Lochgelly Iron & Coal v.

M'Mullan [1934] AC 1 Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Co Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146 Goldman v Hargrave Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis Topp v London Country Bus (South West) Ltd Stansbie v Troman Jebson v Ministry of Defence Attorney General v Hartwell (British Virgin Islands) [2004] Moy -v- Pettman Smith (a firm) and another; HL 3-Feb-2005 Hall v Simons (2000) HL Al-Kandari V J R Brown & Co McKay v Essex AHA (1982) CA McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [2000] Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust 2001 Rees -v- Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust; HL 16-Oct-2003 Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence (1996) CA Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ 318 (11 March 2003) Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92 Palsgraf v Long Island Railway Co (1928) New York Appeals Haley v London Electricity Board Urbanski v Patel Goodwill -v- British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1996] Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks (1856) Exch Glasgow Corporation v Muir (1943), Willsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] Phillips v William Whiteley Ltd [1938] KBD Shakoor v. Situ (t/a Eternal Health Co) [2000] 4 All ER 181 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 3 WLR 370 Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority Whitehouse v. Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267: Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 583 Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1997] 3 WLR 1151 Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors Rogers v. Whitaker. Australia Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304 Blake v Galloway [2004] 3 All ER 315 Mansfield v Weetabix [1997] EWCA Civ 1352 Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 Latimer v AEC [1953] AC 643 Paris v Stepney [1951] AC 367 Watt v Hertfordshire [1954] 1 WLR 835

Read v Lyons [1947] AC 156 Roe v Minister of Health [1954] CA Jones v Boyce (1816) Luxmoore-May v Messenger May Baverstock (a firm) (1990) CA Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes [1959] Scott v London and St Katherine Docks (1865) 3 H & C 596 Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298. Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital [1969] 1 QB 428 Horsley v. MacLaren aka the ogopogo case 1971 (Canada) McWilliams v Arrol [1962] HL Chester v Afshar [2004] 3 WLR 927 House of Lords Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750 House of Lords Gregg v Scott Chaplin v Hicks Spring v. Guardian Assurance PLC. Allied Maples v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 4 All ER 907 Cutler v Vauxhall Motors Dillon v Twin State Gas & Electric Co (1932), 85 NH 449, 163 A 111. Cook v Lewis, [1951] SCR 830 Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467 Jobling v Associated Dairies [1982] AC 794 House of Lords Fairchild v Glenhaven [2002] 3 WLR 89 House of Lords McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 House of Lords Barker v Corus, [2006] 3 All ER 785 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 House of Lords Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155 House of Lord Re Polemis & Furness Withy & Company Ltd. [1921] 3 KB 560 The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] AC 388 House of Lords Tremain v Pike [1969] 1 WLR 1556 Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837 House of Lords Jolley v Sutton [2000] 1 WLR 1082 Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Company [1964] 1 QB 518 Smith v Leech Brain [1962] 2 QB 405 Robinson v Post Office [1974] CA Lamb v Camden LBC [1981] 2 All ER 408 Court of Appeal Perl (Exporters) Ltd v Camden London Borough Council (1984), Knightley v Johns & Ors [1982] 1 WLR 349 Court of Appeal Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 House of Lords McKew v Holland [1969] 3 All ER 1621 Weiland v Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd (1969) Kirkham v CC Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283 Court of Appeal Pigney V Pointers Transport Services Ltd (1957) Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd (2008) UKHL) Carslogie Steamship Co v. Royal Norwegian Government Prendergast v Sam & Dee Ltd., Kosary, and Miller in 1989 Jobling v Associated Dairies [1982] AC 794 House of Lords Derry v Peek (1889) 5 T.L.R. 625

Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd Ross v Caunters [1979] ChDiv Megarry VC Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] HL Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877) Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1988] 3 All ER 718 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates [1994] HL Lennon v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis MLC v Evatt (1968) 12 CLR 556 Esso Petroleum v Mardon [1976] QB 801 James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co Smith v Eric Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 White v Jones 1995 Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel & Co Ltd and others Law Society v KPMG Peat Marwick and Others Yianni v Edwin Evans (1982) QB 438 Stevenson v Nationwide Building Society (1984) 272 EG 663 JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks, Bloom & Co [1981] 3 All ER 289 Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd (1998). Junior Books v Veitchi (1983) HL Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialties Ltd and Others Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington Glass Ltd Dulieu v White [1901] 2 KB 669 McFarlane v. E.E. Caledonian Limited [1994] 2 All ER 1 White V Chief Constable Of Yorkshire Police McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 Alcock v. The Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310 Greatorex v Greatorex and Others [2000] The Times LR May 5, QBD Dooley -v- Cammell Laird and Co Ltd; 1951 Hunter v. British Coal Corporation [1998] 2 All E.R. 97 Attia v British Gas plc Walters v North Glamorgan NHS Trust ([2002] All ER (D)7 (Dec) CA) W v Essex County Council (1998) HL Ferguson v John Dawson & Partners (Contractors) Ltd Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison v. McDonald 1952 Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins & Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd. 1947 Ormrod v. Crossville Motor Service 1953 Morgans v. Launchbury 1973 House of Lords Century Insurance v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board 1942 House of Lords Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. 1862 Warren v Henley's Ltd (1948) Heasemans v. Clarity Cleaning 1987 Court of Appeal Harrison v Michelin Tyre Co Ltd [1985] 1 All ER 918. Storey v. Ashton 1869

Rose v. Plenty 1976 Court of Appeal Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22 Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Ltd. 1957 Jones v Livox Quarries [1952] 2 QB 608 Court of Appeal Dann v Hamilton [1939] 1 KB 509 Froom v Butcher [1976] 1 QB 286 Owens v Brimmell [1977] QBD Harrison v British Railways Board (1981) Moriarty v Brookes [1834] EWHC Exch J79 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell [1965] AC 656 House of Lords Revill v Newbery [1996] 2 WLR 239 Court of Appeal Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2002] 1 WLR 218 Court of Appeal Ogwo v Taylor [1987] 3 WLR 1145 House of Lords Cunningham v Reading FC [1991] Times LR 153 Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2003] 3 WLR 705 House of Lords Keown v Coventry Healthcare NHS Trust, CA (Civ Div) 2/2/2006 Wheat v Lacon [1966] AC 552 Holden v White [1982] 2 All ER 328 Court of Appeal Edwards v Railways Executive [1952] AC 737 House of Lords Lowery v Walker [1911] AC 10 House of Lords Ferguson v Welsh [1987] 1 WLR 1553 House of Lords Phipps v Rochester Corporation [1955] 1 QB 450 Roles v Nathan [1963] 1 WLR 1117 Court of Appeal Salmon v Seafarer Restaurants [1983] 1WLR 1264 AMF International Ltd v Magnet Bowling Ltd (1968) Woodward v Mayor of Hastings Haseldine v Daw Gwilliam v West Hertfordshire Hospital NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 1041 Court of Appeal Ashdown v Samuel Williams & Sons Ltd (1957) Addie v Dumbreck [1929] AC 358 House of Lords British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC 877 House of Lords Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures (1934) CA Smith v ADVFN Plc (CA) South Hetton Coal Company vs North Eastern News Association Limited (1984). Steel & Morris v McDonalds: Steel & Morris v United Kingdom Goldsmith v Bhoyrul ( 1998) Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd and others Sim v. Stretch [1936] Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818 Thorley v Lord Kerry Berkoff v. Burchill Lewis -v- Daily Telegraph Ltd [1963] 1 QB 340 Tolley v Fry Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2 KB 331 Norman v Future Publishing Charleston v News Group Newspapers [1995] 2 AC 65

E .Hutton and Co V Jones (1910) AC 20 Newstead v London Express Newspapers (1940) Morgan -v- Odhams Press Ltd; HL 1971 Knupffer v London Express Newspapers [1944] AC 116, Riches -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32 Theaker v Richardson [1962] 1 WLR 151, Slipper v British Broadcasting Corporation [1991] 1 QB 283 McManus v Beckham 2002 Alexander v North Eastern Railway (1865) 6 B&S 340 Plato Films -v- Speidel [1961] London Artists v Littler [1962] 2 QB 375 Kemsley -v- Foot [1951] 2 KB 34 Merivale -v- Carson (1887) 20 QBD 275 Thomas v Bradbury, Agnew and Co Ltd and another [1906] Watt v. Longsdon Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 House of Lords Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 House of Lords Sedleigh-Denfield v OCallaghan *1940+ AC 880 House of Lords A-G v P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd. (1957) Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264 House of Lords The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] AC 388 House of Lords Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1 House of Lords Hunter v Canary Wharf [1998] 1 WLR 434 House of Lords Malone v Laskey 1907 2 KB 141 St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping *1865+ UKHL J81 House of Lords Sturges v Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch D 852 Court of Appeal Adams v Ursell [1913] 1 Ch 269 Miller v Jackson [1977]3 WLR 20 Court of Appeal Heath v Mayor Brighton (1908) Robinson v Kilvert (1889) McKinnon Industries v Walker [1951] WN 401 Privy Council Christie v Davey (1893) 1 Ch 316 Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468 Bradford Corporation v Pickles [1895] HL St Annes Well Brewery Co v Roberts 1929 Leakey & Ors v National Trust [1980] QB 485 Court of Appeal Tetley v Chitty 1986 1 All ER 663 Hussain v Lancaster City Council [1999] 2 WLR 1142 Court of Appeal Lippiatt and Febry -v- South Gloucestershire County Council; CA 31-Mar-1999 Allen v Gulf Oil Refinery [1981] AC 1001 House of Lords Bliss v Hall [1838] 4 Bing NC 183 Thorpe v Brumfitt ((1872 73) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 650, CA (Eng)) Giles v Walker (1890) 24 QBD 656 Rainham Chemical Works v Belvedere Fish Guano

Attorney General v Corke [1993] Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263 Privy Council Box v Jubb LR 4 EX Div 76 Perry v Kendricks Transport [1956] WLR 85 Court of Appeal Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2 ExD 1 Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Railway [1917] AC 556 Tate & Lyle v Greater London Council [1983] 2 AC 509 Barker v Saint Gobain Pipelines [2004] EWCA Civ 545 Court of Apeal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Lochgelly Iron & Coal v. M'Mullan A miner was killed when part of the coal mine that he was working in fell on top [1934] AC 1 of him. The man's family successfully sued for damages under the Coal Mines Act 1911 (c 50) s 49 (repealed), which required that an employer must ensure that the roof of every coal mine is made secure and not order an employee to work there if it is not. The coal mine owners appealed the decision, but their appeal was dismissed as it was held that the initial action was competent as their negligence had been proved. Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Co Facts Doughty was injured in his work at a factory owned by Turner when a cover over a cauldron of molten hot liquid fell in and caused an explosion, propelling the liquid toward him. It was not known that the cover would explode when it fell in the liquid. Turner was found liable at trial and damages awarded, which they appealed. Issue Was the specific cause of injury foreseeable?

Decision Appeal allowed. Reasons Diplock states that in this case the ratio of Wagon Mound must be applied. Although this is similar to Hughes, there is a crucial difference. In that case the boy was injured as a result of the defendants' negligently leaving the manhole uncovered. Although the specific injury was unforeseeable, the negligent act directly led to it. In this case, the only duty owed to Doughty was to ensure that he would not be injured if the top fell in the molten liquid and splashed some over the side. This was prevented the only reason he was injured was because of the unforeseeable explosion. Turner did not have a duty to protect Doughty from this, as they could not have foreseen it. Ratio If there is no duty owed to the plaintiff in regard to the initial action that led consequentially to the injury, then the defendants are not liable for damages.

Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728

The claimants were tenants in a block of flats. The flats suffered from structural defects due to inadequate foundations which were 2ft 6in deep instead of 3ft deep as required. The defendant Council was responsible for inspecting the foundations during the construction of the flats. The House of Lords held that the defendant did owe a duty of care to ensure the foundations were of the correct depth. Lord Wilberforce introduced a two stage test for imposing a duty of care. This has since been overruled by Caparo v Dickman.

Lord Wilberforce's two stage test: "in order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations in which a duty of care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latterin which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise."

Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC Mrs Donoghue went to a cafe with a friend. The friend brought her a bottle of 562 ginger beer and an ice cream. The ginger beer came in an opaque bottle so that the contents could not be seen. Mrs Donoghue poured half the contents of the bottle over her ice cream and also drank some from the bottle. After eating part of the ice cream, she then poured the remaining contents of the bottle over the ice cream and a decomposed snail emerged from the bottle. Mrs Donoghue suffered personal injury as a result. She commenced a claim against the manufacturer of the ginger beer. Held: Her claim was successful. This case established the modern law of negligence and established the neighbour test. Lord Aitken: "The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question " Who is my neighbour ?" receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in law is my neighbour ? The answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question."

Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman

Facts A company called Fidelity plc, manufacturers of electrical equipments, was the target of a takeover by Caparo Industries plc. Fidelity was not doing well. In March 1984 Fidelity had issued a profit warning, which had halved its share price. In May 1984 Fidelity's directors made a preliminary announcement in its annual profits for the year up to March confirming the negative outlook. The share price fell again. At this point Caparo had begun buying up shares in large numbers. In June 1984 the annual accounts, which were done with the help of the accountant Dickman, were issued to the shareholders, which now included Caparo. Caparo reached a shareholding of 29.9% of the company, at which point it made a general offer for the remaining shares, as the City Code's rules on takeovers required. Once it had control, Caparo found that Fidelity's accounts were in an even worse state than had been revealed by the directors or the auditors. It sued Dickman for negligence in preparing the accounts and sought to recover its losses. Issue What test should be employed in determining negligence? Decision The majority of the Court of Appeal (Bingham LJ and Taylor LJ, O'Connor LJ dissenting) held that a duty was owed by the auditor to shareholders individually, and although it was not necessary to decide that in this case and the judgment was obiter, that a duty would not be owed to an outside investor who had no shareholding. Bingham LJ held that, for a duty owed to shareholders directly, the very purpose of publishing accounts was to inform investors so that they could make choices within a company about how to use their shares. But for outside investors, a relationship of proximity would be "tenuous" at best, and that it would certainly not be "fair, just and reasonable". Appeal allowed. Reasons Bridge of Harwich, writing for a unanimous court, states that the two part test

Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd

he defendant owned a disused cinema which they purchased with the intention of demolishing it and replacing it with a supermarket. The cinema was last used on 29th May 1976. Littlewoods acquired the building on 31st May 1976. Contractors were present at the cinema until 21st June and thereafter the cinema was empty until the incident on 5th July 1976. The contractors had left the building secure, however, vandals had broke into the building. Littlewoods had not been informed of this and so the building remained unsecured. There was evidence to suggest that further entry by vandals had occurred over the couple of weeks. The fittings inside the building were damaged and debris was thrown. On one occasion a sink had been removed and thrown onto the roof of a billiard hall. There were also two small incidents involving fire. None of this was reported to the police or Littlewoods. On July 5th the vandals broke into the cinema and set fire to it. The fire spread and caused damage to neighbouring properties. The owners of the properties brought an action in negligence claiming that Littlewoods owed them a duty of care to prevent the actions of the vandals. Held: Littlewoods were not liable. Whilst they did owe a duty of care they were not in breach of duty. They were not required to provide 24 hour surveillance and were unaware of the previous incidents. The law is unwilling to impose liability for the deliberate act of a third party see Lamb v Camden London Borough Council [1981] QB 625 but will do so in appropriate cases (Dorset Yacht v Home Office [1970] AC 1004). The general rule relating to omissions is that no liability arises for a pure omissions but there exist exceptions to this where there is a special relationship, an assumption of responsibility, where the defendant is in control of a 3rd party that causes the damage, where the defendant is in control of land or dangerous thing.

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd

Some young offenders were doing some supervised work on Brown Sea Island under the Borstal regime. One night the Borstal officers retired for the evening leaving the boys unsupervised. Seven of them escaped and stole a boat which collided with a Yacht owned by the claimant. Held: The Home Office owed a duty of care for their omission as they were in a position of control over the 3rd party who caused the damage and it was foreseeable that harm would result from their inaction. The Defendant left a horse-drawn van unattended in a crowded street. The horses bolted when a boy threw a stone at them. A police officer tried to stop the horses to save a woman and children who were in the path of the bolting horses. The police officer was injured. It was held that the Defendant owed a duty of care as he had created a source of danger by leaving his horses unattended in a busy street

Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146

Goldman v Hargrave

A 100 foot red gum tree on the defendants land was struck by lightning and caught fire. The following morning the defendant contacted a tree feller to cut down the tree saw it into sections. The wood was still smouldering and the defendant failed to douse it with water to eliminate the risk of fire. Over the next few days the weather became very hot and reignited the fire which spread to neighbouring property. Held: The defendant was liable for the naturally occurring danger that arose on his land as he was aware of the danger and failed to act with reasonable prudence to remove the hazard. [Tort negligence - duty of care - public policy duty owed in operational matters] D a Local Authority employed a teacher who left a 4-year-old child alone for about ten minutes while she did other things. The child left the classroom onto a busy road, where he caused a lorry driver to swerve and collide with a telegraph pole. The lorry driver was killed and his widow sued the education authority. Held: The education authority had taken charge of the child and had a duty to take reasonable care to prevent him from causing harm to others. C won.

Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis

Topp v London Country Bus (South West) Ltd

[Tort - negligence - duty of care - omissions - actions of third parties] D, a bus company left a mini-bus parked in a public place with the keys in the ignition, the bus was stolen, and, in the course of the theft, was involved in an accident in which a woman cyclist was killed. C, her husband (and daughter) brought an action against the bus company for negligence. The vehicle was left at a changeover point that normally took 8 minutes, on this occasion it rested there for nine hours. Held: The bus company may have been negligent to leave the bus with the keys in, in an easily accessible place, they could not be held responsible for the accident as it had occurred through the voluntary act of a third party over whom they had no control C lost [Tort - negligence - duty of care - created by contract] D decorator was left alone on the premises by the householder's wife. During her absence, he left the house to obtain wall-paper. He failed to secure the behind him. During the his absence a thief entered the house and stole property. Held: 1. A duty of care was created by the contractual relationship. 2. It was a breach of that duty to leave the front door insecure 3. As a direct result of that breach of duty that the theft occurred. C won

Stansbie v Troman

Jebson v Ministry of Defence

The claimant, a soldier, suffered severe injuries after a night out drinking organised by the MOD. The claimant was transported with 19 other soldiers in the back of an army vehicle with a canvass roof. On the return journey the claimant and other soldiers were very drunk. The senior officer travelled in the front of the vehicle and was unable to see what was going on in the back of the vehicle. The claimant climbed on to the tailgate and attempted to climb on to the roof. He fell and was struck by a lorry. The trial judge held that whilst it was foreseeable that an injury may occur by high spirits and stumbling inside the vehicle it was not foreseeable the claimant would attempt to climb on the roof and therefore the damage was too remote as it had not occurred in a foreseeable manner. Held: It was foreseeable that injury (whether slight or serious) would occur as a result of the drunken and rowdy behaviour of the passengers, including the danger that someone would fall from the vehicle as a result, such wider risk being apt to include within its description the accident which actually happened.

Attorney General v Hartwell (British Virgin Islands) [2004]

PC Laurent was the sole police officer stationed on the island of Jost Van Dyke,a small island with a population of about 135 people in the British Virgin Islands. Laurent was still on probation and was subject to daily supervisory visits by a police sergeant from a nearby larger island. As the sole officer, PC Laurent had a key to the police station's strongbox which contained a gun. One night he took the gun and went to a restaurant where his wife was associating with another man (the Claimant). He then fired four shots injuring the two in addition to a tourist in the restaurant. The claimant brought an action against the police for allowing a probationary officer to have access to a gun.

Held: A duty of care is owed by the police authorities in entrusting officers with guns.

Lord Nicholls: "In the view of their Lordships the appropriate analysis is that when entrusting a police officer with a gun the police authorities owe to the public at large a duty to take reasonable care to see the officer is a suitable person to be entrusted with such a dangerous weapon lest by any misuse of it he inflicts personal injury, whether accidentally or intentionally, on other persons. For this purpose no distinction is to be drawn between personal injuries inflicted in the course of police duties and personal injuries inflicted by a police officer using a police gun for his own ends. If this duty seems far-reaching in its scope it must be remembered that guns are dangerous weapons. The wide reach of the duty is proportionate to the gravity of the risks."

Moy -v- Pettman Smith (a firm) and another; HL 3-Feb-2005

Damages were claimed against a barrister for advice on a settlement given at the door of the court. After substantial litigation, made considerably more difficult by the negligence of the solicitors, the barrister had not advised the claimant at the door of the court to accept an offer. The claimant was not advised as to potential difficulties in having essential evidence admitted, and the evidence was not admitted, and a much lower sum was received. The court of appeal had found the advice itself not to be negligent, but that she should have given the client more detailed advice. Held: The question whether her advice was negligent has to be judged in the light of the choices that were available in the light of her assessment. She had to balance the possibility of her clients desire to achieve a full settlement against the loss of a chance to sue the solicitors for negligence. it is the substance of the advice, not the precise wording used to convey it, that needs to be examined in order to judge whether it was negligent. The significance of Miss Perrys failure to tell Mr Moy that the prospects of getting the evidence in were 50/50 has to be measured against what she did tell him, which was that she was hopeful that the judge would admit the evidence. The court of appeal had been wrong to disturb the finding that the barrister had not been negligent: it was not incumbent upon the appellant to spell out all her reasoning, so she was not in breach of her duty of care to the claimant in the advice which she gave. As to the right of the solictors to appeal: section 1(5) of the 1978 Act should be so construed as not to bar an appeal in a case such as the present. This could be done in either or both of two ways. One could construe the word judgment as referring to a final judgment after any appeals have been determined, rather than the judgment at first instance of the trial judge; or one could confine the operation of the subsection to actions for contribution subsequently brought, so excluding further proceedings by way of appeal in the original action. Whichever construction one adopts, I consider that the solicitors right of appeal to the Court of Appeal was not barred by the operation of section 1(5)

Hall v Simons (2000) HL

^[Tort - negligence duty no duty situations - breach - professionals immunity advocates not a special case] One of several cases (conjoined cases) on similar issues, where claimants had done less well than they would but for negligence of their legal advisers. Held: It was no longer in the public interest that advocates should enjoy immunity from being sued for negligent acts concerned with the conduct of litigation whether in civil or criminal proceedings. Change of rule on lawyers immunity

Al-Kandari V J R Brown & Co

Recognized the duty of a lawyer towards 3rd arty only because the lawyers byundertaking to keep the Client's passport with them had assumed the responsibility to make sure that harm did not come to the 3rd party. Since the client had somehow obtained the passport the lawyers had breached this assumed duty towards the 3rd party

McKay v Essex AHA (1982) CA

^[Tort - negligence - duty of care - public policy - wrongful birth creates no cause of action] DD, the doctors who did not advise a mother to have an abortion. C was born disabled as a result of an infection of rubella (German measles) suffered by her mother while the child was in her womb. The child claimed damages on the ground that she had been "suffered entry into a life in which her injuries are highly debilitating," and for distress, loss and damage. Held: There is no claim in law which allows a child born alive with deformities to claim damages for negligence against doctors in allowing it to be born alive. The doctor was under no legal obligation under the Abortion Act 1967 to the foetus to terminate its life, and the child's claim was contrary to public policy as a violation of the sanctity of human life, and a claim which could not be recognised since the court could not evaluate damages for the denial of nonexistence The effect of the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 was that no child born after the passing of the Act could have a cause of action based on the loss of a chance to die. C lost

McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [2000]

A father, wishing to limit the size of his family to six children, underwent a vasectomy. Months later his surgeon confirmed the success of the operation and that he need not use contraception. The man subsequently made his wife pregnant and the family sought damages from the Health Board for the costs of raising the child. Held, the vasectomy was intended to stop pregnancy and therefore the mother could claim for costs in that regard only. However, the costs around raising the child could not be recovered as it would not be fair just or reasonable to impose such a burden on a liability for financial loss on a doctor. (This is a case where a healthy child was born due to failed sterilization)

Parkinson v St James and (This is a case where a disabled child was born as a result of a failed Seacroft University Hospital NHS sterilization) Trust 2001 FACTS:The Claimant underwent a sterilisation procedure, but this was unsuccessful and she conceived a fifth child, with severe learning difficulties. She brought a claim against the health authority and the matter came before the Court of Appeal. JUDGMENT:The courts awarded her "all costs that she would incur which were attributable to the childs disabilities." A healthy mother who gave birth to a severely disabled child after a negligently performed sterilisation could not claim the whole cost of bringing up the child but that she could recover the additional costs resulting from the childs disability.

Rees -v- Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust; HL 16-Oct2003

Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence (1996) CA

The claimant was disabled, and sought sterilisation because she feared the additional difficulties she would face as a mother. The sterilisation failed. She sought damages. Held: Any disabled woman who gives birth to a normal, healthy child after a negligently performed sterilisation operation is not entitled to sue for the extra childcare costs she incurs because of her disability, the House of Lords ruled last week. However there should be a standardised award, set at 15.000. No damages should be awarded for the extra costs of parenthood arising from a mothers own disability. [Tort negligence - duty of care - no duty situations - just fair and reasonable public policy employers liability] D, responsible for the army and therefore its soldiers, employed a gun commander during the Gulf War. C an artilleryman sustained damage to his hearing when a howitzer was fired accidentally. Held: A serviceman owes no duty of care to his fellow servicemen in battle conditions, since as a matter of common sense and public policy it would not be fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty. For the same reason the Ministry of Defence as Cs employer does not have a duty to provide a safe system of work in those circumstances.

C lost Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ A referee of an adult rugby match was held liable for injuries suffered by 318 (11 March 2003) players during the course of the match. The court found that Rugby was a dangerous game and found that the safety of the players relied on the due enforcement of the rules. The referee owed a duty of care to all players in the match. The referee had failed to comply with particular rules and this was found to be the cause of the Defendants injuries,. Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92 The claimant was a pregnant fishwife. She got off a tram and as she reached to get her basket off the tram, the defendant drove his motorcycle past the tram at excessive speed and collided with a car 50 feet away from where the claimant was standing. The defendant was killed by the impact. The claimant heard the collusion but did not see it. A short time later, the claimant walked past where the incident occurred. The body had been removed but there was a lot of blood on the road. The claimant went into shock and her baby was still born. She brought a negligence claim against the defendant's estate. Held: No duty of care was owed by the defendant to the claimant. There was not sufficient proximity between the claimant and defendant when the incident occurred. Palsgraf v Long Island Railway Co [Tort negligence - duty of care to whom owed - foreseeability of damage] (1928) New York Appeals D employed a railway worker who carelessly knocked a box to the ground. Unknown to him it contained fireworks which exploded on impact; the blast knocked a weighing machine onto C standing some distance away. Held: injury to C was not foreseeable from the mere dropping of a box, and D was not liable for Cs injuries. C lost

Haley v London Electricity Board

Some workmen were digging a trench in a pavement. They went off to lunch. They had nothing to fence of the trench so they left a shovel and pick at one end and a punner at the other end to warn pedestrians. The claimant, a blind man, tripped on the punner and fell hitting his head. As a result of the fall he became deaf. The defendant argued they had done all that was necessary to warn an ordinary person of the danger and there was no need to take extra precautions for blind persons as it was not foreseeable that a blind person would be walking unaided down that street. Held: The defendant was in breach of duty. It was foreseeable that a blind person might walk down the street and they should be given appropriate protection

Urbanski v Patel

Facts Patel, a surgeon, removed the only kidney of Shirley Firman believing that it was an ovarian cyst. As a result, she had to be placed on dialysis until she could find a kidney. Urbanski, Shirley's father, tried to donate his kidney to her, but it was rejected. Urbanski brought an action for the losses he experienced from the removal of his kidney. Issue Is donating a kidney a reasonable action attempting to protect his daughter from the harms of the doctor's negligence? Decision Judgment for the plaintiffs. Reasons Wilson found that in the medical world, the donating of a kidney is accepted as a usual solution to a problem of this type. As a result, Urbanski was acting perfectly reasonably. This case, therefore, follows the ratio of Haynes v Harwood and Urbanski was entitled to recover. Professional Negligence, Health Professions The doctor executed a vasectomy, and advised the plaintiff that he need no longer take contraceptive precautions. Held: No duty fell on a doctor to advise on the possibility of the failure of a vasectomy toward possible future sexual partners of the subject of the operation. The law could not extend a duty to a possible future partner. That was a tenuous relationship. Defendants had installed water mains along the street with hydrants located at various points. One of the hydrants across from Plaintiffs house developed a leak as a result of exceedingly cold temperatures and caused water damage to the house. Plaintiff sued for negligence. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The defendants might have been liable for negligence, if, unintentionally, they omitted to do that which a reasonable person would have done, or did that which a person taking reasonable precautions would not have done.

Goodwill -v- British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1996]

Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks (1856) Exch

Glasgow Corporation v Muir (1943),

A group of children were having a day out with their Sunday school. They were meant to be having a picnic, but the rain had ruined it. The leader of the trip asked the manager of a tearoom, run by Glasgow Corporation, if she would allow the children to have their picnic on their premises. She agreed and the group entered. In the tearoom there was a tuck shop, the window to which was located midway along a corridor. The children had all started to line up along the corridor to buy sweets at the tuck shop. At this time a large tea urn was being carried along the corridor by two adults, to the main room of the tearoom. Somehow, and it is still unknown how, the tea urn overturned and scalded a young girl (Muir). The parents of the girl sued Glasgow Corporation, claiming that they owed the child a duty of care and that they had breached this. The court held that the manageress in charge owed a duty of care, generally, to everyone in the tearoom. However, she did not owe a duty of care to the Sunday school, to take additional precautions to prevent their being injured as a result of her allowing them to enter. So long as the tearoom was run in the same manner as it was day to day, and to the same safety standards, she was not required to take extra steps to prevent the incident which occurred. It was not reasonably foreseeable that allowing the children to come into the premises would result in one of them being scalded. As such, the incident was put down as an accident which could not have been prevented. The reasonable man is presumed to be free both from over-apprehension and from over-confidence, i.e., The reasonable man has been described as the man on the street or the man on the Clapham omnibus

Willsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988]

A premature baby was given too much oxygen by a junior doctor. The baby suffered from a condition affecting his retina which left him totally blind in one eye and partially sighted in the other. The condition could have been caused by the excess oxygen he had been exposed to or it could have been caused by four other factors unrelated to the oxygen, but related to the premature birth. The trial judge found the Health Athority liable. He applied McGhee v NCB but stated that McGhee had reversed the burden of proof where there was more than one possible causes. The Health Authority appealed. Held: Appeal allowed. The defendant was in breach of duty. A junior doctor owes the same standard of care as a qualified doctor. McGhee did not reverse the burden of proof which always remains on the claimant.

Phillips v William Whiteley Ltd [1938] KBD

^[Tort negligence - breach - standards of professionals] D (a jeweller), employed a man to pierce Cs ears, two weeks later she developed an infection that caused an abscess on her neck that required surgical draining. Held: A jeweller is not bound to take the same precautions as a surgeon would take, and D had taken all reasonable precautions. C was unable to prove that the operation was negligently performed, and that the abscess which formed in her neck was due to the negligence. C lost

Shakoor v. Situ (t/a Eternal Health Mr Abdul Shakoor went to a Nottingham based Chinese herbalist, which traded Co) [2000] 4 All ER 181 as the "Eternal Health Co."[1] Mr Kang Situ, who ran the herbalist had trained for five years in China, gaining both a traditional "medicine" and "modern" medical qualifications. His grade was "excellent". He had no British professional medical qualifications. In November 1994, Mr Situ prescribed a course of Chinese herbal remedies for Mr Shakoor's benign lipomata, a skin condition, which produces fatty tissue that lies just below the skin, but causes no risk to health. There is no treatment in the UK, except surgical removal. Mr Shakoor was given a mix of twelve herbs in ten sachets which were to be taken on alternate days after a meal. After nine doses Mr Shakoor got ill, nauseous, his eyes went yellow and he suffered heartburn. He vomited, and had abdominal pain. He went to hospital, and was diagnosed as having "probably hepatitis A". His liver failed, he had hepatic necrosis. He had an operation, but he died in January 1995. In the post-mortem, his liver was found to contain Bai Xian Pi, or dictamnus dasycarpus, which some evidence suggested could be hepatotoxic. A practitioner of traditional Chinese herbal medicine did not have to meet the standard of skill and care of a reasonably competent practitioner of orthodox medicine, but he did have to take account of relevant reports in orthodox medical journals. In this case the prescription had not been inappropriate for a reasonable herbalist, and accordingly Mr Situ of the Eternal Health Co. was not liable for the death of Mr Shakoor. Nettleship v Weston [1971] 3 WLR 370 The defendant was a learner driver. She was taking lessons from a friend. The friend checked that the defendant's insurance covered her for passengers before agreeing to go out with her. On one of the lessons Mrs Weston turned a bend, Mr Nettleship told her to straighten the wheel but Mrs Weston panicked and failed to straighten the wheel. She approached the pavement and Mr Nettleship grabbed the handbrake and tried to straighten the wheel but it was too late. She mounted the pavement and hit a lamp post. Mr Nettleship fractured his knee. The defendant argued that the standard of care should be lowered for learner drivers and she also raised the defence of volenti non fit injuria in that in agreeing to get in the car knowing she was a learner, he had voluntarily accepted the risk. Held: A learner driver is expected to meet the same standard as a reasonable qualified competent driver. Volenti did not apply as he had checked the insurance cover which demonstrated he did not waive any rights to compensation. His damages were reduced by 50% under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 to reflect the degree to which he was also at fault.

Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority

The patient presented with symptoms of tuberculosis but both the consultant physician and the consultant surgeon took the view that Hodgkin's disease, carcinoma, and sarcoidosis were also possibilities, the first of which if present would have required remedial steps to be taken in its early stages. Instead of waiting for the results of the sputum tests, the consultants carried out a mediastinoscopy to get a biopsy. The inherent risk of damage was to the left laryngeal recurrent nerve, even if the operation was properly done. In the event, only tuberculosis was confirmed. Unfortunately, the risk became a reality and the patient suffered a paralysis of the left vocal cord. The decision of the physician and the surgeon to proceed was said by their expert peers to be reasonable in all the circumstances. A court may prefer one body of opinion to the other but that is no basis for a conclusion of negligence.

Whitehouse v. Jordan [1981] 1 All The claimant was a baby who suffered severe brain damage after a difficult ER 267: birth. The defendant, a senior hospital registrar, was supervising delivery in a high-risk pregnancy. After the mother had been in labour for 22 hours, the defendant used forceps to assist the delivery. The Lords found that the doctor's standard of care did not fall below that of a reasonable doctor in the circumstances and so the baby was awarded no compensation. Bolam v Friern Hospital The claimant was undergoing electro convulsive therapy as treatment for his Management Committee [1957] 1 mental illness. The doctor did not give any relaxant drugs and the claimant WLR 583 suffered a serious fracture. There was divided opinion amongst professionals as to whether relaxant drugs should be given. If they are given there is a very small risk of death, if they are not given there is a small risk of fractures. The claimant argued that the doctor was in breach of duty by not using the relaxant drug. Held: The doctor was not in breach of duty. The House of Lords formulated the Bolam test: "a medical professional is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art . . . Putting it the other way round, a man is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of opinion who would take a contrary view." Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1997] 3 WLR 1151 A 2 year old child was admitted to hospital suffering from breathing difficulties. A doctor was summoned but did not attend as her bleep was not working due to low battery. The child died. The child's mother brought an action claiming that the doctor should have attended and intubated the child which would have saved the child's life. The doctor gave evidence that had she attended she would not have intubated. Another doctor gave evidence that they would not have intubated. The trial judge applied the Bolam test and held that there was no breach of duty. The claimant appealed. Held: In applying the Bolam test where evidence is given that other practitioners would have adopted the method employed by the defendant, it must be demonstrated that the method was based on logic and was defensible.

Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital The claimant suffered from pain in her neck, right shoulder, and arms. Her Governors neurosurgeon took her consent for cervical cord decompression, but did not include in his explanation the fact that in less than 1% of the cases, the said decompression caused paraplegia. She developed paraplegia after the spinal operation. Rejecting her claim for damages, the court held that consent did not require an elaborate explanation of remote side effects. In dissent, Lord Scarman said that the Bolam test should not apply to the issue of informed consent and that a doctor should have a duty to tell the patient of the inherent and material risk of the treatment proposed. Rogers v. Whitaker. Australia The High Court of Australia affirmed the Supreme Court of New South Wales' determination that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of any material risk involved in a proposed treatment. A risk is considered material if a reasonable person in similar circumstances would attach significance to the risk, or if the doctor is, or should be, cognizant that the particular patient would express concern about the risk. The trial court overruled the precept that a doctor could not be found negligent in warning a patient if the doctor acted within the purview of common practice, even though other practitioners may follow different procedures and regardless of the particular patient's concerns. In this case, Maree Whitaker became essentially blind after an unsucessful operation on her right eye caused sympathetic ophthalmia in her left eye. Although there was no question that the surgery had been performed with the requisite skill and care, Ms. Whitaker petitioned the court for relief due to the failure of the ophthalmologist, Dr. Christopher Rogers, to warn her of the possibility (approximately 1 in 14,000) that the sympathetic ophthalmia condition could develop. The trial court's award of damages was affirmed because, in spite of Ms. Whitaker's expressed specific concern that her "good eye" not be harmed, Dr. Rogers did not inform her of the potential risks associated with the surgery.

Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304

Two 15 year old school girls were fighting with plastic rulers. A ruler snapped and a splinter went into one of the girls eyes causing blindness. The girl brought an action against the other girl for her negligent action. Held: The girl was only expected to meet the standard of a reasonable 15 year old school girl not that of a reasonable man. She was found not to be in breach of duty.

Blake v Galloway [2004] 3 All ER 315

The claimant, a 15 year old boy, was out with four of his friends including the defendant. The boys started throwing pieces of bark chippings and twigs at each other. The claimant did not join in at first but then threw a piece of bark chipping at the defendant hitting him in the leg. The defendant picked it up and threw it back at the claimant. The piece of bark struck the claimant's eye resulting in serious injury. The claimant brought an action contending that the injury was caused by the battery and or negligence of the defendant. The defendant raised volenti non fit injuria. The trial judge rejected the defence of volenti but held that the damages should be reduced by 50% under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. The defendant appealed contending that there was no breach of duty and that the judge was wrong to reject the defence of volenti. Held: Appeal allowed. In the context of 'horseplay' there is a breach of the duty of care only where the defendant's conduct amounts to recklessness or a very high degree of carelessness. The defendant had consented to the risk of injury occurring within the conventions and understanding of the game. Lord Justice Dyson: "If the defendant in the present case had departed from the tacit understandings or conventions of the play and, for example, had thrown a stone at the claimant, or deliberately aimed the piece of bark at the claimant's head, then there might have been a breach of the duty of care. But what happened here was, at its highest, "an error of judgment or lapse of skill" (to quote from Diplock LJ), and that is not sufficient to amount to a failure to take reasonable care in the circumstances of horseplay such as that in which these youths were engaged. In my view, the defendant's conduct came nowhere near recklessness or a very high degree of carelessness." The game was played on the basis that the objects were thrown at no particular part of the body. It follows that an object thrown in the general direction of a participant, without negligence and without intent to cause injury, The defendant drove his lorry into a shop owned by the claimant. At the time of the incident the defendant was had a malignant insulinoma which resulted in him being in a hyperglycaemic state although he was unaware of this. On the day of the crash he had also been involved in two minor incidents. Held: The defendant was not in breach of duty Leggatt LJ "In my judgment the standard of care that Mr Tarleton was obliged to show in these circumstances was that which is to be expected of a reasonably competent driver unaware that he is or may be suffering from a condition that impairs his ability to drive. To apply an objective standard in a way that did not take account of Mr Tarletons condition would be to impose strict liability. But that is not the law."

Mansfield v Weetabix [1997] EWCA Civ 1352

Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850

Miss Stone was injured when she was struck by a cricket ball outside her home. She brought an action against the cricket club in nuisance and negligence. The cricket field was surrounded by a 7 foot fence. The pitch was sunk ten feet below ground so the fence was 17 feet above the cricket pitch. The distance from the striker to the fence was about 78 yards and just under 100 yards from where the claimant was standing. A witness who lived in the same road as the claimant but close to pitch said that five or six times during the last 30 years he had known balls hit his house or come into the yard. Two members of the Club, of over 30 years' standing, agreed that the hit was altogether exceptional to anything previously seen on that ground. Held: No breach of duty. The likelihood of harm was low the defendant had taken all practical precautions in the circumstances. The cricket ground had been there for 90 years without injury and provided a useful service for the community.

Latimer v AEC [1953] AC 643

The claimant worked in the defendant's factory and slipped up on the factory floor. The factory had become flooded due to adverse weather conditions. The defendant's had put up warning signs mopped up and placed sawdust in the most used places to make it as safe as possible. The trial judge held that there had been a breach of duty as the defendants should have closed the factory if it was unnsafe. However, no argument had been advanced on this. Held: There was no breach of duty. There was no duty to close the factory. The defendant only had to take reasonable precautions to minimise the risk which they had done. There was no need to go to great expense to eliminate any possible risk and thus no obligation to close the factory.

Paris v Stepney [1951] AC 367

The claimant only had sight in one eye due to in injury sustained in the war. During the course of his employment as a garage hand, a splinter of metal went into his sighted eye causing him to become completely blind. The employer did not provide safety goggles to workers engaged in the type of work the claimant was undertaking. The defendant argued there was no breach of duty as they did not provide goggles to workers with vision in both eyes and it was not standard practice to do so. There was therefore no obligation to provide the claimant with goggles. Held: There was a breach of duty. The employer should have provided goggles to the claimant because the seriousness of harm to him would have been greater than that experienced by workers with sight in both eyes. The duty is owed to the particular claimant not to a class of persons of reasonable workers.

Watt v Hertfordshire [1954] 1 WLR 835

The claimant was a fireman. A woman had been involved in a traffic accident and was trapped underneath a lorry. This was 200-300 yards away from the fire station. The fire services were called to release the woman. They needed to transport a heavy lorry jack to the scene of the accident. The jack could not go on the fire engine and the normal vehicle for carrying the jack was not available. The fire chief ordered the claimant and other firemen to lift the jack on to the back of a truck. There was no means for securing the jack on the truck and the firemen were instructed to hold it on the short journey. In the event the truck braked and the jack fell onto the claimant's leg causing severe injuries. Held: There was no breach of duty. The emergency of the situation and utility of the defendant's conduct in saving a life outweighed the need to take precautions.

Read v Lyons [1947] AC 156

The claimant was employed by the defendant in their factory which made explosives for the Ministry of Supply. During the course of her employment an explosion occurred which killed a man and injured others including the claimant. There was no evidence that negligence had caused the explosion. At trial the judge held that the case was governed by the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and liability was therefore strict. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision as the rule in Rylands v Fletcher required an escape of the hazardous matter. The claimant appealed. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal. In the absence of any proof of negligence on behalf of the defendant or an escape of dangerous thing, there was no cause of action on which the claimant could succeed. [Tort negligence - duty of care - foreseeability of harm] A spinal anaesthetic had become contaminated through invisible cracks in the glass vial, when used, paralysed two patients. Held: The cracks were not foreseeable given the scientific knowledge of the time, The foreseeability of harm is clearly a major factor in determining how a reasonable person would act, and although actual foresight by D is generally irrelevant, a reasonable person would not have taken precautions against a risk of which reasonable people in that profession were not aware. D not liable.

Roe v Minister of Health [1954] CA

Jones v Boyce (1816)

The plaintiffs was a passenger on the top of the defendant's coach. Due to the breaking of a defective rein the coach was in danger of overturning. The plaintiff therefore jumped from the coach and broke his leg. In the event the coach was not upset. Held The plaintiff was successful i claiming for his injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant who allowed the defective rein t be used. The plaintiff was said to have acted as a reasonable and prudent person although he had selected the more dangerous of the two alternatives i.e. to jump form the coach instead of staying where he was. He was entitled to do so in the agony of the moment and was able to recover damages.

Luxmoore-May v Messenger May D valued two Stubbs paintings at 30; they eventually sold at auction for Baverstock (a firm) (1990) CA 88,000. Valuation of a picture of was not an exact science and in deciding not to attribute the picture to a particular artist a valuer was not necessarily guilty of professional negligence

Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes [1959]

a thirty-eight year old who had been a moulder all his working life was casting moulding boxes, the ladle of molten metal which he was holding slipped, and some of the metal splashed on to his left foot and, as he was not wearing protective spats or special boots, his foot was injured. He lost because he was experienced and should have guarded against the danger. This was an appeal against the decision of the Court of Exchequer in making absolute a rule to set aside the verdict for the defendants and for a new trial. The defendants were in possession of a warehouse, and were operating a certain crane or machine for lowering goods at the time of the accident. The Defendants and their servants were lowering the crane or machine, with bags of sugar onto the stone pavement in the Docks at St Katherines at the time of the accident. The Claimant, an officer of the Customs could not find who he was looking for, so made inquiries and was told he was in a warehouse, which was pointed out to him. When passing lawfully from the doorway of one warehouse to the other, he fell to the ground as six bags of sugar which were being lowered to the ground from the upper part of the warehouse by the crane fell on him. The Claimant said that he had no warning, and there was no fence or barrier to show persons that the place was dangerous, and nobody called out to him to stop him from going through the door or under the hoist. He also said that instantly before the bags fell he heard the rattling of a chain The Defendants pleaded not guilty. The learned Judge found that there was not sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of the Defendants to entitle him to leave the case to the jury. His Lordship then directed the jury to find verdict for the Defendants. Erle , C. J held that the majority of the Court came to the following conclusions. There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where the thing is shown to be under the management of the Defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care. The judges all agreed to the principles laid down in the cases cited for the Defendants although the judgment turned on the construction to be put on the Judges notes. Erle CJ and Mellor found that they could not find reasonable evidence of negligence which has been apparent to the rest of the Court. The judgment of the Court was affirmed, and the case was ordered to go to a

Scott v London and St Katherine Docks (1865) 3 H & C 596

Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298.

The first defendant was driving a coach owned by the second defendant westwards in the outer lane of a dual carriageway in Hong Kong. Suddenly the coach crossed the central reservation and collided with a public light bus travelling in the inner lane of the eastbound carriageway. One passenger in the bus was killed, and the driver and three other passengers were injured. The plaintiffs, who were those injured and the personal representatives of the deceased, commenced against the defendants an action claiming damages for negligence. At the trial the plaintiffs did not call oral evidence and relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, contending that the fact of the accident alone was sufficient evidence of negligence by the first defendant. The defendants called evidence which established that an untraced car being driven in the inner lane of the westbound carriageway had cut into the outer lane in front of the coach, and to avoid hitting the car the first defendant had braked and swerved to the right whereupon the coach had skidded across colliding with the bus. The judge gave judgment for the plaintiffs on liability holding that the defendants had failed to discharge the burden of disproving negligence. On appeal the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong reversed that decision and found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove negligence. On appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: Held, that it was misleading to talk of the burden of proof shifting to the defendant in a res ipsa loquitur situation because the burden of proving negligence rested throughout the case on the plaintiff (p 300L); that in an appropriate case the plaintiff established a prima facie case by relying upon the fact of the accident and if the defendant adduced no evidence there was nothing to rebut the inference of negligence and the plaintiff would have proved his case, but if the defendant did adduce evidence that evidence had to be evaluated to see if it was still reasonable to draw the inference of negligence from the mere fact of the accident (p 301D); that the judge had mislead himself by assuming that there was a legal burden on the defendants to disprove negligence and he had also failed to give effect to those authorities which established that a defendant placed in a position of peril and emergency had not to be judged byhospital too critical a standard hestomach acted onpains the spur the Mr Barnett went to complaining ofwhen severe andof vomiting. He was seen by a nurse who telephoned the doctor on duty. The doctor told her to send him home and contact his GP in the morning. Mr Barnett died five hours later from arsenic poisoning. Had the doctor examined Mr Barnett at the time there would have been nothing the doctor could have done to save him. Held: The hospital was not liable as the doctor's failure to examine the patient did not cause his death. Introduced the 'but for' test ie would the result have occurred but for the act or omission of the defendant? If yes, the defendant is not liable.

Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital [1969] 1 QB 428

Horsley v. MacLaren aka the ogopogo case 1971 (Canada)

MacLaren was the owner and captain of a boat called the "Ogopogo". He invited several friends out on his boat including Mr. Matthews, Mr. Horsley, and Mr. and Mrs. Jones. During their cruise, Matthews fell overboard into the icy water which caused him to have a heart attack and die. MacLaren backed the boat up to rescue Matthews not knowing if he was alive. Horsley jumped into the water to save Matthews but he was also overcome by the cold water. Mrs. Jones then jumped in to help them both. Mr. MacLaren moved the boat into a better position to rescue the three. In all, Mr. Matthews and Mr.Horsley were killed. The Court held that "encouragement by the common law of the rescue of persons in danger would ... go beyond reasonable bounds if it involved liability of one rescuer to a succeeding one where the former has not been guilty of any fault which could be said to have induced a second rescue attempt." The Donoghue v Stevenson case doesn't touch this principle, because it says that you have a duty to avoid causing harm, not a duty to help someone else. In the Court of Appeal for Ontario decision [1970] 2 O.R. 487, 11 D.L.R. (3d) 277, Arthur Jessup J said the Well-Known Quotes: "So, despite the moral outrage of the text writers, it appears presently the law that one can, with immunity, smoke a cigarette on the beach while ones neighbour drowns and, without a word of warning watch a child or blind person walk into certain danger".

McWilliams v Arrol [1962] HL

[Tort negligence - duty of care - causation] D a building firm had not provided a safety belt to a steel erector who fell 70 feet to his death. C the widow. D was in breach of its statutory duty to provide a safety belt (but not to insist that it be worn) but, there was evidence to show that the man would probably not have worn a belt even had it been provided. Held: The firm's negligence and breach of statutory duty were not the cause of his death. C lost

Chester v Afshar [2004] 3 WLR 927 House of Lords

The claimant had suffered back pain for 6 years. This became quite severe and at times she was unable to walk or control her bladder. An MRI scan revealed that there was disc protrusion into her spinal column and she was advised to have surgery. The surgery carried a 1-2% risk that even if it was performed without negligence the operation could worsen rather than improve her condition. Her consultant neurosurgeon Mr Afshar was under a duty to warn her of this risk although he failed to do so. The claimant had the operation and unfortunately it worsened her condition. The trial judge found that the surgeon had not been negligent in performing the operation but his failure to warn her of the risk was a breach of duty. The claimant argued that if she had been warned she would not have taken the decision to have the operation straight away but would have taken time to consider other options and discuss the risks with her family and would thus not have had the surgery on the day which she did have it. She did not say she would never have had the operation. The judge held that if she had the operation on another occasion it may have been successful. He therefore found for the claimant. The defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the defendant appealed to the House of Lords on the grounds of causation in that she was likely to have consented to the operation and that even if it had been on a different occassion it carried the same risk. Held: 3:2 decision (Lord Bingham & Lord Hoffman dissenting) appeal dismissed. Lord Hope: "To leave the patient who would find the decision difficult without a remedy, as the normal approach to causation would indicate, would render the duty useless in the cases where it may be needed most. This would discriminate against those who cannot honestly say that they would have declined the operation once and for all if they had been warned. I would find that result unacceptable. The function of fell theout lawof isa to enable to be and to The claimant as a school boy tree fromrights a height of vindicated 12 foot. He suffered a fracture to his hip and was taken to hospital. The hospital failed to diagnose his fracture and sent him home. He was in severe pain so he was taken back to hospital 5 days later where an X ray revealed his injury. He was treated and suffered an avascular necrosis which resulted in him having a permanent disability and a virtual certainty that he would develop osteoarthritis. According to medical evidence, had he been correctly diagnosed initially there was a 75% chance that he would have still developed this condition, but there was a 25% chance that he would have made a full recovery. The trial judge awarded damages of 11,500 based of 25% of 46,000 which was what would have been awarded if the claimant had shown that the defendant's conduct had caused the avascular necrosis of the hip. Held: The claimant had failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that the defendant's breach of duty had caused the necrosis since there was a 75% chance that it was caused by the fall. Therefore the claimant was not entitled to receive anything in respect of the necrosis.

Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750 House of Lords

Gregg v Scott

The defendant, Dr Scott, misdiagnosed negligently the plaintiff's malignant cancer, stating it to be benign. This had the effect of delaying Mr Gregg's treatment by nine months, reducing his chances of surviving ten years from 42% to 25%.[1] Under the earlier decision of Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority, the view taken at first instance, and by the Court of Appeal, the claimant could not establish the defendant had prevented him being cured, as his original chance of a cure was below 50%. The plaintiff argued that he was entitled to recover for the loss of the 17% chance the defendant had deprived him of.On appeal to the Lords, the majority upheld the earlier decision of Hotson, though Lord Nicholls (joined by Lord Hope) dissented in arguing that loss of a chance should be actionable: Chaplin, along with 6,000 others, entered a nation wide beauty contest and got through to the final stage where only 50 contestants were left. Hicks was to select the twelve winners from these remaining contestants. The winners were to be given theatrical engagement by him for three years at 5 per week. Hicks, in breach of his contract with Chaplin, prevented her from taking part in the final selection stage. The judge and jury awarded her damages of 100 for the opportunity she lost in being prevented from taking part in the final selection stage. Where by contract a man has a right to belong to a limited class of competitors for a prize, a breach of that contract by reason of which he is prevented from continuing a member of the class and is thereby deprived of his chance of obtaining the prize is a breach in respect of which he may be entitled to recover substantial, and not merely nominal, damages. The existence of a contingency which is dependent on the volition of a third person does not necessarily render the damages for a breach of contract incapable of assessment.

Chaplin v Hicks

Spring v. Guardian Assurance PLC.

In this case the claimant had been employed by an insurance firm and when it was discovered that he was planning to leave and join a rival firm he was dismissed. When the rival firm asked for a reference, the former employer stated that the employee had deliberately mis-sold insurance policies to clients, had acted dishonestly and had creamed off the most profitable business for himself, and had been dismissed as a result. Due to this unfavourable and inaccurate reference the employee was not only unable to get a job for several years but was also struck off the insurance industry register. Initially the Court of Appeal overruled the precedent set in Lawton, but the case was then appealed again to the House of Lords which took a very different view.

Allied Maples v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 4 All ER 907

The defendant solicitors were acting for the claimant in a takeover of the Gillow group of companies. The defendant's failed to warn the claimant of potential liability that may arise under the transaction. The transaction was completed and risk of liability became a reality leaving the claimant liable to pay substantial sums. The claimant sought to recover some of this from the defendant arguing that if they had been advised correctly there was a chance that they would have been able to negotiate out of the liability. Held: The claimant was entitled to recover a sum to reflect their loss of a chance of negotiating out of liability. Where the result depends on what a third party would have done in a hypothetical situation, the claimant only has to demonstrate that there was a more than speculative chance rather than on the balance of probabilities. The assessment of the chance will be reflected in the damages.

Cutler v Vauxhall Motors

the claimant grazed his right ankle in an accident caused by the defendants. The injury caused an ulcer to form and, because the claimant had been suffering for some time from varicose veins in both legs, an immediate operation was necessary. He claimed damages from the defendants for the pain and discomfort of the operation but the Court of Appeal held that since the claimant would very probably have needed a similar operation within ve years in any case, the defendants negligence could not be regarded as the cause of the operation. Dillon v Twin State Gas & Electric Facts: Co (1932), 85 NH 449, 163 A 111. Defendant maintained wires to carry electric current over a large public bridge. Wires ran across bridge a foot above the horizontal girders. Wires were insulated for weather protection but not against contact. Deceased and other boys had played on the bridge for many years. Deceased, sitting on a horizontal girder, lost balance and instinctively grabbed the wires to save himself from falling. He was electrocuted Issue(s): What is the extent of the defendants liability in causing the plaintiffs loss? Ratio: If a defendant would have died but for the negligence of the tortfeasor, the tortfeasor will not be liable. (If the defendant would have been seriously injured, the damages awarded will be decreased) Analysis: The deceased, in falling from bridge was entitled to no protection from the defendant to keep from falling. Liability is only in exposing deceased to the danger of charged wires. But for the current, the deceased would have been killed or seriously injured from the fall. Therefore, the defendant deprived him, not of a life of normal expectancy, but of one too short to result in any economic loss.

Cook v Lewis, [1951] SCR 830

All of the parties were hunting. Lewis was hiding in a bush, and his brother tried to warn Cook and his companions of this but it was misunderstood. A few grouses flew out of the bush, and Cook and his companions fired shots. Lewis was hit in the face, and lost an eye. Cook and his companions gave statements claiming that they could not have shot Lewis. The jury found that it was one of their shots that hit him, but they could not decide whose shot it was. The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, which Cook appealed. When there are two parties, and it is proven that one of their actions caused harm, but it cannot be proven which one it was, who, if anyone, is liable? The decision in the lower court was based upon the general Canadian rule that stated that when it is certain that one of two individuals committed the offence, but it is uncertain which one was the guilty agent, then neither of them can be convicted. Appeal dismissed. When there are two parties, and it is proven that one of them caused harm in their actions but it cannot be proven which party actually did it, then both of them are liable for the resulting damages.

Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467

The claimant suffered an injury to his leg when the defendant ran into him in his car. He suffered pain and loss of amenity and had to take a lower paid job. He tried various different employments some of which he had to discontinue because of his injury. He was employed sorting through scrap metal when he sustained a further injury to his leg. He was on his own when two men came in and demanded money. When he refused they shot him in his injured leg. As a result of the shooting, the claimant had to have his leg amputated. The defendant argued that the second injury removed the very limb from which the earlier disability had stemmed, and that therefore no loss suffered thereafter can be attributed to the defendant's negligence. Arguing that the second injury submerged or obliterated the effect of the first and that all loss thereafter must be attributed to the second injury. The trial judge rejected this argument which he said was more ingenious than attractive. But it was accepted by the Court of Appeal. House of Lords held: The defendant remained liable for the loss of amenity and lower earning capacity even after the amputation.

Jobling v Associated Dairies [1982] AC 794 House of Lords

Mr Jobling, a butcher, slipped on the floor at his place of work due to his employer's negligence. He injured his back which caused him to reduce his earning capacity to 50% of what it was. He then developed an independent back condition which was unrelated to the injury which left him unable to work. The trial judge applied Baker v Willoughby and held that the claimant was entitled to recover damages beyond the onset to the back condition. The employer appealed. Held: The House of Lords distinguished Baker v Willoughby and stated where the victim is overtaken before trial by a wholly unconnected and disabling illness, the decision had no application. The House of Lords were critical of the decision in Baker v Willoughby but stopped short of overruling it.

Fairchild v Glenhaven [2002] 3 WLR 89 House of Lords

This was a conjoined appeal involving three claimants who contracted mesothelioma, a form of lung cancer contracted by exposure to asbestos. Mesothelioma can be caused by a single fibre of asbestos. The condition does not get worse the greater the exposure. Once the fibre has embedded into the lung it can lay dormant for 30-40 years before giving rise to a tumour which can then take 10 years to kill. It will be only the last 1-2 years where a person may experience symptoms. By this time it is too late to treat. Each of the claimants had been exposed to asbestos by a number of different employers. They were unable to demonstrate, and medical science was unable to detect, which employer exposed each of them to the one fatal fibre. Held: If the claimants could demonstrate that one employer had materially increased the risk of contracting mesothelioma they were entitled to claim full compensation from that one employer

McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 House of Lords

The claimant worked at the defendant's brick works. His normal duties did not expose him to much dust but he was then asked to work on the brick kilns in a hot a dusty environment. The defendant was in breach of duty in not providing washing and showering facilities. The claimant thus had to cycle home still covered in the brick dust. The claimant contracted dermatitis. There were two possible causes: the brick dust he was exposed to during the course of his employment which was not attributable to a breach of duty and the brick dust he was exposed to on his journey home which was attributable to a breach. The defendant sought to distinguish Wardlaw's case by arguing that it was proved that every particle of dust inhaled played its part in causing the onset of the disease whereas in this case it is not proved that every minor abrasion played its part. Held: The claimant only had to demonstrate that the dust attributable to the breach of duty materially increased the risk of him contract dermatitis. Lord Salmon: My Lords, I would suggest that the true view is that, as a rule, when it is proved, on a balance of probabilities, that an employer has been negligent and that his negligence has materially increased the risk of his employee contracting an industrial disease, then he is liable in damages to that employee if he contracts the disease notwithstanding that the employer is not responsible for other factors which have materially contributed to the disease.

Barker v Corus, [2006] 3 All ER 785

Barker was exposed to asbestos in his course of employment with several employers, but also in the course of self-employment. He developed mesothelioma and sued for damages. He was unsuccessful at the lower courts and appealed to the House of Lords. Does it matter that the plaintiff was one of the parties that might have contributed to the injury? Hoffman, in the majority, states that the purpose of Fairchild can be applied here. He states that it does not matter that Barker was one of the parties that helped cause the injury - the liability of the other two parties depends only on their own actions and not on those of other parties. Therefore, the other two parties are still liable however the damages are divided according to the probability of each respondant causing the harm. In the dissent, Rodger of Earlsferry states that Fairchild cannot apply here because it tips the scales too far in favour of Barker. It is essentially stating that in cases exactly like this a plaintiff recovers unconditionally, however if the case only differs a little bit then plaintiffs cannot recover for suffering the increased risk of an injury. He also talks about how dividing damages is bad, because claimants often end up with only a small proportion of the damages that they deserve. Appeal allowed. Fairchild applies even if the plaintiff himself is one of the causes of the injury, but the damages are divided up based on the probability of each partys actions causing the harm.

Bonnington Castings Ltd v The claimant contracted pneumoconiosis by inhaling air which contained Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 House of minute Lords particles of silica during the course of his employment. The defendant was in breach of a statutory duty in failing to provide an extractor fan. Had they installed an extractor fan the number of particles of silica that the claimant was exposed to would have been reduced, however, there would still be some particles present. There were thus two possible causes: the guilty dust, which should not have been in the working environment and the innocent dust, which would have been present in any event. The trial judge held that where the duty arose by statute then it was for the defendant to show that his breach of duty (the guilty dust) did not cause the disease. As the defendant was unable to do this they were liable. The defendant appealed contending the burden of proof rests on the claimant. Held: The burden of proof remains on the claimant. However, the claimant only had to demonstrate that the guilty dust had made a material contribution to the disease. He did not have to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that the guilty dust was the sole cause of the disease Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155 House of Lord The claimant had suffered from ME over a period of time and was in recovery when he was involved in a minor car accident due to the defendant's negligence. The claimant was not physically injured in the collision but the incident triggered his ME and had become chronic and permanent so that he was unable to return to his job as a teacher. He was successful at his trial and awarded 162,000 in damages. Held: Provided some kind of personal injury was foreseeable it did not matter whether the injury was physical or psychiatric. There was thus no need to establish that psychiatric injury was foreseeable. Also the fact that an ordinary person would not have suffered the injury incurred by the claimant was irrelevant as the defendant must take his victim as he finds him under the thin skull rule. Some Stevedores carelessly dropped a plank of wood into the hold of a ship. The plank struck something as it was falling which caused a spark. The spark was ignited by petrol vapours resulting in the destruction of the ship. The arbitrator held that the causing of the spark could not have been anticipated and therefore no liability arose. The claimant appealed. Held: There was no requirement that the damage was foreseeable. The defendant was liable for all the direct consequences of their action. NB This was overruled in Wagon Mound No 1

Re Polemis & Furness Withy & Company Ltd. [1921] 3 KB 560

The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] AC 388 House of Lords

The defendant's vessel, The Wagon Mound, leaked furnace oil at a Wharf in Sydney Harbour. Some cotton debris became embroiled in the oil and sparks from some welding works ignited the oil. The fire spread rapidly causing destruction of some boats and the wharf. Held: Re Polemis should no longer be regarded as good law. A test of remoteness of damage was substituted for the direct consequence test. The test is whether the damage is of a kind that was foreseeable. If a foreseeable type of damage is present, the defendant is liable for the full extent of the damage, no matter whether the extent of damage was foreseeable.

Tremain v Pike [1969] 1 WLR 1556

The farm labourer contracted leptosporosis from handling materials on which rats had urinated. Held: The defendant was not liable. It was not known at the time that leptosporosis could be transmitted in this way. Whilst it was foreseeable he may contract the disease by a rat bite the way he contracted the disease was not foreseeable.

Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837 House of Lords

Two boys aged 8 and 10 went exploring an unattended man hole. The man hole had been left by workmen taking a break. It was surrounded by a tent and some paraffin lamps were left to warn road users of the danger. The boys took a lamp down the hole. One of them dropped the lamp and an unforeseeable explosion occurred resulting in extensive burns. Held: The damage was not too remote it was foreseeable that the boys may suffer a burn from the lamp. The fact that the burn resulted from an unforeseeable explosion did not prevent the type of damage being foreseeable.

Jolley v Sutton [2000] 1 WLR 1082

Two 14 year old boys found an abandoned boat on land owned by the council and decided to do it up. The boat was in a thoroughly rotten condition and represented a danger. The council had stuck a notice on the boat warning not to touch the boat and that if the owner did not claim the boat within 7 days it would be taken away. The council never took it away. The boys had been working on the boat for 6-7 weeks when one of them suffered severe spinal injuries, resulting in paraplegia, when the boat fell on top of him. The boys had jacked the boat up to work on the underside and the jack went through the rotten wood. The claimant brought an action under the Occupiers Liability Act 1984. The trial judge found for the claimant. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that whilst it was foreseeable that younger children may play on the boat and suffer an injury by falling through the rotten wood, it was not foreseeable that older boys would try to do the boat up. The claimant appealed. House of Lords held: The claimant's appeal was allowed. The risk was that children would "meddle with the boat at the risk of some physical injury" The actual injury fell within that description. Lord Steyn: "The scope of the two modifiers - the precise manner in which the injury came about and its extent - is not definitively answered by either The Wagon Mound (No. 1) or Hughes v. Lord Advocate. It requires determination in the context of an intense focus on the circumstances of each case."

Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Company [1964] 1 QB 518

An asbestos lid was accidentally knocked into a cauldron of molten liquid. A few moments later an explosion occurred. The claimant was standing close by and suffered burns from the explosion. The explosion occurred as a result of the asbestos reacting with the chemicals in the liquid in the high temperature. At the time of the incident it was not known that the asbestos could react in that way. Held:

The damage was too remote. It was not foreseeable that an explosion would occur. Whilst it may be foreseeable the lid may have caused a splash resulting in a scold, it was not foreseeable that an explosion would occur resulting in burns Smith v Leech Brain [1962] 2 QB A widow brought a claim against the defendant under the Fatal Accidents Act 405 for the death of her husband. The defendant employed the husband. As a result of their negligence he incurred a burn to his lip. The lip contained precancerous cells which were triggered by the injury sustained. He died three years later from cancer. Held: The burn was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence and this resulted in the death. The defendant was liable for his death. It was not necessary to show that death by cancer was foreseeable, nor that an ordinary person would not have died from the injury. The egg shell skull rule applies and the defendant must take his victim as he finds him.

Robinson v Post Office [1974] CA [Civil Process negligence standard of proof chain or causation] D employed C who slipped on a ladder at work because of oil on the step. C suffered a minor injury. At hospital, he was given an anti-tetanus injection. He contracted encephalitis due to an allergy of which he was previously unaware. Held: The hospital was negligent but not liable, since even the proper procedure would not have revealed the allergy. C's employers, on the other hand, were legally responsible for the encephalitis as well as for the minor injury: if a wrongdoer ought to foresee that as a result of his wrongful act the victim may require medical treatment then he is liable for the consequences of the treatment applied although he could not reasonably foresee those consequences. Lamb v Camden LBC [1981] 2 All The defendant council negligently fractured a water pipe outside the claimant's ER 408 Court of Appeal house. This caused extensive damage and the property had to be vacated. One year later the council had not undertaken the repairs. Squatters had also moved in and caused further damage. The claimant arranged for repairs to be done herself and submitted a bill to the council for the repairs and damage caused by the squatters. Held: The local authority was not liable for the acts of the squatters. It was not foreseeable that squatters would move into an empty house in Camden and cause damage despite the prevalence of such behaviour in Camden at the time. the defendant council owned adjoining premises. Number 142 was let to the claimant, and #144 was divided into flats. There was no lock on #144, and thieves entered #142 by knocking a hole through the adjoining wall. The Court of Appeal held that the defendants were not liable, mere foreseeability was not sufficient to establish a duty. Policy factors are at work here; the claimant would be insured against this type of loss. As a result of Mr John's negligent driving his car overturned in a tunnel. Two police officers on motorcycles arrived at the scene. The senior officer instructed them both to ride their motorcycles to the other side of the tunnel and close the entrance to the tunnel as he had forgotten to close it earlier. They took the decision of driving on through the tunnel on the wrong side of the road on a blind bend rather than going the long way round. Unfortunately one of the officers, Mr Knightly, was involved in a head on collision with an oncoming vehicle driven by Mr Cotton and sustained serious injuries. He brought an action against Mr Cotton, Mr John, the senior officer and the Chief Constable of West Midlands. The main contentious point was whether Mr. John remained liable or whether the actions of the other defendant's and the claimant amounted to a novus actus interveniens. Held: The senior officer's instructions and failure to close the entrance to the tunnel were negligent and broke the chain of causation. The claimant's decision in going through the tunnel was not negligent. Thus the claimant was entitled to full damages from the senior officer and Mr John was not liable

Perl (Exporters) Ltd v Camden London Borough Council (1984),

Knightley v Johns & Ors [1982] 1 WLR 349 Court of Appeal

Reeves v Commissioner of Police Martin Lynch committed suicide whilst in a police cell. He had attempted of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 suicide earlier that day in the cells at the magistrates. He had also attempted House of Lords suicide on previous occasions. He had been seen by a doctor at the police station on arrival who reported that he was not schizophrenic or depressed but was a suicide risk. The custody officer checked him at 1.57 pm and left the hatch open. He was found at 2.05 pm having used his shirt as a ligature secured by the open hatch. He was unable to be resuscitated and died a week later. The defendant argued that as Lynch was of sound mind his voluntary and informed act of suicide broke the chain of causation. Held: The act of suicide was the very thing that the police were under a duty to prevent to treat this as a novus actus interveniens would deprive the duty of any substance. Therefore the defendant was liable, however damages were reduced by 50% under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.

McKew v Holland [1969] 3 All ER The claimant sustained an injury at work due to his employer's breach of duty. 1621 He strained his back and hips and his leg was prone to giving way. Whilst in this state he attempted to climb down a steep concrete staircase without a handrail unaided. He got part way down and felt his leg give way so he jumped 10 steps to the bottom. He suffered a fractured right ankle and was also left with a permanent disability. The defendant accepted liability for the injury sustained during his employment but disputed liability for the second injuries resulting from the claimant's action in jumping down the stairs. Held: The claimant's action amounted to a novus actus interveniens because his action in attempting to climb the steps unaided knowing that his leg might give way was unreasonable. The defendant was therefore not liable for the injuries resulting from the incident on the stairs. Weiland v Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd (1969) where the claimant was unable to adjust her bifocals as a result of a neck injury caused by the defendants negligence. She was worried about catching public transport in such a condition and went to her sons office to ask for a lift home. On the way into the office she fell down a flight of stairs and was injured. The claimant was held to have been acting reasonably; the defendant was liable for those injuries.

Kirkham v CC Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283 Court of Appeal

Mr Kirkham was an alcoholic and suffered from depression. He had made a two suicide attempts on 6th Jan 1980. He was admitted to hospital but discharged himself the following day. When he arrived home his wife prevented him from drinking and he became violent and started smashing furniture. The police were called and arrested him. His wife informed them of his suicide attempts and discharging himself from hospital and it was agreed that he should be remanded in custody for his own safety. However, the police failed inform the prison authorities that Mr Kirkham was a suicide risk. He committed suicide whilst on remand at Risley Remand Centre. His wife brought an action based on the negligence of the police in failing to pass on the information. The Police raised the defences of volenti non fit injuria and ex turpi causa. Held: The claimant was successful. The defence of volenti non fit injuria, although normally would apply where a person of sound mind were to take their own life, had no application where a person of unsound mind took their life. The defence of ex turpi causa was not limited to illegal acts but extended also to immoral acts. The court applied the public conscience test and concluded that to allow the claimant to succeed would not affront the public conscience, or shock the ordinary citizen. The claimant injured his head at work due to the Defendant's negligence. Some years later he hanged himself as he was suffering from acute anxiety and depression caused by the original injury. Held. COA. original injury was still operating, and anxiety/depression are a common cause of damage to the head.

Pigney V Pointers Transport Services Ltd (1957)

Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd (2008) UKHL)

Mr Corr was a maintenance engineer who became severely disfigured after he was struck on the head by a machine at work. He underwent extensive reconstructive surgery but remained disfigured. He suffered from flashbacks and post traumatic stress disorder and lapsed into a deep depression from which he never recovered. Six years after the accident he committed suicide. At the time of his death, Mr Corr had begun proceedings against his former employers for damages for the physical and psychological damage he had suffered. After his death, his widow was substituted as the claimant. However, she also sought to sue for the loss attributable to the death by suicide under section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. While IBC Vehicles accepted that the accident was a breach of the duty owed to Mr Corr to take reasonable care to avoid causing him personal injury, including psychological injury, they refused to admit liability for his suicide, arguing that it (1) fell outside the duty of care owed to him by the company; (2) was not an act which was reasonably foreseeable and therefore not one for which they should be held liable; (3) broke the chain of causation and constituted a novus actus interveniens; (4) was an unreasonable act which broke the chain of causation; (5) was the voluntary act of the deceased, and so precluded by the principle volenti non fit injuria; (6) amounted to contributory negligence. The companys appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed. The Lords held that the appellant owed Mr Corr a duty to avoid not only physical but also psychological injury and that the deceased had acted in a way that he would not have done had it not been for the breach by the appellant. In addition, suicide was found to be foreseeable. Although it was not a usual manifestation of severe depression, it was not uncommon. In these particular circumstances it was reasonably foreseeable by the appellant if one considered the possible effect of such an accident on a hypothetical employee. The appellants other arguments were rejected.

Carslogie Steamship Co v. Royal On 26 November 1949 the vessel Heimgar, while under time charter to the Norwegian Government Ministry of Transport, suffered damage in a collision with the Carslogie. It was admitted that the Carslogie was solely to blame. The Heimgar had temporary repairs done in a port in England before proceeding to a port in the United States where permanent repairs could be carried out. During the voyage across the Atlantic, the ship sustained heavy weather damage, which necessitated immediate repair. The ship remained in dock for fifty days during which the repairs due to the collision and those due to the weather damage were carried out concurrently. It had been agreed that ten days would be allocated to the collision repair and thirty days for the weather damage. The owners of the Heimgar claimed damages for the ten days attributable to the collision damage while at port. The owners of the Carslogie were only liable for such loss of profit suffered by the Heimgar as resulted from the Carslogies wrongful act. During the time that the Heimgar was detained in dock she had ceased to be a profit-earning machine because the heavy weather damage had rendered her unseaworthy. Therefore, the respondents had sustained no damage by reason of the fact that for ten days the vessel was undergoing repairs in respect of the collision damage, as the heavy weather damage was the sole reason the Heimgar had to dock for repairs before reaching its destination.

Prendergast v Sam & Dee Ltd., Kosary, and Miller in 1989

The case is the classic example of transcription error. In this case, a reasonably legible hand-written prescription for Amoxil was misread by the dispensing chemist and a toxic dose of glibenclamide was dispensed three times daily" a dose some fifty times the maximum daily dose of 15 mg. Dr Miller was found liable for 25% of the damages in the above case due to the apparent illegibility of his handwriting (I find it quite legible). Mr Jobling, a butcher, slipped on the floor at his place of work due to his employer's negligence. He injured his back which caused him to reduce his earning capacity to 50% of what it was. He then developed an independent back condition which was unrelated to the injury which left him unable to work. The trial judge applied Baker v Willoughby and held that the claimant was entitled to recover damages beyond the onset to the back condition. The employer appealed. Held: The House of Lords distinguished Baker v Willoughby and stated where the victim is overtaken before trial by a wholly unconnected and disabling illness, the decision had no application. The House of Lords were critical of the decision in Baker v Willoughby but stopped short of overruling it.

Jobling v Associated Dairies [1982] AC 794 House of Lords

Derry v Peek (1889) 5 T.L.R. 625 In a company prospectus the defendant stated the company had the right to use steam powered trams as oppose to horse powered trams. However, at the time the right to use steam powered trams was subject of approval of the Board of Trade, which was later refused. The claimant purchased shares in the company in reliance of the statement made and brought a claim based on the alleged fraudulent representation of the defendant. Held: The statement was not fraudulent but made in the honest belief that approval was forthcoming. Lord Herschell defined fraudulent misrepresentation as a statement which is made either: i) knowing it to be false, ii) without belief in its truth, or iii) recklessly, careless as to whether it be true or false.

Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Issue Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 Whether and under what conditions a person can recover damages for loss suffered by reason of his having relied on an innocent but negligent misrepresentation. ^[Tort - negligence - duty of care - extent of the duty depends on the courts assessment of demands of society] D, a bank gave a reference to C (another bank) regarding the financial responsibility of a customer, expecting the bank to act on it. The reference was given "without responsibility." The second bank acted on the reference and suffered financial loss as a result. They sued D in negligence. Held: The law will imply a duty of care when a party seeking information from a party possessed of a special skill trusts him to exercise due care, and that party knew or ought to have known that reliance was being placed on his skill and judgment. However, since here there was an express disclaimer of responsibility, no such duty was, in any event, implied. C lost This case modified pure economic loss in negligence. The effect of Hedley Byrne makes possible the recovery of compensation for financial damage through reliance by the plaintiff according to statements made negligently by the defendant but only where there exists a special relationship' between the parties. The term special relationship which must be between plaintiff and defendant before there can be liability was not fully defined but for its existence seems to be: A, a reliance by the claimant on the defendants specialist skill and judgment; B, reasonable expectation of knowledge on the part of the defendant, that the

Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd

Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd had a stainless steel factory in Birmingham, which obtained its electricity by a direct cable from the power station. Martin & Co Ltd were doing work on the ground with an excavator and negligently damaged that cable. As a consequence, the factory was deprived of electricity for 15 hours which has caused physical damage to the factorys furnaces and metal, lost profit on the damaged metal and lost profit on the metal that was not melted during the time the electricity was off. Spartan Steel claimed all the three heads of damage. The Court of Appeal, consisting of Lord Denning MR, Edmund-Davies LJ and Lawton LJ delivered a majority judgment (Edmund-Davies LJ dissenting), that the Spartan Steel could only recover the damages to their furnaces, the metal they had to discard and the profit lost on the discarded metal. They could not recover the profits lost due to the factory not being operational for 15 hours. Their main reasoning for this was that while the damage to the metal was "physical damage" and the lost profits on the metal was "directly consequential" upon it, the profits lost due to the blackout constituted "pure economic loss". Although the majority seemed to agree that Martin & Co Ltd owed the Spartan Steel a duty of care and the damage was not too remote since it was foreseeable, they declined to allow the recovery of pure economic loss for policy reasons outlined by Lord Denning in his leading judgment: Statutory utility providers are never liable for damages caused by their negligence. A blackout is a common hazard and a risk which everyone can be expected to tolerate from time to time. If claims for pure economic loss in such cases were allowed, it might lead to countless claims, some of which may be spurious (the "floodgates" argument). It would be unfair to place the entire weight of many comparatively small losses upon the shoulders of one person in such cases. The law does not leave the claimant without remedy by allowing him to recover the economic losses that are directly consequential upon physical damage. [Solicitors duty to their clients] D a solicitor prepared a will for a client and sent it to him for signature. D failed to warn the client that his signature should not be witnessed by the spouse of a beneficiary, and subsequently did not notice that this had actually happened. Held: D liable to pay damages to the disappointed beneficiary.

Ross v Caunters [1979] ChDiv Megarry VC

Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] HL

[Tort negligence - duty of care - general principles - the nature of negligence duty of care - proving fault] D, local authority negligently approved plans for the footings (a concrete raft) of a house that subsided. C the house owner could not afford repairs and sold the house at a loss. C alleged that he and his family had suffered an imminent risk to health and safety because gas and soil pipes had broken and there was a risk of further breaks. Held: The damage suffered by C was not material or physical damage. D was not liable for pure economic loss of the cost of remedying defects To permit C to recover his economic loss would logically lead to an unacceptably wide category of claims in respect of buildings or chattels which were defective in quality, and would in effect introduce product liability and transmissible warranties of quality into the law of tort by means of judicial legislation.

C lost Per curiam. It is unrealistic to regard a building or chattel which has been wholly erected or manufactured and equipped by the same contractor as a complex structure in which one part of the structure or chattel is regarded as having caused damage to other property when it causes damage to another part of the same structure or chattel, since the reality is that the structural elements in a building or chattel form a single indivisible unit of which the different parts are essentially interdependent and to the extent that there is a defect in one part of the structure or chattel it must to a greater or lesser degree necessarily affect all other parts of the structure. However, defects in ancillary equipment, manufactured by different contractors, such as central heating boilers or electrical installations may give rise to liability under ordinary principles of negligence. Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877) The claimant insured Ts property against being damaged. The property was damaged as a result of the defendants fault with the result that the claimant had to pay out on the insurance policy with T. Held: claimant could not sue the defendant.

Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co Donald Ogilvie was the director of a company called Trevaunance Hydraulic Tin Mines Ltd, which mined tin in Cornwall. He needed more capital, so he put an advertisement in The Times on July 8, 1946, which said, "10,000. Established Tin Mine (low capitalization) in Cornwall seeks further capital. Instal additional milling plant. Directorship and active participation open to suitable applicant - Apply" Mr Candler responded, saying he was interested in investing 2000, if he could see the company's accounts. Mr Ogilvie instructed Crane, Christmas & Co, a firm of auditors, to prepare the companys accounts and balance sheet. The draft accounts were shown to Mr Candler in the presence of Crane, Christmas & Cos clerk. Mr Candler relied on their accuracy and subscribed for 2,000 worth of shares in the company. But the company was actually in a very bad state. Ogilvie used the investment on himself and then went bankrupt. Mr Candler lost all the money he invested. He brought an action against the accountants, Crane, Christmas & Co. for negligently misrepresenting the state of the company. As there was no contractual relationship between the parties, the action was brought in tort law for pure economic loss. The majority of the Court of Appeal (Sir Lionel Cohen and Sir Cyril Asquith) relied on the case of Derry v Peek to refuse a remedy to the plaintiff, holding that loss resulting from negligent misstatement was not actionable in the absence of any contractual or fiduciary relationship between the parties.

Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1988] 3 All ER 718

Henderson v Merrett Syndicates [1994] HL

the court of appeal held that the duty of care will arise on the defendant who are the friend of plaintiff that give a negligent advice to the plaintiff to selection of a second car. The defendant will liable on it, although defendant not as a professional in the mechanic area. This is an exception existed the duty of care in a social relationship. Because the Court of Appeal clearly measure that the case above was an unusual case, the judgment in this case was made in a special facts. [Civil Process - C can claim in tort or contract] C and other Lloyds "names" sued their underwriting agents for negligent mismanagement of their affairs. Held: Cs claims in tort should go for trial. A claimant, who has remedies available in tort and in contract, is free to choose whichever appears to him to be the most advantageous so long as the contract does not expressly preclude this.

Lennon v Commissioner of Police The claimant, an officer with the Metropolitan Police, successfully applied to of the Metropolis join the police service of Northern Ireland. He sought advice about his transfer from a police personnel executive officer in London. In reply to his specific enquiry he was informed that his housing allowance entitlement would not be affected by his taking time off work during the course of his transfer. He in fact took three weeks off work which resulted in a break in his continuity of service, and on taking up his new position he permanently lost entitlement to a monthly housing allowance of 134. The Court of Appeal upheld his claim in negligence against the commissioner arising from the manner in which his transfer was handled and upheld the award of some 44,000 damages. The general principles governing the existence of a duty of care not to cause pure economic loss to another by careless acts or omissions are well established, and the commissioner was wrong in suggesting that the decision broke new ground involving a radical departure from the existing law. Although there was no contract of employment between the police commissioner and the claimant, the relationship between them was analogous to that created by such a contract; it was fair, just and reasonable to impose on the police commissioner a general duty of care to give advice to the claimant to protect him from economic loss. MLC v Evatt (1968) 12 CLR 556 Established that a professional adviser owed a duty of care to clients to whom they supplied information. Esso Petroleum v Mardon [1976] Mr Mardon entered a tenancy agreement with Esso Petroleum in respect of a QB 801 new Petrol station. Esso's experts had estimated that the petrol station would sell 200,000 gallons of petrol. This estimate was based on figures which were prepared prior to planning application. The planning permission changed the prominence of the petrol station which would have an adverse affect on the sales rate. Esso made no amendments to the estimate. The rent under the tenancy was also based on the erroneous estimate. Consequently it became impossible for Mr Mardon to run the petrol station profitably. In fact, despite his best endeavours the petrol station only sold 78,000 gallons in the first year and made a loss of 5,800. The Court of Appeal held that there was no action for misrepresentation as the statement was an estimate of future sales rather than a statement of fact. However, the claimant was entitled to damages based on either negligent misstatement at common law or breach of warranty of a collateral contract.

James McNaughton Paper Group During negotiations in 1982 between the plaintiff and MK Ltd concerning a Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co possible takeover of MK by the plaintiff, the defendants, MK's accountants, were instructed by MK to prepare accounts for it as quickly as possible. Draft accounts, which showed a net loss for the year ended 30 June 1982 of 48,094, were made available to the plaintiff's chairman. At a subsequent meeting a member of the defendants' firm, P, answering a question from the chairman, asserted that MK was 'breaking even or doing marginally worse'. After the takeover the plaintiff discovered errors in the accounts. It claimed from the defendants damages in negligence in respect of the accounts and of P's assertion. The judge decided the defendants were negligent in relation to both matters and both had to a material extent induced the plaintiff to continue with the takeover; he awarded the plaintiffs 75,000 damages. The defendants appealed. Nicholas Padfield and Monique Allan (instructed by Herbert Smith) for the defendants. Quintin Iwi (instructed by Cameron Markby Hewitt) for the plaintiff. Neill LJ said that it became necessary, in the absence of some general principle, to examine each individual case in the light of the concepts of foreseeability, proximity and fairness. The last of those concepts, however, was elusive and might be only one of the criteria by which proximity was to be judged. It was sufficient to underline that in every case the court had not only to consider the forseeability of the damage and whether the relationship between the parties was sufficiently proximate but also to enquire whether in the particular situation it was fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose on the defendant a duty of the scope suggested for the benefit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had argued that the judge had been fully entitled to conclude that a duty of care existed. However, his Lordship had concluded that, applying the tests established in recent authorities, the existence of a duty of care had not been made out. Nourse and Balcombe LJJ delivered concurring judgments. Appeal allowed.

Smith v Eric Bush [1990] 1 AC 831

A survey report of the claimants house carried out by the defendant failed to advise on some structural damage to the property which resulted in the chimney breast collapsing. There was no contractual relationship between the claimant and defendant as the mortgage company arranged the survey and the claimant made payment to the mortgage company. The contract between the claimant and the mortgage company contained a clause exempting the surveyor from liability. In considering if such a clause was reasonable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 the court took into account the fact that it was a modest house to be used as the family home and concluded that it was an unreasonable clause and therefore ineffective. The House of Lords held that it might be reasonable for a surveyor to exclude liability if the property was of higher value or to be used for investment or business purposes.

White v Jones 1995

Facts Two daughters of 78 year old Mr White sued Mr Jones for failing to follow their father's instructions when drawing up his will. Mr White and his daughters had fallen out briefly and he asked the solicitor to cut them out of the will. Before he died they resolved their problems. He asked Mr Jones to change the will again so that 9000 would be given to his daughters. After he died, with the will still the same, the family would not agree to have the settlement changed. The question was whether Mr Jones could be sued instead. Judgment Lord Goff held with a majority of three to two in the House of Lords that the daughters would be able to claim. Influenced by the idea that solicitors may escape the consequences of not doing their job properly, he said that a special relationship existed between the daughters and the solicitor and that Mr Jones had assumed responsibility towards them. This was so even though there was no contract or fiduciary relationship between them.

Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp

An employee of the authority failed to exercise reasonable skill and care in searching for entries in the local land charges register. The search certificate prepared by the clerk negligently failed to record a charge of 1,828 11s. 5d. in favour of the Ministry. Lord Denning MR held the local authority was liable to the Ministry for the employee's incompetence. At 268 he rejected that a duty of care only arose when there was a voluntary assumption of responsibility, rather "from the fact that the person making it knows, or ought to know, that others, being his neighbours in this regard, would act on the faith of the statement being accurate."

Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel & Co Ltd and others

The plaintiffs took over another company and later brought an action against the advisers, accountants and directors alleging breach of a duty of care by negligent misrepresentation in financial statements published prior to the bid and in defence documents sent to shareholders and served on the plaintiffs' advisers after the bid on which the plaintiffs had relied in making and increasing their offer and whereby they had suffered loss. After the decision of the House of Lords in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 WLR 358 the plaintiffs sought to amend their pleading by restricting it to representations made in the course of the bid when their relationship as identified bidders was sufficiently proximate to create a duty of care owed to them by the defendants, but including the previously issued financial statements as 'continuing representations' never withdrawn or qualified. The plaintiffs further alleged that a particular purpose of the representations was to persuade them to offer better terms. On a summons for leave to amend Hoffman J refused leave holding that despite the amendments the case could not be distinguished from Caparo and was bound to fail because of the absence of a duty of care. The plaintiffs appealed. Jonathan Sumption QC, Stephen Suttle and John Nicholls (instructed by Herbert Smith) for the plaintiffs. Gordon Langley QC and Michael Brindle (instructed by Berwin Leighton) for the first defendants. Nicolas Bratza QC and Ian Croxford (instructed by Barlow Lyde & Gilbert) for the second defendants. Leslie Kosmin (instructed by Reynolds Porter Chamberlain) for the third defendant. Nigel Davis (instructed by McKenna & Co) for the fourth and fifth defendants. Michael McLaren (instructed by Allison & Humphreys) for the sixth, seventh and eighth defendants. Slade LJ said on the assumed facts pleaded the defendants intended that the plaintiffs would rely on the representations in deciding whether or not to make an increased bid and that the plaintiffs had so relied and that it was therefore plainly arguable that there was a relationship of proximity between the plaintiffs and the defendants sufficient to give rise to a duty of care and the case should go to trial. Appeal allowed.

Law Society v KPMG Peat Marwick and Others

The defendant accountants prepared annual accounts reports for a firm of solicitors which the solicitors then provided to the Law Society in accordance with s.34 of the Solicitors Act 1974. Following the discovery of fraud by two partners in the solicitors' firm, substantial payments were made from the compensation fund maintained by the Law Society. The Law Society, as trustee of the fund, commenced proceedings against the defendants, claiming damages on the ground that the defendants had negligently prepared the accounts reports and, as a result, it had not exercised its powers of intervention into the firm which would have reduced the amount paid out of the fund. On a preliminary issue, Sir Richard Scott V-C ([2000] 1 All ER 515) held that the defendants had owed the Law Society, as trustee of the fund, a duty of care when preparing the accounts reports. The defendants appealed. Gordon Pollock QC and Rhodri Davies QC (instructed by Herbert Smith) for the defendants. Lord Goldsmith QC and Matthew Collings (instructed by Wright Son & Pepper) for the Law Society. Held, dismissing the appeal, that the question of whether a duty of care was owed by the accountants to the Law Society as trustee of the compensation fund had to be examined against the test laid down in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, namely, reasonable foreseeability of damage, proximity and whether it was fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty; that the intervention by the Law Society, which an adverse accounts report could trigger, protected both the public and the compensation fund; that it was made clear to the accountants that the reports were required so that protective steps could be taken and it was obvious that if protective action was not taken because a report did not draw attention to non-compliance with the account rules that could have adverse consequences on the fund; that there was no reason why there should not be a private law duty owed to the Law Society, the performance of which would assist it to perform its public or regulatory duty; and that, accordingly, the defendants had owed a duty of care to the Law Society.

Yianni v Edwin Evans (1982) QB 438

Mr Yianni applied to a building society for a mortgage advance of 12,000 for the purchase of a property. The building society appointed an independent surveyor to undertake a valuation of the property. The surveyor reported that the property was adequate security for the mortgage. Mr Yianni did not see a copy of the report although he paid the fee for the valuation. The building society made the required mortgage advance and the purchase went ahead. It subsequently came to light that the surveyor had failed to detect serious structural defects that rendered the property virtually worthless. Mr Yianni sued the surveyor directly. The judge found the surveyor liable, even though the building society, and not the purchaser, had employed him. The surveyor knew, however, that the advance would be granted only if his report were favourable and that it was unlikely the purchaser would obtain his own survey. The surveyor was therefore held to have a duty to both Yianni and to the building society. Since this decision, lenders have made valuation surveys available to prospective purchasers, thus widening the liability of surveyors. -

Stevenson v Nationwide Building Society (1984) 272 EG 663

The purchaser bought a property spanning a small river. The lenders valuer disclaimed any liabillity to the buyer, and a structural report was offered for an additional charge. The property was not sound. Held: The valuation was negligent, and the defendant lender would be vicariously liable unless liability had been excluded. In the absence of some other estoppel, the exclusion term had to pass the test of reasonableness under the Act. Given that the purchaser was himself an estate agent and properly experienced in such matters, the exclusion clause was reasonable. Similar to Smith V Bush. But buyer was estate agent and was held by the court to have 'trade knowledge'. Therefore the disclaimer used by the cheaper surveyor they chose to use was held to be reasonable in this case, a firm of accountant, who carelessly made a financial statement of Y company, and the plaintiff relied on it. The court held that, the firm of accountant imposes the duty of care to plaintiff because the defendant fully aware that the plaintiff will investing in or taking over Y company thus, defendant will knew that the plaintiff will rely on the published accounts. The claimants were interested in opening a health food shop in Bristol. They went to a health food company for advice as to how successful such a shop might be. They received a report, that had been prepared by the defendant, which said that the shop the claimants were proposing to open should be very successful. This was incorrect, and the defendant should have known that. On the strength of the report, the claimants invested a lot of money in opening a health food shop in Bristol and lost their investment. Held: the claimants could not sue the defendant for compensation for the money they lost relying on his overly optimistic projections as to how well their shop would do.

JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks, Bloom & Co [1981] 3 All ER 289

Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd (1998).

Junior Books v Veitchi (1983) HL [Tort negligence - duty of care - development and scope - damage remoteness - economic loss] D, specialist-flooring contractors negligently laid a floor in Cs factory. D as specialist flooring contractors knew what products were required and were alone responsible for the composition and construction of the floor. C suffered loss and damages, such as the cost of removal of machinery and loss of profits while the floor was being re-laid. Held: Te scope of the duty of care extended to a duty to avoid causing pure economic loss consequential on defects in the work. D lost

Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialties Ltd and Others

The third defendant manufactured motors for pumps which were incorporated in a tank for the storage of lobsters which was installed at the plaintiff's fish farm. The motors, being unsuited to UK voltages, cut out and the plaintiff's entire lobster stock died from lack of oxygen. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, damages from the third defendant in negligence for the loss of the lobsters and the economic loss, including loss of profit, resulting therefrom. The trial judge held that the third defendant was liable to the plaintiff in respect of the pure economic loss. The third defendant appealed. Piers Ashworth QC and G W Lowe (instructed by Hadaway & Hadaway, Newcastle-upon-Tyne) for the third defendant. Robin Stewart QC and Michael Heywood (instructed by Crutes, Newcastle-upon-Tyne) for the plaintiff. Robert Goff LJ, having considered Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520, said that damages in negligence for pure economic loss could be recovered only if there were such a very close proximity of relationship between the parties and reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant that the defendant was to be taken voluntarily to have assumed direct responsibility to the plaintiff. The ultimate purchaser of goods supplied unde a chain of ordinary sale contracts could recover such damages only from his immediate vendor, since such proximity and reliance would not arise between him and the manufacturer, and accordingly the plaintiff could not recover his economic loss from the third defendant. Nourse LJ, occurring , said that in the absence of close proximity and reliance, the court was bound by Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27 not to award damages for pure economic loss. O'Connor LJ, concurring, said that Spartan Steel could not be distinguished, and had not been overruled by implication in Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd. Appealed allowed in part with one-half costs. Leave to appeal refused.

Simaan General Contracting Co v The plaintiffs, the main contractors under a contract for a new building in Abu Pilkington Glass Ltd Dhabi, sub-contracted the supply and erecton of curtain walling. The defendants contracted to supply green glass units for incorporation in the curtain walling. They were not in contractual relationship with the plaintiffs. The units were alleged by the building owner to be defective in their colouring. The plaintiffs eventually rejected them and instructed the sub-contractors to replace them with approved panels. The plaintiffs claimed against the defendants damages for negligence in respect of the loss they had suffered as a result of the supply of the defective units. The question whether the defendants, as specified suppliers of the units, owed to the plaintiffs, as the main contractors, a duty to take reasonable care to avoid defects in the units which had caused them loss was tried as a preliminary issue. Judge Newey answered it in favour of the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed. David M Harris (instructed by C R Bayley, Pilkington legal departmen, St Helens) for the defendants. Romie Tager (instructed by Michael Conn & Co) for the defendants. Bingham LJ said that a claim might lie in negligence for recovery of economic loss alone. The defendants owed the plaintiffs a conventional duty of care to avoid physical injury or damage to person or property. The planitiffs could not be said to have relied on the defendants. Where a specialist sub-contractor was nominated by a building owner it might be possible to conclude that the specialist had assumed a direct responsibility to the building owner. There was no basis on which the defendants could be said to have assumed a responsibility to the plaintiffs. Junior Books v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520 had been interpreted as arising from physical damage. That interpretation was binding on the court. The authorities did not establish a general rule that claims in negligence might succeed on proof of foreseeable economic loss even where no damage to property and no proprietary or possessory interest had been shown. It was a type of claim against which the law had consistently set its face. If the units could be regarded as damaged at all, the damage occurred at the time of manufacture, and the plaintiffs had not shown any interest in them at that tme. Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR and Dillon LJshe agreed. Dulieu v White [1901] 2 KB 669 By her statement of claim A. alleged that while was sitting behind the bar of her husband's public-house (she then being pregnant) B.'s servant negligently drove a pair-horse van belonging to B. into the public-house. A. in consequence sustained a severe shock which made her seriously ill and led to her suffering a miscarriage. (She gave premature birth to a child. In consequence of the shock sustained by the plaintiff the said child was born an idiot.) Held, that the statement of claim disclosed a good cause of action against B. Per Kennedy, J.: Mere fright not followed by consequent physical damage will not support an action, but if it is followed by consequent physical damage, then, if the fright was the natural result of the defendants' negligence, an action lies, and the physical damage is not too remote to support it.

McFarlane v. E.E. Caledonian Limited [1994] 2 All ER 1

An oil worker, the claimant, claimed damages for psychiatric injury, after witnessing the destruction caused by a fire on an oil rig from his workplace on a support boat 100 metres away. The fire killed 164 men although the claimant was uninjured. It was held that the claimant was owed a duty of care on the ground that he was a participant in an event and had reasonable been in fear for his life and safety and the impact of the events had caused shock. The defendants appealed. Held, that the claimant was entitled to damages because he was more than a mere bystander to the event. This case also relates to the Hillsborough disaster. In this instance police officers were seeking compensation on the basis that they had suffered psychiatric illness as a result of rescuing victims after the crush. They claimed that because they were rescuers they should be treated as primary victims'. The distinction between primary victim and secondary victim was made in the Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, where all claimants were secondary victims. In Page v Smith this distinction was further developed. The Court of Appeal in Frost v Chief Constable of Yorkshire Police [1997] 3 WLR 1194 (by a majority) had held that the police officers who were allowed to recover for their psychiatric illness as a result of carrying out their professional duties as rescuers and/or employees at the disastrous Hillsborough football stadium stampede were classifiable as primary victims. The House of Lords however, held that for the purposes of distinction between primary and secondary victims, that rescuers were not in a special position in the law. They could only recover if they were exposed to physical danger as primary victims. Since they were not endangered in the discharge of their service or in rescuing, as employees and/or rescuers, the police officers were only secondary victims. As secondary victims they, like the bystanders or spectators, were not entitled to recover damages for their psychiatric illness.

White V Chief Constable Of Yorkshire Police

McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410

A mother received news that her family had been involved in a car accident. On hearing the news she rushed to the hospital to find her injured family and be told that her son had been killed. The mother suffered severe shock, depression and personality change. The defendant admitted negligence. The issue was whether the mother could succeed in her claim because she had not been present at the accident or it aftermath. Held, she could succeed at it was reasonably foreseeable

Alcock v. The Chief Constable of Relatives of those killed or injured at a football stadium claimed damages South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310 against the police for causing them nervous shock resulting in psychiatric illness. The relatives saw and heard the tragedy via live television or radio broadcasts. The police admitted liability in negligence but denied any duty of care to the plaintiffs. The issue was whether the relatives were entitled in law to damages. The House of Lords held that a claimant for damages for psychiatric injury must pass two tests. The injury must be reasonably foreseeable (shown by a close tie of love and affection between the individuals). Second, the claimant must have been proximate to the incident or its aftermath at the time the incident occurred and the shock must have resulted from seeing or hearing the incident or its aftermath.

Greatorex v Greatorex and On 11 April 1996 the First Defendant had been drinking with a friend, who is Others [2000] The Times LR May the Part 20 Defendant in the proceedings. The First Defendant was driving a 5, QBD car belonging to the Part 20 Defendant, who had given him permission to drive the car and was a passenger in it. Whilst overtaking on a blind brow the First Defendant negligently drove over on the wrong side of the road and was hit by an oncoming vehicle. The Part 20 Defendant was uninjured. The First Defendants head was injured and he was unconscious for about an hour. Initially he was trapped inside the car. The police, ambulance and fire services attended the scene of the accident. Among the fire officers who attended the scene was the First Defendants father, the Claimant. At the time of the accident he was employed as a Leading Fire Officer. He was nowhere near the scene of the accident when it happened. He went there in the course of his employment. Having been informed that his son has been injured, he attended to him. The Claimant was later diagnosed as suffering long- term post traumatic stress disorder as a result of the accident. The First Defendant was subsequently convicted of driving a motor vehicle without due care and attention, driving without insurance, and failing to provide a specimen. The Claimant brought proceedings claiming damages against the First Defendant, his son. Since the First Defendant was uninsured at the time of the accident, the Motor Insurers Bureau was joined as a Second Defendant. The Second Defendant in turn brought proceedings against the Part 20 Defendant seeking an indemnity against him. There was no duty of care owed by a victim of self-inflicted injuries towards a secondary party who suffered only psychiatric illness as a result of having witnessed the event causing the injuries or its aftermath. The policy considerations against there being such a duty owed clearly outweighed the arguments in favour, since to impose liability for causing psychiatric harm in such circumstances, particularly where the parties were members of the same family, would be potentially productive of acute family strife. Dooley -v- Cammell Laird and Co The plaintiff was a crane driver whose load of timber, drums of paint, and bags Ltd; 1951 of bolts etc, and without any fault on his part, fell into the hold of a ship as they were being lowered along with scaffolding. No one was actually injured but the plaintiff knew that fellow workers were then in the hold, and he suffered nervous shock. He sued his employers saying that the sling was either overloaded or defective in breach of shipbuilding regulations and the common law duties to provide safe plant and a safe system. Held: The plaintiff was entitled to recover in those circumstances. Cammell Laird were in breach of the regulations. one of which was made as a protection against the risk of bodily injury which included injury to the nerves, the nerves being a part of the body. Donovan J said: I suppose I may reasonably infer that his fellow workmen down the hold were his friends, Mr Dooley was the unwitting agent of the defendants negligence. He was the crane driver who, without any fault, was party to an accident which could have killed his fellow workers. It was his activity in operating the crane which caused the actual and potential damage. It was that activity which brought him into the category of persons for whom the defendants owed a duty of care, not really any question of relationships of friendships.

Hunter v. British Coal Corporation An employee, Mr. Hunter, hit a high pressure water hydrant with the vehicle he [1998] 2 All E.R. 97 was driving at the time, fracturing the hydrant and thereby threatening to flood the mine. One of his fellow employees, Mr. Carter, attempted to help him shut off the valve. They did not succeed and Mr. Hunter went to fetch further assistance. When he was 30 yards away the hydrant exploded, killing Mr. Carter. Mr. Hunter initially assumed that Mr. Carter was unharmed, but when he was informed of the death 15 minutes later he blamed himself and suffered a shock which triggered a two-year depressive illness. The trial judge found as a fact that the accident (and the death) had been caused by the fault of the defendant employer, which had failed to observe the relevant regulations about the siting of the hydrant, and had not been caused or contributed to by Mr. Hunter in any way. Could Mr. Hunter recover damages from his employer for the shock which he suffered on hearing about a death which he did not witness but for which he felt himself to be responsible? The trial judge held not and the majority of the Court of Appeal agreed, but their reasoning demonstrates some of the confusion surrounding this topic. It was accepted by all members of the Court of Appeal that if Mr. Hunter was classified as a secondary victim he would fail in his claim for nervous shock since he lacked, amongst other things, the necessary physical proximity required by the House of Lords in Alcock: he had witnessed neither the accident itself nor its aftermath. The only way in which he could recover was if he could bring himself within some other category, either (i) because he could be regarded as a primary victim or (ii) purely on the basis of the contractual duty of care which the defendant owed him as his employer.

Attia v British Gas plc

The plaintiff brought an action for damages from the defendants for nervous shock. She alleged that she had suffered a psychiatric illness caused by witnessing the destruction of her home by a fire caused by the defendants' negligence while installing central heating to her home. The judge decided as a preliminary issue on assumed facts that the plaintiff could not recover damages and dismissed the action. The plaintiff appealed. David Tucker (instructed by Fremont & Co) for the plaintiff. Janet Turner (instructed by the solicitor, British Gas plc (North Thames)) for the defendants. Dillon LJ said that the issues at trial, assuming the facts pleaded including the psychiatric illness were proved, would have been (a) causation and (b) foreseeability of the damage as a question of remoteness. If the plaintiff could surmount those two hurdles there was no good reason why the law should refuse to allow her to recover damages for nervous shock. His Lordship was not prepared to hold that the fact that the shock which caused the plaintiff's psychiatric illness was caused by damage to property must preclude her from recovering damages for nervous shock, even if it was reasonably foreseeable that she might suffer psychiatric illness as a consequence of the defendants' negligence in causing the fire in her house. Whether the plaintiff's assumed illness caused by the shock was or was not a foreseeable consequence of the defendants' negligence must depend on the actual evidence given at the trial. His Lordship would set aside the judge's order and allow the action to proceed to trial. Woolf and Bingham LJJ delivered judgments concurring with Dillon LJ. Appeal allowed.

Walters v North Glamorgan NHS The claimants 10-month-old son was in hospital suffering from liver failure Trust ([2002] All ER (D)7 (Dec) which was the result of the defendants admitted negligence in failing to CA) diagnose his condition. The claimant was with her son when he had an epileptic seizure which the defendants doctors told her was very unlikely to have caused any serious damage. The childs condition deteriorated and he was taken by ambulance to another hospital for a liver transplant, followed by the claimant in her car. On arrival she was told that her son had in fact suffered severe brain damage, which she was told on the following day was so severe that he would have no quality of life. She agreed to his life support system being turned off and he died. It was agreed that the claimant had suffered shock and a recognised psychiatric illness, namely pathological grief reaction, as a result of what she had witnessed and experienced over a period of some 36 hours between her sons seizure and his death. Could this be categorised as injury by shock that is sudden appreciation by sight or sound of a horrifying event, which violently agitates the mind? Yes, held the Court of Appeal. A realistic view should be taken of what constitutes the necessary event. In this case there was a seamless tale with an obvious beginning and an equally obvious end. It was played out over a period of 36 hours, which for the claimant was undoubtedly one drawn-out experience. Accordingly, the 36hour period constituted one entire event, albeit made up of discreet events. It was a short step for the Court to find that such a step was horrifying

W v Essex County Council (1998) [Tort negligence - duty of care no duty situations - statutory duty - duty of HL care, to whom] D, the council placed a known sex offender with foster parents C. Cs children were abused. C made it clear that they were anxious not to put their children at risk by having a known sex abuser in their home, the social worker and D knew that and also knew that the boy placed had already committed an act or acts of sex abuse. The risk was obvious and the abuse happened. Held: It was plainly arguable that there was a duty of care owed to the parents and a breach of that duty by the defendants. C won.

Ferguson v John Dawson & Partners (Contractors) Ltd

Ferguson was employed by John Dawson & Partners 'on the lump' [a device, now prohibited by statute, for avoiding the payment of national insurance and income tax]. Whilst working on the roof of a building Ferguson fell 15 feet and was seriously injured. He claimed damages from John Dawson & Partners for his injuries. In order to be able to claim damages from John Dawson & Partners he had to show that he was an employee of theirs; they claimed that he was self employed and that, therefore, they were not liable for his injuries. The issue before the court was what terms governed the contract between Ferguson and John Dawson & Partners. In my judgment, on the tests laid down in the authorities, all of this indicates beyond doubt that the reality of the relationship was employer and employee: a contract of service... My own view would have been that a declaration by the parties, even if it be incorporated in the contract, that the workman is to be, or is to be deemed to be, self-employed, an independent contractor, ought to be wholly disregarded not merely treated as not being conclusive - if the remainder of the contractual terms, governing the realities of the relationship, show the relationship of employer and employee...

Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison v. McDonald 1952

Contract of service; employer-employee-relationship: the employer says what and how to do it. Contract of services: the employer says what to do; independent contractor. 'Business integration test'. Problem: is the person fully integrated or only an accessory? Lord Denning brought up this question, but he was not the only one who found it relevant. RMC is in the business of selling concrete, previously they had hired a contractor to deliever the concrete to the customers, but had terminated his contract and decided to offer the jobs to RMC's current staffs. Mr Latimer signed up for the hire-purchase agreement for the lorry and started to deliever concrete for RMC. The employer RMC argued that because Mr Latimer was an independent contractor they needed not pay for his national insurance. MacKenna J reversed the finding of the lower court and held that Mr Latimer was in fact a "small business man" and concluded that the contract was not of service, but of carriage. Test for contract of service: Is the worker subject to a right of control? Did the worker provide personal service in return for remuneration? Are the other provisions of the contract consistent with a contract of service? MacKenna J also placed significant emphasis on the existence of wages/remuneration, the absence of which there would not be consideration, hence a contract would not have been formed.

Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968]

Mersey Docks and Harbour Board The appellants hired out a crane to the respondents for the purpose of v. Coggins & Griffiths (Liverpool) unloading a ship; they also provided a driver for this crane upon the terms that Ltd. 1947 he should be for the duration of the contract 'the servant of the hirers'. In fact although the respondents supervised this man's work, they had no power of control over his actual management of the machine. Through negligent handling of it he injured someone. The defendant was liable. The right of ultimate control over the driver's management of the crane was theirs. It lies upon the general employer to establish that the vicarious responsibility has been shifted from his shoulders to those of the special employer. Principle: in the case that one employer lends a servant to another it depends on whichever of the two had the right of control over the servant's activities at the time the injury was caused.

Ormrod v. Crossville Motor Service 1953

A car should be transported to Monte Carlo by an agent. The driver's negligence caused an accident. The principal was responsible for this accident in the course of a principalagent-relationship. Even if it was partly for the agent's benefit. A husband used his wife's car; it was ensured by the wife. The wife said, 'If you get drunk, get a friend to drive you'. He asked his friend, his friend did not want to. So he drove the car himself and had an accident, both he and his friend were killed and some people were injured. The man was not an agent. He did not do something specific for his wife. It would be the same if he had used it for work (only if he was doing something specific his wife asked him to do). Husband and wife are not necessarily agent and principal. A patrol lorry driver smoked a cigarette while driving, which caused an explosion. Is the smoking of a cigarette in the course of employment or not? It was not too far from the employment, the driver did act as an employee.

Morgans v. Launchbury 1973 House of Lords

Century Insurance v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board 1942 House of Lords

Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. 1862

A bus driver racing to a stop to collect passengers deliberately obstructed the driver of a bus of a rival company, overturning the latter's vehicle. The bus driver had been given instructions against obstructing other buses. The defendants were liable. The driver was acting within the course of his employment at the time; it was immaterial whether his act was forbidden. Profit for the company when the bus is first (more passengers). Otherwise, companies could exculpate themselves simply by prohibiting their servants from committing any torts during their service.

Warren v Henley's Ltd (1948)

Employer not held liable for the assault of the employee because this was an act of personal vengeance and so was outside the course of employment. The defendant was an office cleaning company which had a contract to clean the plaintiff's office. One of the women cleaning the office used the telephone (bill: L 1,411). Has she done this in course of her employment? The employers were not responsible. It was not part of her job. There must be a line where the employers are protected. The courts have become more strict in holding employees liable. This case was a change of attitude towards vicarious liability. The plaintiff employee was working on the duck-board of his machine. The fellow employee (let us call him the joker) was pushing a hand-truck along a passageway marked by chalk lines. In order to startle the plaintiff the joker turned his truck slightly towards the plaintiff and overstepped the chalk lines by some two inches. The truck caught the edge of the duck-board, tipped it upwards and caused the plaintiff to be thrown off. He suffered injuries The joker had been authorised to push the truck and was in the course of so doing when the urge to play the practical joke overcame him. The matter was quite simple; was the joker acting in the course of his employment, or had he embarked, in the words of Parke B in Joel v Morrison (1834) 6 C & P 501, on a frolic of his own? Comyn J took the view that the employer was vicariously liable for the act of the employee-joker. The task was admitted to be difficult, but it is, with respect, suggested that, whatever the reasoning or the difficulty, the result was correct.

Heasemans v. Clarity Cleaning 1987 Court of Appeal

Harrison v Michelin Tyre Co Ltd [1985] 1 All ER 918.

Storey v. Ashton 1869

Rose v. Plenty 1976 Court of Appeal

A driver took a different route to make a frolic of his own. On this way he caused an accident because of his negligence. No liability of the company. Though this was just a little detour, the driver was carrying out his own business. Children were helping the milk men. A boy was injured. The company was responsible. They had a benefit out of the boy's work (the milk comes earlier).

Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22

Hesley Hall was a boarding house for students with severe emotional problems, the warden Mr Graine had supervision of the pupils at Hesley Hall and their daily routine. It transpired during the early 90s that Mr Graine had sexually abused these children and they have suffered psychiatric injuries. Hesley Hall was sued in all sorts of tort from battery to negligence. If the court was to uphold the Salmond test which required: The wrongful act must be authorised by the employer; or The wrongful mode was authorised. This draconian rule meant that an employee engaging in a criminal act (such as the current case) will never be acting in the course of employment, would therefore in the context of the current case cause significant injustice. In the Court of Appeal the judges followed the case of Trotman and held that Hesley Hall is not liable. When the case went up to the House of Lords, the Law Lords unanimously held that vicarious liability is established, hence overruling Trotman. The House of Lords found: The purpose of the warden's duty was to develop trust with the children, that trust gave him access to the boys and allowed the abuse; There was geographical and temporal proximity to the employment, as the abused occured on the premise of his employment and during the time which he should be carrying out his employment duties; There is an inherent risk of sexual abuse in these types of occupations, for the courts to find Hesley Hall liable could potentially be a deterrent to potential abusers. Lord Steyn whose judgment is the most often cited said that the warden's criminal acts are inextricably interwoven with his duties, hence it is closely connect to his work therefore Hesley Hall is liable under vicarious liability. Lord Hobhouse on the otherhand reject the whole notion of vicarious liability, and argued that Hesley Hall owned a direct duty to the children, therefore they are directly liable in tort for systemic negligence. A father directed his son parking a lorry, but by negligence of the son, the father was injured. The son was the employee of the company. The company sued the son for the full money they had to pay in damages. They succeded. Mostly employers do not sue their employees but it can be done.

Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Ltd. 1957

Jones v Livox Quarries [1952] 2 QB 608 Court of Appeal

The claimant worked in the defendants quarry. One lunch break he hitched a lift back to the canteen by standing on the tow bar of a traxcavator. The driver of the traxcavator was unaware that the claimant had jumped on the back and it was against company rules to stand on the back of the traxcavators. Unfortunately a dumper truck, driven recklessly by another employee, crashed into the back of the traxcavator crushing the claimants legs. Consequently the claimant had to have his legs amputated. Held: The defendant was liable but the claimant was held to be 1/5 to blame under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. He had acted against orders and exposed himself to danger. Just as actionable negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to others, so contributory negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to oneself. A person is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonable, prudent man, he might be hurt himself: and in his reckonings he must take into account the possibility of others being careless.

Dann v Hamilton [1939] 1 KB 509 The Claimant was injured when she was a willing passenger in the car driven by the Mr Hamilton. He had been drinking and the car was involved in a serious crash which killed him. In a claim for damages the Defendant raised the defence of volenti non fit injuria in that in accepting the lift knowing of his drunken condition she had voluntarily accepted the risk. Held: The defence was unsuccessful. The claimant was entitled to damages. Asquith J: "There may be cases in which the drunkenness of the driver at the material time is so extreme and so glaring that to accept a lift from him is like engaging in an intrinsically and obviously dangerous occupation, intermeddling with an unexploded bomb or walking on the edge of an unfenced cliff. It is not necessary to decide whether in such a case the maxim 'volenti non fit injuria' would apply, for in the present case I find as a fact that the driver's degree of intoxication fell short of this degree". Froom v Butcher [1976] 1 QB 286 The Claimant was injured in a car accident due to the negligence of the Defendant. The Claimant was not wearing a seat belt. There was disagreement as to the apportionment of loss under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. Lord Denning set out guidance as to apportionment of damages in such cases.

Owens v Brimmell [1977] QBD

Remedies - contributory negligence - 20% deduction for not wearing a seat belt and allowing himself to be carried by drunken driver] C and D together in D's car drank considerable amounts of beer in a pub. Whilst driving home C did not wear a seat belt. D negligently caused an accident, whereby C was injured. Held: The principle was recognised that a passenger can be held to have been contributorily negligent if he rides with a driver who he knows has consumer alcohol in such quantity as is likely to impair to a dangerous degree that driver's capacity to drive properly and safely. On the facts, the passenger was found guilty of 20% contributory negligence.

Harrison v British Railways Board The court said that an injured rescuer could sue the person who created the (1981) danger. The rescuer was found to be contributory negligent for not following established work procedures. Moriarty v Brookes [1834] EWHC The defendant was a publican. He argued with a customer over a disputed Exch J79 payment and struck him causing a cut below his eye. The publican argued he had asked the customer to leave and he had refused to do so and the force was lawfully applied in ejecting him from the pub. Held: The defendant had used excessive force. The Lord Lyndhurst CB set the definition of a wound as "The definition of a wound in criminal cases is an injury to the person, by which the skin is broken. If the skin is broken, and there was a bleeding, that is a wound" Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v The claimants were brothers who were qualified shotfirers employed by the Shatwell [1965] AC 656 House of defendant. They were injured as a result of an explosion at the defendant's Lords quarry caused by the brothers' negligence. They had insufficient wire to test a circuit to allow them to test from a shelter. Another worker had gone to fetch more wire but the brothers decided to go ahead and test with the shorter wire. Each brother claimed against the defendant based on their employer's vicarious liability for the negligence and breach of statutory duty of the other brother. The defendant raised the defence of volenti non fit injuria in that the brothers the brothers had full knowledge of the risk and were acting against express instructions. At trial the judge held that the defence of volenti could not apply where there was breach of a statutory duty. This was upheld in the Court of Appeal. Held: The appeal was allowed. The brothers had deliberately acted in defiance of the employer's express instructions in full knowledge of the risks. The workers were under the statutory duty not the employer. The employer had been instrumental in bringing in the statutory regulations and ensured all workers were aware of them. They had also previously dismissed a worker for flouting the regulations.

Revill v Newbery [1996] 2 WLR 239 Court of Appeal

Mr Newbery was a 76 year old man. He owned an allotment which had a shed in which he kept various valuable items. The shed was subject to frequent break ins and vandalism. Mr Newbery had taken to sleeping in his shed armed with a 12 bore shot gun. Mr Revill was a 21 year old man who on the night in question, accompanied by a Mr Grainger, went to the shed at 2.00 am in order to break in. Mr Newbery awoke, picked up the shot gun and fired it through a small hole in the door to the shed. The shot hit Mr Revill in the arm. It passed right through the arm and entered his chest. Both parties were prosecuted for the criminal offences committed. Mr Revill pleaded guilty and was sentenced. Mr Newbery was acquitted of wounding. Mr Revill brought a civil action against Mr Newbery for the injuries he suffered. Mr Newbery raised the defence of ex turpi causa, accident, self-defence and contributory negligence. Held: The Claimants action was successful but his damages were reduced by 2/3 under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 to reflect his responsibility for his own injuries. An occupier cannot treat a burglar as an outlaw

Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2002] 1 WLR 218 Court of Appeal

The Claimant was a known offender and had a string of convictions. He was seriously injured when he jumped out of a second floor window having just been arrested. The police were aware that he was likely to escape and had done so on several previous occasions. They were also aware that such activity was dangerous but did nothing to prevent him from jumping. The Claimant suffered a fractured skull, brain damage and tetraplegia which rendered him totally dependent on others for support. He brought an action against the police arguing that having arrested him, they owed him a duty of care to prevent him injuring himself. The Defendant denied owing a duty of care and also raised the defence of ex turpi causa in that it was a criminal offence for an arrested person to abscond. The trial judge held that ex turpi causa excluded the imposition of a duty of care. The Claimant appealed. Held: 2:1 The appeal was dismissed. Sir Murray Stuart-Smith identified four principles relating to the maxim ex turpi causa: 1. The operation of the principle arises where the claimant's claim is founded upon his own criminal or immoral act. The facts which give rise to the claim must be inextricably linked with the criminal activity. It is not sufficient if the criminal activity merely gives occasion for tortious conduct of the Defendant. 2. The principle is one of public policy; it is not for the benefit of the Defendant. Since if the principle applies, the cause of action does not arise, the Defendant's conduct is irrelevant. There is no question of proportionality between the conduct of the Claimant and Defendant. 3. In the case of criminal conduct this has to be sufficiently serious to merit the application of the principle. Generally speaking a crime punishable with imprisonment could be expected to qualify. If the offence is criminal, but relatively trivial, it is in any event difficult to see how it could be integral to the

Ogwo v Taylor [1987] 3 WLR 1145 House of Lords

The Defendant attempted to burn off paint from the fascia boards beneath the eaves of his house with a blow lamp and in so doing set fire to the premises. The fire brigade were called and the Claimant, an acting leading fireman, and a colleague entered the house wearing breathing apparatus and the usual fireman's protective clothing and armed with a hose. The two firemen were able, with the aid of a step- ladder, to squeeze through a small hatch to get into the roof space. The heat within the roof space was intense. The Claimant suffered serious burn injuries to his upper body and face from scalding steam which must have penetrated his protective clothing. Held: A duty of care was owed to a professional fireman. There was no requirement that the risk be exceptional. The defence of volenti had no application. Lord Bridge: "The duty of professional firemen is to use their best endeavours to extinguish fires and it is obvious that, even making full use of all their skills, training and specialist equipment, they will sometimes be exposed to unavoidable risks of injury, whether the fire is described as "ordinary" or "exceptional." If they are not to be met by the doctrine of volenti, which would be utterly repugnant to our contemporary notions of justice, I can see no reason whatever why they should be held at a disadvantage as compared to the layman entitled to invoke the principle of the so-called "rescue" cases."

Cunningham v Reading FC [1991] D liable to police injured by concrete loosened from terraces. D neglected to Times LR 153 take precautions against clearly foreseeable acts of violent supporters.

Tomlinson v Congleton Borough The defendant owned Brereton Heath Country Park. It had previously been a Council [2003] 3 WLR 705 House sand quarry and they transformed it in to a country park and opened it up for of Lords public use. The defendants had created a lake on the park which was surrounded by sandy banks. In the hot weather many visitors came to the park. Swimming was not permitted in the lake and notices were posted at the entrance saying Dangerous water. No swimming. However despite this, many people did use the lake for swimming. Rangers were employed and on occasions sought to prevent swimming but some of the visitors would be rude to the rangers attempts to prevent them and many continued to swim. The claimant was injured when he dived into shallow water and broke his neck. At the Court of Appeal it was held that he was a trespasser despite the repeated trespass and inadequate steps to prevent him swimming. They also stated that the warning signs may have acted as an allurement to macho young men. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that since the introduction of the Occupiers Liability Act 1984, the courts should not strain to imply a licence. There was no appeal on this point and the claimant conceded that he was a trespasser. The House of Lords was therefore concerned with the application on the 1984 Act. The Court of Appeal had held that the council were liable but reduced the damages by 2/3 under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. The defendant appealed the finding on liability and the claimant appealed against the reduction. House of Lords held: The Council were not liable. No risk arose from the state of the premises as required under s.1(1)(a) Occupiers Liability Act 1984. The risk arose from the claimants own action. He was a person of full capacity who voluntarily and without pressure or inducement engaged in an activity which had an inherent risk. Even if there was a risk form the state of the premises, the risk was not one against which the council would reasonably be expected to offer the claimant some protection under s.1(3)(C). In reaching this conclusion Lord Hoffman looked in at a the Keown v Coventry Healthcare No Occupiers Liability Claimant put himself at risk by indulging NHS Trust, CA (Civ Div) 2/2/2006 dangerous activity. An 11-year-old child who had climbed the outside of a fire escape was not at risk of suffering injury by reason of any danger due to the state of the premises within the Occupiers Liability Act 1984 s.1(1)(a) but had put himself at risk through his own choice to indulge in a dangerous activity. If there was a danger attributable to the state of the premises, thus giving rise to a potential duty, the content of the duty might vary according to whether the trespasser was a child or an adult, but until that point was reached, then in the general run of cases, the age of the trespasser was not relevant.

Wheat v Lacon [1966] AC 552

The claimant and her family stayed at a public house, The Golfers Arms in Great Yarmouth, for a holiday. Unfortunately her husband died when he fell down the stairs and hit his head. The stairs were steep and narrow. The handrail stopped two steps from the bottom of the stairs and there was no bulb in the light. The claimant brought an action under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 against the Brewery company, Lacon, which owned the freehold of The Golfers Arms and against the Managers of the Pub, Mr & Mrs Richardson, who occupied the pub as a licensee. Held: Both the Richardsons and Lacon were occupiers for the purposes of the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 and therefore both owed the common duty of care. It is possible to have more than one occupier. The question of whether a particular person is an occupier under the Act is whether they have occupational control. Lacon had only granted a license to the Richardsons and had retained the right to repair which gave them a sufficient degree of control. There is no requirement of physical occupation. However, it was found that Lacon was not in breach of duty since the provision of light bulbs would have been part of the day to day management duties of the Richardsons. Since the Richardsons were not party to the appeal the claimants action failed.

Holden v White [1982] 2 All ER 328 Court of Appeal

The claimant, a milkman, was injured on the defendants land by a manhole cover which broke when he stepped on it. At the time he was delivering milk to the house of a third party who had a right of way across the defendants land. It was held that he was not entitled to claim against the defendant since he was exercising a right of way and was not therefore a lawful visitor of the defendant. A particular spot on a railway was used as a short cut on a regular basis. The fence was repaired on several occasions and whenever it was reported to have been interfered with. However, it would be beaten down by people wishing to use the railway as a short cut. Witness testimony was to the effect that the fence was in good repair the morning of the incident. Held: No licence was implied. The Defendant had taken reasonable steps to prevent people coming onto the railway. Lord Goddard: "Repeated trespass of itself confers no licence"

Edwards v Railways Executive [1952] AC 737 House of Lords

Lowery v Walker [1911] AC 10 House of Lords

The Claimant was injured by a horse when using a short cut across the defendants field. The land had been habitually used as a short cut by members of the public for many years and the defendant had taken no steps to prevent people coming on to the land. The defendant was aware that the horse was dangerous. Held: The defendant was liable. Whilst the claimant did not have express permission to be on the land, a licence was implied through repeated trespass and the defendants acquiescence.

Ferguson v Welsh [1987] 1 WLR Sedgefield District Council, in pursuance of a development plan to build 1553 House of Lords sheltered accommodation, engaged the services of Mr Spence to demolish a building. It was a term of the contract that the work was not to be subcontracted out. In breach of this term, Mr Spence engaged the services of the Welsh brothers to carry out the demolition who in turn engaged the services of Mr Ferguson to assist. Mr Ferguson suffered serious injury resulting in permanent paralysis when a wall he was standing on collapsed due to the unsafe practices operated by the Welsh brothers. He brought an action against the Council, Mr Spence and the Welsh brothers. The trial judge held that the Welsh Brothers were liable but that Mr Spence and the Council were not liable. Mr Ferguson appealed against the finding against the Council since the Welsh Brothers (or Mr Spence) had the funds or insurance to meet liability. Held: The appeal was dismissed. Mr Ferguson was a lawful visitor despite the clause forbidding sub-contracting since Mr Spence would have apparent or ostensible authority to invite him on to the land. However, the danger arose from the unsafe system of work adopted by the Welsh Brothers not the state of the premises. Whilst there was evidence that Mr Spence had sub-contracted demolition work to those executing unsafe practices on previous occasions, there was no evidence that the Council were aware of this.

Phipps v Rochester Corporation [1955] 1 QB 450

A 5 year old boy was walking across some open ground with his 7 year old sister. He was not accompanied by an adult. He was injured when he fell into a trench. The Corporation were not held liable as an occupier is entitled to assume that prudent parents would not allow their children to go unaccompanied to places where it is unsafe. Devlin J on duty owed to children The law recognises a sharp difference between children and adults. But there might well I think, be an equally marked distinction between big children and little children. The occupier is not entitled to assume that all children will, unless they are allured, behave like adults; but he is entitled to assume that normally little children will be accompanied by a responsible person. The responsibility for the safety of little children must rest primarily upon the parents; it is their duty to see that such children are not allowed to wander about by themselves, or at least to satisfy themselves that the places to which they do allow their children to go unaccompanied are safe. It would not be socially desirable if parents were, as a matter of course, able to shift the burden of looking after their children from their own shoulders to those persons who happen to have accessible pieces of land.

Roles v Nathan [1963] 1 WLR 1117 Court of Appeal

Two brothers, Donald and Joseph Roles were engaged by Mr Nathan as chimney sweeps to clean the flues in in a central heating system at Manchester Assembly Rooms. The flues had become dangerous due to carbon monoxide emissions. A heating engineer had warned them of the danger, however, the brothers told him they knew of the dangers and had been flue inspectors for many years. The engineer monitored the situation throughout the day and at one point ordered everybody out of the building due to the levels of carbon monoxide. The brothers ignored this advice and continued with their work. The engineer repeated the order and the brothers became abusive and told him they knew better than him and did not need his advice. The engineer forcibly removed them from the building. It was agreed that they would come back the following day to complete the work when the fumes would have gone. They were also told they should not do the work whilst the fires were lighted. However, the next day the brothers were found dead in the basement having returned the previous evening to complete the work when the fires were lit. Their widows brought an action under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957. Held: The defendant was not liable. The dangers were special risks ordinarily incident to their calling. The warnings issued were clear and the brothers would have been safe had they heeded the warnings.

Salmon v Seafarer Restaurants [1983] 1WLR 1264

The defendant owned a fish and chip shop. One night he left the chip fryer on and closed the shop for the night. This caused a fire and the fire services were called to put out the fire. The claimant was a fire man injured in an explosion whilst fighting the fire. He had been thrown to the ground whilst footing a ladder on a flat roof. The defendant sought to escape liability by invoking s.2(3)(b) of the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 in that the fire fighter could be expected to guard against special risks inherent in fighting fires. Held: The defendant was liable. Where it can be foreseen that the fire which is negligently started is of the type which could require firemen to attend to extinguish that fire, and where, because of the very nature of the fire, when they attend they will be at risk even if they exercise all the skill of their calling, there is no reason why a fireman should be at any disadvantage in claiming compensation. The duty owed to a fireman was not limited to the exceptional risks associated with fighting fire but extended to ordinary risks.

AMF International Ltd v Magnet Bowling Ltd (1968)

Woodward v Mayor of Hastings

The contractor was to provide and install valuable timber and other specialised bowling alley equipment. On July 21, 1964 an exceptionally heavy rainstorm flooded the building and the timber for the building work was seriously damaged. The court held that the contractor and the building owner were both occupiers of the building. The defendant school hired cleaners to defrost the ice on the staircase, the claimant was badly injured after slipping on ice on the staircase. The court found that this case was different from Haseldine v Daw because defrosting the stairs did not entail any technical knowledge, it was something that the school could have done themselves, and therefore ensuring that the cleaners had done their jobs properly was not unreasonable to expect of the school authority.

Haseldine v Daw

The claimant in this case was injured by a faulty lift, which was just surveyed by a group of technicians a week before the accident. The claimant purported to sue the owner of the building. The court held that the technical and specialist nature of lift mantainance meant that the qualifty of the survey was not something that the occupiers could reasonably be expected to verify. Hence the occupiers were not liable. Rule to exempt liability on the basis of contracting: The injury must have been caused by the work carried out by the contractor which they were contracted to do; It was reasonable for the occupier to employ independant contractor; The occupier must be reasonably satisfied that the contractor was competent.

Gwilliam v West Hertfordshire The claimant, a 63 year old woman, was injured at a summer fair hosted by Hospital NHS Trust [2002] EWCA West Hertfordshire Hopsital. She was injured whilst using a splat wall Civ 1041 Court of Appeal whereby participants would bounce off a trampette against a wall and become attached to the wall by means of Velcro material. The injury occurred as a result of negligent set up of the equipment. The equipment was provided by a business called Club Entertainments who were an independent contractor engaged by the Hospital. Club Entertainments public liability insurance had expired four days before the incidence and thus they had no cover for the injury. They agreed to settle her claim for 5,000. Mrs Gwilliam brought an action against the hospital based on their failure to ensure that the entertainment arranged was covered by public liability insurance. She claimed the difference between the 5,000 and what she would have received had they been covered by insurance. Held: The Hospital owed a duty of care Under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 this duty did extend to checking whether the independent contractor had insurance cover since this would be relevant to whether they were competent. However, there was no breach of duty since the Hospital had enquired and had been told by Club Entertainment that they had insurance cover. There was no duty to inspect the insurance documents to ensure that cover was adequate. Ashdown v Samuel Williams & Sons Ltd (1957) Held that it is sufficient for an occupier to post a clear and unequivocal notice at the point of entry excluding liability with respect to non-contractual entrants.

Addie v Dumbreck [1929] AC 358 The defendant owned View Park Colliery which was situated in a field adjacent House of Lords to a road. There was a fence around the perimeter of the field although there were large gaps in the fence. The field was frequently used as a short cut to a railway station and children would use it as a playground. The defendant would often warn people off the land but the attempts were not effective and no real attempt was made to ensure that people did not come onto the land. A child came on to the land and was killed when he climbed onto a piece of haulage apparatus. Held: No duty of care was owed to trespassers to ensure that they were safe when coming onto the land. The only duty was not to inflict harm wilfully. Viscount Dunedin: "In the present case, had the child been a licensee, I would have held the defenders liable; secus if the complainer had been an adult. But, if the person is a trespasser, then the only duty the proprietor has towards him is not maliciously to injure him; he may not shoot him; he may not set a spring gun, for that is just to arrange to shoot him without personally firing the shot. Other illustrations of what he may not do might be found, but they all come under the same headinjury either directly malicious or an acting so reckless as to be tantamount to malicious acting." British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC 877 House of Lords A six year old boy was electrocuted and suffered severe burns when he wondered from a play park onto a live railway line. The railway line was surrounded by a fence however, part of the fence had been pushed down and the gap created had been used frequently as a short cut to the park. The defendant was aware of the gap in the fence which had been present for several months, but had failed to do anything about it. Under existing authority of Addie v Dumbreck no duty of care was owed to trespassers. However, the House of Lords departed from their previous decision using the 1966 Practice Statement and held that the defendant railway company did owe a duty of common humanity to trespassers. Lord Pearson: "It seems to me that the rule in Addie v. Dumbreck has been rendered obsolete by changes in physical and social conditions and has become an incumbrance impeding the proper development of the law. With the increase of the population and the larger proportion living in cities and towns and the extensive substitution of blocks of flats for rows of houses with gardens or back yards and quiet streets, there is less playing space for children and so a greater temptation to trespass. There is less supervision of children, so that they are more likely to trespass. Also with the progress of technology there are more and greater dangers for them to encounter by reason of the increased use of, for instance, electricity, gas, fast moving vehicles, heavy machinery and poisonous chemicals. There is considerably more need than there used to be for occupiers to take reasonable steps with a view to deterring persons, especially children, from trespassing in places that are dangerous for them. In my opinion the Addie v. Dumbreck formulation of the duly of occupier to trespasser is plainly inadequate for modern conditions, and its rigid and restrictive character has impeded the proper development of the common law in this field. It has become an anomaly and should be discarded."

Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English

Mr English was employed at Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltds colliery at Glencraig from 27 March 1933. He was repairing an airway leading off the Mine Jigger Brae, a main haulage road. Between 1:30pm and 2pm he was going to the pit bottom and the haulage plan was put in motion. He tried to escape through one of the manholes, but was caught by a rake of hutches and crushed between it and the side of the road. His family claimed damages. The company claimed that Mr Englishs own negligence contributed to his death, because he should have told the person in charge of the machinery, or taken an alternative route. House of Lords held unanimously that an employer has a non delegable duty to create a safe system of work. Even if an employer gives that duty to another person, they still remain responsible for workplace safety.

Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures (1934) CA

[Law and morality - morality shifting over time] C complained that she could be identified with the character Princess Natasha in the film 'Rasputin, the Mad Monk'. The princess claimed damages on the basis that the film suggested that, by reason of her identification with 'Princess Natasha', she had been seduced by Rasputin. Held: The princess was awarded 25,000 damages. It was contended that if the film indicated any relations between Rasputin and 'Natasha' it indicated a rape of Natasha and not a seduction. Slesser LJ considered the film defamatory whether it suggested rape or seduction: I, for myself, cannot see that from the plaintiffs point of view it matters in the least whether this libel suggests that she has been seduced or ravished. The question whether she is or is not the more or the less moral seems to me immaterial in considering this question whether she has been defamed, and for this reason, that, as has been frequently pointed out in libel, not only is the matter defamatory if it brings the plaintiff into hatred, ridicule, or contempt by reason of some moral discredit on her part, but also if it tends to make the plaintiff be shunned and avoided and that without any moral discredit on her part. It is for that reason that persons who have been alleged to have been insane, or to be suffering from certain disease, and other cases where no direct moral responsibility could be placed upon them, have been held to be entitled to bring an action to protect their reputation and their honour. One may, I think, take judicial notice of the fact that a lady of whom it has been said that she has been ravished, albeit against her will, has suffered in social reputation and in opportunities of receiving respectable consideration from the world. Later he added: 'When this woman is defamed in her sexual purity I do not think that the precise manner in which she has been despoiled of her innocence and virginity is a matter which a jury can properly be asked to consider.

Smith v ADVFN Plc (CA)

S took part in postings on a bulletin board on a financial services website maintained by ADVFN. He claimed to have been defamed by hundreds of postings published by users under cover of pseudonyms. He wished to know their IP addresses in order to obtain their names and addresses from their internet service providers. Gray J had made an order for the disclosure of the registered IP addresses of users responsible for over 100 postings in April 2007, but in most cases that information did not enable S to discover the identities of those responsible. He applied to the judge for disclosure of the IP addresses of the users at the times when their postings were made (an order which was not opposed in principle since disclosure of the identity of the users had already been ordered by Gray J), and for the disclosure of the IP addresses of those responsible for a further 150 postings. He appealed from the decision of Mackay J not to order disclosure in respect of the further 150 postings. Whether the judge had wrongly refused to make an order for disclosure of the identities of the users responsible for the further postings. Dismissing the appeal: (1) It was unreasonable to expect the judge, in the short time available, to assess without proper guidance each and every alleged instance of defamation, given the volume and incoherence of the material which he had been expected to consider. Accordingly, he had been entitled to refuse to make the order sought. (2) The Appellants inability to pay the Respondents costs would be a factor which could properly be taken into account against him if he made a further application.

South Hetton Coal Company vs North Eastern News Association Limited (1984).

The newspaper in that case had published an article that was strongly critical of the way the plaintiff a colliery owner housed its workers. The company, when suing for libel, had neither stated nor sought to prove that it had suffered any actual damage. It was argued by the paper that a company could have no personal character and that the article had not related to the business of the company. This argument was unanimously rejected. The Court held that, "It is not necessary to prove any particular damage. The jury may give such damages as they think fit, having regard to the conduct of the parties, respectively, and to all the circumstances of the case."

Steel & Morris v McDonalds: Steel The applicants were sued by McDonalds after handing out a six-page leaflet & Morris v United Kingdom containing allegations damaging allegations about the company, entitled "What's Wrong with McDonalds". At trial (the longest in English legal history, at 313 days), Mr Justice Bell found for McDonalds and awarded them 60,000 in damages (reduced to 40,000 on appeal), although he did find some of the allegations made by the Defendants to be true. The applicants appealed to the ECHR. (1) Whether the unavailability of legal aid for defamation meant that the applicants had been denied their rights to a fair trial under Art 6; (2) Whether the proceedings and their outcome infringed Art 10. Finding violations of Art 6 and Art 10: (1) Denial of legal aid deprived the applicants of the opportunity to present their case effectively before the court central to the concept of a fair trial. States are free to decide how litigants are guaranteed this right. Legal aid is one means. Whether it is necessary depends on the facts of the individual case. The applicants were defending their right to freedom of expression, the financial consequences to them were great and the case was highly complex, both factually and legally. The disparity of legal assistance gave rise to unfairness. (2) The allegations constituted political expression, requiring a high level of protection. It was not incompatible with Art 10 to allow companies to sue for defamation. Nor was the incidence of the burden of proof itself an infringement. However, balancing the procedural unfairness, inequality of arms and the means of the applicants, the damages award was a disproportionate infringement of Art 10. Goldsmith v Bhoyrul ( 1998) Political parties also do not have the right to bring an action for defamation as they should always be open to criticism in a democratic system. Individual candidates for elected office can make claims for defamation and political parties can be sued if they publish defamatory statements. The council brought an action for libel against a newspaper in respect of articles alleging impropriety in the administration of its superannuation fund. The defendants' application to strike out the statement of claim, on the ground that a local authority could not maintain an action in libel for words reflecting on its governmental and administrative functions, was dismissed. The Court of Appeal allowed the defendants' appeal. The council appealed. Charles Gray QC and Heather Rogers (instructed by Kingsford Stacey for solicitor, Derbyshire County Council) for the council. Anthony Lester QC and Desmond Browne QC (instructed by Biddle & Co) for the defendants. Lord Keith of Kinkel said that it was of the highest public importance that a democratically elected governmental body, or indeed any governmental body, should be open to uninhibited public criticism. The threat of a civil action for defamation had inevitably to have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech and it was therefore contrary to the public interest for organs of government, whether central or local, to sue for libel. A local authority did not have the right under the common law of England to maintain an action for damages for defamation. Lord Griffiths, Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Woolf agreed. Appeal dismissed. (WLR)

Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd and others

Sim v. Stretch [1936]

Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818

a defamatory statement is one which tends to lower a person, "in the estimation of right-thinking members of society." It is not that the statement be made to the person in regard, it must be communicated to another. Tort law protects one's interest in preserving his/her reputation. In Canada, the law of defamation permits actions for Libel and Slander against those who seek to damage the anothers reputation. The Defendants owned a golf club where illegal gambling machines were kept. Someone told the police and they were removed. Shortly after a piece of paper appeared on one of the walls saying but 'he who gave the game away, may he byrnn in hell and rue the day'. Did these words defame the claimant in the sense that he was guilty of underhand disloyalty to his fellow club members by telling the police about the machines. The Court of Appeal held that even though some people may consider that the fruit machines were so trivial that they weren't really criminal, the right-thinking man cannot ever view the reporting of crime as defamation. To report crime, however trivial, cannot be a source of scorn or ridicule in the eyes of the law Was an action on a libel published in a letter which the bearer, who had no authority to do so, happened to open, and that case shows that a man is responsible for the publication which has arisen through the curiosity of a person into whose hands the letter happens to pass. Belief that a third person might open it is evidence to go to the jury of intended publication: Delacroix v Thevenot; Gomersall v Davies. A letter not sealed or fastened up is analogous to a post-card, and a post-card is a publication to every one through whose hands it passes. A libel civil action which he brought against Sunday Times journalist Julie Burchill, after she published comments suggesting that he was "hideously ugly"; the judge ruled for Berkoff, finding that Burchill's actions "held him to ridicule and contempt The court considered a request from jurors when assessing damages in a A police investigation into a company that produced plastics were leaked to a newspaper. The front page of the newspaper copied the document which said that an investigation was going on by the fraud squad after criticisms of the chairman's accounts by a shareholder. The company was later absolved of any wrongdoing and they sued for defamation alleging that the newspaper had intended that readers assume the company was fraudulent. The action wasn't based on what the words said themselves, but on a secondary meaning which may have been inferred by the reader: the innuendo meaning. The House of Lords held that the right-minded person would not infer guilt just from the article and the case was dismissed.

Thorley v Lord Kerry

Berkoff v. Burchill

Lewis -v- Daily Telegraph Ltd [1963] 1 QB 340

Tolley v Fry

Tolley was a well-known amateur golfer. During the 1920s if an amateur golfer entered into a commercial contract for benefit, that could harm the reputation and status of the golfer. Fry, without the consent of Tolley, had used a caricature of Tolley in several advertisements in order to promote chocolates. At first instance the judge held that this was capable of being libellous leaving the actual decision to a jury. This body found in favour of the claimant and awarded damages. The Court of Appeal found that the advertisement was not capable of producing libellous effects. To their mind, the case should not have been brought before a jury. They reversed the judges decision and dismissed the action. The House of Lords, in a decision of four against one, restored the original decision in favour of the claimant but ordered a new trial concerning the level of compensation. Viscount Hailsham delivered the major opinion: An action of libel would succeed if the publication complained of produced at least some of the meanings attributed to it in the innuendo, and those meanings were defamatory. Libel is a possible remedy against unwanted character advertising, if some further element of an individuals reputation, such as status as an amateur golfer, were endangered. The case also shows the limits of this action as mere vulgarities are non-actionable.

Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2 KB The Defendants took a photograph of Mr Cassidy (a racehorse owner) with a 331 woman who was not his wife. Mr Cassidy, who often used a different name, told a reporter that he was going to marry her and the image had a caption saying they were engaged, using his alternative name. Mrs Cassidy, the lawful wife, brought an action for defamation. Although they lived separately, Mr Cassidy sometimes came to visit her. She alleged that people would see him arriving at her house thinking he is the man from the photo (where his alternative name was used) and assume that they were living together immorally and only pretending to be his wife. The Court of Appeal said that words published about one person can sometimes defame another person and that Mrs Cassidy had in fact been defamed. By people seeing this man coming to her house who is supposed to be marrying another woman, she looks like she was simply pretending to be his wife. The blame here was on the newspaper but arguably, the fact that a lawful wife existed may have been difficult to discover.

Norman v Future Publishing

The operatic diva, Jessye Norman, sued for libel over the attribution to her in Classic CD music magazine of a joke which involved her getting stuck, being advised to exit sideways from the situation and responding with the line "Honey, I ain't got no sideways". She put various defamatory interpretations on this story. Her claim was struck out by Buckley J on the grounds that the words could not carry a defamatory meaning. She appealed. Whether the attribution of this joke was capable of conveying a meaning defamatory of the claimant. Dismissing the appeal: (1) Where words were alleged to be defamatory because they exposed a claimant to ridicule a line had to be drawn between insults and ridicule; in doing so the perceived intention of the writer could be relevant. (2) The article was generally sympathetic and favourable, and did not disclose an intention to ridicule. (3) The words could not bear any of the defamatory meanings advanced.

Charleston v News Group Newspapers [1995] 2 AC 65

Two popular characters from the tv show Neighbours were portrayed on the front cover of a newspaper naked except for black leather engaged in sexual intercourse. The title read "Strewth! What's Harold up to with out Madge? Porn shocker for Neighbours stars" however the captions on the pictures made clear that the images were false. The image was taken from a sordid computer game which had computer-generated the images. The rest of the article condemned the game in a tone which can be contrasted with the prominence given to the image. The House of Lords accepted that the image must have deeply offensive but said that it was not defamatory since a publication has to be read as a whole. Even though the image and headline were libellous the remainder of the article had a neutralising effect.

E .Hutton and Co V Jones (1910) It was held the intention is irrelevant, the use of a fictious character is no AC 20 defence. It need not answer 100% description of the plaintiff before it can be said to refer to them. The plaintiff was a barrister and the article referred to a church warden it was held a person charged of libel cannot defend himself by saying that he didnt intend to defame the plaintiff. Thus there need not be express neither is it necessary for any key or pointer in the statement to indicate the claimant the test is whether the ordinary sensible reader in the light of the special facts would understand the words as referring to the claimant. He/she is entitled to rely on a subsequent publication to prove it was him referred to. Newstead v London Express A newspaper report of a trial referred to Harold Newstead, a 30 year old Newspapers (1940) Camberwell man, as a bigamist. The claimant, who had the same name, lived in Camberwell and was unmarried, successfully sued for libel.

Morgan -v- Odhams Press Ltd; HL 1971

The plaintiff claimed in defamation. The defence was that the words did not refer to the plaintiff and could not be understood to refer to him. Held: The question as to what meaning words are capable of bearing has been described as a question of law, but only in the sense that the decision thereon is reserved to the judge rather than to the jury: It is not a question of law in the true sense. The ordinary reasonable reader is a layman, not a lawyer, and his capacity for implication is much greater than that of the lawyer. Lord Morris said: The question for the Judge at the end of the plaintiffs case was whether there was evidence upon which the jury could (not would) decide in favour of the plaintiff. That in turn raised the question whether the jury could decide that some readers (having knowledge of certain circumstances) would reasonably understand the words as referring to the plaintiff. If no reasonable reader could have understood the words as referring to the plaintiff, then there would be nothing to be left to the jury. Lord Reid said that some people may think that the law has gone too far in holding a publisher liable for a reference innuendo, if the statement concerned applies to someone the publisher has never heard of. Some articles published during the second world war referred to a political group of Russian exiles as people who wanted to work with Hitler to make Russia facist. The Claimant was the head of the group in the UK and claimed that the words could reasonably be understood as imputing him. The global membership was 2000 but the UK membership was only 24. The House of Lords said that there could be no general rule preventing a lawsuit as long as the statement can be understood as referring to individual members in the party, which they did not do in the present case. The defendant published serious defamatory allegations against several plaintiff police officers. The defendant newspaper appealed against an award of 250,000 exemplary damages for their defamation of the respondent police officers. Held: Damages for defamation might be increased where a newspaper advertised the story complained of. Nevertheless, a retrial was ordered. The jury should be asked to make one award of exemplary damages which should then be divided between the plaintiffs. The award of exemplary damages was proper because there was evidence that the defendant had calculated the risk of damages against the benefit of increased sales. A man sent a letter to his wife which defamed her and their children. It was opened and read by the butler. An action was brought by the children (as a wife could not sue her husband at the time). The Court of Appeal dismissed the case saying that it was not the butler's job to open letters and he only did so out of curiosity. There cannot, therefore, be a publication to a third party where it is not natural and probable that that third party would hear the information. A husband opened a letter which defamed his wife. It was held that the defamation had been published to the husband as it natural and probable that the husband would open it.

Knupffer v London Express Newspapers [1944] AC 116,

Riches -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986]

Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32

Theaker v Richardson [1962] 1 WLR 151,

Slipper v British Broadcasting Corporation [1991] 1 QB 283

The Claimant was a retired police officer was the subject of a film about trying to capture some men who had committed the Great Train Robbery. The Claimant alleged that the film showed him as a complete idiot. The film had been shown to some journalists before its release to the public and those journalists had published reviews contained the defamatory sting of the film i.e. that he was an incompetent police officer. The Claimant sued not only for the release to the public but the repetitions in the journalists' reviews. The defendants argued that the repetitions are only actionable where the defendant has authorised them. The court rejected this argument and said that the Defendant can be liable for any re-publication of the defamatory material as long as it was reasonably foreseeable. Whilst visiting the claimants' autograph shop the defendant allegedly claimed that a signed photograph of her husband, David Beckham, was not genuine. The shop sought to rely on the subsequent publication in the media of the defendant's alleged claims in support of its claim for damages. The judge at first instance struck out the shop's plea in this respect. Whether the shop could rely at trial on an allegation that the claimant was responsible for subsequent press coverage of her visit to the shop. The plea would be reinstated to go to the jury at trial, who would be directed to consider the questions of whether the defendant knew that what she had allegedly said was likely to be reported and that if she slandered someone that slander was likely to be repeated or a reasonable person in the position of the defendant should have appreciated that there was a signficant risk that what she had allegedly said would be repeated.

McManus v Beckham 2002

Alexander v North Eastern Railway (1865) 6 B&S 340

The Defendants published a notice at their train station saying the Claimant had been caught riding on a train without a ticket and was sentenced to 1 fine or three weeks imprisonment. In actual fact it was 14 days imprisonment if he failed to pay the fine. The Claimant complained that the overstatement made it appear as if the offence he had committed was worse than it was. The jury found for the Defendants.

Plato Films -v- Speidel [1961]

The plaintiff had been the Supreme Commander of the Axis Land Forces in Central Europe, and brought an action claiming that he had been defamed in a film showing him privy to the murders of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and M. Barthou in 1934, and as having betrayed Field-Marshal Rommel in 1944. The trial had not yet occurred. The defendants sought to rely on the fact that the plaintiff chose to sue on certain parts of the film, and not on others which were also defamatory of the plaintiff, as a ground for mitigating damages. Held: This was vigorously rejected: "[The defendants] plead that the respondent has been depicted in the film as having been 'guilty of the conduct hereinafter set out the truth of which the plaintiff . . does not deny'. It surprises me that it should be considered a proper matter for pleading that a plaintiff has not thought fit to include in his action every libellous statement made about him by a defendant. It is, in my opinion, wholly improper. and If it is said that other parts of the entire film constitute 'circumstances in which the alleged libel was published' (in themselves a recognised head of mitigation), I think that is a highly artificial meaning to attribute to the phrase. The real purport of this portion of paragraph 5 of the defence seems to be to make the point that the plaintiff must be taken to have admitted the truth of such accompanying derogatory statements as he is not challenged in his libel claim. That is not a matter for pleading. If it amounts to anything at all, it is a matter for comment. As a proposition of law designed to set up some sort of estoppel, I think that it has no foundation.

London Artists v Littler [1962] 2 QB 375

The Defendant wrote a letter to some actors in a play who had all given notice to quit at the same time accusing them of a plot to force the end of a successful play. So many actors giving notice at the same time was apparently an almost unheard of event. They sued him. He pleaded justification and then withdrew it as it became clear that the actors had withdrawn for different reasons and not in order to end the play. The Defendant also argued fair comment on a matter in the public interest. The Court laid down this test: Was the comment made on a matter of public interest, Was the statement an expression of fact or opinion, If opinion, are the underlying facts true and contained in the article, Would a fair man make the same comment. Regarding (1), they held that whenever a matter affects people at large it can be held to be in the public interest.

Kemsley -v- Foot [1951] 2 KB 34

The plaintiff complained that the defendant had defamed him with a headline to an article 'Lower than Hemsley' which otherwise had no connection with the plaintiff. He said it suggested that he was a byword for poor journalism. Held: Criticism of a newspaper owner as to the presentation of news by the paper was to be treated on a par with criticism of a book or play. The critic is not prevented from relying upon fair comment as a defence only because he does not particularise the conduct of which he complains. He need only state plainly the subject-matter of the complaint. Birkett LJ said: "It is clear, therefore, and indeed it was not contended otherwise, that ALL the facts need not be stated, but when the matter is submitted to the judgment of a jury particulars of the facts relied on must be supplied" and "I do not think it is possible to lay down any rule of universal application. If, for example, a defamatory statement is made about a private individual who is quite unknown to the general public, and he has never taken any part in public affairs, and the statement takes the form of comment only and is capable of being construed as comment and no facts of any kind are given, while it is conceivable that the comment may be made on a matter of public interest, nevertheless the defence of fair comment might not be open to a defendant in that case. It is almost certain that a naked comment of that kind in those circumstances would be decided to be a question of fact and could be justified as such if that defence were pleaded. But if the matter is before the public, as in the case of a book, a play, a film, or a newspaper, then I think different considerations apply. Comment may then be made without setting out the facts on which the comment is based if the subject-matter of the comment is plainly stated. This seems to me to accord with good sense and the true public interest." Somervell LJ identified two cases where a publisher may not be obliged to set out the factual basis of his comment in detail: where the subject matter was a work of art placed before the public for comment, and where the subject was a public figure subject in any event to vigorous discussion and where a detailed recital of the facts would be unwelcome. In contradistinction: "At the other end of the scale one may imagine a comment reflecting on the integrity of a

Merivale -v- Carson (1887) 20 QBD 275

A published criticism of a play made reference to one of the characters being "a naughty wife", though in fact there was no adulterous wife in the play. Held: The defence of fair comment is open to a commentator however prejudiced he might be, and however exaggerated or obstinate his views. Bowen LJ said: "Still there is another class of cases in which, as it seems to me, the writer would be travelling out of the region of fair criticism - I mean if he imputes to the author that he has written something which in fact he has not written. That would be a misdescription of the work. There is all the difference in the world between saying that you disapprove of the character of a work, and that you think it has an evil tendency, and saying that a work treats adultery cavalierly, when in fact there is no adultery at all in the story. A jury would have a right to consider the latter beyond the limits of fair criticism." After citing Campbell, Lord Esher MR asked what was meant by 'fair comment' and answered: "What is the meaning of a 'fair comment'? I think the meaning is this: is the article in the opinion of the jury beyond that which any fair man, however prejudiced or however strong his opinion may be, would say of the work in question? Every latitude must be given to opinion and to prejudice, and then an ordinary set of men with ordinary judgment must say whether any fair man would have made such a comment on the work . . Mere exaggeration, or even gross exaggeration, would not make the comment unfair. However wrong the opinion expressed may be in point of truth, or however prejudiced the writer, it may still be within the prescribed limit. The question which the jury must consider is this would any fair man, however prejudiced he may be, however exaggerated or obstinate his views, have said that which this criticism has said of the work which is criticised? If it goes beyond that, then you must find for the plaintiff; if you are not satisfied that it does, then it falls within the allowed limit, and there is no libel at all."

Thomas v Bradbury, Agnew and Co Ltd and another [1906]

The court held that evidence that the defendant was actuated by malice would defeat the defence of fair comment, notwithstanding that in all other aspects the comment may be considered fair. It is for the claimant to adduce such evidence.

Watt v. Longsdon

Browne sent a letter to D, who worked as a liquidator for the firm. The letter alleged that a maid had been Ps mistress and that he was conducting orgies in his flat. D shared this letter with his boss, and Ps wife. Trial court gave judgment to D on the grounds that they were privileged, court of appeals reversed. Did D have a duty to inform, thus shielding him from liability? Holding: Ds publication was privileged as to his disclosure to his boss, but not to Ps wife. In my view on these facts there was a duty, both from a moral and a material point of view, on Longsdon to communicate the letter to Singer, the chairman of his company, who, apart from questions of present employment, might be asked by Watt for a testimonial to a future employer. However, using the best judgment I can in this difficult matter, I have come to the conclusion that there was not a moral or social duty in Longsdon to make this communication to Mrs. Watt such as to make the occasion privileged. Privilege arises when: A duty to communicate information believed to be true to a person who has a material interest in receiving the information, or An interest in the speaker to be protected by communicating information, if true, relevant to that interest, to a person honestly believed to have a duty to protect that interest, or A common interest in and reciprocal duty in respect of the subject matter of the communication between speaker and recipient. The information came from a very doubtful source, and in my judgment no reasonably right minded person could think it his duty, without obtaining some corroboration of the story, and without first communicating with the plaintiff, to pass on these outrageous charges of marital infidelity of a gross kind, and drunkenness and dishonesty, to the plaintiffs wife

Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd

The Plaintiff, a prominent public figure in Ireland, began proceedings for defamation against the Defendants, the publishers of an article contained in the British mainland edition of a national newspaper. The publication related to the political crisis in Ireland in 1994 culiminating in the Plaintiff's resignation as Taoiseach and the collapse of the Irish government. The Plaintiff claimed that the words bore the meaning that he had deliberately lied to mislead the Dial and his cabinet colleagues. The Defendants pleaded, inter alia, qualified privilege at common law. At the trial the jury returned a verdict in the Plaintiff's favour and awarded the sum of 1p by way of damages. The Court of Appeal set aside the jury's verdict and ordered a retrial on the grounds of misdirections to the jury. The Court also ruled that the defence of qualified privilege was not available. The Defendants appealed. Whether the courts should recognise a generic qualified privilege encompassing the publication by a newspaper of political matters affecting the people of the United Kingdom. The common law should not develop a new subject matter category of qualified privilege whereby the publication of all political information would attract qualified privilege whatever the circumstances, since that would fail to provide adequate protection for reputation, and it would be unsound in principle to distinguish political information from other matters of public concern; but that qualified privilege was available in respect of political information upon application of the established common law test of whether there had been a duty to publish the material to the intended recipients and whether they had had an interest in receiving it, taking into account all the circumstances of the publication including the nature, status and source of the material.

Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd

P sued D, an Internet Service Provider, over a newsgroup posting made available from D's newsgroup servers in this jurisdiction. D sought permission to amend its defence to rely, in mitigation of damages, on numerous allegedly provocative postings previously made by P, including to other newsgroups apart from that in which the posting complained of appeared. P resisted the amendment on the ground that it offended against the rule in Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 Q.B.D 491 as bringing in inadmissible evidence of particular acts of misconduct on the part of the P. Whether the amendments should be permitted. The amendments should be permitted. The other postings were relevant and admissible in support of D's case that the action was not brought bona fide, but as part of a cynical practice by P of provoking people into overstepping the mark so that he could then bring vexatious libel actions against them. They were 'introduced to establish that the Plaintiff should only receive derisory or small damages because of his bad conduct which is causally connected to the libel sued upon. In my judgment the Plaintiff's postings are germane to the defamatory posting the subject of his claim.'

Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 The defendant owned a mill and constructed a reservoir on their land. The House of Lords reservoir was placed over a disused mine. Water from the reservoir filtered through to the disused mine shafts and then spread to a working mine owned by the claimant causing extensive damage. Held: The defendants were strictly liable for the damage caused by a non- natural use of land. Lord Cranworth: If a person brings, or accumulates, on his land anything which, if it should escape, may cause damage to his neighbour, he does so at his peril. If it does escape, and cause damage, he is responsible, however careful he may have been, and whatever precautions he may have taken to prevent the damage. Sedleigh-Denfield v OCallaghan [1940] AC 880 House of Lords The council undertook some work on the defendants land at the request of a neighbouring landowner. They had placed a culvert in a ditch to allow the water to drain away, however, they had negligently placed a grate in the wrong place which rendered the grate useless and the culvert became prone to blockages. The defendants workers had cleaned the culvert periodically over a three year period to prevent blockages. However, a heavy rain storm caused a blockage and the ditch became flooded. The flood spread to neighbouring property owned by the claimant and caused substantial damage. The claimant brought an action in nuisance for the damage caused. The defendant argued that he had neither consented to nor had knowledge of the existence of the culvert. Held: The defendant was liable. An occupier may be liable for the acts of a trespasser if they adopt or continue the nuisance. Lord Maugham: My Lords, in the present case I am of opinion that the Respondents both continued and adopted the nuisance. After the lapse of nearly three years they must be taken to have suffered the nuisance to continue; for they neglected to take the very simple step of placing a grid in the proper place which would have removed the danger to their neighbour s land. They adopted the nuisance for they continued during all that time to use the artificial contrivance of the conduit for the purpose of getting rid of water from their property without taking the proper means for rendering it safe.

A-G v P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd. (1957) held that any nuisance is public which materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of life of a class of Her Majestys subjects.

Cambridge Water v Eastern The defendant owned a leather tanning business. Spillages of small quantities Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC of solvents occurred over a long period of time which seeped through the floor 264 House of Lords of the building into the soil below. These solvents made their way to the borehole owned by the Claimant water company. The borehole was used for supplying water to local residents. The water was contaminated at a level beyond that which was considered safe and Cambridge Water had to cease using the borehole. Cambridge Water brought actions based on negligence, nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. Held:

Eastern Counties Leather were not liable as the damage was too remote. It was not reasonably foreseeable that the spillages would result in the closing of the borehole. The foreseeability of the type of damage is a pre-requisite of liability in actions of nuisance and claims based on the rule in Rylands v Fletcher in the same way as it applies to claims based in negligence. The Wagon Mound No 1 case applies to determine remoteness of damage.

The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] AC 388 House of Lords

The defendant's vessel, The Wagon Mound, leaked furnace oil at a Wharf in Sydney Harbour. Some cotton debris became embroiled in the oil and sparks from some welding works ignited the oil. The fire spread rapidly causing destruction of some boats and the wharf. Held: Re Polemis should no longer be regarded as good law. A test of remoteness of damage was substituted for the direct consequence test. The test is whether the damage is of a kind that was foreseeable. If a foreseeable type of damage is present, the defendant is liable for the full extent of the damage, no matter whether the extent of damage was foreseeable.

Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1 House of Lords

The defendant council were responsible for the maintenance of the pipe work supplying water to a block of flats. A leak developed which was undetected for some time. The water collected at an embankment which housed the claimants high pressure gas main. The water caused the embankment to collapse and left the gas main exposed and unsupported. This was a serious and immediate risk and the claimant took action to avoid the potential danger. They then sought to recover the cost of the remedial works under the principle established in Rylands v Fletcher. Held: The defendant was not liable. The councils use of land was not a non-natural use. Lord Bingham: I think it clear that ordinary user is a preferable test to natural user, making it clear that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is engaged only where the defendant's use is shown to be extraordinary and unusual. This is not a test to be inflexibly applied: a use may be extraordinary and unusual at one time or in one place but not so at another time or in another place.

Hunter v Canary Wharf [1998] 1 WLR 434 House of Lords

690 claims were made against Canary Wharf ltd. The claimants lived in the Isle of Dogs and complained that the erection of the Canary Wharf Tower interfered with their television reception. In addition, a second action against London Docklands Development Corporation involved 513 claims for damages in respect of excessive amounts of dust created during the construction of the tower. Some of the claimants were owners or tenants of properties, but many of the claimants had no proprietary interest in lane at all. Some were children living with parents, some were relations or lodgers with use of a room and some were spouses of the tenant or owner of the property. The two issues the House of Lords were required to consider were: 1. Whether interference with television reception was capable of giving rise to an actionable nuisance 2. Whether an interest in property was required to bring an action in Held: 1. There is no right of action in nuisance for interference with the television reception. 2. An interest in property is required to bring an action in nuisance. Khorasanjian v Bush overruled in so far as it holds that a mere licensee can sue in private nuisance.

Malone v Laskey 1907 2 KB 141 The claimant was injured when vibrations from an engine on an adjoining property caused a bracket to come loose and the cistern to fall on her in the lavatory. She was unsuccessful in her claim as she did not have a proprietary interest in the house. Her husband was a mere licensee through his employment as a manager. St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping The claimant owned a manor house with 1300 acres of land which was [1865] UKHL J81 House of Lords situated a short distance from the defendants copper smelting business. He brought a nuisance action against the defendant in respect of damage caused by the smelting works to their crops, trees and foliage. There were several industrial businesses in the locality including and alkali works. The defendant argued that the use of property was reasonable given the locality and the smelting works existed before the claimant purchased the property. Held Where there is physical damage to property, the locality principle has no relevance. It is no defence that the claimant came to the nuisance Sturges v Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch The defendant ran a confectionary shop which operated a noisy pestle and D 852 Court of Appeal mortar. It had done so for over 20 years but had no neighbouring property so there were no complaints as to its use. The claimant then built a consulting room for his practice as a physician adjacent to the defendants noisy shop. The claimant brought an action in nuisance to obtain an injunction to prevent the continuance of the noise. The defendant, relying on the Prescription Act, argued that he had obtained the right to be noisy by operating the noisy pestle for over twenty years. Held: The use of land prior to the construction of the consulting room was not preventable or actionable and therefore it was not capable of founding a prescription right.

Adams v Ursell [1913] 1 Ch 269

D was in the trade of selling fried fish. The shop was located in the residential part of a street. Faced with a claim for an injunction, he argued that his business benefited the public, especially the poor and therefore the smell produced by his trade was justified. Held: Court rejected the defense as Ps comfort and convenience also had to be considered Miller v Jackson [1977]3 WLR 20 The defendants were members of the Lintz Cricket Club. Cricket had been Court of Appeal played at Lintz cricket ground for over 70 years. The land was owned by the National Coal Board (NCB) who also owned some fields surrounding the grounds. Four years prior to the action, the NCB sold one of the fields and a development of Wimpey homes was put up in close proximity to the cricket ground. Mrs Miller purchased one of the houses and brought an action against the cricket club seeking an injunction to prevent them playing cricket at the ground. Initially quite a number of balls were hit over the houses. However, in 1976 the cricket club erected a higher fence and the number of balls hit out was reduced to nine over a two year period. There had been no personal injuries resulting from the balls but some property damage had been caused which the cricket club had paid for. Mrs Miller complained that she could not use her garden during matches and would often stay out of the house altogether. Held: The defendants were liable in both negligence and nuisance (Lord Denning dissenting) However, Cumming Bruce LJ refused the injunction on the grounds that it would be inequitable to grant an injunction given that the cricket ground had been used for so long and would be a loss to the community and Mrs Miller received the benefit of being adjacent to an open space. Lord Lane would have granted the injunction stating that the decision in Sturges v Bridgeman involves the assumption that it is no defence for the defendant to show that they came to the nuisance. Heath v Mayor Brighton (1908) A church claimed that the noise form an electric power station was a nuisance. However the noise did not interfere with the services and so the claim was unsuccessful. Brown paper kept by the plaintiff was damaged by the heat from the defendant's paper box manufacturing process carried on next door to the plaintiff's store room. The plaintiff was unsuccessful as the brown paper was exceptionally sensitive. The defendant manufactured steel and iron products 600 feet from the claimants property. The claimant had a dwelling house and also a commercial florists and nursery. As part of his business he specialised in growing orchids which are known for their particular sensitivity. The claimant brought an action in relation to noxious fumes and smuts which had deposited over his shrubs, trees, hedges and flowers causing them to die. Held: The defendants actions constituted an unlawful nuisance and therefore the claimant was entitled to recover damages in respect of the orchids despite the sensitive nature of the flowers.

Robinson v Kilvert (1889)

McKinnon Industries v Walker [1951] WN 401 Privy Council

Christie v Davey (1893) 1 Ch 316 The claimant was a music teacher. She gave private lessons at her home and her family also enjoyed playing music. She lived in a semi-detached house which adjoined the defendants property. The defendant had complained of the noise on many occasions to no avail. He took to banging on the walls and beating trays and shouting in retaliation. Held: The defendants actions were motivated by malice and therefore did constitute a nuisance. An injunction was granted to restrain his actions. The claimant bred silver foxes for their fur. Silver foxes are particularly timid and if disturbed when pregnant they are prone to miscarry. If alarmed when they have young they may devour them. The defendant was the claimants neighbour. He objected to the fox farm and fired a gun on his own land close to the breeding pens with the intention to scare the foxes and impede breeding. The claimant brought an action in nuisance. Held: The defendant was liable despite the abnormal sensitivity of the foxes because he was motivated by malice. Bradford Corporation v Pickles [1895] HL [Tort negligence - duty of care - proving fault - malice not normally relevant] D owned land containing underground streams which fed C's (Bradford Corporation) waterworks. D began to sink shafts for the alleged purpose of draining certain beds of stone. The effect of Ds operations was to affect seriously the supply of water to appellants springs. The corporation alleged that defendant was not acting in good faith, but to compel them to purchase his land. Held: D has the right to divert or appropriate the water within his own land so as to deprive his neighbour of it. His right is the same whatever his motive may be, whether genuinely to improve his own land, or maliciously to injure his neighbour, or to induce his neighbour to buy him out. No use of property which would be legal if due to a proper motive can become illegal if it is prompted by a motive which is improper or even malicious.

Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468

St Annes Well Brewery Co v Roberts 1929

Where the nuisance existed before the occupier acquired the property he will be liable if it can be proved that he knew or ought to have known of its existence

Leakey & Ors v National Trust [1980] QB 485 Court of Appeal

The claimants land had been damaged by falls of soil and other debris from the defendants land known as Burrow Mump. The falls were caused entirely by nature there was no human activity involved that would have caused the fall. The defendants were aware of the risks since 1968. They had taken legal advice and were told that they would not be liable for naturally occurring slides and consequently did nothing to prevent such slides. Following the exceptionally hot dry summer of 1976 and unusually heavy rainfall in the autumn, Mrs Leaky noticed a big crack appear in the bank above her house. She informed the National Trust and offered to pay half the cost of making it safe. Her offer was rejected. A few weeks later there was a large fall. She joined forces with other neighbours to bring an action in nuisance. Held: The National Trust were liable following the Privy Council decision in Goldman v Hargrave. A defendant is liable for a naturally occurring hazard on the land if they are aware of the danger and failed to act with reasonable prudence to remove the hazard.

Tetley v Chitty 1986 1 All ER 663 A council allowed a go-kart club to use their land for a race track. Nearby residents brought an action in nuisance. The council were held liable for authorising the activities of the go-kart club. The noise was an ordinary and necessary incident to go-kart racing which was the purpose for which the permission to use the land was granted. Hussain v Lancaster City Council The claimants own a shop and residential property which is situated on a [1999] 2 WLR 1142 Court of housing estate owned by the defendant. The claimants suffered severe Appeal harassment, including racial harassment which was predominantly from tenants and their families from the housing estate. The harassment took the form of congregating outside the shop, intimidation, shouting abuse and threats, throwing bricks, stones and balls, smashing windows, burning objects put through the door. The defendant was aware of the harassment from 1991. The council had sent letters to the perpetrators threatening them with eviction if they continued to harass the claimants, however, this was ineffective and the council did not in fact take possession proceedings against any of the perpetrators. The Council had the power to evict them for causing a nuisance under the tenancy agreements and under the Housing Act 1985. The claimants brought an action against the council for their failure to prevent the nuisance when it was in their power to do so. The defendant Council applied for a strike out which was refused. The council appealed. Held: The appeal was allowed and the claim struck out. The case was outside the scope of nuisance since the acts of the perpetrators did not involve the tenants use of the tenants land. Furthermore the Council had neither authorised nor adopted the nuisance. Lippiatt and Febry -v- South Gloucestershire County Council; CA 31-Mar-1999 The defendant had failed to remove travellers who had encamped on its land and caused nuisances against neighbouring farmers. Held: The court refused to strike out a claim in nuisance by neighbouring land owners. It was arguable that a land owner can be liable for repeated acts constituting nuisance committed from its land by those it knew were in occupation, and where no steps were taken to evict them. It was its own land from which a continuing nuisance emanated.

Allen v Gulf Oil Refinery [1981] AC 1001 House of Lords

The claimant brought an action in nuisance for the smell, noise and vibration created by an oil refinery which had been constructed by the defendant on their land. The defendants action in constructing the oil refinery was authorised by an Act of Parliament.

Held: The defendant was not liable as it had a defence of statutory authority. Bliss v Hall [1838] 4 Bing NC 183 D managed a factory for 3 years and during this time smoke, smell and other remittance came from the factory. P moved into a house near the factory. Held: A defence that an activity has been going on before an action brought to halt the activity is inapplicable as P had his rights too, one of which is clean air.

Thorpe v Brumfitt ((1872 73) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 650, CA (Eng))

Giles v Walker (1890) 24 QBD 656

M had granted P a right of way over a passage for all purposes over his land for the purpose of getting to and from Ps Inn. Ms tenants obstructed the passage so that potential customers could not get to the Inn operated by Ps tenant. An injunction was granted against all of the parties causing the obstruction. There was an argument that the words for all purposes meant that the claimed easement did not benefit any specific land and so was invalid. This argument was rejected: the words clearly meant for all purposes connected with the use of Ps land. Seeds from some thistles on the defendants land blew into neighbouring land owned by the claimant and damaged his crops. The defendant was not liable as he had not brought the thistles onto his land and there can not be liability under Rylands v Fletcher for a thing which naturally accumulates on land. F: X and Y set up a company Z Ltd. The function of Z Ltd was to perform a contract entered into both X and Y, with another party, to manufacture explosives. Z Ltd was to manufacture the explosives on X and Ys land. So Z Ltd was a licensee. An explosion occurred, damaging neighbouring property. H:The House of Lords found Z Ltd liable as the licensee which had accumulated the thing. X and Y, as occupiers and landowners were also liable for the escape of the thing accumulated by their licensee as the accumulation was a discharge of X and Ys contractual duty to another party.

Rainham Chemical Works v Belvedere Fish Guano

Attorney General v Corke [1993]

The Defendant allowed people onto his land to live in caravans. These people engaged in anti social activities which took place off Defendant's land. The court held that these people were 'dangerous' within the meaning of Rylands v Fletcher. Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263 The claimant ran a business from the second floor of a building. The defendant Privy Council owned the building and leased different parts to other business tenants. An unknown person had blocked all the sinks in the lavatory on the fourth floor and turned on all the taps in order to cause a flood. This damaged the claimants stock and the claimant brought an action based on the principle set out in Rylands v Fletcher. Held:

The defendants were not liable. The act which caused the damage was a wrongful act by a third party and there was no non-natural use of land.

Box v Jubb LR 4 EX Div 76

The defendant had a reservoir on their land. There was another reservoir situated at a higher level than the defendants. The owner of this other reservoir emptied it through a drain connected to the defendants reservoir causing the defendants reservoir to overflow and damage the claimants land. The claimant brought an action under Rylands v Fletcher contending that there was a non natural user of the land and that there had been an escape of water that caused damage. Held: The defendant was not liable for the damage as it was caused by the act of a third party over which the defendant had no control. The defendant kept an old coach that needed repair on their land adjoining a piece of wasteland. The claimant, a young boy of 10 approached two other boys on the wasteland close to the coach. As he got close, the boys lit a match and threw it into the petrol tank of the coach causing an explosion which left the claimant with severe burns. The claimant brought an action under the principle set out in Rylands v Fletcher. Held: The defendant was not liable as the escape was caused by the deliberate action of a third party.

Perry v Kendricks Transport [1956] WLR 85 Court of Appeal

Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2 ExD The defendant diverted a natural stream on his land to create ornamental 1 lakes. Exceptionally heavy rain caused the artificial lakes and waterways to be flooded and damage adjoining land. The defendant was held not liable under Rylands v Fletcher as the cause of the flood was an act of God. Mellish LJ: Now the jury have distinctly found, not only that there was no negligence in the construction or the maintenance of the reservoirs, but that the flood was so great that it could not reasonably have been anticipated, although, if it had been anticipated, the effect might have been prevented; and this seems to us in substance a finding that the escape of the water was owing to the act of God. However great the flood had been, if it had not been greater than floods that had happened before and might be expected to occur again, the defendant might not have made out that she was free from fault; but we think she ought not to be held liable because she did not prevent the effect of an extraordinary act of nature, which she could not anticipate.

Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Railway [1917] AC 556

The corp. constructed a concrete paddling pool for children in the bed of a stream and obstructed the natural flow of the stream. Owing to a rainfall of extraordinary violence the stream overflowed at the pond and damaged the property of the plaintiffs. Held that the extraordinary rainfall did not absolve the corp. from responsibility and that they were liable in damages.

Tate & Lyle v Greater London Council [1983] 2 AC 509

Tate & Lyle operated a sugar refinery on the bank of the river Thames. They had a jetty from which raw sugar would be offloaded from barges and refined sugar would be taken. The sugar would be taken be larger vessels and then transferred to smaller barges to enable them to get to through the shallow waters. As part of development Tate & Lyle wished to construct a new jetty and dredge the water to accommodate the larger vessels. At the same time the GLC was constructing new ferry terminals. The design of the ferry terminals was such that that it caused siltation of the channels. After using the channels for a short while, Tate & Lyles larger vessels were no longer able to use them. Further dredging at the cost of 540,000 was required to make the channel and jetties usable by the vessels. Tate & Lyle brought an action in negligence and nuisance to recover the cost of te extra dredging. Held: The claim in negligence and private nuisance failed since they did not possess any private rights which enabled them to insist on any particular depth of water. The claim succeeded in public nuisance since the interference caused by the ferry terminals affected public navigation rights. Tate & Lyle suffered particular damage as a result of this interference.

Barker v Saint Gobain Pipelines [2004] EWCA Civ 545 Court of Apeal

Mr Barker contracted mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos. He worked for the defendant between 1960-68. He worked for a different employer for 6 weeks where he was also exposed to asbestos. After 1968 he became selfemployed as a plasterer for 20 years. Whilst self employed he was exposed to asbestos on three occasions. The defendant argued that his exposure to asbestos whilst self-employed prevented him from being able to rely on the causation principle established in Fairchild v Glenhaven whereby the claimant is able to demonstrate that the defendant's breach of duty materially increased the risk of contracting the disease. Held: Fairchild did apply and the claimant was thus successful in establishing causation. His damages would be reduced under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 to reflect the periods where he exposed himself to risk during the course of his self-employment.

Adams v Ursell [1913] 1 Ch 269

D was in the trade of selling fried fish. The shop was located in the residential part of a street. Faced with a claim for an injunction, he argued that his business benefited the public, especially the poor and therefore the smell produced by his trade was justified. Held: Court rejected the defense as Ps comfort and convenience also had to be considered

Addie v Dumbreck [1929] AC 358 The defendant owned View Park Colliery which was situated in a field adjacent to a House of Lords road. There was a fence around the perimeter of the field although there were large gaps in the fence. The field was frequently used as a short cut to a railway station and children would use it as a playground. The defendant would often warn people off the land but the attempts were not effective and no real attempt was made to ensure that people did not come onto the land. A child came on to the land and was killed when he climbed onto a piece of haulage apparatus. Held: No duty of care was owed to trespassers to ensure that they were safe when coming onto the land. The only duty was not to inflict harm wilfully. Viscount Dunedin: "In the present case, had the child been a licensee, I would have held the defenders liable; secus if the complainer had been an adult. But, if the person is a trespasser, then the only duty the proprietor has towards him is not maliciously to injure him; he may not shoot him; he may not set a spring gun, for that is just to arrange to shoot him without personally firing the shot. Other illustrations of what he may not do might be found, but they all come under the same headinjury either directly malicious or an acting so reckless as to be tantamount to malicious acting."

A-G v P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd. (1957) held that any nuisance is public which materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of life of a class of Her Majestys subjects. Alcock v. The Chief Constable of Relatives of those killed or injured at a football stadium claimed damages against the South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310 police for causing them nervous shock resulting in psychiatric illness. The relatives saw and heard the tragedy via live television or radio broadcasts. The police admitted liability in negligence but denied any duty of care to the plaintiffs. The issue was whether the relatives were entitled in law to damages. The House of Lords held that a claimant for damages for psychiatric injury must pass two tests. The injury must be reasonably foreseeable (shown by a close tie of love and affection between the individuals). Second, the claimant must have been proximate to the incident or its aftermath at the time the incident occurred and the shock must have resulted from seeing or hearing the incident or its aftermath.

Alexander v North Eastern Railway (1865) 6 B&S 340

The Defendants published a notice at their train station saying the Claimant had been caught riding on a train without a ticket and was sentenced to 1 fine or three weeks imprisonment. In actual fact it was 14 days imprisonment if he failed to pay the fine. The Claimant complained that the overstatement made it appear as if the offence he had committed was worse than it was. The jury found for the Defendants. Recognized the duty of a lawyer towards 3rd arty only because the lawyers byundertaking to keep the Client's passport with them had assumed the responsibility to make sure that harm did not come to the 3rd party. Since the client had somehow obtained the passport the lawyers had breached this assumed duty towards the 3rd party

Al-Kandari V J R Brown & Co

Allen v Gulf Oil Refinery [1981] AC 1001 House of Lords

The claimant brought an action in nuisance for the smell, noise and vibration created by an oil refinery which had been constructed by the defendant on their land. The defendants action in constructing the oil refinery was authorised by an Act of Parliament. Held: The defendant was not liable as it had a defence of statutory authority. The defendant solicitors were acting for the claimant in a takeover of the Gillow group of companies. The defendant's failed to warn the claimant of potential liability that may arise under the transaction. The transaction was completed and risk of liability became a reality leaving the claimant liable to pay substantial sums. The claimant sought to recover some of this from the defendant arguing that if they had been advised correctly there was a chance that they would have been able to negotiate out of the liability. Held: The claimant was entitled to recover a sum to reflect their loss of a chance of negotiating out of liability. Where the result depends on what a third party would have done in a hypothetical situation, the claimant only has to demonstrate that there was a more than speculative chance rather than on the balance of probabilities. The assessment of the chance will be reflected in the damages. The contractor was to provide and install valuable timber and other specialised bowling alley equipment. On July 21, 1964 an exceptionally heavy rainstorm flooded the building and the timber for the building work was seriously damaged. The court held that the contractor and the building owner were both occupiers of the building. The claimants were tenants in a block of flats. The flats suffered from structural defects due to inadequate foundations which were 2ft 6in deep instead of 3ft deep as required. The defendant Council was responsible for inspecting the foundations during the construction of the flats. The House of Lords held that the defendant did owe a duty of care to ensure the foundations were of the correct depth. Lord Wilberforce introduced a two stage test for imposing a duty of care. This has since been overruled by Caparo v Dickman.

Allied Maples v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 4 All ER 907

AMF International Ltd v Magnet Bowling Ltd (1968)

Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728

Lord Wilberforce's two stage test: "in order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations in which a duty of care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latterin which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise." Ashdown v Samuel Williams & Sons Ltd (1957) Held that it is sufficient for an occupier to post a clear and unequivocal notice at the point of entry excluding liability with respect to non-contractual entrants.

Attia v British Gas plc

The plaintiff brought an action for damages from the defendants for nervous shock. She alleged that she had suffered a psychiatric illness caused by witnessing the destruction of her home by a fire caused by the defendants' negligence while installing central heating to her home. The judge decided as a preliminary issue on assumed facts that the plaintiff could not recover damages and dismissed the action. The plaintiff appealed. David Tucker (instructed by Fremont & Co) for the plaintiff. Janet Turner (instructed by the solicitor, British Gas plc (North Thames)) for the defendants. Dillon LJ said that the issues at trial, assuming the facts pleaded including the psychiatric illness were proved, would have been (a) causation and (b) foreseeability of the damage as a question of remoteness. If the plaintiff could surmount those two hurdles there was no good reason why the law should refuse to allow her to recover damages for nervous shock. His Lordship was not prepared to hold that the fact that the shock which caused the plaintiff's psychiatric illness was caused by damage to property must preclude her from recovering damages for nervous shock, even if it was reasonably foreseeable that she might suffer psychiatric illness as a consequence of the defendants' negligence in causing the fire in her house. Whether the plaintiff's assumed illness caused by the shock was or was not a foreseeable consequence of the defendants' negligence must depend on the actual evidence given at the trial. His Lordship would set aside the judge's order and allow the action to proceed to trial. Woolf and Bingham LJJ delivered judgments concurring with Dillon LJ. Appeal allowed.

Attorney General v Corke [1993]

The Defendant allowed people onto his land to live in caravans. These people engaged in anti social activities which took place off Defendant's land. The court held that these people were 'dangerous' within the meaning of Rylands v Fletcher.

Attorney General v Hartwell (British Virgin Islands) [2004]

PC Laurent was the sole police officer stationed on the island of Jost Van Dyke,a small island with a population of about 135 people in the British Virgin Islands. Laurent was still on probation and was subject to daily supervisory visits by a police sergeant from a nearby larger island. As the sole officer, PC Laurent had a key to the police station's strongbox which contained a gun. One night he took the gun and went to a restaurant where his wife was associating with another man (the Claimant). He then fired four shots injuring the two in addition to a tourist in the restaurant. The claimant brought an action against the police for allowing a probationary officer to have access to a gun.

Held: A duty of care is owed by the police authorities in entrusting officers with guns.

Lord Nicholls: "In the view of their Lordships the appropriate analysis is that when entrusting a police officer with a gun the police authorities owe to the public at large a duty to take reasonable care to see the officer is a suitable person to be entrusted with such a dangerous weapon lest by any misuse of it he inflicts personal injury, whether accidentally or intentionally, on other persons. For this purpose no distinction is to be drawn between personal injuries inflicted in the course of police duties and personal injuries inflicted by a police officer using a police gun for his own ends. If this duty seems far-reaching in its scope it must be remembered that guns are dangerous weapons. The wide reach of the duty is proportionate to the gravity of the risks."

Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467

The claimant suffered an injury to his leg when the defendant ran into him in his car. He suffered pain and loss of amenity and had to take a lower paid job. He tried various different employments some of which he had to discontinue because of his injury. He was employed sorting through scrap metal when he sustained a further injury to his leg. He was on his own when two men came in and demanded money. When he refused they shot him in his injured leg. As a result of the shooting, the claimant had to have his leg amputated. The defendant argued that the second injury removed the very limb from which the earlier disability had stemmed, and that therefore no loss suffered thereafter can be attributed to the defendant's negligence. Arguing that the second injury submerged or obliterated the effect of the first and that all loss thereafter must be attributed to the second injury. The trial judge rejected this argument which he said was more ingenious than attractive. But it was accepted by the Court of Appeal. House of Lords held: The defendant remained liable for the loss of amenity and lower earning capacity even after the amputation.

Barker v Corus, [2006] 3 All ER 785

Barker was exposed to asbestos in his course of employment with several employers, but also in the course of self-employment. He developed mesothelioma and sued for damages. He was unsuccessful at the lower courts and appealed to the House of Lords. Does it matter that the plaintiff was one of the parties that might have contributed to the injury? Hoffman, in the majority, states that the purpose of Fairchild can be applied here. He states that it does not matter that Barker was one of the parties that helped cause the injury - the liability of the other two parties depends only on their own actions and not on those of other parties. Therefore, the other two parties are still liable however the damages are divided according to the probability of each respondant causing the harm. In the dissent, Rodger of Earlsferry states that Fairchild cannot apply here because it tips the scales too far in favour of Barker. It is essentially stating that in cases exactly like this a plaintiff recovers unconditionally, however if the case only differs a little bit then plaintiffs cannot recover for suffering the increased risk of an injury. He also talks about how dividing damages is bad, because claimants often end up with only a small proportion of the damages that they deserve. Appeal allowed. Fairchild applies even if the plaintiff himself is one of the causes of the injury, but the damages are divided up based on the probability of each partys actions causing the harm.

Barker v Saint Gobain Pipelines [2004] EWCA Civ 545 Court of Apeal

Mr Barker contracted mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos. He worked for the defendant between 1960-68. He worked for a different employer for 6 weeks where he was also exposed to asbestos. After 1968 he became self-employed as a plasterer for 20 years. Whilst self employed he was exposed to asbestos on three occasions. The defendant argued that his exposure to asbestos whilst self-employed prevented him from being able to rely on the causation principle established in Fairchild v Glenhaven whereby the claimant is able to demonstrate that the defendant's breach of duty materially increased the risk of contracting the disease. Held: Fairchild did apply and the claimant was thus successful in establishing causation. His damages would be reduced under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 to reflect the periods where he exposed himself to risk during the course of his self-employment.

Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital [1969] 1 QB 428

Mr Barnett went to hospital complaining of severe stomach pains and vomiting. He was seen by a nurse who telephoned the doctor on duty. The doctor told her to send him home and contact his GP in the morning. Mr Barnett died five hours later from arsenic poisoning. Had the doctor examined Mr Barnett at the time there would have been nothing the doctor could have done to save him. Held: The hospital was not liable as the doctor's failure to examine the patient did not cause his death. Introduced the 'but for' test ie would the result have occurred but for the act or omission of the defendant? If yes, the defendant is not liable. A libel civil action which he brought against Sunday Times journalist Julie Burchill, after she published comments suggesting that he was "hideously ugly"; the judge ruled for Berkoff, finding that Burchill's actions "held him to ridicule and contempt

Berkoff v. Burchill

Blake v Galloway [2004] 3 All ER 315

The claimant, a 15 year old boy, was out with four of his friends including the defendant. The boys started throwing pieces of bark chippings and twigs at each other. The claimant did not join in at first but then threw a piece of bark chipping at the defendant hitting him in the leg. The defendant picked it up and threw it back at the claimant. The piece of bark struck the claimant's eye resulting in serious injury. The claimant brought an action contending that the injury was caused by the battery and or negligence of the defendant. The defendant raised volenti non fit injuria. The trial judge rejected the defence of volenti but held that the damages should be reduced by 50% under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. The defendant appealed contending that there was no breach of duty and that the judge was wrong to reject the defence of volenti. Held: Appeal allowed. In the context of 'horseplay' there is a breach of the duty of care only where the defendant's conduct amounts to recklessness or a very high degree of carelessness. The defendant had consented to the risk of injury occurring within the conventions and understanding of the game. Lord Justice Dyson: "If the defendant in the present case had departed from the tacit understandings or conventions of the play and, for example, had thrown a stone at the claimant, or deliberately aimed the piece of bark at the claimant's head, then there might have been a breach of the duty of care. But what happened here was, at its highest, "an error of judgment or lapse of skill" (to quote from Diplock LJ), and that is not sufficient to amount to a failure to take reasonable care in the circumstances of horseplay such as that in which these youths were engaged. In my view, the defendant's conduct came nowhere near recklessness or a very high degree of carelessness."

The game was played on the basis that the objects were thrown at no particular part of the body. It follows that an object thrown in the general direction of a participant, without negligence and without intent to cause injury, but which happened to hit him in the face, was being thrown in accordance with the understandings and conventions of the game, and in a manner to which participants consented. Bliss v Hall [1838] 4 Bing NC 183 D managed a factory for 3 years andthe during this timehad smoke, smell and other remittance came from the factory. P moved into a house near the factory. Held: A defence that an activity has been going on before an action brought to halt the activity is inapplicable as P had his rights too, one of which is clean air. Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks (1856) Exch Defendants had installed water mains along the street with hydrants located at various points. One of the hydrants across from Plaintiffs house developed a leak as a result of exceedingly cold temperatures and caused water damage to the house. Plaintiff sued for negligence. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The defendants might have been liable for negligence, if, unintentionally, they omitted to do that which a reasonable person would have done, or did that which a person taking reasonable precautions would not have done.

Bolam v Friern Hospital The claimant was undergoing electro convulsive therapy as treatment for his mental Management Committee [1957] 1 illness. The doctor did not give any relaxant drugs and the claimant suffered a serious WLR 583 fracture. There was divided opinion amongst professionals as to whether relaxant drugs should be given. If they are given there is a very small risk of death, if they are not given there is a small risk of fractures. The claimant argued that the doctor was in breach of duty by not using the relaxant drug. Held: The doctor was not in breach of duty. The House of Lords formulated the Bolam test: "a medical professional is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art . . . Putting it the other way round, a man is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of opinion who would take a contrary view."

Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1997] 3 WLR 1151

A 2 year old child was admitted to hospital suffering from breathing difficulties. A doctor was summoned but did not attend as her bleep was not working due to low battery. The child died. The child's mother brought an action claiming that the doctor should have attended and intubated the child which would have saved the child's life. The doctor gave evidence that had she attended she would not have intubated. Another doctor gave evidence that they would not have intubated. The trial judge applied the Bolam test and held that there was no breach of duty. The claimant appealed. Held: In applying the Bolam test where evidence is given that other practitioners would have adopted the method employed by the defendant, it must be demonstrated that the method was based on logic and was defensible. Miss Stone was injured when she was struck by a cricket ball outside her home. She brought an action against the cricket club in nuisance and negligence. The cricket field was surrounded by a 7 foot fence. The pitch was sunk ten feet below ground so the fence was 17 feet above the cricket pitch. The distance from the striker to the fence was about 78 yards and just under 100 yards from where the claimant was standing. A witness who lived in the same road as the claimant but close to pitch said that five or six times during the last 30 years he had known balls hit his house or come into the yard. Two members of the Club, of over 30 years' standing, agreed that the hit was altogether exceptional to anything previously seen on that ground. Held: No breach of duty. The likelihood of harm was low the defendant had taken all practical precautions in the circumstances. The cricket ground had been there for 90 years without injury and provided a useful service for the community.

Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850

Bonnington Castings Ltd v The claimant contracted pneumoconiosis by inhaling air which contained minute Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 House of particles of silica during the course of his employment. The defendant was in breach Lords of a statutory duty in failing to provide an extractor fan. Had they installed an extractor fan the number of particles of silica that the claimant was exposed to would have been reduced, however, there would still be some particles present. There were thus two possible causes: the guilty dust, which should not have been in the working environment and the innocent dust, which would have been present in any event. The trial judge held that where the duty arose by statute then it was for the defendant to show that his breach of duty (the guilty dust) did not cause the disease. As the defendant was unable to do this they were liable. The defendant appealed contending the burden of proof rests on the claimant. Held: The burden of proof remains on the claimant. However, the claimant only had to demonstrate that the guilty dust had made a material contribution to the disease. He did not have to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that the guilty dust was the sole cause of the disease

Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92

The claimant was a pregnant fishwife. She got off a tram and as she reached to get her basket off the tram, the defendant drove his motorcycle past the tram at excessive speed and collided with a car 50 feet away from where the claimant was standing. The defendant was killed by the impact. The claimant heard the collusion but did not see it. A short time later, the claimant walked past where the incident occurred. The body had been removed but there was a lot of blood on the road. The claimant went into shock and her baby was still born. She brought a negligence claim against the defendant's estate. Held: No duty of care was owed by the defendant to the claimant. There was not sufficient proximity between the claimant and defendant when the incident occurred.

Box v Jubb LR 4 EX Div 76

The defendant had a reservoir on their land. There was another reservoir situated at a higher level than the defendants. The owner of this other reservoir emptied it through a drain connected to the defendants reservoir causing the defendants reservoir to overflow and damage the claimants land. The claimant brought an action under Rylands v Fletcher contending that there was a non natural user of the land and that there had been an escape of water that caused damage. Held: The defendant was not liable for the damage as it was caused by the act of a third party over which the defendant had no control.

Bradford Corporation v Pickles [1895] HL

[Tort negligence - duty of care - proving fault - malice not normally relevant] D owned land containing underground streams which fed C's (Bradford Corporation) waterworks. D began to sink shafts for the alleged purpose of draining certain beds of stone. The effect of Ds operations was to affect seriously the supply of water to appellants springs. The corporation alleged that defendant was not acting in good faith, but to compel them to purchase his land. Held: D has the right to divert or appropriate the water within his own land so as to deprive his neighbour of it. His right is the same whatever his motive may be, whether genuinely to improve his own land, or maliciously to injure his neighbour, or to induce his neighbour to buy him out. No use of property which would be legal if due to a proper motive can become illegal if it is prompted by a motive which is improper or even malicious.

British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC 877 House of Lords

A six year old boy was electrocuted and suffered severe burns when he wondered from a play park onto a live railway line. The railway line was surrounded by a fence however, part of the fence had been pushed down and the gap created had been used frequently as a short cut to the park. The defendant was aware of the gap in the fence which had been present for several months, but had failed to do anything about it. Under existing authority of Addie v Dumbreck no duty of care was owed to trespassers. However, the House of Lords departed from their previous decision using the 1966 Practice Statement and held that the defendant railway company did owe a duty of common humanity to trespassers. Lord Pearson: "It seems to me that the rule in Addie v. Dumbreck has been rendered obsolete by changes in physical and social conditions and has become an incumbrance impeding the proper development of the law. With the increase of the population and the larger proportion living in cities and towns and the extensive substitution of blocks of flats for rows of houses with gardens or back yards and quiet streets, there is less playing space for children and so a greater temptation to trespass. There is less supervision of children, so that they are more likely to trespass. Also with the progress of technology there are more and greater dangers for them to encounter by reason of the increased use of, for instance, electricity, gas, fast moving vehicles, heavy machinery and poisonous chemicals. There is considerably more need than there used to be for occupiers to take reasonable steps with a view to deterring persons, especially children, from trespassing in places that are dangerous for them. In my opinion the Addie v. Dumbreck formulation of the duly of occupier to trespasser is plainly inadequate for modern conditions, and its rigid and restrictive character has impeded the proper development of the common law in this field. It has become an anomaly and should be discarded."

Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818

The Defendants owned a golf club where illegal gambling machines were kept. Someone told the police and they were removed. Shortly after a piece of paper appeared on one of the walls saying but 'he who gave the game away, may he byrnn in hell and rue the day'. Did these words defame the claimant in the sense that he was guilty of underhand disloyalty to his fellow club members by telling the police about the machines. The Court of Appeal held that even though some people may consider that the fruit machines were so trivial that they weren't really criminal, the right-thinking man cannot ever view the reporting of crime as defamation. To report crime, however trivial, cannot be a source of scorn or ridicule in the eyes of the law

Cambridge Water v Eastern The defendant owned a leather tanning business. Spillages of small quantities of Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC solvents occurred over a long period of time which seeped through the floor of the 264 House of Lords building into the soil below. These solvents made their way to the borehole owned by the Claimant water company. The borehole was used for supplying water to local residents. The water was contaminated at a level beyond that which was considered safe and Cambridge Water had to cease using the borehole. Cambridge Water brought actions based on negligence, nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. Held:

Eastern Counties Leather were not liable as the damage was too remote. It was not reasonably foreseeable that the spillages would result in the closing of the borehole. The foreseeability of the type of damage is a pre-requisite of liability in actions of nuisance and claims based on the rule in Rylands v Fletcher in the same way as it applies to claims based in negligence. The Wagon Mound No 1 case applies to determine remoteness of damage. Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co Donald Ogilvie was the director of a company called Trevaunance Hydraulic Tin Mines Ltd, which mined tin in Cornwall. He needed more capital, so he put an advertisement in The Times on July 8, 1946, which said, "10,000. Established Tin Mine (low capitalization) in Cornwall seeks further capital. Instal additional milling plant. Directorship and active participation open to suitable applicant - Apply" Mr Candler responded, saying he was interested in investing 2000, if he could see the company's accounts. Mr Ogilvie instructed Crane, Christmas & Co, a firm of auditors, to prepare the companys accounts and balance sheet. The draft accounts were shown to Mr Candler in the presence of Crane, Christmas & Cos clerk. Mr Candler relied on their accuracy and subscribed for 2,000 worth of shares in the company. But the company was actually in a very bad state. Ogilvie used the investment on himself and then went bankrupt. Mr Candler lost all the money he invested. He brought an action against the accountants, Crane, Christmas & Co. for negligently misrepresenting the state of the company. As there was no contractual relationship between the parties, the action was brought in tort law for pure economic loss. The majority of the Court of Appeal (Sir Lionel Cohen and Sir Cyril Asquith) relied on the case of Derry v Peek to refuse a remedy to the plaintiff, holding that loss resulting from negligent misstatement was not actionable in the absence of any contractual or fiduciary relationship between the parties.

Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman

Facts A company called Fidelity plc, manufacturers of electrical equipments, was the target of a takeover by Caparo Industries plc. Fidelity was not doing well. In March 1984 Fidelity had issued a profit warning, which had halved its share price. In May 1984 Fidelity's directors made a preliminary announcement in its annual profits for the year up to March confirming the negative outlook. The share price fell again. At this point Caparo had begun buying up shares in large numbers. In June 1984 the annual accounts, which were done with the help of the accountant Dickman, were issued to the shareholders, which now included Caparo. Caparo reached a shareholding of 29.9% of the company, at which point it made a general offer for the remaining shares, as the City Code's rules on takeovers required. Once it had control, Caparo found that Fidelity's accounts were in an even worse state than had been revealed by the directors or the auditors. It sued Dickman for negligence in preparing the accounts and sought to recover its losses. Issue What test should be employed in determining negligence? Decision The majority of the Court of Appeal (Bingham LJ and Taylor LJ, O'Connor LJ dissenting) held that a duty was owed by the auditor to shareholders individually, and although it was not necessary to decide that in this case and the judgment was obiter, that a duty would not be owed to an outside investor who had no shareholding. Bingham LJ held that, for a duty owed to shareholders directly, the very purpose of publishing accounts was to inform investors so that they could make choices within a company about how to use their shares. But for outside investors, a relationship of proximity would be "tenuous" at best, and that it would certainly not be "fair, just and reasonable". Appeal allowed. Reasons Bridge of Harwich, writing for a unanimous court, states that the two part test employed in Dobson should not be used, policy and subsequently been abandoned [Tort negligence - duty of care - public duty owed it inhas operational matters] in D a Local Authority employed a teacher who left a 4-year-old child alone for about ten minutes while she did other things. The child left the classroom onto a busy road, where he caused a lorry driver to swerve and collide with a telegraph pole. The lorry driver was killed and his widow sued the education authority. Held: The education authority had taken charge of the child and had a duty to take reasonable care to prevent him from causing harm to others. C won.

Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis

Carslogie Steamship Co v. Royal On 26 November 1949 the vessel Heimgar, while under time charter to the Ministry of Norwegian Government Transport, suffered damage in a collision with the Carslogie. It was admitted that the Carslogie was solely to blame. The Heimgar had temporary repairs done in a port in England before proceeding to a port in the United States where permanent repairs could be carried out. During the voyage across the Atlantic, the ship sustained heavy weather damage, which necessitated immediate repair. The ship remained in dock for fifty days during which the repairs due to the collision and those due to the weather damage were carried out concurrently. It had been agreed that ten days would be allocated to the collision repair and thirty days for the weather damage. The owners of the Heimgar claimed damages for the ten days attributable to the collision damage while at port. The owners of the Carslogie were only liable for such loss of profit suffered by the Heimgar as resulted from the Carslogies wrongful act. During the time that the Heimgar was detained in dock she had ceased to be a profit-earning machine because the heavy weather damage had rendered her unseaworthy. Therefore, the respondents had sustained no damage by reason of the fact that for ten days the vessel was undergoing repairs in respect of the collision damage, as the heavy weather damage was the sole reason the Heimgar had to dock for repairs before reaching its destination. Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2 KB The Defendants took a photograph of Mr Cassidy (a racehorse owner) with a woman 331 who was not his wife. Mr Cassidy, who often used a different name, told a reporter that he was going to marry her and the image had a caption saying they were engaged, using his alternative name. Mrs Cassidy, the lawful wife, brought an action for defamation. Although they lived separately, Mr Cassidy sometimes came to visit her. She alleged that people would see him arriving at her house thinking he is the man from the photo (where his alternative name was used) and assume that they were living together immorally and only pretending to be his wife. The Court of Appeal said that words published about one person can sometimes defame another person and that Mrs Cassidy had in fact been defamed. By people seeing this man coming to her house who is supposed to be marrying another woman, she looks like she was simply pretending to be his wife. The blame here was on the newspaper but arguably, the fact that a lawful wife existed may have been difficult to discover.

Century Insurance v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board 1942 House of Lords

A patrol lorry driver smoked a cigarette while driving, which caused an explosion. Is the smoking of a cigarette in the course of employment or not? It was not too far from the employment, the driver did act as an employee.

Chaplin v Hicks

Chaplin, along with 6,000 others, entered a nation wide beauty contest and got through to the final stage where only 50 contestants were left. Hicks was to select the twelve winners from these remaining contestants. The winners were to be given theatrical engagement by him for three years at 5 per week. Hicks, in breach of his contract with Chaplin, prevented her from taking part in the final selection stage. The judge and jury awarded her damages of 100 for the opportunity she lost in being prevented from taking part in the final selection stage. Where by contract a man has a right to belong to a limited class of competitors for a prize, a breach of that contract by reason of which he is prevented from continuing a member of the class and is thereby deprived of his chance of obtaining the prize is a breach in respect of which he may be entitled to recover substantial, and not merely nominal, damages. The existence of a contingency which is dependent on the volition of a third person does not necessarily render the damages for a breach of contract incapable of assessment.

Charleston v News Group Newspapers [1995] 2 AC 65

Two popular characters from the tv show Neighbours were portrayed on the front cover of a newspaper naked except for black leather engaged in sexual intercourse. The title read "Strewth! What's Harold up to with out Madge? Porn shocker for Neighbours stars" however the captions on the pictures made clear that the images were false. The image was taken from a sordid computer game which had computergenerated the images. The rest of the article condemned the game in a tone which can be contrasted with the prominence given to the image. The House of Lords accepted that the image must have deeply offensive but said that it was not defamatory since a publication has to be read as a whole. Even though the image and headline were libellous the remainder of the article had a neutralising effect. the court of appeal held that the duty of care will arise on the defendant who are the friend of plaintiff that give a negligent advice to the plaintiff to selection of a second car. The defendant will liable on it, although defendant not as a professional in the mechanic area. This is an exception existed the duty of care in a social relationship. Because the Court of Appeal clearly measure that the case above was an unusual case, the judgment in this case was made in a special facts. The claimant had suffered back pain for 6 years. This became quite severe and at times she was unable to walk or control her bladder. An MRI scan revealed that there was disc protrusion into her spinal column and she was advised to have surgery. The surgery carried a 1-2% risk that even if it was performed without negligence the operation could worsen rather than improve her condition. Her consultant neurosurgeon Mr Afshar was under a duty to warn her of this risk although he failed to do so. The claimant had the operation and unfortunately it worsened her condition. The trial judge found that the surgeon had not been negligent in performing the operation but his failure to warn her of the risk was a breach of duty. The claimant argued that if she had been warned she would not have taken the decision to have the operation straight away but would have taken time to consider other options and discuss the risks with her family and would thus not have had the surgery on the day which she did have it. She did not say she would never have had the operation. The judge held that if she had the operation on another occasion it may have been successful. He therefore found for the claimant. The defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the defendant appealed to the House of Lords on the grounds of causation in that she was likely to have consented to the operation and that even if it had been on a different occassion it carried the same risk. Held: 3:2 decision (Lord Bingham & Lord Hoffman dissenting) appeal dismissed. Lord Hope: "To leave the patient who would find the decision difficult without a remedy, as the normal approach to causation would indicate, would render the duty useless in the cases where it may be needed most. This would discriminate against those who cannot honestly say that they would have declined the operation once and for all if they had been warned. I would find that result unacceptable. The function of the law is to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide remedies when duties have been breached. Unless this is done the duty is a hollow one, stripped of all practical force and devoid of all content. It will have lost its ability to protect the patient and thus to

Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1988] 3 All ER 718

Chester v Afshar [2004] 3 WLR 927 House of Lords

Christie v Davey (1893) 1 Ch 316 The claimant was a music teacher. She gave private lessons at her home and her family also enjoyed playing music. She lived in a semi-detached house which adjoined the defendants property. The defendant had complained of the noise on many occasions to no avail. He took to banging on the walls and beating trays and shouting in retaliation. Held: The defendants actions were motivated by malice and therefore did constitute a nuisance. An injunction was granted to restrain his actions. All of the parties were hunting. Lewis was hiding in a bush, and his brother tried to warn Cook and his companions of this but it was misunderstood. A few grouses flew out of the bush, and Cook and his companions fired shots. Lewis was hit in the face, and lost an eye. Cook and his companions gave statements claiming that they could not have shot Lewis. The jury found that it was one of their shots that hit him, but they could not decide whose shot it was. The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, which Cook appealed. When there are two parties, and it is proven that one of their actions caused harm, but it cannot be proven which one it was, who, if anyone, is liable? The decision in the lower court was based upon the general Canadian rule that stated that when it is certain that one of two individuals committed the offence, but it is uncertain which one was the guilty agent, then neither of them can be convicted. Appeal dismissed. When there are two parties, and it is proven that one of them caused harm in their actions but it cannot be proven which party actually did it, then both of them are liable for the resulting damages. Mr Corr was a maintenance engineer who became severely disfigured after he was struck on the head by a machine at work. He underwent extensive reconstructive surgery but remained disfigured. He suffered from flashbacks and post traumatic stress disorder and lapsed into a deep depression from which he never recovered. Six years after the accident he committed suicide. At the time of his death, Mr Corr had begun proceedings against his former employers for damages for the physical and psychological damage he had suffered. After his death, his widow was substituted as the claimant. However, she also sought to sue for the loss attributable to the death by suicide under section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. While IBC Vehicles accepted that the accident was a breach of the duty owed to Mr Corr to take reasonable care to avoid causing him personal injury, including psychological injury, they refused to admit liability for his suicide, arguing that it (1) fell outside the duty of care owed to him by the company; (2) was not an act which was reasonably foreseeable and therefore not one for which they should be held liable; (3) broke the chain of causation and constituted a novus actus interveniens; (4) was an unreasonable act which broke the chain of causation; (5) was the voluntary act of the deceased, and so precluded by the principle volenti non fit injuria; (6) amounted to contributory negligence. The companys appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed. The Lords held that the appellant owed Mr Corr a duty to avoid not only physical but also psychological injury and that the deceased had acted in a way that he would not have done had it not been for the breach by the appellant. In addition, suicide was found to be foreseeable. Although it was not a usual manifestation of severe depression, it was not uncommon. In these particular circumstances it was reasonably foreseeable by the appellant if one considered the possible effect of such an accident on a hypothetical employee. The appellants other arguments were rejected.

Cook v Lewis, [1951] SCR 830

Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd (2008) UKHL)

Cunningham v Reading FC [1991] D liable to police injured by concrete loosened from terraces. D neglected to take Times LR 153 precautions against clearly foreseeable acts of violent supporters.

Cutler v Vauxhall Motors

the claimant grazed his right ankle in an accident caused by the defendants. The injury caused an ulcer to form and, because the claimant had been suffering for some time from varicose veins in both legs, an immediate operation was necessary. He claimed damages from the defendants for the pain and discomfort of the operation but the Court of Appeal held that since the claimant would very probably have needed a similar operation within ve years in any case, the defendants negligence could not be regarded as the cause of the operation.

Dann v Hamilton [1939] 1 KB 509 The Claimant was injured when she was a willing passenger in the car driven by the Mr Hamilton. He had been drinking and the car was involved in a serious crash which killed him. In a claim for damages the Defendant raised the defence of volenti non fit injuria in that in accepting the lift knowing of his drunken condition she had voluntarily accepted the risk. Held: The defence was unsuccessful. The claimant was entitled to damages. Asquith J: "There may be cases in which the drunkenness of the driver at the material time is so extreme and so glaring that to accept a lift from him is like engaging in an intrinsically and obviously dangerous occupation, intermeddling with an unexploded bomb or walking on the edge of an unfenced cliff. It is not necessary to decide whether in such a case the maxim 'volenti non fit injuria' would apply, for in the present case I find as a fact that the driver's degree of intoxication fell short of this degree". Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd and others The council brought an action for libel against a newspaper in respect of articles alleging impropriety in the administration of its superannuation fund. The defendants' application to strike out the statement of claim, on the ground that a local authority could not maintain an action in libel for words reflecting on its governmental and administrative functions, was dismissed. The Court of Appeal allowed the defendants' appeal. The council appealed. Charles Gray QC and Heather Rogers (instructed by Kingsford Stacey for solicitor, Derbyshire County Council) for the council. Anthony Lester QC and Desmond Browne QC (instructed by Biddle & Co) for the defendants. Lord Keith of Kinkel said that it was of the highest public importance that a democratically elected governmental body, or indeed any governmental body, should be open to uninhibited public criticism. The threat of a civil action for defamation had inevitably to have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech and it was therefore contrary to the public interest for organs of government, whether central or local, to sue for libel. A local authority did not have the right under the common law of England to maintain an action for damages for defamation. Lord Griffiths, Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Woolf agreed. Appeal dismissed. (WLR)

Derry v Peek (1889) 5 T.L.R. 625 In a company prospectus the defendant stated the company had the right to use steam powered trams as oppose to horse powered trams. However, at the time the right to use steam powered trams was subject of approval of the Board of Trade, which was later refused. The claimant purchased shares in the company in reliance of the statement made and brought a claim based on the alleged fraudulent representation of the defendant. Held: The statement was not fraudulent but made in the honest belief that approval was forthcoming. Lord Herschell defined fraudulent misrepresentation as a statement which is made either: i) knowing it to be false, ii) without belief in its truth, or iii) recklessly, careless as to whether it be true or false. Dillon v Twin State Gas & Electric Facts: Co (1932), 85 NH 449, 163 A 111. Defendant maintained wires to carry electric current over a large public bridge. Wires ran across bridge a foot above the horizontal girders. Wires were insulated for weather protection but not against contact. Deceased and other boys had played on the bridge for many years. Deceased, sitting on a horizontal girder, lost balance and instinctively grabbed the wires to save himself from falling. He was electrocuted Issue(s): What is the extent of the defendants liability in causing the plaintiffs loss? Ratio: If a defendant would have died but for the negligence of the tortfeasor, the tortfeasor will not be liable. (If the defendant would have been seriously injured, the damages awarded will be decreased) Analysis: The deceased, in falling from bridge was entitled to no protection from the defendant to keep from falling. Liability is only in exposing deceased to the danger of charged wires. But for the current, the deceased would have been killed or seriously injured from the fall. Therefore, the defendant deprived him, not of a life of normal expectancy, but of one too short to result in any economic loss.

Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC Mrs Donoghue went to a cafe with a friend. The friend brought her a bottle of ginger 562 beer and an ice cream. The ginger beer came in an opaque bottle so that the contents could not be seen. Mrs Donoghue poured half the contents of the bottle over her ice cream and also drank some from the bottle. After eating part of the ice cream, she then poured the remaining contents of the bottle over the ice cream and a decomposed snail emerged from the bottle. Mrs Donoghue suffered personal injury as a result. She commenced a claim against the manufacturer of the ginger beer. Held: Her claim was successful. This case established the modern law of negligence and established the neighbour test. Lord Aitken: "The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question " Who is my neighbour ?" receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in law is my neighbour ? The answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question."

Dooley -v- Cammell Laird and Co The plaintiff was a crane driver whose load of timber, drums of paint, and bags of Ltd; 1951 bolts etc, and without any fault on his part, fell into the hold of a ship as they were being lowered along with scaffolding. No one was actually injured but the plaintiff knew that fellow workers were then in the hold, and he suffered nervous shock. He sued his employers saying that the sling was either overloaded or defective in breach of shipbuilding regulations and the common law duties to provide safe plant and a safe system. Held: The plaintiff was entitled to recover in those circumstances. Cammell Laird were in breach of the regulations. one of which was made as a protection against the risk of bodily injury which included injury to the nerves, the nerves being a part of the body. Donovan J said: I suppose I may reasonably infer that his fellow workmen down the hold were his friends, Mr Dooley was the unwitting agent of the defendants negligence. He was the crane driver who, without any fault, was party to an accident which could have killed his fellow workers. It was his activity in operating the crane which caused the actual and potential damage. It was that activity which brought him into the category of persons for whom the defendants owed a duty of care, not really any question of relationships of friendships.

Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Co

Facts Doughty was injured in his work at a factory owned by Turner when a cover over a cauldron of molten hot liquid fell in and caused an explosion, propelling the liquid toward him. It was not known that the cover would explode when it fell in the liquid. Turner was found liable at trial and damages awarded, which they appealed. Issue Was the specific cause of injury foreseeable?

Decision Appeal allowed. Reasons Diplock states that in this case the ratio of Wagon Mound must be applied. Although this is similar to Hughes, there is a crucial difference. In that case the boy was injured as a result of the defendants' negligently leaving the manhole uncovered. Although the specific injury was unforeseeable, the negligent act directly led to it. In this case, the only duty owed to Doughty was to ensure that he would not be injured if the top fell in the molten liquid and splashed some over the side. This was prevented the only reason he was injured was because of the unforeseeable explosion. Turner did not have a duty to protect Doughty from this, as they could not have foreseen it. Ratio If there is no duty owed to the plaintiff in regard to the initial action that led consequentially to the injury, then the defendants are not liable for damages.

Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Company [1964] 1 QB 518

An asbestos lid was accidentally knocked into a cauldron of molten liquid. A few moments later an explosion occurred. The claimant was standing close by and suffered burns from the explosion. The explosion occurred as a result of the asbestos reacting with the chemicals in the liquid in the high temperature. At the time of the incident it was not known that the asbestos could react in that way. Held: The damage was too remote. It was not foreseeable that an explosion would occur. Whilst it may be foreseeable the lid may have caused a splash resulting in a scold, it was not foreseeable that an explosion would occur resulting in burns

Dulieu v White [1901] 2 KB 669

By her statement of claim A. alleged that while she was sitting behind the bar of her husband's public-house (she then being pregnant) B.'s servant negligently drove a pair-horse van belonging to B. into the public-house. A. in consequence sustained a severe shock which made her seriously ill and led to her suffering a miscarriage. (She gave premature birth to a child. In consequence of the shock sustained by the plaintiff the said child was born an idiot.) Held, that the statement of claim disclosed a good cause of action against B. Per Kennedy, J.: Mere fright not followed by consequent physical damage will not support an action, but if it is followed by consequent physical damage, then, if the fright was the natural result of the defendants' negligence, an action lies, and the physical damage is not too remote to support it.

E .Hutton and Co V Jones (1910) It was held the intention is irrelevant, the use of a fictious character is no defence. It AC 20 need not answer 100% description of the plaintiff before it can be said to refer to them. The plaintiff was a barrister and the article referred to a church warden it was held a person charged of libel cannot defend himself by saying that he didnt intend to defame the plaintiff. Thus there need not be express neither is it necessary for any key or pointer in the statement to indicate the claimant the test is whether the ordinary sensible reader in the light of the special facts would understand the words as referring to the claimant. He/she is entitled to rely on a subsequent publication to prove it was him referred to. Edwards v Railways Executive [1952] AC 737 House of Lords A particular spot on a railway was used as a short cut on a regular basis. The fence was repaired on several occasions and whenever it was reported to have been interfered with. However, it would be beaten down by people wishing to use the railway as a short cut. Witness testimony was to the effect that the fence was in good repair the morning of the incident. Held: No licence was implied. The Defendant had taken reasonable steps to prevent people coming onto the railway. Lord Goddard: "Repeated trespass of itself confers no licence" Esso Petroleum v Mardon [1976] Mr Mardon entered a tenancy agreement with Esso Petroleum in respect of a new QB 801 Petrol station. Esso's experts had estimated that the petrol station would sell 200,000 gallons of petrol. This estimate was based on figures which were prepared prior to planning application. The planning permission changed the prominence of the petrol station which would have an adverse affect on the sales rate. Esso made no amendments to the estimate. The rent under the tenancy was also based on the erroneous estimate. Consequently it became impossible for Mr Mardon to run the petrol station profitably. In fact, despite his best endeavours the petrol station only sold 78,000 gallons in the first year and made a loss of 5,800. The Court of Appeal held that there was no action for misrepresentation as the statement was an estimate of future sales rather than a statement of fact. However, the claimant was entitled to damages based on either negligent misstatement at common law or breach of warranty of a collateral contract. Fairchild v Glenhaven [2002] 3 WLR 89 House of Lords This was a conjoined appeal involving three claimants who contracted mesothelioma, a form of lung cancer contracted by exposure to asbestos. Mesothelioma can be caused by a single fibre of asbestos. The condition does not get worse the greater the exposure. Once the fibre has embedded into the lung it can lay dormant for 30-40 years before giving rise to a tumour which can then take 10 years to kill. It will be only the last 1-2 years where a person may experience symptoms. By this time it is too late to treat. Each of the claimants had been exposed to asbestos by a number of different employers. They were unable to demonstrate, and medical science was unable to detect, which employer exposed each of them to the one fatal fibre. Held: If the claimants could demonstrate that one employer had materially increased the risk of contracting mesothelioma they were entitled to claim full compensation from that one employer

Ferguson v John Dawson & Partners (Contractors) Ltd

Ferguson was employed by John Dawson & Partners 'on the lump' [a device, now prohibited by statute, for avoiding the payment of national insurance and income tax]. Whilst working on the roof of a building Ferguson fell 15 feet and was seriously injured. He claimed damages from John Dawson & Partners for his injuries. In order to be able to claim damages from John Dawson & Partners he had to show that he was an employee of theirs; they claimed that he was self employed and that, therefore, they were not liable for his injuries. The issue before the court was what terms governed the contract between Ferguson and John Dawson & Partners. In my judgment, on the tests laid down in the authorities, all of this indicates beyond doubt that the reality of the relationship was employer and employee: a contract of service... My own view would have been that a declaration by the parties, even if it be incorporated in the contract, that the workman is to be, or is to be deemed to be, selfemployed, an independent contractor, ought to be wholly disregarded - not merely treated as not being conclusive - if the remainder of the contractual terms, governing the realities of the relationship, show the relationship of employer and employee...

Ferguson v Welsh [1987] 1 WLR Sedgefield District Council, in pursuance of a development plan to build sheltered 1553 House of Lords accommodation, engaged the services of Mr Spence to demolish a building. It was a term of the contract that the work was not to be sub-contracted out. In breach of this term, Mr Spence engaged the services of the Welsh brothers to carry out the demolition who in turn engaged the services of Mr Ferguson to assist. Mr Ferguson suffered serious injury resulting in permanent paralysis when a wall he was standing on collapsed due to the unsafe practices operated by the Welsh brothers. He brought an action against the Council, Mr Spence and the Welsh brothers. The trial judge held that the Welsh Brothers were liable but that Mr Spence and the Council were not liable. Mr Ferguson appealed against the finding against the Council since the Welsh Brothers (or Mr Spence) had the funds or insurance to meet liability. Held: The appeal was dismissed. Mr Ferguson was a lawful visitor despite the clause forbidding sub-contracting since Mr Spence would have apparent or ostensible authority to invite him on to the land. However, the danger arose from the unsafe system of work adopted by the Welsh Brothers not the state of the premises. Whilst there was evidence that Mr Spence had sub-contracted demolition work to those executing unsafe practices on previous occasions, there was no evidence that the Council were aware of this.

Froom v Butcher [1976] 1 QB 286 The Claimant was injured in a car accident due to the negligence of the Defendant. The Claimant was not wearing a seat belt. There was disagreement as to the apportionment of loss under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. Lord Denning set out guidance as to apportionment of damages in such cases. Giles v Walker (1890) 24 QBD 656 Seeds from some thistles on the defendants land blew into neighbouring land owned by the claimant and damaged his crops. The defendant was not liable as he had not brought the thistles onto his land and there can not be liability under Rylands v Fletcher for a thing which naturally accumulates on land.

Glasgow Corporation v Muir (1943),

A group of children were having a day out with their Sunday school. They were meant to be having a picnic, but the rain had ruined it. The leader of the trip asked the manager of a tearoom, run by Glasgow Corporation, if she would allow the children to have their picnic on their premises. She agreed and the group entered. In the tearoom there was a tuck shop, the window to which was located midway along a corridor. The children had all started to line up along the corridor to buy sweets at the tuck shop. At this time a large tea urn was being carried along the corridor by two adults, to the main room of the tearoom. Somehow, and it is still unknown how, the tea urn overturned and scalded a young girl (Muir). The parents of the girl sued Glasgow Corporation, claiming that they owed the child a duty of care and that they had breached this. The court held that the manageress in charge owed a duty of care, generally, to everyone in the tearoom. However, she did not owe a duty of care to the Sunday school, to take additional precautions to prevent their being injured as a result of her allowing them to enter. So long as the tearoom was run in the same manner as it was day to day, and to the same safety standards, she was not required to take extra steps to prevent the incident which occurred. It was not reasonably foreseeable that allowing the children to come into the premises would result in one of them being scalded. As such, the incident was put down as an accident which could not have been prevented. The reasonable man is presumed to be free both from overapprehension and from over-confidence, i.e., The reasonable man has been described as the man on the street or the man on the Clapham omnibus

Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd

P sued D, an Internet Service Provider, over a newsgroup posting made available from D's newsgroup servers in this jurisdiction. D sought permission to amend its defence to rely, in mitigation of damages, on numerous allegedly provocative postings previously made by P, including to other newsgroups apart from that in which the posting complained of appeared. P resisted the amendment on the ground that it offended against the rule in Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 Q.B.D 491 as bringing in inadmissible evidence of particular acts of misconduct on the part of the P. Whether the amendments should be permitted. The amendments should be permitted. The other postings were relevant and admissible in support of D's case that the action was not brought bona fide, but as part of a cynical practice by P of provoking people into overstepping the mark so that he could then bring vexatious libel actions against them. They were 'introduced to establish that the Plaintiff should only receive derisory or small damages because of his bad conduct which is causally connected to the libel sued upon. In my judgment the Plaintiff's postings are germane to the defamatory posting the subject of his claim.'

Goldman v Hargrave

A 100 foot red gum tree on the defendants land was struck by lightning and caught fire. The following morning the defendant contacted a tree feller to cut down the tree saw it into sections. The wood was still smouldering and the defendant failed to douse it with water to eliminate the risk of fire. Over the next few days the weather became very hot and reignited the fire which spread to neighbouring property. Held: The defendant was liable for the naturally occurring danger that arose on his land as he was aware of the danger and failed to act with reasonable prudence to remove the hazard.

Goldsmith v Bhoyrul ( 1998)

Political parties also do not have the right to bring an action for defamation as they should always be open to criticism in a democratic system. Individual candidates for elected office can make claims for defamation and political parties can be sued if they publish defamatory statements. Goodwill -v- British Pregnancy Professional Negligence, Health Professions Advisory Service [1996] The doctor executed a vasectomy, and advised the plaintiff that he need no longer take contraceptive precautions. Held: No duty fell on a doctor to advise on the possibility of the failure of a vasectomy toward possible future sexual partners of the subject of the operation. The law could not extend a duty to a possible future partner. That was a tenuous relationship. Greatorex v Greatorex and On 11 April 1996 the First Defendant had been drinking with a friend, who is the Part Others [2000] The Times LR May 20 Defendant in the proceedings. The First Defendant was driving a car belonging to 5, QBD the Part 20 Defendant, who had given him permission to drive the car and was a passenger in it. Whilst overtaking on a blind brow the First Defendant negligently drove over on the wrong side of the road and was hit by an oncoming vehicle. The Part 20 Defendant was uninjured. The First Defendants head was injured and he was unconscious for about an hour. Initially he was trapped inside the car. The police, ambulance and fire services attended the scene of the accident. Among the fire officers who attended the scene was the First Defendants father, the Claimant. At the time of the accident he was employed as a Leading Fire Officer. He was nowhere near the scene of the accident when it happened. He went there in the course of his employment. Having been informed that his son has been injured, he attended to him. The Claimant was later diagnosed as suffering long- term post traumatic stress disorder as a result of the accident. The First Defendant was subsequently convicted of driving a motor vehicle without due care and attention, driving without insurance, and failing to provide a specimen. The Claimant brought proceedings claiming damages against the First Defendant, his son. Since the First Defendant was uninsured at the time of the accident, the Motor Insurers Bureau was joined as a Second Defendant. The Second Defendant in turn brought proceedings against the Part 20 Defendant seeking an indemnity against him. There was no duty of care owed by a victim of self-inflicted injuries towards a secondary party who suffered only psychiatric illness as a result of having witnessed the event causing the injuries or its aftermath. The policy considerations against there being such a duty owed clearly outweighed the arguments in favour, since to impose liability for causing psychiatric harm in such circumstances, particularly where the parties were members of the same family, would be potentially productive of acute family strife.

Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Railway [1917] AC 556

The corp. constructed a concrete paddling pool for children in the bed of a stream and obstructed the natural flow of the stream. Owing to a rainfall of extraordinary violence the stream overflowed at the pond and damaged the property of the plaintiffs. Held that the extraordinary rainfall did not absolve the corp. from responsibility and that they were liable in damages.

Gregg v Scott

The defendant, Dr Scott, misdiagnosed negligently the plaintiff's malignant cancer, stating it to be benign. This had the effect of delaying Mr Gregg's treatment by nine months, reducing his chances of surviving ten years from 42% to 25%.[1] Under the earlier decision of Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority, the view taken at first instance, and by the Court of Appeal, the claimant could not establish the defendant had prevented him being cured, as his original chance of a cure was below 50%. The plaintiff argued that he was entitled to recover for the loss of the 17% chance the defendant had deprived him of.On appeal to the Lords, the majority upheld the earlier decision of Hotson, though Lord Nicholls (joined by Lord Hope) dissented in arguing that loss of a chance should be actionable:

Gwilliam v West Hertfordshire The claimant, a 63 year old woman, was injured at a summer fair hosted by West Hospital NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Hertfordshire Hopsital. She was injured whilst using a splat wall whereby participants Civ 1041 Court of Appeal would bounce off a trampette against a wall and become attached to the wall by means of Velcro material. The injury occurred as a result of negligent set up of the equipment. The equipment was provided by a business called Club Entertainments who were an independent contractor engaged by the Hospital. Club Entertainments public liability insurance had expired four days before the incidence and thus they had no cover for the injury. They agreed to settle her claim for 5,000. Mrs Gwilliam brought an action against the hospital based on their failure to ensure that the entertainment arranged was covered by public liability insurance. She claimed the difference between the 5,000 and what she would have received had they been covered by insurance. Held: The Hospital owed a duty of care Under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 this duty did extend to checking whether the independent contractor had insurance cover since this would be relevant to whether they were competent. However, there was no breach of duty since the Hospital had enquired and had been told by Club Entertainment that they had insurance cover. There was no duty to inspect the insurance documents to ensure that cover was adequate. Haley v London Electricity Board Some workmen were digging a trench in a pavement. They went off to lunch. They had nothing to fence of the trench so they left a shovel and pick at one end and a punner at the other end to warn pedestrians. The claimant, a blind man, tripped on the punner and fell hitting his head. As a result of the fall he became deaf. The defendant argued they had done all that was necessary to warn an ordinary person of the danger and there was no need to take extra precautions for blind persons as it was not foreseeable that a blind person would be walking unaided down that street. Held: The defendant was in breach of duty. It was foreseeable that a blind person might walk down the street and they should be given appropriate protection Hall v Simons (2000) HL ^[Tort - negligence duty no duty situations - breach - professionals immunity advocates not a special case] One of several cases (conjoined cases) on similar issues, where claimants had done less well than they would but for negligence of their legal advisers. Held: It was no longer in the public interest that advocates should enjoy immunity from being sued for negligent acts concerned with the conduct of litigation whether in civil or criminal proceedings. Change of rule on lawyers immunity

Harrison v British Railways Board The court said that an injured rescuer could sue the person who created the danger. (1981) The rescuer was found to be contributory negligent for not following established work procedures. Harrison v Michelin Tyre Co Ltd The plaintiff employee was working on the duck-board of his machine. The fellow [1985] 1 All ER 918. employee (let us call him the joker) was pushing a hand-truck along a passageway marked by chalk lines. In order to startle the plaintiff the joker turned his truck slightly towards the plaintiff and overstepped the chalk lines by some two inches. The truck caught the edge of the duck-board, tipped it upwards and caused the plaintiff to be thrown off. He suffered injuries The joker had been authorised to push the truck and was in the course of so doing when the urge to play the practical joke overcame him. The matter was quite simple; was the joker acting in the course of his employment, or had he embarked, in the words of Parke B in Joel v Morrison (1834) 6 C & P 501, on a frolic of his own? Comyn J took the view that the employer was vicariously liable for the act of the employee-joker. The task was admitted to be difficult, but it is, with respect, suggested that, whatever the reasoning or the difficulty, the result was correct. Haseldine v Daw The claimant in this case was injured by a faulty lift, which was just surveyed by a group of technicians a week before the accident. The claimant purported to sue the owner of the building. The court held that the technical and specialist nature of lift mantainance meant that the qualifty of the survey was not something that the occupiers could reasonably be expected to verify. Hence the occupiers were not liable. Rule to exempt liability on the basis of contracting: The injury must have been caused by the work carried out by the contractor which they were contracted to do; It was reasonable for the occupier to employ independant contractor; The occupier must be reasonably satisfied that the contractor was competent. The Defendant left a horse-drawn van unattended in a crowded street. The horses bolted when a boy threw a stone at them. A police officer tried to stop the horses to save a woman and children who were in the path of the bolting horses. The police officer was injured. It was held that the Defendant owed a duty of care as he had created a source of danger by leaving his horses unattended in a busy street

Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146

Heasemans v. Clarity Cleaning 1987 Court of Appeal

The defendant was an office cleaning company which had a contract to clean the plaintiff's office. One of the women cleaning the office used the telephone (bill: L 1,411). Has she done this in course of her employment? The employers were not responsible. It was not part of her job. There must be a line where the employers are protected. The courts have become more strict in holding employees liable. This case was a change of attitude towards vicarious liability. A church claimed that the noise form an electric power station was a nuisance. However the noise did not interfere with the services and so the claim was unsuccessful.

Heath v Mayor Brighton (1908)

Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Issue Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 Whether and under what conditions a person can recover damages for loss suffered by reason of his having relied on an innocent but negligent misrepresentation. ^[Tort - negligence - duty of care - extent of the duty depends on the courts assessment of demands of society] D, a bank gave a reference to C (another bank) regarding the financial responsibility of a customer, expecting the bank to act on it. The reference was given "without responsibility." The second bank acted on the reference and suffered financial loss as a result. They sued D in negligence. Held: The law will imply a duty of care when a party seeking information from a party possessed of a special skill trusts him to exercise due care, and that party knew or ought to have known that reliance was being placed on his skill and judgment. However, since here there was an express disclaimer of responsibility, no such duty was, in any event, implied. C lost This case modified pure economic loss in negligence. The effect of Hedley Byrne makes possible the recovery of compensation for financial damage through reliance by the plaintiff according to statements made negligently by the defendant but only where there exists a special relationship' between the parties. The term special relationship which must be between plaintiff and defendant before there can be liability was not fully defined but for its existence seems to be: A, a reliance by the claimant on the defendants specialist skill and judgment; B, reasonable expectation of knowledge on the part of the defendant, that the claimant would be relying on that statement; C, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on the defendant; D, there had to be an assumption, either explicit or implicit, of responsibility on behalf of theProcess defendant. [Civil - C can claim in tort or contract] C and other Lloyds "names" sued their underwriting agents for negligent mismanagement of their affairs. Held: Cs claims in tort should go for trial. A claimant, who has remedies available in tort and in contract, is free to choose whichever appears to him to be the most advantageous so long as the contract does not expressly preclude this. Holden v White [1982] 2 All ER 328 Court of Appeal The claimant, a milkman, was injured on the defendants land by a manhole cover which broke when he stepped on it. At the time he was delivering milk to the house of a third party who had a right of way across the defendants land. It was held that he was not entitled to claim against the defendant since he was exercising a right of way and was not therefore a lawful visitor of the defendant. The claimant bred silver foxes for their fur. Silver foxes are particularly timid and if disturbed when pregnant they are prone to miscarry. If alarmed when they have young they may devour them. The defendant was the claimants neighbour. He objected to the fox farm and fired a gun on his own land close to the breeding pens with the intention to scare the foxes and impede breeding. The claimant brought an action in nuisance. Held: The defendant was liable despite the abnormal sensitivity of the foxes because he was motivated by malice.

Henderson v Merrett Syndicates [1994] HL

Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468

Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd

Some young offenders were doing some supervised work on Brown Sea Island under the Borstal regime. One night the Borstal officers retired for the evening leaving the boys unsupervised. Seven of them escaped and stole a boat which collided with a Yacht owned by the claimant. Held: The Home Office owed a duty of care for their omission as they were in a position of control over the 3rd party who caused the damage and it was foreseeable that harm would result from their inaction. MacLaren was the owner and captain of a boat called the "Ogopogo". He invited several friends out on his boat including Mr. Matthews, Mr. Horsley, and Mr. and Mrs. Jones. During their cruise, Matthews fell overboard into the icy water which caused him to have a heart attack and die. MacLaren backed the boat up to rescue Matthews not knowing if he was alive. Horsley jumped into the water to save Matthews but he was also overcome by the cold water. Mrs. Jones then jumped in to help them both. Mr. MacLaren moved the boat into a better position to rescue the three. In all, Mr. Matthews and Mr.Horsley were killed. The Court held that "encouragement by the common law of the rescue of persons in danger would ... go beyond reasonable bounds if it involved liability of one rescuer to a succeeding one where the former has not been guilty of any fault which could be said to have induced a second rescue attempt." The Donoghue v Stevenson case doesn't touch this principle, because it says that you have a duty to avoid causing harm, not a duty to help someone else. In the Court of Appeal for Ontario decision [1970] 2 O.R. 487, 11 D.L.R. (3d) 277, Arthur Jessup J said the Well-Known Quotes: "So, despite the moral outrage of the text writers, it appears presently the law that one can, with immunity, smoke a cigarette on the beach while ones neighbour drowns and, without a word of warning watch a child or blind person walk into certain danger".

Horsley v. MacLaren aka the ogopogo case 1971 (Canada)

Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750 House of Lords

The claimant as a school boy fell out of a tree from a height of 12 foot. He suffered a fracture to his hip and was taken to hospital. The hospital failed to diagnose his fracture and sent him home. He was in severe pain so he was taken back to hospital 5 days later where an X ray revealed his injury. He was treated and suffered an avascular necrosis which resulted in him having a permanent disability and a virtual certainty that he would develop osteoarthritis. According to medical evidence, had he been correctly diagnosed initially there was a 75% chance that he would have still developed this condition, but there was a 25% chance that he would have made a full recovery. The trial judge awarded damages of 11,500 based of 25% of 46,000 which was what would have been awarded if the claimant had shown that the defendant's conduct had caused the avascular necrosis of the hip. Held: The claimant had failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that the defendant's breach of duty had caused the necrosis since there was a 75% chance that it was caused by the fall. Therefore the claimant was not entitled to receive anything in respect of the necrosis.

Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837 House of Lords

Two boys aged 8 and 10 went exploring an unattended man hole. The man hole had been left by workmen taking a break. It was surrounded by a tent and some paraffin lamps were left to warn road users of the danger. The boys took a lamp down the hole. One of them dropped the lamp and an unforeseeable explosion occurred resulting in extensive burns. Held: The damage was not too remote it was foreseeable that the boys may suffer a burn from the lamp. The fact that the burn resulted from an unforeseeable explosion did not prevent the type of damage being foreseeable. 690 claims were made against Canary Wharf ltd. The claimants lived in the Isle of Dogs and complained that the erection of the Canary Wharf Tower interfered with their television reception. In addition, a second action against London Docklands Development Corporation involved 513 claims for damages in respect of excessive amounts of dust created during the construction of the tower. Some of the claimants were owners or tenants of properties, but many of the claimants had no proprietary interest in lane at all. Some were children living with parents, some were relations or lodgers with use of a room and some were spouses of the tenant or owner of the property. The two issues the House of Lords were required to consider were: 1. Whether interference with television reception was capable of giving rise to an actionable nuisance 2. Whether an interest in property was required to bring an action in Held: 1. There is no right of action in nuisance for interference with the television reception. 2. An interest in property is required to bring an action in nuisance. Khorasanjian v Bush overruled in so far as it holds that a mere licensee can sue in private nuisance.

Hunter v Canary Wharf [1998] 1 WLR 434 House of Lords

Hunter v. British Coal Corporation An employee, Mr. Hunter, hit a high pressure water hydrant with the vehicle he was [1998] 2 All E.R. 97 driving at the time, fracturing the hydrant and thereby threatening to flood the mine. One of his fellow employees, Mr. Carter, attempted to help him shut off the valve. They did not succeed and Mr. Hunter went to fetch further assistance. When he was 30 yards away the hydrant exploded, killing Mr. Carter. Mr. Hunter initially assumed that Mr. Carter was unharmed, but when he was informed of the death 15 minutes later he blamed himself and suffered a shock which triggered a two-year depressive illness. The trial judge found as a fact that the accident (and the death) had been caused by the fault of the defendant employer, which had failed to observe the relevant regulations about the siting of the hydrant, and had not been caused or contributed to by Mr. Hunter in any way. Could Mr. Hunter recover damages from his employer for the shock which he suffered on hearing about a death which he did not witness but for which he felt himself to be responsible? The trial judge held not and the majority of the Court of Appeal agreed, but their reasoning demonstrates some of the confusion surrounding this topic. It was accepted by all members of the Court of Appeal that if Mr. Hunter was classified as a secondary victim he would fail in his claim for nervous shock since he lacked, amongst other things, the necessary physical proximity required by the House of Lords in Alcock: he had witnessed neither the accident itself nor its aftermath. The only way in which he could recover was if he could bring himself within some other category, either (i) because he could be regarded as a primary victim or (ii) purely on the basis of the contractual duty of care which the defendant owed him as his employer.

Hussain v Lancaster City Council The claimants own a shop and residential property which is situated on a housing [1999] 2 WLR 1142 Court of estate owned by the defendant. The claimants suffered severe harassment, including Appeal racial harassment which was predominantly from tenants and their families from the housing estate. The harassment took the form of congregating outside the shop, intimidation, shouting abuse and threats, throwing bricks, stones and balls, smashing windows, burning objects put through the door. The defendant was aware of the harassment from 1991. The council had sent letters to the perpetrators threatening them with eviction if they continued to harass the claimants, however, this was ineffective and the council did not in fact take possession proceedings against any of the perpetrators. The Council had the power to evict them for causing a nuisance under the tenancy agreements and under the Housing Act 1985. The claimants brought an action against the council for their failure to prevent the nuisance when it was in their power to do so. The defendant Council applied for a strike out which was refused. The council appealed. Held: The appeal was allowed and the claim struck out. The case was outside the scope of nuisance since the acts of the perpetrators did not involve the tenants use of the tenants land. Furthermore the Council had neither authorised nor adopted the nuisance. Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32 A man sent a letter to his wife which defamed her and their children. It was opened and read by the butler. An action was brought by the children (as a wife could not sue her husband at the time). The Court of Appeal dismissed the case saying that it was not the butler's job to open letters and he only did so out of curiosity. There cannot, therefore, be a publication to a third party where it is not natural and probable that that third party would hear the information.

Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v The claimants were brothers who were qualified shotfirers employed by the defendant. Shatwell [1965] AC 656 House of They were injured as a result of an explosion at the defendant's quarry caused by the Lords brothers' negligence. They had insufficient wire to test a circuit to allow them to test from a shelter. Another worker had gone to fetch more wire but the brothers decided to go ahead and test with the shorter wire. Each brother claimed against the defendant based on their employer's vicarious liability for the negligence and breach of statutory duty of the other brother. The defendant raised the defence of volenti non fit injuria in that the brothers the brothers had full knowledge of the risk and were acting against express instructions. At trial the judge held that the defence of volenti could not apply where there was breach of a statutory duty. This was upheld in the Court of Appeal. Held: The appeal was allowed. The brothers had deliberately acted in defiance of the employer's express instructions in full knowledge of the risks. The workers were under the statutory duty not the employer. The employer had been instrumental in bringing in the statutory regulations and ensured all workers were aware of them. They had also previously dismissed a worker for flouting the regulations.

James McNaughton Paper Group During negotiations in 1982 between the plaintiff and MK Ltd concerning a possible Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co takeover of MK by the plaintiff, the defendants, MK's accountants, were instructed by MK to prepare accounts for it as quickly as possible. Draft accounts, which showed a net loss for the year ended 30 June 1982 of 48,094, were made available to the plaintiff's chairman. At a subsequent meeting a member of the defendants' firm, P, answering a question from the chairman, asserted that MK was 'breaking even or doing marginally worse'. After the takeover the plaintiff discovered errors in the accounts. It claimed from the defendants damages in negligence in respect of the accounts and of P's assertion. The judge decided the defendants were negligent in relation to both matters and both had to a material extent induced the plaintiff to continue with the takeover; he awarded the plaintiffs 75,000 damages. The defendants appealed. Nicholas Padfield and Monique Allan (instructed by Herbert Smith) for the defendants. Quintin Iwi (instructed by Cameron Markby Hewitt) for the plaintiff. Neill LJ said that it became necessary, in the absence of some general principle, to examine each individual case in the light of the concepts of foreseeability, proximity and fairness. The last of those concepts, however, was elusive and might be only one of the criteria by which proximity was to be judged. It was sufficient to underline that in every case the court had not only to consider the forseeability of the damage and whether the relationship between the parties was sufficiently proximate but also to enquire whether in the particular situation it was fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose on the defendant a duty of the scope suggested for the benefit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had argued that the judge had been fully entitled to conclude that a duty of care existed. However, his Lordship had concluded that, applying the tests established in recent authorities, the existence of a duty of care had not been made out. Nourse and Balcombe LJJ delivered concurring judgments. Appeal allowed.

JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks, Bloom & Co [1981] 3 All ER 289

Jebson v Ministry of Defence

in this case, a firm of accountant, who carelessly made a financial statement of Y company, and the plaintiff relied on it. The court held that, the firm of accountant imposes the duty of care to plaintiff because the defendant fully aware that the plaintiff will investing in or taking over Y company thus, defendant will knew that the plaintiff will rely on the published accounts. The claimant, a soldier, suffered severe injuries after a night out drinking organised by the MOD. The claimant was transported with 19 other soldiers in the back of an army vehicle with a canvass roof. On the return journey the claimant and other soldiers were very drunk. The senior officer travelled in the front of the vehicle and was unable to see what was going on in the back of the vehicle. The claimant climbed on to the tailgate and attempted to climb on to the roof. He fell and was struck by a lorry. The trial judge held that whilst it was foreseeable that an injury may occur by high spirits and stumbling inside the vehicle it was not foreseeable the claimant would attempt to climb on the roof and therefore the damage was too remote as it had not occurred in a foreseeable manner. Held: It was foreseeable that injury (whether slight or serious) would occur as a result of the drunken and rowdy behaviour of the passengers, including the danger that someone would fall from the vehicle as a result, such wider risk being apt to include within its description the accident which actually happened.

Jobling v Associated Dairies [1982] AC 794 House of Lords

Mr Jobling, a butcher, slipped on the floor at his place of work due to his employer's negligence. He injured his back which caused him to reduce his earning capacity to 50% of what it was. He then developed an independent back condition which was unrelated to the injury which left him unable to work. The trial judge applied Baker v Willoughby and held that the claimant was entitled to recover damages beyond the onset to the back condition. The employer appealed. Held: The House of Lords distinguished Baker v Willoughby and stated where the victim is overtaken before trial by a wholly unconnected and disabling illness, the decision had no application. The House of Lords were critical of the decision in Baker v Willoughby but stopped short of overruling it.

Jobling v Associated Dairies [1982] AC 794 House of Lords

Mr Jobling, a butcher, slipped on the floor at his place of work due to his employer's negligence. He injured his back which caused him to reduce his earning capacity to 50% of what it was. He then developed an independent back condition which was unrelated to the injury which left him unable to work. The trial judge applied Baker v Willoughby and held that the claimant was entitled to recover damages beyond the onset to the back condition. The employer appealed. Held: The House of Lords distinguished Baker v Willoughby and stated where the victim is overtaken before trial by a wholly unconnected and disabling illness, the decision had no application. The House of Lords were critical of the decision in Baker v Willoughby but stopped short of overruling it.

Jolley v Sutton [2000] 1 WLR 1082

Two 14 year old boys found an abandoned boat on land owned by the council and decided to do it up. The boat was in a thoroughly rotten condition and represented a danger. The council had stuck a notice on the boat warning not to touch the boat and that if the owner did not claim the boat within 7 days it would be taken away. The council never took it away. The boys had been working on the boat for 6-7 weeks when one of them suffered severe spinal injuries, resulting in paraplegia, when the boat fell on top of him. The boys had jacked the boat up to work on the underside and the jack went through the rotten wood. The claimant brought an action under the Occupiers Liability Act 1984. The trial judge found for the claimant. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that whilst it was foreseeable that younger children may play on the boat and suffer an injury by falling through the rotten wood, it was not foreseeable that older boys would try to do the boat up. The claimant appealed. House of Lords held: The claimant's appeal was allowed. The risk was that children would "meddle with the boat at the risk of some physical injury" The actual injury fell within that description. Lord Steyn: "The scope of the two modifiers - the precise manner in which the injury came about and its extent - is not definitively answered by either The Wagon Mound (No. 1) or Hughes v. Lord Advocate. It requires determination in the context of an intense focus on the circumstances of each case."

Jones v Boyce (1816)

The plaintiffs was a passenger on the top of the defendant's coach. Due to the breaking of a defective rein the coach was in danger of overturning. The plaintiff therefore jumped from the coach and broke his leg. In the event the coach was not upset. Held The plaintiff was successful i claiming for his injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant who allowed the defective rein t be used. The plaintiff was said to have acted as a reasonable and prudent person although he had selected the more dangerous of the two alternatives i.e. to jump form the coach instead of staying where he was. He was entitled to do so in the agony of the moment and was able to recover damages. The claimant worked in the defendants quarry. One lunch break he hitched a lift back to the canteen by standing on the tow bar of a traxcavator. The driver of the traxcavator was unaware that the claimant had jumped on the back and it was against company rules to stand on the back of the traxcavators. Unfortunately a dumper truck, driven recklessly by another employee, crashed into the back of the traxcavator crushing the claimants legs. Consequently the claimant had to have his legs amputated. Held: The defendant was liable but the claimant was held to be 1/5 to blame under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. He had acted against orders and exposed himself to danger. Just as actionable negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to others, so contributory negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to oneself. A person is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonable, prudent man, he might be hurt himself: and in his reckonings he must take into account the possibility of others being careless.

Jones v Livox Quarries [1952] 2 QB 608 Court of Appeal

Junior Books v Veitchi (1983) HL [Tort negligence - duty of care - development and scope - damage remoteness economic loss] D, specialist-flooring contractors negligently laid a floor in Cs factory. D as specialist flooring contractors knew what products were required and were alone responsible for the composition and construction of the floor. C suffered loss and damages, such as the cost of removal of machinery and loss of profits while the floor was being re-laid. Held: Te scope of the duty of care extended to a duty to avoid causing pure economic loss consequential on defects in the work. D lost

Kemsley -v- Foot [1951] 2 KB 34

The plaintiff complained that the defendant had defamed him with a headline to an article 'Lower than Hemsley' which otherwise had no connection with the plaintiff. He said it suggested that he was a byword for poor journalism. Held: Criticism of a newspaper owner as to the presentation of news by the paper was to be treated on a par with criticism of a book or play. The critic is not prevented from relying upon fair comment as a defence only because he does not particularise the conduct of which he complains. He need only state plainly the subject-matter of the complaint. Birkett LJ said: "It is clear, therefore, and indeed it was not contended otherwise, that ALL the facts need not be stated, but when the matter is submitted to the judgment of a jury particulars of the facts relied on must be supplied" and "I do not think it is possible to lay down any rule of universal application. If, for example, a defamatory statement is made about a private individual who is quite unknown to the general public, and he has never taken any part in public affairs, and the statement takes the form of comment only and is capable of being construed as comment and no facts of any kind are given, while it is conceivable that the comment may be made on a matter of public interest, nevertheless the defence of fair comment might not be open to a defendant in that case. It is almost certain that a naked comment of that kind in those circumstances would be decided to be a question of fact and could be justified as such if that defence were pleaded. But if the matter is before the public, as in the case of a book, a play, a film, or a newspaper, then I think different considerations apply. Comment may then be made without setting out the facts on which the comment is based if the subject-matter of the comment is plainly stated. This seems to me to accord with good sense and the true public interest." Somervell LJ identified two cases where a publisher may not be obliged to set out the factual basis of his comment in detail: where the subject matter was a work of art placed before the public for comment, and where the subject was a public figure subject in any event to vigorous discussion and where a detailed recital of the facts would be unwelcome. In contradistinction: "At the other end of the scale one may imagine a comment reflecting on the integrity of a subordinate official, whose activities had so far received no publicity, where it might be held that the defence was not available unless the facts relied on were substantially set out or indicated."

Keown v Coventry Healthcare No Occupiers Liability Claimant put himself at risk by indulging in a dangerous NHS Trust, CA (Civ Div) 2/2/2006 activity. An 11-year-old child who had climbed the outside of a fire escape was not at risk of suffering injury by reason of any danger due to the state of the premises within the Occupiers Liability Act 1984 s.1(1)(a) but had put himself at risk through his own choice to indulge in a dangerous activity. If there was a danger attributable to the state of the premises, thus giving rise to a potential duty, the content of the duty might vary according to whether the trespasser was a child or an adult, but until that point was reached, then in the general run of cases, the age of the trespasser was not relevant.

Kirkham v CC Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283 Court of Appeal

Mr Kirkham was an alcoholic and suffered from depression. He had made a two suicide attempts on 6th Jan 1980. He was admitted to hospital but discharged himself the following day. When he arrived home his wife prevented him from drinking and he became violent and started smashing furniture. The police were called and arrested him. His wife informed them of his suicide attempts and discharging himself from hospital and it was agreed that he should be remanded in custody for his own safety. However, the police failed inform the prison authorities that Mr Kirkham was a suicide risk. He committed suicide whilst on remand at Risley Remand Centre. His wife brought an action based on the negligence of the police in failing to pass on the information. The Police raised the defences of volenti non fit injuria and ex turpi causa. Held: The claimant was successful. The defence of volenti non fit injuria, although normally would apply where a person of sound mind were to take their own life, had no application where a person of unsound mind took their life. The defence of ex turpi causa was not limited to illegal acts but extended also to immoral acts. The court applied the public conscience test and concluded that to allow the claimant to succeed would not affront the public conscience, or shock the ordinary citizen.

Knightley v Johns & Ors [1982] 1 WLR 349 Court of Appeal

As a result of Mr John's negligent driving his car overturned in a tunnel. Two police officers on motorcycles arrived at the scene. The senior officer instructed them both to ride their motorcycles to the other side of the tunnel and close the entrance to the tunnel as he had forgotten to close it earlier. They took the decision of driving on through the tunnel on the wrong side of the road on a blind bend rather than going the long way round. Unfortunately one of the officers, Mr Knightly, was involved in a head on collision with an oncoming vehicle driven by Mr Cotton and sustained serious injuries. He brought an action against Mr Cotton, Mr John, the senior officer and the Chief Constable of West Midlands. The main contentious point was whether Mr. John remained liable or whether the actions of the other defendant's and the claimant amounted to a novus actus interveniens. Held: The senior officer's instructions and failure to close the entrance to the tunnel were negligent and broke the chain of causation. The claimant's decision in going through the tunnel was not negligent. Thus the claimant was entitled to full damages from the senior officer and Mr John was not liable

Knupffer v London Express Newspapers [1944] AC 116,

Some articles published during the second world war referred to a political group of Russian exiles as people who wanted to work with Hitler to make Russia facist. The Claimant was the head of the group in the UK and claimed that the words could reasonably be understood as imputing him. The global membership was 2000 but the UK membership was only 24. The House of Lords said that there could be no general rule preventing a lawsuit as long as the statement can be understood as referring to individual members in the party, which they did not do in the present case.

Lamb v Camden LBC [1981] 2 All The defendant council negligently fractured a water pipe outside the claimant's house. ER 408 Court of Appeal This caused extensive damage and the property had to be vacated. One year later the council had not undertaken the repairs. Squatters had also moved in and caused further damage. The claimant arranged for repairs to be done herself and submitted a bill to the council for the repairs and damage caused by the squatters. Held: The local authority was not liable for the acts of the squatters. It was not foreseeable that squatters would move into an empty house in Camden and cause damage despite the prevalence of such behaviour in Camden at the time.

Latimer v AEC [1953] AC 643

The claimant worked in the defendant's factory and slipped up on the factory floor. The factory had become flooded due to adverse weather conditions. The defendant's had put up warning signs mopped up and placed sawdust in the most used places to make it as safe as possible. The trial judge held that there had been a breach of duty as the defendants should have closed the factory if it was unnsafe. However, no argument had been advanced on this. Held: There was no breach of duty. There was no duty to close the factory. The defendant only had to take reasonable precautions to minimise the risk which they had done. There was no need to go to great expense to eliminate any possible risk and thus no obligation to close the factory. The defendant accountants prepared annual accounts reports for a firm of solicitors which the solicitors then provided to the Law Society in accordance with s.34 of the Solicitors Act 1974. Following the discovery of fraud by two partners in the solicitors' firm, substantial payments were made from the compensation fund maintained by the Law Society. The Law Society, as trustee of the fund, commenced proceedings against the defendants, claiming damages on the ground that the defendants had negligently prepared the accounts reports and, as a result, it had not exercised its powers of intervention into the firm which would have reduced the amount paid out of the fund. On a preliminary issue, Sir Richard Scott V-C ([2000] 1 All ER 515) held that the defendants had owed the Law Society, as trustee of the fund, a duty of care when preparing the accounts reports. The defendants appealed. Gordon Pollock QC and Rhodri Davies QC (instructed by Herbert Smith) for the defendants. Lord Goldsmith QC and Matthew Collings (instructed by Wright Son & Pepper) for the Law Society. Held, dismissing the appeal, that the question of whether a duty of care was owed by the accountants to the Law Society as trustee of the compensation fund had to be examined against the test laid down in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, namely, reasonable foreseeability of damage, proximity and whether it was fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty; that the intervention by the Law Society, which an adverse accounts report could trigger, protected both the public and the compensation fund; that it was made clear to the accountants that the reports were required so that protective steps could be taken and it was obvious that if protective action was not taken because a report did not draw attention to non-compliance with the account rules that could have adverse consequences on the fund; that there was no reason why there should not be a private law duty owed to the Law Society, the performance of which would assist it to perform its public or regulatory duty; and that, accordingly, the defendants had owed a duty of care to the Law Society.

Law Society v KPMG Peat Marwick and Others

Leakey & Ors v National Trust [1980] QB 485 Court of Appeal

The claimants land had been damaged by falls of soil and other debris from the defendants land known as Burrow Mump. The falls were caused entirely by nature there was no human activity involved that would have caused the fall. The defendants were aware of the risks since 1968. They had taken legal advice and were told that they would not be liable for naturally occurring slides and consequently did nothing to prevent such slides. Following the exceptionally hot dry summer of 1976 and unusually heavy rainfall in the autumn, Mrs Leaky noticed a big crack appear in the bank above her house. She informed the National Trust and offered to pay half the cost of making it safe. Her offer was rejected. A few weeks later there was a large fall. She joined forces with other neighbours to bring an action in nuisance. Held: The National Trust were liable following the Privy Council decision in Goldman v Hargrave. A defendant is liable for a naturally occurring hazard on the land if they are aware of the danger and failed to act with reasonable prudence to remove the hazard.

Lennon v Commissioner of Police The claimant, an officer with the Metropolitan Police, successfully applied to join the of the Metropolis police service of Northern Ireland. He sought advice about his transfer from a police personnel executive officer in London. In reply to his specific enquiry he was informed that his housing allowance entitlement would not be affected by his taking time off work during the course of his transfer. He in fact took three weeks off work which resulted in a break in his continuity of service, and on taking up his new position he permanently lost entitlement to a monthly housing allowance of 134. The Court of Appeal upheld his claim in negligence against the commissioner arising from the manner in which his transfer was handled and upheld the award of some 44,000 damages. The general principles governing the existence of a duty of care not to cause pure economic loss to another by careless acts or omissions are well established, and the commissioner was wrong in suggesting that the decision broke new ground involving a radical departure from the existing law. Although there was no contract of employment between the police commissioner and the claimant, the relationship between them was analogous to that created by such a contract; it was fair, just and reasonable to impose on the police commissioner a general duty of care to give advice to the claimant to protect him from economic loss.

Lewis -v- Daily Telegraph Ltd [1963] 1 QB 340

The court considered a request from jurors when assessing damages in a A police investigation into a company that produced plastics were leaked to a newspaper. The front page of the newspaper copied the document which said that an investigation was going on by the fraud squad after criticisms of the chairman's accounts by a shareholder. The company was later absolved of any wrongdoing and they sued for defamation alleging that the newspaper had intended that readers assume the company was fraudulent. The action wasn't based on what the words said themselves, but on a secondary meaning which may have been inferred by the reader: the innuendo meaning. The House of Lords held that the right-minded person would not infer guilt just from the article and the case was dismissed. A bus driver racing to a stop to collect passengers deliberately obstructed the driver of a bus of a rival company, overturning the latter's vehicle. The bus driver had been given instructions against obstructing other buses. The defendants were liable. The driver was acting within the course of his employment at the time; it was immaterial whether his act was forbidden. Profit for the company when the bus is first (more passengers). Otherwise, companies could exculpate themselves simply by prohibiting their servants from committing any torts during their service.

Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. 1862

Lippiatt and Febry -v- South Gloucestershire County Council; CA 31-Mar-1999

The defendant had failed to remove travellers who had encamped on its land and caused nuisances against neighbouring farmers. Held: The court refused to strike out a claim in nuisance by neighbouring land owners. It was arguable that a land owner can be liable for repeated acts constituting nuisance committed from its land by those it knew were in occupation, and where no steps were taken to evict them. It was its own land from which a continuing nuisance emanated. Hesley Hall was a boarding house for students with severe emotional problems, the warden Mr Graine had supervision of the pupils at Hesley Hall and their daily routine. It transpired during the early 90s that Mr Graine had sexually abused these children and they have suffered psychiatric injuries. Hesley Hall was sued in all sorts of tort from battery to negligence. If the court was to uphold the Salmond test which required: The wrongful act must be authorised by the employer; or The wrongful mode was authorised. This draconian rule meant that an employee engaging in a criminal act (such as the current case) will never be acting in the course of employment, would therefore in the context of the current case cause significant injustice. In the Court of Appeal the judges followed the case of Trotman and held that Hesley Hall is not liable. When the case went up to the House of Lords, the Law Lords unanimously held that vicarious liability is established, hence overruling Trotman. The House of Lords found: The purpose of the warden's duty was to develop trust with the children, that trust gave him access to the boys and allowed the abuse; There was geographical and temporal proximity to the employment, as the abused occured on the premise of his employment and during the time which he should be carrying out his employment duties; There is an inherent risk of sexual abuse in these types of occupations, for the courts to find Hesley Hall liable could potentially be a deterrent to potential abusers. Lord Steyn whose judgment is the most often cited said that the warden's criminal acts are inextricably interwoven with his duties, hence it is closely connect to his work therefore Hesley Hall is liable under vicarious liability. Lord Hobhouse on the otherhand reject the whole notion of vicarious liability, and argued that Hesley Hall owned a direct duty to the children, therefore they are directly liable in tort for systemic negligence. Lord Millett preferred a wider approach than Bazley, i.e. any risk that are incidental to employment will give raise to vicarious liability. This approach is based on enterprise theory indirected criminology. A father his son parking a lorry, but by negligence of the son, the father was injured. The son was the employee of the company. The company sued the son for the full money they had to pay in damages.

Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22

Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Ltd. 1957

They succeded. Mostly employers do not sue their employees but it can be done. Lochgelly Iron & Coal v. M'Mullan A miner was killed when part of the coal mine that he was working in fell on top of him. [1934] AC 1 The man's family successfully sued for damages under the Coal Mines Act 1911 (c 50) s 49 (repealed), which required that an employer must ensure that the roof of every coal mine is made secure and not order an employee to work there if it is not. The coal mine owners appealed the decision, but their appeal was dismissed as it was held that the initial action was competent as their negligence had been proved.

London Artists v Littler [1962] 2 QB 375

The Defendant wrote a letter to some actors in a play who had all given notice to quit at the same time accusing them of a plot to force the end of a successful play. So many actors giving notice at the same time was apparently an almost unheard of event. They sued him. He pleaded justification and then withdrew it as it became clear that the actors had withdrawn for different reasons and not in order to end the play. The Defendant also argued fair comment on a matter in the public interest. The Court laid down this test: Was the comment made on a matter of public interest, Was the statement an expression of fact or opinion, If opinion, are the underlying facts true and contained in the article, Would a fair man make the same comment. Regarding (1), they held that whenever a matter affects people at large it can be held to be in the public interest. The Claimant was injured by a horse when using a short cut across the defendants field. The land had been habitually used as a short cut by members of the public for many years and the defendant had taken no steps to prevent people coming on to the land. The defendant was aware that the horse was dangerous. Held: The defendant was liable. Whilst the claimant did not have express permission to be on the land, a licence was implied through repeated trespass and the defendants acquiescence.

Lowery v Walker [1911] AC 10 House of Lords

Luxmoore-May v Messenger May D valued two Stubbs paintings at 30; they eventually sold at auction for 88,000. Baverstock (a firm) (1990) CA Valuation of a picture of was not an exact science and in deciding not to attribute the picture to a particular artist a valuer was not necessarily guilty of professional negligence Malone v Laskey 1907 2 KB 141 The claimant was injured when vibrations from an engine on an adjoining property caused a bracket to come loose and the cistern to fall on her in the lavatory. She was unsuccessful in her claim as she did not have a proprietary interest in the house. Her husband was a mere licensee through his employment as a manager. Mansfield v Weetabix [1997] EWCA Civ 1352 The defendant drove his lorry into a shop owned by the claimant. At the time of the incident the defendant was had a malignant insulinoma which resulted in him being in a hyperglycaemic state although he was unaware of this. On the day of the crash he had also been involved in two minor incidents. Held: The defendant was not in breach of duty Leggatt LJ "In my judgment the standard of care that Mr Tarleton was obliged to show in these circumstances was that which is to be expected of a reasonably competent driver unaware that he is or may be suffering from a condition that impairs his ability to drive. To apply an objective standard in a way that did not take account of Mr Tarletons condition would be to impose strict liability. But that is not the law."

Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority

The patient presented with symptoms of tuberculosis but both the consultant physician and the consultant surgeon took the view that Hodgkin's disease, carcinoma, and sarcoidosis were also possibilities, the first of which if present would have required remedial steps to be taken in its early stages. Instead of waiting for the results of the sputum tests, the consultants carried out a mediastinoscopy to get a biopsy. The inherent risk of damage was to the left laryngeal recurrent nerve, even if the operation was properly done. In the event, only tuberculosis was confirmed. Unfortunately, the risk became a reality and the patient suffered a paralysis of the left vocal cord. The decision of the physician and the surgeon to proceed was said by their expert peers to be reasonable in all the circumstances. A court may prefer one body of opinion to the other but that is no basis for a conclusion of negligence. An oil worker, the claimant, claimed damages for psychiatric injury, after witnessing the destruction caused by a fire on an oil rig from his workplace on a support boat 100 metres away. The fire killed 164 men although the claimant was uninjured. It was held that the claimant was owed a duty of care on the ground that he was a participant in an event and had reasonable been in fear for his life and safety and the impact of the events had caused shock. The defendants appealed. Held, that the claimant was entitled to damages because he was more than a mere bystander to the event. A father, wishing to limit the size of his family to six children, underwent a vasectomy. Months later his surgeon confirmed the success of the operation and that he need not use contraception. The man subsequently made his wife pregnant and the family sought damages from the Health Board for the costs of raising the child. Held, the vasectomy was intended to stop pregnancy and therefore the mother could claim for costs in that regard only. However, the costs around raising the child could not be recovered as it would not be fair just or reasonable to impose such a burden on a liability for financial loss on a doctor. (This is a case where a healthy child was born due to failed sterilization) The claimant worked at the defendant's brick works. His normal duties did not expose him to much dust but he was then asked to work on the brick kilns in a hot a dusty environment. The defendant was in breach of duty in not providing washing and showering facilities. The claimant thus had to cycle home still covered in the brick dust. The claimant contracted dermatitis. There were two possible causes: the brick dust he was exposed to during the course of his employment which was not attributable to a breach of duty and the brick dust he was exposed to on his journey home which was attributable to a breach. The defendant sought to distinguish Wardlaw's case by arguing that it was proved that every particle of dust inhaled played its part in causing the onset of the disease whereas in this case it is not proved that every minor abrasion played its part. Held: The claimant only had to demonstrate that the dust attributable to the breach of duty materially increased the risk of him contract dermatitis. Lord Salmon: My Lords, I would suggest that the true view is that, as a rule, when it is proved, on a balance of probabilities, that an employer has been negligent and that his negligence has materially increased the risk of his employee contracting an industrial disease, then he is liable in damages to that employee if he contracts the disease notwithstanding that the employer is not responsible for other factors which have materially contributed to the disease.

McFarlane v. E.E. Caledonian Limited [1994] 2 All ER 1

McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [2000]

McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 House of Lords

McKay v Essex AHA (1982) CA

^[Tort - negligence - duty of care - public policy - wrongful birth creates no cause of action] DD, the doctors who did not advise a mother to have an abortion. C was born disabled as a result of an infection of rubella (German measles) suffered by her mother while the child was in her womb. The child claimed damages on the ground that she had been "suffered entry into a life in which her injuries are highly debilitating," and for distress, loss and damage. Held: There is no claim in law which allows a child born alive with deformities to claim damages for negligence against doctors in allowing it to be born alive. The doctor was under no legal obligation under the Abortion Act 1967 to the foetus to terminate its life, and the child's claim was contrary to public policy as a violation of the sanctity of human life, and a claim which could not be recognised since the court could not evaluate damages for the denial of non-existence The effect of the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 was that no child born after the passing of the Act could have a cause of action based on the loss of a chance to die. C lost

McKew v Holland [1969] 3 All ER The claimant sustained an injury at work due to his employer's breach of duty. He 1621 strained his back and hips and his leg was prone to giving way. Whilst in this state he attempted to climb down a steep concrete staircase without a handrail unaided. He got part way down and felt his leg give way so he jumped 10 steps to the bottom. He suffered a fractured right ankle and was also left with a permanent disability. The defendant accepted liability for the injury sustained during his employment but disputed liability for the second injuries resulting from the claimant's action in jumping down the stairs. Held: The claimant's action amounted to a novus actus interveniens because his action in attempting to climb the steps unaided knowing that his leg might give way was unreasonable. The defendant was therefore not liable for the injuries resulting from the incident on the stairs. The defendant manufactured steel and iron products 600 feet from the claimants property. The claimant had a dwelling house and also a commercial florists and nursery. As part of his business he specialised in growing orchids which are known for their particular sensitivity. The claimant brought an action in relation to noxious fumes and smuts which had deposited over his shrubs, trees, hedges and flowers causing them to die. Held: The defendants actions constituted an unlawful nuisance and therefore the claimant was entitled to recover damages in respect of the orchids despite the sensitive nature of the flowers. A mother received news that her family had been involved in a car accident. On hearing the news she rushed to the hospital to find her injured family and be told that her son had been killed. The mother suffered severe shock, depression and personality change. The defendant admitted negligence. The issue was whether the mother could succeed in her claim because she had not been present at the accident or it aftermath. Held, she could succeed at it was reasonably foreseeable

McKinnon Industries v Walker [1951] WN 401 Privy Council

McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410

McManus v Beckham 2002

Whilst visiting the claimants' autograph shop the defendant allegedly claimed that a signed photograph of her husband, David Beckham, was not genuine. The shop sought to rely on the subsequent publication in the media of the defendant's alleged claims in support of its claim for damages. The judge at first instance struck out the shop's plea in this respect. Whether the shop could rely at trial on an allegation that the claimant was responsible for subsequent press coverage of her visit to the shop. The plea would be reinstated to go to the jury at trial, who would be directed to consider the questions of whether the defendant knew that what she had allegedly said was likely to be reported and that if she slandered someone that slander was likely to be repeated or a reasonable person in the position of the defendant should have appreciated that there was a signficant risk that what she had allegedly said would be repeated. [Tort negligence - duty of care - causation] D a building firm had not provided a safety belt to a steel erector who fell 70 feet to his death. C the widow. D was in breach of its statutory duty to provide a safety belt (but not to insist that it be worn) but, there was evidence to show that the man would probably not have worn a belt even had it been provided. Held: The firm's negligence and breach of statutory duty were not the cause of his death. C lost A published criticism of a play made reference to one of the characters being "a naughty wife", though in fact there was no adulterous wife in the play. Held: The defence of fair comment is open to a commentator however prejudiced he might be, and however exaggerated or obstinate his views. Bowen LJ said: "Still there is another class of cases in which, as it seems to me, the writer would be travelling out of the region of fair criticism - I mean if he imputes to the author that he has written something which in fact he has not written. That would be a misdescription of the work. There is all the difference in the world between saying that you disapprove of the character of a work, and that you think it has an evil tendency, and saying that a work treats adultery cavalierly, when in fact there is no adultery at all in the story. A jury would have a right to consider the latter beyond the limits of fair criticism." After citing Campbell, Lord Esher MR asked what was meant by 'fair comment' and answered: "What is the meaning of a 'fair comment'? I think the meaning is this: is the article in the opinion of the jury beyond that which any fair man, however prejudiced or however strong his opinion may be, would say of the work in question? Every latitude must be given to opinion and to prejudice, and then an ordinary set of men with ordinary judgment must say whether any fair man would have made such a comment on the work . . Mere exaggeration, or even gross exaggeration, would not make the comment unfair. However wrong the opinion expressed may be in point of truth, or however prejudiced the writer, it may still be within the prescribed limit. The question which the jury must consider is this would any fair man, however prejudiced he may be, however exaggerated or obstinate his views, have said that which this criticism has said of the work which is criticised? If it goes beyond that, then you must find for the plaintiff; if you are not satisfied that it does, then it falls within the allowed limit, and there is no libel at all."

McWilliams v Arrol [1962] HL

Merivale -v- Carson (1887) 20 QBD 275

Mersey Docks and Harbour Board The appellants hired out a crane to the respondents for the purpose of unloading a v. Coggins & Griffiths (Liverpool) ship; they also provided a driver for this crane upon the terms that he should be for the Ltd. 1947 duration of the contract 'the servant of the hirers'. In fact although the respondents supervised this man's work, they had no power of control over his actual management of the machine. Through negligent handling of it he injured someone. The defendant was liable. The right of ultimate control over the driver's management of the crane was theirs. It lies upon the general employer to establish that the vicarious responsibility has been shifted from his shoulders to those of the special employer. Principle: in the case that one employer lends a servant to another it depends on whichever of the two had the right of control over the servant's activities at the time the injury was caused. Miller v Jackson [1977]3 WLR 20 The defendants were members of the Lintz Cricket Club. Cricket had been played at Court of Appeal Lintz cricket ground for over 70 years. The land was owned by the National Coal Board (NCB) who also owned some fields surrounding the grounds. Four years prior to the action, the NCB sold one of the fields and a development of Wimpey homes was put up in close proximity to the cricket ground. Mrs Miller purchased one of the houses and brought an action against the cricket club seeking an injunction to prevent them playing cricket at the ground. Initially quite a number of balls were hit over the houses. However, in 1976 the cricket club erected a higher fence and the number of balls hit out was reduced to nine over a two year period. There had been no personal injuries resulting from the balls but some property damage had been caused which the cricket club had paid for. Mrs Miller complained that she could not use her garden during matches and would often stay out of the house altogether. Held: The defendants were liable in both negligence and nuisance (Lord Denning dissenting) However, Cumming Bruce LJ refused the injunction on the grounds that it would be inequitable to grant an injunction given that the cricket ground had been used for so long and would be a loss to the community and Mrs Miller received the benefit of being adjacent to an open space. Lord Lane would have granted the injunction stating that the decision in Sturges v Bridgeman involves the assumption that it is no defence for the defendant to show that they came to the nuisance.

Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp

An employee of the authority failed to exercise reasonable skill and care in searching for entries in the local land charges register. The search certificate prepared by the clerk negligently failed to record a charge of 1,828 11s. 5d. in favour of the Ministry. Lord Denning MR held the local authority was liable to the Ministry for the employee's incompetence. At 268 he rejected that a duty of care only arose when there was a voluntary assumption of responsibility, rather "from the fact that the person making it knows, or ought to know, that others, being his neighbours in this regard, would act on the faith of the statement being accurate."

MLC v Evatt (1968) 12 CLR 556

Established that a professional adviser owed a duty of care to clients to whom they supplied information.

Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel & Co Ltd and others

The plaintiffs took over another company and later brought an action against the advisers, accountants and directors alleging breach of a duty of care by negligent misrepresentation in financial statements published prior to the bid and in defence documents sent to shareholders and served on the plaintiffs' advisers after the bid on which the plaintiffs had relied in making and increasing their offer and whereby they had suffered loss. After the decision of the House of Lords in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 WLR 358 the plaintiffs sought to amend their pleading by restricting it to representations made in the course of the bid when their relationship as identified bidders was sufficiently proximate to create a duty of care owed to them by the defendants, but including the previously issued financial statements as 'continuing representations' never withdrawn or qualified. The plaintiffs further alleged that a particular purpose of the representations was to persuade them to offer better terms. On a summons for leave to amend Hoffman J refused leave holding that despite the amendments the case could not be distinguished from Caparo and was bound to fail because of the absence of a duty of care. The plaintiffs appealed. Jonathan Sumption QC, Stephen Suttle and John Nicholls (instructed by Herbert Smith) for the plaintiffs. Gordon Langley QC and Michael Brindle (instructed by Berwin Leighton) for the first defendants. Nicolas Bratza QC and Ian Croxford (instructed by Barlow Lyde & Gilbert) for the second defendants. Leslie Kosmin (instructed by Reynolds Porter Chamberlain) for the third defendant. Nigel Davis (instructed by McKenna & Co) for the fourth and fifth defendants. Michael McLaren (instructed by Allison & Humphreys) for the sixth, seventh and eighth defendants. Slade LJ said on the assumed facts pleaded the defendants intended that the plaintiffs would rely on the representations in deciding whether or not to make an increased bid and that the plaintiffs had so relied and that it was therefore plainly arguable that there was a relationship of proximity between the plaintiffs and the defendants sufficient to give rise to a duty of care and the case should go to trial. Appeal allowed.

Morgan -v- Odhams Press Ltd; HL 1971

The plaintiff claimed in defamation. The defence was that the words did not refer to the plaintiff and could not be understood to refer to him. Held: The question as to what meaning words are capable of bearing has been described as a question of law, but only in the sense that the decision thereon is reserved to the judge rather than to the jury: It is not a question of law in the true sense. The ordinary reasonable reader is a layman, not a lawyer, and his capacity for implication is much greater than that of the lawyer. Lord Morris said: The question for the Judge at the end of the plaintiffs case was whether there was evidence upon which the jury could (not would) decide in favour of the plaintiff. That in turn raised the question whether the jury could decide that some readers (having knowledge of certain circumstances) would reasonably understand the words as referring to the plaintiff. If no reasonable reader could have understood the words as referring to the plaintiff, then there would be nothing to be left to the jury. Lord Reid said that some people may think that the law has gone too far in holding a publisher liable for a reference innuendo, if the statement concerned applies to someone the publisher has never heard of.

Morgans v. Launchbury 1973 House of Lords

A husband used his wife's car; it was ensured by the wife. The wife said, 'If you get drunk, get a friend to drive you'. He asked his friend, his friend did not want to. So he drove the car himself and had an accident, both he and his friend were killed and some people were injured. The man was not an agent.

He did not do something specific for his wife. It would be the same if he had used it for work (only if he was doing something specific his wife asked him to do). Husband and wife are not necessarily agent and principal. Moriarty v Brookes [1834] EWHC The defendant was a publican. He argued with a customer over a disputed payment Exch J79 and struck him causing a cut below his eye. The publican argued he had asked the customer to leave and he had refused to do so and the force was lawfully applied in ejecting him from the pub. Held: The defendant had used excessive force. The Lord Lyndhurst CB set the definition of a wound as "The definition of a wound in criminal cases is an injury to the person, by which the skin is broken. If the skin is broken, and there was a bleeding, that is a wound" Moy -v- Pettman Smith (a firm) and another; HL 3-Feb-2005 Damages were claimed against a barrister for advice on a settlement given at the door of the court. After substantial litigation, made considerably more difficult by the negligence of the solicitors, the barrister had not advised the claimant at the door of the court to accept an offer. The claimant was not advised as to potential difficulties in having essential evidence admitted, and the evidence was not admitted, and a much lower sum was received. The court of appeal had found the advice itself not to be negligent, but that she should have given the client more detailed advice. Held: The question whether her advice was negligent has to be judged in the light of the choices that were available in the light of her assessment. She had to balance the possibility of her clients desire to achieve a full settlement against the loss of a chance to sue the solicitors for negligence. it is the substance of the advice, not the precise wording used to convey it, that needs to be examined in order to judge whether it was negligent. The significance of Miss Perrys failure to tell Mr Moy that the prospects of getting the evidence in were 50/50 has to be measured against what she did tell him, which was that she was hopeful that the judge would admit the evidence. The court of appeal had been wrong to disturb the finding that the barrister had not been negligent: it was not incumbent upon the appellant to spell out all her reasoning, so she was not in breach of her duty of care to the claimant in the advice which she gave. As to the right of the solictors to appeal: section 1(5) of the 1978 Act should be so construed as not to bar an appeal in a case such as the present. This could be done in either or both of two ways. One could construe the word judgment as referring to a final judgment after any appeals have been determined, rather than the judgment at first instance of the trial judge; or one could confine the operation of the subsection to actions for contribution subsequently brought, so excluding further proceedings by way of appeal in the original action. Whichever construction one adopts, I consider that the solicitors right of appeal to the Court of Appeal was not barred by the operation of section 1(5)

Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialties Ltd and Others

The third defendant manufactured motors for pumps which were incorporated in a tank for the storage of lobsters which was installed at the plaintiff's fish farm. The motors, being unsuited to UK voltages, cut out and the plaintiff's entire lobster stock died from lack of oxygen. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, damages from the third defendant in negligence for the loss of the lobsters and the economic loss, including loss of profit, resulting therefrom. The trial judge held that the third defendant was liable to the plaintiff in respect of the pure economic loss. The third defendant appealed. Piers Ashworth QC and G W Lowe (instructed by Hadaway & Hadaway, Newcastleupon-Tyne) for the third defendant. Robin Stewart QC and Michael Heywood (instructed by Crutes, Newcastle-upon-Tyne) for the plaintiff. Robert Goff LJ, having considered Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520, said that damages in negligence for pure economic loss could be recovered only if there were such a very close proximity of relationship between the parties and reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant that the defendant was to be taken voluntarily to have assumed direct responsibility to the plaintiff. The ultimate purchaser of goods supplied unde a chain of ordinary sale contracts could recover such damages only from his immediate vendor, since such proximity and reliance would not arise between him and the manufacturer, and accordingly the plaintiff could not recover his economic loss from the third defendant. Nourse LJ, occurring , said that in the absence of close proximity and reliance, the court was bound by Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27 not to award damages for pure economic loss. O'Connor LJ, concurring, said that Spartan Steel could not be distinguished, and had not been overruled by implication in Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd. Appealed allowed in part with one-half costs. Leave to appeal refused. [Tort negligence - duty of care - no duty situations - just fair and reasonable - public policy employers liability] D, responsible for the army and therefore its soldiers, employed a gun commander during the Gulf War. C an artilleryman sustained damage to his hearing when a howitzer was fired accidentally. Held: A serviceman owes no duty of care to his fellow servicemen in battle conditions, since as a matter of common sense and public policy it would not be fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty. For the same reason the Ministry of Defence as Cs employer does not have a duty to provide a safe system of work in those circumstances. C lost Two 15 year old school girls were fighting with plastic rulers. A ruler snapped and a splinter went into one of the girls eyes causing blindness. The girl brought an action against the other girl for her negligent action. Held: The girl was only expected to meet the standard of a reasonable 15 year old school girl not that of a reasonable man. She was found not to be in breach of duty.

Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence (1996) CA

Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304

Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] HL

[Tort negligence - duty of care - general principles - the nature of negligence - duty of care - proving fault] D, local authority negligently approved plans for the footings (a concrete raft) of a house that subsided. C the house owner could not afford repairs and sold the house at a loss. C alleged that he and his family had suffered an imminent risk to health and safety because gas and soil pipes had broken and there was a risk of further breaks. Held: The damage suffered by C was not material or physical damage. D was not liable for pure economic loss of the cost of remedying defects To permit C to recover his economic loss would logically lead to an unacceptably wide category of claims in respect of buildings or chattels which were defective in quality, and would in effect introduce product liability and transmissible warranties of quality into the law of tort by means of judicial legislation. C lost Per curiam. It is unrealistic to regard a building or chattel which has been wholly erected or manufactured and equipped by the same contractor as a complex structure in which one part of the structure or chattel is regarded as having caused damage to other property when it causes damage to another part of the same structure or chattel, since the reality is that the structural elements in a building or chattel form a single indivisible unit of which the different parts are essentially interdependent and to the extent that there is a defect in one part of the structure or chattel it must to a greater or lesser degree necessarily affect all other parts of the structure. However, defects in ancillary equipment, manufactured by different contractors, such as central heating boilers or electrical installations may give rise to liability under ordinary principles of negligence.

Nettleship v Weston [1971] 3 WLR 370

The defendant was a learner driver. She was taking lessons from a friend. The friend checked that the defendant's insurance covered her for passengers before agreeing to go out with her. On one of the lessons Mrs Weston turned a bend, Mr Nettleship told her to straighten the wheel but Mrs Weston panicked and failed to straighten the wheel. She approached the pavement and Mr Nettleship grabbed the handbrake and tried to straighten the wheel but it was too late. She mounted the pavement and hit a lamp post. Mr Nettleship fractured his knee. The defendant argued that the standard of care should be lowered for learner drivers and she also raised the defence of volenti non fit injuria in that in agreeing to get in the car knowing she was a learner, he had voluntarily accepted the risk. Held: A learner driver is expected to meet the same standard as a reasonable qualified competent driver. Volenti did not apply as he had checked the insurance cover which demonstrated he did not waive any rights to compensation. His damages were reduced by 50% under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 to reflect the degree to which he was also at fault.

Newstead v London Express Newspapers (1940)

A newspaper report of a trial referred to Harold Newstead, a 30 year old Camberwell man, as a bigamist. The claimant, who had the same name, lived in Camberwell and was unmarried, successfully sued for libel.

Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298.

The first defendant was driving a coach owned by the second defendant westwards in the outer lane of a dual carriageway in Hong Kong. Suddenly the coach crossed the central reservation and collided with a public light bus travelling in the inner lane of the eastbound carriageway. One passenger in the bus was killed, and the driver and three other passengers were injured. The plaintiffs, who were those injured and the personal representatives of the deceased, commenced against the defendants an action claiming damages for negligence. At the trial the plaintiffs did not call oral evidence and relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, contending that the fact of the accident alone was sufficient evidence of negligence by the first defendant. The defendants called evidence which established that an untraced car being driven in the inner lane of the westbound carriageway had cut into the outer lane in front of the coach, and to avoid hitting the car the first defendant had braked and swerved to the right whereupon the coach had skidded across colliding with the bus. The judge gave judgment for the plaintiffs on liability holding that the defendants had failed to discharge the burden of disproving negligence. On appeal the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong reversed that decision and found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove negligence. On appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council:

Held, that it was misleading to talk of the burden of proof shifting to the defendant in a res ipsa loquitur situation because the burden of proving negligence rested throughout the case on the plaintiff (p 300L); that in an appropriate case the plaintiff established a prima facie case by relying upon the fact of the accident and if the defendant adduced no evidence there was nothing to rebut the inference of negligence and the plaintiff would have proved his case, but if the defendant did adduce evidence that evidence had to be evaluated to see if it was still reasonable to draw the inference of negligence from the mere fact of the accident (p 301D); that the judge had mislead himself by assuming that there was a legal burden on the defendants to disprove negligence and he had also failed to give effect to those authorities which established that a defendant placed in a position of peril and emergency had not to be judged by too critical a standard when he acted on the spur of the moment to avoid an accident (p 302D); that in attempting to extricate himself, his coach and his passengers from a situation which appeared to him as one of extreme danger, the first defendant had acted with the alertness, and judgment could reasonably haveornamental been expected in the Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2 ExD The defendantskill diverted a natural which stream on his land to create lakes. 1 Exceptionally heavy rain caused the artificial lakes and waterways to be flooded and damage adjoining land. The defendant was held not liable under Rylands v Fletcher as the cause of the flood was an act of God. Mellish LJ: Now the jury have distinctly found, not only that there was no negligence in the construction or the maintenance of the reservoirs, but that the flood was so great that it could not reasonably have been anticipated, although, if it had been anticipated, the effect might have been prevented; and this seems to us in substance a finding that the escape of the water was owing to the act of God. However great the flood had been, if it had not been greater than floods that had happened before and might be expected to occur again, the defendant might not have made out that she was free from fault; but we think she ought not to be held liable because she did not prevent the effect of an extraordinary act of nature, which she could not anticipate.

Norman v Future Publishing

The operatic diva, Jessye Norman, sued for libel over the attribution to her in Classic CD music magazine of a joke which involved her getting stuck, being advised to exit sideways from the situation and responding with the line "Honey, I ain't got no sideways". She put various defamatory interpretations on this story. Her claim was struck out by Buckley J on the grounds that the words could not carry a defamatory meaning. She appealed. Whether the attribution of this joke was capable of conveying a meaning defamatory of the claimant. Dismissing the appeal: (1) Where words were alleged to be defamatory because they exposed a claimant to ridicule a line had to be drawn between insults and ridicule; in doing so the perceived intention of the writer could be relevant. (2) The article was generally sympathetic and favourable, and did not disclose an intention to ridicule. (3) The words could not bear any of the defamatory meanings advanced.

Ogwo v Taylor [1987] 3 WLR 1145 House of Lords

The Defendant attempted to burn off paint from the fascia boards beneath the eaves of his house with a blow lamp and in so doing set fire to the premises. The fire brigade were called and the Claimant, an acting leading fireman, and a colleague entered the house wearing breathing apparatus and the usual fireman's protective clothing and armed with a hose. The two firemen were able, with the aid of a step- ladder, to squeeze through a small hatch to get into the roof space. The heat within the roof space was intense. The Claimant suffered serious burn injuries to his upper body and face from scalding steam which must have penetrated his protective clothing. Held: A duty of care was owed to a professional fireman. There was no requirement that the risk be exceptional. The defence of volenti had no application. Lord Bridge: "The duty of professional firemen is to use their best endeavours to extinguish fires and it is obvious that, even making full use of all their skills, training and specialist equipment, they will sometimes be exposed to unavoidable risks of injury, whether the fire is described as "ordinary" or "exceptional." If they are not to be met by the doctrine of volenti, which would be utterly repugnant to our contemporary notions of justice, I can see no reason whatever why they should be held at a disadvantage as compared to the layman entitled to invoke the principle of the so-called "rescue" cases."

Ormrod v. Crossville Motor Service 1953

A car should be transported to Monte Carlo by an agent. The driver's negligence caused an accident. The principal was responsible for this accident in the course of a principal-agentrelationship. Even if it was partly for the agent's benefit. Remedies - contributory negligence - 20% deduction for not wearing a seat belt and allowing himself to be carried by drunken driver] C and D together in D's car drank considerable amounts of beer in a pub. Whilst driving home C did not wear a seat belt. D negligently caused an accident, whereby C was injured. Held: The principle was recognised that a passenger can be held to have been contributorily negligent if he rides with a driver who he knows has consumer alcohol in such quantity as is likely to impair to a dangerous degree that driver's capacity to drive properly and safely. On the facts, the passenger was found guilty of 20% contributory negligence.

Owens v Brimmell [1977] QBD

Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155 House of Lord

The claimant had suffered from ME over a period of time and was in recovery when he was involved in a minor car accident due to the defendant's negligence. The claimant was not physically injured in the collision but the incident triggered his ME and had become chronic and permanent so that he was unable to return to his job as a teacher. He was successful at his trial and awarded 162,000 in damages. Held: Provided some kind of personal injury was foreseeable it did not matter whether the injury was physical or psychiatric. There was thus no need to establish that psychiatric injury was foreseeable. Also the fact that an ordinary person would not have suffered the injury incurred by the claimant was irrelevant as the defendant must take his victim as he finds him under the thin skull rule.

Palsgraf v Long Island Railway Co [Tort negligence - duty of care to whom owed - foreseeability of damage] (1928) New York Appeals D employed a railway worker who carelessly knocked a box to the ground. Unknown to him it contained fireworks which exploded on impact; the blast knocked a weighing machine onto C standing some distance away. Held: injury to C was not foreseeable from the mere dropping of a box, and D was not liable for Cs injuries. C lost The claimant only had sight in one eye due to in injury sustained in the war. During the course of his employment as a garage hand, a splinter of metal went into his sighted eye causing him to become completely blind. The employer did not provide safety goggles to workers engaged in the type of work the claimant was undertaking. The defendant argued there was no breach of duty as they did not provide goggles to workers with vision in both eyes and it was not standard practice to do so. There was therefore no obligation to provide the claimant with goggles. Held: There was a breach of duty. The employer should have provided goggles to the claimant because the seriousness of harm to him would have been greater than that experienced by workers with sight in both eyes. The duty is owed to the particular claimant not to a class of persons of reasonable workers. Parkinson v St James and (This is a case where a disabled child was born as a result of a failed sterilization) Seacroft University Hospital NHS FACTS:Trust 2001 The Claimant underwent a sterilisation procedure, but this was unsuccessful and she conceived a fifth child, with severe learning difficulties. She brought a claim against the health authority and the matter came before the Court of Appeal. JUDGMENT:The courts awarded her "all costs that she would incur which were attributable to the childs disabilities." A healthy mother who gave birth to a severely disabled child after a negligently performed sterilisation could not claim the whole cost of bringing up the child but that she could recover the additional costs resulting from the childs disability.

Paris v Stepney [1951] AC 367

Perl (Exporters) Ltd v Camden London Borough Council (1984),

the defendant council owned adjoining premises. Number 142 was let to the claimant, and #144 was divided into flats. There was no lock on #144, and thieves entered #142 by knocking a hole through the adjoining wall. The Court of Appeal held that the defendants were not liable, mere foreseeability was not sufficient to establish a duty. Policy factors are at work here; the claimant would be insured against this type of loss.

Perry v Kendricks Transport [1956] WLR 85 Court of Appeal

The defendant kept an old coach that needed repair on their land adjoining a piece of wasteland. The claimant, a young boy of 10 approached two other boys on the wasteland close to the coach. As he got close, the boys lit a match and threw it into the petrol tank of the coach causing an explosion which left the claimant with severe burns. The claimant brought an action under the principle set out in Rylands v Fletcher. Held: The defendant was not liable as the escape was caused by the deliberate action of a third party. ^[Tort negligence - breach - standards of professionals] D (a jeweller), employed a man to pierce Cs ears, two weeks later she developed an infection that caused an abscess on her neck that required surgical draining. Held: A jeweller is not bound to take the same precautions as a surgeon would take, and D had taken all reasonable precautions. C was unable to prove that the operation was negligently performed, and that the abscess which formed in her neck was due to the negligence. C lost

Phillips v William Whiteley Ltd [1938] KBD

Phipps v Rochester Corporation [1955] 1 QB 450

A 5 year old boy was walking across some open ground with his 7 year old sister. He was not accompanied by an adult. He was injured when he fell into a trench. The Corporation were not held liable as an occupier is entitled to assume that prudent parents would not allow their children to go unaccompanied to places where it is unsafe. Devlin J on duty owed to children The law recognises a sharp difference between children and adults. But there might well I think, be an equally marked distinction between big children and little children. The occupier is not entitled to assume that all children will, unless they are allured, behave like adults; but he is entitled to assume that normally little children will be accompanied by a responsible person. The responsibility for the safety of little children must rest primarily upon the parents; it is their duty to see that such children are not allowed to wander about by themselves, or at least to satisfy themselves that the places to which they do allow their children to go unaccompanied are safe. It would not be socially desirable if parents were, as a matter of course, able to shift the burden of looking after their children from their own shoulders to those persons who happen to have accessible pieces of land.

Pigney V Pointers Transport Services Ltd (1957)

The claimant injured his head at work due to the Defendant's negligence. Some years later he hanged himself as he was suffering from acute anxiety and depression caused by the original injury. Held. COA. original injury was still operating, and anxiety/depression are a common cause of damage to the head.

Plato Films -v- Speidel [1961]

The plaintiff had been the Supreme Commander of the Axis Land Forces in Central Europe, and brought an action claiming that he had been defamed in a film showing him privy to the murders of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and M. Barthou in 1934, and as having betrayed Field-Marshal Rommel in 1944. The trial had not yet occurred. The defendants sought to rely on the fact that the plaintiff chose to sue on certain parts of the film, and not on others which were also defamatory of the plaintiff, as a ground for mitigating damages. Held: This was vigorously rejected: "[The defendants] plead that the respondent has been depicted in the film as having been 'guilty of the conduct hereinafter set out the truth of which the plaintiff . . does not deny'. It surprises me that it should be considered a proper matter for pleading that a plaintiff has not thought fit to include in his action every libellous statement made about him by a defendant. It is, in my opinion, wholly improper. and If it is said that other parts of the entire film constitute 'circumstances in which the alleged libel was published' (in themselves a recognised head of mitigation), I think that is a highly artificial meaning to attribute to the phrase. The real purport of this portion of paragraph 5 of the defence seems to be to make the point that the plaintiff must be taken to have admitted the truth of such accompanying derogatory statements as he is not challenged in his libel claim. That is not a matter for pleading. If it amounts to anything at all, it is a matter for comment. As a proposition of law designed to set up some sort of estoppel, I think that it has no foundation. The case is the classic example of transcription error. In this case, a reasonably legible hand-written prescription for Amoxil was misread by the dispensing chemist and a toxic dose of glibenclamide was dispensed three times daily" a dose some fifty times the maximum daily dose of 15 mg. Dr Miller was found liable for 25% of the damages in the above case due to the apparent illegibility of his handwriting (I find it quite legible). a thirty-eight year old who had been a moulder all his working life was casting moulding boxes, the ladle of molten metal which he was holding slipped, and some of the metal splashed on to his left foot and, as he was not wearing protective spats or special boots, his foot was injured. He lost because he was experienced and should have guarded against the danger. F: X and Y set up a company Z Ltd. The function of Z Ltd was to perform a contract entered into both X and Y, with another party, to manufacture explosives. Z Ltd was to manufacture the explosives on X and Ys land. So Z Ltd was a licensee. An explosion occurred, damaging neighbouring property. H:The House of Lords found Z Ltd liable as the licensee which had accumulated the thing. X and Y, as occupiers and landowners were also liable for the escape of the thing accumulated by their licensee as the accumulation was a discharge of X and Ys contractual duty to another party. Some Stevedores carelessly dropped a plank of wood into the hold of a ship. The plank struck something as it was falling which caused a spark. The spark was ignited by petrol vapours resulting in the destruction of the ship. The arbitrator held that the causing of the spark could not have been anticipated and therefore no liability arose. The claimant appealed. Held: There was no requirement that the damage was foreseeable. The defendant was liable for all the direct consequences of their action. NB This was overruled in Wagon Mound No 1

Prendergast v Sam & Dee Ltd., Kosary, and Miller in 1989

Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes [1959]

Rainham Chemical Works v Belvedere Fish Guano

Re Polemis & Furness Withy & Company Ltd. [1921] 3 KB 560

Read v Lyons [1947] AC 156

The claimant was employed by the defendant in their factory which made explosives for the Ministry of Supply. During the course of her employment an explosion occurred which killed a man and injured others including the claimant. There was no evidence that negligence had caused the explosion. At trial the judge held that the case was governed by the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and liability was therefore strict. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision as the rule in Rylands v Fletcher required an escape of the hazardous matter. The claimant appealed. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal. In the absence of any proof of negligence on behalf of the defendant or an escape of dangerous thing, there was no cause of action on which the claimant could succeed. RMC is in the business of selling concrete, previously they had hired a contractor to deliever the concrete to the customers, but had terminated his contract and decided to offer the jobs to RMC's current staffs. Mr Latimer signed up for the hire-purchase agreement for the lorry and started to deliever concrete for RMC. The employer RMC argued that because Mr Latimer was an independent contractor they needed not pay for his national insurance. MacKenna J reversed the finding of the lower court and held that Mr Latimer was in fact a "small business man" and concluded that the contract was not of service, but of carriage. Test for contract of service: Is the worker subject to a right of control? Did the worker provide personal service in return for remuneration? Are the other provisions of the contract consistent with a contract of service? MacKenna J also placed significant emphasis on the existence of wages/remuneration, the absence of which there would not be consideration, hence a contract would not have been formed. The claimant was disabled, and sought sterilisation because she feared the additional difficulties she would face as a mother. The sterilisation failed. She sought damages. Held: Any disabled woman who gives birth to a normal, healthy child after a negligently performed sterilisation operation is not entitled to sue for the extra childcare costs she incurs because of her disability, the House of Lords ruled last week. However there should be a standardised award, set at 15.000. No damages should be awarded for the extra costs of parenthood arising from a mothers own disability.

Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968]

Rees -v- Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust; HL 16-Oct2003

Reeves v Commissioner of Police Martin Lynch committed suicide whilst in a police cell. He had attempted suicide of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 earlier that day in the cells at the magistrates. He had also attempted suicide on House of Lords previous occasions. He had been seen by a doctor at the police station on arrival who reported that he was not schizophrenic or depressed but was a suicide risk. The custody officer checked him at 1.57 pm and left the hatch open. He was found at 2.05 pm having used his shirt as a ligature secured by the open hatch. He was unable to be resuscitated and died a week later. The defendant argued that as Lynch was of sound mind his voluntary and informed act of suicide broke the chain of causation. Held: The act of suicide was the very thing that the police were under a duty to prevent to treat this as a novus actus interveniens would deprive the duty of any substance. Therefore the defendant was liable, however damages were reduced by 50% under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.

Revill v Newbery [1996] 2 WLR 239 Court of Appeal

Mr Newbery was a 76 year old man. He owned an allotment which had a shed in which he kept various valuable items. The shed was subject to frequent break ins and vandalism. Mr Newbery had taken to sleeping in his shed armed with a 12 bore shot gun. Mr Revill was a 21 year old man who on the night in question, accompanied by a Mr Grainger, went to the shed at 2.00 am in order to break in. Mr Newbery awoke, picked up the shot gun and fired it through a small hole in the door to the shed. The shot hit Mr Revill in the arm. It passed right through the arm and entered his chest. Both parties were prosecuted for the criminal offences committed. Mr Revill pleaded guilty and was sentenced. Mr Newbery was acquitted of wounding. Mr Revill brought a civil action against Mr Newbery for the injuries he suffered. Mr Newbery raised the defence of ex turpi causa, accident, self-defence and contributory negligence. Held: The Claimants action was successful but his damages were reduced by 2/3 under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 to reflect his responsibility for his own injuries. An occupier cannot treat a burglar as an outlaw

Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd

The Plaintiff, a prominent public figure in Ireland, began proceedings for defamation against the Defendants, the publishers of an article contained in the British mainland edition of a national newspaper. The publication related to the political crisis in Ireland in 1994 culiminating in the Plaintiff's resignation as Taoiseach and the collapse of the Irish government. The Plaintiff claimed that the words bore the meaning that he had deliberately lied to mislead the Dial and his cabinet colleagues. The Defendants pleaded, inter alia, qualified privilege at common law. At the trial the jury returned a verdict in the Plaintiff's favour and awarded the sum of 1p by way of damages. The Court of Appeal set aside the jury's verdict and ordered a retrial on the grounds of misdirections to the jury. The Court also ruled that the defence of qualified privilege was not available. The Defendants appealed. Whether the courts should recognise a generic qualified privilege encompassing the publication by a newspaper of political matters affecting the people of the United Kingdom. The common law should not develop a new subject matter category of qualified privilege whereby the publication of all political information would attract qualified privilege whatever the circumstances, since that would fail to provide adequate protection for reputation, and it would be unsound in principle to distinguish political information from other matters of public concern; but that qualified privilege was available in respect of political information upon application of the established common law test of whether there had been a duty to publish the material to the intended recipients and whether they had had an interest in receiving it, taking into account all the circumstances of the publication including the nature, status and source of the material.

Riches -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986]

The defendant published serious defamatory allegations against several plaintiff police officers. The defendant newspaper appealed against an award of 250,000 exemplary damages for their defamation of the respondent police officers. Held: Damages for defamation might be increased where a newspaper advertised the story complained of. Nevertheless, a retrial was ordered. The jury should be asked to make one award of exemplary damages which should then be divided between the plaintiffs. The award of exemplary damages was proper because there was evidence that the defendant had calculated the risk of damages against the benefit of increased sales.

Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263 The claimant ran a business from the second floor of a building. The defendant owned Privy Council the building and leased different parts to other business tenants. An unknown person had blocked all the sinks in the lavatory on the fourth floor and turned on all the taps in order to cause a flood. This damaged the claimants stock and the claimant brought an action based on the principle set out in Rylands v Fletcher. Held:

The defendants were not liable. The act which caused the damage was a wrongful act by a third party and there was no non-natural use of land. Robinson v Kilvert (1889) Brown paper kept by the plaintiff was damaged by the heat from the defendant's paper box manufacturing process carried on next door to the plaintiff's store room. The plaintiff was unsuccessful as the brown paper was exceptionally sensitive.

Robinson v Post Office [1974] CA [Civil Process negligence standard of proof chain or causation] D employed C who slipped on a ladder at work because of oil on the step. C suffered a minor injury. At hospital, he was given an anti-tetanus injection. He contracted encephalitis due to an allergy of which he was previously unaware. Held: The hospital was negligent but not liable, since even the proper procedure would not have revealed the allergy. C's employers, on the other hand, were legally responsible for the encephalitis as well as for the minor injury: if a wrongdoer ought to foresee that as a result of his wrongful act the victim may require medical treatment then he is liable for the consequences of the treatment applied although he could not reasonably foresee those consequences. Roe v Minister of Health [1954] CA [Tort negligence - duty of care - foreseeability of harm] A spinal anaesthetic had become contaminated through invisible cracks in the glass vial, when used, paralysed two patients. Held: The cracks were not foreseeable given the scientific knowledge of the time, The foreseeability of harm is clearly a major factor in determining how a reasonable person would act, and although actual foresight by D is generally irrelevant, a reasonable person would not have taken precautions against a risk of which reasonable people in that profession were not aware. D not liable. The High Court of Australia affirmed the Supreme Court of New South Wales' determination that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of any material risk involved in a proposed treatment. A risk is considered material if a reasonable person in similar circumstances would attach significance to the risk, or if the doctor is, or should be, cognizant that the particular patient would express concern about the risk. The trial court overruled the precept that a doctor could not be found negligent in warning a patient if the doctor acted within the purview of common practice, even though other practitioners may follow different procedures and regardless of the particular patient's concerns. In this case, Maree Whitaker became essentially blind after an unsucessful operation on her right eye caused sympathetic ophthalmia in her left eye. Although there was no question that the surgery had been performed with the requisite skill and care, Ms. Whitaker petitioned the court for relief due to the failure of the ophthalmologist, Dr. Christopher Rogers, to warn her of the possibility (approximately 1 in 14,000) that the sympathetic ophthalmia condition could develop. The trial court's award of damages was affirmed because, in spite of Ms. Whitaker's expressed specific concern that her "good eye" not be harmed, Dr. Rogers did not inform her of the potential risks associated with the surgery.

Rogers v. Whitaker. Australia

Roles v Nathan [1963] 1 WLR 1117 Court of Appeal

Two brothers, Donald and Joseph Roles were engaged by Mr Nathan as chimney sweeps to clean the flues in in a central heating system at Manchester Assembly Rooms. The flues had become dangerous due to carbon monoxide emissions. A heating engineer had warned them of the danger, however, the brothers told him they knew of the dangers and had been flue inspectors for many years. The engineer monitored the situation throughout the day and at one point ordered everybody out of the building due to the levels of carbon monoxide. The brothers ignored this advice and continued with their work. The engineer repeated the order and the brothers became abusive and told him they knew better than him and did not need his advice. The engineer forcibly removed them from the building. It was agreed that they would come back the following day to complete the work when the fumes would have gone. They were also told they should not do the work whilst the fires were lighted. However, the next day the brothers were found dead in the basement having returned the previous evening to complete the work when the fires were lit. Their widows brought an action under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957. Held: The defendant was not liable. The dangers were special risks ordinarily incident to their calling. The warnings issued were clear and the brothers would have been safe had they heeded the warnings.

Rose v. Plenty 1976 Court of Appeal

Ross v Caunters [1979] ChDiv Megarry VC

Children were helping the milk men. A boy was injured. The company was responsible. They had a benefit out of the boy's work (the milk comes earlier). [Solicitors duty to their clients] D a solicitor prepared a will for a client and sent it to him for signature. D failed to warn the client that his signature should not be witnessed by the spouse of a beneficiary, and subsequently did not notice that this had actually happened.

Held: D liable to pay damages to the disappointed beneficiary. Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 The defendant owned a mill and constructed a reservoir on their land. The reservoir House of Lords was placed over a disused mine. Water from the reservoir filtered through to the disused mine shafts and then spread to a working mine owned by the claimant causing extensive damage. Held: The defendants were strictly liable for the damage caused by a non- natural use of land. Lord Cranworth: If a person brings, or accumulates, on his land anything which, if it should escape, may cause damage to his neighbour, he does so at his peril. If it does escape, and cause damage, he is responsible, however careful he may have been, and whatever precautions he may have taken to prevent the damage.

Salmon v Seafarer Restaurants [1983] 1WLR 1264

The defendant owned a fish and chip shop. One night he left the chip fryer on and closed the shop for the night. This caused a fire and the fire services were called to put out the fire. The claimant was a fire man injured in an explosion whilst fighting the fire. He had been thrown to the ground whilst footing a ladder on a flat roof. The defendant sought to escape liability by invoking s.2(3)(b) of the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 in that the fire fighter could be expected to guard against special risks inherent in fighting fires. Held: The defendant was liable. Where it can be foreseen that the fire which is negligently started is of the type which could require firemen to attend to extinguish that fire, and where, because of the very nature of the fire, when they attend they will be at risk even if they exercise all the skill of their calling, there is no reason why a fireman should be at any disadvantage in claiming compensation. The duty owed to a fireman was not limited to the exceptional risks associated with fighting fire but extended to ordinary risks. This was an appeal against the decision of the Court of Exchequer in making absolute a rule to set aside the verdict for the defendants and for a new trial. The defendants were in possession of a warehouse, and were operating a certain crane or machine for lowering goods at the time of the accident. The Defendants and their servants were lowering the crane or machine, with bags of sugar onto the stone pavement in the Docks at St Katherines at the time of the accident. The Claimant, an officer of the Customs could not find who he was looking for, so made inquiries and was told he was in a warehouse, which was pointed out to him. When passing lawfully from the doorway of one warehouse to the other, he fell to the ground as six bags of sugar which were being lowered to the ground from the upper part of the warehouse by the crane fell on him. The Claimant said that he had no warning, and there was no fence or barrier to show persons that the place was dangerous, and nobody called out to him to stop him from going through the door or under the hoist. He also said that instantly before the bags fell he heard the rattling of a chain The Defendants pleaded not guilty. The learned Judge found that there was not sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of the Defendants to entitle him to leave the case to the jury. His Lordship then directed the jury to find verdict for the Defendants. Erle , C. J held that the majority of the Court came to the following conclusions. There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where the thing is shown to be under the management of the Defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care. The judges all agreed to the principles laid down in the cases cited for the Defendants although the judgment turned on the construction to be put on the Judges notes. Erle CJ and Mellor found that they could not find reasonable evidence of negligence which has been apparent to the rest of the Court. The judgment of the Court was affirmed, and the case was ordered to go to a new trial, when the effect of the evidence will in all probability be more correctly ascertained.

Scott v London and St Katherine Docks (1865) 3 H & C 596

Sedleigh-Denfield v OCallaghan [1940] AC 880 House of Lords

The council undertook some work on the defendants land at the request of a neighbouring landowner. They had placed a culvert in a ditch to allow the water to drain away, however, they had negligently placed a grate in the wrong place which rendered the grate useless and the culvert became prone to blockages. The defendants workers had cleaned the culvert periodically over a three year period to prevent blockages. However, a heavy rain storm caused a blockage and the ditch became flooded. The flood spread to neighbouring property owned by the claimant and caused substantial damage. The claimant brought an action in nuisance for the damage caused. The defendant argued that he had neither consented to nor had knowledge of the existence of the culvert. Held: The defendant was liable. An occupier may be liable for the acts of a trespasser if they adopt or continue the nuisance. Lord Maugham: My Lords, in the present case I am of opinion that the Respondents both continued and adopted the nuisance. After the lapse of nearly three years they must be taken to have suffered the nuisance to continue; for they neglected to take the very simple step of placing a grid in the proper place which would have removed the danger to their neighbour s land. They adopted the nuisance for they continued during all that time to use the artificial contrivance of the conduit for the purpose of getting rid of water from their property without taking the proper means for rendering it safe.

Shakoor v. Situ (t/a Eternal Health Mr Abdul Shakoor went to a Nottingham based Chinese herbalist, which traded as the Co) [2000] 4 All ER 181 "Eternal Health Co."[1] Mr Kang Situ, who ran the herbalist had trained for five years in China, gaining both a traditional "medicine" and "modern" medical qualifications. His grade was "excellent". He had no British professional medical qualifications. In November 1994, Mr Situ prescribed a course of Chinese herbal remedies for Mr Shakoor's benign lipomata, a skin condition, which produces fatty tissue that lies just below the skin, but causes no risk to health. There is no treatment in the UK, except surgical removal. Mr Shakoor was given a mix of twelve herbs in ten sachets which were to be taken on alternate days after a meal. After nine doses Mr Shakoor got ill, nauseous, his eyes went yellow and he suffered heartburn. He vomited, and had abdominal pain. He went to hospital, and was diagnosed as having "probably hepatitis A". His liver failed, he had hepatic necrosis. He had an operation, but he died in January 1995. In the post-mortem, his liver was found to contain Bai Xian Pi, or dictamnus dasycarpus, which some evidence suggested could be hepatotoxic. A practitioner of traditional Chinese herbal medicine did not have to meet the standard of skill and care of a reasonably competent practitioner of orthodox medicine, but he did have to take account of relevant reports in orthodox medical journals. In this case the prescription had not been inappropriate for a reasonable herbalist, and accordingly Mr Situ of the Eternal Health Co. was not liable for the death of Mr Shakoor.

Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital The claimant suffered from pain in her neck, right shoulder, and arms. Her Governors neurosurgeon took her consent for cervical cord decompression, but did not include in his explanation the fact that in less than 1% of the cases, the said decompression caused paraplegia. She developed paraplegia after the spinal operation. Rejecting her claim for damages, the court held that consent did not require an elaborate explanation of remote side effects. In dissent, Lord Scarman said that the Bolam test should not apply to the issue of informed consent and that a doctor should have a duty to tell the patient of the inherent and material risk of the treatment proposed.

Sim v. Stretch [1936]

a defamatory statement is one which tends to lower a person, "in the estimation of right-thinking members of society." It is not that the statement be made to the person in regard, it must be communicated to another. Tort law protects one's interest in preserving his/her reputation. In Canada, the law of defamation permits actions for Libel and Slander against those who seek to damage the anothers reputation.

Simaan General Contracting Co v The plaintiffs, the main contractors under a contract for a new building in Abu Dhabi, Pilkington Glass Ltd sub-contracted the supply and erecton of curtain walling. The defendants contracted to supply green glass units for incorporation in the curtain walling. They were not in contractual relationship with the plaintiffs. The units were alleged by the building owner to be defective in their colouring. The plaintiffs eventually rejected them and instructed the sub-contractors to replace them with approved panels. The plaintiffs claimed against the defendants damages for negligence in respect of the loss they had suffered as a result of the supply of the defective units. The question whether the defendants, as specified suppliers of the units, owed to the plaintiffs, as the main contractors, a duty to take reasonable care to avoid defects in the units which had caused them loss was tried as a preliminary issue. Judge Newey answered it in favour of the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed. David M Harris (instructed by C R Bayley, Pilkington legal departmen, St Helens) for the defendants. Romie Tager (instructed by Michael Conn & Co) for the defendants. Bingham LJ said that a claim might lie in negligence for recovery of economic loss alone. The defendants owed the plaintiffs a conventional duty of care to avoid physical injury or damage to person or property. The planitiffs could not be said to have relied on the defendants. Where a specialist sub-contractor was nominated by a building owner it might be possible to conclude that the specialist had assumed a direct responsibility to the building owner. There was no basis on which the defendants could be said to have assumed a responsibility to the plaintiffs. Junior Books v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520 had been interpreted as arising from physical damage. That interpretation was binding on the court. The authorities did not establish a general rule that claims in negligence might succeed on proof of foreseeable economic loss even where no damage to property and no proprietary or possessory interest had been shown. It was a type of claim against which the law had consistently set its face. If the units could be regarded as damaged at all, the damage occurred at the time of manufacture, and the plaintiffs had not shown any interest in them at that tme. Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR and Dillon LJ agreed. Appeal allowed.

Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877) The claimant insured Ts property against being damaged. The property was damaged as a result of the defendants fault with the result that the claimant had to pay out on the insurance policy with T. Held: claimant could not sue the defendant. Slipper v British Broadcasting Corporation [1991] 1 QB 283 The Claimant was a retired police officer was the subject of a film about trying to capture some men who had committed the Great Train Robbery. The Claimant alleged that the film showed him as a complete idiot. The film had been shown to some journalists before its release to the public and those journalists had published reviews contained the defamatory sting of the film i.e. that he was an incompetent police officer. The Claimant sued not only for the release to the public but the repetitions in the journalists' reviews. The defendants argued that the repetitions are only actionable where the defendant has authorised them. The court rejected this argument and said that the Defendant can be liable for any re-publication of the defamatory material as long as it was reasonably foreseeable.

Smith v ADVFN Plc (CA)

S took part in postings on a bulletin board on a financial services website maintained by ADVFN. He claimed to have been defamed by hundreds of postings published by users under cover of pseudonyms. He wished to know their IP addresses in order to obtain their names and addresses from their internet service providers. Gray J had made an order for the disclosure of the registered IP addresses of users responsible for over 100 postings in April 2007, but in most cases that information did not enable S to discover the identities of those responsible. He applied to the judge for disclosure of the IP addresses of the users at the times when their postings were made (an order which was not opposed in principle since disclosure of the identity of the users had already been ordered by Gray J), and for the disclosure of the IP addresses of those responsible for a further 150 postings. He appealed from the decision of Mackay J not to order disclosure in respect of the further 150 postings. Whether the judge had wrongly refused to make an order for disclosure of the identities of the users responsible for the further postings. Dismissing the appeal: (1) It was unreasonable to expect the judge, in the short time available, to assess without proper guidance each and every alleged instance of defamation, given the volume and incoherence of the material which he had been expected to consider. Accordingly, he had been entitled to refuse to make the order sought. (2) The Appellants inability to pay the Respondents costs would be a factor which could properly be taken into account against him if he made a further application.

Smith v Eric Bush [1990] 1 AC 831

A survey report of the claimants house carried out by the defendant failed to advise on some structural damage to the property which resulted in the chimney breast collapsing. There was no contractual relationship between the claimant and defendant as the mortgage company arranged the survey and the claimant made payment to the mortgage company. The contract between the claimant and the mortgage company contained a clause exempting the surveyor from liability. In considering if such a clause was reasonable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 the court took into account the fact that it was a modest house to be used as the family home and concluded that it was an unreasonable clause and therefore ineffective. The House of Lords held that it might be reasonable for a surveyor to exclude liability if the property was of higher value or to be used for investment or business purposes.

Smith v Leech Brain [1962] 2 QB A widow brought a claim against the defendant under the Fatal Accidents Act for the 405 death of her husband. The defendant employed the husband. As a result of their negligence he incurred a burn to his lip. The lip contained pre-cancerous cells which were triggered by the injury sustained. He died three years later from cancer. Held: The burn was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence and this resulted in the death. The defendant was liable for his death. It was not necessary to show that death by cancer was foreseeable, nor that an ordinary person would not have died from the injury. The egg shell skull rule applies and the defendant must take his victim as he finds him.

Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd

he defendant owned a disused cinema which they purchased with the intention of demolishing it and replacing it with a supermarket. The cinema was last used on 29th May 1976. Littlewoods acquired the building on 31st May 1976. Contractors were present at the cinema until 21st June and thereafter the cinema was empty until the incident on 5th July 1976. The contractors had left the building secure, however, vandals had broke into the building. Littlewoods had not been informed of this and so the building remained unsecured. There was evidence to suggest that further entry by vandals had occurred over the couple of weeks. The fittings inside the building were damaged and debris was thrown. On one occasion a sink had been removed and thrown onto the roof of a billiard hall. There were also two small incidents involving fire. None of this was reported to the police or Littlewoods. On July 5th the vandals broke into the cinema and set fire to it. The fire spread and caused damage to neighbouring properties. The owners of the properties brought an action in negligence claiming that Littlewoods owed them a duty of care to prevent the actions of the vandals. Held: Littlewoods were not liable. Whilst they did owe a duty of care they were not in breach of duty. They were not required to provide 24 hour surveillance and were unaware of the previous incidents. The law is unwilling to impose liability for the deliberate act of a third party see Lamb v Camden London Borough Council [1981] QB 625 but will do so in appropriate cases (Dorset Yacht v Home Office [1970] AC 1004). The general rule relating to omissions is that no liability arises for a pure omissions but there exist exceptions to this where there is a special relationship, an assumption of responsibility, where the defendant is in control of a 3rd party that causes the damage, where the defendant is in control of land or dangerous thing.

South Hetton Coal Company vs North Eastern News Association Limited (1984).

The newspaper in that case had published an article that was strongly critical of the way the plaintiff a colliery owner housed its workers. The company, when suing for libel, had neither stated nor sought to prove that it had suffered any actual damage. It was argued by the paper that a company could have no personal character and that the article had not related to the business of the company. This argument was unanimously rejected. The Court held that, "It is not necessary to prove any particular damage. The jury may give such damages as they think fit, having regard to the conduct of the parties, respectively, and to all the circumstances of the case."

Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd

Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd had a stainless steel factory in Birmingham, which obtained its electricity by a direct cable from the power station. Martin & Co Ltd were doing work on the ground with an excavator and negligently damaged that cable. As a consequence, the factory was deprived of electricity for 15 hours which has caused physical damage to the factorys furnaces and metal, lost profit on the damaged metal and lost profit on the metal that was not melted during the time the electricity was off. Spartan Steel claimed all the three heads of damage. The Court of Appeal, consisting of Lord Denning MR, Edmund-Davies LJ and Lawton LJ delivered a majority judgment (Edmund-Davies LJ dissenting), that the Spartan Steel could only recover the damages to their furnaces, the metal they had to discard and the profit lost on the discarded metal. They could not recover the profits lost due to the factory not being operational for 15 hours. Their main reasoning for this was that while the damage to the metal was "physical damage" and the lost profits on the metal was "directly consequential" upon it, the profits lost due to the blackout constituted "pure economic loss". Although the majority seemed to agree that Martin & Co Ltd owed the Spartan Steel a duty of care and the damage was not too remote since it was foreseeable, they declined to allow the recovery of pure economic loss for policy reasons outlined by Lord Denning in his leading judgment: Statutory utility providers are never liable for damages caused by their negligence. A blackout is a common hazard and a risk which everyone can be expected to tolerate from time to time. If claims for pure economic loss in such cases were allowed, it might lead to countless claims, some of which may be spurious (the "floodgates" argument). It would be unfair to place the entire weight of many comparatively small losses upon the shoulders of one person in such cases. The law does not leave the claimant without remedy by allowing him to recover the economic losses that are directly consequential upon physical damage.

Spring v. Guardian Assurance PLC.

In this case the claimant had been employed by an insurance firm and when it was discovered that he was planning to leave and join a rival firm he was dismissed. When the rival firm asked for a reference, the former employer stated that the employee had deliberately mis-sold insurance policies to clients, had acted dishonestly and had creamed off the most profitable business for himself, and had been dismissed as a result. Due to this unfavourable and inaccurate reference the employee was not only unable to get a job for several years but was also struck off the insurance industry register. Initially the Court of Appeal overruled the precedent set in Lawton, but the case was then appealed again to the House of Lords which took a very different view.

St Annes Well Brewery Co v Roberts 1929

Where the nuisance existed before the occupier acquired the property he will be liable if it can be proved that he knew or ought to have known of its existence

St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping The claimant owned a manor house with 1300 acres of land which was situated a [1865] UKHL J81 House of Lords short distance from the defendants copper smelting business. He brought a nuisance action against the defendant in respect of damage caused by the smelting works to their crops, trees and foliage. There were several industrial businesses in the locality including and alkali works. The defendant argued that the use of property was reasonable given the locality and the smelting works existed before the claimant purchased the property. Held Where there is physical damage to property, the locality principle has no relevance. It is no defence that the claimant came to the nuisance

Stansbie v Troman

[Tort - negligence - duty of care - created by contract] D decorator was left alone on the premises by the householder's wife. During her absence, he left the house to obtain wall-paper. He failed to secure the behind him. During the his absence a thief entered the house and stole property. Held: 1. A duty of care was created by the contractual relationship. 2. It was a breach of that duty to leave the front door insecure 3. As a direct result of that breach of duty that the theft occurred. C won

Steel & Morris v McDonalds: Steel The applicants were sued by McDonalds after handing out a six-page leaflet & Morris v United Kingdom containing allegations damaging allegations about the company, entitled "What's Wrong with McDonalds". At trial (the longest in English legal history, at 313 days), Mr Justice Bell found for McDonalds and awarded them 60,000 in damages (reduced to 40,000 on appeal), although he did find some of the allegations made by the Defendants to be true. The applicants appealed to the ECHR. (1) Whether the unavailability of legal aid for defamation meant that the applicants had been denied their rights to a fair trial under Art 6; (2) Whether the proceedings and their outcome infringed Art 10. Finding violations of Art 6 and Art 10: (1) Denial of legal aid deprived the applicants of the opportunity to present their case effectively before the court - central to the concept of a fair trial. States are free to decide how litigants are guaranteed this right. Legal aid is one means. Whether it is necessary depends on the facts of the individual case. The applicants were defending their right to freedom of expression, the financial consequences to them were great and the case was highly complex, both factually and legally. The disparity of legal assistance gave rise to unfairness. (2) The allegations constituted political expression, requiring a high level of protection. It was not incompatible with Art 10 to allow companies to sue for defamation. Nor was the incidence of the burden of proof itself an infringement. However, balancing the procedural unfairness, inequality of arms and the means of the applicants, the damages award was a disproportionate infringement of Art 10.

Stevenson v Nationwide Building Society (1984) 272 EG 663

The purchaser bought a property spanning a small river. The lenders valuer disclaimed any liabillity to the buyer, and a structural report was offered for an additional charge. The property was not sound. Held: The valuation was negligent, and the defendant lender would be vicariously liable unless liability had been excluded. In the absence of some other estoppel, the exclusion term had to pass the test of reasonableness under the Act. Given that the purchaser was himself an estate agent and properly experienced in such matters, the exclusion clause was reasonable. Similar to Smith V Bush. But buyer was estate agent and was held by the court to have 'trade knowledge'. Therefore the disclaimer used by the cheaper surveyor they chose to use was held to be reasonable Contract of service; employer-employee-relationship: the employer says what and how to do it. Contract of services: the employer says what to do; independent contractor. 'Business integration test'. Problem: is the person fully integrated or only an accessory? Lord Denning brought up this question, but he was not the only one who found it relevant.

Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison v. McDonald 1952

Storey v. Ashton 1869

A driver took a different route to make a frolic of his own. On this way he caused an accident because of his negligence. No liability of the company. Though this was just a little detour, the driver was carrying out his own business.

Sturges v Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch The defendant ran a confectionary shop which operated a noisy pestle and mortar. It D 852 Court of Appeal had done so for over 20 years but had no neighbouring property so there were no complaints as to its use. The claimant then built a consulting room for his practice as a physician adjacent to the defendants noisy shop. The claimant brought an action in nuisance to obtain an injunction to prevent the continuance of the noise. The defendant, relying on the Prescription Act, argued that he had obtained the right to be noisy by operating the noisy pestle for over twenty years. Held: The use of land prior to the construction of the consulting room was not preventable or actionable and therefore it was not capable of founding a prescription right.

Tate & Lyle v Greater London Council [1983] 2 AC 509

Tate & Lyle operated a sugar refinery on the bank of the river Thames. They had a jetty from which raw sugar would be offloaded from barges and refined sugar would be taken. The sugar would be taken be larger vessels and then transferred to smaller barges to enable them to get to through the shallow waters. As part of development Tate & Lyle wished to construct a new jetty and dredge the water to accommodate the larger vessels. At the same time the GLC was constructing new ferry terminals. The design of the ferry terminals was such that that it caused siltation of the channels. After using the channels for a short while, Tate & Lyles larger vessels were no longer able to use them. Further dredging at the cost of 540,000 was required to make the channel and jetties usable by the vessels. Tate & Lyle brought an action in negligence and nuisance to recover the cost of te extra dredging. Held: The claim in negligence and private nuisance failed since they did not possess any private rights which enabled them to insist on any particular depth of water. The claim succeeded in public nuisance since the interference caused by the ferry terminals affected public navigation rights. Tate & Lyle suffered particular damage as a result of this interference.

Tetley v Chitty 1986 1 All ER 663 A council allowed a go-kart club to use their land for a race track. Nearby residents brought an action in nuisance. The council were held liable for authorising the activities of the go-kart club. The noise was an ordinary and necessary incident to gokart racing which was the purpose for which the permission to use the land was granted. The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] The defendant's vessel, The Wagon Mound, leaked furnace oil at a Wharf in Sydney AC 388 House of Lords Harbour. Some cotton debris became embroiled in the oil and sparks from some welding works ignited the oil. The fire spread rapidly causing destruction of some boats and the wharf. Held: Re Polemis should no longer be regarded as good law. A test of remoteness of damage was substituted for the direct consequence test. The test is whether the damage is of a kind that was foreseeable. If a foreseeable type of damage is present, the defendant is liable for the full extent of the damage, no matter whether the extent of damage was foreseeable.

The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] AC 388 House of Lords

The defendant's vessel, The Wagon Mound, leaked furnace oil at a Wharf in Sydney Harbour. Some cotton debris became embroiled in the oil and sparks from some welding works ignited the oil. The fire spread rapidly causing destruction of some boats and the wharf. Held: Re Polemis should no longer be regarded as good law. A test of remoteness of damage was substituted for the direct consequence test. The test is whether the damage is of a kind that was foreseeable. If a foreseeable type of damage is present, the defendant is liable for the full extent of the damage, no matter whether the extent of damage was foreseeable. A husband opened a letter which defamed his wife. It was held that the defamation had been published to the husband as it natural and probable that the husband would open it. The court held that evidence that the defendant was actuated by malice would defeat the defence of fair comment, notwithstanding that in all other aspects the comment may be considered fair. It is for the claimant to adduce such evidence. Was an action on a libel published in a letter which the bearer, who had no authority to do so, happened to open, and that case shows that a man is responsible for the publication which has arisen through the curiosity of a person into whose hands the letter happens to pass. Belief that a third person might open it is evidence to go to the jury of intended publication: Delacroix v Thevenot; Gomersall v Davies. A letter not sealed or fastened up is analogous to a post-card, and a post-card is a publication to every one through whose hands it passes. M had granted P a right of way over a passage for all purposes over his land for the purpose of getting to and from Ps Inn. Ms tenants obstructed the passage so that potential customers could not get to the Inn operated by Ps tenant. An injunction was granted against all of the parties causing the obstruction. There was an argument that the words for all purposes meant that the claimed easement did not benefit any specific land and so was invalid. This argument was rejected: the words clearly meant for all purposes connected with the use of Ps land. Tolley was a well-known amateur golfer. During the 1920s if an amateur golfer entered into a commercial contract for benefit, that could harm the reputation and status of the golfer. Fry, without the consent of Tolley, had used a caricature of Tolley in several advertisements in order to promote chocolates. At first instance the judge held that this was capable of being libellous leaving the actual decision to a jury. This body found in favour of the claimant and awarded damages. The Court of Appeal found that the advertisement was not capable of producing libellous effects. To their mind, the case should not have been brought before a jury. They reversed the judges decision and dismissed the action. The House of Lords, in a decision of four against one, restored the original decision in favour of the claimant but ordered a new trial concerning the level of compensation. Viscount Hailsham delivered the major opinion: An action of libel would succeed if the publication complained of produced at least some of the meanings attributed to it in the innuendo, and those meanings were defamatory. Libel is a possible remedy against unwanted character advertising, if some further element of an individuals reputation, such as status as an amateur golfer, were endangered. The case also shows the limits of this action as mere vulgarities are non-actionable.

Theaker v Richardson [1962] 1 WLR 151, Thomas v Bradbury, Agnew and Co Ltd and another [1906]

Thorley v Lord Kerry

Thorpe v Brumfitt ((1872 73) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 650, CA (Eng))

Tolley v Fry

Tomlinson v Congleton Borough The defendant owned Brereton Heath Country Park. It had previously been a sand Council [2003] 3 WLR 705 House quarry and they transformed it in to a country park and opened it up for public use. of Lords The defendants had created a lake on the park which was surrounded by sandy banks. In the hot weather many visitors came to the park. Swimming was not permitted in the lake and notices were posted at the entrance saying Dangerous water. No swimming. However despite this, many people did use the lake for swimming. Rangers were employed and on occasions sought to prevent swimming but some of the visitors would be rude to the rangers attempts to prevent them and many continued to swim. The claimant was injured when he dived into shallow water and broke his neck. At the Court of Appeal it was held that he was a trespasser despite the repeated trespass and inadequate steps to prevent him swimming. They also stated that the warning signs may have acted as an allurement to macho young men. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that since the introduction of the Occupiers Liability Act 1984, the courts should not strain to imply a licence. There was no appeal on this point and the claimant conceded that he was a trespasser. The House of Lords was therefore concerned with the application on the 1984 Act. The Court of Appeal had held that the council were liable but reduced the damages by 2/3 under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. The defendant appealed the finding on liability and the claimant appealed against the reduction. House of Lords held: The Council were not liable. No risk arose from the state of the premises as required under s.1(1)(a) Occupiers Liability Act 1984. The risk arose from the claimants own action. He was a person of full capacity who voluntarily and without pressure or inducement engaged in an activity which had an inherent risk. Even if there was a risk form the state of the premises, the risk was not one against which the council would reasonably be expected to offer the claimant some protection under s.1(3)(C). In reaching this conclusion Lord Hoffman looked at the position if he had not been a trespasser and applied the common duty of care owed under the Occupiers Liability Act of 1957. He was of the opinion that there was no duty to warn or take steps to prevent-the claimant from diving as the dangers [Tort - negligence - duty of care - omissions actions of third parties] D, a bus company left a mini-bus parked in a public place with the keys in the ignition, the bus was stolen, and, in the course of the theft, was involved in an accident in which a woman cyclist was killed. C, her husband (and daughter) brought an action against the bus company for negligence. The vehicle was left at a changeover point that normally took 8 minutes, on this occasion it rested there for nine hours. Held: The bus company may have been negligent to leave the bus with the keys in, in an easily accessible place, they could not be held responsible for the accident as it had occurred through the voluntary act of a third party over whom they had no control C lost

Topp v London Country Bus (South West) Ltd

Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1 House of Lords

The defendant council were responsible for the maintenance of the pipe work supplying water to a block of flats. A leak developed which was undetected for some time. The water collected at an embankment which housed the claimants high pressure gas main. The water caused the embankment to collapse and left the gas main exposed and unsupported. This was a serious and immediate risk and the claimant took action to avoid the potential danger. They then sought to recover the cost of the remedial works under the principle established in Rylands v Fletcher. Held: The defendant was not liable. The councils use of land was not a non-natural use. Lord Bingham: I think it clear that ordinary user is a preferable test to natural user, making it clear that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is engaged only where the defendant's use is shown to be extraordinary and unusual. This is not a test to be inflexibly applied: a use may be extraordinary and unusual at one time or in one place but not so at another time or in another place.

Tremain v Pike [1969] 1 WLR 1556

The farm labourer contracted leptosporosis from handling materials on which rats had urinated. Held: The defendant was not liable. It was not known at the time that leptosporosis could be transmitted in this way. Whilst it was foreseeable he may contract the disease by a rat bite the way he contracted the disease was not foreseeable.

Urbanski v Patel

Facts Patel, a surgeon, removed the only kidney of Shirley Firman believing that it was an ovarian cyst. As a result, she had to be placed on dialysis until she could find a kidney. Urbanski, Shirley's father, tried to donate his kidney to her, but it was rejected. Urbanski brought an action for the losses he experienced from the removal of his kidney. Issue Is donating a kidney a reasonable action attempting to protect his daughter from the harms of the doctor's negligence? Decision Judgment for the plaintiffs. Reasons Wilson found that in the medical world, the donating of a kidney is accepted as a usual solution to a problem of this type. As a result, Urbanski was acting perfectly reasonably. This case, therefore, follows the ratio of Haynes v Harwood and Urbanski was entitled to recover.

Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2002] 1 WLR 218 Court of Appeal

The Claimant was a known offender and had a string of convictions. He was seriously injured when he jumped out of a second floor window having just been arrested. The police were aware that he was likely to escape and had done so on several previous occasions. They were also aware that such activity was dangerous but did nothing to prevent him from jumping. The Claimant suffered a fractured skull, brain damage and tetraplegia which rendered him totally dependent on others for support. He brought an action against the police arguing that having arrested him, they owed him a duty of care to prevent him injuring himself. The Defendant denied owing a duty of care and also raised the defence of ex turpi causa in that it was a criminal offence for an arrested person to abscond. The trial judge held that ex turpi causa excluded the imposition of a duty of care. The Claimant appealed. Held: 2:1 The appeal was dismissed. Sir Murray Stuart-Smith identified four principles relating to the maxim ex turpi causa: 1. The operation of the principle arises where the claimant's claim is founded upon his own criminal or immoral act. The facts which give rise to the claim must be inextricably linked with the criminal activity. It is not sufficient if the criminal activity merely gives occasion for tortious conduct of the Defendant. 2. The principle is one of public policy; it is not for the benefit of the Defendant. Since if the principle applies, the cause of action does not arise, the Defendant's conduct is irrelevant. There is no question of proportionality between the conduct of the Claimant and Defendant. 3. In the case of criminal conduct this has to be sufficiently serious to merit the application of the principle. Generally speaking a crime punishable with imprisonment could be expected to qualify. If the offence is criminal, but relatively trivial, it is in any event difficult to see how it could be integral to the claim.

4. referee The Law (Contributory Actfor 1945 is not applicable where the Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ A ofReform an adult rugby matchNegligence) was held liable injuries suffered by players 318 (11 March 2003) during the course of the match. The court found that Rugby was a dangerous game and found that the safety of the players relied on the due enforcement of the rules. The referee owed a duty of care to all players in the match. The referee had failed to comply with particular rules and this was found to be the cause of the Defendants injuries,. W v Essex County Council (1998) [Tort negligence - duty of care no duty situations - statutory duty - duty of care, to HL whom] D, the council placed a known sex offender with foster parents C. Cs children were abused. C made it clear that they were anxious not to put their children at risk by having a known sex abuser in their home, the social worker and D knew that and also knew that the boy placed had already committed an act or acts of sex abuse. The risk was obvious and the abuse happened. Held: It was plainly arguable that there was a duty of care owed to the parents and a breach of that duty by the defendants. C won.

Walters v North Glamorgan NHS The claimants 10-month-old son was in hospital suffering from liver failure which was Trust ([2002] All ER (D)7 (Dec) the result of the defendants admitted negligence in failing to diagnose his condition. CA) The claimant was with her son when he had an epileptic seizure which the defendants doctors told her was very unlikely to have caused any serious damage. The childs condition deteriorated and he was taken by ambulance to another hospital for a liver transplant, followed by the claimant in her car. On arrival she was told that her son had in fact suffered severe brain damage, which she was told on the following day was so severe that he would have no quality of life. She agreed to his life support system being turned off and he died. It was agreed that the claimant had suffered shock and a recognised psychiatric illness, namely pathological grief reaction, as a result of what she had witnessed and experienced over a period of some 36 hours between her sons seizure and his death. Could this be categorised as injury by shock that is sudden appreciation by sight or sound of a horrifying event, which violently agitates the mind? Yes, held the Court of Appeal. A realistic view should be taken of what constitutes the necessary event. In this case there was a seamless tale with an obvious beginning and an equally obvious end. It was played out over a period of 36 hours, which for the claimant was undoubtedly one drawn-out experience. Accordingly, the 36-hour period constituted one entire event, albeit made up of discreet events. It was a short step for the Court to find that such a step was horrifying Warren v Henley's Ltd (1948) Watt v Hertfordshire [1954] 1 WLR 835 Employer not held liable for the assault of the employee because this was an act of personal vengeance and so was outside the course of employment. The claimant was a fireman. A woman had been involved in a traffic accident and was trapped underneath a lorry. This was 200-300 yards away from the fire station. The fire services were called to release the woman. They needed to transport a heavy lorry jack to the scene of the accident. The jack could not go on the fire engine and the normal vehicle for carrying the jack was not available. The fire chief ordered the claimant and other firemen to lift the jack on to the back of a truck. There was no means for securing the jack on the truck and the firemen were instructed to hold it on the short journey. In the event the truck braked and the jack fell onto the claimant's leg causing severe injuries. Held: There was no breach of duty. The emergency of the situation and utility of the defendant's conduct in saving a life outweighed the need to take precautions.

Watt v. Longsdon

Browne sent a letter to D, who worked as a liquidator for the firm. The letter alleged that a maid had been Ps mistress and that he was conducting orgies in his flat. D shared this letter with his boss, and Ps wife. Trial court gave judgment to D on the grounds that they were privileged, court of appeals reversed. Did D have a duty to inform, thus shielding him from liability? Holding: Ds publication was privileged as to his disclosure to his boss, but not to Ps wife. In my view on these facts there was a duty, both from a moral and a material point of view, on Longsdon to communicate the letter to Singer, the chairman of his company, who, apart from questions of present employment, might be asked by Watt for a testimonial to a future employer. However, using the best judgment I can in this difficult matter, I have come to the conclusion that there was not a moral or social duty in Longsdon to make this communication to Mrs. Watt such as to make the occasion privileged. Privilege arises when: A duty to communicate information believed to be true to a person who has a material interest in receiving the information, or An interest in the speaker to be protected by communicating information, if true, relevant to that interest, to a person honestly believed to have a duty to protect that interest, or A common interest in and reciprocal duty in respect of the subject matter of the communication between speaker and recipient. The information came from a very doubtful source, and in my judgment no reasonably right minded person could think it his duty, without obtaining some corroboration of the story, and without first communicating with the plaintiff, to pass on these outrageous charges of marital infidelity of a gross kind, and drunkenness and dishonesty, to the plaintiffs wife

Weiland v Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd (1969)

where the claimant was unable to adjust her bifocals as a result of a neck injury caused by the defendants negligence. She was worried about catching public transport in such a condition and went to her sons office to ask for a lift home. On the way into the office she fell down a flight of stairs and was injured. The claimant was held to have been acting reasonably; the defendant was liable for those injuries. The claimant and her family stayed at a public house, The Golfers Arms in Great Yarmouth, for a holiday. Unfortunately her husband died when he fell down the stairs and hit his head. The stairs were steep and narrow. The handrail stopped two steps from the bottom of the stairs and there was no bulb in the light. The claimant brought an action under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 against the Brewery company, Lacon, which owned the freehold of The Golfers Arms and against the Managers of the Pub, Mr & Mrs Richardson, who occupied the pub as a licensee. Held: Both the Richardsons and Lacon were occupiers for the purposes of the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 and therefore both owed the common duty of care. It is possible to have more than one occupier. The question of whether a particular person is an occupier under the Act is whether they have occupational control. Lacon had only granted a license to the Richardsons and had retained the right to repair which gave them a sufficient degree of control. There is no requirement of physical occupation. However, it was found that Lacon was not in breach of duty since the provision of light bulbs would have been part of the day to day management duties of the Richardsons. Since the Richardsons were not party to the appeal the claimants action failed.

Wheat v Lacon [1966] AC 552

White V Chief Constable Of Yorkshire Police

This case also relates to the Hillsborough disaster. In this instance police officers were seeking compensation on the basis that they had suffered psychiatric illness as a result of rescuing victims after the crush. They claimed that because they were rescuers they should be treated as primary victims'. The distinction between primary victim and secondary victim was made in the Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, where all claimants were secondary victims. In Page v Smith this distinction was further developed. The Court of Appeal in Frost v Chief Constable of Yorkshire Police [1997] 3 WLR 1194 (by a majority) had held that the police officers who were allowed to recover for their psychiatric illness as a result of carrying out their professional duties as rescuers and/or employees at the disastrous Hillsborough football stadium stampede were classifiable as primary victims. The House of Lords however, held that for the purposes of distinction between primary and secondary victims, that rescuers were not in a special position in the law. They could only recover if they were exposed to physical danger as primary victims. Since they were not endangered in the discharge of their service or in rescuing, as employees and/or rescuers, the police officers were only secondary victims. As secondary victims they, like the bystanders or spectators, were not entitled to recover damages for their psychiatric illness.

White v Jones 1995

Facts Two daughters of 78 year old Mr White sued Mr Jones for failing to follow their father's instructions when drawing up his will. Mr White and his daughters had fallen out briefly and he asked the solicitor to cut them out of the will. Before he died they resolved their problems. He asked Mr Jones to change the will again so that 9000 would be given to his daughters. After he died, with the will still the same, the family would not agree to have the settlement changed. The question was whether Mr Jones could be sued instead.

Judgment Lord Goff held with a majority of three to two in the House of Lords that the daughters would be able to claim. Influenced by the idea that solicitors may escape the consequences of not doing their job properly, he said that a special relationship existed between the daughters and the solicitor and that Mr Jones had assumed responsibility towards them. This was so even though there was no contract or fiduciary relationship between them. Whitehouse v. Jordan [1981] 1 All The claimant was a baby who suffered severe brain damage after a difficult birth. The ER 267: defendant, a senior hospital registrar, was supervising delivery in a high-risk pregnancy. After the mother had been in labour for 22 hours, the defendant used forceps to assist the delivery. The Lords found that the doctor's standard of care did not fall below that of a reasonable doctor in the circumstances and so the baby was awarded no compensation. Williams v Natural Life Health The claimants were interested in opening a health food shop in Bristol. They went to a Foods Ltd (1998). health food company for advice as to how successful such a shop might be. They received a report, that had been prepared by the defendant, which said that the shop the claimants were proposing to open should be very successful. This was incorrect, and the defendant should have known that. On the strength of the report, the claimants invested a lot of money in opening a health food shop in Bristol and lost their investment. Held: the claimants could not sue the defendant for compensation for the money they lost relying on his overly optimistic projections as to how well their shop would do.

Willsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988]

A premature baby was given too much oxygen by a junior doctor. The baby suffered from a condition affecting his retina which left him totally blind in one eye and partially sighted in the other. The condition could have been caused by the excess oxygen he had been exposed to or it could have been caused by four other factors unrelated to the oxygen, but related to the premature birth. The trial judge found the Health Athority liable. He applied McGhee v NCB but stated that McGhee had reversed the burden of proof where there was more than one possible causes. The Health Authority appealed. Held: Appeal allowed. The defendant was in breach of duty. A junior doctor owes the same standard of care as a qualified doctor. McGhee did not reverse the burden of proof which always remains on the claimant. Mr English was employed at Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltds colliery at Glencraig from 27 March 1933. He was repairing an airway leading off the Mine Jigger Brae, a main haulage road. Between 1:30pm and 2pm he was going to the pit bottom and the haulage plan was put in motion. He tried to escape through one of the manholes, but was caught by a rake of hutches and crushed between it and the side of the road. His family claimed damages. The company claimed that Mr Englishs own negligence contributed to his death, because he should have told the person in charge of the machinery, or taken an alternative route. House of Lords held unanimously that an employer has a non delegable duty to create a safe system of work. Even if an employer gives that duty to another person, they still remain responsible for workplace safety.

Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English

Woodward v Mayor of Hastings

The defendant school hired cleaners to defrost the ice on the staircase, the claimant was badly injured after slipping on ice on the staircase. The court found that this case was different from Haseldine v Daw because defrosting the stairs did not entail any technical knowledge, it was something that the school could have done themselves, and therefore ensuring that the cleaners had done their jobs properly was not unreasonable to expect of the school authority.

Yianni v Edwin Evans (1982) QB 438

Mr Yianni applied to a building society for a mortgage advance of 12,000 for the purchase of a property. The building society appointed an independent surveyor to undertake a valuation of the property. The surveyor reported that the property was adequate security for the mortgage. Mr Yianni did not see a copy of the report although he paid the fee for the valuation. The building society made the required mortgage advance and the purchase went ahead. It subsequently came to light that the surveyor had failed to detect serious structural defects that rendered the property virtually worthless. Mr Yianni sued the surveyor directly. The judge found the surveyor liable, even though the building society, and not the purchaser, had employed him. The surveyor knew, however, that the advance would be granted only if his report were favourable and that it was unlikely the purchaser would obtain his own survey. The surveyor was therefore held to have a duty to both Yianni and to the building society. Since this decision, lenders have made valuation surveys available to prospective purchasers, thus widening the liability of surveyors. -

Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures (1934) CA

[Law and morality - morality shifting over time] C complained that she could be identified with the character Princess Natasha in the film 'Rasputin, the Mad Monk'. The princess claimed damages on the basis that the film suggested that, by reason of her identification with 'Princess Natasha', she had been seduced by Rasputin. Held: The princess was awarded 25,000 damages. It was contended that if the film indicated any relations between Rasputin and 'Natasha' it indicated a rape of Natasha and not a seduction. Slesser LJ considered the film defamatory whether it suggested rape or seduction: I, for myself, cannot see that from the plaintiffs point of view it matters in the least whether this libel suggests that she has been seduced or ravished. The question whether she is or is not the more or the less moral seems to me immaterial in considering this question whether she has been defamed, and for this reason, that, as has been frequently pointed out in libel, not only is the matter defamatory if it brings the plaintiff into hatred, ridicule, or contempt by reason of some moral discredit on her part, but also if it tends to make the plaintiff be shunned and avoided and that without any moral discredit on her part. It is for that reason that persons who have been alleged to have been insane, or to be suffering from certain disease, and other cases where no direct moral responsibility could be placed upon them, have been held to be entitled to bring an action to protect their reputation and their honour. One may, I think, take judicial notice of the fact that a lady of whom it has been said that she has been ravished, albeit against her will, has suffered in social reputation and in opportunities of receiving respectable consideration from the world. Later he added: 'When this woman is defamed in her sexual purity I do not think that the precise manner in which she has been despoiled of her innocence and virginity is a matter which a jury can properly be asked to consider.

http://sixthformlaw.info/02_cases/mod3a/aqa/_cases_tort_1duty.htm#Hall%20v%20Simons%2 0%282000%29%20HL http://www.e-lawresources.co.uk/Tort-law.php

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Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd and others Derry v Peek (1889) 5 T.L.R. 625 Dillon v Twin State Gas & Electric Co (1932), 85 NH 449, 163 A 111. Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 Dooley -v- Cammell Laird and Co Ltd; 1951 Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Co Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Company [1964] 1 QB 518 Dulieu v White [1901] 2 KB 669 E .Hutton and Co V Jones (1910) AC 20 Edwards v Railways Executive [1952] AC 737 House of Lords Esso Petroleum v Mardon [1976] QB 801 Fairchild v Glenhaven [2002] 3 WLR 89 House of Lords Ferguson v John Dawson & Partners (Contractors) Ltd Ferguson v Welsh [1987] 1 WLR 1553 House of Lords Froom v Butcher [1976] 1 QB 286 Giles v Walker (1890) 24 QBD 656 Glasgow Corporation v Muir (1943), Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd Goldman v Hargrave Goldsmith v Bhoyrul ( 1998) Goodwill -v- British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1996] Greatorex v Greatorex and Others [2000] The Times LR May 5, QBD Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Railway [1917] AC 556 Gregg v Scott Gwilliam v West Hertfordshire Hospital NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 1041 Court of Appeal Haley v London Electricity Board Hall v Simons (2000) HL Harrison v British Railways Board (1981) Harrison v Michelin Tyre Co Ltd [1985] 1 All ER 918. Haseldine v Daw Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146 Heasemans v. Clarity Cleaning 1987 Court of Appeal Heath v Mayor Brighton (1908) Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates [1994] HL Holden v White [1982] 2 All ER 328 Court of Appeal Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468 Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd Horsley v. MacLaren aka the ogopogo case 1971 (Canada) Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750 House of Lords Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837 House of Lords Hunter v Canary Wharf [1998] 1 WLR 434 House of Lords Hunter v. British Coal Corporation [1998] 2 All E.R. 97 Hussain v Lancaster City Council [1999] 2 WLR 1142 Court of Appeal Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell [1965] AC 656 House of Lords James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co

JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks, Bloom & Co [1981] 3 All ER 289 Jebson v Ministry of Defence Jobling v Associated Dairies [1982] AC 794 House of Lords Jobling v Associated Dairies [1982] AC 794 House of Lords Jolley v Sutton [2000] 1 WLR 1082 Jones v Boyce (1816) Jones v Livox Quarries [1952] 2 QB 608 Court of Appeal Junior Books v Veitchi (1983) HL Kemsley -v- Foot [1951] 2 KB 34 Keown v Coventry Healthcare NHS Trust, CA (Civ Div) 2/2/2006 Kirkham v CC Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283 Court of Appeal Knightley v Johns & Ors [1982] 1 WLR 349 Court of Appeal Knupffer v London Express Newspapers [1944] AC 116, Lamb v Camden LBC [1981] 2 All ER 408 Court of Appeal Latimer v AEC [1953] AC 643 Law Society v KPMG Peat Marwick and Others Leakey & Ors v National Trust [1980] QB 485 Court of Appeal Lennon v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Lewis -v- Daily Telegraph Ltd [1963] 1 QB 340 Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. 1862 Lippiatt and Febry -v- South Gloucestershire County Council; CA 31-Mar-1999 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22 Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Ltd. 1957 Lochgelly Iron & Coal v. M'Mullan [1934] AC 1 London Artists v Littler [1962] 2 QB 375 Lowery v Walker [1911] AC 10 House of Lords Luxmoore-May v Messenger May Baverstock (a firm) (1990) CA Malone v Laskey 1907 2 KB 141 Mansfield v Weetabix [1997] EWCA Civ 1352 Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority McFarlane v. E.E. Caledonian Limited [1994] 2 All ER 1 McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [2000] McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 House of Lords McKay v Essex AHA (1982) CA McKew v Holland [1969] 3 All ER 1621 McKinnon Industries v Walker [1951] WN 401 Privy Council McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 McManus v Beckham 2002 McWilliams v Arrol [1962] HL Merivale -v- Carson (1887) 20 QBD 275 Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins & Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd. 1947 Miller v Jackson [1977]3 WLR 20 Court of Appeal Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp MLC v Evatt (1968) 12 CLR 556 Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel & Co Ltd and others Morgan -v- Odhams Press Ltd; HL 1971 Morgans v. Launchbury 1973 House of Lords

Moriarty v Brookes [1834] EWHC Exch J79 Moy -v- Pettman Smith (a firm) and another; HL 3-Feb-2005 Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialties Ltd and Others Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence (1996) CA Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] HL Nettleship v Weston [1971] 3 WLR 370 Newstead v London Express Newspapers (1940) Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298. Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2 ExD 1 Norman v Future Publishing Ogwo v Taylor [1987] 3 WLR 1145 House of Lords Ormrod v. Crossville Motor Service 1953 Owens v Brimmell [1977] QBD Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155 House of Lord Palsgraf v Long Island Railway Co (1928) New York Appeals Paris v Stepney [1951] AC 367 Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust 2001 Perl (Exporters) Ltd v Camden London Borough Council (1984), Perry v Kendricks Transport [1956] WLR 85 Court of Appeal Phillips v William Whiteley Ltd [1938] KBD Phipps v Rochester Corporation [1955] 1 QB 450 Pigney V Pointers Transport Services Ltd (1957) Plato Films -v- Speidel [1961] Prendergast v Sam & Dee Ltd., Kosary, and Miller in 1989 Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes [1959] Rainham Chemical Works v Belvedere Fish Guano Re Polemis & Furness Withy & Company Ltd. [1921] 3 KB 560 Read v Lyons [1947] AC 156 Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] Rees -v- Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust; HL 16-Oct-2003 Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 House of Lords Revill v Newbery [1996] 2 WLR 239 Court of Appeal Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd Riches -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263 Privy Council Robinson v Kilvert (1889) Robinson v Post Office [1974] CA Roe v Minister of Health [1954] CA Rogers v. Whitaker. Australia Roles v Nathan [1963] 1 WLR 1117 Court of Appeal Rose v. Plenty 1976 Court of Appeal Ross v Caunters [1979] ChDiv Megarry VC Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 House of Lords Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 House of Lords Salmon v Seafarer Restaurants [1983] 1WLR 1264 Scott v London and St Katherine Docks (1865) 3 H & C 596

Sedleigh-Denfield v OCallaghan *1940+ AC 880 House of Lords Shakoor v. Situ (t/a Eternal Health Co) [2000] 4 All ER 181 Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors Sim v. Stretch [1936] Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington Glass Ltd Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877) Slipper v British Broadcasting Corporation [1991] 1 QB 283 Smith v ADVFN Plc (CA) Smith v Eric Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 Smith v Leech Brain [1962] 2 QB 405 Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd South Hetton Coal Company vs North Eastern News Association Limited (1984). Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd Spring v. Guardian Assurance PLC. St Annes Well Brewery Co v Roberts 1929 St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping *1865+ UKHL J81 House of Lords Stansbie v Troman Steel & Morris v McDonalds: Steel & Morris v United Kingdom Stevenson v Nationwide Building Society (1984) 272 EG 663 Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison v. McDonald 1952 Storey v. Ashton 1869 Sturges v Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch D 852 Court of Appeal Tate & Lyle v Greater London Council [1983] 2 AC 509 Tetley v Chitty 1986 1 All ER 663 The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] AC 388 House of Lords The Wagon Mound no 1 [1961] AC 388 House of Lords Theaker v Richardson [1962] 1 WLR 151, Thomas v Bradbury, Agnew and Co Ltd and another [1906] Thorley v Lord Kerry Thorpe v Brumfitt ((1872 73) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 650, CA (Eng)) Tolley v Fry Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2003] 3 WLR 705 House of Lords Topp v London Country Bus (South West) Ltd Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 2 AC 1 House of Lords Tremain v Pike [1969] 1 WLR 1556 Urbanski v Patel Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2002] 1 WLR 218 Court of Appeal Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ 318 (11 March 2003) W v Essex County Council (1998) HL Walters v North Glamorgan NHS Trust ([2002] All ER (D)7 (Dec) CA) Warren v Henley's Ltd (1948) Watt v Hertfordshire [1954] 1 WLR 835 Watt v. Longsdon Weiland v Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd (1969) Wheat v Lacon [1966] AC 552 White V Chief Constable Of Yorkshire Police White v Jones 1995

Whitehouse v. Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267: Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd (1998). Willsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English Woodward v Mayor of Hastings Yianni v Edwin Evans (1982) QB 438 Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures (1934) CA