FMEA Handbook
FMEA Handbook
FMEA Handbook
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND
EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(FMEA)
REFERENCE MANUAL
First Edition Issued February, 1993 • Second Edition, February, 1995 • Third Edition, April, 2001
Copyright © 1993, © 1995, © 2001
DaimlerChrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, General Motors Corporation
FOREWORD
1st and 2nd Edition
This reference Manual and Reporting Format was developed by the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) teams at Chrysler, Ford and General Motors, working under the auspices of the Automotive
Division of the American Society for Quality Control (ASQC) and the Automotive Industry Action Group
(AIAG).
The ASQC/AIAG Task Force charter is to standardize the reference manuals, procedures, reporting formats
and technical nomenclature used by Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors in their respective supplier quality
systems. Accordingly, this manual and format, which is approved and endorsed by Chrysler, Ford and
General Motors, should be used by suppliers implementing FMEA techniques into their design/
manufacturing processes.
In the past, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors each had their own guidelines and formats for insuring
supplier FMEA compliance. Differences between these guidelines and formats resulted in additional
demands on supplier resources. To improve upon this situation, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors agreed
to develop, and, through AIAG, distribute this Manual. The work group responsible for the Manual was led
be George Baumgartner of Ford Motor Company.
This Manual provides general guidelines for preparing an FMEA. It does not give specific instructions on
how to arrive at each FMEA entry, a task best left to each FMEA team. This Manual also is not intended to
be a comprehensive FMEA reference source or training document.
While these guidelines are intended to cover all situation normally occurring either in the design phase or
process analysis, there will be questions that arise. These questions should be directed to your customer's
Supplier Quality Assurance (SQA) activity. If you are uncertain as to how to contact the appropriate SQA
activity, the buyer in your customer's Purchasing office can help.
The Task Force gratefully acknowledges: the leadership and commitment of Vice Presidents Thomas T.
Stallkamp at Chrysler, Norman F. Ehlers at Ford, and J. Ignasio Lopez de Arriortua of General Motors; the
assistance of the AIAG in the development, production, and distribution of the Procedure; the guidance of
Task Force principals Russ Jacobs (Chrysler), Steve Walsh (Ford), Dan Reid (General Motors), and Rad
Smith; and the assistance of the ASQC Automotive Division Reading Team. This team, led by Tripp Martin
(Peterson Spring), reviewed the Manual for technical content and accuracy and made valuable
contributions to form and content. Since the Manual was developed to meet specific needs of the
automotive industry, the ASQC voluntary standards process defined by ASQC policies and procedures was
not used in its development.
Additional copies can be ordered from AIAG and/or permission to copy portions of this Procedure for use
within supplier organizations should be obtained from AIAG at 248-358-3003.
FOREWORD
3rd Edition
The FMEA 3rd Edition (QS-9000) is a reference manual to be used by suppliers to DaimlerChrysler, Ford
Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation as a guide to assist them in the development of both
Design and Process FMEAs. This reference manual is intended to clarify questions concerning the techni-
cal development of FMEAs.
This reference manual is consistent with the Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force charter to standard-
ize the reference manuals, procedures, reporting formats and technical nomenclature used by suppliers to
DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation. Accordingly the FMEA, 3rd
Edition Manual is written to provide guidance for the supplier. The manual does not define requirements, it
does provide general guidelines intended to cover situations normally occurring when preparing FMEAs
during the design phase or process analysis phase.
This manual is the technical equivalent of SAE J1739, for Design and Process FMEAs. However, it does
not include an application for Machinery FMEA. Interested parties in Machinery FMEA may refer to SAE
J1739 for a related example.
The Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force would like to thank the following individuals, and their
companies, who have contributed their time and efforts to the development of either this edition of the
FMEA manual or earlier editions.
3rd Edition
Kevin A. Lange - DaimlerChrysler
Steven C. Leggett - General Motors Corporation
Beth Baker - AIAG
Earlier Editions
Howard Riley - DaimlerChrysler Mark T. Wrobbel - DaimlerChrysler
George R. Baumgartner - Ford Motor Company Rebecca French - General Motors
Lawrence R. McCullen - General Motors Mary Ann Raymond - Bosch
Robert A. May - Goodyear William Ireland - Kelsey-Hayes
Tripp Martin - Peterson Spring
In addition, the Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force would like to thank the following individuals from
the SAE J1739 work group who contributed significantly to the technical changes and improvements in this
edition.
This manual is a copyright of DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation, with
all rights reserved. Additional copies may be obtained from AIAG, Southfield, Michigan, by calling 248-358-
3003. Supply chain organizations of DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company or General Motors Corporation
have permission to copy forms used in this manual.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Number
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
What Is an FMEA ............................................................................................................................ 1
Manual Format ................................................................................................................................ 1
FMEA Implementation .................................................................................................................... 2
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 9
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 35
–I–
TABLE OF CONTENTS - continued
Page
Number
APPENDICES
– Il –
– Ill –
GENERAL INFORMATION
Overview This manual introduces the topic of Potential Failure Mode and
Effects Analysis (FMEA) and gives general guidance in the
application of the technique.
Manual Format This reference document presents two types of FMEA: Design
FMEA, and Process FMEA.
–1–
FMEA Implementation Because of the general industry trend to continually improve
products and processes whenever possible, using the FMEA as
a disciplined technique to identify and help minimize potential
concern is as important as ever. Studies of vehicle campaigns
have shown that fully implemented FMEA programs could have
prevented many of the campaigns.
There are three basic cases for which FMEA's are generated,
each with a different scope or focus:
–2–
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SEQUENCE
What - Design
are the How bad Changes
Effect(s)? is it?
- Process
Changes
- Special
What are the Controls
Functions, Features or
–3–
Requirements? - Changes to
Standards,
How often Procedures,
What or Guides
are the does it
What can go wrong? Cause(s)? happen?
- No Function
- Partial/Over/
Degraded
Function
Figure 1. FMEA Process Sequence
- Intermittent
Function How can this be
prevented and
- Unintended detected?
Function
How good is this
method at
detecting it?
It is not appropriate to compare the ratings of one team’s FMEA
with the ratings of another team’s FMEA, even if the product/
process appears to be identical, since each team's environment
is unique and thus the respective individual ratings will be
unique (i.e., the ratings are subjective).
–4–
–5–
–6–
DESIGN FMEA
POTENTIAL
IN
DESIGN
(DESIGN FMEA)
–7–
–8–
DESIGN FMEA
INTRODUCTION
Customer Defined The definition of “Customer” for a Design FMEA is not only the
“End User” but also the design-responsible engineers/teams of
the vehicle or higher-level assemblies, and/or the
manufacturing/process-responsible engineers in activities such
as manufacturing, assembly, and service.
Team Effort During the initial Design FMEA process, the responsible
engineer is expected to directly and actively involve
representatives from all affected areas. These areas of expertise
and responsibility should include but are not limited to
assembly, manufacturing, design, analysis/test, reliability,
materials, quality, service, and suppliers, as well as the design
area responsible for the next higher or lower assembly or
system, sub-assembly, or component. The FMEA should be a
catalyst to stimulate the interchange of ideas between the
functions affected and thus promote a team approach.
–9–
DESIGN FMEA
Unless the responsible engineer is experienced with FMEA and
team facilitation, it is helpful to have an experienced FMEA
facilitator assist the team in its activities.
• Tool access
• Diagnostic capability
• Material classification symbols (for recycling)
– 10 –
DESIGN FMEA
An example block diagram is shown in Appendix C. The block
diagram can also indicate the flow of information, energy, force,
fluid, etc. The object is to understand the deliverables (input) to
the block, the process (function) performed in the block, and the
deliverables (output) from the block.
– 11 –
FMEA Number 1234
1
POTENTIAL
System
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
X Subsystem (DESIGN FMEA) Page 1 of 1
Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops (Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)
8
▲
▲
▲
▲
Item 12 C 13 O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Potential
Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Design Design e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
of Failure
Function s r c v c t N.
10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Front Door L.H. Corroded Deteriorated life of Upper edge of 6 Vehicle general durability 7 294 Add laboratory A Tate-Body Based on test 7 2 2 28
7
H8HX-0000-A interior door leading to: protective wax test veh. T-118 accelerated Engrg results (Test No.
lower door • Unsatisfactory application specified for T-109 corrosion testing 8X 09 30 1481) upper
panels appearance due inner door panels is T-301 edge spec raised
to rust througH too low 125mm
• Ingress to and paint over time
egress from • Impaired function 4 Vehicle general durability 7 196 Add laboratory Combine w/test Test results 7 2 2 28
7
vehicle of interior door Insufficient wax testing- as above accelerated for wax upper (Test No. 1481)
• Occupant hardware thickness specified corrosion testing edge verification show specified
protection thickness is
from weather, adequate. DOE
noise, and Conduct Design A Tate shows 25%
side impact of Experiments Body Engrg variation in
– 12 –
(DOE) on wax 9X 01 15 specified thickness
thickness is acceptable.
SAMPLE
DESIGN FMEA
1) FMEA Number Enter the FMEA document number, which may be used for
tracking.
2) System, Indicate the appropriate level of analysis and enter the name
Subsystem, or and number of the system, subsystem, or component being
Component Name analyzed. The FMEA team members must decide on what
constitutes a system, subsystem, or component for their
and Number specific activities. The actual boundaries that divide a system,
subsystem, and component are arbitrary and must be set by the
FMEA team. Some descriptions are provided below and some
examples are provided in Appendix F.
3) Design Responsibility Enter the OEM, department, and group. Also include the
supplier name, if applicable.
5) Model Year(s)/Program(s) Enter the intended model year(s)/program(s) that will use and/or
be affected by the design being analyzed (if known).
6) Key Date Enter the initial FMEA due date, which should not exceed the
scheduled production design release date.
7) FMEA Date Enter the date the original FMEA was compiled and the latest
revision date.
– 13 –
FMEA Number 1234
1
POTENTIAL
System
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
X Subsystem (DESIGN FMEA) Page 1 of 1
Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops (Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)
8
▲
▲
▲
▲
Item 12 C 13 O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Potential
Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Design Design e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
of Failure
Function s r c v c t N.
10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Front Door L.H. Corroded Deteriorated life of Upper edge of 6 Vehicle general durability 7 294 Add laboratory A Tate-Body Based on test 7 2 2 28
7
H8HX-0000-A interior door leading to: protective wax test veh. T-118 accelerated Engrg results (Test No.
lower door • Unsatisfactory application specified for T-109 corrosion testing 8X 09 30 1481) upper
panels appearance due inner door panels is T-301 edge spec raised
to rust througH too low 125mm
• Ingress to and paint over time
egress from • Impaired function 4 Vehicle general durability 7 196 Add laboratory Combine w/test Test results 7 2 2 28
7
vehicle of interior door Insufficient wax testing- as above accelerated for wax upper (Test No. 1481)
• Occupant hardware thickness specified corrosion testing edge verification show specified
protection thickness is
from weather, adequate. DOE
noise, and Conduct Design A Tate shows 25%
side impact of Experiments Body Engrg variation in
– 14 –
(DOE) on wax 9X 01 15 specified thickness
thickness is acceptable.
SAMPLE
DESIGN FMEA
8) Core Team List the names of the responsible individuals and departments
that have the authority to identify and/or perform tasks. (It is
recommended that each team member's name, department,
telephone number, addresse, etc., be included on a distribution
list.)
9) Item/Function Enter the name and other pertinent information (e.g., the
number, the part class, etc.) of the item being analyzed. Use the
nomenclature and show the design level as indicated on the
engineering drawing. Prior to initial release (e.g., in the
conceptual phases), experimental numbers should be used.
10) Potential Failure Mode Potential failure mode is defined as the manner in which a
component, subsystem, or system could potentially fail to meet
or deliver the intended function described in the item/function
column (i.e., intended function fails). The potential failure mode
may also be the cause of a potential failure mode in a higher-
level subsystem or system, or be the effect of one in a lower-
level component.
Cracked Deformed
Loosened Leaking
Sticking Oxidized
Fractured Does not transmit torque
Slips (does not hold full torque) No support (structural)
Inadequate support (structural) Harsh engagement
Disengages too fast Inadequate signal
Intermittent signal No signal
EMC/RFI Drift
– 15 –
FMEA Number 1234
1
POTENTIAL
System
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
X Subsystem (DESIGN FMEA) Page 1 of 1
Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops (Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)
8
▲
▲
▲
▲
Item 12 C 13 O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Potential
Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Design Design e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
of Failure
Function s r c v c t N.
10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Front Door L.H. Corroded Deteriorated life of Upper edge of 6 Vehicle general durability 7 294 Add laboratory A Tate-Body Based on test 7 2 2 28
7
H8HX-0000-A interior door leading to: protective wax test veh. T-118 accelerated Engrg results (Test No.
lower door • Unsatisfactory application specified for T-109 corrosion testing 8X 09 30 1481) upper
panels appearance due inner door panels is T-301 edge spec raised
to rust througH too low 125mm
• Ingress to and paint over time
egress from • Impaired function 4 Vehicle general durability 7 196 Add laboratory Combine w/test Test results 7 2 2 28
7
vehicle of interior door Insufficient wax testing- as above accelerated for wax upper (Test No. 1481)
• Occupant hardware thickness specified corrosion testing edge verification show specified
protection thickness is
from weather, adequate. DOE
noise, and Conduct Design A Tate shows 25%
side impact of Experiments Body Engrg variation in
– 16 –
(DOE) on wax 9X 01 15 specified thickness
thickness is acceptable.
SAMPLE
DESIGN FMEA
11) Potential Effect(s) of Failure Potential effects of failure are defined as the effects of the failure
mode on the function, as perceived by the customer.
Noise Rough
Erratic Operation Inoperative
Poor Appearance Unpleasant Odor
Unstable Operation Impaired
Intermittent Operation Thermal Event
Leaks Regulatory Non-Compliance
12) Severity (s) Severity is the rank associated with the most serious effect for a
given failure mode. Severity is a relative ranking within the
scope of the individual FMEA. A reduction in the severity
ranking index can be effected only through a design change.
Severity should be estimated using Table 2 as a guideline:
– 17 –
FMEA Number 1234
1
POTENTIAL
System
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
X Subsystem (DESIGN FMEA) Page 1 of 1
Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops (Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)
8
▲
▲
▲
▲
Item 12 C 13 O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Potential
Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Design Design e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
of Failure
Function s r c v c t N.
10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Front Door L.H. Corroded Deteriorated life of Upper edge of 6 Vehicle general durability 7 294 Add laboratory A Tate-Body Based on test 7 2 2 28
7
H8HX-0000-A interior door leading to: protective wax test veh. T-118 accelerated Engrg results (Test No.
lower door • Unsatisfactory application specified for T-109 corrosion testing 8X 09 30 1481) upper
panels appearance due inner door panels is T-301 edge spec raised
to rust througH too low 125mm
• Ingress to and paint over time
egress from • Impaired function 4 Vehicle general durability 7 196 Add laboratory Combine w/test Test results 7 2 2 28
7
vehicle of interior door Insufficient wax testing- as above accelerated for wax upper (Test No. 1481)
• Occupant hardware thickness specified corrosion testing edge verification show specified
protection thickness is
from weather, adequate. DOE
noise, and Conduct Design A Tate shows 25%
side impact of Experiments Body Engrg variation in
– 18 –
(DOE) on wax 9X 01 15 specified thickness
thickness is acceptable.
SAMPLE
DESIGN FMEA
12) Severity (S) (continued)
Table 2. Suggested DFMEA Severity Evaluation Criteria
Hazardous Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle 10
without operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without
warning warning.
Hazardous Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle 9
with warning operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation with warning.
Very High Vehicle/item inoperable (loss of primary function). 8
High Vehicle/item operable but at reduced level of performance. Customer very 7
dissatisfied.
Very Low Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most 4
customers (greater than 75%).
Minor Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50% of 3
customers.
Very Minor Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by discriminat- 2
ing customers (less than 25%).
13) Classification This column may be used to classify any special product
characteristics (e.g., critical, key, major, significant) for
components, subsystems, or systems that may require
additional design or process controls.
– 19 –
FMEA Number 1234
1
POTENTIAL
System
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
X Subsystem (DESIGN FMEA) Page 1 of 1
Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops (Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)
8
▲
▲
▲
▲
Item 12 C 13 O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Potential
Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Design Design e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
of Failure
Function s r c v c t N.
10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Front Door L.H. Corroded Deteriorated life of Upper edge of 6 Vehicle general durability 7 294 Add laboratory A Tate-Body Based on test 7 2 2 28
7
H8HX-0000-A interior door leading to: protective wax test veh. T-118 accelerated Engrg results (Test No.
lower door • Unsatisfactory application specified for T-109 corrosion testing 8X 09 30 1481) upper
panels appearance due inner door panels is T-301 edge spec raised
to rust througH too low 125mm
• Ingress to and paint over time
egress from • Impaired function 4 Vehicle general durability 7 196 Add laboratory Combine w/test Test results 7 2 2 28
7
vehicle of interior door Insufficient wax testing- as above accelerated for wax upper (Test No. 1481)
• Occupant hardware thickness specified corrosion testing edge verification show specified
protection thickness is
from weather, adequate. DOE
noise, and Conduct Design A Tate shows 25%
side impact of Experiments Body Engrg variation in
– 20 –
(DOE) on wax 9X 01 15 specified thickness
thickness is acceptable.
SAMPLE
DESIGN FMEA
14) Potential Cause(s)/ Typical failure causes may include, but are not limited to:
Mechanism(s) of Failure
(continued) Incorrect Material Specified
Inadequate Design Life Assumption
Over-stressing
Insufficient Lubrication Capability
Inadequate Maintenance Instructions
Incorrect Algorithm
Improper Maintenance Instructions
Improper Software Specification
Improper Surface Finish Specification
Inadequate Travel Specification
Improper Friction Material Specified
Excessive Heat
Improper Tolerance Specified
Typical failure mechanisms may include but are not limited to:
Yield Chemical Oxidation
Fatigue Electromigration
Material Instability
Creep
Wear
Corrosion
– 21 –
FMEA Number 1234
1
POTENTIAL
System
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
X Subsystem (DESIGN FMEA) Page 1 of 1
Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops (Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)
8
▲
▲
▲
▲
Item 12 C 13 O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Potential
Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Design Design e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
of Failure
Function s r c v c t N.
10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Front Door L.H. Corroded Deteriorated life of Upper edge of 6 Vehicle general durability 7 294 Add laboratory A Tate-Body Based on test 7 2 2 28
7
H8HX-0000-A interior door leading to: protective wax test veh. T-118 accelerated Engrg results (Test No.
lower door • Unsatisfactory application specified for T-109 corrosion testing 8X 09 30 1481) upper
panels appearance due inner door panels is T-301 edge spec raised
to rust througH too low 125mm
• Ingress to and paint over time
egress from • Impaired function 4 Vehicle general durability 7 196 Add laboratory Combine w/test Test results 7 2 2 28
7
vehicle of interior door Insufficient wax testing- as above accelerated for wax upper (Test No. 1481)
• Occupant hardware thickness specified corrosion testing edge verification show specified
protection thickness is
from weather, adequate. DOE
noise, and Conduct Design A Tate shows 25%
side impact of Experiments Body Engrg variation in
– 22 –
(DOE) on wax 9X 01 15 specified thickness
thickness is acceptable.
SAMPLE
DESIGN FMEA
15) Occurrence (O) A consistent occurrence ranking system should be used to
(continued) ensure continuity. The occurrence ranking number is a relative
rating within the scope of the FMEA and may not reflect the
actual likelihood of occurrence.
16) Current Design Controls List the prevention, design validation/verification (DV), or other
activities that have been completed or committed to and that
will assure the design adequacy for the failure mode and/or
cause/mechanism under consideration. Current controls (e.g.,
design reviews, fail/safe designs such as a pressure relief valve,
mathematical studies, rig/lab testing, feasibility review,
prototype tests, road testing, fleet testing) are those that have
been or are being used with the same or similar designs. The
team should always be focused on improving design controls;
for example, creating new system tests in the lab, or creating
new system modeling algorithms, etc.
Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops (Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)
8
▲
▲
▲
▲
Item 12 C 13 O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Potential
Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Design Design e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
of Failure
Function s r c v c t N.
10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Front Door L.H. Corroded Deteriorated life of Upper edge of 6 Vehicle general durability 7 294 Add laboratory A Tate-Body Based on test 7 2 2 28
7
H8HX-0000-A interior door leading to: protective wax test veh. T-118 accelerated Engrg results (Test No.
lower door • Unsatisfactory application specified for T-109 corrosion testing 8X 09 30 1481) upper
panels appearance due inner door panels is T-301 edge spec raised
to rust througH too low 125mm
• Ingress to and paint over time
egress from • Impaired function 4 Vehicle general durability 7 196 Add laboratory Combine w/test Test results 7 2 2 28
7
vehicle of interior door Insufficient wax testing- as above accelerated for wax upper (Test No. 1481)
• Occupant hardware thickness specified corrosion testing edge verification show specified
protection thickness is
from weather, adequate. DOE
noise, and Conduct Design A Tate shows 25%
side impact of Experiments Body Engrg variation in
– 24 –
(DOE) on wax 9X 01 15 specified thickness
thickness is acceptable.
SAMPLE
DESIGN FMEA
16) Current Design Controls The preferred approach is to first use prevention controls, if
(continued) possible. The initial occurrence rankings will be affected by the
prevention controls provided they are integrated as part of the
design intent. The initial rankings for detection will be based on
design controls that either detect the cause/mechanism of
failure, or detect the failure mode.
The Design FMEA form in this manual has two columns for the
design controls (i.e., separate columns for Prevention Controls
and Detection Controls) to assist the team in clearly
distinguishing between these two types of design controls. This
allows for a quick visual determination that both types of design
controls have been considered. Use of this two-column form is
the preferred approach.
17) Detection (D) Detection is the rank associated with the best detection control
listed in the design control. Detection is a relative ranking,
within the scope of the individual FMEA. In order to achieve a
lower ranking, generally the planned design control (e.g.,
validation, and/or verification activities) has to be improved.
– 25 –
FMEA Number 1234
1
POTENTIAL
System
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
X Subsystem (DESIGN FMEA) Page 1 of 1
Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops (Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)
8
▲
▲
▲
▲
Item 12 C 13 O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Potential
Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Design Design e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
of Failure
Function s r c v c t N.
10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Front Door L.H. Corroded Deteriorated life of Upper edge of 6 Vehicle general durability 7 294 Add laboratory A Tate-Body Based on test 7 2 2 28
7
H8HX-0000-A interior door leading to: protective wax test veh. T-118 accelerated Engrg results (Test No.
lower door • Unsatisfactory application specified for T-109 corrosion testing 8X 09 30 1481) upper
panels appearance due inner door panels is T-301 edge spec raised
to rust througH too low 125mm
• Ingress to and paint over time
egress from • Impaired function 4 Vehicle general durability 7 196 Add laboratory Combine w/test Test results 7 2 2 28
7
vehicle of interior door Insufficient wax testing- as above accelerated for wax upper (Test No. 1481)
• Occupant hardware thickness specified corrosion testing edge verification show specified
protection thickness is
from weather, adequate. DOE
noise, and Conduct Design A Tate shows 25%
side impact of Experiments Body Engrg variation in
– 26 –
(DOE) on wax 9X 01 15 specified thickness
thickness is acceptable.
SAMPLE
DESIGN FMEA
Suggested Evaluation Criteria
The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking
system that is consistent, even if modified for individual product
analysis.
18) Risk Priority Number (RPN) The risk priority number is the product of the severity (S),
occurrence (O), and detection (D) rankings.
– 27 –
FMEA Number 1234
1
POTENTIAL
System
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
X Subsystem (DESIGN FMEA) Page 1 of 1
Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops (Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)
8
▲
▲
▲
▲
Item 12 C 13 O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Potential
Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Design Design e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
of Failure
Function s r c v c t N.
10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Front Door L.H. Corroded Deteriorated life of Upper edge of 6 Vehicle general durability 7 294 Add laboratory A Tate-Body Based on test 7 2 2 28
7
H8HX-0000-A interior door leading to: protective wax test veh. T-118 accelerated Engrg results (Test No.
lower door • Unsatisfactory application specified for T-109 corrosion testing 8X 09 30 1481) upper
panels appearance due inner door panels is T-301 edge spec raised
to rust througH too low 125mm
• Ingress to and paint over time
egress from • Impaired function 4 Vehicle general durability 7 196 Add laboratory Combine w/test Test results 7 2 2 28
7
vehicle of interior door Insufficient wax testing- as above accelerated for wax upper (Test No. 1481)
• Occupant hardware thickness specified corrosion testing edge verification show specified
protection thickness is
from weather, adequate. DOE
noise, and Conduct Design A Tate shows 25%
side impact of Experiments Body Engrg variation in
– 28 –
(DOE) on wax 9X 01 15 specified thickness
thickness is acceptable.
SAMPLE
DESIGN FMEA
19) Recommended Action(s) Engineering assessment for preventive/corrective action should
be first directed at high severity, high RPN, and other items
designated by the team. The intent of any recommended action
is to reduce rankings in the following order: severity,
occurrence, and detection.
Actions such as, but not limited to, the following should be
considered:
20) Responsibility for the Enter the name of organization and individual responsible for
Recommended Action(s) each recommended action and the target completion date.
– 29 –
FMEA Number 1234
1
POTENTIAL
System
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
X Subsystem (DESIGN FMEA) Page 1 of 1
Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops (Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)
8
▲
▲
▲
▲
Item 12 C 13 O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Potential
Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Design Design e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
of Failure
Function s r c v c t N.
10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Front Door L.H. Corroded Deteriorated life of Upper edge of 6 Vehicle general durability 7 294 Add laboratory A Tate-Body Based on test 7 2 2 28
7
H8HX-0000-A interior door leading to: protective wax test veh. T-118 accelerated Engrg results (Test No.
lower door • Unsatisfactory application specified for T-109 corrosion testing 8X 09 30 1481) upper
panels appearance due inner door panels is T-301 edge spec raised
to rust througH too low 125mm
• Ingress to and paint over time
egress from • Impaired function 4 Vehicle general durability 7 196 Add laboratory Combine w/test Test results 7 2 2 28
7
vehicle of interior door Insufficient wax testing- as above accelerated for wax upper (Test No. 1481)
• Occupant hardware thickness specified corrosion testing edge verification show specified
protection thickness is
from weather, adequate. DOE
noise, and Conduct Design A Tate shows 25%
side impact of Experiments Body Engrg variation in
– 30 –
(DOE) on wax 9X 01 15 specified thickness
thickness is acceptable.
door hardware
including
mirror,
hinges, latch
and window Design aid investigation 8 280 Add team Body Engrg & Based on test, 3 7 1 3 21
7 Entrapped air prevents 5
regulator with non-functioning evaluation using Assy Ops additional vent
wax from entering
• Provide proper spray head production spray 8X 11 15 holes provided in
corner/edge access
surface for equipment and affected areas
appearance specified wax
items
- Paint and 4 Drawing evaluation 4 112 Add team Body Engrg & Evaluation 7 1 1 7
7 Insufficient room
soft trim of spray head access evaluation using Assy Ops showed
between panels for
spray head access\ design aid buck 8X 09 15 adequate access
and spray head
SAMPLE
DESIGN FMEA
21) Action(s) Taken After the action has been implemented, enter a brief description
of the actual action and effective date.
22) Action Results After the preventive/corrective action has been identified,
estimate and record the resulting severity, occurrence, and
detection rankings. Calculate and record the resulting RPN. If
no actions are taken, leave the related ranking columns blank.
Follow-Up Actions
The design-responsible engineer is responsible for ensuring that
all actions recommended have been implemented or adequately
addressed. The FMEA is a living document and should always
reflect the latest design level as well as the latest relevant
actions, including those occurring after start of production.
– 31 –
– 32 –
PROCESS FMEA
POTENTIAL
IN
(PROCESS FMEA)
– 33 –
– 34 –
PROCESS FMEA
INTRODUCTION
A Process Potential FMEA is an analytical technique used by a
Manufacturing/Assembly-Responsible Engineer/Team as a
means to ensure that, to the extent possible, potential failure
modes and their associated causes/mechanisms have been
considered and addressed. In its most rigorous form, an FMEA
is a summary of the team’s thoughts (including an analysis of
items that could go wrong based on experience) as a process is
developed. This systematic approach parallels and formalizes
the mental discipline that an engineer normally goes through in
any manufacturing planning process.
Team Effort During the initial development of the Process FMEA, the
responsible engineer is expected to directly and actively involve
representatives from all affected areas. These areas should
include but are not limited to design, assembly, manufacturing,
materials, quality, service, and suppliers, as well as the area
responsible for the next assembly. The Process FMEA should
be a catalyst to stimulate the interchange of ideas between the
areas affected and thus promote a team approach.
– 35 –
FMEA Number 1450
1
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA) Page 1 of 1
▲
▲
▲
▲
Process 12 C 13 Potential O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Function Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Process Process e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s of Failure u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
s r c v c t N.
Requirements 10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Add positive MFG Engrg Stop added,
Manual Insufficient Deteriorated life of Manually inserted 8 Visual check each hour- 5 280 depth stop to 9X 10 15 sprayer checked 7 2 5 70
7
application of wax coverage door leading to: spray head not 1/shift for film thickness sprayer on line
wax inside door over specified • Unsatisfactory inserted far (depth meter) and
surface appearance due enough coverage Automate Mfg Engrg Rejected due to
to rust through spraying 9X 12 15 complexity of
paint over time
different doors
• Impaired function
on same line
of interior doo
hardware 7 Spray heads 5 Test spray pattern at Visual check each hour- 5 175 Use Design of Mfg Engrg Temp and press 7 1 5 35
clogged start-up and after idle 1/shift for film thickness Experiments 9X 10 01 limits were
- Viscosity too periods, and preventive (depth meter) and (DOE) on determined and
To cover inner high maintenance program to coverage viscosity vs. limit controls
door, lower - Temperature clean heads temperature vs. have been
– 36 –
surfaces at too low pressure installed -
minimum wax - Pressure control charts
thickness to too low show process is
retard corrosion in control
Cpk=1.85
7 Spray time 8 Operator instructions and 7 392 Install spray Maintenance Automatic spray 7 1 7 49
insufficient lot sampling (10 doors / timer 9X 09 15 timer installed -
TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA
SAMPLE
PROCESS FMEA
INTRODUCTION (Continued)
The Process FMEA is a living document and should be initiated:
• Before or at the feasibility stage,
• Prior to tooling for production, and
• Take into account all manufacturing operations, from
individual components to assemblies.
The Process FMEA should begin with a flow chart of the general
process. This flow chart should identify the product/process
characteristics associated with each operation. Identification of
some product effects from the corresponding Design FMEA,
should be included, if available. Copies of the flow chart used in
FMEA preparation should accompany the FMEA.
1) FMEA Number Enter the FMEA document number, which may be used for
tracking.
– 37 –
FMEA Number 1450
1
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA) Page 1 of 1
▲
▲
▲
▲
Process 12 C 13 Potential O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Function Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Process Process e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s of Failure u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
s r c v c t N.
Requirements 10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Add positive MFG Engrg Stop added,
Manual Insufficient Deteriorated life of Manually inserted 8 Visual check each hour- 5 280 depth stop to 9X 10 15 sprayer checked 7 2 5 70
7
application of wax coverage door leading to: spray head not 1/shift for film thickness sprayer on line
wax inside door over specified • Unsatisfactory inserted far (depth meter) and
surface appearance due enough coverage Automate Mfg Engrg Rejected due to
to rust through spraying 9X 12 15 complexity of
paint over time
different doors
• Impaired function
on same line
of interior doo
hardware 7 Spray heads 5 Test spray pattern at Visual check each hour- 5 175 Use Design of Mfg Engrg Temp and press 7 1 5 35
clogged start-up and after idle 1/shift for film thickness Experiments 9X 10 01 limits were
- Viscosity too periods, and preventive (depth meter) and (DOE) on determined and
To cover inner high maintenance program to coverage viscosity vs. limit controls
door, lower - Temperature clean heads temperature vs. have been
– 38 –
surfaces at too low pressure installed -
minimum wax - Pressure control charts
thickness to too low show process is
retard corrosion in control
Cpk=1.85
7 Spray time 8 Operator instructions and 7 392 Install spray Maintenance Automatic spray 7 1 7 49
insufficient lot sampling (10 doors / timer 9X 09 15 timer installed -
TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA
SAMPLE
PROCESS FMEA
2) Item Enter the name and number of the system, subsystem, or
component for which the process is being analyzed.
3) Process Responsibility Enter the OEM, department, and group. Also include the
supplier name if known.
5) Model Year(s)/Program(s) Enter the intended model year(s)/program(s) that will use and/or
be affected by the design/process being analyzed (if known).
6) Key Date Enter the initial FMEA due date, which should not exceed the
scheduled start of production date.
7) FMEA Date Enter the date the original FMEA was compiled and the latest
revision date.
8) Core Team List the names of the responsible individuals and departments
that have the authority to identify and/or perform tasks. (It is
recommended that each team member's name, department,
telephone number, addresse, etc., be included on a distribution
list.)
10) Potential Failure Mode Potential failure mode is defined as the manner in which the
process could potentially fail to meet the process requirements
and/or design intent as described in the process function/
requirements column. It is a description of the nonconformance
at that specific operation. It can be a cause associated with a
potential failure mode in a subsequent (downstream) operation
or an effect associated with a potential failure in a previous
(upstream) operation. However, in preparing the FMEA, assume
that the incoming part(s)/material(s) are correct. Exceptions can
be made by the FMEA team where historical data indicate
deficiencies in incoming part quality.
– 39 –
FMEA Number 1450
1
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA) Page 1 of 1
▲
▲
▲
▲
Process 12 C 13 Potential O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Function Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Process Process e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s of Failure u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
s r c v c t N.
Requirements 10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Add positive MFG Engrg Stop added,
Manual Insufficient Deteriorated life of Manually inserted 8 Visual check each hour- 5 280 depth stop to 9X 10 15 sprayer checked 7 2 5 70
7
application of wax coverage door leading to: spray head not 1/shift for film thickness sprayer on line
wax inside door over specified • Unsatisfactory inserted far (depth meter) and
surface appearance due enough coverage Automate Mfg Engrg Rejected due to
to rust through spraying 9X 12 15 complexity of
paint over time
different doors
• Impaired function
on same line
of interior doo
hardware 7 Spray heads 5 Test spray pattern at Visual check each hour- 5 175 Use Design of Mfg Engrg Temp and press 7 1 5 35
clogged start-up and after idle 1/shift for film thickness Experiments 9X 10 01 limits were
- Viscosity too periods, and preventive (depth meter) and (DOE) on determined and
To cover inner high maintenance program to coverage viscosity vs. limit controls
door, lower - Temperature clean heads temperature vs. have been
– 40 –
surfaces at too low pressure installed -
minimum wax - Pressure control charts
thickness to too low show process is
retard corrosion in control
Cpk=1.85
7 Spray time 8 Operator instructions and 7 392 Install spray Maintenance Automatic spray 7 1 7 49
insufficient lot sampling (10 doors / timer 9X 09 15 timer installed -
operator starts
TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA
SAMPLE
PROCESS FMEA
10) Potential Failure Mode pose and answer the following questions:
(continued)
• How can the process/part fail to meet requirements?
• Regardless of engineering specifications, what would a
customer (end user, subsequent operations, or service)
consider objectionable?
Start by comparing similar processes and reviewing customer
(end user and subsequent operation) claims relating to similar
components. In addition, a knowledge of the design intent is
necessary. Typical failure modes could be but are not limited to:
Bent Burred Hole off-location
Cracked Hole too shallow Hole missing
Handling damage Dirty Hole too deep
Surface too rough Deformed Surface too smooth
Open circuited Short circuited Mis-labeled
11) Potential Effect(s) of Potential effects of failure are defined as the effects of the failure
Failure mode on the customer(s).
For the end user, the effects should always be stated in terms of
product or system performance, such as:
Noise Rough
Erratic operation Excessive
Effort Inoperative
Unpleasant odor Unstable
Operation impaired Draft
Intermittent operation Poor appearance
Leaks Vehicle control impaired
Rework/Repairs Customer dissatisfaction
Scrap
12) Severity (S) Severity is the rank associated with the most serious effect for a
given failure mode. Severity is a relative ranking within the
– 41 –
FMEA Number 1450
1
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA) Page 1 of 1
▲
▲
▲
▲
Process 12 C 13 Potential O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Function Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Process Process e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s of Failure u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
s r c v c t N.
Requirements 10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Add positive MFG Engrg Stop added,
Manual Insufficient Deteriorated life of Manually inserted 8 Visual check each hour- 5 280 depth stop to 9X 10 15 sprayer checked 7 2 5 70
7
application of wax coverage door leading to: spray head not 1/shift for film thickness sprayer on line
wax inside door over specified • Unsatisfactory inserted far (depth meter) and
surface appearance due enough coverage Automate Mfg Engrg Rejected due to
to rust through spraying 9X 12 15 complexity of
paint over time
different doors
• Impaired function
on same line
of interior doo
hardware 7 Spray heads 5 Test spray pattern at Visual check each hour- 5 175 Use Design of Mfg Engrg Temp and press 7 1 5 35
clogged start-up and after idle 1/shift for film thickness Experiments 9X 10 01 limits were
- Viscosity too periods, and preventive (depth meter) and (DOE) on determined and
To cover inner high maintenance program to coverage viscosity vs. limit controls
door, lower - Temperature clean heads temperature vs. have been
– 42 –
surfaces at too low pressure installed -
minimum wax - Pressure control charts
thickness to too low show process is
retard corrosion in control
Cpk=1.85
7 Spray time 8 Operator instructions and 7 392 Install spray Maintenance Automatic spray 7 1 7 49
insufficient lot sampling (10 doors / timer 9X 09 15 timer installed -
operator starts
TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA
SAMPLE
PROCESS FMEA
Table 6. Suggested PFMEA Severity Evaluation Criteria
Criteria: Severity of Effect Criteria: Severity of Effect
This ranking results when a This ranking results when a
potential failure mode results in a potential failure mode results in a
final customer and/or a final customer and/or a
manufacturing/assembly plant manufacturing/assembly plant
defect. The final customer should defect. The final customer should
always be considered first. If both always be considered first. If both
occur, use the higher of the two occur, use the higher of the two
severities. severities.
Effect (Customer Effect) (Manufacturing/ Assembly Effect) Ranking
Hazardous Very high severity ranking when a Or may endanger operator (machine 10
without potential failure mode affects safe or assembly) without warning.
warning vehicle operation and/or involves
noncompliance with government
regulation without warning.
Hazardous Very high severity ranking when a Or may endanger operator (machine 9
with warning potential failure mode affects safe or assembly) with warning.
vehicle operation and/or involves
noncompliance with government
regulation with warning.
Very High Vehicle/item inoperable (loss of Or 100% of product may have to be 8
primary function). scrapped, or vehicle/item repaired in
repair department with a repair time
greater than one hour.
High Vehicle/Item operable but at a Or product may have to be sorted 7
reduced level of performance. and a portion (less than 100%)
Customer very dissatisfied. scrapped, or vehicle/item repaired in
repair department with a repair time
between a half-hour and an hour.
Moderate Vehicle/Item operable but Comfort/ Or a portion (less than 100%) of the 6
Convenience item(s) inoperable. product may have to scrapped with
Customer dissatisfied. no sorting, or vehicle/item repaired in
repair department with a repair time
less than a half-hour.
Low Vehicle/Item operable but Comfort/ Or 100% of product may have to be 5
Convenience item(s) operable at a reworked, or vehicle/item repaired off-
reduced level of performance. line but does not go to repair
department.
Very Low Fit and Finish/Squeak and Rattle item Or the product may have to be 4
does not conform. Defect noticed by sorted, with no scrap, and a portion
most customers (greater than 75%). (less than 100%) reworked.
Minor Fit and Finish/Squeak and Rattle item Or a portion (less than 100%) of the 3
does not conform. Defect noticed by product may have to be reworked,
50% of customers. with no scrap, on-line but out-of-sta-
tion.
Very Minor Fit and Finish/Squeak and Rattle item Or a portion (less than 100%) of the 2
does not conform. Defect noticed by product may have to be reworked,
discriminating customers (less than with no scrap, on-line but in-station.
25%).
None No discernible effect. Or slight inconvenience to operation
or operator, or no effect. 1
– 43 –
FMEA Number 1450
1
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA) Page 1 of 1
▲
▲
▲
▲
Process 12 C 13 Potential O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Function Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Process Process e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s of Failure u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
s r c v c t N.
Requirements 10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Add positive MFG Engrg Stop added,
Manual Insufficient Deteriorated life of Manually inserted 8 Visual check each hour- 5 280 depth stop to 9X 10 15 sprayer checked 7 2 5 70
7
application of wax coverage door leading to: spray head not 1/shift for film thickness sprayer on line
wax inside door over specified • Unsatisfactory inserted far (depth meter) and
surface appearance due enough coverage Automate Mfg Engrg Rejected due to
to rust through spraying 9X 12 15 complexity of
paint over time
different doors
• Impaired function
on same line
of interior doo
hardware 7 Spray heads 5 Test spray pattern at Visual check each hour- 5 175 Use Design of Mfg Engrg Temp and press 7 1 5 35
clogged start-up and after idle 1/shift for film thickness Experiments 9X 10 01 limits were
- Viscosity too periods, and preventive (depth meter) and (DOE) on determined and
To cover inner high maintenance program to coverage viscosity vs. limit controls
door, lower - Temperature clean heads temperature vs. have been
– 44 –
surfaces at too low pressure installed -
minimum wax - Pressure control charts
thickness to too low show process is
retard corrosion in control
Cpk=1.85
7 Spray time 8 Operator instructions and 7 392 Install spray Maintenance Automatic spray 7 1 7 49
insufficient lot sampling (10 doors / timer 9X 09 15 timer installed -
operator starts
TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA
SAMPLE
12) Severity (S) (continued) scope of the individual FMEA. A reduction in severity ranking
index can be effected through a design change to system,
subsystem or component, or a redesign of the process.
13) Classification This column may be used to classify any special product or
process characteristics (e.g., critical, key, major, significant) for
components, subsystems, or systems that may require
additional process controls.
14) Potential Cause(s)/ Potential cause of failure is defined as how the failure could
Mechanism(s) of Failure occur, described in terms of something that can be corrected or
can be controlled.
– 45 –
FMEA Number 1450
1
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA) Page 1 of 1
▲
▲
▲
▲
Process 12 C 13 Potential O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Function Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Process Process e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s of Failure u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
s r c v c t N.
Requirements 10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Add positive MFG Engrg Stop added,
Manual Insufficient Deteriorated life of Manually inserted 8 Visual check each hour- 5 280 depth stop to 9X 10 15 sprayer checked 7 2 5 70
7
application of wax coverage door leading to: spray head not 1/shift for film thickness sprayer on line
wax inside door over specified • Unsatisfactory inserted far (depth meter) and
surface appearance due enough coverage Automate Mfg Engrg Rejected due to
to rust through spraying 9X 12 15 complexity of
paint over time
different doors
• Impaired function
on same line
of interior doo
hardware 7 Spray heads 5 Test spray pattern at Visual check each hour- 5 175 Use Design of Mfg Engrg Temp and press 7 1 5 35
clogged start-up and after idle 1/shift for film thickness Experiments 9X 10 01 limits were
- Viscosity too periods, and preventive (depth meter) and (DOE) on determined and
To cover inner high maintenance program to coverage viscosity vs. limit controls
door, lower - Temperature clean heads temperature vs. have been
– 46 –
surfaces at too low pressure installed -
minimum wax - Pressure control charts
thickness to too low show process is
retard corrosion in control
Cpk=1.85
7 Spray time 8 Operator instructions and 7 392 Install spray Maintenance Automatic spray 7 1 7 49
insufficient lot sampling (10 doors / timer 9X 09 15 timer installed -
operator starts
TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA
SAMPLE
PROCESS FMEA
14) Potential Cause(s)/ Inadequate gating/venting
Mechanism(s) of Failure Inadequate or no lubrication
(continued) Part missing or mislocated
Worn locator
Worn tool
Chip on locator
Broken tool
Improper machine setup
Improper programming
– 47 –
FMEA Number 1450
1
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA) Page 1 of 1
▲
▲
▲
▲
Process 12 C 13 Potential O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Function Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Process Process e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s of Failure u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
s r c v c t N.
Requirements 10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Add positive MFG Engrg Stop added,
Manual Insufficient Deteriorated life of Manually inserted 8 Visual check each hour- 5 280 depth stop to 9X 10 15 sprayer checked 7 2 5 70
7
application of wax coverage door leading to: spray head not 1/shift for film thickness sprayer on line
wax inside door over specified • Unsatisfactory inserted far (depth meter) and
surface appearance due enough coverage Automate Mfg Engrg Rejected due to
to rust through spraying 9X 12 15 complexity of
paint over time
different doors
• Impaired function
on same line
of interior doo
hardware 7 Spray heads 5 Test spray pattern at Visual check each hour- 5 175 Use Design of Mfg Engrg Temp and press 7 1 5 35
clogged start-up and after idle 1/shift for film thickness Experiments 9X 10 01 limits were
- Viscosity too periods, and preventive (depth meter) and (DOE) on determined and
To cover inner high maintenance program to coverage viscosity vs. limit controls
door, lower - Temperature clean heads temperature vs. have been
– 48 –
surfaces at too low pressure installed -
minimum wax - Pressure control charts
thickness to too low show process is
retard corrosion in control
Cpk=1.85
7 Spray time 8 Operator instructions and 7 392 Install spray Maintenance Automatic spray 7 1 7 49
insufficient lot sampling (10 doors / timer 9X 09 15 timer installed -
operator starts
TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA
SAMPLE
PROCESS FMEA
Table 7. Suggested PFMEA Occurrence Evaluation Criteria
16) Current Process Current Process Controls are descriptions of the controls that
Controls either prevent to the extent possible the failure mode or cause/
mechanism of failure from occurring, or detect the failure mode
or cause/mechanism of failure should it occur. These controls
can be process controls such as error/mistake proofing,
statistical process control (SPC), or can be post-process
evaluation. The evaluation may occur at the subject operation
or at subsequent operations.
There are two types of Process Controls to consider:
The Process FMEA form in this manual has two columns for the
process controls (i.e., separate columns for Prevention Controls
and Detection Controls) to assist the team in clearly
distinguishing between these two types of process controls.
This allows for a quick visual determination that both types of
process controls have been considered. Use of this two-
column form is the preferred approach.
– 49 –
FMEA Number 1450
1
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA) Page 1 of 1
▲
▲
▲
▲
Process 12 C 13 Potential O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Function Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Process Process e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s of Failure u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
s r c v c t N.
Requirements 10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Add positive MFG Engrg Stop added,
Manual Insufficient Deteriorated life of Manually inserted 8 Visual check each hour- 5 280 depth stop to 9X 10 15 sprayer checked 7 2 5 70
7
application of wax coverage door leading to: spray head not 1/shift for film thickness sprayer on line
wax inside door over specified • Unsatisfactory inserted far (depth meter) and
surface appearance due enough coverage Automate Mfg Engrg Rejected due to
to rust through spraying 9X 12 15 complexity of
paint over time
different doors
• Impaired function
on same line
of interior doo
hardware 7 Spray heads 5 Test spray pattern at Visual check each hour- 5 175 Use Design of Mfg Engrg Temp and press 7 1 5 35
clogged start-up and after idle 1/shift for film thickness Experiments 9X 10 01 limits were
- Viscosity too periods, and preventive (depth meter) and (DOE) on determined and
To cover inner high maintenance program to coverage viscosity vs. limit controls
door, lower - Temperature clean heads temperature vs. have been
– 50 –
surfaces at too low pressure installed -
minimum wax - Pressure control charts
thickness to too low show process is
retard corrosion in control
Cpk=1.85
7 Spray time 8 Operator instructions and 7 392 Install spray Maintenance Automatic spray 7 1 7 49
insufficient lot sampling (10 doors / timer 9X 09 15 timer installed -
operator starts
TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA
SAMPLE
PROCESS FMEA
16) Current Process If a one-column (for process controls) form is used, then the
Controls (continued) following prefixes should be used. For prevention controls,
place a 'P' before each prevention control listed. For detection
controls, place a 'D' before each detection control listed.
17) Detection (D) Detection is the rank associated with the best detection control
listed in the process control column. Detection is a relative
ranking, within the scope of the individual FMEA. In order to
achieve a lower ranking, generally the planned process control
has to be improved.
– 51 –
FMEA Number 1450
1
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA) Page 1 of 1
▲
▲
▲
▲
Process 12 C 13 Potential O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Function Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Process Process e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s of Failure u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
s r c v c t N.
Requirements 10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Add positive MFG Engrg Stop added,
Manual Insufficient Deteriorated life of Manually inserted 8 Visual check each hour- 5 280 depth stop to 9X 10 15 sprayer checked 7 2 5 70
7
application of wax coverage door leading to: spray head not 1/shift for film thickness sprayer on line
wax inside door over specified • Unsatisfactory inserted far (depth meter) and
surface appearance due enough coverage Automate Mfg Engrg Rejected due to
to rust through spraying 9X 12 15 complexity of
paint over time
different doors
• Impaired function
on same line
of interior doo
hardware 7 Spray heads 5 Test spray pattern at Visual check each hour- 5 175 Use Design of Mfg Engrg Temp and press 7 1 5 35
clogged start-up and after idle 1/shift for film thickness Experiments 9X 10 01 limits were
- Viscosity too periods, and preventive (depth meter) and (DOE) on determined and
To cover inner high maintenance program to coverage viscosity vs. limit controls
door, lower - Temperature clean heads temperature vs. have been
– 52 –
surfaces at too low pressure installed -
minimum wax - Pressure control charts
thickness to too low show process is
retard corrosion in control
Cpk=1.85
7 Spray time 8 Operator instructions and 7 392 Install spray Maintenance Automatic spray 7 1 7 49
insufficient lot sampling (10 doors / timer 9X 09 15 timer installed -
operator starts
TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA
SAMPLE
PROCESS FMEA
17) Detection (D) (continued) Suggested Evaluation Criteria
The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking
system that is consistent, even if modified for individual
product analysis. (See Table 8.)
18) Risk Priority Number (RPN) The risk priority number is the product of the severity (S), occur-
rence (O), and detection (D) rankings.
– 53 –
FMEA Number 1450
1
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA) Page 1 of 1
▲
▲
▲
▲
Process 12 C 13 Potential O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Function Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Process Process e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s of Failure u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
s r c v c t N.
Requirements 10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Add positive MFG Engrg Stop added,
Manual Insufficient Deteriorated life of Manually inserted 8 Visual check each hour- 5 280 depth stop to 9X 10 15 sprayer checked 7 2 5 70
7
application of wax coverage door leading to: spray head not 1/shift for film thickness sprayer on line
wax inside door over specified • Unsatisfactory inserted far (depth meter) and
surface appearance due enough coverage Automate Mfg Engrg Rejected due to
to rust through spraying 9X 12 15 complexity of
paint over time
different doors
• Impaired function
on same line
of interior doo
hardware 7 Spray heads 5 Test spray pattern at Visual check each hour- 5 175 Use Design of Mfg Engrg Temp and press 7 1 5 35
clogged start-up and after idle 1/shift for film thickness Experiments 9X 10 01 limits were
- Viscosity too periods, and preventive (depth meter) and (DOE) on determined and
To cover inner high maintenance program to coverage viscosity vs. limit controls
door, lower - Temperature clean heads temperature vs. have been
– 54 –
surfaces at too low pressure installed -
minimum wax - Pressure control charts
thickness to too low show process is
retard corrosion in control
Cpk=1.85
7 Spray time 8 Operator instructions and 7 392 Install spray Maintenance Automatic spray 7 1 7 49
insufficient lot sampling (10 doors / timer 9X 09 15 timer installed -
operator starts
TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA
SAMPLE
PROCESS FMEA
19) Recommended Action(s) Engineering assessment for preventive/corrective action should
be first directed at high severity, high RPN, and other items
designated by the team. The intent of any recommended action
is to reduce rankings in the following order: severity, occur-
rence, and detection.
Actions such as, but not limited to, the following should be
considered:
– 55 –
FMEA Number 1450
1
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA) Page 1 of 1
▲
▲
▲
▲
Process 12 C 13 Potential O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Function Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Process Process e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s of Failure u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
s r c v c t N.
Requirements 10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Add positive MFG Engrg Stop added,
Manual Insufficient Deteriorated life of Manually inserted 8 Visual check each hour- 5 280 depth stop to 9X 10 15 sprayer checked 7 2 5 70
7
application of wax coverage door leading to: spray head not 1/shift for film thickness sprayer on line
wax inside door over specified • Unsatisfactory inserted far (depth meter) and
surface appearance due enough coverage Automate Mfg Engrg Rejected due to
to rust through spraying 9X 12 15 complexity of
paint over time
different doors
• Impaired function
on same line
of interior doo
hardware 7 Spray heads 5 Test spray pattern at Visual check each hour- 5 175 Use Design of Mfg Engrg Temp and press 7 1 5 35
clogged start-up and after idle 1/shift for film thickness Experiments 9X 10 01 limits were
- Viscosity too periods, and preventive (depth meter) and (DOE) on determined and
To cover inner high maintenance program to coverage viscosity vs. limit controls
door, lower - Temperature clean heads temperature vs. have been
– 56 –
surfaces at too low pressure installed -
minimum wax - Pressure control charts
thickness to too low show process is
retard corrosion in control
Cpk=1.85
7 Spray time 8 Operator instructions and 7 392 Install spray Maintenance Automatic spray 7 1 7 49
insufficient lot sampling (10 doors / timer 9X 09 15 timer installed -
operator starts
TABLE 5. PROCESS FMEA
SAMPLE
PROCESS FMEA
20) Responsibility for the Enter the individual responsible for the recommended action,
Recommended Action(s) and the target completion date.
21) Action(s) Taken After the action has been implemented, enter a brief description
of the actual action and effective date.
22) Action Results After the preventive/corrective action has been identified,
estimate and record the resulting severity, occurrence, and
detection rankings. Calculate and record the resulting RPN. If
no actions are taken, leave the related ranking columns blank.
Follow-Up Actions
The process-responsible engineer is responsible for ensuring
that all actions recommended have been implemented or
adequately addressed. The FMEA is a living document and
should always reflect the latest design level as well as the latest
relevant actions, including those occurring after the start of
production.
– 57 –
PROCESS FMEA
– 58 –
APPENDIX A
DESIGN FMEA QUALITY OBJECTIVES
Note: Specific Program Requirements take precedence
2. HIGH RISK FAILURE MODES The FMEA addresses all high risk Failure Modes, as identified by
the FMEA team, with executable Action Plans. All other failure
modes are considered.
5. LESSONS LEARNED The FMEA considers all major “lessons learned” (such as high
warranty, campaigns, etc.) as input to failure mode
identification.
8. TEAM The right people participate as part of the FMEA team through-
out the analysis, and are adequately trained in FMEA methods.
As appropriate, a facilitator should be used.
9. DOCUMENTATION The FMEA document is completely filled out "by the book",
including "Action Taken" and new RPN values.
10. TIME USAGE Time spent by the FMEA team as early as possible is an effec-
tive and efficient use of time, with a value-added result. This
assumes Recommended Actions are identified as required and
the actions are implemented.
– 59 –
APPENDIX B
PROCESS FMEA QUALITY OBJECTIVES
Note: Specific Program Requirements take precedence.
2. HIGH RISK FAILURE MODES The FMEA addresses all high risk Failure Modes, as identified by
the FMEA team, with executable Action Plans. All other failure
modes are considered.
3. CONTROL PLANS The Pre-launch and Production Control Plans consider the
failure modes from the Process FMEA.
4. INTEGRATION The FMEA is integrated and consistent with the Process Flow
Diagram and the Process Control Plan. The Process FMEA
considers the Design FMEA, if available as part of its analysis.
5. LESSONS LEARNED The FMEA considers all major “lessons learned” (such as high
warranty, campaigns, non-conforming product, customer
complaints, etc.) as input to failure mode identification.
9. DOCUMENTATION The FMEA document is completely filled out "by the book",
including "Action Taken" and new RPN values.
10. TIME USAGE Time spent by the FMEA team as early as possible is an
effective and efficient use of time, with a value-added result.
This assumes Recommended Actions are identified as required
and the actions are implemented.
– 60 –
APPENDIX C
DESIGN FMEA BLOCK DIAGRAM EXAMPLE
The example below is a relational block diagram. Other types of block diagrams may be used by the FMEA
Team to clarify the item(s) being considered in their analysis
SWITCH
ON/OFF
C
BULB 3 HOUSING
ASSEMBLY A
D
4 4
1
PLATE SPRING
E BATTERIES
F
+ 5 B 5 -
– 61 –
POTENTIAL FMEA Number
____ System
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
____ Subsystem (DESIGN FMEA) Page of
Model Year(S)/Vehicle(s) _____________________ Key Date _________ FMEA Date (Orig.) _________ (Rev.)
– 62 –
APPENDIX D
STANDARD FORM FOR DESIGN FMEA
POTENTIAL FMEA Number
System
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
Subsystem (DESIGN FMEA) Page of
Core Team
– 63 –
APPENDIX D
STANDARD FORM FOR DESIGN FMEA
FMEA Number 1234
1
POTENTIAL
System
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
X Subsystem (DESIGN FMEA) Page 1 of 1
Core Team T. Fender-Car Product Dev., Childers-Manufacturing, J. Ford-Assy Ops (Dalton, Fraser, Henley Assembly Plants)
8
▲
▲
▲
▲
Item 12 C 13 O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Potential
Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Design Design e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
of Failure
Function s r c v c t N.
10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Front Door L.H. Corroded Deteriorated life of Upper edge of 6 Vehicle general durability 7 294 Add laboratory A Tate-Body Based on test 7 2 2 28
7
H8HX-0000-A interior door leading to: protective wax test veh. T-118 accelerated Engrg results (Test No.
lower door • Unsatisfactory application specified for T-109 corrosion testing 8X 09 30 1481) upper
panels appearance due inner door panels is T-301 edge spec raised
to rust througH too low 125mm
• Ingress to and paint over time
egress from • Impaired function 4 Vehicle general durability 7 196 Add laboratory Combine w/test Test results 7 2 2 28
7
vehicle of interior door Insufficient wax testing- as above accelerated for wax upper (Test No. 1481)
• Occupant hardware thickness specified corrosion testing edge verification show specified
protection thickness is
from weather, adequate. DOE
noise, and Conduct Design A Tate shows 25%
side impact of Experiments Body Engrg variation in
– 64 –
(DOE) on wax 9X 01 15 specified thickness
thickness is acceptable.
and window Design aid investigation 8 280 Add team Body Engrg & Based on test, 3 7 1 3 21
7 Entrapped air prevents 5
regulator with non-functioning evaluation using Assy Ops additional vent
wax from entering
• Provide proper spray head production spray 8X 11 15 holes provided in
corner/edge access
surface for equipment and affected areas
appearance specified wax
items
- Paint and 4 Drawing evaluation 4 112 Add team Body Engrg & Evaluation 7 1 1 7
7 Insufficient room
soft trim of spray head access evaluation using Assy Ops showed
between panels for
spray head access\ design aid buck 8X 09 15 adequate access
and spray head
SAMPLE
Appendix F System FMEA
To help illustrate the meaning of System, Subsystem, and Component FMEA’s, two
examples have been constructed below in Figure F1 (for Interfaces and Interactions)
and in Figure F2 (for Item, Function, and Failure Modes).
Subsystem B
Subsystem A Subsystem C
System
Subsystem D
Environment
The FMEA team is responsible for specifying the scope of its respective FMEA’s. The example in Figure
F1 shows that the team has specified Subsystems A, B, C, and D along with the surrounding environment
as comprising the System that must be considered while completing the System FMEA.
In Figure F1, interfaces between subsystems are shown where Subsystem A touches
(connects with) Subsystem B, B touches C, C touches D, A touches D, and B touches
D. The Environment also touches each of the subsystems listed in Figure F1, which
requires that the ‘Environmental Interfaces’ be considered when completing the
FMEA.
NOTE: Each Subsystem FMEA should have its Interfaces included in its respective
Subsystem FMEA.
In Figure F1, interactions between subsystems can occur among any of the interfacing
systems (e.g., Subsystem A heats up, resulting in Subsystem D and Subsystem B also
gaining heat through the respective interfaces, as well as Subsystem A giving off heat
to the environment). Interactions might also occur among ‘non-contacting’ systems via
transfer through the ‘environment’ (e.g., if the environment is composed of high
humidity and Subsystems A and C are dissimilar metals separated by a non-metal
composing Subsystem B, Subsystems A and C can still have an electrolytic reaction
due to the moisture from the environment). Thus, interactions among non-contacting
subsystems can be relatively difficult to predict but are important and should be
considered.
– 65 –
EXAMPLE 2: Items, Functions, and Failure Modes
Figure F2 (see next page) describes a method of showing the Items, Functions, and Failure Modes in a
‘tree arrangement’ that can assist the team in visualizing the System, Subsystems, and Components.
At the System Level, the descriptions will tend to be much more general than for the Subsystems and
Components (Components will usually have the most specific descriptions).
The ‘tree arrangement’ is arranged as follows for the System, Subsystem, and Components:
ITEM
- FUNCTION 1
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE A
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE B
etc.....
- FUNCTION 2
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE A
POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE B
etc.....
- etc.....
– 66 –
System Level Subsystem Level Component Level
– 67 –
• difficult to pedal • length of frame mounting points
too short
Function:
– provide reliable transportation Handle Bar Assembly Function:
– support frame assembly
Potential Failure Mode(s): production methods (welding)
• chain breaks frequently Front Wheel Assembly
• Tires require frequent Potential Failure Mode(s):
maintenance Rear Wheel Assembly
Function: Lower Front Tube
– provide comfortable Sprocket Assembly
transportation
Lower Rear Tube
Potential Failure Mode(s): Seat Assembly
• seating position is not
comfortable Chain Assembly Sprocket Tube
Item
Process Responsibility __________ Prepared By
– 68 –
APPENDIX G
STANDARD FORM FOR PROCESS FMEA
POTENTIAL FMEA Number
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA) Page of
– 69 –
APPENDIX G
STANDARD FORM FOR PROCESS FMEA
FMEA Number 1450
1
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(PROCESS FMEA) Page 1 of 1
▲
▲
▲
▲
Process 12 C 13 Potential O 15 Current Current 17 D 18 Action Results 22
Function Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Process Process e R. Recommended Responsibility
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Action(s) & Target Actions S O D R.
9 Mode Failure v s of Failure u Prevention Detection e N. Completion Date Taken e c e P.
s r c v c t N.
Requirements 10 11 14 16 16 19 20 21
Add positive MFG Engrg Stop added,
Manual Insufficient Deteriorated life of Manually inserted 8 Visual check each hour- 5 280 depth stop to 9X 10 15 sprayer checked 7 2 5 70
7
application of wax coverage door leading to: spray head not 1/shift for film thickness sprayer on line
wax inside door over specified • Unsatisfactory inserted far (depth meter) and
surface appearance due enough coverage Automate Mfg Engrg Rejected due to
to rust through spraying 9X 12 15 complexity of
paint over time
different doors
• Impaired function
on same line
of interior doo
hardware 7 Spray heads 5 Test spray pattern at Visual check each hour- 5 175 Use Design of Mfg Engrg Temp and press 7 1 5 35
clogged start-up and after idle 1/shift for film thickness Experiments 9X 10 01 limits were
- Viscosity too periods, and preventive (depth meter) and (DOE) on determined and
To cover inner high maintenance program to coverage viscosity vs. limit controls
door, lower - Temperature clean heads temperature vs. have been
– 70 –
surfaces at too low pressure installed -
minimum wax - Pressure control charts
thickness to too low show process is
retard corrosion in control
Cpk=1.85
APPENDIX H
7 Spray time 8 Operator instructions and 7 392 Install spray Maintenance Automatic spray 7 1 7 49
insufficient lot sampling (10 doors / timer 9X 09 15 timer installed -
shift) to check for operator starts
coverage of critical areas spray, timer
controls shut-off
control charts
show process is
in control
Cpk=2.05
SAMPLE
APPENDIX I
SUGGESTED PFMEA OCCURRENCE EVALUATION
CRITERIA WITH Ppk VALUES
Very High: Persistent Failures > 100 per thousand pieces < 0.55 10
50 per thousand pieces ≥ 0.55 9
High: Frequent Failures 20 per thousand pieces ≥ 0.78 8
10 per thousand pieces ≥ 0.86 7
Moderate: Occasional Failures 5 per thousand pieces ≥ 0.94 6
2 per thousand pieces ≥ 1.00 5
1 per thousand pieces ≥ 1.10 4
Low: Relatively Few Failures 0.5 per thousand pieces ≥ 1.20 3
0.1 per thousand pieces ≥ 1.30 2
Remote: Failure is Unlikely < 0.01 per thousand pieces ≥ 1.67 1
Sample Calculation
Sample Calculation to determine Ppk value from a likely failure rate of 5 per thousand pieces.
5
Defect rate = = 0.05 .
1000
0.05
= 0.0025 divided by 2 for out-of-specifications high or low.
2
Using a "Z" table the associated "Z" value is 2.81 for a tail value of 0.0025.
SL - x
1. Z =
σˆ s
where:
x = Average
SL = Specifications
min (SL upper - x, x - SL lower)
2. Ppk =
3σˆ s
3. Replace using Z
Z 2.81
4. Ppk = = = 0.9367 ~
= 0.94
3 3
Note: The above Ppk values are to be used by the FMEA team as guidance to assist in determining an
occurrence ranking when valid statistical data is available. No other use of the above Ppk values
is intended.
– 71 –
Glossary
Control Plans The control plan provides the process monitoring and control
methods that will be used to control characteristics.
Design Life The time period (e.g., cycles, time, mileage) for which the design
is intended to perform its requirements.
Design Validation/Verification (DV) A program intended to ensure that the design meets its
requirements.
Design of Experiments (DOE) Methods that identify factors that affect the mean and variation
with minimum testing/experimentation.
Error/Mistake Proofing Each OEM may have its own unique definition for Error/Mistake
Proofing. Confer with the OEM for the appropriate definition.
Pareto A simple tool that can assist problem solving that involves
ranking all potential problem areas.
Process Change A change in processing concept that could alter the capability of
the process to meet the design requirements or the durability of
the product.
Quality Function Deployment (QFD) A structured method in which customer requirements are
translated into appropriate technical requirements for each
stage of product development and production.
Root Cause The root cause is the reason for the primary non-conformance
and is the item that requires change to achieve permanent
preventive/corrective action.
Special Process Characteristic A special process characteristic (e.g., critical, key, major,
significant) is a process characteristic for which variation must
be controlled to some target value to ensure that variation in a
process or a special product characteristic is maintained to its
target value during manufacturing and assembly.
Special Product Characteristic A special product characteristic (e.g., critical, key, major,
significant) is a product characteristic for which reasonably
anticipated variation could significantly affect a product’s safety
or compliance with governmental standards or regulations, or is
likely to significantly affect customer satisfaction with a product.
– 72 –
– 73 –
– 74 –
Inside Back Cover
Back Cover