Top Threats To Cloud Computing v.10
Top Threats To Cloud Computing v.10
Top Threats To Cloud Computing v.10
to
Introduction
The permanent and official location for the Cloud Security Alliance Top Threats research is:
http://www.cloudsecurityalliance.org/topthreats
Table of Contents
Introduction................................................................................................................................... 2
Foreword........................................................................................................................................ 4
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 6
Threat #1: Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing .......................................................... 8
Threat #2: Insecure Interfaces and APIs ....................................................................................... 9
Threat #3: Malicious Insiders...................................................................................................... 10
Threat #4: Shared Technology Issues ......................................................................................... 11
Threat #5: Data Loss or Leakage ................................................................................................ 12
Threat #6: Account or Service Hijacking.................................................................................... 13
Threat #7: Unknown Risk Profile ............................................................................................... 14
Foreword
Welcome to the Cloud Security Alliances Top Threats to Cloud Computing, Version 1.0. This is one
of many research deliverables CSA will release in 2010.
Also, we encourage you to download and review our flagship research, Security Guidance for Critical
Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing, which you can download at:
http://www.cloudsecurityalliance.org/guidance
The Cloud Security Alliance would like to thank HP for their assistance in underwriting this research
effort.
Best Regards,
Jerry Archer
Alan Boehme
Dave Cullinane
Paul Kurtz
Nils Puhlmann
Jim Reavis
Underwritten by HP
Acknowledgments
Working Group Leaders
Dan Hubbard, Websence
Michael Sutton, Zscaler
Contributors
Amer Deeba, Qualys
Andy Dancer, Trend Micro
Brian Shea, Bank of America
Craig Balding, CloudSecurity.org
Dennis Hurst, HP
Glenn Brunette, Oracle
Jake Lee, Bank of America
Jason Witty, Bank of America
Jim Reavis, Cloud Security Alliance
John Howie, Microsoft
Josh Zachry, Rackspace
Ken Biery, Verizon Business
Martin Roesler, Trend Micro
Matthew Becker, Bank of America
Mike Geide, Zscaler
Scott Matsumoto, Cigital
Scott Morrison, Layer 7 Technologies
William Thornhill, Bank of America
Wolfgang Kandek, Qualys
Advisory Committee
Archie Reed, HP
Daniele Cattedu, ENISA European Network and Information Security Agency
Dave Cullinane, eBay
Giles Hogben, ENISA European Network and Information Security Agency
Gunter Ollmann, Damballa
Jens Jensen, Open Grid Forum
Joshua Pennell, IOActive
Nils Puhlmann, Zynga
Rick Howard, VeriSign
Executive Summary
Cloud Computing represents one of the most significant shifts in information technology many of us are
likely to see in our lifetimes. Reaching the point where computing functions as a utility has great
potential, promising innovations we cannot yet imagine.
Customers are both excited and nervous at the prospects of Cloud Computing. They are excited by the
opportunities to reduce capital costs. They are excited for a chance to divest themselves of infrastructure
management, and focus on core competencies. Most of all, they are excited by the agility offered by the
on-demand provisioning of computing and the ability to align information technology with business
strategies and needs more readily. However, customers are also very concerned about the risks of Cloud
Computing if not properly secured, and the loss of direct control over systems for which they are
nonetheless accountable.
To aid both cloud customers and cloud providers, CSA developed Security Guidance for Critical Areas
in Cloud Computing, initially released in April 2009, and revised in December 2009. This guidance has
quickly become the industry standard catalogue of best practices to secure Cloud Computing, consistently
lauded for its comprehensive approach to the problem, across 13 domains of concern. Numerous
organizations around the world are incorporating the guidance to manage their cloud strategies. The
guidance document can be downloaded at www.cloudsecurityalliance.org/guidance.
The great breadth of recommendations provided by CSA guidance creates an implied responsibility for
the reader. Not all recommendations are applicable to all uses of Cloud Computing. Some cloud services
host customer information of very low sensitivity, while others represent mission critical business
functions. Some cloud applications contain regulated personal information, while others instead provide
cloud-based protection against external threats. It is incumbent upon the cloud customer to understand
the organizational value of the system they seek to move into the cloud. Ultimately, CSA guidance must
be applied within the context of the business mission, risks, rewards, and cloud threat environment
using sound risk management practices.
The purpose of this document, Top Threats to Cloud Computing, is to provide needed context to assist
organizations in making educated risk management decisions regarding their cloud adoption strategies. In
essence, this threat research document should be seen as a companion to Security Guidance for Critical
Areas in Cloud Computing. As the first deliverable in the CSAs Cloud Threat Initiative, the Top
Threats document will be updated regularly to reflect expert consensus on the probable threats which
customers should be concerned about.
There has been much debate about what is in scope for this research. We expect this debate to continue
and for future versions of Top Threats to Cloud Computing to reflect the consensus emerging from
those debates. While many issues, such as provider financial stability, create significant risks to
customers, we have tried to focus on issues we feel are either unique to or greatly amplified by the key
characteristics of Cloud Computing and its shared, on-demand nature. We identify the following threats
in our initial document:
The threats are not listed in any order of severity. Our advisory committee did evaluate the threats and
each committee member provided a subjective ranking of the threats. The exercise helped validate that
our threat listing reflected the critical threat concerns of the industry, however the cumulative ranking did
not create a compelling case for a published ordered ranking, and it is our feeling that greater industry
participation is required to take this step. The only threat receiving a consistently lower ranking was
Unknown Risk Profile, however the commentary indicated that this is an important issue that is simply
more difficult to articulate, so we decided to retain this threat and seek to further clarify it in future
editions of the report.
Selecting appropriate security controls and otherwise deploying scarce security resources optimally
require a correct reading of the threat environment. For example, to the extent Insecure APIs
(Application Programming Interfaces) is seen as a top threat, a customers project to deploy custom lineof-business applications using PaaS (Platform as a Service) will dictate careful attention to application
security domain guidance, such as robust software development lifecycle (SDLC) practices. By the same
token, to the extent Shared Technology Vulnerabilities is seen as a top threat, customers must pay careful
attention to the virtualization domain best practices, in order to protect assets commingled in shared
environments.
In addition to the flagship CSA guidance and other research in our roadmap, this research should be seen
as complimentary to the high quality November 2009 research document produced by ENISA (European
Network and Information Security Agency), Cloud Computing: Benefits, Risks and Recommendations
for Information Security. ENISAs research provides a comprehensive risk management view of Cloud
Computing and contains numerous solid recommendations. The ENISA document has been a key
inspiration, and we have leveraged the ENISA risk assessment process to analyze our taxonomy of
threats. We encourage readers of this document to also read the ENISA document:
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/rm/files/deliverables/cloud-computing-risk-assessment
Our goal is to provide a threat identification deliverable that can be quickly updated to reflect the
dynamics of Cloud Computing and its rapidly evolving threat environment. We look forward to your
participation on subsequent versions of Top Threats to Cloud Computing, as we continue to refine our
list of threats, and to your input as we all figure out how to secure Cloud Computing.
Examples
IaaS offerings have hosted the Zeus botnet, InfoStealer trojan horses,
and downloads for Microsoft Office and Adobe PDF exploits.
Additionally, botnets have used IaaS servers for command and control
functions. Spam continues to be a problem as a defensive measure,
entire blocks of IaaS network addresses have been publicly blacklist.
Impact
Criminals continue to leverage
new technologies to improve
their reach, avoid detection,
and improve the effectiveness
of their activities. Cloud
Computing providers are
actively being targeted,
partially because their
relatively weak registration
systems facilitate anonymity,
and providers fraud detection
capabilities are limited.
CSA Guidance
Reference
Domain 8: Data Center
Operations
Domain 9: Incident Response,
Notification and Remediation
Service Models
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
Remediation
References
http://www.malwaredomainlist.com/
http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=5110
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/07/amazon_
hey_spammers_get_off_my.html
Impact
While most providers strive to
ensure security is well
integrated into their service
models, it is critical for
consumers of those services to
understand the security
implications associated with
the usage, management,
orchestration and monitoring
of cloud services. Reliance on
a weak set of interfaces and
APIs exposes organizations to
a variety of security issues
related to confidentiality,
integrity, availability and
accountability.
Examples
Anonymous access and/or reusable tokens or passwords, clear-text
authentication or transmission of content, inflexible access controls or
improper authorizations, limited monitoring and logging capabilities,
unknown service or API dependencies.
CSA Guidance
Reference
Domain 10: Application
Security
Remediation
Service Models
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
References
http://www.programmableweb.com
http://securitylabs.websense.com/content/Blogs/3402.aspx
Examples
No public examples are available at this time.
Impact
The impact that malicious
insiders can have on an
organization is considerable,
given their level of access and
ability to infiltrate
organizations and assets.
Brand damage, financial
impact, and productivity
losses are just some of the
ways a malicious insider can
affect an operation. As
organizations adopt cloud
services, the human element
takes on an even more
profound importance. It is
critical therefore that
consumers of cloud services
understand what providers are
doing to detect and defend
against the malicious insider
threat.
Remediation
References
http://blogs.bankinfosecurity.com/posts.php?postID=140
http://technicalinfodotnet.blogspot.com/2010/01/tetheredespionage.html
CSA Guidance
Reference
Domain 2: Governance and
Enterprise Risk Management
Domain 7: Traditional
Security, Business Continuity,
and Disaster Recovery
Service Models
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
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Examples
Remediation
Impact
Attacks have surfaced in
recent years that target the
shared technology inside
Cloud Computing
environments. Disk partitions,
CPU caches, GPUs, and other
shared elements were never
designed for strong
compartmentalization. As a
result, attackers focus on how
to impact the operations of
other cloud customers, and
how to gain unauthorized
access to data.
CSA Guidance
Reference
Domain 8: Data Center
Operations
Domain 13: Virtualization
Service Models
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
References
http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2008/07/0wning-xen-in
vegas.html
http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa09/KORTCHINSKY/BHUSA09-Kortchinsky-CloudburstPAPER.pdf
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS10010.mspx
http://blogs.vmware.com/security/2010/01/announcingvsphere-40-hardening-guide-public-draft-release.html
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Examples
Insufficient authentication, authorization, and audit (AAA) controls;
inconsistent use of encryption and software keys; operational failures;
persistence and remanence challenges: disposal challenges; risk of
association; jurisdiction and political issues; data center reliability; and
disaster recovery.
Remediation
Implement strong API access control.
Encrypt and protect integrity of data in transit.
Analyzes data protection at both design and run time.
Implement strong key generation, storage and management,
and destruction practices.
Contractually demand providers wipe persistent media before it
is released into the pool.
Contractually specify provider backup and retention strategies.
Impact
Data loss or leakage can have
a devastating impact on a
business. Beyond the damage
to ones brand and reputation,
a loss could significantly
impact employee, partner, and
customer morale and trust.
Loss of core intellectual
property could have
competitive and financial
implications. Worse still,
depending upon the data that
is lost or leaked, there might
be compliance violations and
legal ramifications.
CSA Guidance
Reference
Domain 5: Information
Lifecycle Management
Domain 11: Encryption and
Key Management
Domain 12: Identity and
Access Management
Service Models
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
References
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_data_loss_2009
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13846_3-10029707-62.html
http://nylawblog.typepad.com/suigeneris/2009/11/does-cloudcomputing-compromise-clients.html
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Examples
No public examples are available at this time.
Remediation
References
http://www.infoworld.com/d/cloud-computing/hackers-find
home-in-amazons-ec2-cloud-742
http://vmetc.com/2009/03/12/virtual-machine-sniffer-on-esxhosts/
CSA Guidance
Reference
Domain 2: Governance and
Enterprise Risk Management
Domain 9: Incident Response,
Notification and Remediation
Domain 12: Identity and
Access Management
Service Models
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
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Examples
Remediation
Impact
When adopting a cloud
service, the features and
functionality may be well
advertised, but what about
details or compliance of the
internal security procedures,
configuration hardening,
patching, auditing, and
logging? How are your data
and related logs stored and
who has access to them? What
information if any will the
vendor disclose in the event of
a security incident? Often such
questions are not clearly
answered or are overlooked,
leaving customers with an
unknown risk profile that may
include serious threats.
CSA Guidance
Reference
Domain 2: Governance and
Enterprise Risk Management
Domain 3: Legal and
Electronic Discovery
Domain 8: Data Center
Operations
Domain 9: Incident Response,
Notification and Remediation
Service Models
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
References
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/magazineFeature/0,296894
,sid14_gci1349670,00.html
http://chenxiwang.wordpress.com/2009/11/24/follow-up-cloudsecurity/
http://www.forrester.com/cloudsecuritywebinar
http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/site/blog/post/symposium_summ
ary_security_in_the_cloud_panel/
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