends that concerns of stability
and impact on access, innovation and competition be considered in tandem.
PRINCIPLE 6. The need to ensure that regulatory actions are carried out in a manner that
is least detrimental to competitiveness of Indias financial system.
The Commission does not take a position on financial globalisation as such. The
financial system provides the pathways through which foreign capital gets infused in the
economy. The Commission simply notes that if policy makers continue to look to foreign
capital for assistance in meeting the development and financing needs of the economy,
micro-prudential regulation should be assessed in part by how such regulation affects
the ability of the country to attract such capital.
Regulations enhancing safety and soundness of institutions should help the country
attract financial capital, because investors are averse to losing capital due to instability
in the financial system. But if micro-prudential regulation over-reaches, then this can
negatively affect the return on capital. There is some evidence that global banks transfer
resources away from markets with highly restrictive financial regulation.
The Commission also notes that the viability of an onshore financial system is an
important measure of international competitiveness. Difficulties in regulation can lead
to financial intermediation involving India to move offshore. The Commission recommends balancing two competing concerns. On the one hand, rules preventing the use
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of offshore trading venues deny users of markets the lowest cost products and services.
Conversely, a regulatory race to the bottom where economic stability is sacrificed to increase competitiveness is equally problematic.
PRINCIPLE 7. The need to take into account the long term implications of regulatory actions, which will include a period of at least five years following a regulatory action.
Numerous examples illustrate how micro-prudential regulation can be used in a
manner that reduces failure over a short period of time, though with much worse consequences over a longer period of time. For example, regulations that allow conversion of
a pool of illiquid, poorly rated assets into liquid tranches of differentially rated securities
(some of them highly rated), may reduce the total capital obligations for the institutions
originating these assets, while also seeming to maintain safety and soundness. Such
regulation, if not conducted properly with sound alignment of incentives, requirement
of buffers at different levels, and other checks and balances, may encourage creation of
risks that may have consequences years later, perhaps going beyond the regulatory cycle
in which the regulation was notified.
PRINCIPLE 8. The need to minimise the pro-cyclical effects of regulatory actions.
Micro-prudential regulation can often be pro-cyclical, that is, it can amplify business
cycle fluctuations, and possibly cause or exacerbate financial instability. In a contraction,
regulatory constraints may bite well before the bankruptcy law does, as financial institutions regard violating minimum capital requirements as extremely costly. Depending on
how the instruments of micro-prudential regulation are used, the extent of pro-cyclicality
may vary.
In the framework proposed by the Commission, the primary function of micro-prudential regulation is to think about one financial firm at a time. The task of thinking about
overall systemic risk has been placed separately from micro-prudential regulation, precisely because micro-prudential regulation requires a different perspective. This principle requires micro-prudential regulators to be aware of the extent to which their rules are
pro-cyclical and to seek alternative mechanisms which minimise this phenomenon.
PRINCIPLE 9. The requirement that persons who control and manage the affairs of regulated persons must share the responsibility of ensuring the safety and soundness of the
regulated persons.
Though the main objective of micro-prudential regulation is to maintain safety and
soundness for regulated persons, the regulator is not the one ultimately responsible for
the safety and soundness of the regulated persons. That responsibility should stay with
the board and management of the regulated person. Once a financial service provider is
identified for micro-prudential regulation, consumers, investors and other stake-holders
should not perceive themselves to be absolved from responsibility for the safety and
soundness of that institution. Regulation is only an additional set of measures that do not
replace the efforts of the board and management of the regulated person. The regulator
should lay out frameworks, which the board and management would be responsible for
implementing.
In addition to these principles enshrined in the draft Code, the Commission also recommends that micro-prudential regulation be conducted in such a manner that there is
balance between a structured and a responsive regulatory approach. A very structured,
rules-based approach may bring clarity and certainty for regulated institutions, but may
limit the ability of the regulator to see risks arising from areas they may not have thought
about sufficiently in time. Also, if an institution is able to find a way to game the rules, the
regulator may not be able to see the problems at all. Regulators could miss the big picture
while being overly dependent on minutiae of the framework they have put in place. On
66
the other hand, a principles-based, more discretionary approach may reduce certainty
for the regulated institutions but give the regulator greater flexibility to pursue the microprudential objective. A balance needs to be struck between these two possibilities.
While there is merit in having primarily a structured approach to regulation, the nature of micro-prudential regulation is such that the regulator should not get overly dependent on a structured framework and specific rules, and should have capabilities to
scope and monitor the risks being built, and through due process, respond to these risks
pro-actively. This requires a mix of rules and judgement.
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CHAPTER 7
Resolution
7.1. The problem
The failure of large private financial firms can be highly disruptive for households that
were customers of the failing firm, and for the economy as a whole. This might have been
less important 20 years ago when the Indian financial system was dominated by PSUs that
rely on implicit financial support from the tax payer. As India has increasingly opened
up entry into finance, and several large private financial firms have arisen, it becomes
important to create mechanisms to deal with failing firms.
Sound micro-prudential regulation will reduce the probability of firm failure. However, eliminating all failure is neither feasible nor desirable. Failure of financial firms is an
integral part of the regenerative processes of the market economies: weak firms should
fail and thus free up labour and capital that would then be utilised by better firms. However, it is important to ensure smooth functioning of the economy, and avoid disruptive
firm failure.
This requires a specialised resolution mechanism. A resolution corporation would
watch all financial firms that have made intense promises to households, and intervene
when the net worth of the firm is near zero (but not yet negative). It would force the closure
or sale of the financial firm, and protect small consumers either by transferring them to
a solvent firm or by paying them. As an example, in India, customers of a failed bank are
guaranteed the first Rs.1 lakh of their deposits as deposit insurance.
At present, India has a deposit insurance corporation, the DICGC. However, the DICGC
is not a resolution corporation; it deals only with banks; and is otherwise unable to play
a role in the late days of a financial firm. This is a serious gap in the Indian financial system. For all practical purposes, at present, an unceremonious failure by a large private
financial firm is not politically feasible. Lacking a formal resolution corporation, in India,
the problems of failing private financial firms will be placed upon customers, tax payers,
and the shareholders of public sector financial firms. This is an unfair arrangement.
Establishing a sophisticated resolution corporation is thus essential to strong responses to the possible failure of a large financial firm and its consequences for the Indian
economy. Drawing on international best practices, the Commission recommends a unified resolution corporation that will deal with an array of financial firms such as banks
and insurance companies; it will not just be a bank deposit insurance corporation. The
corporation will concern itself with all financial firms that make highly intense promises
to consumers, such as banks, insurance companies, defined benefit pension funds, and
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payment systems. The corporation will also take responsibility for the graceful resolution
of systemically important financial firms, even if they have no direct link to consumers.
The defining feature of the resolution corporation will be its speed of action. It must
stop a financial firm while the firm is not yet insolvent. International experience has
shown that delays in resolution almost always lead to a situation where the net worth
becomes negative; a situation where costs are likely to be placed on the tax payer. The
choice that we face is between a swift resolution corporation, which will stop financial
firms when they are weak but solvent, and a slow resolution corporation which will make
claims on the tax payer. Hence, a sophisticated legal apparatus has been designed by the
Commission, for a resolution corporation that will act swiftly to stop weak financial firms
while they are still solvent. The resolution corporation will choose between many tools
through which the interests of consumers are protected, such as sales, assisted sales,
mergers and other arrangements.
It is important to make a clear distinction between micro-prudential regulation and
resolution. Micro-prudential regulation and supervision is a continuous affair. Occasionally, when a firm approaches failure, the capabilities of the resolution corporation are required, and would proceed in a different manner than micro-prudential regulation. The
resolution corporation is analogous to a specialised disaster management agency, which
is not involved in everyday matters of governance, but assumes primacy in a special situation. The resolution corporation will have close co-ordination with the micro-prudential
regulators. For strong firms, the resolution corporation will lie in the background. As the
firm approaches failure, the resolution corporation will assume primacy. The provisions
for both micro-prudential regulation and resolution have been drafted in an internally
consistent fashion that design for this lockstep.
The first three pillars of the work of the Commission consumer protection, microprudential regulation and resolution are tightly interconnected. Consumer protection
deals with the behaviour of financial firms towards their customers in periods of good
health. Micro-prudential regulation aims to reduce, but not eliminate, the probability
of the failure of financial firms. Resolution comes into the picture when, despite these
efforts, financial firms fail.
7.2. An effective resolution framework

The analysis of the Commission in designing an effective resolution framework reflected
a combination of:
1. Indias experiences in managing a failing financial firm;
2. The emerging global consensus on the need to have an effective and wider resolution framework
that is not limited to banks; and
3. The analysis of the tools of resolution that would protect the interests of the consumer and would
incur least cost to the tax payer.
Table 7.1 enunciates the organisational structure of the resolution corporation. In

thinking about the design and composition of the board of the resolution corporation,
the Commission believes that a formal framework of information-sharing and timely coordination between the resolution corporation and the micro-prudential regulators can
help achieve orderly and least disruptive resolution.
An effective resolution framework also requires appropriate arrangements for crossborder resolution. Since many SIFIs operate on a global level, an unco-ordinated approach by the home and host countries authorities would create difficulties in the way
of resolution of such institutions in a manner that would protect interests of consumers
and prevent the risk of a contagion. Deliberations are underway at international policy forums to devise an optimal approach to cross-border resolution. India must participate in
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Table of Recommendations 7.1 Organisation structure of the resolution corporation

The draft Code on resolution establishes a resolution corporation as a statutory body to carry out the resolution of
covered service providers. Covered service provider includes:
1. each financial service provider that makes covered obligations as discussed in Table 7.2; and
2. each financial service provider designated by the Council as a SIFI.
The resolution corporation must have representation from across the financial regulatory architecture, including
the central bank, financial regulators, and the Central Government, and must be headed by a chief executive. The
resolution corporation must have representation of independent experts. The resolution corporation must also have
an administrative law member on its board. The establishment of the resolution corporation will be carried out in
alignment with the principles of legal process identified by the Commission.
Accordingly, the board of the resolution corporation will consist of executive, non-executive and nominee members,
to be appointed by the Central Government:
1. the total number of members must not be more than nine (9);
2. the total number of non-executive members must be greater than the total number of executive members;
and
3. three (3) members will be nominee members.
The executive members will include
1. the Chairperson of the corporation; and
2. an administrative law member.
The nominee members will consist of
1. one nominee of the Reserve Bank;
2. one nominee of the Unified Financial Authority; and
3. one nominee of the Central Government.
The board will appoint a senior officer of the corporation to act as secretary to the board.

Resolution of covered service providers that are approaching failure should be carried out with the objectives of:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Protecting the stability and resilience of the financial system;

Enhancing financial market efficiency through efficient pricing and allocation of risk;
Protecting consumers of covered obligations up to a reasonable limit; and
Protecting public funds.
emerging global arrangements on cross-border resolution. Developments in this regard

may well require amendments to the law in the future, such as to require the resolution
corporation to co-ordinate with its counterparts in other jurisdictions. In this regard, the
Commission recommends that, in five years from now, a committee be set up to review
the emerging consensus in this field and suggest amendments in the legal framework on
resolution accordingly.
7.3. Objectives of the resolution corporation

Designing an effective resolution mechanism requires clarity of objectives in performing
resolution. Table 7.2 outlines the objectives of the resolution corporation that must guide
its functioning.
The increasing size of deposit-taking institutions and the emergence of financial conglomerates have increased the risk to financial stability from firm failure. To address this
concern, regulatory regimes have tried to redefine the scope of resolution. Internationally, regulators are now moving to broaden the mandate of resolution authorities to include any SIFI including banks, holding companies, non-bank financial corporations, and
financial market infrastructure such as payment, settlement and clearing systems. The
Code drafted by the Commission envisages a resolution corporation of similar scope.
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Commensurately, the corporation must have sufficient resources (financial, organisation

and technical), and must have the legal powers for the rapid and orderly liquidation of a
wide variety of covered firms and SIFIs to avert risk to financial stability.
The resolution corporation regime must enhance financial market efficiency. It must
not restrict market participants from innovation or taking calculated risks. Instead, it
should facilitate the efficient pricing and allocation of risk, and the internalisation of the
costs of firm failure. Market efficiency will be supported and enhanced in the following
ways:
1. All covered service providers would pay fees that are proportional to the prospective costs that
they may impose upon resolution, which reflects a combination of the probability of failure and
the costs borne by the resolution corporation upon firm failure.
2. Allocation of losses to firm owners and unsecured and uninsured creditors will be in a manner
that respects hierarchy of claims.
An important aspect of the resolution framework centres around the protection of

consumers in proportion to the nature, scale and complexity of obligations owed by the
regulated entity; and to prioritise claims according to the hierarchy determined by such
obligations.
In determining the nature, scale and complexity of obligations the regulator, in consultation with the resolution corporation, must take into consideration the following factors:
1. the nature and extent of detriment that may be caused to consumers in case of
non-fulfillment of obligations owed to them by the covered service provider;
2. the lack of ability of consumers to access and process information relating to the
safety and soundness of the covered service provider; and
3. the inherent difficulties that may arise for financial service providers in fulfilling
those obligations.
The obligations that score high on the above factors must always be protected by
the resolution corporation. Such obligations will be referred to as covered obligations.
The objective of the resolution corporation will be to protect consumers of covered obligations up to a reasonable limit.
If there is no resolution framework, the Government will be pressured to capitalise
distressed firms, leading to high fiscal costs, and losses to tax payers. This is especially
true in the case of a SIFI, whose failure could threaten financial stability and the health of
the real economy. The other alternative to taxpayer-funded bailout could be bankruptcy.
However, as global experience in the aftermath of the financial crisis shows, regular bankruptcy proceedings may not be adequate to prevent financial market instability. Thus, a
specialised resolution regime must offer a viable alternative to the financial instability
resulting from bankruptcy proceedings, or the fiscal and political consequences of tax
payer-funded bailouts.
The global experience with financial firms that approach failure is that rapid and early
action works smoothly, while delayed action places substantial costs upon the exchequer. Hence, the objective of protecting public funds is synonymous with building a capability that monitors covered financial firms, makes an early assessment about a firm that
is approaching failure, and undertakes interventions early. This requires a sophisticated
risk assessment system, one that works in partnership with micro-prudential regulation
but ultimately reaches an independent decision.
7.4. Interaction between agencies

Micro-prudential regulation is closely linked with the resolution framework. They share a
common objective, that is, to minimise costs to customers, the financial system at large,
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and the tax payer arising from the risk of failure of a financial institution. However, there
are important differences between the perspective of micro-prudential and resolution
authorities in terms of timing and intensity of intervention. As long as a firm is healthy,
the resolution authority does not intervene; and instead, relies on information from the
micro-prudential regulator. At best, it conducts periodic reviews.
As the probability of failure increases, the degree of supervision by the resolution
corporation will increase. At each stage of greater difficulty, there will be regular interaction between the micro-prudential regulators and the resolution corporation. Microprudential regulators and the resolution corporation have a well defined protocol, embedded in the draft Code, for joint work covering:
1. Risk assessment of covered service providers;
2. Actions to be taken with respect to a covered service provider at different stages of risk to the
covered service provider; and
3. Identification of emerging regulatory risks, their assessment, quantification and impact on the
financial sector.
The task of resolving a failing covered service provider also involves interaction with
the competition regulator, CCI. One commonly used tool of resolution involves selling
the firm to a healthy firm. In the routine business of selling or merging a firm, the effects
on competition must be considered. The resolution corporation must consult the CCI on
the likely effects of its actions on the state of competition in the market. In addition, the
resolution corporation must prepare a report detailing the effect that its proposed action
is likely to have on competition in the relevant market. The interaction should involve
sharing of any relevant information and data at the disposal of the resolution corporation.
However, in times of crisis, concerns of financial stability may outweigh competition concerns. An analysis of global experience shows that post-crisis, national competition authorities recognise that failing firm investigations are too lengthy, as firms in distress may deteriorate rapidly, and cause inefficient liquidations. Procedures need to be
amended to facilitate speedy mergers of failing firms. In such an event, the obligation to
consult the CCI and examine the implications on competition must be exempted.
The resolution corporation must approach the FSDC in two circumstances. Firstly,
if there is a difference of opinion between the resolution corporation and the microprudential regulator, either entity may approach the FSDC, which must resolve their dispute. Secondly, if the resolution corporation believes that it may be required to take action against a SIFI, it must necessarily inform the FSDC of the measures that it proposes to
take thus, and seek permission for taking any such measures. The Commission is of the
view that actions by the resolution corporation against a SIFI are likely to have systemic
implications. The one entity in the new financial architecture designed by the Commission with a view of the entire system is the FSDC. Therefore, any actions against a SIFI
must necessarily be with the knowledge and permission of the FSDC, to preempt any unforeseen systemic consequences from occurring.
Table 7.3 establishes the framework of co-ordinated action with other agencies.
7.5. Powers of the resolution corporation

The Commission believes that the resolution corporation needs to be equipped with
wide powers to carry out its functions. To carry out its supervisory reviews, the resolution
corporation needs to have a specialised staff of examiners. These examiners will conduct regular examination of covered service providers. When the covered service provider
shows unfavourable trends in its risk profile, the resolution corporation can call for special examinations as a measure of enhanced supervision.
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Table of Recommendations 7.3 Interaction with other agencies

The draft Code on resolution obliges the resolution corporation, the micro-prudential regulators, the competition
regulator and the FSDC to consult and co-ordinate regularly and frequently, achieve regulatory harmonisation, and
share information. Accordingly, the draft Code provides for:
1. An appropriate mechanism to address disputes in the event of disagreement between the regulators and the
resolution corporation;
2. Where actions are likely to involve a SIFI, the resolution corporation must necessarily obtain the permission
of the FSDC;
3. An obligation to consult CCI on the likely effects of the resolution corporations proposed actions on competition in the relevant market; and
4. Exemption from consultation with the CCI in certain circumstances, if the resolution corporation determines
that those actions need to be taken immediately to prevent the probable failure of a covered service provider.
Proactive and timely intervention by the micro-prudential regulator and the resolution corporation is the key to ensure orderly resolution of covered service providers and to
prevent losses to the insurance fund. To operationalise this, the Commission envisages a
framework of prompt corrective action incorporating a series of intervention measures
to be undertaken by the micro-prudential regulator and the resolution corporation to restore the financial health of the covered service provider. As a first step, the framework
requires determination of certain measures of risk and identification of certain stages of
the financial condition of covered service providers, based on the direction and magnitude of these risk measures. Once the stages are identified, the micro-prudential regulator and the resolution corporation will seek to address the concerns of firms through
their supervisory and regulatory tools.
The Commission believes that the benefits of such a framework would be two-fold:
1. Enhanced regulatory intervention on deteriorating covered service providers would mitigate the
risk-taking incentives by imposing more market discipline; and
2. Reduced regulatory forbearance such as too big to fail, by linking regulatory response to a covered service providers financial condition.
Table 7.4 outlines the Commissions recommendations.
7.5.1. Powers of the resolution corporation as receiver

The framework of prompt corrective action is designed to identify the risks to a covered
service providers viability at an early stage so that corrective actions can be taken by the
covered service provider. However, if the covered service provider fails to implement the
corrective actions prescribed by the micro-prudential regulator and the resolution corporation, and its financial condition continues to deteriorate, the covered service provider
falls within the receivership domain of the resolution corporation.
Table 7.5 defines the powers of the resolution corporation as the receiver. In thinking
about the corporations role as a receiver, the Commission recommends that the corporation be given wide range of powers and accorded significant legal immunity.
7.6. Resolution tools

The choice and sequencing of the use of a resolution tool must be guided by the objective of minimising direct and financial costs to the system, proportional protection to
cover small and less-sophisticated depositors and customers, and minimising contagion
risk. The objectives should be prioritised as the resolution corporation determines to be
appropriate in each case.
Global experience shows that the tools of resolution can broadly be categorised as:
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Table of Recommendations 7.4 Examination and prompt corrective action

The resolution process requires the resolution corporation to undertake a series of activities including the regular
monitoring, supervision and evaluation of covered service providers; prompt corrective action; and transferring and
disposing assets of failing or failed covered service providers. To carry out these functions, the draft Code enables
the resolution corporation to:
1. Conduct regular evaluations at periodic intervals;
2. Conduct special evaluations of covered service providers that show unfavourable changes in their risk profile; and
3. Impose monetary penalty if a covered service provider fails to disclose relevant information or co-operate
with the corporation.
The resolution corporation and the micro-prudential regulators must together establish a framework for prompt
corrective action to identify risks to covered service providers at an early stage, and to ensure their timely resolution.
Therefore, the law must provide for the determination of:
1. Indicators or measures of risk assessment by the micro-prudential regulator; and
2. Stages identifying the risk to the viability of covered service providers based on these indicators or measures.
Five such stages low, moderate, material, imminent and critical risk to viability must be identified. Each covered
service provider, depending on its state of health, will be classified accordingly. In each of the stages, the resolution
corporation will implement a series of measures as described below:
1. Low risk to viability: In this stage, the activity of the resolution corporation will be restricted to monitoring
the covered service provider based on regulatory data, reports from examinations and inspections, and any
other data that may be available to the corporation.
2. Moderate risk to viability: In this stage the resolution corporation will conduct a special examination of the
affairs of the covered service provider to assess its health, and communicate its concerns to the covered
service provider and may levy a premium surcharge.
3. Material risk to viability: In this stage, in addition to the actions mentioned above, the resolution corporation
will require the covered service provider to prepare a resolution plan. The resolution plan will help the resolution corporation in devising optimal resolution strategies for the covered service provider. It will intensify
engagement with the covered service provider on the resolution plan, including obtaining all the information
related to the plan.
4. Imminent risk to viability: If the covered service provider has imminent risk to viability, within 90 days of such
a determination, the corporation will apply for receivership of the covered service provider. The regulator
must appoint the corporation as the receiver for such a covered service provider.
5. Critical risk to viability: If a covered service provider reaches this stage, the corporation will cancel or terminate
all policies of insurance and apply for liquidation.
In each of these stages the regulator will apply its regulatory tools and will intensify engagement with the covered
service provider, till it is placed in the receivership domain of the resolution corporation.
1. Sale to another institution: The most market-oriented tool of resolution involves selling all or part
of the business of a covered service provider to a viable commercial purchaser. This tool is useful
because it ensures continuity of services, and incurs minimal resolution cost. In the exercise of
this tool, the resolution corporation must ensure that thorough diligence is followed in inviting
bids, giving accurate information, maximising the number of potential purchasers and exploring
multiple transaction structures.
2. Bridge institution: In some cases, it may not be possible to find a willing buyer for a failing covered service provider. In such cases, the resolution corporation can establish a wholly-ownedsubsidiary to bridge the time lag between the failure of such an institution and the satisfactory
transfer to a third party. The management of the bridge institution will try to restore asset quality and arrange for finding a suitable buyer for the covered service provider. This is an interim
solution which will culminate in either sale or liquidation or a combination of the two.
3. Temporary public ownership: If the other two tools fail to work, temporary public ownership is
the last resort. The law will provide for specific conditions for its application.
Table 7.6 defines the three resolution tools and the conditions for their use.
The Commission recommends that the process of resolving a covered service provider,
including the choice of a resolution tool, should not depend on the ownership structure
of the service provider. This will result in ownership neutrality in the approach of the
corporation. In this framework, the treatment of public and private firm; and domestic
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Table of Recommendations 7.5 Powers of the resolution corporation as receiver

If a covered service provider fails to implement the instructions of the micro-prudential regulator and the resolution
corporation under the prompt corrective action framework, and reaches a stage of imminent risk to viability, the
regulator will appoint the resolution corporation as receiver of that covered service provider. As a consequence of
being appointed as receiver of a covered service provider, the resolution corporation will have the following powers:
1. To act as successor to all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the covered service provider;
2. To take over the management of the covered service provider;
3. To exercise any of the three major tools to resolve a covered service provider: sale to another financial service
provider, the incorporation of a bridge institution, or temporary public ownership (nationalisation);
4. To manage and operate the covered service provider including selling off its assets, arranging for the assumption of its liabilities, and conducting the business of the covered service provider; and
5. The resolution corporation as receiver shall terminate all rights and claims that the shareholders and creditors of the covered service provider may have against the assets of the company, except for the right to payment, resolution, or other satisfaction of their claims.
The resolution process must be allowed to proceed smoothly, with appropriate immunity from legal proceedings
pending the completion of resolution. In law, this requires mandating the following:
1. The decision to resolve a covered service provider, as determined by the resolution corporation, is final, conclusive and may not be appealed;
2. A court will not have jurisdiction over any claim or any action seeking a determination of rights with respect to
the assets of the covered service provider, including any assets which the resolution corporation may acquire
as receiver; and
3. Throughout the exercise of its functions, the resolution corporation must be bound by a clearly defined legal
process. If it strays from this process, it may be open to challenge before the tribunal.
Table of Recommendations 7.6 Tools of resolution

The draft Code on resolution enables the resolution corporation to exercise at least three types of resolution tools:
1. Resolution by purchase
I The resolution corporation can merge a failing covered service provider with another financial service
provider(s), or transfer some of its assets and liabilities to another financial service provider; and
I The resolution corporation must ensure that there is thorough due diligence, and there is minimal
disruption caused to the consumers of the service providers concerned.
2. Resolution by bridge service provider
I The resolution corporation can create a wholly-owned bridge institution to which all or some of the
assets and liabilities of a failing covered service provider may be transferred;
I This tool may be exercised if, given the size and complexity of the covered service provider, it is infeasible to sell it to another institution directly; and
I This tool may also be exercised if the resolution corporation determines that the continued operation
of the covered service provider is essential to provide financial services in the market.
3. Resolution by temporary public ownership
I As a last resort, the resolution corporation may require temporary public ownership of a failing covered
service provider in order to maintain financial stability;
I This tool should be used only when all other options have been exhausted;
I Temporary public ownership should typically be used for a SIFI, including banking service providers,
where the risk of firm failure is a threat to the financial system;
I The resolution corporation must consult and obtain the permission of the FSDC in the exercise of this
tool; and
I Since the tool has large fiscal implications, the draft Code must limit the conditions when the tool can
be exercised.
and a wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign firm will be identical from the viewpoint of
resolvability.
In the existing legislative landscape, there are certain Acts such as the State Bank of
India Act, 1955 and the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, that were enacted to create
specific financial institutions. These laws contain provisions that vary or exclude the applicability of general corporate and financial laws to the institutions created under them.
For instance, the State Bank of India Act, 1955 exempts the State Bank of India from the
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applicability of laws governing winding-up of companies and provides for its liquidation
only by an order of the Government. These provisions create unfair competition as it
creates a perception of safety in the minds of consumers and an expectation that they
will be insulated from the failure of such firms. The Commission recommends that such
provisions be amended immediately so that the resolution corporation can engage in orderly and least disruptive resolution of all covered service providers in accordance with
its objectives envisaged in Table 7.2.
In an attempt towards enhancing the effectiveness of the resolution framework, the
Commission also focussed on the regulatory framework of co-operative societies that
carry out banking activities. In the current arrangement, such co-operative banks are
governed by state legislations and are subject to a dual regulatory framework by the RBI
and the Registrars of Co-operative Societies of the States in which the banks are located.
This has created difficulties in the regulation of co-operative banks. These difficulties
have been attempted to be addressed through memorandums of understanding entered
into between the RBI and State Governments. Some States and Union Territories which
have amended the local Co-operative Societies Act empowering the RBI to order the Registrar of Co-operative Societies of the State or Union Territory to wind up a co-operative
bank or to supersede its committee of management and requiring the Registrar not to
take any action regarding winding up, amalgamation or reconstruction of a co-operative
bank without prior sanction in writing from the RBI are covered under the Deposit Insurance Scheme. These co-operative banks are designated as eligible co-operative banks
for the purpose of deposit insurance under the DICGC Act, 1961. This has resulted in an
uneven framework where some co-operative banks are eligible to avail the deposit insurance scheme by the DICGC while some others are not part of this arrangement.
The Commission is of the view that when co-operative societies engage in the business of providing financial services, they need to be regulated and supervised by financial
regulators in a manner that is commensurate with the nature of their business and the
risks undertaken by them and must be resolved in an orderly manner to cause least disruption to the consumers and the financial system. Since co-operatives often cater to the
needs of small households, the Commission is of the view that in the event of a deterioration in their risk profile, they should be subject to the prompt resolution framework
envisaged by the Commission.
This can be achieved under Article 252 of the Constitution which allows two or more
State Legislatures to pass a resolution accepting the authority of the Parliament to make
laws for the State on any matter on which it otherwise does not have the capacity to legislate. Using this provision, State Governments could pass resolutions to extend the power
to make laws on the regulation, supervision and resolution of co-operative societies carrying on financial services to the Parliament.
The Commission therefore makes the following recommendations with respect to
co-operative societies:
1. In consonance with the recommendations on competitive neutrality, co-operative societies carrying on financial services should be subject to similar regulatory and supervisory framework of
resolution as other entities carrying on similar activities;
2. Using Article 252 of the Constitution of India, State Governments should accept the authority of
the Parliament to legislate on matters relating to the failure resolution of co-operative societies
carrying on financial services; and
3. The regulator may impose restrictions on the carrying on of financial services by co-operative
societies from States whose Governments have not accepted the authority of the Parliament to
legislate on the regulation of co-operatives. These restrictions would entail that co-operative
societies in such states would not be covered under the resolution framework envisaged by the
Commission.
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Table of Recommendations 7.7 Funding of resolution and insurance coverage

Funding the costs of resolution and consequent payouts are incorporated in the draft Code. The resolution corporation must create a resolution fund. The draft Code enables the resolution corporation to:
1. Expand the coverage of traditional deposit insurance to include payment of compensation to specified consumers of covered service providers;
2. Collect premia from covered service providers to cover the likely costs of resolution; and
3. Terminate insurance in specific circumstances.
For the purpose of calculating premia, the draft Code provides for:
1. the manner of classification of covered service providers into different categories;
2. the manner and methodology of assessment of premia payable by different categories of covered service
providers;
3. the process of collection of premia from covered service providers; and
4. the manner and mode of payment of premia by covered service providers to the Corporation.
The resolution corporation must be able to revise insurance limits, in accordance with the principle of proportionality
to the risk to viability of covered service providers.
The draft Code on resolution allows for persons or institutions who have been reimbursed from the resolution fund
to claim for compensation over and above what they have received. Alternately, persons or institutions who are
legitimate claimants, but whose claims have not been recognised by the resolution corporation, should also be able
to seek such compensation.
In exceptional circumstances, there may be an access to a line of credit from the Central Government for a temporary
period.
7.7. Fund for compensation and resolution

Since the scope of resolution runs beyond banks, the Code drafted by the Commission envisages the creation of a resolution fund, to which various premia received from covered
service providers will be credited. The premia to be collected from the covered service
providers would be proportional to their financial position as envisaged in the prompt
corrective action framework.
In certain specified circumstances, the resolution corporation can terminate the policy of insurance issued by the resolution corporation. For example, the resolution corporation will be empowered to terminate the policy if the covered service provider fails
to pay the premia for a specified period, or if the covered service provider is engaged in
unsafe or unsound practices in conducting their business.
In the context of resolution, the Commission recommends the use of proceeds of the
resolution fund for resolution related expenses including administrative expenses as well
as for the payment of compensation to specified consumers. This reduces the burden on
covered service providers to make separate contributions for different purposes.
The Commission recognises the fact that the resolution corporation may require
monetary assistance if it is unable to meet its obligations in times of extreme financial
distress in the markets. In such exceptional circumstances, the resolution corporation
would be allowed to avail a line of credit from the Central Government for a specified
period. The Central Government will determine and review the terms of the line of credit.
Any extension, renewal or increase of credit under the line of credit sought by the resolution corporation must be accompanied by a detailed report stating the reasons for
additional borrowing and its intended uses.
Table 7.7 summarises the recommendations of the Commission on insurance coverage and the scheme of funding resolution that must be embedded in the draft Code on
resolution.
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Table of Recommendations 7.8 Winding-up proceedings

If a covered service provider has failed and needs to be liquidated or wound up, the draft Code on resolution must
allow for:
1. The process of liquidation to be carried out in accordance with the law of incorporation of the covered service
provider;
2. The resolution corporation to be appointed as the official liquidator by the court concerned; and
3. The resolution corporation to be the creditor of the first priority if the resolution corporation has utilised
proceeds from the fund towards meeting the expenses of liquidation.
7.8. Consequences of resolution

A resolution action by the resolution corporation may include the following:
1. Transfer of shares, property, rights and obligations in contracts;
2. Change in the management of the firm, even resulting in removal of certain workforce;
3. Compensation; and
4. Liquidation of the covered service provider.
To provide for compensation, the resolution corporation must be empowered to

carry out proceedings where persons or institutions to be compensated are identified
and awarded monetary compensation.
Compensation proceedings would cover the following process:
1. Identification of the persons or institutions affected by the actions of the corporation who are to
be compensated;
2. Evaluation of the amount of compensation to be carried out to each person or institution identified for compensation; and
3. Payment of the award.
As a last recourse, the law would allow dissenting claimants to file appeal to the appellate tribunal, beyond which the compensation proceedings would be final and conclusive. Appeals would be restricted to establishing whether due process was followed in
the award of compensation.
An efficient resolution mechanism is one that ensures that those covered service
providers that have become unviable are wound up. This ensures that deterioration of
the financial health of a covered service provider does not affect other covered service
providers in the financial system.
Since the resolution corporation closely monitors the viability of a covered service
provider and works towards bringing the institution to a less riskier financial state, it is
best suited to determine when a covered service provider should be liquidated. As such,
if the resolution corporation determines that a covered service provider has failed, the
covered service provider would proceed to liquidation.
The Commission has decided that liquidation of a covered service provider would
only happen in accordance with the law under which the institution was incorporated.
However, this law must stipulate that the resolution corporation would be appointed as
the official liquidator of the firm. As mentioned earlier, there are certain special laws governing public sector financial institutions that contain provisions which would restrict the
power of the resolution corporation to act as the official liquidator of those institutions.
The Commission recommends that such provisions of existing laws be amended immediately to give effect to this power of the resolution corporation.
Table 7.8 states the position of the Commission regarding liquidation proceedings.
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CHAPTER 8
Capital controls
Capital controls are restrictions on the movement of capital across borders. The design
of controls vary from country to country. Typically, capital controls include a range of
measures from reserve requirements to quantitative limits, licensing requirements and
outright bans. Controls may be imposed economy-wide or may apply only to specific
sectors. In addition, restrictions may apply to all kinds of flows or may differentiate by
type or duration of flows.
Indias current account is fully liberalised. The Commission has no view on either
the timing or the sequencing of capital account liberalisation. These are decisions which
should be made by policy makers in the future. The focus of the Commission has been on
establishing a sound framework of law and public administration through which capital
controls will work.
8.1. Objectives of capital controls

While some nations have used capital controls as part of their policy response to sudden inflows, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommends that capital controls be
implemented only on a temporary basis, when other macroeconomic policy responses
have been exhausted. The Commission notes that empirical studies present mixed evidence on the effectiveness of capital controls in addressing macroeconomic imbalances
and systemic risk. The Commission also acknowledges that, in the current Indian context, a distinction must be made between strategic and tactical capital controls. While
the former involves defining a credible framework of rules of the game which can be
used by foreign investors to decide their investment strategy, the latter would be situation specific - to be imposed when particular circumstances arise and withdrawn when
they abate. Consequently, the Commission recommends that capital controls be available for policy purposes as a temporary measure during macroeconomic crises.
Even in countries which have achieved full capital account convertibility, the legal
framework provides for the imposition of controls for preventing foreign ownership of
certain national assets for reasons of national security. The Commission recommends
that in the Indian context too, the law should restrict foreign ownership of national assets. Accordingly, the draft Code provides for the pursuit of this objective with clarity on
instruments and objectives.
The application of capital controls should be consistent with the principle of competitive neutrality. Controls should only be imposed at the entry level. Once all entry level
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requirements are fulfilled, there should be full national treatment of foreign entities, i.e.
full symmetry when compared with resident entities. For instance, net worth, capital adequacy norms or investment restrictions should not be different for a foreign entity when
compared to a resident entity performing similar functions or investments in India.
8.2. Current framework

The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, codifies the existing approach to capital controls. It differentiates between current account transactions and capital account
transactions. The Central Government makes rules in consultation with RBI for current
account transactions, and the RBI in consultation with the Central Government makes
regulations in relation to capital account transactions. This approach has led to a complex web of rules and regulations on capital controls spread across laws. It has also led to
the absence of a clear and consistent framework of policy and translation of policy into
law. In studying the current framework, the Commission notes that the deficiencies can
be broadly be classified into two categories:
1. Difficulties of multiplicity: These arise due to multiple laws, multiple regulators and multiple artificial investment vehicles created by the regulations; and
2. Difficulties of absence: These arise due to absence of legal process and judicial review, and absence of clear and consistent drafting.
8.2.1. Difficulties of multiplicity

The difficulties of multiplicity involve the following elements:
1. Multiple laws: The current framework of controls involves a myriad and complex web of regulations issued by multiple regulators regulating multiple market participants. Regulations are also
organised by asset classes such as equity, quasi-equity instruments (such as convertible debentures) and debt instruments, issued by both listed and unlisted entities.
2. Multiple regulators: The institutional bodies regulating capital flows include the RBI, SEBI, FMC,
IRDA, and the interim PFRDA. Within the Central Government, the Ministry of Finance houses the
Department of Revenue, the Department of Economic Affairs, and the Department of Financial
Services. The Department of Economic Affairs hosts the Foreign Investment Promotion Board
which approves Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the country, on a case by case basis for those
investments which require prior approval under the regulatory framework. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry hosts the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion which is responsible
for promulgating policy on FDI into the country.
3. Multiple investment vehicles and unequal treatment: Various artificial investment vehicles
have been created in India to regulate capital inflows. These investment vehicles include the Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs), the Foreign Venture Capital Investors (FVCIs) and the Qualified
Foreign Investors (QFIs). Varied levels of controls are exercised on these vehicles, in accordance
with policy considerations. In addition to the artificial vehicles, non-resident Indians and persons
of Indian origin are treated differently from other foreign investors, effectively creating a separate
investment vehicle.
Additionally, there is also a problem of unequal treatment, as foreign investors are not treated at
par with Indian investors.
8.2.2. Difficulties of absence

The difficulties of absence in the field of capital controls comprise the following:
1. Absence of legal process: The rule making process in relation to capital controls is devoid of any
public consultation. In addition, policy pronouncements and regulations are rarely accompanied
by statements of policy and purpose, making it difficult for stake-holders to deduce a regulators
intention.
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2. Absence of judicial review: Currently, for violations of any regulations, direction or contraventions of conditions subject to which any authorisation is issued by the RBI, administrative hearings are conducted by first, adjudication officers and second, by Special Directors (Appeals).
Adjudication officers can begin inquiry only upon receipt of a complaint from an authorised person. While contravention of conditions of approval of RBI can be a cause of action, failure to
grant an approval by the RBI or the Foreign Investment Promotion Board is conspicuous by its
absence. Typically, the RBI regulation of capital flows has been seen purely as an act of monetary policy under the discretion of the central bank and not a regulatory action worthy of legal
appeals. Appeals from decisions of Special Director (Appeals) lie to a tribunal created by the Central Government. A person aggrieved by a decision or order of the appellate tribunal created by
the Central Government must file an appeal to the appropriate High Court.
3. Absence of clear and consistent drafting: Capital controls regulations, as currently articulated, are ambiguous and inconsistent which increases the transaction costs for investors. At any
given level of convertibility, an ad hoc administrative arrangement of sometimes overlapping,
sometimes contradictory and sometimes non-existent rules for different categories of players
has created problems of regulatory arbitrage and lack of transparency. These transactions costs
increase the cost of capital faced by Indian recipients of foreign equity capital.
8.3. Proposed framework

India now has an open current account. Under the draft Code, there is a liberalised regime
where foreign exchange for the purposes of current account transactions can be freely
brought into the country or taken out of the country. This will be subject only to tax and
money laundering considerations, as currently applicable.
The capital controls framework in India must address the difficulties in the present
framework and seek to rationalise and unify rule making. The design of the draft Code on
capital controls focuses on accountability and legal process, and leaves the questions of
sequencing and timing of capital account liberalisation to policy makers in the future.
The Commission deliberated at length on the proposed framework on capital controls. One view was that the imposition of controls on capital flows are essentially based
on political considerations. Hence the rule-making on capital controls must vest with
the Central Government. Empowering the regulator to frame regulations on capital controls creates difficulties in articulating the objectives that should guide the regulator while
framing regulations on capital controls. Another view was to give the regulator enhanced
regulation making powers as it directly interact with market participants. The Commission, however recommends a mixed formulation. The rules governing capital controls on
inward flows and consequent outflows i.e. repayment of the principal amount, should be
framed by the Central Government, in consultation with the RBI. The regulations governing capital controls on outward flows should be framed by the RBI, in consultation with
the Central Government.
Table 8.1 enunciates the design of the proposed framework on capital controls.
8.3.1. Rules and regulations on capital controls

The rules on inward flows will be made by the Central Government and the RBI will make
regulations on outward flows. The rule making and regulation making will be a consultative process between the Central Government and the RBI. The consultations will
be documented and may also be guided by national security considerations. Table 8.2
details the rule and the regulation making process recommended by the Commission.
As is the case today, the oversight of reporting and supervisory powers over intermediaries in capital controls, the authorised dealers, will be placed with the RBI, till such time
capital account convertibility is not achieved. As is the case currently, the Financial Intelligence Unit would have a role in monitoring these flows for purposes of addressing
money-laundering and related matters.
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The draft Code addresses fundamental concerns in the framework of capital controls, and provides for the following:
1. The rules on capital account transactions for all inbound flows including outflows that arise as a consequence
of these inflows, will be made by the Central Government in consultation with the RBI. The regulations on
capital account transactions for all outbound flows will be made by the RBI in consultation with the Central
Government.
2. A single investment vehicle for investment in India i.e., qualified foreign investors (those foreign investors who
meet the customer due diligence criteria prescribed by the Central Government);
3. A sound legal process while making rules for capital account transactions and while granting approvals;
4. A framework for imposition of controls in emergency situations (such as war, natural calamity and balance
of payment crises);
5. Review or restrictions on capital account transactions on national security considerations, by the Central
Government or the RBI for inbound and outbound flows, respectively;
6. Review of decisions of the Central Government and the RBI; and
7. The principle that once controls are imposed at the entry level there must be equal treatment for Indian
investors and foreign investors.
8.3.2. Single investment vehicle

The Commission believes that there must be an unified QFI framework to address unequal treatment of foreign investors. This recommendation is not new; the UK Sinha Report also recommended the removal of artificial and multiple classification of foreign investors. In adopting those recommendations, regulators created an additional investor
class of QFI without subsuming existing investor classes. This has unnecessarily increased
complexity in regulation. The Commission therefore recommends combining regulation
of all investment vehicles and individuals into a single, unified framework, the QFI regime.
Any non-resident should be eligible to become a QFI provided it meets the customer due
diligence norms prescribed by the Central Government. Creating a single investor class
for foreign investments would offer a clear investment regime, and would considerably
reduce uncertainty, compliance costs and the time taken to make investments without
in any way altering the domestic investment framework. At the same time, this would
ensure that India complies with the treaty obligations associated with the FATF.
8.3.3. Legal process

Legal process broadly refers to the processes, procedural rights and institutions through
which law is made and applied. Legal process includes principles of transparency and
accountability, fairness in application, equality before the law and participation in decision making. The Commission proposes the deepening of legal process guarantees in
the countrys framework on capital controls. Legal process principles will be applicable
at the levels of policy formulation, rule making, regulation making and implementation.
With rule/regulation making, the responsibilities are split between the Central Government and RBI. For regulations issued by RBI (for outbound flows), the usual regulationmaking process detailed in the draft Code should be applied. For rules issued by the Central Government, the conventional regulation-making process cannot be applied as the
Central Government is not a regulatory agency. The Commission recommends that a
process that is similar in most respects should be utilised.
The grant of approvals presents unique problems. At the implementation level, denials of approvals and registrations must be done with transparency and must provide
explicit reasoning. For instance, registrations must not be denied to meet broad policy
objectives and policy decisions must not be implemented in an ad hoc manner or be targeted at individual participants. The Central Government and the RBI will be obliged to
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Table of Recommendations 8.2 Rule and regulation making process

While making rules on inbound flows, the Central Government must first consult the RBI and then publish draft rules.
The draft rules must be released for public consultation along with an analysis of the costs and benefits of the proposed rule. All other provisions of regulatory governance which apply to regulators while making draft regulations
will apply to the Central Government as well.
For outbound flows, the RBI must first consult the Central Government and then utilise the usual regulation-making
process.
In emergency circumstances, the Central Government or the RBI, as the case may be, need not follow the detailed rule
making process. However, consultation between the Central Government and the RBI must precede the rule making.
Additional controls on capital account transactions may be imposed in emergency circumstances.
The emergency rules and regulations will remain valid for only three months, and are required to be notified and
placed before both the Houses of the Parliament.
The emergency rules and regulations will remain valid for only three months, and are required to be notified and
placed before both the Houses of the Parliament.
Emergency situations include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Outbreak of a natural calamity;

Grave and sudden changes in domestic and foreign economic conditions;
Serious difficulties or expectation of serious difficulties in international payments and international finance;
Proclamation of national emergency under Article 352 of the Constitution of India; or
Proclamation of financial emergency under Article 360 of the Constitution of India.
Table of Recommendations 8.3 Grant of approval

The Central Government, in relation to inbound flows, and the RBI, in relation to outbound flows, will have the authority to grant approvals or dispose off applications by following a time-bound due process. Reasoned decision in this
regard must be provided. If approval is granted, it must clearly specify the scope, effective period and any conditions
subject to which it is granted.
While deciding on an application, the principles of proportionality between the costs imposed and the benefits expected to be achieved must be considered, and similarly situated persons must be treated in a similar manner i.e.
full national treatment must be followed.
However, the Central Government and the RBI may impose conditions or reject applications on national security
considerations such as:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Ownership of critical infrastructure by foreign investors;

Ownership of critical technologies by foreign investors;
Control or ownership of assets in India by foreign governments;
Involvement of a non-resident or foreign government which presents a threat to peaceful coexistence of India
with other nations;
5. Involvement of a non-resident or foreign government which presents a threat or a major disruption to foreign
relations of India; or
6. Any other matter prescribed by the Central Government or specified by the RBI.
provide decisions within specific and reasonable time limits. However, the Central Government and RBI may deny approvals or impose conditions where there are national security considerations.
Table 8.3 establishes the Commissions recommended framework regarding the granting of approvals that is embedded in the draft Code.
8.3.4. Review
The decisions of the Central Government and the RBI will be subject to a two-tier review.
A senior officer in the Central Government will hear the matters relating to denial of approvals or imposition of unnecessary conditions by the Central Government. Appeals
from orders of such senior officers would lie to the appellate tribunal. The administrative
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Table of Recommendations 8.4 Review

The decision of the Central Government on granting or rejection of approvals on inbound flows will be subject to a
review by a senior officer in the Central Government. The decision of the RBI on granting or rejection of approvals on
outbound flows will be subject to a review by the administrative law member of the RBI. Matters relating to violations
of the capital controls rules, regulations or conditions of any approval by any person will be subject to review of the
administrative law officer in the RBI. The administrative law officer may initiate inquiry upon receipt of report by
investigation officers. The administrative law officer must follow principles of natural justice, conduct an inquiry in
a fair, transparent and time-bound manner and provide reasoned orders in writing. Appeals from the orders of the
administrative law officer will lie to the administrative law member of the RBI. Appeals from the orders of the senior
officer and the administrative law member will lie to the appellate tribunal.
Table of Recommendations 8.5 Reporting and Supervision

1.
2.
3.
4.
Supervision would be conducted by the RBI through its oversight of authorised dealers.
The authorised dealers will conduct continuous monitoring of qualified foreign investors.
The persons undertaking transactions and the authorised dealers will file reports with the RBI through FDMC.
The Central Government will have access to the reports filed with the FDMC.
law member of the RBI will hear the matters relating to denial of approvals or imposition
of unnecessary conditions by RBI. Appeals from orders of such administrative law member will lie to the appellate tribunal.
Cases of violations of the provisions on capital controls under the draft Code, any
rules or regulations on capital controls, or conditions subject to which approvals are
granted, would be subject to review by an administrative law officer in the RBI. Appeals
from the orders of the administrative law officer will lie to the administrative law member of the RBI. Appeals from the orders of such administrative law member will lie to the
appellate tribunal.
Thus, this process would include first and second levels of administrative appeals,
as well as the provision for awarding remedies. The Central Government, the RBI, and
the appellate tribunal would be obliged to provide reasoned decisions involving interpretations of law. Such decisions would also be published. Appeals from the appellate
tribunal would go directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the High Courts, though writ
jurisdiction of the High Courts would not be precluded.
Table 8.4 outlines the recommendations of the Commission that are embedded in
the draft Code.
8.3.5. Reporting, supervision and enforcement

Ensuring compliance of provisions on capital controls in the draft Code, rules and regulations in relation to the capital controls is placed with the RBI in the draft Code. This would
include oversight of reporting of foreign exchange transactions with the FDMC and ensuring compliance of the law, rules and regulations. Under conditions of full capital account
convertibility, these functions will be placed with the Central Government.
The RBI will supervise authorised dealers (such as banking service providers) for the
purpose of ensuring compliance with the law, rules and regulations. Certain supervisory
activities would be delegated to these authorised dealers who will use their discretion
on the basis of certain guiding principles (see Table 8.5 generally). All reports made to
authorised dealers will be shared with RBI through the FDMC. FDMC will be able to share
this information with the Central Government, as required.
8.3.6. Guidance and compounding

The transparent and easily accessible framework for guidance and compounding provided in the draft Code extends to the capital controls framework as well. The RBI will
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Table of Recommendations 8.6 Compounding and guidance

1. Compounding of offences will be carried out by the RBI.
2. General and specific guidance will also be provided by the RBI.
provide guidance and compound matters in relation to capital controls under the draft
Code.
Table 8.6 outlines the recommendations of the Commission on guidance and compounding.
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CHAPTER 9
Systemic risk
9.1. The problem of systemic risk

The field of financial regulation has traditionally focused on consumer protection, microprudential regulation and resolution. However, the 2008 financial crisis highlighted systemic risk as another important dimension of financial regulatory governance. Subsequently, governments and lawmakers worldwide have pursued regulatory strategies to
avoid such systemic crises and reduce the costs to the exchequer, and ultimately society,
of resolving the crises that do occur.
Systemic risk is the risk of a collapse in the functioning of the financial system, largely
due to its interconnectedness to other parts of the economy, leading to an adverse impact on the real economy. Thinking about systemic risk oversight requires an integrated
and comprehensive view of the entire financial system. In comparison, conventional financial regulation leans towards analysing consumers, financial products, financial firms
or financial markets, one at a time.
The Commission recommends the IMF-FSB-BIS definition of systemic risk:
[a] risk of disruption to financial services that is caused by an impairment of all
or parts of the financial system and has the potential to have serious negative
consequences for the real economy.
The primary regulatory mandate of regulators and agencies defines their perspective
and information access, so an individual sectoral regulator is likely to focus its gaze or
have a viewpoint on the operations of that sector alone, and not on the overall financial
system of the country. For example, a resolution corporation tends to look at firms from
the narrow perspective of how an individual firm would be resolved when in distress and
this perspective informs its approach to the financial system. Systemic risk analysis, in
contrast, requires a comprehensive system-wide perspective on the impact of the failure
of an individual firm or sector.
The analysis of the Commission regarding systemic risk reflects a combination of:
1. Indias experiences with several systemic crises from 1992 onwards;
2. The emerging global consensus on methods for avoiding systemic crises that have come into focus after the
2008 financial crisis; and
3. The analysis of scenarios involving potential systemic crises in coming decades in India.
To some extent, systemic crises are the manifestation of failures in the core tasks of
financial regulation consumer protection, micro-prudential regulation and resolution.
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The Commission notes that even if individual institutions appear sound and are well-monitored, system-wide risks
may build up in the aggregate. Such risks need to be monitored, identified and addressed - with a system-wide
perspective and not a sectoral perspective. Hence there is a need for an agency to:
1. Foster the stability and resilience of the financial system by identifying, monitoring and mitigating systemic
risk; and
2. Improve co-ordination between multiple regulatory agencies (such as the micro-prudential regulators, the
resolution corporation and other agencies within the financial system) by bringing diverse perspectives into
the discussion, engaging with the regulatory stake-holders, identifying and reducing regulatory uncertainty
(including regulatory arbitrage), and addressing unregulated areas.When a systemic crisis materialises, the
agency must assist the Ministry of Finance and regulatory agencies in their efforts relating to resolving the
crisis.
Many of the crises of the past, and hypothetical crisis scenarios of the future, are indictments of the limits of such regulation, standing alone. Increasing institutional capacity to
address the problems of consumer protection, micro-prudential regulation and resolution will certainly work to diminish systemic risk, however, such risk will not be eliminated.
The Commission notes that despite well-intentioned implementation, flaws in institutional design, and errors of operation in existing institutional arrangements are inevitable. Additionally, even if extant consumer protection, micro-prudential regulation
and resolution regimes work perfectly, some systemic crises may not be prevented, and
measures to contain such crises will need to be developed. These dimensions of concern
call for urgent and thorough work in the field of systemic risk oversight, as a fourth pillar
of financial regulation.
9.2. Objectives and principles

While there is a clear case for establishing institutional capacity in these areas, it is also
important to be specific in the enunciation of its implementation. Unless systemic risk
regulation is envisioned as a precise set of functions, demarcated by clear and concrete
rules as specified by the draft Code, systemic risk law could easily devolve into a set of
vaguely specified sweeping powers, and there could be a danger of sacrificing the goals
of development and efficiency in favour of avoiding potential systemic risk. Therefore,
the Commission has taken care to precisely articulate the strategy for systemic risk oversight, seeking to avoid any draconian control of regulatory powers and emphasising on
inter-regulatory agency co-ordination. The Commissions recommendations also emphasise broad principles of regulatory governance so as to ensure that the operations
of an agency charged with such functions are guided by an appropriate set of checks and
balances.
Table 9.1 enunciates the objectives of systemic risk oversight.
Table 9.2 lists the principles that should guide the functioning of the agency designated to monitor and address systemic risk concerns.
9.3. Institutional arrangement

The monitoring of systemic risk across the world, in varying capacities, has resulted in
countries adopting differing structural frameworks for this purpose. For example, the UK
has envisaged a Financial Policy Committee, located within the Bank of England, that
functions in a manner analogous to its Monetary Policy Committee. The US has established a statutory body called the Financial Stability Oversight Council which comprises
the heads of various regulatory agencies and government representatives. Similarly, the
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Table of Recommendations 9.2 Principles

The agency must be subject to regulatory governance norms, including the obligation to report on its activities at
frequent intervals. The agencys decisions can significantly impact financial market participants, including by way
of increasing costs of micro-prudential regulation. Such decisions can also have unintended consequences, causing
regulatory arbitrage and otherwise generally affecting the competitive nature of financial markets. Therefore, the
draft Code requires that the agency:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Performs actions proportionate to the benefits expected from those actions;

Ensures that its actions seek to reduce the potential for regulatory inconsistency;
Does not cause a significant adverse effect on the competitiveness or growth of the financial sector;
Acts in a transparent manner; and
Be subject to the Duty to explain principle: Whenever there is a conflict between principles, the agency
must explain the rationale for acting in contravention of a principle, subject to the caveat that the agencys
actions must always further its overall objective under the draft Code.
European Union has established a European Systemic Risk Board consisting of central
bank representatives from member-states, as well as European Union financial regulators.
The regulatory architecture envisaged by the Commission consists of a resolution
corporation tasked with managing the resolution of regulated entities, while regulators
will pursue consumer protection and micro-prudential regulation within certain sectors
of the financial system. None of these agencies will be able to monitor the financial system as a whole, on a constant basis. Hence, the Commission believes that monitoring
and addressing of systemic risk concerns is best executed by a council of regulatory agencies, which allow it to combine the expertise of the multiple agencies involved in regulation, consumer protection and resolution. The board of the council will include the
Minister of Finance, Central Government as the chairperson and would be served by an
executive committee comprising the heads of the regulators and agencies of the financial
sector. The Commission also envisages a secretariat to assist the executive committee
with administrative matters. Except in circumstances of dispute resolution and implementation of system-wide measures, the managerial and administrative responsibilities
of the council would vest in the executive committee, Where the executive committee is
unable to reach consensus on a proposed decision or action of the council, the board will
step in to resolve the issue, thus facilitating efficient functioning of the agency.
In the consultative processes of the Commission, the RBI expressed the view that it
should be charged with the overall systemic risk oversight function. This view was debated extensively within the meetings of the Commission, however, there were several
constraints in pursuing this institutional arrangement. In the architecture proposed by
the Commission, the RBI would perform consumer protection and micro-prudential regulation only for the banking and payments sector. This implied that the RBI would be
able to generate knowledge in these sectors alone from the viewpoint of the safety and
soundness of such financial firms and the protection of the consumer in relation to these
firms. This is distinct from the nature of information and access that would be required
from the entire financial system for the purpose of addressing systemic risk.
The Commission notes that its recommendation is in keeping with that of the Raghuram Rajan report (2008), which led to the establishment of the Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC) by the Ministry of Finance. The proposals of the Commission
aim to place the FSDC on a sound legal footing by sharply defining its powers and tasking
it with achieving objectives in relation to monitoring and addressing systemic risk concerns.
Another key decision of the Commission involved the question of whether to structure the FSDC as a statutory body or as a unit within the Ministry of Finance. The analysis
of the Commission emphasises the former for two reasons. First, the FSDC would require
operational and financial autonomy in order to build a technically sophisticated staff to
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Table of Recommendations 9.3 Establishment of the Agency

The following characteristics will apply to the FSDC:
1.
2.
3.
4.
It will be a statutory body;

It will have operational and financial autonomy, and endeavour to build up a technically sophisticated staff;
The chairperson of its board will be the Minister of Finance, Central Government;
Other members of the board will be the head of the regulator for banking and payments, the head of the
regulator for other financial sectors, the chief executive of the resolution corporation, the chief executive of
the FSDC and an administrative law member to fulfill the requirements of regulatory governance; and
5. It will be served by an executive committee chaired by the regulator for banking and payments. Managerial
and administrative control will vest in the executive committee, which will refer decisions to the board when
it is unable to reach consensus. There will also be a secretariat which will assist the board and the executive
committee.
Table of Recommendations 9.4 The systemic risk regulation process

Systemic risk regulation is envisioned as a five-element process. The first four would be performed by the FSDC exclusively and the fifth would be carried out under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance, Central Government.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Data, research and analysis;

Identification and designation of SIFIs, including conglomerates;
Formulation and implementation of system-wide measures for mitigation of systemic risk;
Inter-regulatory agency co-ordination; and
Crisis management.
undertake vigorous oversight. Second, where the FSDCs actions might adversely affect
financial firms, enshrining the FSDC as a statutory body with adequate mechanisms for
accountability will fulfill the requirements of regulatory governance.
The FSDC will have a compact membership of five persons, thus facilitating efficient
discussions and decision making. The FSDC will be headed by a Chief Executive who will
lead a high quality, full-time professional staff.
The Commissions recommendations are listed in Table 9.3.
9.4. The five elements of the systemic risk regulation process

Systemic risk regulation is a five-element process, as shown in Table 9.4. The first element is a data collection and research function. It involves constructing a measurement
system through which the FSDC can study the entire financial system. The analysis of
system-wide data collected by the FSDC on an ongoing basis will generate areas for discussion by the FSDC. The consensus of the FSDC executive committee and board will then
be implemented by the respective agencies where areas of systemic risk concern have
been identified. The FSDC will also be empowered to collect, warehouse and disseminate all financial sector data through a system-wide database.
The second element is that of utilising this system-wide database to identify SIFIs,
including conglomerates. These will then be placed under enhanced supervision by the
respective regulators and the resolution corporation. The FSDC will also be a forum for
discussion about what this enhanced supervision will constitute, so as to ensure coherence in perspectives across the financial system.
The third element is that of taking the decision to impose system-wide measures on
the financial system. The implementation of the system-wide measure chosen by the
FSDC will be done by the regulatory agencies, in accordance with their primary legislative
mandate. These measures can include capital buffers that work to diminish systemic
risk, for example, by building up capital across the financial system in good times and
drawing on that capital when the system is under stress. As with everything else in the
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field of systemic risk, it is essential that system-wide measures are implemented on the
scale of the financial system or a large part of the financial system. For example, raising
capital requirements for the banking sector alone may lead to an increase in systemic
risk relating to bank substitutes, or the non-banking sector, which may defeat the purpose of imposing the system-wide measure. For a system-wide measure such as capital
requirements to matter on the scale of the entire financial system, the formulation and
operation of such measures would have to take place in a co-ordinated fashion.
The fourth element requires promotion of inter-regulatory co-ordination amongst
the member of the FSDC. Effective co-ordination across a wide range of policy areas
is a key element of designing an appropriate institutional framework to monitor systemic risk. Since co-ordination is an inherent part of the FSDCs work, the performance
of this function may not be visible as a stand alone process with separate tangible goals.
Nonetheless, the FSDC would focus on facilitating co-ordination which will aim to reduce
regulatory uncertainty, thus promoting the overall coherence of the financial system.
Finally, the fifth element involves assisting the Central Government with crisis management. In the event that any systemic crises occur, the draft Code emphasises a more
formal and cohesive approach to crisis management. The Ministry of Finance, Central
Government will lead the crisis management function, with assistance from the FSDC. The
FSDC will also provide assistance to members and other agencies in their efforts to resolve
the crisis.
9.5. Constructing and analysing a system-wide database

The process of systemic risk oversight begins with the gathering of information from all
sectors of the financial system, collating the same and analysing it from the viewpoint
of identifying system-wide trends which may be areas of concern. This requires interregulatory agency co-ordination, through which the data gathering, as well as discussion
leads to informed decision making. The Commission envisages the construction of a unified database, located at the FSDC which will hold all data relating to the entire financial
system.
The FSDC will be a forum for the construction of a sophisticated database leading to
the assimilation and transmission of system-wide financial data (Table 9.5). This database
will serve to assist the FSDC in conducting research on systemic risk and system-wide
trends, and facilitate a discussion about policy alternatives between the members of the
FSDC. It will not have any power to give directions to financial regulatory agencies, which
would be governed only by their respective legislation. The reporting requirements will
be stipulated by the respective regulatory agency in relation to its respective financial
entities. The latter will be required to route the data only through the FSDCs database.
All regulatory agencies will have instantaneous and continuous access to the data of financial entities which they regulate.
Once this database is in place, and maintained regularly, the FSDC would conduct
research, in co-operation with all regulatory institutions and with several academic institutions in order to analyse this data and identify potential systemic risks. These areas
of concern would be brought up for discussion at the FSDC. Based on the consensus
achieved at the FSDC, actions would be undertaken by all regulatory agencies in a coordinated fashion.
Towards this end, the FSDC will operate a data centre called the Financial Data Management Centre (FDMC) that will obtain data from regulated entities and other financial
firms. All supervisory information supplied by a regulated entity to any regulator will be
routed through and held by this database; there will be no other physical or electronic
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filings by financial firms. It must be noted however that regulators and agencies will continue to collect any data that they require until the FDMC is fully functional. The FDMC will
also contain public domain data from the economy at large, as appropriate.
Once the FDMC is operationalised each regulated entity will only submit all regulatory
data through the database. Further, each regulatory agency will only be allowed to access
the data it is authorised to collect from the entities that it regulates, to ensure that there is
no widespread access by all regulatory agencies to a regulated entitys data. This access
will be governed by memoranda of understanding that the members will enter into with
the FSDC and the FDMC.
Table of Recommendations 9.5 The Financial Data Management Centre
I The FDMC will work within the FSDC as the sole electronic system for the collection of data from financial
entities for regulatory reporting and supervision;
I All decisions on the nature of information to be collected will be entirely within the domain of individual
regulatory agencies;
I The FDMC staff will merely aggregate the data and provide access to the regulators. All vetting and review of
such data, and requests for additional information will continue to be done by the individual regulators; and
I The FSDC would be empowered to enter into memoranda of understanding with other regulators such as the
CCI or other statutory agencies associated with the financial system for increasing the ambit of a centralised
data collection, transmission and warehousing function.
To preserve data confidentiality, the FSDCs use of the data in the FDMC will be governed by the draft Code. It is envisaged that where the FSDC is required to obtain information from unregulated financial entities, it will be able to do so; however requests for
data by the FSDC must necessarily be in consonance with its objectives. There will be
legal procedures, grounded in principles of due process and regulatory governance that
will guide the request for such data by the FSDC.
It is envisaged that anonymised data from the FDMC (which will not contravene confidentiality or privacy concerns or other law) may be made available for access to research
bodies and members of the public to foster greater analysis and research relating to the
financial system.
The FDMC would represent the first accretion of information on a financial system
scale in India. With this data in hand, the FSDC would conduct a research programme
on the problems of monitoring and mitigating systemic risk, through the identification
of system-wide trends. In addition, the FDMC would also reduce the burden of multiple filings by financial firms, and promote a more efficient system of regulatory information gathering. Many benefits accrue from creating an FDMC, including de-duplication of
regulatory filings, lower costs of compliance for firms, and standardisation of regulatory
data standards. Members of the public and research bodies will also be able to access
anonymised data to foster greater analysis and research of the financial system.
The operations of the FDMC are defined in Table 9.5.
It is evident that there will be considerable challenges that the FSDC would face while
trying to conduct this research programme. The patterns of systemic risk in India are likely
to differ considerably when compared with the experiences of more developed countries,
which limits the portability of knowledge and ideas from those settings. Additionally, policy and scholarly understanding of systemic risk is relatively underdeveloped to the extent that actions to develop these databases have begun as recently as 2010 in countries
such as the US. The FSDC would have to undertake special efforts in ensuring that the research programme has adequate capabilities and meets the desired end. The research
programme must:
1. Identify the interconnectedness of, and systemic risk concerns in, the financial system;
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Table of Recommendations 9.6 Data, research and analysis

I Effective and informed analysis of systemic risk requires access to a high-quality, system-wide financial
database containing data from all regulated and some unregulated entities;
I The draft Code will provide for a central agency or other mechanism that collects, warehouses and provides
access to financial data. Such mechanism must be guided by certain basic principles to standardise data
collection; to reduce duplication of data; and to protect the confidentiality and privacy of data;
I There will be technological safeguards, as well as legal process to balance the gains from requests for data,
and possession of information;
I The agency will also conduct analysis and research to develop indicators and instruments to monitor and
mitigate risk, respectively. Each policy initiative in the field of systemic risk should be associated with datacapture and post-mortem analysis. This research must achieve state of the art capability by world standards.
It must recognise the unique features of the Indian financial system (and not mechanically transplant ideas
from elsewhere) while featuring rigorous research methodologies that are respected worldwide; and
I Regular progress reports on the database, and results of the research programme, should be disseminated
to the public. Anonymised data may also be released to foster better analysis and research.
2. Provide rapid response analysis when there is a significant financial event;

3. Develop systemic risk indicators;
4. Advise the FSDC on the formal functions of the FSDC (listed ahead) in the field of
systemic risk;
5. Analyse the optimal uses of system-wide measures for influencing systemic risk
that are embedded in the present law, and envision measures that merit consideration in future amendments to law;
6. Study the impact of regulatory policy on overall financial stability; and
7. Communicate the results of research to market participants and the public on a
regular basis.
A summary of the research and analysis function as envisaged by the Commission is
provided in Table 9.6.
9.6. Identification of systemically important firms

The draft Code in relation to micro-prudential regulation envisaged by the Commission
imposes prudential requirements upon financial firms in accordance with the objectives
and principles of the regulator. Some financial firms may present exceptional risks to
the system by virtue of their sheer size, interconnectedness or infeasibility of resolution.
Some financial firms can generate systemic risk concerns when seen as a conglomerate,
though not taken individually. Some financial firms or conglomerates could be systemically important even if they make no promises to consumers, and are thus outside microprudential regulation.
The FSDC will analyse the data from the FDMC to obtain information in relation to the
overall financial system, and name the firms and conglomerates that are systemically important. The process used to identify SIFIs here will benefit from international standards,
but will be rooted in Indian realities. The methodology that will be used for this designation will be released into the public domain, go through a notice-and-comment process,
and finally be approved by the FSDC.
This methodology will then be applied to the database within the FSDC to generate a
checklist of systemically important firms and conglomerates, which will be released into
the public domain. These firms will be brought under heightened supervision through
micro-prudential supervision and the resolution corporation. The strategies for heightened supervision, that will be applied in micro-prudential supervision and by the resolution corporation, will be discussed at the FSDC so as to induce consistency in treatment
across the financial system. This information will also be released into the public domain.
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Table of Recommendations 9.7 Designation as Systemically Important Financial

Institutions
I The FSDC will agree on the methodology for identifying SIFIs, which will embrace global standards to the
extent possible for the Indian financial system. All the recommendations for the regulation-making process
put forth by the Commission will be enforced on the construction of the methodology;
I Using this methodology, the FSDC will identify SIFIs. The list of such institutions will be released into the public
domain annually;
I SIFIs will have the choice of appealing their designation at the appellate tribunal;
I This designation will be used by micro-prudential regulators, and by the resolution corporation, to exercise
a higher standard of regulation and supervision; and
I The FSDC will monitor the higher standard of regulation and supervision by the regulatory agencies.
Financial firms can be adversely affected by being designated systemically important and being called upon to face higher regulatory standards and supervisory focus.
The Commission therefore believes that financial firms must have an opportunity to appeal this designation to ensure that the FSDCs decisions comport with basic principles of
regulatory governance.
The process followed in this field must, hence, follow a carefully structured set of
steps, as detailed in Table 9.7.
9.7. System-wide measures

Financial regulators worldwide are gradually evolving measures for regulation which apply at a system scale. For example, measures that seek to resolve the problems caused
by systemic cyclicality include the increase of capital requirements across the financial
system in good times, and vice versa. This area also requires co-ordinated movement
by all financial regulatory agencies. If, for example, capital requirements are raised in the
banking sector alone, but not in other parts of the financial system, business will simply
move away from banks, leading to regulatory arbitrage.
Therefore, there is considerable interest worldwide in identifying appropriate measures for counter-cyclical capital variation that are applicable to the entire financial system, or large parts of the financial system. At the same time, systemic risk as a body of
professional, scholarly and policy knowledge is relatively underdeveloped. Therefore the
Commission proposes laying the legal foundations for one measure - the counter-cyclical
capital buffer.
The FSDC must conduct research and formulate a mechanism for the implementation
of a counter-cyclical capital buffer such that it is applicable to the entire financial system,
or large parts of the financial system - thus preventing concerns of regulatory arbitrage.
Once such a measure has been formulated, the members of the FSDC will will move in
unison to increase or decrease capital requirements in counter-cyclical fashion. It must
be noted that the counter-cyclical capital buffer is in addition to each regulators power
to specify capital requirements under its micro-prudential mandate.
Various types of system-wide measures which seek to resolve problems that are not
solely cyclical in nature are also being debated internationally, such as sectoral capital requirements and leverage ratio requirements. In the coming decades, as the global
consensus on such measures, as well as the experiences of countries in the use of such
measures will increase, the FSDC may need to develop and authorise other system-wide
measures.
When such a scenario arises, the systemic risk law should be amended to provide the
legal foundations of additional measures. The Commission recommends that the FSDC
should research the applicability of other system-wide measures to the Indian financial
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Table of Recommendations 9.8 Counter-cyclical capital measures

I The FSDC must conduct research and formulate a mechanism for the implementation of a counter-cyclical
capital buffer such that it is applicable to the entire financial system, or large parts of the financial system;
I The counter-cyclical capital buffer will be applied at the level of the entire financial system, or to large parts
of the financial system, as appropriate;
I The FSDC will make the decision to increase capital requirements when systemic risk is building up, and decrease such requirements, and free capital when the system is under stress;
I Decisions of the FSDC will translate into action through co-ordinated regulations issued by the respective
regulatory agencies with identical effective dates; and
I The FSDC will continue to conduct research on other measures. Once the FSDC is satisfied regarding the applicability of a measure, drawing on both international experience and original research in Indian settings,
the Ministry of Finance will propose amendments to the appropriate sections of the draft Code pertaining to
systemic risk, in Parliament.
Table of Recommendations 9.9 Aspects of inter-regulatory agency co-ordination

Promoting formal co-ordination mechanisms amongst regulatory agencies;
Coordinating the conduct of systemic-risk monitoring functions;
Facilitating the adoption of common standards and practices in rule-making and enforcement;
Coordinating with international organisations and multilateral bodies in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance; and
I Helping to resolve inter-regulatory agency disputes.
I
I
I
I
system and devise new measures (based on international best practices where appropriate). To this end, the Commission recommends that the Central Government should
undertake a formal review of this issue in five years.
9.8. Inter-regulatory agency co-ordination

The institutional arrangement of the FSDC brings together multiple regulatory perspectives which are essential to identifying market trends that can result in systemic risk. The
Commission believes that the FSDC can further promote co-ordination and consultation
by initiating measures like the establishment of joint working groups, cross-staffing initiatives, designated points of contact for inter-regulatory communication, resolution of
disputes and other such mechanisms between member-regulators.
The board of the FSDC will engage in resolving regulatory disputes amongst members of the FSDC and between members and other regulatory agencies, if required. The
board of the FSDC will be empowered to determine its own procedure for resolution of
the dispute, in line with the principles of natural justice.
The FSDC will also work with member-regulators to help in identifying and reducing
regulatory uncertainty. In order to reduce regulatory uncertainty, the FSDC will promote
consistency in the principles and practices adopted by its member-regulators in the areas
of rule-making and enforcement. Such efforts will enable better resolution of conflicts
between the policies of the members and promote cohesive oversight of the financial
system.
The Commission wishes to emphasise that any action of the FSDC in this regard will
not interfere with the functioning or the primary regulatory mandate of the regulators.
Table 9.9 summarises the envisioned approach to inter-regulatory co-ordination.
9.9. Crisis management

Despite the best efforts at avoiding systemic crises, there is a possibility that some crises
may occur. Crisis management requires extraordinary co-operation between the various
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regulatory agencies. In such a situation, the FSDC will:

I Provide and conduct data analysis and research to seek to understand and resolve
the crisis;
I Assist the regulators and members of the FSDC in their efforts to resolve the crisis;
I Implement any system-wide measures such as the release of the counter-cyclical
capital buffer;
I Discuss and assist in the implementation of extraordinary methods of resolution
for certain entities, such as SIFIs, if required; and
I Initiate an audit of all actions leading up to, and taken during, a crisis.
For efficient crisis management, the Central Government should have the ability to
tap into the data and knowledge at FSDC and particularly, the FDMC. Second, crisis management will be improved by the presence of the resolution corporation and system-wide
measures such as the release of the counter-cyclical buffer. Finally, the Ministry of Finance
will be required to consult with the FSDC before making any decisions in relation to fiscal
assistance, or other extraordinary assistance to financial service providers. The use of
these powers should be restricted to emergency situations, and the actions of the FSDC
should be subject to a post-crisis audit so as to ensure accountability.
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CHAPTER 10
Financial inclusion and market

development
In the framework proposed by the Commission, the focus is on regulatory functions,

which are meant to address market failures that impede efficient functioning of the financial system. There are certain functions that are present in the existing legal and regulatory framework that are not strictly regulatory in nature, and therefore remain to be
addressed. Specifically, these are functions that the state plays in (a) ensuring more equitable distribution of financial services, and (b) in fostering the development or improvement of market infrastructure and market processes. In this chapter, these problems are
discussed in terms of the objectives, powers to pursue objectives, principles to guide use
of powers, and institutional roles that should be enshrined in the the draft Code.
10.1. Objectives
Development concerns within Indian financial markets broadly involve two aspects: (i)
financial inclusion: initiatives where certain sectors, income or occupational categories
are the beneficiaries of redistribution of financial services, and (ii) market development:
fostering the development or improvement of market infrastructure or market process
(see Table 10.1).
Financial inclusion comprises certain interventions that impose costs on society as
a whole and yield gains to particular groups of citizens. Prominent and well-known initiatives of this nature include restrictions on branch licensing, to require banks to open
branches in rural areas, and priority sector lending, to name some more widely known
initiatives in banking. Similar initiatives are there in other sectors as well.
Table of Recommendations 10.1 Development functions
The Code should provide for the objective of fostering the development or improvement of market infrastructure or
market process. This objective translates into the following:
1. Modernisation of market infrastructure or market process, particularly with regard to the adoption of new
technology;
2. Expanding consumer participation; and
3. Aligning market infrastructure or market process with international best practices.
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FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND MARKET DEVELOPMENT
Market development requires information gathering and analysis, which may be at

the level of one sector, or on the scale of the full financial system. Inter-regulatory coordination is often called for. Market development may also require spending resources
on market infrastructure that has public good characteristics. Such resources may be recovered from the financial service providers, and spent on market infrastructure based on
a thorough understanding of costs and benefits. Market development may also require
notifying regulations to bring market processes in line with international best practices.
Accordingly, the Commission, after much debate on the objectives of regulators in
the pursuit of development, recommends that the regulatory objective of development
should translate into the following:
1. Modernisation: The regulator should undertake measures that are necessary to modernise market infrastructure or market process, particularly measures with regard to the adoption of new
technology.
2. Enlarging consumer participation: The regulator should be able to pursue certain social goals
which contribute to the welfare of the people more broadly. In particular, the regulator should be
able to undertake measures that provide for the differentiation of financial products or financial
services to specified categories of consumers, or that enlarge consumer participation in financial
markets generally.
3. Best practices: The regulator may undertake measures to align market infrastructure or market
process with international best practices.
Besides the measures that the regulator may undertake to pursue its objective of
market development, the Commission recommends that the Central Government should
be able to direct a specific regulator to ensure the provision of specified financial services
by specified financial service providers or to any consumer or class of consumers. The
provision of services in this regard must be with a view to ensure effective and affordable
access of financial services to persons who would ordinarily not have such access.
The Commission acknowledges that there may be costs incurred by financial service
providers in implementing such directions, and recommends that the Central Government reimburse the cost of granting such access to the financial service providers.
10.2. Institutional architecture

The Commission believes that these questions of development of markets and financial
inclusion create certain problems for public administration. As an example, consider an
attempt at subsidising credit for agriculture, or an attempt at increasing the flow of credit
into certain states. If this is done by a financial regulator, three problems are encountered:
1. Hidden costs: When a regulation forces banks to give more loans to open a bank branch in a nonprofitable location, this imposes a cost a tax upon other branches, and also depositors and
shareholders. Questions of institutional design are raised when the power to impose such costs
on certain parts in society is given to unelected officials. Therefore, the Commission recommends
that where there is a cost incurred by financial service providers in granting effective and affordable access to financial services, such financial service providers should be reimbursed in some
form (for example, cash, cash equivalents or tax benefits).
2. Dilution of accountability: There is considerable policy knowledge and experience worldwide
about embedding principles of accountability into systems of consumer protection and microprudential regulation. There is less experience and information available with regard to accountability principles for market development or inclusion initiatives. For example, the number of
households that participate in a given financial product may be increased quickly by reducing the
burden of consumer protection. Similarly, the function of redistribution to exporters, by requiring banks to give loans to exporters, is in direct conflict with the function of protecting consumers
who deposit money with banks. Competing objectives can hinder accountability.
3. Inefficiency: When a transfer is achieved by taxing some consumers in order to deliver gains to
others, this is a form of taxation. The Commission believes such implicit and selective taxation of
different categories of consumers is inefficient.
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Table of Recommendations 10.2 Implementing market development

The implementation of the objectives of development should be as follows:
1. Regulators should pursue a developmental strategy that fosters the development and improvement of marketwide infrastructure and processes:
I This should include measures to modernise market infrastructure or market process, including in particular, the adoption of new technology; measures to provide for product differentiation, or enlarging
consumer participation; or measures to align market infrastructure or market process with international best practices.
I This goal should be subordinate to the goals of consumer protection and micro-prudential regulation,
and should only be pursued where there is evidence of co-ordination failures in the market impeding
the development of such infrastructure and processes.
I A high-quality rule-making process should be applied and should involve features such as cost-benefit
analysis and notice-and-comment periods.
I There should be ex-post evaluation of the initiatives, to assess the costs of these initiatives and compare them with the benefits.
2. In addition, the Central Government should be able to direct specific regulators to ensure certain practices
in the financial markets:
I These directions should be in the form of an order in writing issued by the Central Government and
notified in the Official Gazette, to any specific Regulator to ensure the provision of any specific financial service by any specific category of financial service provider or to any consumer or classes of consumers on such conditions as may be prescribed, with a view to ensure effective and affordable access
of financial services to any category of persons who would ordinarily not have such access; and
I The Central Government should reimburse the cost of granting such access by providing either cash
or cash equivalents, or tax benefits to the financial service provider.
3. For initiatives involving multiple regulators, FSDC would play a think-tank role: In this instance, FSDC would
perform a research and analytic role - measuring the state of play and the rate of progress of initiatives, undertaking post-facto analysis of past initiatives, formulating new ideas for reform and raising them before the
Council.
4. Where the issue is cross-sectoral and there is a need for co-ordination among regulators, this co-ordination
should be done through FSDC.
The Commission believes that there is a danger of reaching suboptimal outcomes

when goals, powers and accountability are not clearly defined. Accordingly, the Commission recommends efforts to measure the efficacy of given development initiatives and
evaluate alternative paths.
The Commission recommends:
1. Initiatives for development should be pursued by the regulators.
2. Additionally, the Central Government may direct a specific regulator to ensure the provision of
specified financial services either by specified financial service providers or to any consumers or
classes of consumers. The provision of such services must be with a view to ensure effective and
affordable access to such services by persons who would ordinarily not have such access.
3. Where a financial service provider incurs costs in implementing such directions, the Central Government will reimburse the cost of granting such access by providing either cash or cash equivalents, or tax benefits to the financial service provider.
4. Wherever an initiative involves multiple regulators, the overall process of development should
be analysed and measured by the FSDC. Similarly, if there is a need for co-ordination between
regulators, it should be done through FSDC (see Table 10.2)
10.3. Principles that guide the use of measures

The Commission suggests a cluster of principles to guide the use of measures by the regulator and the government. In particular the Commission believes that the law must provide for the following balancing principles:
1. Minimising any potential adverse impact on the ability of the financial system to
achieve an efficient allocation of resources: For a given improvement in financial
101
inclusion, the instruments should be used in a manner that is least distorting for
capital allocation decisions of institutions.
2. Minimising any potential adverse impact on the ability of a consumer to take responsibility for transactional decisions: Consumers should take responsibility for their
informed decisions. Instruments of development should be used in such a manner
that lead to the least distortion of incentives for consumers.
3. Minimising detriment to objectives of consumer protection, micro prudential regulation, and systemic risk regulation: Instruments should be used in a manner least
likely to cause detriment to achievement of objectives of the main financial regulation laws.
4. Ensuring that any obligation imposed on a financial service provider is commensurate and consistent with the benefits expected to result from the imposition of obligations under such measures.
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CHAPTER 11
Monetary policy
In the long run, the prime determinant of price stability in a country is the conduct of
monetary policy. While price fluctuations on a horizon of a few months may be influenced by other considerations, such as a monsoon failure, these considerations do not
explain sustained inflation over multi-year horizons. Advanced and emerging economies
have achieved price stability by establishing appropriate institutional arrangements for
monetary policy.
Price stability is a desirable goal in its own right, particularly in India where inflation is
known to hurt the poor. A focus on price stability is also associated with macroeconomic
stabilisation. When an economy is overheating, inflation tends to rise; and a central bank
that focuses on price stability tightens monetary policy. Similar effects would be found
in a downturn, with a drop in inflation and monetary easing. Through this, a central bank
that focuses on price stability tends to stabilise the economy.
In the 1970s, many countries experienced stagflation: a combination of low GDP
growth and high inflation rate. To a large extent, these problems were related to the
conduct of monetary policy. From the late 1970s onwards, the shift to a more rules-based
monetary policy, and one that was more oriented towards price stability, has helped improve macroeconomic outcomes.
The Commission believes that the central bank must be given a quantitative monitorable objective by the Central Government for its monetary policy function. Whereas
the Commission recognises that there is broad consensus at an international scale on the
need for a central bank to have a clear focus on price stability, after much discussions, it
has decided to not specify such a requirement in the draft Code. Instead, the objective
that the central bank must pursue would be defined by a Central Government and could
potentially change over the years. If, in the future, the Government felt that the appropriate goal of monetary policy was a fixed exchange rate, or nominal GDP, then it would be
able to specify these goals.
The problems of independence and accountability have unique features in the field
of monetary policy. In the areas of consumer protection, micro-prudential regulation and
resolution, independence and accountability are required in order to reduce the extent
to which individual financial firms facing enforcement actions bring pressure on financial regulators. In contrast, in the field of monetary policy, there is no engagement with
individual financial firms. The objectives are at the level of the economy; the instruments
utilised are at the level of the economy. Monetary policy does not require conducting
inspections of financial firms and writing orders at the level of one financial firm.
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Table of Recommendations 11.1 Objective of monetary policy

1. The Central Government, in consultation with the central bank Chairperson, would release a Statement establishing the specifics of its predominant objective, as well as other secondary objectives (if any). In addition, if there are multiple secondary objectives, these would be prioritised in the Statement. These would be
medium-term objectives.
2. The Statement would also define what constitutes a substantial failure in achieving the objectives.
3. The Statement would be released into the public domain.
At the same time, there is a strong case for independence in making this decision.
If a central bank lacks independence, it comes under pressure to cut rates in the period
preceding elections. This tends to kick off increased inflation after elections. The lack of
independence at a central bank is thus associated with reduced fairness in elections and
enhanced macroeconomic fluctuations.
Achieving independence of a central bank requires appropriate institutional design.
One key element is a MPC that controls all instruments of monetary policy. Such an arrangement yields improved decisions by pooling the thinking and analysis of multiple
members. In addition, it reduces the extent to which the head of a central bank can be
pressured to cut rates in accommodating the government. The Ministry of Finance, as a
representative of the Central Government, has the right to be heard in MPC meetings, but
it should have no voting member in the MPC. This would remove political and electoral
considerations from the conduct of monetary policy.
The strongest form of independence, among all the agencies for which bills have
been drafted by the Commission, is found with the central bank. This requires a commensurately strong accountability mechanism. Strengthening accountability, alongside
enhanced independence, is a core theme of the Commission.
11.1. Objective of monetary policy

The Central Government, in consultation with the head of the central bank (refered to
as Chairperson in this chapter), would determine the predominant objective of monetary policy, as well as other secondary objectives (if any) through a formal process shown
in Table 11.1. The specifics of the objectives would be articulated in a Statement, which
would be released into the public domain. Each objective would be a quantifiable, numerical target. Secondary objectives would be prioritised and could be pursued subject
to successful delivery of the predominant objective. These would be medium-term targets. The Statement would also quantitatively define what constitutes a substantial failure in achieving these objectives.
While the Statement would be issued every two years, it is expected that the substance of the Statement would be modified only occasionally, thus giving stability to
monetary policy strategy.
11.2. Powers of the central bank

In order to perform its monetary policy functions and play its role as the lender of last
resort, the central bank will have the following powers:
1. Issuance of Legal Tender Currency: The central bank would be the sole agency authorised to issue currency.
2. Banker to Banks: In order to facilitate smooth inter-bank transfer of funds, or to
make payments and to receive funds on their behalf, banks need a common banker.
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MONETARY POLICY
To facilitate smooth operation of this function of banks, an arrangement needs to

be in place to transfer money from one bank to another. To fulfil this function, the
central bank would act as custodian of specified reserves of commercial banks and
as their settlement agent.
3. Act as banker to the government: As a banker to the Government, the central bank
would perform the same functions for the Government as a commercial bank performs for its customers. It would maintain accounts of the Government; receive deposits from, and make advances to, the Government; provide foreign exchange resources to the Government for repaying external debt or purchasing foreign goods
or making other payments. This would not include debt management for the Central Government, which would be undertaken by the debt management agency.
4. Act as custodian and manager of foreign exchange reserves: The central bank, as
custodian of the countrys foreign exchange reserves, would be responsible for
managing such reserves. The basic parameters of the central banks policies for
foreign exchange reserves management would be safety, liquidity and returns.
5. Powers to manage its balance sheet: The central bank would have the power to undertake market operations, onshore and offshore, in managing its balance sheet.
This may include, but would not be limited to, buying and selling of securities, foreign currencies, gold and other precious metals.
11.3. The monetary policy process

Once the Central Government has chosen the objective of monetary policy, the monetary
policy process would comprise five elements:
1. Measurement and research foundations;
2. Decisions about the instruments of monetary policy;
3. Operating procedure of monetary policy;
4. Monetary policy transmission; and
5. Accountability mechanisms.
The central bank would establish an internal organisation structure to perform the
first step the economic measurement and economic research foundations that must
guide monetary policy.
The Commission recommends the establishment of an executive MPC that would
meet on a fixed schedule and vote to determine the course of monetary policy.
Once the MPC has determined the policy action, the central bank would establish an
operating procedure through which the operating target would be achieved.
Monetary policy influences the economy through the monetary policy transmission
the array of channels through which monetary policy instruments influence households
and firms in the economy.
Finally, there are accountability mechanisms through which the central bank would
be held accountable for delivering on the objectives that have been established for it.
When all these five elements work well, the central bank would be able to deliver
on the goals established for it. The draft Code has focused on the second (Decisions
about the instruments of monetary policy) and the fifth (Accountability mechanisms),
which require to be enshrined in the law. The remaining three elements measurement
and research, operating procedure, and monetary policy transmission would take place
through the management process of the central bank, with oversight of the board.
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MONETARY POLICY
Table of Recommendations 11.2 The monetary policy committee

1. The MPC will be chaired by the Chairperson of the central bank. It will have one executive member of the
board of the central bank and five external members.
2. External members will be independent experts in the field of monetary economics and finance. These members will be appointed by the Central Government, where in case of two of these members, the appointment
will be in consultation with the Chairperson.
3. The external members will extensively engage with the organisation and have access to data (except data on
individual financial firms that is related to the supervisory process), research and other office facilities. However, they will have no management or operational role within the central bank. They will not be members
of the board or any of the two advisory councils (described ahead). Their only function in the central bank is
to be members of the MPC.
4. The MPC will meet periodically and vote on all instruments of monetary policy. The main briefing report of
the central banks research department to the MPC would be released to the public one day before the MPC
meeting.
5. A representative of the Central Government would participate in the MPC meetings, but would not have a vote.
The representative would express the views of the Ministry of Finance and these views would be released into
the public domain.
6. Decisions of the MPC would be made on a one-person one-vote basis.
7. Each of the seven members will also submit a rationale statement about his/her vote. With a lag of three
weeks, the voting record and all seven rationale statements would be released into the public domain.
8. The central bank Chairperson would have the power to override the MPC in exceptional circumstances. However, he/she would be required to release a rationale statement in public, explaining the reasons for disagreeing with the MPC.
11.4. The monetary policy committee

The Commission recommends the creation of an MPC that would determine the policy
interest rate. In addition to the Chairperson and one executive member of the board,
the MPC would have five external members. Of these five, two would be appointed by
the Central Government, in consultation with the Chairperson, while the remaining three
would be appointed solely by the Central Government. These members must not be employees of the Government or the central bank or be involved in political activity. They
may be permitted to hold other offices or positions during their tenure as MPC members,
subject to there being no conflict of interest. In order to avoid conflict of interest, external
members should: (a) be restricted from certain activities or affiliations outside the central
bank these may include restrictions on involvement in financial institutions; and (b) not
have allied commercial interests that may give them unfair advantage due to access to
privileged information obtained in their capacity as members of the MPC.
MPC members would have access to relevant information within the central bank,
other than information about individual financial firms that is related to the supervisory
process. The members would interact with the research department on an ongoing basis.
This would provide the members with a complete information base required to vote on
monetary policy decisions.
This arrangement, which has been adopted in the monetary policy process worldwide, has many strengths. A formal voting structure, coupled with the release of the voting record and rationale statement, ensures that each member analyses the questions
and arrives at his/her own judgement; and ensures that it diminishes the extent to which
an individual can dominate the MPC meeting.
Monetary policy faces a challenge in terms of the dangers of political interference,
particularly in the period prior to elections. The political leadership may often try to pressure the head of the central bank, asking for accommodative monetary policy. By placing
the decision clearly in the hands of the MPC, there is no one person that can be pressured.
A representative of the Central Government, would participate in MPC meetings but would
not have a vote.
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MONETARY POLICY
The staff of the central bank report to the head of the central bank and face obvious
conflicts of interest in voting independently. Additionally, having multiple members from
one organisation raises the possibility of group-think. These concerns are addressed by
having five external members on the MPC. However, ultimately it is the head of the central
bank who must be held responsible for delivering on the monetary policy objectives.
The accountability mechanisms (described ahead) would ultimately rest with the
head of the central bank. Hence, under extreme circumstances, the head of the central
bank has the power to override the MPC. However, this would have to be accompanied
by a letter to the Central Government, which would be released into the public domain,
explaining why he/she feels that the MPC is exceptionally incorrect in its assessment, thus
justifying an exceptional bypassing of the MPC.
Under normal conditions, monetary policy can generally be conducted using only
one instrument, the control of the short-term policy rate. Occasionally, there may be a
need to use other instruments, such as quantitative easing, or, trading on the currency
market, or, capital controls.1 The framework envisaged by the Commission is unified in
its approach: All powers of monetary policy should be wielded in the pursuit of well defined objectives established by the Central Government, and all exercise of these powers
should be done by voting at the MPC.
The structure and functioning of the MPC is summarised in Table 11.2.
11.5. Accountability
Alongside the definition of the monetary policy objectives of the central bank, the Statement of the Central Government that establishes the objective of monetary policy would
clearly define what constitutes a substantial failure to achieve monetary policy objectives. If such an event should arise, the head of the central bank would have to: (a) write a
document explaining the reasons for these failures; (b) propose a programme of action;
(c) demonstrate how this programme addresses the problems that have hindered the
achievement of the target(s); and (d) specify a time horizon over which the MPC expects
the target to be achieved.
A further check is envisaged in the form of a reserve power granted to the Central
Government to issue directions to the central bank on issues of monetary policy under
certain extreme circumstances. Given the drastic nature of this power, any direction under this power must be approved by both Houses of Parliament and can be in force only
for a period of three months. Such direction may be issued in consultation with the head
of the central bank.
11.6. Institutional structure

11.6.1. Board of the central bank
The board of the central bank would oversee the functioning of: (a) monetary policy; (b)
micro-prudential and consumer protection functions for banking; and (c) micro-prudential and consumer protection functions for payments. The Chairperson and the board
would ultimately be responsible for continually reforming the organisation so as to deliver on its objectives as defined in the draft Code. Decision-making about organisational
and institutional arrangements would take place at the board.
1 The Commission envisages that the central bank will frame regulations on outbound capital flows, in consultation with the Government.
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MONETARY POLICY
Table of Recommendations 11.3 Board of the central bank

1. The board of the central bank would have up to 12 members; the number of executive members should not
exceed 50 percent.
2. One of the executive members will be the Chairperson of the Bank (who would be the chair of the board).
3. One executive member will function as the administrative law member.
4. There would also be nominee members of the Central Government.
5. In the exercise of micro-prudential and consumer protection functions, all regulations would be issued by
the board.
6. The board would oversee the functions of the central bank and have overall control of its organisation structure. It would continually work towards refashioning the organisation so as to best achieve its goals.
7. The board would be assisted by two advisory councils, in the fields of banking and payments.
Table of Recommendations 11.4 Functioning of the advisory councils for consumer

protection and micro-prudential regulation in banking and payments
1. In the regulation-making process, all information associated with a proposed regulation would be placed
before the advisory councils, which would draft a memo with its views on the proposed regulation. This
memo would be presented to the board of the central bank.
2. Each advisory council would author a report every year, taking stock of progress in their respective fields and
making specific recommendations for reform. The reports would be presented to the board of the central
bank for decisions and be released to the public.
3. Each council would periodically originate memos on current policy issues that would be presented to the
central bank board for decisions and released to the public.
While the board would not be involved in monetary policy decisions, it would, however, watch the extent to which the objectives of monetary policy (as formulated by the
Central Government) are being achieved. The structure of the board, proposed by the
Commission, reflects these three functions, and is shown in Table 11.3.
11.6.2. Advisory councils for banking and payments

The provisions on regulatory governance in the draft Code envisioned by the Commission
involves a well-structured regulation-making process. When this process is completed,
each proposed regulation would contain a draft regulation, the associated cost-benefit
analysis, the comments received from the public, and the substantive response to each
of them. Such information would be placed before the advisory councils and they would
issue a statement containing their opinion on draft regulations. In addition, the two advisory councils would publish a report each year, highlighting new developments and
areas of concern in their respective fields. The functioning of the two advisory councils
for banking and payments is summarised in Table 11.4.
11.7. Temporary Liquidity Assistance

The central bank would operate mechanisms through which liquidity assistance is potentially available to financial service providers, against adequate collateral, to tide over
temporary liquidity shortages, or, technical payment problems that may hamper smooth
functioning of the financial system. This would involve a distinction between standing facilities, which are oriented towards resolving problems in payments systems, and emergency lending assistance, which are somewhat longer term. These processes would involve mechanisms for co-ordination between the central bank and other regulatory agencies. The central bank would issue regulations to determine rules of collateral and the
overall rules governing the lending.
Since this facility is intended to provide short-term liquidity support to financial service providers and not meant to be used as a replacement for funding day-to-day oper108
MONETARY POLICY
ations, the price structure should be such that the borrowing entity would prefer to first
seek regular funding from the market.
The identity of the borrowing entity would be revealed to the public only after an
appropriate lag, while the total amount lent through this facility should be part of the
daily reporting requirements.
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CHAPTER 12
Public debt management
12.1. An independent public debt management agency

In India today, some functions of public debt management are divided between the Central Government and the RBI. The RBI manages the market borrowing programme of Central and State Governments. External debt is managed directly by the Central Government. However, some functions that are crucial to managing public debt are not carried
out at present. For instance, no agency undertakes cash and investment management,
and information relating to contingent and other liabilities is not consolidated. Most importantly, there is no comprehensive picture of the liabilities of the Central Government,
which impedes informed decision making regarding both domestic and foreign borrowing.
For roughly two decades, the solution that has been proposed in order to address this
problem has been a specialised agency that manages the liabilities of the Central Government in a holistic manner. Public debt is increasingly obtained from private lenders,
including both domestic and foreign entities. Under these conditions, the management
of Government liabilities can grow in infinitely complex ways that could only be tackled
by a specialised agency.
A number of reports dealing with the issue of reform of public debt management,
notably the REPORT OF THE INTERNAL WORKING GROUP ON DEBT MANAGEMENT (2008), have
highlighted this gap in Indian financial sector regulation, and have argued for the creation
of an independent public debt management office. The Commission also believes that
there are other institutional benefits in avoiding conflicting roles for the RBI.
The Commission has considered the views of the RBI in this regard. The RBI believes
that to achieve public policy objectives of ensuring growth, price stability and financial
stability, co-ordination between monetary policy, fiscal policy and sovereign debt management is critical. In the Commissions formulation, the management of public debt
will not be carried out in isolation of an understanding between monetary policy and
fiscal policy. This is addressed through the governance arrangements that the Commission recommends for the public debt management agency, where the RBI and the Central
Government have a presence and a voice in the agencys deliberations (see Table 12.2).
Drawing on the consensus of expert committees of the last 20 years, the Commission recommends fast-tracking the setting up of an independent public debt management agency. In this regard, the RBI has put forth the view that the expert committees
that have recommended an independent public debt management agency have made
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PUBLIC DEBT MANAGEMENT
fiscal consolidation an essential pre-condition for creating such an agency. However,

the Commission is of the view that such a pre-condition is not stated as a requisite in
most of the expert committee reports that have recommended an independent public
debt management agency, with the REPORT OF THE INTERNAL WORKING GROUP ON DEBT
MANAGEMENT being a case in point.
The Commission believes that the main benefit of an independent public debt management agency will come through the integration of public debt management functions
and various databases and information, which are currently dispersed. By unifying the
public debt management function, and efficiently linking it with the cash and the investment management functions, there will be improved information, analysis and thus decision making. With specialised human resources at its disposal, the public debt management agency can contribute to a more effective interface with the market resulting in
cost-efficient management of Government borrowings. A specialised, unified and independent agency will have significant comparative advantage over the existing structure
of a fractured and unco-ordinated Government borrowing programme spread across various agencies.
The Commissions views on public debt management and the creation of the public debt management agency draws significantly from the deliberations of the Working
Group on Public Debt Management (see Annex 19.9).
12.2. Structure of the public debt management agency

The governance and operations of the public debt management agency would be handled through a two-tiered arrangement. At the top, there would be an advisory council,
comprising of experts in finance, law, and public debt management. The advisory council must advise and issue opinions on any matter related to the objectives and functions
of the public debt management agency that is referred to it by the agency or the Central
Government. It must also advise and provide its opinion on the financing plans submitted by the public debt management agency to the Central Government, as well as the
agencys annual report, whenever such opinion is sought. The council must meet periodically to review and ratify the borrowing programme for the upcoming months.
The advisory council must issue its opinion by way of a consensus decision. Enforcing a consensus requirement is also a way of ensuring that there is co-ordination between
the members of the council. Ideally, the chairperson of the council must be obliged to
seek consensus from all members. When no consensus is possible, the council would resort to voting procedures. In such a scenario, opinions of individual dissenting members
should be documented and placed on record. The functioning of the advisory council
must follow standard governance practices as regards appointments, vacancies, meeting
procedures, terms and conditions of appointment, resignation and future employment.
As its title suggests, the advisory council would have no executive control over the
day to day management of the public debt management agency. The supervision and
control over daily operations and management would vest in the hands of a management committee within the public debt management agency. The composition of the
management committee would be similar to that of the advisory council, except that advisory council members would be senior in rank to those of the management committee.
This management committee must exercise general superintendence over, and manage the administration and business of, the public debt management agency. The rules
and procedures followed by the committee must follow standard governance practices.
The appointment of the chief executive of the public debt management agency should
be open and transparent. The management committee should meet more frequently
than the advisory council, and take operational decisions, which affect the daily affairs
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of the public debt management agency. Table 12.1 and Table 12.2 establish the essential
structure of the public debt management agency.
Table of Recommendations 12.1 An independent debt management agency
The draft Code creates a specialised statutory public debt management agency that is equipped to manage the
liabilities of the Government in a holistic manner. It will have a two-tiered arrangement as follows:
1. The public debt management agency will be guided by an advisory council and run by a management committee.
2. The composition of the advisory council and management committee will be broadly similar, with representation from the RBI and the Central Government. The management committee should be headed by the
chief executive of the agency, and the advisory council should be headed by an independent chairperson
(see Table 12.2).
3. The public debt management agency should function with independent goals and objectives. However, it
remains an agent of the Central Government, to which it will be accountable for its actions and results.
4. There should be regular and frequent consultation and co-ordination with the Central Government and the
RBI, to ensure that all views are taken on record, and there is co-ordination between fiscal policy, monetary
policy and public debt management. In part, this will also be achieved through the management committee
and advisory council, where both the Central Government and the RBI have representation.
5. The management committee will seek the opinion of the advisory council in matters of strategy and policy.
6. The advisory council must provide opinions on any matters that are referred to it. It may also make recommendations, of its own accord, on any activities of the public debt management agency it finds relevant.
7. The principles of governance, including transparency and accountability, will apply to all functions of the
public debt management agency, its committee and council.
8. The public debt management agency should be lean on staffing, and should have the power to decide staff
salaries, and outsource a majority of its non-core activities.
The public debt management agency should be a lean organisation, with limited
staff on its rolls. A larger number of employees may be more challenging to handle, and
may affect the organisations performance. The public debt management agency must
also have the authority to recruit staff with specialised skills on the sovereign bond market. Therefore, both selection processes and salary structures must be within the control
of the agency itself. All non-core responsibilities should be outsourced to appropriate
service providers, and the expertise and functions present within the agency should be
limited and focused on the narrow mandate of the organisation.
Table of Recommendations 12.2 The composition of the advisory council and management committee
The composition of the management committee will be as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
the chief executive of the public debt management agency as its chairperson;
a nominee of the Central Government as member;
a nominee of the RBI as member;
a nominee of the State Governments, only if the agency borrows on behalf of any of them; and
experts as members.
In case the agency borrows on behalf of one State Government, such Government would nominate its officer as
member. If the agency borrows on behalf of more than one State Government, one of such Governments would
nominate that officer as member.
The composition of the advisory council will be as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
a chairperson;
a nominee of the Central Government higher than the rank of its nominee in the management committee;
a nominee of the RBI higher than the rank of its nominee in the management committee;
experts; and
the chief executive of the agency.
With the exception of the chief executive of the agency, the members of the advisory council cannot be the same as
the members of the management committee.
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Table of Recommendations 12.3 Operationalising agency role with independent objectives

The combination of being an agency with independent objectives and agent of Government has operational implications of the following nature:
1. While the public debt management agency will always act on instructions from the Central Government,
the draft Code should allow it to have the discretion to decide on the details of how it implements those
instructions in accordance with its objectives.
2. Throughout the process of implementing the instructions it receives, the public debt management agency
must ensure that the objectives are met.
3. If, however, the instructions do not enable its objectives to be met, the public debt management agency must
have the opportunity to place its objections to the instructions on record.
4. This should be done through mandating a regular consultation and feedback process between the agency
and the Central Government, which should take place throughout the agencys exercise of its functions.
5. When issuing instructions, the Central Government must be obliged to consider the views of the public debt
management agency, and would have full knowledge of the objectives of the agency as laid down in the draft
Code.
6. If there is a disagreement between the two, the public debt management agency would be statutorily bound
to meet the instructions, but through the consultation and feedback process, it would have placed on record
its inability to meet its objective.
7. The accountability mechanism routed through the Central Government and eventually to Parliament
would take into consideration all the efforts made by the public debt management agency with regard to
achieving its objective, and the objections, if any, it would have already placed on record to this effect.
Table of Recommendations 12.4 Objectives of the public debt management agency

Table 12.1 states that the draft Code must create a public debt management agency that functions with independent
goals and objectives, while remaining an agent of the Central Government. Accordingly, the draft Code charges the
public debt management agency with the objective of minimising the cost of raising and servicing public debt over the
long-term within an acceptable level of risk at all times. This will guide all of its key functions, which include managing
the public debt, cash and contingent liabilities of Central Government, and related activities.
12.3. Objectives and functions of the public debt management

agency
Table 12.4 sets out the objectives of the public debt management agency. It is important
to recognise the tension between the short-term and the long-term. A public debt manager can always obtain gains in the short run through tactical decisions which appear to
be expedient or immediately yield gains of a few basis points. But these tactics could well
be damaging in the long run, if they reduce the confidence of market participants. Hence,
the objective of the public debt management agency must be clearly defined in the draft
Code as undertaking those actions which minimise the cost of borrowing of the Government in the long run. This should rule out an array of short-sighted tactical actions, such
as exploiting informational asymmetry against market participants, exploiting regulatory
constraints faced by market participants, and so on.
The key functions of the public debt management agency would be to undertake
public debt and cash management for the Central Government. In addition to these, the
various functions of the public debt management agency include the management of
contingent liabilities, research and information, and the fostering of a liquid and efficient
market for Government securities. These functions are summarised in Table 12.5.
12.3.1. Public debt management

The public debt management agency should advise the Central Government on the composition of debt instruments including the proportion of domestic to foreign debt instruments, alongside a thorough debt-sustainability analysis. Given the rising fiscal needs of
114
State Governments, the public debt management agency should co-ordinate the Central
Government borrowing calendar with the borrowings of State Governments to ensure
that the auctions of new issues are appropriately spaced.
The operations of the public debt management agency should also keep in mind investor preferences and the ultimate objective of public debt management, i.e., to meet
the financial needs of the Central Government in an efficient manner over the long run.
However, the final decision will rest with the Central Government. Once the Central Government has made decisions on the key questions, its remit would be executed by the
public debt management agency.
Over the medium-term, the public debt management agencys focus is likely to shift
towards building voluntary demand for Indian Government paper. It may consider a
range of alternatives such as issuing inflation-indexed bonds or issuing in foreign currency, aiming to establish mechanisms that help address market concerns regarding inflation, exchange rate and credit risk, so as to minimise the interest cost paid by the Central Government in the long run.
As things stand today, external debt includes loans received from foreign Governments and multilateral institutions. The foreign currency borrowing of the Central Government takes place through multilateral and bilateral agencies. There is no direct borrowing from international capital markets. Further, State Governments cannot directly
borrow from abroad and have to go through the Central Government as the sovereign
risk is borne by the latter. Considering all these, both internal and external debt should
fall under the scope of the public debt management agency.
Wherever feasible, the public debt management agency should establish limits for
various categories of risk and overall risk. It must also seek to insure against these risks
inherent in its portfolio. It should also develop a framework that helps identify the risks
in the portfolio more efficiently, such as those associated with public debt management
operations, refinancing, contingent liabilities, impact of sovereign credit ratings issued
by credit rating agencies and global and domestic business cycle risks. It should also coordinate with the fiscal and monetary policy functions, and actively engage with credit
rating agencies and the private sector and build relationships with market participants.
12.3.2. Cash management

The Central Government has been consistently running large fiscal deficit over the years.
In this situation, cash surpluses do not arise except for very short periods of time, due
to temporary mismatches between receipts and expenditures within a given financial
year. However, the public debt management agency should be tasked with the function
of managing and investing surplus cash of the Central Government whenever such a situation arises in future.
There is also a need for the efficient management of cash balances across various departments and ministries of the Central Government. Currently, a large part of the funds
received by the various departments and ministries of the Central Government are held
as surplus cash. This results in inefficient cash management for the Central Government
as a whole. This is because the Central Government might be required to borrow in the
market in a deficit situation even while some of its ministries hold on to surplus balances.
The cash balance position of the Central Government is also closely linked to the
balances of State Governments, since the latter temporarily place surpluses with the Central Government. The frictional factors that contribute to the unintended liquidity crunch
from time to time can be avoided if better cash management practices are introduced
by both Central and State Governments in harmony with their public debt management
practices.
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Therefore, the public debt management agency should also carry out cash management, with a particular focus on its two main components cash forecasting and cash
balancing. Cash forecasting involves participating actively in the forecasting of expenditure and revenue, including long-term annual or half-yearly forecasts and the short-term
monthly, fortnightly, weekly or even daily internal forecasts. It also means integrating
forecasts of receipts and payments with other information on cash flows, notably those
generated by financing decisions - bond issuance and servicing and by the cash managers own transactions.
Cash balancing involves co-ordinating the matching of day-to-day expenses and revenues. This includes maintaining a regular channel of communication with the Central
Governments banker (i.e., RBI) to estimate end-of-day balances. It also requires implementing a remit from the Ministry of Finance regarding managing idle balances. In certain situations, this might also involve management of permanent or structural cash surpluses.
The public debt management agency should also maintain a database (or have access to the database created by the Ministry of Finance for this purpose) of the actual
cash balances and the liquidity requirements of various departments and ministries of
the Central Government, including forecasts of spending and revenue patterns that gets
updated frequently.
12.3.3. Contingent liabilities

Contingent liabilities may be either explicit or implicit, and may be issued by either the
Central or State Governments. There are close interconnections between contingent liabilities and debt issuance. The invoking of guarantees can have a substantial impact on
the risk assessment of the public debt structure of the Central Government. The Commission is of the view that the public debt management agency must manage and execute implicit and explicit contingent liabilities. It must evaluate the potential risk of these
contingent liabilities and advise the Central Government on charging appropriate fees.
In addition, the Government should be required to seek the public debt management
agencys advice before issuing any fresh guarantees since this has implications for the
overall stability of the public debt portfolio.
The realisation of contingent liabilities is counter-cyclical and adds to the financial
burden of the Central Government especially at a time when it is in a crisis situation. Given
this, the public debt management agency should advise the Central Government on making provisions for contingent credit lines with bilateral and multi-lateral agreements and
establish similar credit lines with international agencies.
The management of contingent liabilities is a specialised function that involves undertaking the risk assessment of clients. Therefore, the public debt management agency
should be allowed to contract out in part or in entirety the management of contingent
liabilities to outside agencies if it so chooses.
12.3.4. Research and information

The public debt management agency must adopt a holistic approach that encompasses
the entire liability structure of the Central Government. This includes not just marketable
debt but also contractual liabilities from public accounts (such as small savings, provident fund receipts) and any other internal liabilities. While these liabilities are part of
public accounts and not a part of consolidated funds, they influence the cost of raising
debt and provide indirect support to the Governments.
It is also useful for the public debt management agency to maintain a comprehensive database of State Government debt, including information on Consolidated Funds
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Table of Recommendations 12.5 Functions of the public debt management agency

1. Managing public debt:
I The public debt management agency must design and recommend an annual calendar for the Central
Government to manage its public debt;
I The calendar will advise on all aspects of the composition of the borrowing and repayment of public
debt;
I This must be designed in consultation with Central Government and other key stake-holders;
I The public debt management agency will eventually act on instructions received from the Central Government, but they must be empowered to make recommendations, even on a daily basis, if necessary;
and
I To ensure that there is an integrated approach to debt management, the public debt management
agency must also manage the external debt for the Central Government.
2. Cash management:
I The public debt management agency must co-ordinate with the departments, ministries and agencies
of the Central Government and RBI to estimate, monitor and manage daily cash balances. It must
advise Government on measures to promote efficient cash management practices and to deal with
surpluses and deficits.
3. Contingent liabilities:
I The public debt management agency must manage and execute implicit and explicit contingent liabilities;
I It must evaluate the potential risk of these contingent liabilities and advise the Central Government
on charging appropriate fees; and
I The Central Government must seek the public debt management agencys advice before issuing any
fresh guarantees since this affects the overall stability of the public debt portfolio.
4. Research and information: The public debt management agency must have a view of the entire liability structure of the Central Government. Accordingly, it must develop, maintain and manage information systems;
disseminate information and data; and conduct and foster research relating to its functions.
5. Fostering the market for Government securities: A liquid and efficient Government bond market enables lowcost financing in the long run. Hence, the public debt management agency must take steps to foster a liquid
and efficient market for Government securities, including advising the regulators and the Central Government
on the policy and design of the market. In this role, the public debt management agency must work towards:
I
I
I
I
I
Growth and diversity in investors and intermediaries;

Fairplay;
Competition in intermediation;
Cost-minimising mechanisms for issuance and trading; and
Measurement of liquidity and market efficiency, and presentation of an annual report on the progress
of the Government of India sovereign bond market.
of States, public accounts of States, Contingency Funds of States and any additional explicit or implicit guarantees and contingent liabilities not covered in these accounts.
The public debt management agency must, therefore, develop, maintain and manage information systems, disseminate information and data. It must release comprehensive transaction-level data, and actively foster academic research in the public domain.
Beyond merely collating and disseminating data, the public debt management agency
must identify gaps in existing sources of data and work with public and private institutions
to fill them. Where necessary and relevant, it must synthesise data for market participants. The public debt management agency must also regularly collect and disseminate
data and information on its own performance and operations.
12.3.5. Fostering the market for Government securities

Fostering a liquid and efficient market for Government securities should be an integral
function of the public debt management agency given the importance of a well functioning securities market in carrying out its primary functions of debt and cash management.
This becomes all the more important as the market for Government securities has not as
yet substantially developed in India.
The function of developing the Government securities market should not be conFINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION
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Table of Recommendations 12.6 Scope of the public debt management agency

There are limitations on the public debt management agencys functions, particularly in expanding it to States, as
the management of State debt is a State subject under the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the draft Code must
provide for the following:
1. While the public debt management agency acts as a Central Government agency obliged to manage only
Central Government debt, it must undertake those functions related to State Government debt, which have
implications for the Central Governments debt portfolio.
2. This involves maintaining a comprehensive database of State Government debt and co-ordinating the Central Governments borrowing calendar with the market borrowings of State Governments.
3. However, the public debt management agency may provide the option to the States of managing their public
debt, subject to the State Governments entering into agreements with the agency to this effect.
4. Additionally, the public debt management agency should be empowered to offer technical assistance to
State Governments to set up their own debt management offices.
fused with financial regulation. The functions of consumer protection and micro-prudential regulation, for the Government securities market, do not rest with the public debt
management agency. However, as a specialised body that understands the market for
Government securities, the public debt management agency should be an important
voice on legal and institutional reforms that are necessary to achieve its objectives.
Going beyond this, public debt management agency must run a continuous effort
of measuring market efficiency and liquidity, and asking how these can be improved, so
as to cater to the goal of achieving low-cost financing for the Central Government in the
long run. It must undertake initiatives to continually broaden access and participation in
the market for bonds issued by the Indian Government, in terms of both investors and
financial intermediaries, since this would yield improved market efficiency and liquidity.
12.4. Scope
Imposing the services of the public debt management agency on State Governments is
not possible since the management of State debt is a State subject under the Constitution. The public debt management agency must be a Central Government agency obligated to manage only Central Government debt. It must, however, undertake functions
related to State Government debt, which have implications for the Central Governments
debt portfolio. This involves maintaining a comprehensive database of State Government debt and co-ordinating the Central Governments borrowing calendar with State
Governments market borrowings. However, at a later stage, the public debt management agency may provide the option to the States of managing their public debt (see
Table 12.6), subject to the State Governments entering into agreements with the agency
to this effect. This will not oblige State Governments to deal with the public debt management agency, as State Governments will also be able to enter into similar agreements
with any entity offering such services for managing their public debt. Additionally, the
Commission recommends that the public debt management agency should be empowered to offer technical assistance to State Governments to set up their own debt management offices.
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CHAPTER 13
Foundations of contracts and

property
13.1. The interaction of financial laws with other laws

Financial laws do not operate in a vacuum. They interact with other laws in numerous
ways. The Commission recognises that managing the interactions of the financial sector laws and regulations with other areas of law is of great significance. In this chapter
the Commission addresses the following issues of interaction of financial laws and their
operation in the financial markets:
1. Interaction with other laws: For the operation of financial markets and services, certain modification of the applicability of general laws of contracts, property and corporations are required.
Some examples of these are the good faith principle in insurance, legal certainty of derivatives,
requirement of corporations to make disclosures for publicly traded securities. Public policy concerns, and the regulatory stance, need to be unified for a broad array of traded securities in contrast with the present sectoral laws.
2. Infrastructure Institutions: Financial markets and services operate on a special set of institutions like exchanges, clearing houses, depositories, trade repositories, etc. Regulations governing these institutions, and the actions of these institutions, are integral to achieving objectives of
consumer protection, micro-prudential regulation, systemic risk, and competition policy. In addition, a unique feature of some Infrastructure Institutions lies in the production of information
that has a public goods character. This calls for transparency-enhancing measures and blocking
market abuse.
3. Special provisions for Infrastructure Institutions: Financial market institutions also require
certain levels of protection from the operation of normal legal principles of areas of laws like
evidence, property, bankruptcy, etc. These are mainly related to the certainty of the transactions
carried out by financial parties on these institutions. For example, settlements carried out in a
clearing house cannot be undone when a participant goes bankrupt.
4. Public issue and trade of securities: Issuing of securities to the larger public requires financial
laws to govern entities outside the financial sector with respect to the securities they have issued.
The objective of these regulations is not to regulate non-financial firms but to ensure that obligations incorporated in the securities created by them are fairly applied and the financial markets
have adequate information about these non-financial entities which have issued the securities
to make informed decisions about investments in such securities.
5. Issues pertaining to the market abuse: Financial markets operate based on the information
generated by the issuers of securities and the integrity of transactions and information of Infrastructure Institutions. This requires the law to criminalise actions which undermine the integrity
and fairness of trading of securities.
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FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACTS AND PROPERTY
As they do not fit within the standard system of consumer protection and prudential regulation, the Commission has decided to consolidate its recommendations with
respect to these issues in this chapter.
13.2. Principles relating to certain contracts

The financial sector requires modification of general principles of laws. These pertain
mainly to:
1. Insurance laws where certain legal principles presently used are required to be legislated to provide greater clarity.
2. Securities laws where legal enforceability and contractual obligations are required to be protected.
13.2.1. Insurance
Insurance principles are governed by various principles of case law along with statute.
The Commission examined these positions as a part of its comprehensive review of Indias financial law. The Commission recommends legislative clarifications in the following areas to ensure the smooth functioning of insurance contracts.
1. The term contract of insurance has been used in the Insurance Act, 1938 in the definitions of
life insurance, general insurance, fire insurance, marine insurance and miscellaneous insurance
businesses but the term contract of insurance is not defined in any legislation.
2. Insurance contracts are governed by the principle of uberrimae fidei, where all parties to an insurance contract must deal in good faith, making a full declaration of all material facts in a given
insurance proposal. In addition to the insurers obligation to the insured consumer under the
consumer protection laws, the Commission recommends that the law must require the insured
to disclose all material facts to the insurer.
3. There is no specific statutory requirement to have an insurable interest to enforce insurance contracts (other than marine insurance contracts) though courts have always treated the presence
of such an interest as a prerequisite for enforcing the same. The Commission recommends that
primary law should not require an insurable interest at the time of entering into an insurance contract though the regulator should have the authority to require an insurable interest for certain
types of insurance contracts through regulations.
4. Currently, Section 38 of the Insurance Act of 1938 does not allow insurers the option to refuse an
assignment of life insurance policies. The Insurance (Amendment) Bill, 2000 proposes that an
insurer may refuse an assignment if it finds that such an assignment is not bona fide and not in
the interest of the policy holder or the public interest. The Commission recommends that the
regulator should have the power to specify the types of permitted assignments and restricted
assignments of insurance policies, though insurers should not have the discretion to refuse any
assignment.
5. Currently, if an insurance policy mentions the options available to a policyholder upon the lapse
of a policy, no further notice needs to be given to the policyholder. The Commission recommends that insurers should serve notice to the policyholders in the event a policy lapses for nonpayment of premium. Policyholders should be informed of the consequences of a lapse in the
policy and the options available to them in the event of such lapse.
6. In indemnity insurance contracts, the law of subrogation, where an insurance company tries to
recoup payments for claims made which another party should have been responsible for paying,
is governed by case law. The Commission recommends that the law of subrogation be clearly
defined in statute, drawing from directions provided by the Supreme Court in relevant case law.
Table 13.1 offers a brief summary of the specific recommendations of the Commission
pertaining to the principles of insurance contracts.
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Table of Recommendations 13.1 Insurance contracts

With respect to insurance law, the Commission recommends:
1. Consumers must have a duty of good faith obligation towards the insurer;
2. The regulator should be able to make an insurable interest mandatory for only specified types of insurance
contracts;
3. The law should allow free assignment of insurance contracts subject to anti-fraud restrictions placed by the
regulator;
4. Adequate consumer protection regulations should be placed in the law requiring notice of impending default
of insurance contracts due to non-payment of premium; and
5. The duties of the insured and the insurer in the various events arising out of subrogation must be clearly
stated in law, in accordance with relevant Supreme Court rulings.
Table of Recommendations 13.2 Defining securities

To define securities, the Commission recommends:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Securities must be defined in two parts;

The first part is the test of a freely transferable financial interest.
The second part is an illustrative list of securities;
The government should be allowed to add more securities to the illustrative list and financial markets develop and the innovation creates new securities.
13.2.2. Securities
Defining what constitutes securities has been a challenge in many jurisdictions. The Commission found that the test depends on the free transferability of the instrument which
leads to the creation of markets. Table 13.2 provides the recommendations of the Commission on defining securities.
Financial derivatives contracts are transactions, where parties agree that one party
will pay the other a sum determined by the outcome of an underlying financial event such
as an asset price, interest rate, currency exchange ratio or credit rating. Such contracts
help in raising and allocating capital as well as in shifting and managing risks. Derivative
contracts may be exchange traded or non-exchange traded, the latter being referred to
as OTC. They may be standardised or non-standardised.
At the moment, there are certain complexities in enforcing derivative contracts. Section 30 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 renders all wagering contracts void. Financial
derivatives may be rendered unenforceable because of this provision. Exceptions to this
rule have therefore been carved out through special legal provisions. Section 18A of the
Securities Contracts (Regulations) Act, 1956 and Chapter III-D of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (introduced by the RBI Amendment Act, 2006) are examples of such special
provisions. The Commission is of the view that for legal certainty in the enforceability of
financial derivatives, an exception to the general application of section 30 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 must be clearly specified in the law in a more general way.
The Commission has reviewed the question of requiring central clearing of OTC derivatives. Internationally, after the financial crisis in 2008, there has been a marked shift in
favour of centrally cleared OTC derivative trading. In light of the positions taken by the G20, both the European Union and the United States (US) have moved towards a regulatory
framework for OTC derivatives trading that encourages central clearance. The Commission recommends that the regulator should have sufficient discretion to authorise such
a position as and when required.
The Commission also reviewed the issue of inheritance of securities and other financial products. It found that the issues of inheritance should not create undue burdens
on intermediaries who hold securities on behalf of the deceased. For example, property
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Table of Recommendations 13.3 Exemption for derivative contracts

1. Notwithstanding section 30 of the Contract Act, 1872, a derivative contract is enforceable if it is exchange
traded or entered into between sophisticated counterparties;
2. If a financial service firm is able to prove that it transferred any security, deposit or obligation to a legally
recognised nominee or to an executor or liquidator, it should be immune from being made a party to any
dispute about the inheritance or bankruptcy of a person.
disputes over securities should not involve the depository where a deceased person had
kept securities. Similar issues are found in bank accounts and insurance contracts. This
requires the laws to create a clear safe-harbour for financial service firms as long as they
transfer the securities to a nominee, or a court appointed executor, liquidator. The Commission states that this does not change any substantive provision in the inheritance laws
of any person but merely clarifies the duties of financial firms in specified event.
The detailed recommendations of the Commission on securities are summarised in
Table 13.3.
13.3. Infrastructure Institutions

There are certain activities associated with organised financial trading which are unique
and different from the usual activities rendered by any other financial service provider in
the financial market.
13.3.1. Different types of Infrastructure Institutions

Infrastructure Institutions are a product of the historical development of the financial sector markets. As use of technology and complexity of the financial sector increases new
types of Infrastructure Institutions will develop within the financial sector. The Commission reviewed the requirement for designation as Infrastructure Institutions and listed the
following activities in the financial sector at present:
1. Multilateral Payment Clearing System: Which is a mechanism to transfer value between a payer and a beneficiary by which the payer discharges the payment obligations to the beneficiary. Payments enable two-way flows of payments in exchange
for goods and services in the economy;
2. Exchanges: Exchanges are organisations which allow a number of parties to trade
securities amongst themselves. They create rules for trading, monitor parties to
prevent abuse, ensure declaration of relevant information, keep record of transactions and manage risks arising out of the transactions;
3. Clearing and settlement: Clearing is the calculation of the obligations of counterparties to make deliveries or make payments on the settlement date. The final
transfer of securities (delivery) in exchange for the final transfer of funds (payment)
in order to settle the obligations is referred to as settlement. Once delivery and
payment are completed, the settlement is complete;
4. Title storage: Securities be kept in physical or de-materialised form. Securities accounts are maintained to reduce the costs and risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities;
5. Counter party default management: The risk that the counter party to a financial
transaction may default on its promise and thereby jeopardise the entire transaction is minimised by imposing a Central Counter Party (CCP). This CCP acts as a
buyer to the seller and a seller to the buyer only for the purpose of settlement;
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6. Storage of transaction data: The last financial crisis has highlighted the interconnected nature of finance. When a financial market player fails, the unmet obligations to other parties may spread risk across the financial system. While it is not
possible to move all transactions to an exchange, trade repositories for OTC transactions have become an important infrastructure system to monitor risks during
normal times and improve interventions in times of emergency.
The Commission recommends that the Government be provided with the power to
add more services to the list of Infrastructure Institutions.
13.4. Regulatory issues of Infrastructure Institutions

The Commission found that the regulation of Infrastructure Institutions requires the regulator to address the following six primary issues about their functioning.
1. An Infrastructure Institution must be governed in a manner which is compliant with the principles
of prudential regulation;
2. An Infrastructure Institution must also protect the interests of the persons using its services in
compliance with the principles of consumer protection;
3. Infrastructure Institutions are usually systemically important as they connect other financial service providers and therefore systemic risk concerns require to be addressed;
4. Infrastructure Institutions sometimes enjoy considerable market influence as they provide infrastructure services to all players and this requires the regulator to ensure that this market influence is not used to discriminate between users;
5. Certain Infrastructure Institutions produce information which is used by the larger economy. The
release and integrity of the information needs to be maintained;
6. Certain Infrastructure Institutions should be obliged to track market abuse and enforce against
it, without diluting the requirement upon the regulator for this purpose.
The Commission recommends that Infrastructure Institutions be obliged to pursue

these six objectives alongside the regulators. Regulators must have oversight over this
rule-making process and ensure that rules are made by Infrastructure Institutions that
are consonant with the above six objectives of regulators.
13.4.1. Prudential regulation

The general micro-prudential law mandates the regulator to monitor the promises made
by financial firms in the securities sector. The Infrastructure Institutions make important
promises to the consumers like delivering securities at an agreed price, keeping record of
ownership, transferring money for financial and non-financial activities and extinguishing claims. The failure to keep these promises will have repercussions upon consumers
and the financial system at large. Hence, regulators must enforce prudential regulation
requirements upon Infrastructure Institutions.
13.4.2. Consumer protection law

While Infrastructure Institutions may themselves not directly deal with consumers, financial service providers usually act as intermediaries between such institutions and retail
consumers. This requires that regulators ensure that Infrastructure Institutions apply the
principles of consumer protection law. These principles will operate in a number of ways
to protect the interests of the consumer:
1. It will require the market design, that is embedded in the rules created by Infrastructure Institutions, to be fair to consumers;
2. It will require securities advisors to judge the appropriateness of the security to the needs of the
retail consumer; and
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3. It will require sellers of securities to provide adequate information about the securities being sold
and the terms and conditions of the security to retail consumers.
13.4.3. Systemic risk

Infrastructure Institutions are usually systemically important financial institutions. Their
failure has negative consequence on the entire financial system due to the connection
services they provide between financial service providers. The rules made by Infrastructure Institutions must thus pursue high levels of safety, and regulators must monitor such
institutions from this perspective.
13.4.4. Monopoly abuse

Contracting has taken place for millennia without the intervention of these Infrastructure
Institutions. The economic purpose of such institutions may be classified into two parts.
The first is that of reduced cost in contracting. The search cost for a counterparty goes
down by going to an exchange. Standardisation of processes is essential for the use of
electronics in securities trading, settlement, and payments.
The market power that Infrastructure Institutions enjoy are amenable to abuse. This
may arise in areas like refusing to list securities, preventing access to connections or preventing access on neutral terms. Hence the regulator has to monitor the terms on which
the Infrastructure Institution operates. An essential element of this is the requirement
that all Infrastructure Institutions operate on predetermined rules which are approved by
the regulator so that there is no arbitrary treatment of any party accessing the services.
13.4.5. Information as a public good

The information produced by Infrastructure Institutions has wide ramifications for the
market economy. The prices of securities are utilised by the wider economy as a vital
input for making decisions about resource allocation. Hence, Infrastructure Institutions
should be required to release high quality information that will support such applications.
13.4.6. Market abuse supervision

Information produced by Infrastructure Institutions is vital to the functioning of the financial system. It is also an input into decision making across the economy. When this information is incorrect, it reduces the quality of decision-making across the economy, often
involving persons who are not direct participants in the financial markets. Hence, regulators and Infrastructure Institutions must undertake initiatives that ensure the integrity
of this information. This requires blocking market abuse.
Further, Infrastructure Institutions are at the front-line of supervision on the problems
of market abuse. While the prime responsibility for enforcement against market abuse
lies with regulators, the front-line tasks of watching markets and conducting the early
stages of an investigation lie with Infrastructure Institutions. In the modern environment
with high-speed computerised trading and complex trading strategies, Infrastructure Institutions are required to build sophisticated supervisory staff of a kind that is not easily
assembled in governmental agencies.
Product development at Infrastructure Institutions will often lead to innovative new
products being developed. While this is desirable, such institutions will also be required
to build the commensurate supervisory capacity to understand and detect abuse in tracking billions of transactions in fast-paced information technology systems. The regulatory
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Table of Recommendations 13.4 Depositories

I Allowing depositories to store securities, including Government securities and records of other financial services in electronic format only;
I Recognising the title of the consumer and the custody of the depositary from such electronic records;
I Allowing depositories to making records of pledge or hypothecation which are legally recognised; and
I Allowing depositories to communicate with trading platforms and making changes to records accordingly.
structure in this field consists of regulators focusing on the goal of market integrity and
ensuring that Infrastructure Institutions are performing their functions in this regard adequately.
The requirements placed upon Infrastructure Institutions would have adverse implications for the costs of setting up new Infrastructure Institutions and the costs incurred
by users of such institutions. Hence, the draft Code envisages a review, conducted by the
Regulator every five years, that examines the balance that has been obtained between
the regulatory objectives and competitive dynamics.
13.5. Special provisions for Infrastructure Institutions

Infrastructure Institutions require special protection in the laws to ensure transactions to
be final. This requires certain classes of such institutions to have certain privileges in law
not available to private parties. The Commission found that the privileges should only
be given to such institutions if they are regulated. These privileges are applicable in the
areas of:
1. Acting as depositories;
2. Settlement;
3. Clearing
13.5.1. Depositories
Securities are intangible property. The only proof of the property is the contract (which is
a written obligation). This creates unique challenges in relation to establishing ownership
of such securities because:
1. Transfer of various types of financial products like shares or debentures can be easily forged (if
they are paper based);
2. Paper based contracts are prone to destruction or loss; and
3. Modern financial systems operate on electronic systems.
The depository system for securities has been an efficient solution to the problems
of securities and their title. Table 13.4 sets out the detailed recommendations of the Commission in relation to depositories.
13.5.2. Finality of settlements

A multitude of trades result in a multitude of obligations among the members. In an organised financial system, these are netted to result in consolidated obligations of each
member to the CCP. The settlement so arrived at, must be final as against any claim by any
creditor (including liquidator) of a member outside the closed system of the trading. In
other words, legal certainty of transactions in organised financial trading is achieved only
by making the netted obligations bankruptcy remote to the members of the organised financial system. Table 13.5 sets out the recommendation of the Commission to protect
settlements on exchanges.
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Table of Recommendations 13.5 Finality of settlements

The Commission recommends the creation of an exception to normal priority of claims in the following instance:
When a trading member of a clearing house is declared as insolvent or bankrupt, the transactions and obligations of
the member will be outside the jurisdiction of any liquidator or receiver. The claims of the clearing house over assets
earmarked for settlement of claims will be the property of such clearing house till the claims are settled and cannot
form part of the liquidation process.
Table of Recommendations 13.6 Finality of transactions

1. An Infrastructure Institution which does netting and settlements should operate on rules which are approved
by the regulator;
2. The final set of transactions created by the Infrastructure Institution would be enforceable in law and would
be recognised as a settlement for all the trades carried out;
3. The Infrastructure Institution would be allowed to replace contractual obligations between trading parties
with the obligations arising out of settlement system; and
4. Even in the event of a bankruptcy of a person all the collateral of the person which have been deposited to
the Infrastructure Institution must be outside the jurisdiction of a receiver or liquidator. The collateral should
be used to complete the transactions already initiated on the Infrastructure Institution and then any surplus
may be garnered by the liquidator.
13.5.3. Finality of financial transactions

The Commission noted that transactions on an Infrastructure Institution cannot be easily
undone. In netting and settling systems, if any individual transaction is undone, all dependant transactions will also have to be undone. This would create uncertainty for all
persons using such institutions. Problems could also arise on exchanges where trades
are executed at one point of time but the exchange of securities and money happens at a
later point of time. If a person refuses to uphold the trade or goes bankrupt after making
a trade but before completing it, a transaction may fail. Failure of a transaction in the
exchange may have domino effect on other transactions.
The Commission is of the view that transactions on an Infrastructure Institution should
be final and not undone under any circumstances. Recommendations of the Commission in relation to finality of transactions are given in Table 13.6.
13.6. Public issue and trade of securities

The Commission found that the public issue and trade of securities have three important
regulatory objectives:
1. The public issue of securities should be done in a manner that adequate information about the
issuer and the security is available (on a continuous basis) to the public to make informed decisions about investments.
2. The entity issuing the securities must have governance system which ensures that the issuer
treats all purchasers of a specific class of securities in the same way and prevent illegitimate
transfer of any funds from the issuer.
3. The trade of securities require that the rules governing the trading of different securities have
common underlying principles which should apply to all trading of securities. These are required
to prevent regulatory arbitrage between trading different securities and should be based on mitigating and managing the risk of transactions.
13.6.1. Public issue of securities

An incorporated or unincorporated entity may pool capital from an investor base by issuing securities. While doing so, the investor relies on the ability of the entitys manage126
Table of Recommendations 13.7 Issuance of securities

With respect to issuance of securities the Commission recommends:
1. Mandating the Government to publish a list of financial instruments which will be governed under securities
law;
2. That once an instrument is included in the list of securities, the trading of such instruments should be carried
out under general principles of organised financial trading;
3. Stipulating registration of the securities irrespective of the nature of the entity issuing them with specific
requirements;
4. Creating statutory basis for disclosure obligations on the issuer (which must be done through regulations),
instead of being completely reliant on the listing agreement;
5. Giving the regulator jurisdiction over issuers of securities when they approach a certain size or number of
purchasers;
6. Creating exemptions from registration requirement of issues which are below a certain size;
7. Empowering the regulator to regulate minimum corporate governance standards for issuers irrespective of
their legal structure; and
8. Empowering the regulator to frame regulations requiring disclosure of any change in ownership of the issuer
entity (take over) and give investors a reasonable exit option is such event.
ment, which is in turn reliant on the disclosures made by the entity as well as the transparency of its governance processes.
The law must ensure that whenever any entity is raising capital from a fairly large pool
of investors, it is properly managed and monitored. If such an entity is not managed and
monitored, unscrupulous persons may use such entities to commit fraud. This, in turn,
may detrimentally affect investor confidence and the smooth functioning of markets.
Accordingly, the Commission recommends that issuance of security by any person must comply with certain registration requirements unless exempted by law. However, the Commission understands that such a broad definition may impose a prohibitive
compliance cost on issuers. High compliance costs may limit the growth of small entrepreneurs. As such, broad exemptions need to be granted from the registration requirement for a limited number of issues to a limited number of people.
Presently, various continuous obligations and corporate governance norms are embedded in the Companies Act, 1956. These naturally apply only to companies issuing securities. Various obligations applicable to issuers, such as corporate governance norms,
arise from the listing agreement. The Commission is of the view that since securities
may be issued by entities other than companies, the disclosure and governance norms
of the issuer should be independent of the legal structure of the issuer. The Commission
believes that obligations imposed on issuers of securities must be codified in statute and
elaborated by subordinate legislation or regulations.
13.6.2. Trading of securities

The Commission noted that while each type of securities may have specific legal issues
related to creation, the organised trading of securities faces similar concerns about integrity. The Commission recommends that the law takes a unified approach to regulate
the trading of securities. This would include exchanges, brokers, clearing houses and
payment systems. This would require a generalised definition of securities. The Commission found that there is no fixed definition of securities. Therefore it recommends that
the Central Government should create a list of securities based on the understanding of
the financial sector.
Table 13.7 gives a detailed summary of the specific recommendations of the Commission pertaining to disclosure and governance obligations to be applied to issuers of
securities.
127
Table of Recommendations 13.8 Listing of securities

With respect to listing of securities the Commission recommends:
1. Ensuring that exchanges do not arbitrarily refuse to list securities;
2. That persons in control of the issuer of securities do not discriminate against persons who have bought securities through the exchange;
3. That in the event the securities are de-listed or cease to be traded, persons who have bought the securities
from the exchange should be able to sell the securities at a fair price; and
4. That in the event the issuer changes fundamentally through a takeover, persons who do not agree to the
change are able to sell the securities at a fair price.
Exchanges play a central role in the organised trading of securities. Table 13.8 provides the recommendations of the Commission with respect to the actions of exchanges
in the course of listing and trading.
13.7. Market abuse

The Commission noted that the underlying principles of securities market requires integrity of the information produced by markets and fairness of the terms in trading in
securities. These can be distorted through various ways which can be classified into the
following categories:
1. Market Manipulation: Organised financial trading produces a stream of information, about
prices, spreads or turnover. This information has important ramifications for the economy. Millions of individuals and firms make economic decisions as a consequences of the trading value
of the securities. Any action which generates an artificial modification in these numerical values has an adverse impact on the market. Hence the law and regulatory processes that protect
the integrity of information flow in the market. The regulator either on its own or through the
Infrastructure Institution must establish rules, and exercise supervision, to identify and penalise
attempts by market participants to induce artificial values of prices, spreads or turnover.
2. Insider trading: Concerns itself with trading based on non-public information that is availed
through some special relationships and is considered an unfair advantage in such markets.
The Commission proposes that the law governing these concerns should be clubbed
together under a general legal principle of market abuse. Market abuse can be classified
into:
1. abuse of information;
2. abuse of securities; and
3. securities market abuse.
Table of Recommendations 13.9 Types of market abuse

The law governing market abuse must cover the following circumstances:
1. Abuse of information: Occurs under three circumstances:
I When a person under a legal duty to disclose information does not do so or discloses false or deceptive
information;
I When any person uses information gained from sources which are not supposed to disclose information for purposes of trading; and
I When any person circulates false or deceptive information with the objective of changing the price of
a security and then trading such security for profit.
Example: Insider trading, spreading false information.
2. Insider trading: Concerns itself with trading based on non-public information that is availed through some
special relationships and is considered an unfair advantage in such markets.
3. Securities market abuse: Occurs when a person, with the intention of making a financial gain, artificially
affects the price, liquidity, demand, supply or trading of securities or gives a false impression of the same.
This may be done by dealing in securities or employing manipulative, deceptive or artificial means.
128
Table of Recommendations 13.10 Market abuse

1. Market abuse means insider trading, abuse of information and securities market abuse.
2. Dealing in securities through market infrastructure, with abusing the same, must be treated as an offence.
3. Insider trading means dealing in securities or disclosing unpublished price sensitive information to any other
person while in possession of unpublished price sensitive information, when such information was achieved
through the breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust or confidence.
4. The law must categorise attempting and abetting market abuse as an offence, albeit with lesser penalties.
5. The law should prescribe a penalty on the offender, which would be capped at three times the illegitimate
gains made or losses caused. The maximum imprisonment as in the present law should be retained.
The Commission recommends that the law governing market abuse cover the circumstances mentioned in Table 13.9.
Market abuse invites civil penalties as well as criminal sanctions in major jurisdictions
across the world. The recommendations of the Commission in relation to market abuse
are captured in Table 13.10.
129
CHAPTER 14
Financial regulatory architecture
We now turn to the financial regulatory architecture, or the division of the overall work of
financial regulation across a set of regulatory agencies. In the international experience,
there are three main choices (Table 14.1): A single financial regulator; a twin peaks model,
where one agency focuses on consumer protection and the other on micro-prudential
regulation; and a fragmented approach, where there are multiple agencies.
14.1. Financial regulatory architecture as a distinct feature of

financial law
Many alternative structures can be envisioned for the financial regulatory architecture.
Parliament must evaluate alternative block diagrams through which a suitable group of
statutory agencies is handed out the work associated with the law. These decisions could
conceivably change over the years.
At present, Indian law features tight connections between a particular agency (e.g.
SEBI) and the functions that it performs (e.g. securities regulation). The draft Code does
not provide for such integration. This is to ensure that from the outset, and over coming
decades, decisions about the legal framework governing finance can proceed separately
from decisions about the financial regulatory architecture. Changes in the work allocation of agencies would not require changes to the underlying law itself. This will yield
greater legal certainty, while facilitating rational choices about financial regulatory architecture motivated by considerations in public administration and public economics.
Table of Recommendations 14.1 Alternative structures
Single regulator
All financial regulation can be placed with one agency. In this case, this one agency will enforce microprudential and consumer protection provisions in the draft Code for all financial activities.
Twin peaks
Some countries have constructed two regulators: one focused on micro-prudential regulation and the other
on consumer protection.
Complex structures
The US has a highly fragmented regulatory model. As an example, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regulates derivatives trading, while the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates
the spot market. The US also has state level regulators in some areas.
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FINANCIAL REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE
14.2. Problems of the present arrangements

At present, India has a legacy financial regulatory architecture. The present work allocation between RBI, SEBI, IRDA, PFRDA, and FMC was not designed; it evolved over the
years, with a sequence of piecemeal decisions responding to immediate pressures from
time to time.
The present arrangement has gaps for which no regulator is in charge such as the
diverse kinds of ponzi schemes that periodically surface in India, which are not regulated
by any of the existing agencies. It also contains overlaps where conflicts between regulators has consumed the energy of top economic policy makers and held back market
development.
Over the years, these problems will be exacerbated through technological and financial innovation. Financial firms will harness innovation to place their activities into the
gaps, so as to avoid regulation. When there are overlaps, financial firms will undertake
forum-shopping, where the most lenient regulator is chosen, and portray their activities
as belonging to that favoured jurisdiction.
An approach of multiple sectoral regulators that construct silos induces economic
inefficiency. At present, many activities that naturally sit together in one financial firm are
forcibly spread across multiple financial firms, in order to suit the contours of the Indian
financial regulatory architecture. Financial regulatory architecture should be conducive
to greater economies of scale and scope in the financial system. In addition, when the
true activities of a financial firm are split across many entities, each of which has oversight
of a different supervisor, no single supervisor has a full picture of the risks that are present.
Fragmentation of financial firms, which responds to fragmentation of financial regulation,
leads to a reduced ability to understand risk.
When a regulator focuses on one sector, certain unique problems of public administration tend to arise. Assisted by lobbying of financial firms, the regulator tends to share
the aspirations of the regulated financial firms, such as low competition, preventing financial innovation in other sectors, high profitability, and high growth. These objectives
often conflict with the core economic goals of financial regulation such as consumer protection and swift resolution.
Reflecting these difficulties, the present Indian financial regulatory architecture has,
over the years, been universally criticised by all expert committee reports. The Commission has analysed the recommendations for reform of financial regulatory architecture
of all these expert committee reports and weighed the arguments presented by each of
them.
14.3. Considerations that guide alternative architecture

choices
In order to analyse alternative proposals in financial regulatory architecture, the Commission established the following principles:
Accountability: Accountability is best achieved when an agency has a clear purpose. The traditional Indian notion that a regulator has powers over a sector but lacks
specific objectives and accountability mechanisms is unsatisfactory.
Conflicts of interest: In particular, direct conflicts of interest are harmful for accountability and must be avoided.
A complete picture of firms: A financial regulatory architecture that enables a comprehensive view of complex multi-product firms, and thus a full understanding of the risks
that they take, is desirable.
132
Table of Recommendations 14.2 Financial regulatory architecture envisaged by the

Commission
Present
Proposed
(1) RBI
(1) RBI
(2) SEBI
(3) FMC
(4) IRDA
(2) Unified Financial Authority (UFA)
(5) PFRDA
(6) SAT
(3) FSAT
(7) DICGC
(4) Resolution Corporation

(5) FRA
(6) Public Debt Management Agency (PDMA)
(8) FSDC
(7) FSDC
Avoiding sectoral regulators: When a financial regulator works on a sector, there is

a possibility of an alignment coming about between the goals of the sector (growth and
profitability) and the goals of the regulator. The regulator then tends to advocate policy
directions that are conducive for the growth of its sector, which might be at the cost of
overall consumer protection. Such problems are less likely to arise when a regulatory
agency works towards an economic purpose such as consumer protection across all, or
at least, many sectors.
Economies of scale in Government agencies: In India, there is a paucity of talent
and domain expertise in Government, and constructing a large number of agencies is
relatively difficult from a staffing perspective. It is efficient to place functions that require
correlated skills into a single agency.
Transition issues: It is useful to envision a full transition into a set of small and implementable measures.
14.4. A financial regulatory architecture suited for Indian

conditions
The Commission proposes the following structure, featuring seven agencies.
Agency #1: The RBI, which formulates and implements monetary policy, and enforces
consumer protection and micro-prudential provisions of the draft Code in the fields of
banking and payment systems.
Agency #2: The UFA, which enforces the consumer protection and micro-prudential
provisions of the draft Code across the financial sector, other than in banking and payment systems.
Agency #3: A resolution corporation, which implements the provisions on resolution
of financial firms in the draft Code.
Agency #4: The FSAT, which hears appeals against all financial regulatory agencies.
Agency #5: The FRA, which addresses consumer complaints across the entire financial system.
Agency #6: The FSDC, which will be responsible for systemic risk oversight.
Agency #7: The PDMA, an independent public debt management agency.
The table summarises the changes in the financial regulatory architecture that will
be proposed. These changes will alter the Indian financial landscape from eight financial
regulatory agencies to seven.
133
This proposal features seven agencies and is hence not a unified financial regulator
proposal. It features a modest set of changes, which renders it implementable:
1. The RBI will continue to exist, although with modified functions;
2. The existing SEBI, FMC, IRDA, and PFRDA will be merged into a new UFA;
3. The existing SAT will be subsumed into the FSAT;
4. The existing DICGC will be subsumed into the Resolution Corporation;
5. A new FRA will be created;
6. A new PDMA will be created; and
7. The existing FSDC will become a full-fledged statutory agency, with modified functions.
14.4.1. Draft Indian Financial Code

The Commission has drafted a consolidated Indian Financial Code, which embeds the
creation of the seven agencies and their responsibilities and functions. The draft Code
consists of the following fifteen Parts:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Preliminary and definitions

Establishment of financial regulatory agencies
Regulatory governance
Financial consumer protection
Prudential regulation
Contracts, trading and market abuse
Resolution of financial service providers
Financial Stability and Development Council
Development
Capital controls
Public Debt Management Agency
Investigations, enforcement actions and offences
Functions, powers and duties of the Tribunal
Miscellaneous
The part on establishment of financial regulatory agencies provides for the creation
of five new statutory bodies - UFA, Resolution Corporation, FRA, PDMA and FSAT. This part
also provides for the allocation of regulatory responsibilities between the two financial
sector regulators - UFA and RBI.
In case of RBI, the Commission recommends the continuance of the existing arrangement, with RBI as the countrys monetary authority. The draft Code however revisits the
functions and powers of RBI, and sets out the manner in which it must be operated and
governed. This includes provisions for the creation of an MPC and the powers of the committee in connection with the discharge of RBIs monetary policy functions. Similarly, in
case of FSDC, the existing FSDC is to be recast as a statutory body.
The remaining provisions of the draft Code lay down the powers and functions of
these statutory bodies and the principles and processes to govern the exercise of their
powers.
In the process of achieving the financial regulatory architecture proposed by the
Commission, several amendments and repeals are also required to be made to the current financial sector laws that create the existing regulators and lay down their powers
and functions.
14.4.2. Functions of the proposed agencies

We now review the functions of each of these seven proposed agencies:
134
RBI
It is proposed that RBI will perform three functions: monetary policy;

regulation and supervision of banking in enforcing the proposed consumer protection provisions and the proposed micro-prudential provisions; and regulation and supervision of payment systems.
UFA
The unified financial authority will implement the consumer protection

provisions and micro-prudential provisions for the entire financial system, apart from banking and payments. This would yield benefits in
terms of economies of scope and scale in the financial system; it would
reduce the identification of the regulatory agency with one sector; and
it would help address the difficulties of finding the appropriate talent in
Government agencies.
This proposed unified financial authority would also take over the work
on organised financial trading from RBI in the areas connected with the
Bond-Currency-Derivatives nexus, and from FMC for commodity futures,
thus giving a unification of all organised financial trading including equities, government securities, currencies, commodity futures, corporate bonds, and so on.
The unification of regulation and supervision of financial firms such as
mutual funds, insurance companies, and a diverse array of firms that
are not banks or payment systems, would yield consistent treatment
in consumer protection and micro-prudential regulation across all of
them.
FSAT
The present SAT will be subsumed in FSAT, which will hear appeals
against RBI for its regulatory functions, the unified financial authority,
decisions of the FRA, against the Central Government in its capital control functions and some elements of the work of the FSDC and the Resolution Corporation.
Resolution
Corporation
The present DICGC will be subsumed into the Resolution Corporation,

which will work across the financial system.
FRA
The FRA is a new agency which will have to be created in implementing

this financial regulatory architecture. It will set up a nationwide machinery to become a one-stop shop, where consumers can carry complaints against all financial firms.
PDMA
An independent public debt management agency is envisioned.
FSDC
Finally, the existing FSDC will become a statutory agency and have modified functions.
The Commission believes that this proposed financial regulatory architecture is a

modest step away from present practice, embeds important improvements, and will
serve India well in coming years.
Over a horizon of five to ten years after the draft Code comes into effect, it would
advocate a fresh look at these questions, with two possible solutions. One possibility is
the construction of a single unified financial regulatory agency, which would combine all
the activities of the proposed UFA and also the work on payments and banking. Another
possibility is to shift to a two-agency structure, with one Consumer Protection Agency,
135
which enforces the proposed consumer protection provisions across the entire financial
system and a second Prudential Regulation Agency, which enforces the micro-prudential
provisions across the entire financial system. In either of these paths, RBI would focus on
monetary policy.
These changes in the financial regulatory architecture would be relatively conveniently achieved, given the strategy of emphasising separability between laws that define functions, and the agencies that would enforce the laws. Over the years, based on a
practical assessment of what works and what does not work, the Government and Parliament can evolve the financial regulatory architecture so as to achieve the best possible
enforcement of a stable set of laws.
136
CHAPTER 15
Transition issues
Once the government decides to move forward with the Indian Financial Code, transitioning from the existing setup to the framework proposed by the Commission will require
planning and co-ordination. If not managed well, regulatory uncertainty could introduce
considerable difficulties in the system. The Commission recommends that the Central
Government should consider establishing a focused project team within the Ministry of
Finance to facilitate the overall transition process. This team must be provided adequate
staff and resources to enable effective discharge of its functions. The Commission suggests that the tasks of the project team would be to:
1. Create and implement an overall blueprint for the transition to the new legal framework;
2. Steer the draft Code through the entire legislative process;
3. Facilitate information flows and co-ordinate with relevant departments or agencies of the government, including existing regulators;
4. Determine the manner in which existing regulations will be phased out and the timing of the draft
Code coming into effect; and
5. Identify the steps to be taken to ease the transition process for regulated entities, such as onetime exemptions from capital gains tax or stamp duty requirements.
To ensure that the transition is achieved in a timely and organised manner, the project
team must devote significant efforts towards laying the groundwork for the actual creation and operation of new or modified agencies. In this context, the Commission suggests:
1. Aligning ongoing work with project plan: The project team must examine pending bills or
draft regulations relevant to the financial sector in order to assess whether they are aligned with
the key ideas of the proposed framework, as accepted by the Government. In the event of any
material deviation, the project team may recommend that the Government consider the withdrawal of any bill that has been placed before Parliament.
2. Introducing some elements into existing practice: The Commission is of the view that many
of its recommendations, particularly in the field of regulatory governance, build upon or formalise existing regulatory practices and procedures. Therefore, to the extent possible, the Commissions recommendations on regulatory governance can be implemented by the existing regulators with immediate effect. For example, many regulators already invite public comment on
draft regulations. A requirement that all public comments received must be published can be enforced with immediate effect. Such steps will not only ease the transition process, but also allow
the regulators more time to modify their internal processes.
3. Preparation for creation of new agencies: With FRA, PDMA FDMC and FSAT, there is a particularly important role for the development of information technology (IT) systems. The development of these systems can commence ahead of time. The second ingredient is the physical
facilities to house the new group of agencies. This would also benefit from advance work.
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TRANSITION ISSUES
On the functional side, certain preparatory steps can be taken. The Commission recommends
the creation of an Interim Co-ordination Council of existing regulators, namely, SEBI, FMC, PFRDA
and IRDA, that are to be merged to create the UFA.
The following are the recommendations of the Commission on how the implementation of each of the agency may take place:
1. UFA
(a) On acceptance: An interim Board, without any powers, should be set up using an executive order. This Board will evaluate existing regulations and prepare for the eventual setting up of the UFA. Further, a co-ordination committee
will be set up between all regulators that will be subsumed under UFA.
(b) On passage of draft Code: The Board will be appointed as the official board
under the law. All financial sector regulators other than RBI shall be subsumed
under UFA. All the subsumed regulators will change letter heads and continue
to function. Employees will be transferred. The Board will begin consultation
on new regulations. Existing regulations will transition to new regulations over
time.
(c) Law + 2 years: Regulations existing before the passage of the draft Code will
lapse. By this time, the Board must have replaced the entire subsidiary legislation and consolidated all subsumed agencies.
2. RBI
(a) On acceptance: The RBI Board will evaluate existing regulations and prepare
for the eventual transformation of the RBI. The Board will start taking steps to
shift out functions of the PDMA and plan the establishment of the MPC process.
(b) On passage of draft Code: The Board will need to be reconstituted reflecting
the provisions of the law. The Board will begin consultation on new regulations. Existing regulations will transition to new regulations over time. PDMA
and MPC will come into existence.
(c) Law + 2 years: Regulations existing before the passage of draft Code will
lapse. By this time, the Board must have replaced the entire subsidiary legislation.
3. Resolution Corporation
(a) On acceptance: An interim Board, without any powers, should be set up using an executive order. This Board will evaluate existing rules and prepare for
the eventual setting up of the Resolution Corporation.
under the law. DICGC will cease to exist and its obligations will be subsumed
by the Resolution Corporation till the new rules are put in place. Employees
will be transferred or reverted. The Board will begin consultation on new regulations. Existing regulations will transition to the new regulations over time.
(c) Law + 2 years: By this time, the Resolution Corporation will be fully functional
and the new set of rules will be in place.
4. FRA
(a) On acceptance: An interim Board, without any powers, should be set up using an executive order. This Board will evaluate existing rules and prepare for
the eventual setting up of the FRA.
under the law. Existing rules and ombudsmen will transition to new rules and
agency over time.
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TRANSITION ISSUES
(c) Law + 2 years: By this time, the FRA will be fully functional and the new set
of rules will be in place. Ombudsmen will cease to exist and all pending cases
will be transferred to FRA.
5. FSAT
(a) On acceptance: Preparation for expanding of physical and IT infrastructure,
and benches. Drafting of new procedural laws should begin.
(b) On passage of draft Code: SAT will be subsumed into the FSAT. The letterhead will change. New procedural laws will be passed and come into effect.
6. FSDC
(a) On acceptance: The process of creating the financial system database will
begin. Regulations specifying the technical specifications, as well as frequency
of upgrading capabilities will be made. An interim Board and Sub-Committee
will begin the process of preparing for the creation of research, analysis and
process for SIFI designation.
(b) On passage of draft Code: FSDC will come into existence as a statutory entity;
and will implement all the existing research and continue capacity building.
(c) Law + 2 years: FDMC will become operational.
7. PDMA
(a) On acceptance: An interim Board, without any powers, should be set up using an executive order. This Board will prepare for the eventual setting up of
the PDMA.
(b) On passage of draft Code: PDMA will come into existence as a statutory entity; will implement all functions except cash management, contingent liabilities and services to others.
(c) Law + 2 years: PDMA will become fully operational.
The draft Indian Financial Code is expected to replace a number of existing legislations, and necessitate amendments in most other such legislations. The legislations
expected to be replaced will have to be repealed. Many issues addressed by provisions
of these legislations are directly addressed in the draft Code, albeit in a principles-based
manner. For some other issues, subordinate legislation is expected to be issued, but the
draft Code provides the general power to the regulator and the corresponding principles
to guide the regulators.
In this shift from a largely rules-based legal framework to a principles-based one,
principles in the draft Code are expected to provide regulators with the independence
to respond to problems within the financial system, using the enumerated powers given
to them in the draft Code. The use of these powers is to be guided by principles in the
draft Code, a requirement for benefits of a regulation to outweigh its costs, and a general
requirement for consultations and research. For example, instruments such as the Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) for banks and investment restrictions for insurance companies
are not directly enshrined in the draft Code, but the draft Code empowers the regulators
to make regulations on such requirements, guided by a set of principles, including one
that requires them to be risk-based.
There are also issues on which shift to a new approach is recommended, which
means that certain provisions in the existing legislations or certain legislations on the
whole will not find corresponding provisions in the draft Code, nor are they expected to be
addressed through subordinate legislation. On these issues, the Commission has taken
a considered view to recommend a move to a different approach towards regulation.
For example, in the interest of competitive neutrality and regulatory clarity, the Commission recommends repealing all legislations that give special status to certain financial
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TRANSITION ISSUES
service providers that are functionally the same as other financial service providers created through regulatory authorisation. Such financial service providers will have to seek
authorisation just like other financial service providers, and will be subjected to the same
regulatory framework. For example, certain banks and insurance companies in India enjoy a statutory status, which should be replaced by a regulatory authorisation to do these
businesses.
From existing legislations affecting Indias financial system that are not to be repealed, most will require amendments. Some will have to be substantially amended,
and others will require only minor amendments.
Following is a list of legislations to be repealed:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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The Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956

The Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992
The Depositories Act, 1996
The Public Debt Act, 1944
The Government Securities Act, 2006
The Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934
The Insurance Act, 1938
The Banking Regulation Act, 1949
The Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952
The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970
The Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961
The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999
The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 1999
The Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007
The Acts establishing bodies corporate involved in the financial sector (e.g. The
State Bank of India Act, 1955 and The Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956)
CHAPTER 16
Summary of recommendations
not embedded in the draft Code
This chapter lists the recommendations from chapters in this report that have not been
translated into specific provisions in the draft Code.
16.1. Ownership neutrality and competition

The Commission envisages a regulatory framework where governance standards for regulated entities will not depend on the form of organisation of the financial firm or its
ownership structure. The Commission hence recommends the repeal of all special legislations listed in Table 2.1 that (a) establish statutory financial institutions; or (b) lay down
specific provisions to govern any aspect of the operation or functioning of public sector
financial institutions. The undertakings of all such statutory institutions should be transferred to ordinary companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and their regulatory treatment should be identical as that applicable to all other financial companies.
The Commission also recommends proportional regulation of certain financial activities that are owned and managed by Government agencies and which presently fall outside the sphere of financial regulation. This includes fund management services offered
by the EPFO and other statutory provident funds, insurance services of postal life insurance and the ESIC and the various small savings products issued by the Government. This
requires examination of the legislative foundations of these programs and clarification of
regulatory jurisdiction.
The principle that financial services should be regulated and supervised in a proportionate manner should apply equally to co-operatives created under laws made by
State Governments. Since the subject of co-operative societies falls within the legislative
domain of State Governments under the Constitution of India, the Commission recommends the following measures to ensure that regulators have adequate statutory control
over the regulation and supervision of financial co-operatives:
1. Using Article 252 of the Constitution of India, State Governments should accept the authority
of Parliament to legislate on matters relating to the regulation and supervision of co-operative
societies carrying on financial services; and
2. The regulator may impose restrictions on the carrying on of specified financial services by cooperative societies belonging to States whose Governments have not accepted the authority of
the Parliament to legislate on the regulation of co-operative societies carrying on financial services.
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS NOT EMBEDDED IN THE DRAFT CODE
16.2. Parliamentary review of subordinate legislation

In order to strengthen the oversight of regulators who are empowered by Parliament to
issue subordinated legislation, it is recommended that the subordinate legislations made
by regulators should be reviewed by the same parliamentary committee which reviews
primary legislation for the financial sector.
16.3. Recommendations of Working Groups

The Commission began by an in-depth examination of sectors within the financial system through the establishment of five WGs. Once this sector-level understanding was in
hand, the non-sectoral draft Code was constructed by generalising from the recommendations produced by the five WGs. The legal effects of the non-sectoral draft Code have
been evaluated in terms of implications for each of the recommendations of all the WGs.
The WG reports embed a rich and contemporary knowledge of the policy problems
faced in the five sectors. They add up to the largest-scale synchronised expert committee
process in the history of Indian finance. Under the principles based and non-sectoral legal
framework adopted by the Commission, several of the provisions that currently appear
in the financial sector laws and have been discussed by WGs, and many of the recommendations of WGs, should feature in the subordinated legislations framed by the regulators.
Therefore, the Commission recommends that the respective regulators should take into
account the recommendations of the WGs while formulating subordinated legislation to
implement the draft Code.
The recommendations of five WGs setup by the Commission can be found in Annex
19.6, 19.7, 19.8, 19.9 and 19.10. The full reports of all WGs are on the FSLRC website.
16.4. Cross-border resolution

An effective resolution framework requires appropriate arrangements for cross-border
resolution. Since many SIFIs operate on a global level, an unco-ordinated approach by
the home and host countries authorities would create difficulties in the way of resolution
of such institutions in a manner that would protect interests of consumers and prevent
the risk of a contagion. Deliberations are underway at international policy forums to devise an optimal approach to cross-border resolution. India must participate in emerging
global arrangements on cross-border resolution. The developments in this regard, in the
coming years, may well require amendments to the draft Code on resolution - such as to
require the resolution corporation to co-ordinate with its counterparts in other jurisdictions. The Commission recommends that in five years from now, a committee be set up
to review the emerging consensus in the field of cross-border resolution and to suggest
amendments in the legal framework on resolution accordingly.
The Commission recommends that the process of resolving a covered service provider
including the choice of a resolution tool should not depend on the ownership structure
of the service provider. This will result in ownership neutrality in the approach of the corporation. In this framework, thus, the treatment of public and private firm; and domestic
and a wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign firm will be identical from the viewpoint of
resolvability.
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS NOT EMBEDDED IN THE DRAFT CODE
16.5. Systemic risk

The FSDC has been given the power to formulate and implement certain system-wide
measures which seek to mitigate systemic risk in the financial system. Regardless of any
independent action of the FSDC in relation to research on new system-wide measures,
the Commission recommends that the Central Government should undertake a formal
review in relation to this issue in five years.
16.6. Transition issues

The Commission recommends that the Central Government should consider establishing
a focused project team within the Ministry of Finance to manage the overall transition
process.
In the view of the Commission, the tasks of the project team would be to:
1. Create and implement an overall blueprint for the transition to the new legal framework;
2. Support the legislative process in the analysis and processing of the draft Code;
3. Undertake research and capacity building that is required prior to the new activities of regulatory
agencies;
4. Undertake systems analysis, design and prototyping for the IT systems that would be required in
establishing new functionality and new agencies;
5. Enable information flows and co-ordinate with all relevant departments or agencies of the government, including existing regulators;
6. Determine the manner in which pending bills and existing regulations will be phased out and the
timing and sequencing of the draft Code coming into effect;
7. Incorporate, to the extent possible, the Commissions recommendations on regulatory governance within the existing regulators;
8. Create an Interim Co-ordination Council of the existing agencies that are to be merged to create
the UFA; and
9. Identify the steps to be taken to ease the transition process for regulated entities, such as exemptions from capital gains tax or stamp duty requirements.
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CHAPTER 17
Conclusion
Financial economic policy is implemented by front-line agencies who are assigned functions by Parliament. The main purpose of financial law is to put these agencies on a
sound footing, with the triad of objectives, powers and accountability mechanisms. The
Commission has focused itself upon this task. The draft Code features substantial improvements upon present Indian practice in terms of clarity of objectives, precise statement of enumerated powers, and an array of accountability mechanisms.
The motivation for the establishment of the Commission was rooted in a series of
expert committee reports which identified important difficulties in the prevailing Indian
financial economic policy framework. The Commission has absorbed these areas of concern. Most of the shortcomings lie in the subordinated legislation, which is drafted by
financial regulatory agencies. The work of the Commission, therefore, does not directly
engage with these problems. The work of the Commission is focused on the incentives in
public administration that shape the drafting and implementation of subordinated legislation. As a consequence, while the Commission has fully taken cognisance of the policy
problems analysed by the expert committees of the last five years, it does not directly
address them.
The Commission is mindful that over the coming 25 to 30 years, Indian GDP is likely
to become eight times larger than the present level, and is likely to be bigger than the US
GDP of 2012. Over these coming years, there will be substantial changes in the financial
system. The technological change, and the financial products and processes which will
come into play, cannot be envisaged today.
When the proposals of the Commission are enacted by Parliament, they will set in
motion a modified set of incentives in public administration. Clear objectives in law, and
a sound regulation-making process, will improve the quality of subordinated legislation
that is issued by regulatory agencies. The emphasis on legal process in the new laws will
induce improved working of the supervisory process. A common consumer protection
law will clarify the objectives of financial regulatory agencies. These elements will yield a
gradual process of change.
The Commission has endeavoured to draft a body of law that will stand the test of
time. Hence, it has focused on establishing sound financial regulatory agencies, which
will continually reinterpret principles-based laws in the light of contemporary change,
and draft subordinated legislation that serves the needs of the Indian economy. This
subordinated legislation, coupled with the jurisprudence built up at the FSAT and the
Supreme Court, will continually reflect the changing needs of the Indian economy, and
serve the country well in coming decades.
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CHAPTER 18
Notes of dissent
18.1. Note of dissent by J.R. Varma
In my view, the authorization requirement (Section 142) for providing any financial service
(which is defined very broadly in Section 2(75)) creates the risk of regulatory overreach.
Many activities carried out by accountants, lawyers, actuaries, academics and other professionals as part of their normal profession could attract the registration requirement because these activities could be construed as provision of a financial service. Similarly, investors who rebalance their own portfolios regularly and day traders who routinely place
limit orders on a stock exchange could also be deemed to require authorization. An expansive reading of Section 2(75)(k) could require even a messenger boy who delivers a
mutual fund application form to obtain authorization. All this creates scope for needless
harassment of innocent people without providing any worthwhile benefits.
The UK law by contrast requires authorization only for a narrow list of regulated activities and there is an explicit carve out for any activity which is carried on in the course of
carrying on any profession or business which does not otherwise consist of regulated activities. Similarly, newspaper columns and a variety of information services are excluded
from the definition of regulated activities under UK law.
The draft Indian Financial Code (Section 150(3)) does allow regulators to exclude any
activities from the definition of financial service. However, this does not solve the problem of regulatory overreach because it relies entirely on regulatory self restraint (which is
often a scarce commodity). By contrast, under the UK law, the list of regulated activities
is defined by the government and not by the regulator itself.
In my view, the authorization requirement under Section 142 should be restricted to
a narrower subset of financial service providers.
147
NOTES OF DISSENT
18.2. Note of dissent by K.J. Udeshi

While I am in agreement with the recommendations of the Report, I have reservation on
the recommendations relating to Capital Controls. The Commission recommends the
following formulation:
The regulations governing capital controls on inward flows should be framed by the
Government, in consultation with the RBI. The regulations governing capital controls on
outward flows should be framed by the RBI, in consultation with the Government. (See
Chapter 8.3)
Consultation does not imply a consensus and when the RBI is in disagreement with
the Government, the Government has the unquestionable powers to issue directions to
the RBI. When the rule-making vests with the Government, the RBI may be consulted, but
if there is a disagreement, the RBI would willy-nilly have to deal with a fait accompli and be
accountable for the actions it would be required to take in the light of the Governments
decisions.
In India, the forex reserves accretion is invariably on account of a capital account
surplus and not due to a current account surplus and hence the composition of the inward flows assumes importance. Inward capital flows into India comprise FDI as also
debt/portfolio equity flows and the latter are not only volatile but can undergo sharp directional shifts. There is widespread concern among several central banks in Emerging
Market Economies about the added pressures on monetary management due to the prevailing extraordinarily strong and volatile cross-border capital flows. If the RBI has no say
in initiating policy relating to these volatile flows, the RBI would be constrained to take
monetary policy measures, both direct and indirect and administrative actions to deal
with the consequences of such flows; such measures may not be what the Government
or industry and the business community seek, leading to overall dissatisfaction.
If the RBI is to be accountable for the performance on its Balance Sheet, it has to be
enabled to decide on the timing, quantity and quality of inward capital flows so that it
can calibrate its forex interventions and sterilisation measures.
To the extent that inward capital flows impact liquidity conditions, it becomes necessary for the RBI to impose a burden on the banking system through imposition of reserve
requirements and open market sales of securities. Such measures can impinge on the
banking system and may not be in consonance with the medium/long-term policy object.
Both, financial markets and Governments have short time horizons and when initiating policy relating to debt/ portfolio equity flows is with the Government, it makes the
task of the RBI as Monetary Authority and the Regulator much more difficult.
I am, therefore, not in agreement with the Commissions recommendation to place
the policy and rule-making relating to all inward capital flows with the Government.
One of the TOR of the Commission is:
V. Examine the interplay of exchange controls under FEMA and FDI Policy with other
regulatory regimes within the financial sector.
The formulation of the FDI policy in many jurisdictions is statutorily the prerogative of
the Central Governments, since the policy has implications for the macroeconomy, employment, security issues, social and political considerations etc. The Governments concerns in evolving FDI policies need to be recognised and therefore, my suggestion to the
Commission has been that: (a) the Government may be entrusted with the policymaking
relating to FDI, in consultation with the RBI, and the framing of the Rules relating thereto
and (b) the RBI may be entrusted with the policymaking relating to all other transactions
on the capital account, both inward and outward, in consultation with the Government
and the framing of the regulations relating thereto.
148
NOTES OF DISSENT
Since the management of capital flows, excluding FDI is required to be with the RBI
and the foreign exchange reserves management function is with the RBI, it is imperative
that the policy on exchange rate management should remain with the RBI.
The handling of the foreign exchange crisis of the pre-liberalisation period (1990s) as
also the handling of the exchange rate policy and cycles of ebb and flow of forex inflows
has shown that such arrangements have worked well.
149
NOTES OF DISSENT
18.3. Note of dissent by P.J. Nayak

While the Commissions Report strives to break fresh ground in several directions, and
particularly in respect of Consumer Protection and Resolution, there are two approaches
adopted with which I disagree, while otherwise being supportive of the Commissions
recommendations. As both approaches affect significantly the structure and conclusions
of the Report, I believe their importance necessitates this Note of Dissent.
18.3.1. The Finance Ministry as a Financial Sector Regulator

The last 25 years of the evolution of financial sector regulation in India has seen a continual empowerment of regulatory agencies. This began with the transfer of powers for capital markets regulation from the Government to a new regulator, SEBI; led subsequently to
the establishment of other regulators for commodities, insurance and pension funds; and
has coincided with the increasing empowerment of the two principal regulators, RBI and
SEBI, through periodic amendments to Acts of Parliament under which they draw their
powers. This directional thrust in the empowerment of regulators established outside of
the Government has brought expertise into financial regulation. It is also now generally
accepted that when the Government did regulate directly, as it did for the primary capital
market through the Controller of Capital Issues, or the secondary capital market through
the stock exchange division of the Finance Ministry, the consequences were sometimes
unfortunate: new capital issues were continually grossly mis-priced, and malpractices in
the functioning of brokerage firms were commonplace.
The Commission now arrests and partly reverses this directional movement, and it
is with apprehension that one must view the very substantial statutory powers recommended to be moved from the regulators (primarily RBI) to the Finance Ministry and to
a statutory FSDC, the latter being chaired by the Finance Minister. The Commission has
recommended that direct statutory powers be vested in the Government in matters of (i)
Capital Controls and (ii) Development. The statutory empowerment of the FSDC encompasses (iii) Inter-Regulatory Co-Ordination; (iv) Identification and Monitoring of SIFIs; and
(v) Crisis Management.
This transfer of powers collectively constitutes a profound shift in the exercise of regulatory powers away from (primarily) RBI to the Finance Ministry. The Finance Ministry
thereby becomes a new dominant regulator. To rearrange the regulatory architecture in
this manner, requiring new institution-building while emasculating the existing tradition
of regulators working independently of the Government, appears unwise. There is no
convincing evidence which confirms that regulatory agencies have under performed on
account of their very distance from the Government; indeed, many would argue that this
distance is desirable and has helped to bring skills (and a fluctuating level of independence) into financial regulation.
The concept of a statutory FSDC, and the functions sought to be vested in it, are sensible provisions and will provide much needed co-ordination between regulators, as also
the ability to steer the financial sector through periods of systemic risk. What is worrisome is that the chairmanship of FSDC is with the Finance Ministry, as this could lead to
a government creep into the micro-prudential powers of other regulators. At present,
without statutory powers, such a creep is difficult. As an uneasy compromise, the Commission has recommended (in Table 9.3) that an Executive Committee of the board of
FSDC be constituted which will be chaired by the regulator for banking and payments
[read Governor RBI], with managerial and administrative control, which will refer decisions to the board of FSDC when the Committee is unable to reach a consensus. It is unlikely that this would constitute an adequate buffer against Government creep. A superior
way of combining the needs of efficient co-ordination, the management of systemic risk
150
NOTES OF DISSENT
and regulatory independence, would be to have the Governor RBI (as the senior of the
two micro-prudential regulators) chair the FSDC, with Finance Ministry officials also being represented on its board. The Chairmanship of FSDC is therefore critical. In any case,
with the Commission proposing just two micro-prudential regulators, co-ordination becomes easier, and the case for the Finance Ministry exercising FSDC leadership weakens.
The Commissions recommendation (Chapter 8.3) of transferring from RBI to the Central Government rule-making powers on capital account transactions for all inward flows
has even more alarming implications. Regulations influencing the quantity and structure of Indias external liabilities, the management of the balance of payments, and the
conduct of monetary policy have a close and intricate synergy. For the Commission to
recommend regulatory scatter, wherein capital controls regulation is with the Government, monetary policy is conducted by RBI and the balance of payments is wedged in
between the conduct of monetary policy and the impact of capital controls regulation is
likely to prove damaging to the conduct of monetary policy and of fluent macroeconomic
co-ordination.
The present law under FEMA vests powers of capital account regulation with RBI. It is
true that since the economic reforms of 1991, FDI Policy governing inward equity investments has been authored by the Central Government, on the argument that it constitutes an adjunct of Industrial Policy. ECB policy has however evolved through consultation between the Finance Ministry and RBI, and has invariably required the assent of RBI,
even where it may have been initiated by the Government. At best this de facto position
could be formalised as de jure, with regulations on inward equity and equity-related investment being authored by the Central Government, and with external debt regulation
vested in RBI. To move formal regulatory powers governing external debt policy away
from RBI would be damaging to the maintenance of macroeconomic balances.
18.3.2. Principles as the Basis of Financial Sector Law

The Commission strives to choose an imaginative and bold approach in adopting a principles-based approach towards formulating law for the financial sector. It is necessary
however to also put this approach to the test of pragmatism in the Indian context, particularly as most financial sector law has hitherto been rules-based.
Rules-based legislation brings greater certainty to financial sector participants in the
understanding of whether a financial product or sales behaviour are legal, but this understanding is necessarily contextual. Rules therefore need to be elaborate in order to cover a
plurality of situations which could arise in practice and, where there are gaps in these, participants could potentially exploit these to their advantage. Where rules-based law has
achieved adequate comprehensiveness, it provides greater certainty to financial sector
participants in understanding whether contracts and behaviour are lawful. Principlesbased law does not provide such certainty, but by focusing on more generalised principles, covers the gaps by providing meaning to situations not presently contemplated but
which could arise in future.
There are two difficulties which a principles-based approach could create. The first,
recognised in the Commissions Report, is that participants are more reliant on courts in
interpreting the law in a specific context. As the Commissions Report notes (See Chapter 2.2) Central to common law is the role of judges. When laws are written in terms of
principles, there would be legitimate disagreements about the interpretation of principles. These are resolved by judges who build up the jurisprudence that clarifies what a
principle means in the light of the continuous evolution of finance and technology.
Such an approach works well when court processes are speedy and decisions of
courts are dispensed quickly. In the Indian context, with an accumulating backlog of
cases, the position is more problematic.
151
NOTES OF DISSENT
A second difficulty arises on account of the specific principles adopted for the legislative law. In the case of micro-prudential regulation, for instance, 11 principles are listed
in Table 6.9 and constitute principles of administrative and economic rationality. The resulting law, applicable to the entire financial sector and embodying these 11 principles,
is proposed in Section 141 of the draft Indian Financial Code. If the legislative basis of a
micro-prudential law for banking (for instance) is to be restricted to these 11 principles, the
burden on regulatory law to bring greater specificity in respect of banking increases very
substantially. A mammoth superstructure of regulatory law will thus sit atop a slender
base of legislative law. Aside from the issue of whether Parliament would be comfortable
with this balance between legislative and regulatory law, such a legal structure imposes
a high burden on the quality of regulation- writing. As each regulation can be challenged
on grounds of being in violation of the principles, uncertainty about regulatory law will
persist until the courts have ruled.
This double whammy of uncertainty will be detrimental to financial contracting, including new product design and sales behaviour across the financial sector. Financial
sector contracts gain in strength when the interpretation of contracts is understood by
general consensus ex-ante, before the contract is entered into, rather than ex-post, after
interpretation by courts. While it may be true that a principles-based system will settle
into its own equilibrium over a period of years, the likely travails associated with that
until then appear disproportionate to the benefits. A more rules-based approach to the
writing of financial sector law would have been preferable.
152
NOTES OF DISSENT
18.4. Note of dissent by Y.H. Malegam

I regret I am unable to agree with my colleagues on the following proposals in the Report.
18.4.1. Capital Controls

1. The Report recommends (Chapter 8.3) that: The rules on capital account transactions for all inward flows will be made by the Central Government in consultation with
the regulators. The rules on capital account transactions for all outward flows will be
made by the RBI in consultation with the Central Government
2. I believe that rules should be made by the Central Government only in respect of
FDI inward flows and rules in respect of all other flows, both inward and outward
should be made by RBI. My reasons for this belief are as under.
3. The distinction made in the Report between inward and outward flows is not as
relevant as a distinction between inward FDI flows and other inward flows. The
latter distinction is necessary for the following reasons:
I Inward FDI flows result in the acquisition of assets by non-residents in India
which can have policy implications e.g., retail,insurance etc.
I While inward FDI flows do carry the right of repatriation of capital, in actual fact
very little repatriation takes place and in the short-term FDI flows are largely
stable.
I On the other hand, non-FDI inward flows e.g., portfolio investment, external commercial borrowing, NRI deposits etc. are essentially short-term and
volatile in nature.
I Even non-FDI inward flows, on repayment result in outward flows.
4. The Report states (See Chapter 8.1) that IMF recommends that capital controls
be implemented only on a temporary basis where other macro-economic policy
responses have been exhausted. While this is true, in a more recent Staff Paper
(November 14, 2012) IMF has modified its stand and made the following statements:
I Capital flow liberalisation is generally more beneficial and less risky if countries have reached certain levels of thresholds of financial and institutional
development
I Rapid capital inflow surges or disruptive outflows can create policy challenges
I In certain circumstances, capital flow management measures can be useful
These comments have to be viewed in the context of Indias persistent current account deficit which is financed largely by net non-FDI inward flows.
5. As the Report mentions (section 11.2) RBI in order to perform its monetary policy
functions and play the role as lender of the last resort needs certain powers which
include the power to Act as custodian and manager of foreign exchange reserves.
There is strong linkage between capital controls and monetary policy. Capital flows
have a natural tendency to affect monetary aggregates by increasing or decreasing
the effective money supply and liquidity in the economy. Hence, in the Indian context, capital controls have been actively used as an additional monetary policy tool.
To do this effectively, it is necessary that all capital flows, other than FDI inward
flows should be monitored and controlled by RBI. Further as the IMF has pointed
out, rapid capital inflow surges or disruptive outflows can destabilise the exchange
and create volatility. For this reason also, capital controls need to be calibrated by
RBI which has the responsibility for exchange rate management.
153
NOTES OF DISSENT
6. The present arrangement is that while the Central Government determines the policy for FDI, RBI, in consultation with the Central Government makes rules in relation
to other capital flows. This arrangement has worked well and even the U.K. Sinha
Working Group has not suggested any change to this basic arrangement. For the
reasons enumerated above, this basic arrangement must be allowed to continue.
18.4.2. Financial Regulatory Architecture

1. The Report proposes (See Chapter 14.4) that: the financial regulatory architecture
suited for Indian conditions should consist of seven agencies which will include:
I Agency #1: A central bank that does monetary policy and enforces the consumer protection and micro-prudential provisions of draft Code in the fields
of banking and payments
I Agency #2: UFA which enforces the consumer protection and micro-prudential provisions of the draft Code in all finance other than banking and payments
The proposal therefore is that RBI will only regulate and supervise banks and payment system and that NBFCs and Housing Finance Companies(HFCs) will be regulated and supervised by UFA.
2. I believe that it is essential that NBFCs and HFCs should be regulated by the same
regulator as regulates the banks i.e., RBI. My reasons are as under.
3. NBFCs are currently regulated and supervised by RBI. HFCs are currently regulated
and supervised by National Housing Bank (NHB) which is a 100% subsidiary of RBI.
Under the National Housing Bank (Amendment) Bill 2012 which is before the Standing Committee on Finance of the Parliament, it is proposed that the ownership of
NHB will pass to Government and that regulation will pass to RBI with supervision
remaining with NHB. The transfer of regulation is considered necessary since banks
also do housing finance activity, the relative portfolio sizes being banks 64% and
HFCs 36%. There are currently 54 HFCs with a total asset size of Rupees 335,000
crores which represents roughly 4.1% of the total asset size of all scheduled commercial banks.
4. NBFCs are also engaged in substantially the same activity as banks. They are asset finance companies, infrastructure finance companies, micro-finance companies and
investment companies. They rely upon bank finance and are significant competitors of banks, particularly in the retail banking sector. Individually and collectively
they are significant players in the financial system as shown below:
I There are 12,348 NBFCs registered with RBI of which only 265 accept public
deposits.
I The total assets of NBFCs aggregate to Rupees 1,038,000 crores which represents roughly 12.7% of the total assets of all scheduled commercial banks.
I There are 376 systemically important NBFCs with assets which aggregate to
Rupees 923,000 crores, representing roughly 11.3% of the total assets of all
scheduled commercial banks.
I There are 42 NBFCs which have total assets in excess of the smallest scheduled
commercial bank and 2 NBFCs which have total assets in excess of the smallest
Public Sector bank.
5. As the Report points, (See Chapter 1.5.2) difficulties are created in addressing finance regulation on a holistic basis, when there is the rise of a rapidly growing
shadow banking sector. As most knowledgeable commentators have pointed out,
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NOTES OF DISSENT
one of the major causes of the 2008 financial crisis was the fact that credit intermediation activities were conducted by non-banks outside the regulatory environment. This has raised serious concerns of regulatory arbitrage, requirements for
similar regulation of entities performing similar activities and issues of commonality of risks and synergies of unified regulation.
6. The concern for shadow banking has also resulted in a number of international
initiatives as under:
I At the November 2010 Seoul Summit, the G-20 leaders highlighted the fact
that Basel III is strengthening the regulation and supervision of shadow banking and requested the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to make recommendations in the matter.
I FSB identified shadow banking as non-banks carrying on bank-like activities
such as credit intermediation, maturity transformation and credit facilitation.
I Even before the crisis IMF has prescribed that similar risks and functions should
be supervised similarly to minimise the risk of regulatory arbitrage.
I In many countries, HFCs are regulated by bank regulators e.g., MAS in Singapore, HKMA in Hong Kong. In the U.S. the Dodd Frank Act provides for regulatory and supervisory oversight of both systemically important banks and
non-banks by the Fed.
7. All the above considerations support the view that:
I NBFCs and HFCs are engaged in activities which can be termed shadow banking.
I They are of a size individually and collectively which can pose a serious challenge to the efficient regulation of banks.
I All the considerations mentioned in the Report to support the need for a single unified regulation support a single unified regulation of banks, NBFCs and
HFCs.
I The Commission having decided that there would be two micro-prudential
regulators with a separate regulator for banking must recognise that NBFCs
and HFCs have greater synergy with banks than with the activities regulated
by UFA.
I Consequently it is imperative that NBFCs and HFCs be regulated and supervised by RBI
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CHAPTER 19
Annexes
19.1. Formation of the FSLRC
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
RESOLUTION
No.18/1/2011-RE.
New Delhi, the 24 March, 2011
The Government in its budget 2010-11 had, inter alia, announced the setting up of a
Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (FSLRC) with a view to re-writing and
cleaning up the financial sector laws to bring them in tune with current requirements.
Accordingly, it has been decided to constitute the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms
Commission comprising the following:
i)
Chairman
Justice (Retd.) B.N. Srikrishna
ii)
Member
Justice (Retd.) Debi Prasad Pal
iii)
Member
Dr. P.J. Nayak
iv)
Member
Smt. K.J. Udeshi
v)
Member
Shri Yezdi H. Malegam
vi)
Member
Prof Jayanth R. Varma
vii) Member
Prof. M. Govinda Rao
viii) Member
Shri C. Achuthan
ix)
Member Convenor
Shri Dhirendra Swarup
x)
Member, Nominee
Joint Secretary (Capital Markets)
xi)
Secretary
Shri C.K.G. Nair
2. The Terms of Reference of the Commission will be as follows:
I. Examining the architecture of the legislative and regulatory system governing
the financial sector in India, including:
a. Review of existing legislation including the RBI Act, the SEBI Act, the IRDA
Act, the PFRDA Act, FCRA, SCRA and FEMA, which govern the financial sector;
b. Review of administration of such legislation, including internal structures
and external structures (departments and ministries of government), if
required;
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ANNEXES
c. Review of inter-play of jurisdictions occupied by various regulators;

d. Review of jurisdiction of departments within each regulator, and consider
need for segregation / combination, and such other streamlining;
e. Review of issues relating to conflict of interest of regulators in the market;
f. Review of the manner in which subordinate legislation is drafted and implemented;
g. Review of eligibility criteria for senior officers in regulatory authorities and
issues relating to tenure, continuity, and means of tapping and retaining
lessons learnt by each authority;
h. Examine a combined appellate oversight over all issues concerning users
of financial sector;
II. Examine if legislation should mandate statement of principles of legislative
intent behind every piece of subordinate legislation in order to make the purposive intent of the legislation clear and transparent to users of the law and
to courts.
III. Examine if public feedback for draft subordinate legislation should be made
mandatory, with exception for emergency measures.
IV. Examine prescription of parameters for invocation of emergency powers where
regulatory action may be taken on an ex parte basis.
V. Examine the interplay of exchange controls under FEMA and FDI Policy with
other regulatory regimes within the financial sector.
VI. Examine the most appropriate means of oversight over regulators and their
autonomy from government.
VII. Examine the need for re-statement of the law and immediate repeal of any
out-dated legislation on the basis of judicial decisions and policy shifts in the
last two decades of the financial sector post-liberalisation.
VIII. Examination of issues of data privacy and protection of consumer of financial
services in the Indian market.
IX. Examination of legislation relating to the role of information technology in the
delivery of financial services in India, and their effectiveness.
X. Examination of all recommendations already made by various expert committees set up by the government and by regulators and to implement measures
that can be easily accepted.
XI. Examine the role of state governments and legislatures in ensuring a smooth
inter-state financial services infrastructure in India.
XII. Examination of any other related issues.
3. The Commission will device its own procedure and may appoint consultants, advisors and experts and outsource research work to institutions of repute and expertise in the relevant area for the purpose for which the Commission has been set up.
It may recall for such information and take such evidence as it may consider necessary. Ministries and Departments of the Government of India will furnish such
information and documents and other assistance as may be required by the Commission. The Government of India trusts that State Governments and others concerned will extend to the Commission their fullest co-operation and assistance.
4. The Commission will have its headquarters in Delhi.
5. The Commission will make its recommendations within 24 months of the date of
this Gazette Notification. It may consider, if necessary, sending reports on any of
the matters as and when the recommendations are finalised.
Sd/(R. Gopalan)
Secretary to the Government of India
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ANNEXES
19.2. List of consultants, researchers and other officials who

assisted the Commission
I Consultants
1. Somasekhar Sundaresan
2. Bobby Parikh
3. Rajshekhar Rao
I Research team
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
Prof. Ajay Shah

Prof. Ila Patnaik
Prof. Sunder Ram Korivi
Amol Kulkarni
Ankur Narain Saxena
Apoorva Ankur Mishra
Bhavna Jaisingh
K. Aishwarya
Kaushalya Venkataraman
Neena Jacob
Pratik Datta
Radhika Pandey
Shubho Roy
Smriti Parsheera
Sowmya Rao
Sumathi Chandrashekaran
Suyash Rai
Aakriti Mathur
Aishwarya Kumar
Akhil Dua
Apoorva Gupta
Karan Anand
Kumar Anand
Parikshit Kabra
Shekhar Hari Kumar
Shreeya Kashyap
Vikram Bahure
Abhishek Gupta
Alex Etra
Ambarish Mohanty
Chirag Anand
Darshika Singh
Devika Das
Madhavi Pundit
Meeta Ganguly
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ANNEXES
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
Neeraj Singh
Sudarshan Bhattacharjee
Varsha Agrawal
Vimal Balasubramaniam
Dr. Poonam Mehra
Shobana B
Kavitha Ranganathan
I Other officials
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
A.K. Sinha
Uday P. Apsingekar
Vishvesh Bhagat
Dipak Banerjee
D.P. Hura
Ram Rattan
R.S. Tyagi
19.3. List of invitees for interaction with FSLRC
160
S.No
Name of Official/ Expert / Organisation
1
2
3
4*
5
6
7*
8*
9*
10*
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24 *
25
26
27
Mr. R. Gopalan
FICCI
Dr. C. Rangarajan
Dr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia
Dr. Shankar Acharya
Dr. Bimal Jalan
Confederation of India Industry
National Council of Applied Economic Research
Centre for Policy Research
ASSOCHAM
PHDCCI
Dr. Vijay Kelkar
Dr. Percy S. Mistry
Dr. Raghuram G. Rajan
FSDC Sub-Committee
Forward Markets Commission
Indian Banks Association
Prof. Viral Acharya
Mr. Deepak S. Parekh
National Stock Exchange of India Ltd.
Multi Commodity Exchange of India Ltd.
National Commodity & Derivatives Exchange
BSE Limited
Dr. Y.V. Reddy
Mr. Ashok Chawla
Mr. Rajiv Agarwal
Dr. Avinash Persaud
ANNEXES
* Did not participate in the interaction

External Agencies/Experts called on the Commission
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
City of London
Minister for Financial Services, Australia - Mr. Bill Shorten
Indo-US Business Council
US Federal Reserve Board Governor - Mr. Jerome H. Powell
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco - Mr. John C. Williams
Financial Services Authority, UK - Mr. Hector Sants
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19.4. Issues for discussion with experts and stake-holders

General
I Strengths and limitations of the existing statutory framework of financial sector regulation and development
I Strengths and limitations of the current regulatory-organisational structures
I Capability of the Indian institutional architecture to address issues emerging from
financial sector developments globally
I Adequacy of the consumer protection and investor grievances mechanisms embedded in the current framework
I Relevance of regulatory-architectural changes in advanced jurisdictions post-global
crisis to India
I Mechanism for removing/reducing conflicts of interests in the current financial structure
I Any other suggestions
Additional questions/issues on the basis of domain expertise of the

invitee
I Can regulation reduce the growing disenchantment with financial market adventures?
I Specific issues relating to the banking sector.
I Is a principle based approach (PBA) still a way forward? If so, is it possible to implement a PBA with limited regulatory capabilities? How to negotiate the transition
phase in case of adopting a new institutional architecture?
I How does and how far the Competition Act address issues relating to customer
grievances at the micro level? What are the institutional linkages available in the
current customer/investor grievance redressal mechanism (including Consumer
Protection Act) in promoting micro level customer satisfaction?
I What is the extent of institutionalised interface between the Competition Commission and the sectoral regulators? What mechanisms are in place or proposed to
enhance the co-operation mechanism?
I How to balance the provisions in the Competition Act in respect of mergers vis a
vis financial sector regulatory decisions based on expedient financial stability reasons?
I What is the experience with respect to implementation of Consumer Protection Act
in achieving customer satisfaction? How far is it successful in resolving customer /
investor grievances arising from the financial sector?
I What are the constraints for developing a national common market for commodities and spreading commodity derivatives throughout the country?
I How do you visualise the linkages between commodity derivatives market and
other financial sector markets? Can they function independently in a completely
integrated, globalised financial framework?
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19.5. Interactions with authorities overseas

Australia
Treasury
Mr. Bill Shorten, Minister

Mr. Mike Callaghan, Executive Director
Mr. Rob Nicholl, CEO, Debt Management Office
Australian Prudential
Regulatory Authority (APRA)
Dr. John Laker, Chairman

Dr. Jeff Carmichael, Wallis Inquiry Member and Inaugural Chairman of APRA
Financial Sector Advisory Council (FSAC)
Mr. Paul Binsted, Chairman
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA)
Mr. Glenn Stevens, Governor
ASIC
Mr. Greg Medcraft, Chairman
Mr. Ravi Menon, Managing Director and senior

management team
The Treasury
Mr. Mark Hoban, Financial Secretary
Financial Services Authority (FSA)
Mr. Hector Sants, CEO

Mr. Lyndon Nelson, Director
Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA)

Transition Team
Ms. Sarah Breeden, & Mr. Gregory Stevens
Financial
(FMLC)
Lord Hoffman, Chairman
British Bankers Association (BBA)
Ms. Sally Scutt, Deputy CEO
Prof. Charles Goodhart
LSE Prof. and Director of Financial Regulation Research Programme
Financial Sector Practitioners Panel
Chairman Russell Collins
UK Debt Management Office
Mr. Robert Stheeman, CEO and Mr. James Knight
International Centre for Financial

Regulation
Ms. Barbara Ridpath, CEO
City of London Roundtable
Stuart Fraser, Mark Boleat and Representatives

from financial markets
Singapore
Monetary Authority of Singapore
United Kingdom
Markets
Law
Committee
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ANNEXES
Canada
Department of Finance
Mr. Jeremy Rudin, Assistant Deputy Minister
Financial Consumer Agency of

Canada (FCAC)
Mr. Ursula Menke, Commissioner

Ms. Lucie Tedesco, Deputy Commissioner
Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation

(CDIC)
Ms. Michele Bourque, President
Bank of Canada
Mr. Tiff Macklem, Sr. Dy. Governor

Mr. Timothy Lane, Dy. Governor
Office of the Superintendent of

Financial Institutions (OSFI)
Mr. Mark Zelmer, Asstt. Supdt.

Ms. Patty Evanoff, Senior Director
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC)
Prof. Mary Condon, Vice-Chair
19.6. Working Group on insurance, retirement financing, and

small savings
19.6.1. Composition
Composition:
Shri C.S. Rao
Shri Tarun Bajaj
Ms. Anuradha Prasad
Shri Rajendra Chitale
Chairman
Senior Adviser
Member
Member
Special Invitee
19.6.2. Terms of Reference:

1. Insurance
(a) Review the consumer protection aspects of insurance and recommend principles for legal framework for the same. Some specific issues to be examined
in this regard are:
i. Review distribution models and sales practices in the insurance industry.
ii. Review the present grievance redressal mechanisms.
iii. Review the manner in which special aspects of insurance contracts, such
as, dealing with misstatements, insurance fraud, assignment of policy
and appointment of nominees, should be addressed.
iv. Review the competition laws suitable for the insurance sector.
v. Review general market conduct laws suitable for the insurance sector.
(b) Examine the role of the regulator in pursuing the goal of development and
the manner in which the development of products in various areas, including,
rural and social sector, micro insurance, agriculture insurance, health insurance, should be specified in laws and regulations.
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(c) Examine whether information should be treated as a public good that can
be shared through appropriate data warehousing and data mining infrastructure, subject to customer privacy and confidentiality requirements.
(d) Identify the prudential regulation and supervision aspects of insurance regulation and recommend a model legal framework for the same. This may include:
i. review of the ownership and capital structure of insurance companies.
ii. review of the laws governing investment norms for insurance companies examining how the regulators can be empowered to adjust the regulatory
framework with time.
iii. review of the prudent man principle approach versus prescription of investment guidelines.
(e) Review the legal framework relating to re-insurance and examine the changes
that might be required to promote more robust participation in the sector.
(f) Review the systemic risks that can arise from the failure of insurance firms,
and the legal framework for dealing with such risks.
(g) Examine the appropriate resolution mechanisms that need to be adopted to
deal with the failure of any insurance firm, keeping in view the interests of policyholders and financial stability. Also review whether this process should differ in any manner for life and non life insurance firms.
(h) Review the design and implementation of the Employees State Insurance Act,
1948 and examine the possibility of allowing employers covered by that legislation to opt for group medical insurance offered by the private insurance
industry.
(i) Review the regulation and structure of State owned insurers, in particular the
special status of Life Insurance Corporation.
(j) Examine the manner in which life insurance policies offered by the Department of Posts can be brought within the regulatory ambit in order to ensure
the protection of consumers and provide a level playing field.
(k) Review the role of self regulatory organisation and industry associations in the
insurance sector and examine whether there is a need for a re-assessment of
their functions.
(l) Review the insurance related provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 and identify any changes required to be made to the existing legal regime.
(m) Examine the mechanisms that need to be put in place for resolution of disputes between market players-insurers an intermediaries
(n) In this context, review which powers should be given to regulators under law,
how should the powers be used, how should the supervisory function be
structured, and what punitive actions can be taken.
2. Pensions
(a) The present retirement income framework in India consists of many components, such as, EPFO, New Pension System (NPS), Public Provident Fund (PPF),
provident fund trusts and superannuation trusts, and is regulated in a very
fragment manner. Examine the manner in which these components can be
brought within the regulatory ambit of financial sector laws and the means
for achieving coherence among the different components of the system?
(b) Identify the consumer protection, prudential regulation and systemic risk aspects of pension regulation, which includes NPS, EPFO, provident fund trusts
and superannuation trusts.
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(c) Review the development role of PFRDA and examine whether a developmental mandate is essential for ensuring widespread participation in voluntary
NPS?
(d) Review of NPS and examine if there are any changes required to its present
features to promote the interests of consumers. This would include, reviewing the mandatory annuity requirement prescribed under NPS and examining
the feasibility and desirability of providing minimum guaranteed returns to
subscribers.
(e) Review the laws governing investment norms for NPS, EPFO, provident fund
trusts and superannuation trusts, and recommend a model legal framework
that gives the requisite powers to the regulators.
(f) Review the existing administered interest rate mechanism followed by EPFO
and examine the problems that might arise on account of unfunded liabilities
under the Employees Pension Scheme.
(g) In this context, review which powers should be given to regulators under law,
3. Small Savings
(a) Review the existing legal framework governing small savings schemes and
identify any changes required to be made to it.
(b) At present the Government acts as both the operator of small savings schemes
as well as its regulator. Examine the issues that might arise on this account
and whether there is a case for bringing these schemes under the same regulatory framework as the larger financial system.
(c) Examine the legal framework required for the regulation of small savings distribution agents, including post offices and banks and review their incentive
structures.
(d) Review whether the financial activities of the Department of Posts may be
brought within the regulatory ambit - can narrow banking, corporatisation be
considered as options?
(e) Examine the possibility of separating the investment function from the savings mobilisation function of small savings schemes and the potential implications of the same.
(f) Identify the consumer protection and prudential regulation aspects of small
savings schemes. The consumer protection aspects would include reviewing
the need for preventive measures to deal with issues of excessive churning as
well as the need for an appropriate grievance redressal mechanism. Issues to
be considered in connection with the prudential regulation of National Small
Savings Fund would include, capital requirements, liquidity regulations and
norms on governance and internal controls.
(g) In this context, review which powers should be given to regulators under law,
19.6.3. Recommendations on insurance

Development goals
1. The development of insurance markets should not be a regulatory objective. Market forces should ordinarily be able to achieve an adequate level of development in
the sector. Towards his end, the law should specify that the need for pursuing competitive neutrality and fair competition should be basic principles to be followed by
the regulator.
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2. General development of markets has to be distinguished from specific measures

that need to be taken to achieve the financial inclusion agenda. The mechanisms
for achieving financial inclusion in the field of insurance should be aligned with the
decisions that the Commission may take for promoting inclusion in the banking
sector.
3. Capital regulation
(a) The capital resources maintained by insurance companies should be commensurate with the specific risks arising from their business activities. To
achieve this, the primary law should provide that the prescribed capital requirements should be determined in a risk-based manner. Subject to this
principle, the regulator will frame subordinate legislations to lay down the
actual capital requirements and the process for computation of capital.
(b) The regulator should also be permitted to prescribe the minimum capital requirement for the setting up of an insurance company, instead of having the
rupees 100 crores requirement laid down in the primary law. This will allow the
entry conditions to be revised from time to time without requiring an amendment to the law.
4. The law should provide that insurance companies are permitted to hold different
classes of capital. The classification of capital into different tiers will be done by the
regulator through subordinate legislation. The regulator will also be empowered to
restrict the extent to which insurers may rely on different tiers of capital for satisfying
their capital requirements.
5. Insurance law should not specify foreign investment limits for investments in the
sector. As in all other sectors, this power should be with the Central Government.
In making its determination, the government may consider adopting different FDI
limits for different types of insurance activities. In particular, a higher limit may be
considered for the health insurance sector to promote more robust growth in the
sector.
6. High-level principles relating to sound governance and management of insurance
firms need to be enshrined in the law. The law should also mandate self-assessment
of solvency and risk profile by insurers. The regulator should then use its supervisory powers to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the measures adopted by
the insurance company.
7. The law should specify that investments are to be made as per the prudent person principle and quantitative investment requirements and restrictions should be
removed from the primary law. To the extent necessary, the regulator should be
empowered to specify appropriate investment norms through subordinate legislation. This power would be subject to certain restrictions to be specified under the
law. Specifically, the regulator will not be able to prescribe the composition of the
investment portfolio or the minimum levels of investment for any given category of
investment.
8. The law should not prohibit insurance companies from investing overseas. Insurers may choose to globally diversify their portfolio in accordance with the prudent
person principle and risk-based capital requirements. The regulator may, however,
choose to set out reasonable limits on the currency mismatch risks that may be
held by an insurer.
Consumer Protection
9. The law should set out the principles of consumer protection to be observed by the
insurance service providers and the framework within which these principles may
be implemented by the regulator.
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10. All individuals, who may be individual agents or employees of corporate agents,
brokers, advisers, banks and insurance companies, who are involved in the sale of
insurance services to consumers must be registered with the regulator. This registration process will be based on certain objective criteria, such as minimum qualifications, training and certification requirements, which will be prescribed by the
regulator. The responsibility of verifying the individuals compliance with the specified requirements should be left to the insurance company, in respect of its employees and agents. In case of independent advisors and brokers, who are not aligned
with any particular insurer, the relevant service provider would be responsible for
the registration of its employees.
11. No minimum or maximum cap on commission or fee should be mentioned in the
primary legislation. The law should allow the regulator to prescribe incentive structures for the sale of insurance services, keeping in view consumer interests.
12. In case a policy lapses due to the non payment of premium, there should be an
obligation placed on the insurer to issue a notice to the policyholder. However,
these details need not be specified in the primary law. The primary law should
only provide that the regulator may frame specific regulations for dealing with the
lapsation on insurance policies, with a view to protecting policyholders.
13. The scope of the present insurance ombudsman system needs to be expanded
to allow complaints against insurance intermediaries, other than agents of the insurance company for whom the insurer will be directly liable. The ombudsman
awards should be made enforceable against the complainant as well as the service
provider, subject to the right to appeal before a specialised appellate forum.
14. The law should specify the duty of parties to an insurance contract to act in good
faith. It should also set out the meaning and consequences of insurance fraud.
15. The collection and sharing of insurance information can help insurers make better
pricing and underwriting decisions. It can also help insurers combat instances of
insurance fraud. The law should enable the sharing of insurance information while
specifically providing the data protection and confidentiality requirements applicable to any person, including the regulator, that holds information belonging to
others.
16. The primary legislation must empower the regulator to act in a manner that promotes better access to micro insurance. This should be done by stating that promoting innovation and access to insurance services is one of the key principles to
be followed by the regulator.
17. There is a need for reforms in the heath care sector to provide for the codification
of ailments, procedures and protocols followed by health providers. This will help
in promoting better underwriting by insurance companies by reducing the moral
hazard problems in the supply of health care services to insured persons.
18. Motor insurance:
(a) In order to minimise inconvenience and costs, the law should provide the accident victim, insurer and insured an opportunity to arrive at a voluntary settlement of the claim without having to go through the adjudication process. If
the parties fail to arrive at a settlement, the compensation should be decided
on a fast track basis by a specialised tribunal.
(b) The law should lay down the minimum amount of insurance coverage that
must be obtained by every vehicle owner. This will ensure that accident victims are assured of receiving compensation of up to the insured amount. It
will also provide insurers with more certainty on their potential liabilities. In
order to achieve this, the regulator will have to discontinue the practice of fixing the premium for third party motor insurance policies.
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19. Role of surveyors:

(a) The Indian Institute of Insurance Surveyors and Loss Assessors should be given
statutory recognition as a professional body responsible for the licensing and
supervision of surveyors and loss assessors.
(b) In order to protect the interests of consumers, the legal framework should allow them to appoint a surveyor in addition to the surveyor required to be appointed by the insurer. The insurer will be required to consider both reports
before making a decision on the claim.
20. The law should empower the regulator to specify the types of permitted and restricted assignments of insurance policies. The insurer will not have the discretion
to refuse to record an assignment that is made in accordance with the regulations.
Competition issues
21. The legal framework governing LIC should be at par with the laws applicable to all
other life insurance companies. In particular, there should be no sovereign guarantee for the policies of LIC. The status of LIC should be changed from a statutory corporation to a Government company governed under standard company law provisions.
22. There is a need for encouraging competition in the reinsurance sector by adopting
the following measures:
(a) do away with the mandatory requirement placed upon general insurance
companies to reinsure a portion of their business with General Insurnace Council (GIC);
(b) remove barriers which prevent Indian insurance companies from doing business with global reinsurers, subject only to prudential regulation requirements;
and
(c) create an enabling framework for the entry of global reinsurance firms, including Lloyds, in the Indian reinsurance sector.
23. Competition policy should play an effective role in ensuring that government schemes do not create an uneven playing field between state-owned and private insurance companies.
Resolution and systemic relevance
24. The law should contain appropriate resolution mechanisms to deal with failing
insurance firms, including provisions for enhanced supervision and the option of
transferring the business of the failing insurer to a solvent insurer. These mechanisms should be applicable to both life and non-life insurers.
25. There is a need to create a compensation scheme to protect policyholders from
the inability of an insurer to meet its financial obligations and to minimise the taxpayers exposure to the failure of insurance firms. The design of the policyholder
compensation scheme should be decided under the resolution framework being
designed by the Commission.
26. It should be the regulators responsibility to assess the systemic importance of individual insurance firms. Additional supervisory and resolution tools will need to
be employed in respect of those insurance companies that are found to be systemically important.
Unregulated areas of insurance
27. Establishments covered by ESIC should have the option to opt out of the medical
benefit facilities provided under the scheme and obtain group health insurance
coverage offered by an insurance company, if they are able to obtain similar benefits at a similar cost . In such cases, a proportionate amount of the total contribution
payable to ESIC that relates to the medical benefits provided under the scheme will
be used as the premium for obtaining the insurance policy.
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28. Being a social security scheme administered by the government, ESIC should not
be subjected to the entire gamut of insurance laws and regulations. However, the
law should allow the insurance regulator to identify certain specific principles, such
as those relating to corporate governance, investment management and consumer
protection, that would have to be complied with by ESIC.
29. In case of government-sponsored schemes that are administered through insurance companies, the general provisions of insurance laws would be applicable.
However, the law should allow the regulator to vary the applicability of certain provisions of law, particularly in respect of the pre-sale obligations of insurers.
30. In case of schemes where the insurance coverage is contemplated to be provided
directly by the government and the scheme is not funded through a complete or
substantial fiscal transfer, the law will identify certain specific provisions, such as
those relating to corporate governance, investment management and consumer
protection, that would have to be complied with by the government body implementing the scheme. In order for these provisions to be effectively implemented,
the law should mandate that any insurance business carried out by the government, which is eligible for limited regulation under insurance law, should be carried
out through a separate corporate entity.
31. Life insurance schemes operated by the Department of Post (DOP) should be corporatised and brought within the purview of the insurance regulator to ensure effective prudential management, protect the interests of policyholders and create a
level playing field.
19.6.4. Recommendations on retirement financing

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
170
Scope of retirement financing regulation

There should be common regulation and supervision for all retirement financing
schemes, including various types of pension and provident fund schemes, but not
including the unfunded, tax-financed schemes (such as Old Age Pension Schemes),
or those that are largely tax-financed. This would mean that the mandates that are
presently divided between PFRDA and EPFO must be brought under one regulatory
agency.
EPFO should only manage and not regulate retirement financing schemes. EPFO itself should be regulated in the same manner like any other retirement financing entity, and the entire range of regulations should apply to it. Similar approach should
be taken towards PPF.
Smaller exempt and excluded funds should integrate with Employees Provident
Fund (EPF) or NPS. The tax treatment should continue if the fund chooses to integrate with either of the two. The law should not make reference to the possibility
of exemption or exclusion, and it should mandate all existing funds that fall under
these categories to opt for either NPS or EPFO.
The primary objective of retirement financing regulation should be to correct market failures in the retirement financing sector. Development of the sector or inclusion should not be mandates given to the regulator, though the regulator should
have the flexibility to customise the regulation according to the profile of the consumers and the kind of the product being offered, based on cost-benefit analysis
of the regulation.
Prudential regulation and supervision of retirement financing should be largely
risk-based. Regulator should ensure that investigatory and enforcement requirements are proportional to the risks being mitigated.
ANNEXES
6. The law must provide for licensing of retirement finance entities and retirement
finance funds, but there should be no licensing of individual plans. The regulator
may prescribe conditions to be fulfilled by each plan to be launched by the licensed
fund. In addition to the entitys licensing, each of the trustees of the entity should
be registered with the regulator.
7. The law should define principles-based criteria for awarding licenses to retirement
financing entities and funds. Licensing should be on the basis of demonstration
by the trustees/promoters that they have the required legal, managerial and ownership structures, capability (human, technology and financial), risk management
systems, investment policy, financial strength and capital to manage the entity
and/or the fund. The process of awarding the licenses should be transparent, and
the applicants should be given a detailed response in a reasonable amount of time.
The regulator should also have the power to modify or withdraw the licenses after
due process, and such decisions should be appealable in a court of law.
8. The law should provide that the prudent person standard be followed for investment management by those managing the retirement financing funds, such as pension funds, EPFO, etc. The regulators should also have the powers to impose some
broad portfolio restrictions to prevent excessive risk-taking by the funds. These restrictions should be imposed only as exceptions, and must not take the form of the
regulators prescribing investment management strategies for the funds.
9. All retirement financing funds must be required to set forth and actively pursue an
overall investment policy. The law should empower the regulator to define the
minimum requirements for the policy.
10. The law should empower the regulator to set standards for valuation of retirement
financing assets in a transparent manner, informed by prevailing standards in other
parts of the domestic financial system or in other jurisdictions. The regulator may,
if it so chooses, delegate the task of setting standards to a standard setting body,
but the regulator would continue to be responsible for the standards.
11. For defined contribution schemes with administered interest rates, such as EPF and
PPF, the regulators should have the power to regulate and supervise them for sound
investment management practices.
12. The law must empower the regulator to regulate and supervise the risk management systems of retirement finance entities and funds, to ensure the adequacy of
risk management systems in place. These powers must cover all the key elements
of risk management systems, and must always be used in a risk-based manner. The
regulations must be principles-based, should focus on supervision rather than exante rules, and the regulator should not impose any one risk management model
on the entities and funds. For small funds with poor in-house capability, the regulator may mandate seeking external support in developing sound risk management
practices.
13. The regulators must be given the power to impose risk-based capital and liquidity
requirements on retirement finance funds.
14. The law should give the regulator the power to regulate and supervise all the key
elements of corporate governance of retirement finance entities and funds, in a riskbased manner.
Consumer Protection
15. The law should provide protection to consumers from being misled or deceived,
subjected to unfair terms of contract, or unduly penalised by the fund. Consumers
should have access to a reasonable mechanism of grievance redressal. Consumers
should also be given the right to get support to take the right decisions, and receive
reasonable quality of service.
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16. Consumer protection regulation must be proportional to the risk held by the consumer, and the extent to which the consumer is responsible for taking decisions
about the plan on issues such as investment.
17. All individuals dealing with retirement financing must be registered with the regulator, who must stipulate significant training requirements on the individuals involved in the process of helping the consumers decide about retirement financing.
18. The structure of various types of charges on retirement financing schemes should
be regulated by the regulator.
19. The regulator must be given the powers to ensure inter-operability, portability and
exit options in retirement financing plans.
20. The regulator must have the power to mandate suitability analysis and advice to
be given by the provider to the consumer regarding the asset allocation decision.
The regulator must also have the power to recommend modifications to schemes
and processes to ensure that consumers are given suitable solutions.
Failure of retirement finance funds
21. The law should provide for an efficient resolution mechanism for funds offering defined benefit retirement financing plans. This should be modelled on the resolution
process for banking and insurance, but with more time for the funds to improve
their financial position. There should be an agency responsible for the resolution
function.
22. There should be a process to move the consumers funds from one defined contribution fund to another smoothly, if the retirement finance entity sponsoring the
defined contribution fund goes bankrupt.
23. The agency responsible for resolution should have access to comprehensive information about retirement finance entities and funds. The agency should have access to auditors reports and the powers to ask for information on any fund and
conduct on-site investigation of a fund.
24. The resolution process should start with a quantitative trigger.
25. The resolution process should start with giving the fund a notice to improve its financial position. If the fund fails to do so, the process should focus on transfer of
the assets to another fund, or under the management of another fund. Liquidation of fund should be the last option in the resolution process. When resolution
process starts, the fund should be prevented from collecting contributions
26. Establishing a retirement finance protection fund, which would guarantee payouts
from all defined benefit schemes, may be considered. The fund could also provide
some guarantees to defined contribution schemes, to help them hedge certain investment risks.
27. If the retirement finance protection fund is established, it should charge risk-based
levy from the participating funds; participation should be mandatory for funds offering defined benefit plans; and the fund could be managed by the agency that is
responsible for resolution of failing funds.
Special topics
28. Only insurance companies that have proven capability in offering life insurance
should be allowed to do the business of issuing annuities.
29. Compared to pension funds, for insurance firms issuing annuities, there should be
greater flexibility given to the regulator in law to stipulate restrictions on investment
choices. This should be in line with the regulations of life insurance companies.
30. The regulators should work to ensure that consumers take the optimal annuitisation decision, by mandating partial annuitisation and providing active support to
consumers to take the right decision.
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31. Resolution of insurance firms issuing annuities should be considered along the
lines of resolution of any life insurance firm. This issue has been discussed in detail
in this reports chapter on insurance firms.
32. Just as in the PFRDA Bill, NPS should be acknowledged as a unique object in the
law, and its various components should be regulated at par with their respective
categories.
33. The law should acknowledge the unique status of NPS as a government intervention to address market failures in the retirement financing market, and the market power is commands to meet its objectives. If NPS exerts anti-competitive pressures over and above its basic objectives, it should be regulated from a competition standpoint. NPS should be separated from the retirement financing regulator,
because there is conflict of interest in managing such a system and regulating the
retirement financing sector. This can be achieved by making the NPS Trust an independent entity. The retirement financing regulator should regulate and supervise
the NPS Trust.
34. The law should give the regulator the powers to regulate infrastructure for retirement financing sector. Sections from PFRDA Bill on regulation of infrastructure for
retirement financing can be considered for drafting these provisions in legislation.
These sections provide for regulation and supervision of infrastructure services
such as record keeping.
19.6.5. Recommendations on small savings

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Legal framework
There is a need to consolidate and modernise the laws on small savings. Accordingly, the GSB Act, GSC Act and PPF Act should be replaced with a consolidated
law that should, inter alia, contain provisions relating to manner of collection and
investment of funds, consumer protection, grievance redressal and, to the extent
relevant, prudential regulation.
Structure and regulatory framework
All functions related to the operation and management of small savings should
be performed by an independent entity that should be brought within the limited
purview of the financial regulator. However, prudential regulation of the proposed
small savings entity should not extend to changing the manner in which the funds
held by National Small Savings Fund (NSSF) are invested since that constitutes a
fiscal decision.
To address concerns that corporatisation of the scheme would lead to loss of public
confidence, it should be ensured that upon the transfer of the management of small
savings to an independent entity, the law effecting such transfer should explicitly
clarify that these schemes are guaranteed by the government.
Consumer protection
Requisite changes may be made in the laws governing small savings to include provisions on investor protection, compensation and grievance redressal.
To minimise operational risks on account of agent defaults and to protect the interests of investors, the law should lay down the framework for the licensing, qualifications and training of agents.
19.6.6. List of Acts to be reviewed

1. Insurance Act, 1938
2. Insurance Regulatory Development Authority Act, 1999
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3. Insurance Laws Amendment Bill, 2008

4. Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956
5. Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Bill, 2009
6. General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972
7. Marine Insurance Act, 1963
8. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
9. The Actuaries Act, 2006
10. Employees State Insurance Act, 1948
11. Companies Act, 1956 (to a limited extent)
12. Indian Contract Act, 1872 (to a limited extent)
13. The Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority Bill, 2011
14. Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (Employees
Provident Fund Scheme, 1952, Employees Pension Scheme, 1995, Employees Deposit-Linked Insurance Scheme, 1976)
15. Income Tax Act, 1961 (to the extent relevant for recognised provident and superannuation funds)
16. Public Provident Fund Act, 1968
17. Government Savings Bank Act, 1873
18. Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959
19.7. Working Group on payments

19.7.1. Composition
Dr. P.J. Nayak
Shri Ranjit Tinaikar
Shri Uttam Nayak
Shri Bharat Poddar
Shri A.P. Singh
Shri Abhishek Sinha
Chairman
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
19.7.2. Terms of reference

1. To identify what are the systemic risks to the financial system and to the real economy from payment systems. Payment systems can be systemically important, partly
because shocks can originate within them, resulting in operational risks, but also
because they can act as channels for propagating shocks originating outside their
operations, through credit and liquidity markets. An understanding of the potential systemic credit, liquidity and operational risks in payment systems is thus required, so that criteria for identifying systemically important payment participants
and systemically important payments systems can be formulated. Finally, to assess
whether there are risks to financial stability arising from encouraging competition
and innovation in payments.
2. To evaluate whether the regulatory system should cover all payment systems without exception, or instead merely those which are systemically important. Alternatively, to examine whether there should be a separate regulator for retail and smallvalue payment systems as compared to systemically important payment systems.
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3. As shocks can spread through payment systems to other participants and lead to
their bankruptcy, to examine the design of a uniform and quick process for handling
payment-induced bankruptcy.
4. To review whether independent payment systems should be encouraged, not linked
to payment participants, thereby minimising moral hazard through conflicts of interest, and encouraging technology infusion at a faster pace. This would in turn
require a review of whether payments should be viewed as an offshoot of banking,
or as a distinct industry in its own right. It would also require assessing whether
banks being special" militates against having independent payment systems. To
assess whether existing legislation is adequately supportive of the absorption of
fast-changing payments technologies.
5. To review whether RBI should remain the regulator of payment systems or whether
instead a regulator independent of RBI should be set up. This involves identifying
whether there are conflicts of interest and moral hazard, as also whether adequate
domain knowledge gets continually upgraded, in the present regulatory structure.
6. To ensure compatibility with the recommendations of the FATF.
7. To suggest regulation to promote transparency, security, efficiency and certainty of
payments; and to ensure that regulation is agnostic to ownership structures of the
regulated, necessitating treating regulated entities in the public and private sectors
on par. To also suggest constructive and creative ways of enforcement of regulations.
8. To develop a quick and clear appeals process when there is conflict, equally fair to
both disputants, especially when one of them is the regulator. To frame dynamic
laws for penalties and review the stringency of current laws.
9. To promote financial inclusion following the ideals proposed in various reports
such as the Report of the Inter-Ministerial Group: Framework for delivery of Basic
Financial Services Using Mobile Phones; From Exclusion to Inclusion with Micropayments; and Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI).
10. Any other matter the Working Group may consider relevant.
19.7.3. Recommendations
1. The Payments Regulator should permit self-registration of payment system providers, including through online modalities.
2. The Payments Regulator should permit existing non-payment businesses to extend
their business models to cover payments, in order that customer coverage could
thereby expand.
3. Empower the payments regulator to ensure that access to infrastructure services is
open and free of restrictive practices.
4. In order to foster financial inclusion within payments, the Payments Regulator should encourage the concept that certain categories of small-value payments could
dispense with Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements for the entity making payments. Further, the categories of such payments should be clearly identified.
5. The Payments Regulator should permit, and indeed encourage, electronic KYC authentication as a full substitute for paper-based KYC authentication.
6. Regulation must maintain a level playing field within the payments industry between the public sector and the private sector, and between bank and non-bank
players. It would need to be neutral to the ownership and category structures of
the regulated entity, in the absence of which innovation within the payments industry is liable to be stifled.
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7. Regulation should encourage independent payment system providers, which are

not linked to payment participants, thereby minimising moral hazard through conflict of interest.
8. Encourage innovation in payments regulation and supervision, by recognising that
this is a fast-changing technology-enabled business. Bring in relevant expertise into
the regulatory body in order to improve the regulation and supervision of this industry. Restrict representation from within RBI on the Board for Regulation and Supervision of Payment and Settlement Systems to the Governor (as Chairman) and
the Deputy Governor in charge of Payments.
9. The Payments Regulator would need actively to sponsor the constitution of a Payments Council, a body which would be representative of payment system providers
and users of payment systems. Regulations would be issued by the Payments Regulator which would define the role which the Council would play in advising the
payments regulator on industry standards and other related matters. It would be
mandatory for the payments regulator to consult with the Payments Council on
such matters.
10. All payment system providers should be governed by one consistent legislative
framework.
11. A system of proportionate regulation would be helpful, allowing nascent businesses to adapt technology solutions without undue regulatory intervention, while
requiring systemically important businesses to submit to stronger regulatory oversight.
12. It is important to infuse a transparent and fair rule of law into regulatory decisions.
Legislation needs to provide for a quick appeals process, equally fair to both disputants, especially when one of them is the regulator. Further, all appellate powers
presently vested in RBI and the Finance Ministry should be transferred to the appellate body.
13. All regulations made by RBI on payments would need to be consistent with the principles listed above as contained in Recommendations 1-12 above, which would be
incorporated into a new enactment on payments. Regulations could thereby be
challenged in the appellate body on grounds of violating the new legislative law.
14. Strong legal protection for payment system participants and other customers of
payment systems would need to be incorporated in the new legislation. The constitution of a separate Customer Protection Agency to ensure this, backed by laws
that require the enforcement of contracts by payment system providers, would facilitate this. Customer protection would no longer be the prime responsibility of
RBI as the payments regulator.
15. Introduce a uniform and quick process for handling bankruptcy within the payments sector, with revenue payables of a payment system provider having priority
in the context of bankruptcy.
19.8. Working Group on securities

19.8.1. Composition
Prof. Jayanth R. Varma
Shri Ravi Narain
Shri Madhu Kannan
Shri Neeraj Gambhir
Shri Jayesh Mehta
Shri S.A. Narayan
Prof. K.G. Sahadevan
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Chairman
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
ANNEXES
19.8.2. Terms of Reference

The WG on securities will work on all dimensions of organised financial trading. The terms
of reference shall be as follows:
1. Review the existing legal framework including SC(R)A, SEBI Act, depositories legislation, RBI Amendment Act of 2006, FC(R)A, etc.
2. Review expert committee recommendations, and identify the legal changes which
would implement existing recommendations.
3. Unification and harmonisation of the legal and regulatory treatment of all underlying and all traded products. How would we treat OTC and exchange-traded derivatives in a unified framework? How should the word security be defined, in a way
that accommodates all dimensions of organised financial trading, and supports future innovations?
What should be done about commodity spot trading when delivery is done through
dematerialised warehouse receipts? This may require examining the Warehouse
Development and Regulation Act.
4. Should clearing corporations / clearinghouses be treated as a part of micro-prudential regulation or systemic stability? Are they systemically important components
of the payments system?
5. What are the unique features of consumer protection in securities markets?
6. What are the unique features of micro-prudential regulation and systemic stability
for securities markets?
7. What does financial law have to do, other than the main paths of consumer protection, micro-prudential regulation and systemic risk? What Aspects of Financial
Contracts require legislative attention, over and above these three pillars?
How do we obtain:
(a) Enforceability of derivative contracts in view of their similarity to wagering
contracts
(b) Enforceability of netting, cross margining and closeout of positions by the
clearing corporation especially in the event of bankruptcy of market participants.
(c) Bankruptcy remoteness of collateral in derivative margining and other contexts
(d) Securitisation especially of future cash flows
(e) Inter-linkage of CCPs with the payment system and their ability to settle in central bank money
(f) Legal protection of exchanges and clearing corporations in respect of actions
taken by them after a participant default
(g) Resolution of clearing corporations and other systemically important securities market intermediaries
8. To review the legal framework through which the regulatory agency would write
subordinate legislation on issues of ownership, governance, and compensation
policy for critical infrastructure providers.
9. How should the issues of insider trading and fraud be dealt with, in a general way,
which applies to all securities?
10. The field of corporate governance is a complex interplay of company law and securities law. What, if anything, should securities law be doing?
11. In the field of fund management, to review the structures used by mutual funds,
private equity funds, etc., and examine the need for fundamentally different approaches.
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1. The legal framework for securities must recognise the public good nature of financial markets and establish the principles of market integrity and transparency as
key regulatory objectives
2. The definition of securities should be entity neutral and should be broad enough
to cover new instruments that emerge from the process of financial innovation. It
must include a wide range of unlisted tradable instruments for the purpose of market abuse regulations, but must have broad exemptions for the purpose of registration requirements as explained in Recommendations 6 and 8.
3. The registration requirement must be entity neutral and should not therefore be
restricted to companies.
4. There is a need to prevent redistribution of shares by the original recipient of shares.
Otherwise, indirectly an offer may be made to a large number of persons.
5. There is need for an aggregation requirement whereby offers of the same class of
securities by the same issuer over a period of say twelve months are aggregated.
Concomitantly, the number of 50 may need to be increased to 100 or 150.
6. It is necessary to exempt offers to qualified institutional investors who do not need
as much protection as retail investors.
7. There is a need to impose a registration requirement when the total number of
holders of the securities exceeds a threshold (say 500 or 1000) even though only
a small number of investors were approached in any given year.
8. It is desirable to have a crowd funding exemption for issues that are small in the
aggregate even if they tap a large number of investors.
9. The statute must explicitly state that the purpose of the registration requirements
is to ensure adequate disclosure and that the registration requirement is not to be
used as a form of merit based regulation of public offers.
10. Commodity derivatives should be regulated in the same way as financial derivatives while taking care to exclude genuine commercial transactions in commodities.
11. The obligations to make adequate disclosures (prospectus, annual and quarterly
reports and material event disclosures) must be laid down in statute and made
applicable to all listed entities regardless of their legal form. The details regarding
the content and format of these disclosures can be left to delegated legislation.
12. There must be a statutory provision allowing the regulator(s) to impose corporate
governance obligations on listed entities in relation to (a) minimum proportion of
independent directors in the Board of Directors (or similar governance organ) and
its key committees (b) financial literacy requirements of members of key committees of the board.
13. The scope and objectives of takeover regulations must be laid down in statute. In
particular:
(a) The regulations should cover all acquisitions of 25% of the voting rights as well
as creeping acquisitions by controlling shareholders.
(b) Minority shareholders must be treated fairly by giving them an opportunity to
sell at the higher of the highest price paid by the acquirers and the undisturbed
market price by means of an open offer.
(c) While the long term goal is therefore a regime of 100% open offers, taking into
account the development of takeover financing and other relevant factors, the
regulator may specify a lower size of the open offer. The regulator(s) would be
required to publish a report every five years justifying the size of the open offer.
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(d) The Board of the target company should be restricted from alienating material
assets, incurring material borrowings, issuing new shares, buying back shares
except with the approval of the shareholders by special resolution during the
pendency of an open offer.
(e) The regulator should impose appropriate disclosure requirements on the acquirer to allow the shareholders of the target company to make an informed
decision.
14. Legal certainty of enforceability of derivative transactions must be ensured for (a)
exchange traded derivatives and (b) OTC derivative transaction between sophisticated counter parties without reference to whether and by whom they are regulated.
15. The regulator(s) should be mandated by law to balance the conflicting objectives of
safety and efficiency in relation to for-profit Financial Market Intermediarys (FMIs).
Moreover, the regulator(s) must be required to publish a report every five years on
how it achieved this balance highlighting the emerging competitive landscape and
technological developments.
16. Every clearing house should be able to settle in central bank money. There should
be mandatory settlement in central bank money for systemically important clearing houses, which should be stipulated in primary legislation.
17. Clearing corporations of stock exchanges should be brought within the scope of
the Payment Act (2007) to ensure finality of netting and settlement and to allow the
clearing corporations to appropriate the collateral of insolvent members towards
their settlement and other obligations.
18. The definition of insider trading should be incorporated into the statute and should
cover only cases where the trading was in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence.
19. The definition of other forms of market abuse like fraud, misrepresentation and the
use of deceptive devices must also be part of the statute.
20. In order to bring consistency in the scope of activities conducted by market intermediaries, an activity based approach should be followed to define market intermediaries in primary securities legislation.
21. A broad set of activities which are intended to be regulated by the securities regulator, whether or not such activities are primary or ancillary functions of the concerned entity must be specified.
22. In order to ensure that the securities market regulator adequately enforces the provisions in relation to code of conduct of market intermediaries, the principal legislation in relation to securities market should lay down the broad principles of code
of conduct of market intermediaries, specifically covering high standard of service,
due diligence, disclosure of fees, prompt disbursal of payments, timely and adequate disclosures, confidentiality of client information, avoidance and management of conflicts of interest, sound corporate governance and compliance.
23. Regulation regarding governance structure of funds should be neutral to the legal
structure adopted by the fund. Regulations should not specifically prescribe the
legal structure of the fund.
24. To facilitate more flexible and modern legal forms of organisation, suitable amendments may be required in taxation and other laws.
25. The primary statute must contain broad provisions on the governance of mutual
funds including: the basic principle of unit holder approval for major decisions (or
exit opportunity in lieu of such approval); requirements regarding offer documents
and periodic disclosures; requirements regarding custodian and auditors. Details
regarding these can be left to delegated legislation.
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26. The primary statute must also lay down the broad principles of investment restrictions including matters like diversification requirements, borrowing restrictions,
and liquidity of underlying investments. Details regarding these can be left to delegated legislation.
19.9. Debt Management Office

19.9.1. Composition
Dr. M. Govinda Rao
Shri Kanagasabapathy Kuppuswamy
Chairman
Member
Member
19.9.2. Terms of Reference of the Working Group on Debt Management Office

1. Critically evaluate the case for separation of the PDMA from the RBI. In this context,
focus on the conflicts of interest between the RBIs monetary policy, supervisory
and regulatory objectives and the debt management objectives of minimising the
borrowing cost and the development of a Government bond market. This analysis
may be carried out in the light of new developments.
2. Determine how to setup the PDMA under the Commission legal architecture, keeping in view Commissions work on independence, transparency and accountability.
3. Specify the work required in the PDMA on databases. This requires consolidation of
all information on assets and liabilities along with contingent liabilities into a single
centralised database.
4. Specify in greater detail the consolidation of the functions of several dispersed
debt management departments within the RBI and Ministry of Finance into a single
agency.
5. Issues related to placing the cash management function in the PDMA:
(a) Specify the cash management functions of the PDMA.
(b) Study international best practices on how PDMAs and the Treasury cooperate
on cash management.
(c) Draft law which places the cash management function in the PDMA.
6. Sub-national debt: As long as states are indebted to the Central Government, the
states are required to seek the permission of the Central Government to borrow.
The nature of assistance that the PDMA may offer to these sub-national governments in managing their debt needs to be explored.
7. Review the 2008 report and draft Bill on establishing a National Treasury Management Agency chaired by Dr. Jehangir Aziz, from the above perspectives.
8. Any other matter the working group may consider relevant.
1. The WG recommends that implicit and explicit contingent liabilities should be managed and executed by the PDMA. The PDMA should evaluate the potential risk of
these contingent liabilities and advise the Government on charging appropriate
fees. In addition, the Government should be mandatorily required to seek advice
of the PDMA before issuing any fresh guarantees since this has implications for the
overall stability of the debt portfolio.
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2. The PDMA should adopt a holistic approach that encompasses the entire liability
structure of the Central Government including not just marketable debt but also
contractual liabilities from public accounts (such as small savings, provident fund
receipts) and any other internal liabilities.
3. The WG believes that imposing the services of the PDMA on State Governments
might not be advisable since the management of state debt is a state subject.
It recommends that at the present juncture, the PDMA should be a Central Government agency obligated to manage only Central Government debt. The PDMA
should, however, undertake functions related to State Government debt, which
have implications for the Central Governments debt portfolio. This involves maintaining a comprehensive database of State Government debt and coordinating the
Central Governments borrowing calendar with State Governments market borrowings. However, at a later stage, PDMA may provide the option to the states of
managing their debt.
4. in regard to external debt, the WG is in favour of an integrated approach and recommends that the PDMA manages the external debt for the Central Government.
The WG believes that the current set-up of external borrowings through external
assistance needs to evolve over time into the Central Government developing a
sovereign benchmark in the external market. This would benefit the corporates approaching international markets. In order to assist the PDMA in performing this role,
the WG recommends that the Aid, Accounts and Audits Division (AAA), currently under the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), Ministry of Finance should be merged
with the PDMA once it comes into operation.
5. The Central Government has been consistently running large fiscal deficit over the
years. In this situation, cash surpluses do not arise except for very short periods
due to temporary mismatches between receipts and expenditures within a given
financial year. However, PDMA should be tasked with the function of managing and
investing surplus cash of the Government whenever such a situation arises in future.
6. On the structure of the proposed PDMA, the WG after considering various options
recommends setting it up as a statutory corporation with representation from both
the Central Government and the RBI. Further, the proposed PDMA should function
with independent goals and objectives while being accountable to the Central Government for its actions and results. There should be a mechanism for constant consultation and coordination with both the Ministry of Finance and RBI.
7. The WG recommends a two tiered arrangement for the operations and management of the PDMA. It envisions a vertical relationship between the Policy Advisory
Board and the Board of Management with the latter seeking opinion of the former
in matters of strategy and policy. The Board of Management should have a direct
line of communication with the Government. However, it should be required to
consider any opinions or recommendations made by the Policy Advisory Board
through a documented voting process. The duties of the Policy Advisory Board
should be to provide opinions on any matters that may be referred to it by either the
Board of Management or the Government. In addition, the Policy Advisory Board
may also make recommendations suo motu on any activities of the PDMA it finds
relevant.
8. The WG is of the opinion that transparency should be embedded into the organisational structure and the proceedings and other related documents of the meetings,
including dissenting opinions, should be made statutorily public, and be open to
the jurisdiction of the Right to Information (RTI). Based on the staff size and the
activities of PDMAs in various countries, the WG recommends that the Indian PDMA
should be lean on staffing (approximately 70 staff), and should outsource a majority of its non-core activities.
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19.10. Working Group on banking

19.10.1. Composition
Smt. K.J. Udeshi
Shri Y.H. Malegam
Shri Janmajeya Sinha
Shri Aditya Puri
Ms. Naina Lal Kidwai
Shri Rajiv Lall
Shri Harsh Vardhan
Shri M.G. Bhide
Chairperson
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
19.10.2. Terms of Reference

The working group on banking will work on all entities which accept deposits for the purpose of lending or investments, of deposits of money from the public, repayable on demand or otherwise. The Terms of Reference of the Working Group shall be as follows:
1. To review the legal framework of the financial firms that are engaged in banking,
such as commercial banks, public sector banks, cooperative banks, SBI and its subsidiaries and Regional Rural Bank (RRB) in India.
2. Unification and harmonisation of the legal and regulatory treatment of these entities.
3. To identify legal mechanisms for obtaining equal treatment, regardless of ownership and nationality on questions of competition policy, mergers, take overs, and
governance.
4. The field of creditors rights and debt recovery should ideally be a feature of company law and debt in general. Yet, finance policy makers have embarked on initiatives such as The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI). What is the appropriate balance that
Commission should adopt?
5. To review expert committee recommendations, and identify the legal changes which
would implement existing recommendations.
6. To review the legal framework through which the regulatory agency would write
subordinate legislation on issues of ownership, governance, and compensation of
banks.
7. Addressing consumer protection, resolution, systemic risk and prudential regulation in banking.
1. The WG recommends that the definition of banking must be guided by the principle
that all deposit taking activities (where the public places deposits with any entity,
which are redeemable at par with assured rates of return) must be considered as
banking. Consequently entities undertaking such activities must obtain a bank license and /or be subject to the regulatory purview of the banking regulator.
2. On the definition of banking the WG recommends that any entity that accepts deposits, has access to clearing and to the RBI repo window is a bank. The primary
activity of a bank is to accept deposits. Once an entity accepts deposits, it will have
access to clearing and discount window of RBI.
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3. On the issue of co-operatives which collect monies from members/ shareholders,

this WG recommends that any co-operative society accepting deposits exceeding
a specified value must fall within the regulatory purview of the banking regulator.
Co-operative banks are currently regulated under Part V of the Banking Regulation
Act, 1949 (BR Act), but many provisions in the BR Act are not applicable to them.
This WG recommends that such exclusions be removed. Co-operative banks must
be treated at par with banking companies. This WG also endorses the policy recommendations of the Malegam Report on Urban Co-operative Banks (2011). To
deal with the problem of dual control, the Committee recommends the creation
of a new organisation structure for Urban Cooperative Banks (UCBs) consisting of
a board of management in addition to the board of directors. The board of directors would be elected in accordance with the provisions of the respective State Cooperative Societies Acts or the Multi-State Co-operative Act, 2002 and would be
regulated and controlled by the Registrar of Co- operative Societies. The board of
directors would establish a board of management, which shall be entrusted with
the responsibility for the control and direction of the affairs of the Bank assisted by
a CEO who shall have the responsibility for the management of the Bank. RBI would
have powers to control and regulate the functioning of the Bank and of its board of
management and of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in exactly the same way as it
controls and regulates the functioning of the Board and the Chief Executive in the
case of a commercial bank.
4. On the issue of companies accepting deposits, the members of the WG deliberated
at length. It was pointed out to the WG that the RBI had, in its presentation before the
Commission submitted that; Only banks, statutory corporations, companies and
co-operative societies regulated by the RBI should be allowed to accept deposits
from public. While some members were of the opinion that the issue of companies
accepting deposits is beyond the purview of this WG, other members expressed the
opinion that deposit taking activities should be restricted only to banks. On the
question of whether this issue falls within the ambit of this WG, the members deliberated that the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (RBI Act) already prohibits partnership firms from accepting deposits. Hence some members of the WG recommended
extending this prohibition to corporates accepting deposits as well. This requires
amending Section 58A of the Companies Act, 1956. The proposed Companies Bill of
2011 is a step in this direction. It places restrictions on the acceptance of deposits by
companies. It lays down the procedure for acceptance of deposits by members. A
limited class of companies including banks and non- banking financial companies
are allowed to accept deposits from public.
5. On the issue of NBFCs, this WG recommends that deposit taking NBFCs must obtain a
license to operate as a bank and will fall within the regulatory purview of the banking regulator. The class of NBFCs that do not accept deposits from public will not
be regulated by the banking regulator.
6. This WG also considered and debated the recommendations of Vickers Report (2011)
and on the issue of ring fencing:
(a) This WG recognises the significant role played by NBFCs in providing finance.
However, with a view to systemic risk oversight, this WG recognises that credit
linkages between banking and non-bank finance should be subject to appropriate regulatory oversight from the viewpoints of both micro-prudential regulation and systemic risk regulation.
(b) Once transition to the Financial Holding Company (FHC) structure, as contained in the recommendation of this WG, is achieved subsidiaries of banks
must only do such activities which banks themselves can undertake.
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7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
(c) There must be ring-fencing of banks vis-a-vis other non-bank entities. Further,
banks must not lend to intermediaries which are not regulated by a financial
sector regulator. However, the operation of certain financial institutions such
as mutual funds might require access to short-term funding. Such short-term
funding must be within stringent prudential regulations.
This WG recommends that laws relating to banking should be ownership neutral
and should provide a level playing field for all banks. As a necessary consequence
this WG recommends corporatisation of all Public Sector Banks (PSBs).1
In case of foreign banks having branches in India, this WG recommends that all such
foreign banks set up a Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS) in India. Transition issues
will need to be addressed by the Government of India (GOI) so that they do not
incur taxation from capital gains, or stamp duty, when they convert from branch
operations to WOS.
On the issue of deposit taking by co-operative societies this WG recommends that
there should be some restriction on deposit taking by co-operative societies and
that such activity should fall under the regulatory purview of the relevant legislation. The deliberation was on whether the restriction should be based on number
of members or on the value of deposits. While some members expressed the view
that restriction should be based on number of members i.e. a co-operative society
accepting deposits from more than 50 members should fall within the regulatory
ambit of the RBI, the opinion finally weighed in favour of value of deposits. The WG
finally concluded by recommending that any co-operative credit society accepting
deposits exceeding a specified value must follow the provisions of the relevant legislation.
The WG recommends that there should be no exemption from the jurisdiction of
the CCI under the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act) for mergers of banks.
The WG, however makes a distinction between voluntary and assisted mergers. All
voluntary mergers will be subject to the review and approval by the competition
regulator. One of the key recommendations of the Commission is the establishment of a resolution corporation to ensure prompt and orderly resolution of weak
financial institutions. One of the tools of resolution involves sale or merger of weak
firm with a healthy acquirer through appropriate mechanisms of due-diligence. To
achieve this framework, the WG recommends that all assisted mergers involving
sale of a failing bank to a healthy bank will be done under the supervisory review
of the resolution corporation.
This WG recommends corporatisation of all PSBs, such as SBI, its subsidiaries, corresponding new banks within the meaning of the Bank Nationalisation Acts and RRBs
by converting them into companies under the Companies Act. This would level
the playing field and will also rationalise the merger/ amalgamation provisions by
bringing them with a single unified framework under the BR Act. In addition, this
WG also endorses the policy approach that co-operative banks accepting public
deposits must obtain a bank license from the regulator.
Ownership in banks must be dispersed. The WG recommends that the current position of law in this regard be maintained.
Bank supervisors must have powers to comprehensively look at human resource
policy documents of a bank and recommend changes to the extent such policies
impinge upon excessive risk-taking and soundness. The Board of Directors (BOD)
and shareholders of banks must have the power to claw back payments made to
the top management in line with the global trend of curbing excessive risk taking
by the top management.
1 In its submission to the Commission, the RBI has made a strong case for integrating the various statutes governing
different segments of the banking industry and different dimensions of the banking business into a harmonised law
to provide clarity and transparency.
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14. Regulators must look at compensation policy and structure and its impact upon
incentives and the ability of the bank to perform adequate risk management. The
focus of supervisors should be upon the incentive implications of the compensation structure. There is a case for rules that require compensation to be spread
over longer horizon, with provisions for claw back of payments in certain cases.
While there is some thinking on framework for compensation in private and foreign
banks, the same needs to be extended to PSBs. The legal and regulatory framework
for compensation should give the BOD and shareholders the ability to push PSBs
towards more rational compensation structures, given the deep links between the
problems of risk management, operational controls of PSBs, and the flaws of compensation structure.
15. The notion of fit and proper for the boards of banks needs to be reviewed. The WG
recommends removing the restriction on directors on Boards of banks also being
directors of other enterprises. However, the Managing Director (MD) would not be
allowed to occupy a board position in group companies/entities.
16. Further, this WG recommends that Section 20(1)(b) of the BR Act, which places restrictions on loans and advances by the BOD, must be confined to only loans and
advances made to private limited companies or to entities where the director has
substantial interest. For the purposes of this recommendation, the entities in which
the director is deemed to be substantially interested must be in line with standards
used for related party transactions under the Companies Act and accounting standards. This recommendation is broadly in line with the recommendations of the
Committee on Financial Sector Assessment (CFSA) (2009). Referring to the definition of substantial interest in Section 5(ne) of the BR Act, the CFSA was of the view
that,
this quantitative stipulation (Rs. 5 lakhs or 10% of the paid up capital
of a company) has proved to be very low because of inflation and also
growth in size of banking companies. It is felt that the quantitative ceiling
of Rs. 5 lakhs should be removed and an appropriate percent of the paidup capital be stipulated
Hence the definition of substantial interest needs to be revised upwards.
17. With respect to PSBs, the BOD, must be given greater powers to nominate members
of the appointment committee and the compensation committee of the BOD.
18. On governance arrangements, the WG recommends that uniform rule of law must
be followed by banks irrespective of ownership. This includes:
(a) Separating the position of chairman and managing director in case of PSBs as
well.
(b) BODs of PSBs must play the same role as any other BOD, with the same stipulations as any other type of bank.
(c) Fully complying with the listing norms (SEBI stock exchange rules) in case of
listed entities.
19. This WG recommends that the current mode of operations of banks under Bank
Subsidiary Model (BSM) is inadequate and there should be a shift towards the FHC
model as a preferred model for financial sector in India. The FHC model mitigates
the risks spilling over to the bank from other entities in the group.
20. Subsidiaries of banks should only do business that could have been done purely
within the bank. If insurance cannot be done by a bank, it should not be done by
the subsidiary of a bank.
21. Further, capital of banks should not be allowed to take any risks apart from banking risks, and mechanisms must be put in place through which resources from the
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bank does not flow up into the FHC or to sister subsidiaries in times of crisis, or otherwise. This is consistent with the ring-fencing approach, where micro-prudential
regulation and resolution would face clearly defined bank risks, which are engaged
in a well defined business of banking (public deposits that are redeemable at par
with assured rates of return), with no other complexities of financial structure.
22. To achieve this transition the GOI must provide a one time exemption to capital
gains and stamp duty when such conversion happens.
23. With respect to the structure of the holding company, the Percy Mistry Report (2007)
states that the holding company must pursue the business strategy of a unified financial conglomerate. In addition this WG endorses the policy recommendations
contained in the Percy Mistry Report (2007) which states that the holding company
must be required to comply only with the Companies Act with exchange listing requirements, and should be subject only to systemic risk oversight by the appropriate regulator.
24. Considering the issues and gaps in the current legal framework and drawing on
the recommendations of standard-setting bodies and international best practises,
this WG recommends that a sophisticated resolution corporation be set up that will
deal with an array of financial firms including banks and insurance companies. The
mandate of this corporation must not just be deposit insurance. It must concern
itself with all financial firms which make intense promises to consumers, such as
banks, insurance companies, defined benefit pension funds, and payment systems.
A key feature of the resolution corporation must be its swift operation. It must also
effectively supervise firms and intervene to resolve them when they show signs of
financial fragility but are still solvent. The legal framework must be so designed to
enable the resolution corporation to choose between many tools through which
the interests of consumers are protected, including sales, assisted sales and mergers.
25. Prudential regulation should be ownership-neutral. The scope of regulation should
be agnostic to the ownership structure of the banks.
26. Quantity and quality of capital should be the core part of prudential regulation of
banks.
27. Prudential regulation should cover systemic interconnectedness in the context of
the holding company model. As outlined above, one of the core mandates of prudential regulation is to limit the negative externalities arising out of the failure of
a systemically important firm. The instruments of prudential regulation should be
designed to deal with such kinds of firms.
28. In the proposed regulatory architecture the jurisdiction, approval and enforcement
process of regulators is important and needs to be clearly defined in the prudential
legislation.
29. There is a need for a comprehensive law on consumer protection and a redressal
forum focussed on financial services, which cuts across different sectors such as
banking, insurance and securities market.
30. In addition specific consumer protection issues also arise in case of electronic/net
banking and lending. The rights and liabilities of parties entering into a net banking
transaction is not clearly provided under any law and consumers are not protected
by law against unauthorised electronic transfers. In addition liability of lenders towards fair disclosure and treating borrowers fairly is not governed by legislation but
through guidelines of RBI. These specific issues are required to be addressed in laws
to be written by Commission.
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31. The WG recommends the move towards the FHC model as with appropriate accounting and reporting standards, it will help in identification of systemic risk buildup in large financial conglomerates.
With appropriate accounting and reporting standards the move towards the FHC
model will help in identification of systemic risk buildup in large financial conglomerates.
32. There are concerns which arise with insolvency proceedings of entities which are
systemically important. In this regard the WG endorses the recommendation of CFSA
to keep resolution of these entities separate from those relating to ordinary companies.
33. This WG endorses the recommendations of CFSA which recognises the need for a
regulatory agency which would conduct periodic assessments of macro-economic
risks and risk concentrations. This agency must also monitor functioning of large,
systemically important, financial conglomerates anticipating potential risks.
34. While research and academic literature in systemic risk is relatively new, based on
the existing experience of the countries and as endorsed by its inclusion in the Basel
III report, the WG recognises the need for countercyclical capital buffer as a policy
tool for dealing with systemic risk.
35. In our view, the threshold limits for application of Recovery of The Recovery of
Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (RDDBFI) must not be stated
in the act. The Central Government must have the power to determine the limit
through rules. In addition, the capability and efficiency of Debt Recovery Tribunals
(DRTs) must be measured on an ongoing basis and limitations must be addressed
efficiently. The threshold limit after which cases may be filed before the DRT may
be decreased only if the efficiency and capability permit.
36. This WG endorses the recommendations of Malegam Report on Urban Co-operative
Banks (2011) and recommends a separation of the ownership of UCBs. In this way
the banking business would be separated from the co-operative society. This would
ensure that the regulatory treatment of the banking arm of the co-operative society
is at par with banks. With the implementation of this recommendation the banking arm of co-operative banks must also be granted the same privileges available
to banks under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI) and RDDBFI.
37. Section 14 of SARFAESI is silent on the time period within which petitions are required to be disposed off by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrates. Since no time lines are prescribed, these petitions take longer than required
to be disposed off leading to unnecessary delays. In International Asset Reconstruction Company Private Limited through its Authorised Representative of Constituted
Attorney Mr. Tushar B. Patel v. Union of India, through the District Magistrate and Others noting the significant delay caused in enforcing security interests under Section
14 of SARFAESI petitions, the Bombay High Court has prescribed a time line of two
months for all petitions filed under Section 14 of SARFAESI. This WG recommends
that the law should prescribe a time period (perhaps 2 months) within which the
District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, should
dispose off Section 14 petitions. Those who fail to meet the time limit should be
required to report the number of cases where they took longer than the prescribed
time limit.
38. Neither Section 14 of SARFAESI nor the rules prescribed under SARFAESI, state what
documents are required for filing a petition for enforcing a security. This leads to
uncertainty in procedure with different courts requiring different documents leading to unnecessary delays. The Debt Laws Amendment Bill (2011), addresses this
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issue by providing a list of documents to be filed with a Section 14 petition under

SARFAESI. In our view, the proposal in the Debt Laws Amendment Bill (2011) would
be sufficient for addressing this issue. This WG recommends the same list of documents to be filed with a Section 14 petition.
39. A petition for enforcing security interest under Section 14 SARFAESI can only be filed
with a District Magistrate or a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. In present day administrative services, the Deputy Commissioner of a particular district also acts as a
District Magistrate. A Deputy Commissioner is an administrative officer principally
responsible for overseeing revenue collection, such as collection of land revenue
and other public dues. A Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on the other hand, does not
exercise executive and judicial function but is the administrative head of metropolitan courts in India. Since both District Magistrates and Chief Metropolitan Magistrates are involved more in administrative functions than actual day to day judicial
functions, there is considerable delay in addressing petitions under Section 14 of
SARFAESI. The Debt Laws Amendment Bill (2011) addresses this issue by allowing
the District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to authorise any officer
subordinate to him to take actions for enforcing the security interest. On this issue,
it is the view of this WG that the proposals in the Debt Laws Amendment Bill (2011) is
sufficient to address the problem. If the District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is allowed to authorise any officer subordinate to him to take actions
for enforcing the security interest it would help in reducing delays.
40. In India our laws give preference to crown debt in the form of taxes and statutory
dues over the claims of secured creditors during insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings. Though reforms in certain tax laws now provide priority of secured creditors. Tax dues under Customs Act, 1962, Central Excise Act, 1944, and service tax
under the Finance Act, 1994 are subject to the claims of secured lenders under RDDBFI and SARFAESI. While these reforms have only partly addressed the issue, the
general principle of priority of secured lenders over crown debts and debts under
other welfare legislations such as labour laws is not specifically provided for in our
laws. This WG endorses the recommendations of the Raghuram Rajan Committee
Report (2009) on rationalising insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings:
(a) While it is important to protect employee claims such as overdue wages, there
must be a limit, say six months, to which such pay is protected. After the expiry
of this period employees must also join the ranks of unsecured creditors.
(b) The government, which has substantial powers to recover arrears to it prior to
bankruptcy, should not stand ahead of secured creditors.
(c) Statutory priorities of a firm should be well disclosed so that creditors can act
well in time, before they get crowded out by other claims.
41. The purpose of setting up DRTs was to ensure speedy recovery of debts by setting
up a special tribunal system which follows a summary procedure as opposed to a
detailed procedure followed by the civil courts. DRTs in India are now plagued with
the same problems that afflict civil courts: Huge backlog of cases and insufficient
infrastructure. An efficient tribunal system has sufficient resources at its disposal
and has well trained and competent staff. If the objective and purpose of setting
up DRTs are to be given effect to, one cannot ignore the infrastructure issues that
afflict the DRTs.
To address the infrastructure issues that afflict DRTs in India, there is a need to rethink and overhaul the legal framework under RDDBFI:
(a) Objective of DRT: Amend RDDBFI to clearly state the objective of RDDBFI, as
a special tribunal for providing a mechanism for recovery of debt that is fair,
just, economical and quick.
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(b) Efficiency of DRT: Suitably amend RDDBFI to place an obligation on the appropriate entity to ensure efficient and effective functioning of the system.
(c) Training of judicial and recovery officers: Suitably amend RDDBFI and SARFAESI to place a duty on the appropriate entity for training of judicial and recovery officers.
(d) Uniform procedures: Amend RDDBFI to reflect the principle that uniform
procedures must be followed by all DRTs.
(e) Comprehensive rules on procedures: Detailed rules of procedure under
the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are not required to be followed. Keeping this in mind, the
rules of procedure for DRTs under RDDBFI, namely the Debt Recovery Tribunal
Rules, 1993, were drafted. The rules of procedure were intended to be light
touch by allowing significant liberty to the tribunals to devise their own methods and standards This has led to inconsistent and differing approaches taken
by different DRTs. There is a need to set out comprehensive if not detailed, set
of rules of procedure applicable to hearings before DRT to increase certainty
of procedure and provide guidance to practitioners.
(f) Quantitative measurements of performance: Amend RDDBFI and SARFAESI
to ensure reporting requirements by appropriate authorities for preparing annual reports which detail revenues received through filing fees, resource allocation, steps taken towards efficient functioning of the tribunals, statistical
analysis of cases and workload, time taken to dispose cases, and reasons for
delay.
(g) Funding and resource allocation: There is a need to rethink the funding and
resource allocation for DRTs in India. Tribunals do not function efficiently if
they are not well funded and do not have sufficient resources at their disposal.
The recommendations are two fold:
i. Independence: Currently, resource allocation for DRTs is done through
the Ministry of Finance, through the budgetary process. Financial sector
regulators in India, such as SEBI and IRDA, have the ability to charge fees
from regulated entities to cover the cost of their functioning. Independence in funding and resource allocation is important for effective functioning as it allows the entity the operational flexibility. The recommendation is therefore to amend RDDBFI recognising the principle of independent resource allocation.
ii. Quantum of fees: There is merit in empowering the DRTs to determine
the filing fees by keeping in mind the overall costs for their effective functioning. The applicants who file petitions before DRTs are financial institutions which can afford to pay for speedy recovery of loans made by
them.2 Currently, only the Central Government has the power to make
regulations prescribing the fees. Since the recommendation of this WG
is to grant more independence to DRTs for allocating resources, deciding
the quantum of fees should be their prerogative and is a necessary outcome of such independence.
(h) Adopting information technology: Indian courts have been slow in adopting information technology. While there has been some improvements in
communication to the public through websites; there is no movement towards integrating the entire court process into an electronic form. Digitisation of court records and computerisation of registries would be beneficial
2 At present, the cost of filing an original application before the DRT is Rs. 12,000 when the amount of debt owed
is Rs. 10 lakhs, subject to a maximum cap of Rs. 1.50 lakhs.
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in handling the huge backlog of cases. As an example, digitising the registry

of the Supreme Court of India has been beneficial in reducing arrears and in
facilitating docket management. For efficient functioning of DRTs, adopting
information technology would help in overall reduction of case backlog and
would lead to greater efficiency.
42. Amend Section 5 of SARFAESI to allow sale of assets from one Asset Reconstruction
Company (ARC) to another.
43. Amend Section 9 of SARFAESI to allow the issue of convertible debt by an ARC. The
proposals contained in the Debt Laws Amendment Bill (2011) allows converting only
a portion of the debt into equity. It does not allow the conversion of all of the debt
into equity, and it does not allow issuing convertible debt which may or may not
convert into equity.
44. Suitably amend SARFAESI to allow all secured creditors who are regulated entities
under the purview of the Act.
45. Amend Section 12 of SARFAESI to list enumerated powers of RBI along with principles
that reflect factors which will inform RBI of the choice of powers to be used.
46. While stamp duty laws are not within the purview of laws to be rationalised either
under Commission or within the scope of the TOR of this WG, this WG is of the opinion that there must be rationalisation of stamp duty laws in India. A possible solution could be the levy of transaction tax as opposed to stamp duty. The power to
levy transaction tax lies with the Parliament and a transaction tax similar to that of
goods and services tax may be introduced by abolishing stamp duty.
47. The recommendations in this part are primarily clarifications and standardisation
of the process of securitisation, and are not features of the primary law. Reforms
in these areas would lead to smoother functioning and greater clarity in the process of securitisation. Some of these also act as a guide to the enumerated powers/principles to be reflected in the powers of the regulator under Section 12 of SARFAESI:
(a) Clarity on sale/lease of business: Although Section 9(b) of SARFAESI allows
securitisation/reconstruction companies to sell or lease a part of the business
of the borrower, the exercise of this power is subject to RBI guidelines, which
have not been issued by RBI. This WG recommends that since the primary legislation allows sale or lease of a business by an ARC, the regulator must not
exercise discretion by not issuing guidelines on substantive rights.
(b) Restructuring support finance: Borrowers debts turn into Non Performing Assets (NPAs) on account of their inability to finance the debt. The goal of
restructuring is to turn around the profitability of such borrowers. Typically,
ARCs fund the purchase of the bad assets by issuing securitisation receipts to
Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs). ARCs are only allowed to deploy funds to
restructure the loan account of the borrower. Deploying of funds by the ARC
into the defaulting borrower is not permitted. Given that ARCs are in a better
position to restructure and revive failing companies there may be merit in allowing ARCs to also deploy funds into the borrowing company. On the basis of
the proposals contained in the Debt Laws Amendment Bill, 2011, which allows
partial conversion of loan into equity, deploying funds into the borrower company should be allowed, as this will act as an incentive for the ARC to restructure the company in a holistic manner. This WG is of the opinion that the regulator must prescribe guidelines, subject to prudential regulations, on when
ARCs can deploy funds towards restructuring the borrower company along
with the process to be followed.
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(c) Pledged shares and exemptions from the Takeover Code: When the underlying security, which has been acquired by an ARC, are shares held in dematerialised form, there are no statutory provisions or regulatory guidelines allowing substitution of the ARC in place of the original lender. This leads to complications and excessive procedural requirements. Further, while banks and
financial institutions have been exempted from the Securities and Exchange
Board of India Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover, Regulations,
2011 (Takeover Code), for pledged shares held by them, similar exemptions
have not been made applicable to ARCs. This WG recommends that substitution of ARCs in place of the original lender, and the exemption from the applicability of the Takeover Code must be allowed. This would however require
appropriate amendments to sub-ordinate legislation by SEBI and Ministry of
Company Affairs, Government of India (MCA), as applicable.
(d) Modification of charges: Companies which mortgage their assets are necessarily required to intimate the Registrar of Companies (ROC) to assist in case of
insolvency/winding up. However, currently dormant companies (companies
who have not complied with filing of annual returns among other things) are
not allowed to change or modify their charge registers in light of recent notifications of the MCA.3 This leads to a situation where if the assets of the dormant
company are securitised and transferred to ARCs, the names of ARCs cannot
be substituted leading to difficulties in enforcement proceedings/insolvency
and winding up cases. This WG is of the opinion that modification of charges
and exemptions in case of ARCs acquiring NPAs of dormant companies must
be allowed. This would however require appropriate clarifications by the MCA.
(e) Central Registry: The Central Government has set up a central electronic
registry under SARFAESI effective from March 31, 2011 to prevent frauds in loan
cases involving multiple loans from different banks. The central registry is
maintained by Central Registry of Securitisation Asset Reconstruction and Security Interest of India (CERSAI) under SARFAESI. The registration of charges can
be done online and search of the records of the registry can be done by any
person online. This WG is of the opinion that the scope of the registry must
be expanded to include encumbrance over any property and not just those
which are mortgaged to banks or financial institutions. In addition all existing registration systems such as land registry and filings with the registrar of
companies, must be integrated with the central registry so that encumbrance
on any property (movable or immovable or intangible) is recorded and can be
verified by any person dealing with such property.
19.10.4. List of Acts governing the Indian banking sector

1. Banking Regulation Act, 1949
2. Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (applicable to banks nationalised in 1970)
3. Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980 (applicable to banks nationalised in 1980)
4. Companies Act, 1956 (to a limited extent)
5. Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, rules, guidelines, master circulars, and regulations
made thereunder
3 The Ministry of Company Affairs through General Circular 33/ 2001 dated June 1, 2011 notified that unless a company files its updated balance sheet and profit and loss account it will not be able to file any event based compliance
forms, including for modification of charges.
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6. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security

Interest Act, 2002
7. Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993
8. Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (for foreign currency dealings), guidelines,
rules, regulations and master circulars made thereunder
9. Banking Ombudsman Scheme, 2006 (not an Act, but governs resolution of consumer disputes)
10. Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007
11. Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (for rural banks)
12. Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961
13. Banking Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2011
14. State Co-operative Societies Acts (for each state)
15. Multi State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002
16. State Bank of India Act, 1955
17. State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959
18. Competition Act, 2002
19.10.5. List of Committee Reports on Indian banking sector

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
192
Narasimham Committee I and II

Percy Mistry Committee
Raghuram Rajan Committee
Leeladhar report: Consolidation of Banking Industry in India
Umarji Report: Review of the Banking Regulation Act
A. Ghosh Committee: Frauds and Malpractices in Banks
Adhyarjuna Commitee: Changes in NI Act and Stamp Act
B. Eradi Committee: Insolvency and winding up
Bhide committee: Coordination between commercial banks and SFCs
James Raj Committee: Functioning of PSBs
K. Madhav Das Committee: Urban Co-operative Banks
Marathe Committee: Licensing of New Banks
M.L. Dantwala Committee: Regional Rural Banks
Thingalaya Committee: Restructuring of RRBs
S.S. Nadkarni Committee: Trading in PSBs
S.S. Kohli: Rationalising Staff Strength in Banks
S. Padmanabhan Committee: Inspection of Banks
S. Padmanabhan Committee: Onsite supervision function of Banks
R.N. Midgra Committee: Cooperative societies
Rajamannar Committee: Changes in banking laws and bouncing of cheques
Raghavan Committee: Competition Law
R. Jilani: Inspection system of banks
Pillai Commitee: Pay scales of bank officers
Pendarkar committee: Review of the system of inspection of commercial, RRB and
urban co-operative banks
ANNEXES
19.11. Interactions by the Working Groups

WG on Payments
I
I
I
I
I
I

National Payments Corporation of India
PayPal
Vodafone
Bharti Airtel
A Little World
WG on Insurance, Pensions & Small Savings

I
I
I
I
I
I
General Insurance Council

Life Insurance Council
Lloyds
Indian Institute of Insurance, Surveyors & Loss Assessors
Ministry of Labour
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority
WG on Securities
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Association of Investment Bankers of India

Association of National Exchanges Members of India
BSE Ltd.
Indian Clearing Corporation of India
National Stock Exchange of India Ltd.
National Securities Clearing Corporation Ltd.
MCX-SX
Central Depository Service (India) Ltd.
The BSE Brokers Forum
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19.12. External Reviewers and Experts who worked with the

Research Team
S.No.
Name
Designation
Organisation
Avinash Persaud
Senior Fellow
Caribbean Policy Research Institute
Badri Narayanan
Advisor
Third Eye Capital Advisors LLP
Bikku Kuruvila
Legal Consultant
New York, USA
Bindu Ananth
President
IFMR Trust
Chandrasekhar
Bhaskar Bhave
Former Chairman
Jahangir Aziz
Chief Economist
JP Morgan Chase & Co
K.N. Vaidyanathan
Chief Risk Officer
Mahindra and Mahindra
K.P. Krishnan
Secretary
Economic Advisory Council to Prime Minister
Kate McKee
Senior Advisor
CGAP
10
M.S. Sahoo
Former Member
11
Matt Crooke
Minister-Counsellor
Australian High Commission, New Delhi
12
Molina Asthana
Principal Solicitor (Commercial,

Property
&
Technology)
Victorian Government Solicitors Office,

Melbourne, Australia
13
Monika Halan
Editor
Mint Money
14
N.K. Nampoothiry
Special Secretary
Department of Legal Affairs, GOI
15
Nachiket Mor
Chair
Sugha Vazhvu Health Care Private Ltd
16
O.N. Ravi
Corporate
Officer
17
Ritvik R. Pandey
Director (Budget)
Department of Economic Affairs, GOI
18
Renuka Sane
Research Economist
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
19
Sanjay Banerji
Professor of Finance
University of Nottingham Business School
20
Sanjiv Shah
Executive Director
Goldman Sachs
21
Subrata Sarkar
Professor
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
22
Sudhamoy Khasnobis
Founder
i-Care Life Pte. Ltd, Singapore
23
T. Koshy
Executive Director, Advisory Services
Ernst & Young Private Ltd.
24
Tarun Ramadorai
Professor of Financial Economics
Said Business School & Oxford-Man Institute of Quantitative Finance University of

Oxford
25
Vikramaditya Khanna
Professor
University of Michigan Law School
26
Viral V. Acharya
Professor of Economics
New York University Stern School of Business
27
Yesha Yadav
Assistant Professor of Law
Vanderbilt University Law School
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Development
The Clearing Corporation of India Limited
ANNEXES
19.13. Submissions to FSLRC

A. General Submissions
S.No. From
Remarks
1. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, President & CEO, Re- SARFAESI Act: Legal and Regulatory issues
liance Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd
through CM Division of MoF
2. Mr. S.M. Roy
Funds for investor education - unclaimed moneys of investors lying with companies
3. CM Division, DEA, MoF
Draft National Competition Policy 2011
4. Mr. B. Veeraswamy
Review of employees Pension Scheme - 1995
5. Mr. Dirk Kempthorne, President & CEO White paper on Benefits of Life Insurance Sector
of ACLI / CM Division, DEA, MoF
Reforms prepared by American Council of Life
Insurers (ACLI)
6. PHD Chamber of Commerce and Indus- Written submission based on interaction
try
7. FICCI
Written submission based on interaction
8. DFS, through CM Division, DEA, MoF
Suggestions for the consideration of Commission
9. Indian Banks Association
10. Mr. Charan Lal Sahu, All India Sahu Ma- Amendments in all Laws U/A 39(C) of the Conhasabha, through DEA, MoF
stitution of India in Central Acts to root out corruption
11. Mr. Sandeep Parekh, FINSEC, Mumbai
Written representation on policy issues to terms

of reference of the Commission
12. Mr. L. Rutten, MD & CEO, MCX, Mumbai
13. Mr. Bill Shorten, Minister for Employ- Written submission based on interaction
ment and Workplace Relations etc.,
Canberra ACT
14. Mr. Rajiv Agarwal, Secretary, Consumer Written submission based on interaction
Affairs
15. Mr. R. Gopalan, Secretary (Economic Af- Copy of reply sent to Shri Rajiv Agarwal, Secrefairs)
tary, M/o Consumer Affairs Reg. non acceptance
of their request to remove FCRA from the TOR of
the Commission
16. MoF (CM Division)
Withdrawal of Indian Trust Act(Amendment)

bill 2009 from the Lok Sabha seeking
views/comments of Commission
17. Mr. H. Jayesh, Juris Corp, Mumbai

18. Keith Noyes, Regional Director, Asia Pacific International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., Singapore
19. CUTS International
On the need for a dedicated consumer protection agency
195
ANNEXES
B. Feedback on Approach Paper

S.No
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
196
Author/Publication
Bureau Report Economic Times (ET) 02.10.2012
Ila Patnaik Financial Express 02.10.2012
Monika Halan MINT 02.10.2012
Editorial MINT 02.10.2012
Bureau Report Business Standard 02.10.2012
Asit Ranjan Mishra MINT 02.10.2012
Editorial Financial Express 02.10.2012
Bureau Report Financial Express 02.10.2012
Editorial ET 04.10.2012
Shaji Vikraman ET 04.10.2012
Bureau Report Hindustan Times 05.10.2012
Dhirendra Kumar ET 08.10.2012
George Mathew Indian Express 09.10.2012
K.K. Srinivasan (Former Member, IRDA) email dated 12.10.2012
Bimal Jalan (Ex. RBI Governor) Moneycontrol.com 13.10.2012
Sucheta Dalal Moneylife 16.10.2012
Sameer Kochhar Inclusion.in 17.10.2012
Dr. C. Rangarajan, Chairman, PMEAC Moneycontrol.com 20.10.2012,
MINT 28.10.2012 & Times of India 29.10.2012
Dipankar Chaudhury MINT 25.10.2012
S.S. Tarapore Inclusion.in 29.10.2012
Madhoo Pavaskar e-mail 30.10.2012
Venkat Chary, Chairman, MCX e-mail/letter 30.10.2012
Joseph Massey, MD, MCX-SX 31.10.2012
CUTS International e-mail dated 02.11.2012
Ministry of Corporate Affairs 05.11.2012
Forbes India 08.11.2011
Indian Centre for Islamic Banking 12.11.2012
Alternative Investments and Credits Limited 15.11.2012
Department of Consumer Affairs 29.11.2012
Reserve Bank of India 07.12.2012

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Government of India

Volume I: Analysis and Recommendations

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

2 The tasks of financial law

3 Structure of the regulator

4 Functions and powers of the regulator

Functions and powers of the regulator . .

10 Financial inclusion and market development

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

12 Public debt management

13 Foundations of contracts and property

14 Financial regulatory architecture

16 Summary of recommendations not embedded in the draft Code

Aid, Accounts and Audits Division

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

Financial Sector Appellate Tribunal

Unified Financial Agency

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

When the Ministry of Finance approached me in early 2011 to chair a Commission on

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

appreciate the efforts of the consultants of the Commission; Somasekhar Sundaresan,

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

Work process of the Commission

The tasks of financial law

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

8. Public debt management A specialised framework on public debt management

The footprint of regulation

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

Structure of the regulator

Functions and powers of the regulator

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

Protection against unfair conduct;

In addition, unsophisticated consumers have three additional protections:

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

Financial inclusion and market development

Public debt management agency

Contracts, trading and market abuse

Financial regulatory architecture

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

5. A new Financial Redressal Agency (FRA) will be created.

The Commission believes that this proposed financial regulatory architecture is a

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

The outputs of the Commission

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

1.2. Deliberations in the Commission

1.3. Interaction with experts and stake-holders

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

amendments frequently and, in the process, lead to regulatory uncertainties. It was

1.4. Working Group Process

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

1.5. Analysis and assessment

1.5.1. Long-term views on the Indian economy

1.5.2. Fragility of the current system

FINANCIAL SECTOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

1.5.3. Financial inclusion and literacy

1.5.4. Financial globalisation and lessons from the crisis