Academy Qefacec ‘September 2011 SCADA / EMS / DMS Evolution Academy ‘What are the differences, drivers and the direction - Gary Ockwell - Efacec ACS, Atlanta Chief Technology OfficerNote this is not Thomas - this picture is not real, but it’s fun. Academy Qefacec The evolution of utility SCADA / EMS / DMS began in 1965, November 9 At the time SCADA was the first to be given a reaon for the development of an indistry 5:16pm: Sir Adam Beck Power Station, Niagara Falls... Presidential Report: Presidential Report: “ occurring ata time of day in which there is maxinuan need for power in this area of great population density, offered the greatest potential for havoc” hal Ree trNov. 9,1965 5:16pm + 30 Million Inhabitants + 800,000 in trapped subways + 250 Flights at JFK + 150 Hospitals Utilities had minimal information and control capability to monitor and restore service Nov. 9, 1965 5:16pm + 30 Million Inhabitants + 800,000 in trapped subways + 230 Flights at JFK + 150 Hospitals Nov. 9, 19651968 Formation of NERC- + Generation Control & Performance + Transmission + Interchange + System Coordination + Emergency Operations + Operations Planning + Telecommunications + Operator Personnel and Training 60's and 70's: SCADA systems evolved to improve remote control and security: + Auto Generation Control + Economic Dispatch + Interchange Transaction Sched. + Short Term Load Forecast + Reserve MonitoringAdvanced EMS Applications matured to improve reliability: 80's: State Estimator Load Flow Contingency Analysis Optimal Power Flow Short Circuit Analysis “Open” Systems evolved from proprietary architectures UNIX Networks Relational Database New Control Performance Standards Robust Advanced AppliJuly2.and August 10, 196 ‘Western Outages of 1996 : + 75 million customers affected up to 6 hours + Systems are over stressed by transfers - exceeding design. + Not enough reactive support / reserves in area. + Initiating conditions and events not ctudied before hand. + Operators did not know system was insecure. + two widespread power outages that occurred across Western Canada, the Western United States, and Northwest Mexico. + They were thought to be similarly caused by over-demand during hot weather. May, 1996 FERC Orders 888 and 889 (May, 1996) + Events of 1996 raised urgency of addressing reliability issues + Competition raises need for changes in how we manage reliability + Institutional and technical solutions are being developed and deployed * Separation of Transmission and Distribution * Detailed Rules of Conduct + Standard Tariff for Transmission Services + OASIS / 150 * Affects Point-to-Point Transmission + Posting of Energy Sched. & Services + Power System Transmission Studies + Audit InformationMay, 1996 FERC Orders 888 and 889 (May, 1996) Deregulation Deregulation created the concept of “customers” rather than “consumers”. Greater emphasis on customer service, customer retention gave birth to new energy “products” Distribution Management Systems became important with cost justification. De-regulation has Created a Financial Energy Market Market cannot Improve Reliability Reliability is Subordinate to Profitability Reliability is affected by Market volatility Market is Volatile due to Non-Stability caused by lack of storage capability, immediate demand requirements... May,1996 FERC Orders 888 and 889 (May, 1996) Deregulation Wa + Energy Scheduling + Load Forecasting | + AGC / Real-time Interface + SCADA Metering Interface + Energy Accounting / Billing + NERC Tagging + 150 Interface + OASIS Interface + ERCOT Interface + Risk Management erface vl designe real-time markt wasn place hat instantly responded to market derma, Anilary Serves would not be required. + AGC / Regulation + Spinning Reserve + Non Spinning Reserve + Replacement Reserve + Volt / VAR Control + Black StartMay, 1996 FERC Orders 888 and 889 (May, 1996 ) Deregulation Vertically Integrated Electric Trading System. Front office functions + Quotation and trade capture Mid office functions + Scheduling + Risk management Real-time Functions + Balancing and dispatch + Real-time interface and archiving Back office functions + Settlements and accounting FERC Orders 2000 ~ Regional Transmission Operator (RTO) Eight Minimum Functions: Tariff Administration Congestion Management Parallel Path Flow Ancillary Services OASIS Operator Market Monitoring Expansion Interregional coordination SNeFERC Orders 2000 - Network Model: Fall 2001 ‘On February 10, 2000, upon a recommendation dy the NERC Data Exchange Working Group, the NERC Security Coordinator Subcommittee passed (with one dissenting vote) the following motion: ll Security Coordinators shall provide upon request real-time, breaker-oriented network models (with associated measurement inkages) of their security areas to other Security Coordinators... ‘The network model is what distinguishes a SCADA system fre and EMS. Now the model must be available as a real-time Common Information model CIM Critical Infrastructure Protection October 4, 2001 To: The Honorable Jeff Bingaman Chairman, energy and Natural Resources Committee United States Senate several Key areas where Congress can help to ensure the continued security and reliability of the grid 1. Legislation is needed to authorize an industry-led electric reliability ‘organization, subject to government oversight, to develop and enforce mandatory reliability rules 2. Legislation is needed to enable the timely and secure sharing of sensitive information between the private sector and the federal government. 3. Congress must carefully evaluate legislative proposals to require further disclosures of bulk power system operating data, in order to minimize the security risks inherent in the public disclosure and dissemination of critical, sensitive system o2erating data in real time. 4 Congress should take siens to ensure that utilities have adequate and ‘secure telecommunications capabilities in emergency situations. 5. Congress should take steps to expedite background security checks for utility employees NERC becoming NAEROCritical Infrastructure Protection What has changed since Sept. 2001 is a greater realization of vulnerability to attacks. The industry has developed Critical Infrastructure protection standards and guidelines for EMS. Standard CIP-001-0 — Sabotage Reporting Standard CIP-002-1 Critical Cyber Asset Ident. Standard CIP-003-1 Security Management Controls Standard CIP-004-1 Personnel and Trainine Standard CIP-005-1 Electronic Security Perimeter(s) Standard CIP-006-1 Physical Security Standard CIP-007-1 Systems Security Management Standard CIP-008-1 Incident Reporting and Response Planning Standard CIP-009-1 Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets ‘Thursday, August 14, 2003, Northeast blackout + 50Mil + BStates, 2 Provinces affected + 60 65,000 MW load interrupted initiclly + 2 Days to restore all jon people August 14, 2003, ND ee ke ae ear eeThursday, August 14, 2003, Northeast blackout ‘What have we learned since 1985 ? + 30 Million Inhabitants + 50 Million Inhabitants affected Nov. 9, 1965 August 14, 2003 . 4% ‘Thursday, August 14, 2003, Northeast blackout necro aa tine HE Slackout Root Cause Group 1 FE Situational Awareness Vegetation Management Reliability Coordi inato; \ Diagnostics "ineffectiveEvolution of DMS Driving Forces - worldwide Worldwide penalty avoidance for poor reliability + ElSalvador utilities imposed with performance penalties of 200% payback for lost power + Swedish government proposed that DisCo to pay $600 to each customer for a power loss of 72 hrs. + In Argentina the local distribution Co. paid $70M in penalties due to loss of service to customers + US Utilities must show an improvement in MAIFI/CAIDI to qualify for rate increases. + One third of all NERC/FERC de-reg documentation relates to monitoring and enforcement. Evolution of DMS Driving Forces in USA / Canada. $ng Billion — to $188 Billion The estimated annual cost of power outages and quality disturbances. 60% Load in 2015 that will be due to sensitive electronics (chips, automated manufacturing). 44% The surcharge on electric costs due to power quality issues. 259% Target amount of power that is to be generated by distributed resources $15,000-$40,000 Extensions cost of distribution circuit per mileEvolution of DMS Driving Forces 11,000,000 U.S. homes where the density less than five hames per square mile. Maintaining lines in rural areas expensive, time-consuming Over million million miles of distribution wires installed over 40 years ago soon need replacement 500,000 U.S. homes currently not connected to utility grid 300,000 U.S. homes built annually where grid needs to be extended $200 Billion Estimate of what needs to be spent between now and 2020 to upgrade the grid with new technology (not counting the estimated $15 Billion per year for growth) TEC 1366 Performance Indices designed to quantify reliability Led to the introduction of ‘self healing’ feeders. + Not all Self Healing technology can be considered ‘smart grid” + Must he adaptable te network changes + Must not be limited to size + Must not be limited to manufacturer's switching device + Must co-operate with all other Smart Grid applicationsEvolution of DMS TEC 1366 Performance Indices designed to quantify reli FDIR (minimizes “interruption event” N;) FDIR, Sw, OMS (minimizes “duration” ) FDIR, OSw, OMS (minimizes “interruption event” & “duration”) FDIR, OSw, OMS (minimizes “interruption event” & “duration”) FDIR (minimizes “interruption event” N,) FDIR, OSw, OMS (minimizes “interruption event’ & “duration”) FDIR, OSw, OMS (minimizes “duration” r) FDIR (prevents “sustained interuptions CN(k>n)) FDIR (reduces “events” with restoration within 5 minutes) FDIR, Osw, OMS (minimizes both sustained and momentary interruptions) 2. DG & DER energy options 3. new products, services, Pc) 4. power quality & efficiency 5. optimize assets, operational efficiencyCreating and maintaining the network model can be overwhelming DMS models eclipse EMS models, therefore the tools and graphics capabilities must be different.Differences between EMS and DMS. - DMS Model Maintenance equipment eke Cad Ud = pr ae ao a — —= Mission Realtime Creal Realtime ne Network IP comms. Toad transter faur, on itregl detection ‘self healing owe tou demand — meterreading outage response reporting minimizationSmart Grid DMS Standards 3D land, aerial based advanced Visualization Analytics | Knowledge Performance Indicators / Predictive Mgmt Critical Reais Sa _Network IP comms Tec e150 Fila ‘Automation Smart Grid DMS Applications Web Services GUI - GridVu ek fre 3 Phase Unbalanced Network Model SCADA-G | Study-M | D-Objects Teer fd Ga enue eure cuSpecific Smart Grid DMS Solutions will be discussed with the time remaining. Smart Grid Customers to be revealed include: . El Paso Electric : Georgia Power . AVISTA . San Diego Gas and Electric . ATCO (Canada)WANTED: Somebody to go back in time with me. This is not a joke. P.O. Box 322, Oakview, CA 93022. You'll get paid after. we get back. Must bring your own weapons. Safety not guaranteed. | have only done this once before.