PAZ LOPEZ DE CONSTANTINO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ASIA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, defendant-appellee.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-1670

August 31, 1950

AGUSTINA PERALTA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ASIA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, defendant-appellee.
Mariano Lozada for appellant Constantino.
Cachero and Madarang for appellant Peralta.
Dewitt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for appellee.
Ramirez and Ortigas and Padilla, Carlos and Fernando as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
These two cases, appealed from the Court of First Instance of Manila, call for decision of
the question whether the beneficiary in a life insurance policy may recover the amount
thereof although the insured died after repeatedly failing to pay the stipulated premiums,
such failure having been caused by the last war in the Pacific.
The facts are these:
First case. In consideration of the sum of P176.04 as annual premium duly paid to it, the
Asia Life Insurance Company (a foreign corporation incorporated under the laws of
Delaware, U.S.A.), issued on September 27, 1941, its Policy No. 93912 for P3,000,
whereby it insured the life of Arcadio Constantino for a term of twenty years. The first
premium covered the period up to September 26, 1942. The plaintiff Paz Lopez de
Constantino was regularly appointed beneficiary. The policy contained these
stipulations, among others:
This POLICY OF INSURANCE is issued in consideration of the written and printed
application here for a copy of which is attached hereto and is hereby made a part
hereof made a part hereof, and of the payment in advance during the lifetime and
good health of the Insured of the annual premium of One Hundred fifty-eight and
4/100 pesos Philippine currency1 and of the payment of a like amount upon each
twenty-seventh day of September hereafter during the term of Twenty years or until
the prior death of the Insured. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx

xxx

xxx

All premium payments are due in advance and any unpunctuality in making any such
payment shall cause this policy to lapse unless and except as kept in force by the
Grace Period condition or under Option 4 below. (Grace of 31 days.)

After that first payment, no further premiums were paid. The insured died on September
22, 1944.

It is admitted that the defendant, being an American corporation , had to close its branch
office in Manila by reason of the Japanese occupation, i.e. from January 2, 1942, until
the year 1945.
Second case. On August 1, 1938, the defendant Asia Life Insurance Company issued its
Policy No. 78145 (Joint Life 20-Year Endowment Participating with Accident Indemnity),
covering the lives of the spouses Tomas Ruiz and Agustina Peralta, for the sum of
P3,000. The annual premium stipulated in the policy was regularly paid from August 1,
1938, up to and including September 30, 1941. Effective August 1, 1941, the mode of
payment of premiums was changed from annual to quarterly, so that quarterly premiums
were paid, the last having been delivered on November 18, 1941, said payment covering
the period up to January 31, 1942. No further payments were handed to the insurer.
Upon the Japanese occupation, the insured and the insurer became separated by the
lines of war, and it was impossible and illegal for them to deal with each other. Because
the insured had borrowed on the policy an mount of P234.00 in January, 1941, the cash
surrender value of the policy was sufficient to maintain the policy in force only up to
September 7, 1942. Tomas Ruiz died on February 16, 1945. The plaintiff Agustina
Peralta is his beneficiary. Her demand for payment met with defendant's refusal,
grounded on non-payment of the premiums.
The policy provides in part:
This POLICY OF INSURANCE is issued in consideration of the written and printed
application herefor, a copy of which is attached hereto and is hereby made apart
hereof, and of the payment in advance during the life time and good health of the
Insured of the annual premium of Two hundred and 43/100 pesos Philippine
currency and of the payment of a like amount upon each first day of August hereafter
during the term of Twenty years or until the prior death of either of the Insured.
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx

xxx

xxx

All premium payments are due in advance and any unpunctuality in making any such
payment shall cause this policy to lapse unless and except as kept in force by the
Grace Period condition or under Option 4 below. (Grace of days.) . . .

Plaintiffs maintain that, as beneficiaries, they are entitled to receive the proceeds of the
policies minus all sums due for premiums in arrears. They allege that non-payment of
the premiums was caused by the closing of defendant's offices in Manila during the
Japanese occupation and the impossible circumstances created by war.
Defendant on the other hand asserts that the policies had lapsed for non-payment of
premiums, in accordance with the contract of the parties and the law applicable to the
situation.
The lower court absolved the defendant. Hence this appeal.
The controversial point has never been decided in this jurisdiction. Fortunately, this court
has had the benefit of extensive and exhaustive memoranda including those of amici
curiae. The matter has received careful consideration, inasmuch as it affects the interest

of thousands of policy-holders and the obligations of many insurance companies

operating in this country.
Since the year 1917, the Philippine law on Insurance was found in Act No. 2427, as
amended, and the Civil Code.2 Act No. 2427 was largely copied from the Civil Code of
California.3 And this court has heretofore announced its intention to supplement the
statutory laws with general principles prevailing on the subject in the United State.4
In Young vs. Midland Textile Insurance Co. (30 Phil., 617), we said that "contracts of
insurance are contracts of indemnity upon the terms and conditions specified in the
policy. The parties have a right to impose such reasonable conditions at the time of the
making of the contract as they may deem wise and necessary. The rate of premium is
measured by the character of the risk assumed. The insurance company, for a
comparatively small consideration, undertakes to guarantee the insured against loss or
damage, upon the terms and conditions agreed upon, and upon no other, and when
called upon to pay, in case of loss, the insurer, therefore, may justly insists upon a
fulfillment of these terms. If the insured cannot bring himself within the conditions of the
policy, he is not entitled for the loss. The terms of the policy constitute the measure of
the insurer's liability, and in order to recover the insured must show himself within those
terms; and if it appears that the contract has been terminated by a violation, on the part
of the insured, of its conditions, then there can be no right of recovery. The compliance
of the insured with the terms of the contract is a condition precedent to the right of
recovery."
Recall of the above pronouncements is appropriate because the policies in question
stipulate that "all premium payments are due in advance and any unpunctuality in
making any such payment shall cause this policy to lapse." Wherefore, it would seem
that pursuant to the express terms of the policy, non-payment of premium produces its
avoidance.
The conditions of contracts of Insurance, when plainly expressed in a policy, are
binding upon the parties and should be enforced by the courts, if the evidence brings
the case clearly within their meaning and intent. It tends to bring the law itself into
disrepute when, by astute and subtle distinctions, a plain case is attempted to be
taken without the operation of a clear, reasonable and material obligation of the
contract. Mack vs. Rochester German Ins. Co., 106 N.Y., 560, 564.
(Young vs. Midland Textile Ins. Co., 30 Phil., 617, 622.)

In Glaraga vs. Sun Life Ass. Co. (49 Phil., 737), this court held that a life policy was
avoided because the premium had not been paid within the time fixed, since by its
express terms, non-payment of any premium when due or within the thirty-day period of
grace, ipso facto caused the policy to lapse. This goes to show that although we take the
view that insurance policies should be conserved5 and should not lightly be thrown out,
still we do not hesitate to enforce the agreement of the parties.
Forfeitures of insurance policies are not favored, but courts cannot for that reason
alone refuse to enforce an insurance contract according to its meaning. (45 C.J.S., p.
150.)

Nevertheless, it is contended for plaintiff that inasmuch as the non-payment of premium

was the consequence of war, it should be excused and should not cause the forfeiture of
the policy.
Professor Vance of Yale, in his standard treatise on Insurance, says that in determining
the effect of non-payment of premiums occasioned by war, the American cases may be
divided into three groups, according as they support the so-called Connecticut Rule, the
New York Rule, or the United States Rule.
The first holds the view that "there are two elements in the consideration for which the
annual premium is paid First, the mere protection for the year, and second, the
privilege of renewing the contract for each succeeding year by paying the premium for
that year at the time agreed upon. According to this view of the contract, the payment of
premiums is a condition precedent, the non-performance would be illegal necessarily
defeats the right to renew the contract."
The second rule, apparently followed by the greater number of decisions, hold that "war
between states in which the parties reside merely suspends the contracts of the life
insurance, and that, upon tender of all premiums due by the insured or his
representatives after the war has terminated, the contract revives and becomes fully
operative."
The United States rule declares that the contract is not merely suspended, but is
abrogated by reason of non-payments is peculiarly of the essence of the contract. It
additionally holds that it would be unjust to allow the insurer to retain the reserve value of
the policy, which is the excess of the premiums paid over the actual risk carried during
the years when the policy had been in force. This rule was announced in the well-known
Statham6case which, in the opinion of Professor Vance, is the correct rule.7
The appellants and some amici curiae contend that the New York rule should be applied
here. The appellee and other amici curiae contend that the United States doctrine is the
orthodox view.
We have read and re-read the principal cases upholding the different theories. Besides
the respect and high regard we have always entertained for decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, we cannot resist the conviction that the reasons expounded
in its decision of the Statham case are logically and judicially sound. Like the instant
case, the policy involved in the Statham decision specifies that non-payment on time
shall cause the policy to cease and determine. Reasoning out that punctual payments
were essential, the court said:
. . . it must be conceded that promptness of payment is essential in the business of
life insurance. All the calculations of the insurance company are based on the
hypothesis of prompt payments. They not only calculate on the receipt of the
premiums when due, but on compounding interest upon them. It is on this basis that
they are enabled to offer assurance at the favorable rates they do. Forfeiture for nonpayment is an necessary means of protecting themselves from embarrassment.
Unless it were enforceable, the business would be thrown into confusion. It is like the
forfeiture of shares in mining enterprises, and all other hazardous undertakings.
There must be power to cut-off unprofitable members, or the success of the whole

scheme is endangered. The insured parties are associates in a great scheme. This
associated relation exists whether the company be a mutual one or not. Each is
interested in the engagements of all; for out of the co-existence of many risks arises
the law of average, which underlies the whole business. An essential feature of this
scheme is the mathematical calculations referred to, on which the premiums and
amounts assured are based. And these calculations, again, are based on the
assumption of average mortality, and of prompt payments and compound interest
thereon. Delinquency cannot be tolerated nor redeemed, except at the option of the
company. This has always been the understanding and the practice in this
department of business. Some companies, it is true, accord a grace of thirty days, or
other fixed period, within which the premium in arrear may be paid, on certain
conditions of continued good health, etc. But this is a matter of stipulation, or of
discretion, on the part of the particular company. When no stipulation exists, it is the
general understanding that time is material, and that the forfeiture is absolute if the
premium be not paid. The extraordinary and even desperate efforts sometimes
made, when an insured person is in extremes to meet a premium coming due,
demonstrates the common view of this matter.
The case, therefore, is one in which time is material and of the essence and of the
essence of the contract. Non-payment at the day involves absolute forfeiture if such
be the terms of the contract, as is the case here. Courts cannot with safety vary the
stipulation of the parties by introducing equities for the relief of the insured against
their own negligence.

In another part of the decision, the United States Supreme Court considers and rejects
what is, in effect, the New York theory in the following words and phrases:
The truth is, that the doctrine of the revival of contracts suspended during the war is
one based on considerations of equity and justice, and cannot be invoked to revive a
contract which it would be unjust or inequitable to revive.
In the case of Life insurance, besides the materiality of time in the performance of the
contract, another strong reason exists why the policy should not be revived. The
parties do not stand on equal ground in reference to such a revival. It would operate
most unjustly against the company. The business of insurance is founded on the law
of average; that of life insurance eminently so. The average rate of mortality is the
basis on which it rests. By spreading their risks over a large number of cases, the
companies calculate on this average with reasonable certainty and safety. Anything
that interferes with it deranges the security of the business. If every policy lapsed by
reason of the war should be revived, and all the back premiums should be paid, the
companies would have the benefit of this average amount of risk. But the good risks
are never heard from; only the bar are sought to be revived, where the person
insured is either dead or dying. Those in health can get the new policies cheaper
than to pay arrearages on the old. To enforce a revival of the bad cases, whilst the
company necessarily lose the cases which are desirable, would be manifestly unjust.
An insured person, as before stated, does not stand isolated and alone. His case is
connected with and co-related to the cases of all others insured by the same
company. The nature of the business, as a whole, must be looked at to understand
the general equities of the parties.

The above consideration certainly lend themselves to the approval of fair-minded men.
Moreover, if, as alleged, the consequences of war should not prejudice the insured,
neither should they bear down on the insurer.
Urging adoption of the New York theory, counsel for plaintiff point out that the obligation
of the insured to pay premiums was excused during the war owing to impossibility of
performance, and that consequently no unfavorable consequences should follow from
such failure.
The appellee answers, quite plausibly, that the periodic payment of premiums, at least
those after the first, is not an obligation of the insured, so much so that it is not a debt
enforceable by action of the insurer.
Under an Oklahoma decision, the annual premium due is not a debt. It is not an
obligation upon which the insurer can maintain an action against insured; nor is its
settlement governed by the strict rule controlling payments of debts. So, the court in
a Kentucky case declares, in the opinion, that it is not a debt. . . . The fact that it is
payable annually or semi-annually, or at any other stipulated time, does not of itself
constitute a promise to pay, either express or implied. In case of non-payment the
policy is forfeited, except so far as the forfeiture may be saved by agreement, by
waiver, estoppel, or by statute. The payment of the premium is entirely optional,
while a debt may be enforced at law, and the fact that the premium is agreed to be
paid is without force, in the absence of an unqualified and absolute agreement to pay
a specified sum at some certain time. In the ordinary policy there is no promise to
pay, but it is optional with the insured whether he will continue the policy or forfeit it.
(3 Couch, Cyc. on Insurance, Sec. 623, p. 1996.)
It is well settled that a contract of insurance is sui generis. While the insured by an
observance of the conditions may hold the insurer to his contract, the latter has not
the power or right to compel the insured to maintain the contract relation with it
longer than he chooses. Whether the insured will continue it or not is optional with
him. There being no obligation to pay for the premium, they did not constitute a
debt.(Noble vs. Southern States M.D. Ins. Co., 157 Ky., 46; 162 S.W., 528.)
(Emphasis ours.)

It should be noted that the parties contracted not only for peacetime conditions but also
for times of war, because the policies contained provisions applicable expressly to
wartime days. The logical inference, therefore, is that the parties contemplated
uninterrupted operation of the contract even if armed conflict should ensue.
For the plaintiffs, it is again argued that in view of the enormous growth of insurance
business since the Statham decision, it could now be relaxed and even disregarded. It is
stated "that the relaxation of rules relating to insurance is in direct proportion to the
growth of the business. If there were only 100 men, for example, insured by a Company
or a mutual Association, the death of one will distribute the insurance proceeds among
the remaining 99 policy-holders. Because the loss which each survivor will bear will be
relatively great, death from certain agreed or specified causes may be deemed not a
compensable loss. But if the policy-holders of the Company or Association should be
1,000,000 individuals, it is clear that the death of one of them will not seriously prejudice
each one of the 999,999 surviving insured. The loss to be borne by each individual will
be relatively small."

The answer to this is that as there are (in the example) one million policy-holders, the
"losses" to be considered will not be the death of one but the death of ten thousand,
since the proportion of 1 to 100 should be maintained. And certainly such losses for
10,000 deaths will not be "relatively small."
After perusing the Insurance Act, we are firmly persuaded that the non-payment of
premiums is such a vital defense of insurance companies that since the very beginning,
said Act no. 2427 expressly preserved it, by providing that after the policy shall have
been in force for two years, it shall become incontestable (i.e. the insurer shall have no
defense) except for fraud, non-payment of premiums, and military or naval service in
time of war (sec. 184 [b], Insurance Act). And when Congress recently amended this
section (Rep. Act No. 171), the defense of fraud was eliminated, while the defense of
nonpayment of premiums was preserved. Thus the fundamental character of the
undertaking to pay premiums and the high importance of the defense of non-payment
thereof, was specifically recognized.
In keeping with such legislative policy, we feel no hesitation to adopt the United States
Rule, which is in effect a variation of the Connecticut rule for the sake of equity. In this
connection, it appears that the first policy had no reserve value, and that the equitable
values of the second had been practically returned to the insured in the form of loan and
advance for premium.
For all the foregoing, the lower court's decision absolving the defendant from all liability
on the policies in question, is hereby affirmed, without costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Montemayor, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur.