Brains in a Vat: Different Perspectives

Author(s): Yuval Steinitz

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 175 (Apr., 1994), pp. 213-222
Published by: Wiley-Blackwell for The Philosophical Quarterly
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ON MCDOWELL ON THE CONTENT OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE

213

in givingan expositionofone ofthehornsofthedilemma.One hornofthedilemma

is thatifwe takeconsciousnessto be inseparablefromthe norm-governed
notionof
self-consciousness
and fromreflective
and self-critical
attitudestowardsoneself,then
it does seem hard to accept thatDennett'sframework,
in whichconsciouscontents
are a selectionof thecontentsthatgo to and frobetweensubsystems,
willcaptureall
ofthephenomena;butby thesame tokena frog'svisualexperiencewillnotcountas
and conscious,as McDowell claimsit does. But,on the otherhorn,ifwe
contentful
shrinkthe phenomenonof consciousnessto exclude self-consciousness
and thereby
includethe experienceof unself-conscious
creaturessuch as frogsas conscious,then
I adopted- of(l) generalizing
itseemsto me thedual strategy
Dennett'sidea ofaccess
and
relations,
(2) defusingMcDowell's epistemologicalalarms which motivatehis
criticism
ofDennett- providesa quiteadequatedefenceofDennettagainstMcDowell.
Columbia
Universit

BRAINS IN A VAT: DIFFERENT

PERSPECTIVES

BY YUVAL STEINITZ
In his'Brainsin a Vat" Putnamargueswithgreatpanache
againstontological,externalhis
In fact,they
are
worldscepticism.
however, arguments uncompelling.
Ultimately,
seem disingenuousin places.
This paper has two parts. In the firstI argue that even if Putnam's linguistic
sceptic(likePutnamhimself),
argumentsare enoughto convincea modernlinguistic
win
are
insufficient
over
an
old-school
to
they
certainly
'ontologicalsceptic'- that
is, a scepticwho sees ontologyas a fieldof philosophymore fundamentalthan the
As I shallexplain,
theoryof reference(likeDescartesat theoutsetof hisMeditations).
resultwould beg
Putnam'srelianceon causal semanticsto achievehis anti-sceptical
thecentralquestionagainstcertainkindsofsceptics.In thesecondpartI argue that
Putnam's argumentsare not sufficient
to win over his own camp of linguistic
is takenforgranted.His arguments,
not
his
causal
semantics
even
when
philosophers,
ifvalid,mightundercutthepossibility
ofwhatI shallcall a comprehensive
sceptical
of what I shall call partial
scenario,but theyhave littleto say about the possibility
scepticalscenarios.
Beforepresentingmy criticism,let me brieflysummarizePutnam's 'linguistic'
Putnamarguesthatscepticalpropositions
scepticism.
argumentagainstexternal-world
like'I am a brainin a vat' (henceforth
BIV), thatis,a brainsubjectedto a sophisticated
are self-refuting.
simulationof reality,
computerwhichperforms
comprehensive
H. Putnam, Reason,Truthand History(Cambridge UP, 1981), pp. 1-21; see also the
related discussionpp. 49-74. All page referencesare to thisbook.
1994.
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YUVAL STEINITZ

His argumentis as follows:in orderforthispropositionto acquire itspresumed

and vats.However,
to realbrains
realisticmeaning,theterms'brain'and 'vat'mustrefer
refer
to
an
a
word
can
to
causal
semantics,
object only if thatobject is
according
somehowcausallyconnectedwiththe utteranceor thoughtof the word. Thus in
orderforthe word 'vat' to referto an actual vat, and not to referto a 'vat in the
image' (p. 15), or be a mere clusterof random,meaninglessmarkings,theremust
be some causal connectionbetweenthe perceptionof some actual vat and the fact
said or conceived.
thatthe word 'vat' was written,
Returningnow to the BIV proposition:ifthe speakeris a genuineBIV, thenit is
impossiblethathe shouldever have observedthe vat he is in, or any vat,brain or
computerwhatsoever.Thus the word 'vat' in his usage does not referto real vats,
but only to 'vats in the image', and the entirepropositionfailsto refer.If, on the
other hand, the speakeris not a BIV, then his propositionhas reference,but is
obviouslyfalse.Hence the proposition'I am a BIV' eitherfailsto referor is false.
But if it failsto referto the vat containingthe brain,i.e., if it refersto mental
images ratherthan to real objects,then it is also false(p. 15). For what it would
(actually)telltheassumedBIV is thathe is a BIV in theimage,whilewhathe would
(actually)be is a BIV in reality.So it is necessarilyfalse.
Taken together,the two partsof thispaper place Putnamin a dilemma.On the
one hand,as thescepticalscenario(e.g.,theBIV story)is renderedmorecomprehensive,
it becomes increasinglynecessary,fromthe sceptic'sperspective,to discard the
realistic,causal theoryof referenceupon whichPutnam'santi-sceptical
argumentis
indirect
based. On theotherhand,as thescepticalscenariois renderedmorepartial,
forrealisticreference,
causal connectionswithexternalreality,whichare sufficient
become increasingly
plausible.
I. THE ONTOLOGIST'S

PERSPECTIVE

The BIV hypothesisis an updatedversionof the scepticalargumentspresentedin

thatthe entireworldmightbe onlya self-madefigment
Descartes' firstMeditation,
of his imagination,or rathera fictiongeneratedby an evil genius.The firstline of
defenceforthe scepticshouldbe to stressthe disjunctivenatureof thisclaim:
I cannotknowwhether(a) I am a bodilypersonwho perceivesindependentrealis onlya dreamin mymind.
ity,or(b) everything
the scepticaldisjunctioncan be
to the BIV hypothesis,
Adaptingthisformulation
formulatedthus:
I cannotknowwhether(a) I am a bodilypersonwho perceivesindependentreality,or(b) I am a BIV.
An unprejudicedconsideration,
the scepticwillargue,willfindthe two disjunctsto
one overtheother,since
be equallyplausible.There can be no reasonforpreferring
any possibleexperiencewould be compatiblewithboth.
Does thisemphasison the disjunctivenatureof scepticismpose a new challenge
fromPutnam'sperspective?At firstglance it seems not. Putnam could elegantly
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BRAINS IN A VAT

215

tacklethe above disjunctionmuch as he respondedto the BIV propositionalone:

he mightarguethat,fora BIV, thedisjunction'I am a bodilypersonor a BIV' fails
and meaning- because,fora BIV, theterms'body',
to acquireitsassumedreference
'brain', 'computer'and 'vat' failto refer.It followsthatif the scepticaldisjunction
is meaningfulin the presupposedcommon sense, i.e., if it acquires its assumed
to purely
referenceto a real body,brain,computerand vat, ratherthan referring
mentalentities,thendisjunct(a) mustbe true.
But here,I contend,we can see how froman old-style
e.g.,
ontologist's
perspective,
fromthe perspectiveof a Cartesianforwhom ontologyis the most fundamental
philosophicalfield,Putnam'sargumentindeedbegs thequestion.Beinga philosopher
before
of languageat heart,Putnamdecidesthe questionof the theoryof reference
decidingmajor ontologicalissues,such as the existenceof an external,perceivable
Putnampresupposesa 'meta-language'
world.As Casati and Dokic2briefly
remarked,
whichis inappropriate
fora real BIV, and onlythenaddressesthescepticaldisjunction.
of the BIV propositions
restsupon theprior
It turnsout thathis apparentrefutation
assumptionthatthe speakeris, afterall, a bodilypersonwho has a directperceptual
or thathe at leasttacitlybelieveshimselfto be sucha person,or,
contactwithreality,
that
he
at leasttacitlybelievesmostmembersof his societyto be such
alternatively,
it
For
is
(or on some internal
presuppositions
onlyby relyingon such realistic
persons.3
as arguedby Dell' Utri4),thatthe assumedcausal theoryof
realistic
presuppositions,
reference
becomesacceptable.And suchrealistic
premisesdo indeedbeg thequestion.
this'begging
Of coursePutnammightrespondthat,fromhislinguistic
perspective,
of thequestion'is no liabilityat all, but rathera signofthevalidityofhis argument.
itis themarkofa validdeductiveargumentthatitsconclusion
For,as Geach remarks,5
is impliedbyitspremises.ButifPutnam'sargumentis intendedto convincea sceptical
will,forsuch a
ontologist,he should recognizethat the above 'question-begging'
sceptic,entirelyundercutthe forceof his arguments.For the ontologistmaintains,
as I shall soon explain in greaterdetail, that choosing a theoryof referenceis
conditionedby one's chosen ontology,and not viceversa.
Consider,forexample,the above scepticaldisjunction.The Cartesianapproach
sees thisdoubt about the natureof man, whichmay be compressedinto the wellknownconundrum'What am I?', as a keyissue of philosophy.I shall now argue
whichPutnamclaimsto have renderedimpossible,
thatthisfundamental
scepticism,
2 R. Casati andJ.
Dokic, 'Brains in a Vat, Language and Meta-Language', Analysis51
(1991), pp. 91-3.
3 On the social
background of Putnam's linguisticargumentsee Massimo Dell' Utri,
'Choosing Conceptions of Realism: the Case of the Brains in a Vat', Mind 99 (1990), pp.
79-90 (cf. p. 83).
4 Dell' Utri p. 90. His reconstructionsuggeststhat Putnam's argumentagainst scepticismpresupposesinternalrealism.I have opted, however,to agree withBrueckner,'Brains
83 (1986), pp. 148-67, note 2, that this argumentshould
in a Vat', JournalofPhilosophy
be sharplydistinguishedfromPutnam's internalrealism as expressed in the rest of the
was confirmedby Putnam himself).
book (all the more so since Brueckner'sinterpretation
I was thus surprisedto discover in Realismwitha HumanFace (Harvard UP, 1992), ch. 7,
that Putnam reiterateshis BIV argumentas an outcome of internalrealism. I contend,
however,that my argumentagainst Putnam worksagainst both interpretations.
5 P. Geach, ReasonandArgument
(Oxford UP, 1976), p. 18.
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YUVAL STEINITZ

assumesthatany decisionsconcerningthe righttheoryof referenceare absolutely

dependentupon decisions about centralontologicalissues. Therefore,fromthe
ontologist'spointof view,the ontologicalissuesinvolvedhave clearprecedence.
Putnammightstillresistby claimingthatsinceontologicalscepticsstatetheirviews
and argue forthem,the questionof whethertheyassertanything- whethertheir
wordshave real meaningand reference- mustin some sense be priorto whether
whattheysay is true.
This, I believe, is partiallytrue about meaning,but it must be wrong about
reference.
As Quine emphasized,a reasonabletheoryof referencemustallow us to
say what thereis not. And since therecan be no referenceto what thereis not,
anyonewho deniesthe existenceof the externalworld(or who deniesthe existence
of ghosts,unicorns,etc.) mustnot be disturbedby the obviousfactthathis words
'externalworld','ghosts'and 'unicorns'do notrefer.This seemsin linewithPutnam's
own argument,forthoughhe accusestheBIV-scepticofbeingincapableofreferring
he does not accuse him of
to the real vat whichcontainshim according
tohisstory,
of
to
whose
existence
he denies,e.g., his hands,
beingincapable referring anything
his friends,etc. (and we shall see in the imagineddialogue below whereit would
lead him ifhe did).
Coming back to the ontologist'spoint of view,I thinkthe best way to illustrate
the significance
the above difference
of approach mightacquire is by considering
froman
Berkeley'sempiricalidealism. Obviously,the theoryof referencederived
ontologicalstancesuch as Berkeley'sis incompatiblewithPutnam'srealisticcausal
theoryof reference.
Indeed,bothBerkeleyand Putnamwerelookingfora wayto escape thescepticism
Descartes unfoldsin the firstchaptersof the Meditations.
But Berkeleypreaches a
different
solution.He maintainsthatthebestmethodofovercomingscepticismis to
neutralizeit by givingup realismand then re-adjustingthe theoryof reference
He would thusclaim thatwordssuch as 'brain','vat', etc.,shouldnot
accordingly.6
be conceivedas denotingobjective
whichare independentof anyperceiver,nor
objects
as denotingsubjective
i.e., objectswhichowe theirexistence,viz.,theirinternal
objects,
to
reality,to the linguisticpracticeof any particularsociety,but ratheras referring
the commonperceptionsof God and man, perceptionsprojectedby God onto His
creatures'minds.
IfBerkeley'srebuttalofscepticismis internally
coherent,thenPutnam'sargument,
is not responsiveto it. Putnam,
claimingany surrenderof realismto be self-refuting,
does not endeavourto demonstratethat idealisticor solipsistic
quite surprisingly,
whichmake
approachescannotbe accompaniedby compatibletheoriesofreference
theirexternal-world
scepticismself-coherent.7
These considerationssuggestthatthereis anotherand indeed a major difficulty
withPutnam's(and Dell' Utri's)responsesto traditionalscepticism:theBIVsto?ydoes
secs 87-90.
ofHumanKnowledge,
Principles
transcendentalargumentforthatpurpose is set forthby Kant, who assertsthatour
concept of self-identity
acquires itsmeaningonlyagainstthe assumed backgroundofexternal reality:Critique
ofPureReasonB 276. This view actuallyimpliesthatthe Cogitois already
sufficient
to confuteexternal-worldscepticism.
6

7A

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BRAINS IN A VAT

217

notconstitute
an adequate
version
Putnamclaimsthata real
scepticism.
ofold,external-world
BIV is incapable of expressingscepticismbecause his words fail to refer.Or, as
an actual BIV would nothave the(internal)
suggestedby Dell' Utri'sreconstruction,
realisticlanguagerequiredforexpressinghis fearsand doubts.But whatforcedoes
thisclaim have against,say, an idealisticsolipsist,who claims the entireworld to
existin his mind,withoutassuminga singleexternalentity?Such a solipsistcan
thinkof himself,i.e., his soul, as the only thingthat exists,withoutcontradicting
himselfby appealingto realisticlanguage.
Thus Putnam'sargumentagainstexternal-world
scepticism(as well as Dell' Utri's
versionof it) is a bit tricky:the representative
scepticis held to doubt everything
outsidehis mind,excepthis brain,vat and computer,whichdo lie outsidehis mind.
He is thenfoundincapableofforming
director indirectperceptualconnectionswith
thoseisolatedislandsof externalrealityleftbehind.And thisrendershis scepticism
self-refuting.
This shows that Putnam's refutationof external-worldscepticismis heavily
dependentupon, and hence limitedto, a speciallytooled scepticalhypothesis,in
whichthereis an external
Wherethisdeceivingagentis further
assumed
deceiving
agent.
to be ofa materialistic
the
Putnam
can
nature,e.g.,
system,
vat-computer
arguethat
it has to be perceptually
connectedto the sceptic,in orderto be referred
to. Now, in
orderto see moreclearlywhyPutnam'sargumentis entirely
ineffective
againstother,
more conclusiveexpressionsof external-world
or materialscepticism,considerthe
resultswere he to tryto applyit to Berkeley'sidealism:
All thereis are souls and ideas.
Berkeley:
Putnam:This is self-refuting.
Indeed, any external-world
scepticismis self-refuting,
as I have demonstrated
in thecase ofBIV, forifit is true,thenthesceptic's
words and ideas fail to referto those material,externalobjects which
constitute
his deludingenvironment.
So ifwe are brainsin a vat,we cannot
say or thinkthatwe are.
But mystoryis different!
In mystorythereare no material,externalobjects,
Berkeley:
and hence no causal connectionwithsuch objects is necessaryfortheir
description.
[Putnamwould do well to end the discussionat thisjuncture.For were he to press
his point,he would be forcedto argue thatthe existenceof an external,objective
is a necessaryconditionnotjust forreferencebut formeaningfulness
referent
too.
He would have to do thisin orderto extendhis linguisticargumentto Berkeley's
ofBerkeley'sentirely
idealism,thatis, in orderto doubtthemeaningfulness
negative
existentialpropositionsabout an objective,externalreality.But such a view has
unwelcomeontologicalconsequences.]
Putnam:This is wrongtoo. True, yourstorydoes notcontainany external,material
objects. But have you notjust spoken about such objects,while denying
theirveryexistence?Thus, accordingto mycausal theoryofmeaning,there
mustbe somecausal,perceptualconnectionbetweenyourwordsor ideas of
materialobjectsand at least one exemplarof such an object,in orderfor
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YUVAL STEINITZ

yourwordsto acquire theirprevalentmeanings,thoughyou believethem

to have no referenceat all. So eitherthereare materialobjectsor thereare
not. If thereare, your external-world
scepticismis false.If thereare not,
thenyou could not say and mean thatthereare not.
I now see the true natureof your argument.Your demand fora causal
Berkeley:
connectionwiththeobjectwe speakabout,or at leastfora causal connection
withotherobjectsof the same kind,is none otherthan a disguisedversion
of the ancientParmenideandoctrinethat'It cannotbe said thatanything
is not'.8Indeed, you ostensiblyalterit by claimingthat 'It cannot be said
that anythingis causallyunconnected'.But since therecan be no causal
connectionwithwhat thereis not,your demand boils down to the same
ontologicalconsequences,thatis, theinflatedontologyofobjects(or at least
kindsof objects)thatissuesfromthe old riddleof non-being.9
In the last few pages we have seen why Putnam's anti-scepticalargumentis
ineffective
againstwidelycomprehensive
scepticalscenarioswhichpermitno external
reality(solipsism),or at least no materialreality(idealism).Let us summarizethe
discussionso farby stressingtwo major points:
1. Putnamarguesthatscepticalassertionssuch as 'Realityis an all-encompassing
and triumphantly
claimsthathe has revealed
dream',or 'I am a BIV', are self-refuting,
a substantial
inontologicalscepticism.
ButI havesuggested
thatPutnam's
inconsistency
satisfaction
would be warrantedonlyif his realisticcausal theoryof referencewere
truecomewhatmay.I have also demonstrated
thatPutnammightfindit quitedifficult
to forcea stubbornontologicalscepticto accepthis causal theoryof reference
in the
firstplace. For the ontologicaldoubtsraisedby such a scepticare not restricted
to
ontology.Rather,theyspreadto theprevalentcausal semanticsas well.
thatPutnamclaimedto have revealed,between
Note,then,thatthecontradiction
thecausal theoryofreference
on theone hand,and some majorscepticalarguments
on theother,would notimmediately
win overa trueontologicalsceptic.In fact,this
contradictionmightonly serve to emphasize how extensivethe ramifications
of
traditionalontologicalscepticismreallyare.
2. Insteadofbeingtruecomewhatmay,andinsteadofbeingan elementary
hypothesis
or an axiom about the theoryof reference,
Putnam'scausal theoryof referenceis
clearlydependent
upon an implicitontologicalstance:eitherupon externalrealism,as
or upon internalrealism,as suggestedby Dell' Utri.
suggestedby Brueckner,
Well,whyshouldnot Putnamadopt one ofthese'conceptionsofrealism'(as Dell'
Utriputsit) as his premise?Take, forinstance,internalrealism:is it not possible,at
least in principle,that thistheoryis indeed necessary
forthinkingand referring,
as
Putnamand Dell' Utri suggest?'0
8See M.
6 (1968),
Furth,'Elementsof Eleatic Ontology',JournaloftheHistory
ofPhilosophy
p. 116.
9These unwelcome
consequencesofPutnam'sargumentwerefirst
pointedout in Philosophia
16 (1986) by P. Tichy, 'Putnam on Brainsin a Vat', pp. 144-5, and by F.B. Farrell,'Putnam
and the Vat-People', p. 154.
'0 Putnam ch. 3; Dell' Utri sec. V.
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This is not to thepointhere.Assumingthatexternalrealismand internalrealism

are false,then Putnam's causal semanticsgoes too. In that case, Putnam's antiof it, go as well. Assuming,on
scepticalargument,and Dell' Utri's reconstruction
the otherhand, thatone of theseontologicalstanceshappensto be true,thentheir
For ifexternalor internalrealism
argumentsagainstscepticismare valid but useless.
is true,then all formsof external-world
scepticism,e.g., the BIV story,Solipsism,
The
Idealism,the Evil Genius story,etc., areinstantly
falsfiedbythisveryassumption.
questionhas been explicitlybegged at the outset.There is no need forPutnam's
BIV referencestory.
II. A BIV PERSPECTIVE
In the firstpartof thispaper I showedthatPutnam'sargumentis ineffective
against
old-styleontologicalscepticism.This is because scepticismof thissortmightbecome
so comprehensive
thatitmustinfluence
thetheoryofreference
preferred
bythesceptic.
In the following
pages I shallevaluatethe forceof Putnam'sargumentsagainsta
more moderatesceptic,who considersa singleBIV placed in a real, richmaterial
and who happenstotakeforgrantedPutnam'scausaltheoryofreference.
surrounding,
Must he accept,underthoseassumptions,
Putnam'ssolutionof BIV-scepticism?
PutnampresentstheBIV hypothesis
as a storyabout a mad scientist
who performs
the experiment.The followingstoryprovidesa reasonablesequel, in the sense that
it does not contradictany majorphysicalprinciplesor the laws of logic. Its purpose
is to showthatthehermeticseparationbetweena BIV, on theone hand,and objective
as Putnammaintains.It would follow
reality,on the other,mightnot be as air-tight
thatevenifa scepticalBIV wereto acceptPutnam'srealisticcausal theoryofreference
in whichhisassertion
(as no CartesianBIV would),stilltheremightbe circumstances
'I am a BIV' would acquire itsassumedrealisticreference,
and hencebe meaningful
and succeed in referring
in the ordinarysense.
factthathis
Imagine a brain in a vat named Alex. Apart fromthe unfortunate
are connectedto a computer,Alex is a normalperson in all other
nerve-endings
respects.Like mostpeople,Alex does notbelongto the categoryofthosewho waste
theirtimeon philosophicalmeditations.Doubts such as 'Am I a BIV?' have never
enteredhis mind.
One day it occurs to the mad scientistto documenthis sensationalexperiment.
He buysa video camera,filmstheBIV systemand the computercontrolling
it,and
thatveryeveningscreensthefilmforhis friends.Suddenlyhe realizesthathis circle
of friendsincludes,in some weirdsense,Alex as well. It would be unfair,he thinks,
to preventAlex fromseeingthefilm:'Afterall, haven'tI hurthimenoughbyputting
him into the vat?'
But how couldAlexwatchthefilm?And how could he be preventedfromrealizing
thathe himselfis thefilm'shero,whichmightjeopardize some psychologicalaspects
of the experiment?
In orderto accomplishthis,the mad scientistdecidesthatit would be bestifthe
computermade Alex meethimsomewhere,afterwhichhe wouldinvitehimto watch
the filmat his home. Since the filmshows nothingabout the way the brain was
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YUVAL STEINITZ

removedfromits body and put into the vat, thereis no reason forAlex to realize
thathe is lookingat himself.
And so it was. The computerperformeda perfectsimulationof a partyat which
themad scientist
invitedAlex to his home. There he showedhimthefilmabout the
BIV. (Obviously our amazed hero watched the film through the electrodes
permanentlyattachedto his visual nerves,just as he saw all the otherthingsthat
constituted
his world.)
a fewdays laterit occurredto Alex forthe firsttimein his lifeto
Nevertheless,
raise a scepticalquestion:'MightI be a BIV myself?'.
Afterturningthisdoubt over in his mind day and night,he finallywent to the
library(obviouslya simulatedlibrary)to read an essayentitled'Brainsin a Vat'. On
page 50 he came upon the followingconclusion:'So, ifwe are Brainsin a Vat, we
cannotthinkthatwe are'. 'That poor brain I saw in the film',thoughtAlex. 'Even
ifit had suspecteditstruepredicament,thatverythoughton itspartwould be selfAnd so he sighedin relief.
refuting.'
The moral: Alex consideredthe possibilityof being a BIV, and conceivedthe
concepts'brain'and 'vat'in hismind,as a resultofsomecausal,perceptualconnection
withthe real vat containinghim.Hence hiswordsand doubtsseem to acquire their
assumedreferenceand meaning.
Does the factthathis observationtookplace by means of a filmprojectedfrom
a computermemory,and transmitted
tohisbrainvia electrodes,
preventthefulfilment
of the requiredcausal connection?
claimsthatitdoes. Here he sharplydiffers
fromKripke,
Putnam,quitesurprisingly,
anotherproponentof the causal theoryof reference,
who arguesthateven themost
indirectand heavilymediatedcausal connectionis sufficient
forthe establishment
of fullreferential
relationsbetweenthe conceptsor names and the objects,through
what he calls 'a causal (historical)chain'." Accordingto Kripke,a blind man can
referto light,even thoughhe has neverseen it, or anythingsimilarto it. Thus, if
Alex opted for the Kripkean interpretation
of the causal theoryof reference,he
would be 'allowed' to referto vats and computers,even thoughhe graspedtheir
conceptsthroughdiscoursewitha computer,on the condition,of course,thatthose
conceptswere programmedinto the computerby someone whose conceptsof vat
and computer
do refer.
Putnam(pp. 11-12), in contrast,dismissesthereferential
value of suchveryweak
causal connections:12
Althoughthe machine does not perceive
apples, fields,or steeples,its creatordesignersdid. There is somecausal connectionbetweenthemachineand therealworld apples, etc., via the perceptualexperienceand knowledgeof the creatordesigners.But such a weak connectioncan hardlysufficeforreference.
" S. Kripke, NamingandNecessity
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p. 139.
12
Putnam's position here concerningthe insufficiency
of such weak connectionscontrasts not only with Kripke's, but also with his own earlier writingon this topic: cf.
'Explanation and Reference', reprintedin his Mind,Languageand Reality(Cambridge UP,
1975), p. 202.
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And he justifiesthiswiththe followingargument:

The machineis utterly
to thecontinued
insensitive
existenceofapples,fields,steeples,
etc. Even ifall thesethingsceasedto exist,themachinewould stilldiscoursejust as
happilyin the same way. That is whythe machinecannotbe regardedas referringat all.
But thisview is indeed veryodd. It impliesthatwhen we read in a book about
cannot referto real
penguinsin Antarctica,we should claim thatthe wordpenguin
thanthecomputer
penguins,as thewrittenwordand thebook are no lessinsensitive
to the continuedexistenceof penguins.Is the assumptionthat this book might
continueto be read 'just as happilyin the same way', even ifpenguins'ceased to
value? And ifso, thenwhatwould
exist',enoughto disqualifythe book's referential
be the referenceof the entry'penguin' in the insensitive1930 edition of the
Britannica?
Encyclopaedia
Putnammightargue thatthe book could in principlebe re-editedand updated,
and thatthe 1930 editioncould be replacedby the2030 edition.But then,in exactly
the same way, the mad scientistconductingthe BIV experimentcould update the
should theyunfortunately
occur, of
computermemoryconcerningthe extinctions,
penguins,apples, or steeples.He could also programthe computerto update itself
thesevolumes
perhapsevenusingtheBritannica
periodically,
year-books.Incidentally,
are printednowadaysfrominformation
thatis processedand storedin a computer
to the printervia electronicmediations.
memory,and transmitted
Thus we must opt for Kripke's version,and stipulatethat the mere fact that
sensationsare processedand transmitted
or nonby a computer,or by any artificial
artificial
meanswhatsoever,
cannoteliminatetherequiredcausal connectionbetween
a word and its supposed referendum,
on the conditionthat such a connectiondoes
existin the firstplace. In 'a causal (historical)chain' the firstlinkis what matters:
throughit the whole chain should be perceptuallylinkedto reality.All otherlinks
need notbe perceptual,not even thelastlinkwhichconveysthetermlight
to a blind
man,or thetermvatto a BIV. Therefore,ifAlex suspects,as a resultofhiscomputermediatedwatchingof a film(or even as a resultof a computer-mediated
readingof
a descriptionofvats),thathe mightbe a BIV, his doubtsare ultimately
meaningful
and capable of referring.
What thenshould our scepticbelieve,ifhe suspectshis truepredicament,while
assumingthe existenceof a rich independentworld of objects outsideof his own
world? Surely, being sceptical, he cannot reject the possibility(a possibility
acknowledgedby Putnamas well) thatthe computer'smemoriesand programsare
at least partlya functionof externalreality.Thereforeit would be onlyreasonable
forhim to hypothesize(even thoughhe can neververifyit) thatthe words 'brain'
and 'vat' in his language mayacquire a real referenceafterall.
I thinkit has become evidentby now that the only way to preservePutnam's
argumentagainstBIV scepticismis to adopt a more rigidversionof the BIV story,
one thateliminatesanycausal linkagewithexternalrealitywhatever.Not surprisingly,
indeed, Putnamhintsat thissecond line of defencewhen he moves to considera
strangepossibleworldin which 'everysentientbeing is and alwayswas a brain in
? The Editorsof ThePhilosophical
1994.
Quarterly,

222

YUVAL STEINITZ

a vat' (p. 14). Such a comprehensivescepticalscenario,he seems to believe,must

be eitherself-refuting
or false.
But thisis cold comfort.
hornofthedilemma,
First,because itreturnsus to thefirst
i.e., to our previous conclusion that such a comprehensive
ontologicalscepticism
necessitateschangingthe theoryof referenceaccordingly.Second, because even if
Alex refusedto accept this,and steadfastly
held to Putnam'srealisticcausal theory
ofreference,
he stillcould notshakeoffscepticism.Scepticsare also concernedabout
Alexis facingis nota meredouble
partialscepticalscenarios.So theactualdisjunction
but a triple
disjunction:
(a) I am a personwithbody,perceivingobjectivereality;
(b) I am a BIV controlledby a computer,but part of the'computer'ssimulation
of realityoriginatesin the observationsof its programmers(or, alternatively,
in
the observationsof attached robotic sensorymechanisms),who do perceive
objectivereality;
(c) I am a BIV, and thereis nothingelse outsidemy system.(Or, alternatively,
all scientists
are themselvesBIVs.)
and programmers
Of course,Putnammay happilyelaborateupon the possiblerealizationof the last
comprehensivescenario(c), whichpermitshim (on the conditionof neglectingour
in such
thatscepticism,
previousargumentsof sectionI) to relyupon his hypothesis
a case, is self-refuting....
Yet thisshould not comforthim,nor should it comfortany BIV-sceptic.For as
long as disjunct(b) cannot be excluded,scepticismseems to remainas plausibleas
ever.13

Tel-Aviv
Universit
and Universit
ofHaifa

'3 I would like to thank Naomi Goldblum, Noah J. Efronand Zev Bechler forhelpful
comments.
? The Editorsof ThePhilosophical
1994.
Quarterly,