Military Review

January - February 2002

72 Situational Leadership

by Major George W. Yeakey, U.S. Army, Retired

This article examines the effect of the recently updated U.S.
Army Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, on situational
leadership theory. It reviews the development of adaptive
leadership models and theory and considers how refinements
in situational leadership theory might affect combat leaders in
today's contemporary operating environment.
Adaptive leadership in today's Army is increasingly important with
technological changes and the force-structure downsizing that all
military services are experiencing. Adaptive leadership is necessary in
today's complex and ambiguous military environment. Technology and
the availability and flow of information contribute to a very fluid
operational situation.1 US Army Field Manual (FM) 22100, Army
Leadership, has added transactional and transformational leadership
styles of directing, participating, and delegating.2 These styles add to
the leader's arsenal of leadership styles that can be used to shape
behavior, emotions, and the organizational climate.
FM 22100 stresses that leaders must be able to adjust their
leadership style to the situation as well as to the people being led.
Leaders are not limited to one style in a given situation and, with the
nature of the battlefield today and tomorrow, being able to adapt
appropriate styles will influence soldiers' success. Techniques from
different styles are used to motivate people and accomplish the
mission. A leader's judgment, intelligence, cultural awareness, and self-
control "play major roles in helping you choose the proper style and
the appropriate techniques for the task at hand."3
The Army has pursued the idea of adaptive leadership since the
formation of the Continental Army. Because organization, control,
discipline, and teamwork were lacking, General George Washington
sought the aid of Baron Frederich von Steuben, a former Prussian staff
officer of Frederick the Great, to write drill movements and regulations
to instill discipline in "an Army of several thousand half starved,
wretched men in rags."4 From the beginning of U.S. military psychology
almost 100 years ago, there has been a preoccupation with predicting
effective military behavior, particularly in leaders. Most of the early
military classification and qualification tests sought to predict behavior
under the common assumption that certain ideal behavior would
inevitably lead to highly desirable performance as a leader.5
Military leaders must make use of the studies and histories of military
units and figures, and not repeat mistakes of the past.6 Leaders should
learn from the past and focus on issues that concern soldiers
simultaneously with mission accomplishment. Leadership effectiveness
cannot be overemphasized in leader development and training,
especially leader effectiveness in combat. Military leadership studies
must focus on military leadership instead of management. Behaviors of
corporate managerial leaders do not correlate directly to the behaviors
of military leaders although the correlation has been assumed in
military leader development programs. Modern military training for
combat leaders tends to stress the managerial functions of the officer
and his abilities to manage materiel and personnel. This managerial
training generally receives greater emphasis than tactics.7
Military leaders are different from leaders in other types of
organizations because they are appointed and not emergent.8 The
military leader's authority to lead derives from the Constitution. If he
cannot pull his followers by force of character, he can push them by
force of law. Military leadership is essentially autocratic and operates in
a wheel rather than an allchannel communication net. The flow of
communication, or essential information, is between the leader and his
subordinates rather than among all the members of his group. The
wheel net, though no doubt gratifying to autocratic leaders, produces
more errors, slower solutions, and reduced gratification to the group
than does the more democratic allchannel net. Effective leaders are
able to adjust communication flow by adapting situationally
appropriate leadership styles.

In light of these considerations, military

leadership has been effective. The military
leader, like any other leader, has two roles:
the task specialist and the social specialist.
His primary concern is to achieve the
group's goal of defeating an enemy in
combat. For such a role, being likable is a
less-important trait than being more active, more intelligent, or better
informed than his followers. As a social specialist, a leader's main
function is preserving good personal relations within the group,
maintaining morale, and keeping the group intact. In a military
environment, the functions of a successful social specialist prevent
mutiny and reduce such symptoms of low morale such as absenteeism,
desertion, malingering, and crime. The social function achieves
cohesion as a team or unit. The ideal military leader combines
excellence as a task specialist with an equal flair for social or heroic
leadership.
Predictors of successful combat leadership include having first-level
leadership experience, time in the unit, unit relationships, job
knowledge, and the concomitant security of knowing the right thing to
do. All these lead to the confidence required to perform well under
threatening conditions.9 Social support is more important for successful
and effective leadership at lower levels than at higher ones. The
characteristics that earmark the effective combat leader may not be
the same as those that identify the appointed leader.10
 T.O. Jacobs contends that battlefield leaders must know the dynamics
of Army rules to meet challenges and produce untried solutions. The
leader must continuously seek alternatives to apply to new situations.
Leaders at lower levels must have more initiative and foresight and
decreased sensitivity to rank differences. This shifts the leader's focus
from who is right to what is right, an adaptive view that relies on
information to meet technical challenges. Leaders all levels must
possess higher technical competence and have the ability to apply that
expertise while maintaining cohesive units.11
Because of stress in the military environment, leaders must generate
high unit cohesion before hostilities begin. Leaders must be able to
operate autonomously, building respect and values for maintaining the
purpose and will of their units in combat. They need greater flexibility
and adaptability to deal with surprise. Units must be able to operate
expediently to meet the challenge of unanticipated events. Flexibility
must be a unit norm and an individual characteristic. Also, units must
have the opportunity to train in unfamiliar situations, to learn from
mistakes, and to learn the process of thorough thinking so that the
initial shock of combat stress does not cause cognitive freezing.
Leaders must have the capacity to create a climate for more junior
leaders that permits rational risk-taking. The climate must foster
training, coaching, and developing subordinate leaders.12 The
increasing level of sophistication in military hardware, tactics, and
techniques require the military leader to empower the subordinate to
take on more complex tasks with fewer resources.13 The leader must be
aware of power and politics, which previously have been a prerequisite
for only the most senior leaders.14
Early opportunities for varied responsibilities support leader
development in the Army, and the Army does this better than any
other institution, especially among junior and noncommissioned
officers (NCOs). However, the private sector left the Army behind in the
use of developmental feedback from peers and subordinates.15
Leaders can improve by combining conceptual training,
developmental feedback, an environment for continuous learning, a
performance appraisal system that attends to both development and
selection, and a system of promoting leaders based on more than
written reports. This combination has proven effective in the private
sector but is deficient in developing military leaders in the field.
To improve leadership, one must define an effective leader. An
effective leader should be someone who exercises transactional
leadership and puts leadership theory into practice.16 There must be a
focus on selecting programs that identify personal leadership traits
related to leader effectiveness. The concept of leadership that most
consistently matches the military ideal seems to emphasize
transformational leadership training.
The common themes of military leadership training are a focus on
contingency leadership principles, followership that precedes
leadership activities, leadership experiences combined with feedback,
and formal classroom training designed to provide the theoretical basis
for leadership experiences. A variety of empirical studies have
demonstrated that transformational leadership augments or
supplements transactional leadership, and training in that area would
be a beneficial addition to leadership training programs.17
Personal traits, attitudes, values, and past experience influence
leadership style and performance. Situational factors and the ability
and motivation of one's followers also influence leadership style and
performance. A leader must correctly assess situational factors and
adapt the most appropriate and effective leadership style for that
situation. A leader must also augment transactional leadership
behavior with transformational behavior to impact his followers
significantly.18
 James Hunt and John Blair describe in their heuristic model the
elements that impact today's military leaders.19 As shown in Figure 1,
the model is designed to promote understanding of the key leadership
characteristics on the future battlefield and the magnitude of their
implications for soldiers, commanders, and for the Army as an
organization. The model includes environmental and organizational
factors (macrocontingency factors); those situational factors specific to
a unit, task and individual (microcontingency factors); and a range of
individual and unit effectiveness outcomes. The model recognizes the
situational variables impacting leaders and their effect on the
battlefield.
Situational Leadership Theory
Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard's Situational Leadership
Theory (SLT) has been used by the military services for years in leader
training and development.20 It includes dynamics of the heuristic model
and addresses the needs of military leaders.21 SLT emphasizes the
combination of task and social specialist, and active situational
leadership versus management.22 SLT also addresses leadership style
and performance issues.23
All military services have based the tenets of leadership on the SLT
leadership model.24 During the 1970s and 1980s, the Army used SLT
and the leadership effectiveness and adaptability description
instruments as leader development tools for organizational
effectiveness staff officers. The U.S. Air Force uses the model in most
of its leadership training for officers and NCOs.
Although Hersey and Blanchard's SLT and Hunt and Blair's heuristic
model have utility in leadership training, David D. Van Fleet and Gary
Yukl warn, "great care should be taken when attempting to generalize
any leadership theory developed for business organizations or military.
To be useful within military organizations, a leadership theory must
have been demonstrated to fit those organizations."25 The same holds
true about generalizing across military organizations, such as drill and
nondrill situations and combat and noncombat situations, as well as
combat and administrative or support units. Other caveats include the
distinction among sea, land, and air services, and unit size or
organizational level. Four military studies—two combat and two
noncombat settings—using a taxonomy of 23 leadershipbehaviors,
revealed that "it was evident that the relative importance of different
leader behaviors depended to a great extent on the nature of the
situation."26 The 1990 FM 22100 contained the principles of SLT and the
situational factors of the leader, the led, the situation, and
communication which indicates the appropriateness of the military
setting for testing SLT and its inclusion as a model in leadership
training.27

SLT was derived from the Life

Cycle Theory of Leadership to
develop a conceptual framework
to pinpoint key situational
variables. It uses as its basic
data a leader's daily perception
and observation of his
environment rather than
research data. The theory was
designed for the prac-titioner's
use.
In SLT, leader/follower relationships are not necessarily hierarchical.
Any reference to leader or follower implies potential leader and
potential follower. The concepts are intended to apply regardless of
attempts to influence a subordinate's behavior, the boss, an associate,
a friend, or relative.
 Current SLT defines maturity as the capacity to set high but
attainable goals (achievement motivation), willingness and ability to
take responsibility, and education and experience of the individual or a
group. These variables of maturity relate only to a specific task to be
performed.28 People are more or less mature in relation to a specific
task, function, or objective that a leader wants to accomplish.
Individuals in the group are not necessarily at the same maturity level.
The differences between education and experience are minimal, with
education being learned in a formal classroom and experience learned
on the job.
Responsibility has dual factors of willingness and ability. There are
four combinations of these two factors: individuals who are neither
willing nor able to take responsibility; individuals who are willing but
not able to take responsibility; individuals who are able but not willing
to take responsibility; and those who are both willing and able to take
responsibility. The highest maturity level is the last combination. In
terms of task-relevant maturity, Hersey and Blanchard emphasize job
maturity as the ability and technical knowledge to do the task and psy-
chological maturity as selfconfidence and self respect. The theory
"focuses on the appropriateness or effectiveness of leadership styles
according to the taskrelevant maturity of the followers."29 Hersey and
Blanchard illustrate this cycle with a bellshaped curve going through
the four leadership quadrants of the effectiveness dimension of the
tridimensional leader effectiveness model.
The situational leadership model rests on two concepts: one, that
leader effectiveness results from using a behavioral style that is
appropriate to the demands of the environment; and two, that leader
effectiveness depends on learning to diagnose that environment.30
Diagnosing the environment is the first of the three competencies of
leadership.32 Adapting to the environment with the appropriate
leadership style and communicating that style to subordinates are the
other two leader competencies.
Environmental variables, except job demands, have two major
components: style and expectations. Style is defined as consistent
behavior the leader uses when working with and through other people,
as perceived by those people. Expectations are defined as the
perceptions of appropriate behavior for one's own role or the roles of
others within the organization. Expectations define what individuals in
organizations should do in various circumstances and how they think
others—supervisors, peers, and followers—should act in their
positions.32
Appropriate leadership style is determined by the leader's
assessment of an individual's maturity level relative to the task at
hand. Once the leader identifies the maturity level, he can identify the
appropriate leadership style (the curve determines the appropriate
leadership style). Fundamental to the theory is the leader's ability to
adjust his style to meet the maturity of the followers. The indication
that the leader is using the appropriate style will be performance or
results.
A major criticism of SLT has been its definition of maturity.33 In more
recent SLT models, follower maturity is replaced with follower
readiness. Like maturity, readiness is defined as the "extent to which a
follower demonstrates the ability and willingness to accomplish a
specific task."34 Other than the change in terminology, the components
of readiness and maturity are basically the same.
In the 1996 edition of Management of Organizational Behavior:
Utilizing Human Resources, the continuum of follower readiness is
expanded to include behavioral indicators of the four readiness
levels.35 This is yet another tool to assess the ability and competence,
or motivation, of followers and offers the leader clues to diagnose the
situation correctly.
 The expanded situational leadership model in Figure 2 shows the
relationship of leader behavior or style to subordinate readiness. The
model also offers pertinent definitions.36 In practical applications of the
model, a leader's number one error is incorrectly diagnosing a person
who is insecure or apprehensive as being unmotivated.37 Willingness is
the combination of confidence, commitment, and motivation. Ability is
the knowledge, experience, and demonstrated skill that the follower
brings to the task and is based on an actual display of ability. Leaders
should not select a leadership style by assuming what the followers
should know.

In situational
leadership, the follower
determines the
appropriate leader
behavior. Situational
leadership attempts to
"improve the odds that
managers will be able to
become effective and
successful leaders."38 A
leader's effectiveness
depends on the person's
or group's readiness
level. In the expanded
situational leadership
model, the leader
diagnoses the level of
readiness, adapts the
appropriate high- probability leadership style, and communicates the
style to influence behavior effectively. The leader helps the follower
grow in readiness by adjusting leadership behavior through the four
styles along the leadership curve. The leader accomplishes this growth
in readiness by reinforcing successive approximations of the desired
behavior. The style is appropriate only as far as the followers are
productive. Change may occur in the maturity level of the follower,
new technology may be introduced in the organization, or a structural
change may occur requiring the leader to move backward on the curve
to provide the appropriate level of support and direction.
The leader makes several decisions in determining the appropriate
leadership style. The first is the objective and the individual or group
activities that the leader wants to influence. The next is determining
the group's readiness level, followed by determining the appropriate
leadership style. The leader then assesses results and reassesses the
accomplishment of objectives and determines if further leadership is
indicated. If there is a gap between expected performance and actual
performance, then additional leadership interventions are in order and
the cycle is repeated. Tasks, readiness, and results are dynamic, and
leadership is a fulltime job.
Various groups and organizations have used SLT for more than 25
years. More than one million leaders receive SLT training annually.
Hersey, Blanch-ard, and Johnson use the research of R.A. Gumpert and
R.K. Hambleton as evidence of SLT's effectiveness.39 The results of that
research support the utility of the managerial development theory in
Gumpert and Hambleton's research. Managers trained in SLT do better
under conditions of change than managers who are not.
Hersey, Blanchard, and Johnson write that the basic principles of the
model have not changed since the theory's inception in the 1960s, and
there is even greater emphasis recently on the task or the activity the
leader is attempting to impact.40 SLT is not as much about leadership
as about meeting follower needs. This task-specific focus of the model
is the primary reason that the followers' maturity gives way to task the
followers' readiness.
Although the model is still evolving and Hersey and Blanchard
continue to collaborate on refining SLT, they went their separate ways
in 1979. Hersey still calls his model SLT, using the concepts and
descriptors discussed here. Blanchard and his associates call their
version of the model SLTII, and they focus more on developing groups
and teams. Maturity and readiness in SLTII are labeled development
(D1, D2, D3, and D4). Those stages of development are orientation,
dissatisfaction, resolution, and production. Individual growth goes from
the enthusiastic beginner, to the disillusioned learner, to the capable
but cautious performer, and finally to the selfdirected achiever.
Leadership styles, which move the followers from the stages of
developing to developed, are directing (S1); coaching (S2); supporting
(S3); and delegating (S4). The principles of SLT are otherwise used the
same in SLTII.41
Military Applications
Hersey and Blanchard's 1969 theory is practical and easy to
understand, but its widespread use calls for indepth empirical testing
to determine its validity as a tool for leaders to impact an organization
and people in the organization. The theory's principles have been
studied in various organizations, from corporations to schools to
churches, but there is little literature on military use. Using a military
sample to test the theory would extend the body of knowledge on SLT
and leadership research in general and test the model using a different
organization.42
In a recent study conducted in a U.S. Army National Guard air assault
battalion, the premises of the theory were supported although
statistical support of the model's primary assertions were not
supported.43 The study tested Hersey and Blanchard's 1996 SLT in a
military population using the instruments developed for the theory.
This study is significant because it uses the military environment to
test SLT by using a research design that incorporates leadership
effectiveness and adaptability descriptions (LEAD) and readiness scale
instruments originally developed for SLT. The design uses the leader
style/subordinate maturity match, outcome measures of performance,
satisfaction with supervision, and job satisfaction. The military
environment provides a clear delineation of relationships between
subordinate and superior relationships where the superior is
responsible for developing subor-dinate's maturity. The study uses a
360-degree evaluation of the perceptions of leader effectiveness and
provides an organizational leadership effectiveness average or
composite that is correlated with the outcome measures.
Feedback on the leader's effectiveness is provided with self, peer,
and subordinate as well as superior evaluations. The military services
use this type of feedback for leader training in academic settings but
not in the field or fleet.
In a study at the U.S. Naval Academy, anonymous feedback provided
to upperclassmen resulted in lower discrepancies between self-ratings
and subordinate ratings of transformational leadership and has
improved subsequent leader performance.44 Leadership performance is
improved through education and experience. Feedback from followers,
peers, and superiors is important to improve leadership performance.45
Leadership effectiveness and its impact on unit morale and cohesion
are assessed in this study as an outcome measure using a job
description index (JDI) and an organizational climate survey. The Army
does not routinely use climate surveys, although it frequently collects
data on equipment and financial readiness. The absence of a parallel
reporting emphasis on the state of the human element relegates that
aspect of combat readiness to a secondary position.46
The data shows that the outcome measures employed indicate that
the leadership is performing effectively and that satisfaction with
supervision, the job, and the organization is high. Leaders considering
the readiness or maturity level of subordinates are employing the
appropriate leadership style. These trends seem to support SLT, but
statistical tests indicate otherwise. Given leadership effectiveness in
this situation, the leaders are unable to adjust their styles to
developmentally improve the readiness of the unit. The predominant
leadership style in the organization is style 2 (sell). The adaptability
score indicates adaptability of leaders to use situationally appropriate
leadership styles. The adaptability score in this example shows that
leaders in this organization do not vary their style appropriately to the
readiness levels of the follower.
Readiness scores indicate a relatively high readiness among
respondents. The score is above the level of R3, defined as a level
where subordinates are able to complete the tasks but are not willing.
Although the best leader style in this situation is S3 (participate), the
probability of success using style S2 (sell) is high while success with S4
(delegate) is not as high.47 The probability of success using S2 with R3
in this example may explain the positive results of outcome measures.
Performance scores indicate a high level of performance
corresponding to the high level of subordinate readiness. The job in
general (JIG) and the JDI, also employed in this study, indicate high job
satisfaction and satisfaction with leaders. The organizational climate
survey and the strength management and attrition model also indicate
high-profile averages in areas of leadership, to include NCO and officer
leadership, accessibility to leaders, and unit cohesiveness. Time in the
organization, in the same military occupational specialty, and with the
same supervisor contributed to readiness levels and high scores on
satisfaction scales. Respondents were mature and well educated.
Matching subordinate's leadership style with the readiness level the
results in greater leader effectiveness, with a subsequent increase in
the outcome measures of performance and satisfaction.
 Correlations and statistical analyses show support for SLT's
interaction between style and readiness match, and performance but
not with results of the JDI or JIG. The findings of this study verify what
C.F. Fernandez and Robert P. Vecchio concluded in their research on
SLT.48 The statistical techniques used offer little supporting evidence for
situational leadership even using LEAD and the readiness scales
designed for situational leadership.
Implications for Leadership Training
FM 22100 states that "effective leaders are flexible enough to adjust
their leadership style and techniques to the people they lead. Some
subordinates respond best to coaxing, suggestions, or gentle prodding;
others need, and even want at times, the verbal equivalent of a kick in
the pants."49 Where leaders use style S2 (sell), subordinates are
involved in decisionmaking to the extent that they provide information
about the decision. The decision is still the leader's; however, even
subordinates' limited involvement in decisionmaking gives them some
ownership in the decision, raising their level of commitment to it. The
S2 style is appropriate for moderately competent subordinates who
support organizational goals. In this example, the respondents'
readiness level is R3 where subordinates are able but not willing. They
have the knowledge and ability to do the task but are reluctant to
complete it on their own, and feedback in task performance is
solicited.50 When the leadership style is nearly optimal, given
subordinates' readiness, a key is how much better the overall outcome
measures would fare if the leader had greater flexibility to change his
style as the situation allows. The change from a more directive style to
one where the subordinates are selfsufficient is the basis of Army
leadership in developing subordinates. FM 22-100 states that "in order
to get their best performance, you must figure out what your
subordinates need and what they are able to do—even when they don't
know themselves."51 The manual goes on to say that "competent
leaders mix elements of all these styles to match to the place, task and
people involved. . . . If you can use only one leadership style, you're
inflexible and will have difficulty operating in situations where that
style doesn't fit."52

Although the data in this

research does not support the
precepts of SLT, the outcomes of
performance and satisfaction,
given the readiness level of R3,
indicate effectiveness of the
leader in a static style readiness
even though adaptability is low. B.R. Cook finds that U.S. Air Force
officers agree that they have one leadership style and are overly
reliant on that style.53 That style is also predominantly S2. The U.S. Air
Force uses SLT extensively in its leadership training and has most
adequately investigated the model's shortcomings. A 1994 review of
SLT by the Air University Leadership and Management Program
Advisory Group found that, while the general feeling is that the model
is useful, there are some significant limitations. The SLT model does a
good job highlighting the appropriate leadership style based on
follower maturity but does not adequately address other military
considerations. These include the level at which leadership is
exercised; different styles that may be required because of combat
demands; staff versus operational leadership; or differing styles
appropriate to service, joint, or combined leadership.
Leaders may not recognize situations where different leadership
styles are more appropriate or may not have the skills necessary to
apply the appropriate behaviors where delegation or a more directive
style is more effective. The key factor underlying SLT is the ability of
the leader to adjust styles to meet the subordinates' maturity
demands. Whether or not the leader is using the appropriate styles
should be seen in the unit's outcomes.54
FM 22100 incorporates transformational and transactional leadership
styles in addition to the three styles—directing, participating, and
delegating—in the older version.55 The transformational leadership
style focuses on inspiration and change and allows the leader to take
advantage of the skills and knowledge of experienced subordinates.
This style is appropriate for the R3 and R4 readiness levels where
subordinates are the most ready. The transactional style focuses on
rewards and punishments. The leader only evokes shortterm
commitment from subordinates. This style is not developmental,
discourages the subordinates from risktaking or innovation, and is only
marginally appropriate for the R1 readiness level. FM 22100 advocates
combining the two styles or using techniques from the two styles to fit
the situation. The intent of combining styles is the same as a leader's
flexibility in using the appropriate style of leadership.56
Several studies have emphasized the training value of SLT. In the
military environment, the ultimate goal of effective leadership is to
accomplish the mission. Subordinate leaders gain experience,
knowledge, and skills to be accountable for their actions as senior
leaders delegate to them the authority to influence. The leader's
effectiveness based on outcomes similar to this study can assess the
training value of SLT, particularly the effectiveness dimension where
leaders recognize the appropriate leader style to use in different
situations.
At one time, Army recruiters filled manpower needs by focusing on
high school students who dreamed of military service and a free
college education. The Army's operational tempo has increased to the
point that the Army is not meeting its manpower needs, and it cannot
fill short-term needs fast enough by waiting for high school seniors to
graduate. Newly recruited soldiers are being trained and assigned to
operational units within months. With soldiers deployed to 65 different
countries, the challenge of being ready to handle these immense,
continuous worldwide deployments to meet operational and strategic
needs is an Army leadership priority. The military is portrayed as
overworked, underpaid, and underresourced. Reports have suggested
flaws in the Army's leadership as the cause. Leader-development
programs—or the lack thereof—and promotion systems are not up to
the task of getting the right people in the right jobs with the
momentum to effect change.57 The propensity for military service
among young people has dropped, so recruiters pitch enticements that
include sizable bonuses to attract young men and women.
Following the recruiting challenge comes the retention challenge.
Deployment burnout, doing more with less, and the new Army culture's
lack of support for family togetherness has soldiers leaving the Army.
With a strong economy, soldiers who leave the service are not afraid of
being jobless, and a new Army program guarantees positions in major
corporations for recruits who complete their enlistments. Retention is a
morale and cohesion issue, both of which are outcomes of effective
leadership.58
Former U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer stated that
"with the current leadership doctrine and the tradition of leaders who
truly care about soldiers, these challenges can turn into tomorrow's
opportunities."59 Leadership is an essential element of combat power
and cannot be left to chance. Leader development must be carefully
planned and executed just like any other operation. Lieutenant Colonel
Donald M. Craig describes a leader development model consisting of
three pillars: institutional training and education where skills are
acquired as well as knowledge to perform duty position requirements;
operational assignments to refine the leaders' skills, broadening his
knowledge and shaping behavior and skills; and self-develop-ment,
where leaders grow from learning, experience, and personal study.60
This model is an amplified version of Department of the Army Pamphlet
35058, Leader Development for America's Army.61
Important in this leader development process is feedback from peers,
subordinates, and supervisors as well as continuous selfassessment.
The thorough study of other leaders provides leaders a perspective to
analyze effectiveness and to take what works and incorporate it into
their own selfdevelopment process. Critical leader development
includes a thorough understanding of subordinates' strengths,
weaknesses, and professionalgoals. The leader must be aware of his
subordinates' readiness.
Colonel Maureen Leboeuf includes empowerment along with formal
schooling and leadership training in her leader development
philosophy.62 Empowerment is one of the hardest tasks for leaders to
master becauseit means delegating authority. Delegation encourages
leadership growth within the organization. Leaders developing leaders
has always been the Army's leader development philosophy, the basics
of which are learned in oneon one situations or in small groups or
teams. The critical leadership task in combat becomes motivating
soldiers. Motivation includes morale factors, the key to which is unit
cohesion. The Army does not stress the linkage among leadership,
morale, and combat motivation.
 Some of this morale building in a combat environment is done
through communication: informing soldiers during combat of the actual
situation to alleviate fear caused by the unknown.63 Hersey and
Blanchard's 1988 SLT includes leaders using the appropriate leadership
style relative to subordinates' readiness.64 That style gradually moves
to less task and less relationship behaviors as the subordinate is more
willing and able to complete the task. SLT stresses communicating that
leadership style to the subordinate.

To develop subordinates to
become effective leaders and
operate as cohesive teams,
leaders must be adaptable in
their own leadership styles to
move toward participative
leadership, then empower the
subordinate through delegation of authority. The ability to recognize
the importance of the leader being active in developing the
subordinates to an R4 state, where empowerment is practical, is the
utility of the situational leadership model.65
Adding transactional and transformational leadership to directing,
participating, and delegating leadership clarifies SLT in Army
leadership. Transformational leadership is the long-term state of
leadership in Army units where the S4R4 style/readiness match exists.
Transactional leadership is used only short-term in situations where
there is no time to react to other than directive leadership. Examples of
these situations include safety and underfire issues.
Choosing to use directive leadership or delegation involves more
situational factors than the readiness of the subordinates. The
appropriate style changes as the leadership environment changes.
Combat requires more unified and more autocratic leadership. The
interaction between commanders and subordinate leaders is verbal
and informal. On the other hand, the staff leader's style is bureaucratic
and participative, and the interaction between staff members is written
and formal. The level and type of the organization also affect style.
Hersey, Blanchard, and Johnson incorporate SLT in crisis leadership
situations such as combat, staff operations management,
transformational leadership, and performance management.66 They
treat these all as situations where the style of leadership is adapted
appropriately for optimal effectiveness. These authors advocate that
the limitations of the model brought out by the military services are
situational opportunities to apply their theory.
Situational leadership is a popular and widely used model that
emphasizes using more than one leadership style, particularly in
developing subordinates in the military. It assumes that as
subordinates gain training, experience, and guidance, they will be
better prepared to accomplish the goals of the organization with less
leader influence. Eventually, the subordinate will be the leader. It is a
complex model with complex variables. Leadership and leader styles
are concepts that defy definition. Follower readiness is a multifaceted
dimension that is difficult to measure. The situational leadership model
continues to be used in the military services as a training vehicle in
virtually all formal leadership training programs.67MR

1.COL Kent E. Erving and LTC David A. Decker, "Adaptive Leaders and
the Interim Brigade Combat Team, Military Review (September-October
2000), 24.
2.US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership (Washington,
DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], 1999).
3.Ibid., 3-19.
4.FM 22-5, Drill and Ceremony (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986).
5.J.W. Anderson, "The Prediction of Combat Effective Leadership,"
University of Washington Dissertation, Dissertation Abstracts
International, 41-5b, 1968-1969.
6.David D. Van Fleet and Gary A. Yukl, Military Leadership: An
Organizational Perspective (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc., 1986).
7.Anderson.
8.N.F. Dixon, "Leaders of Men," In M. Syrett and C. Hogg, Frontiers of
Leadership: An Essential Reader (Okford, UK: Blackwell, 1976).
9.Anderson.
10.Dixon.
11.T.O. Jacobs, "Intro to Section 4," in R. Gal and A.P. Mangelsdorf,
Handbook of Military Psychology (Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons,
Ltd., 1991).
12.Anderson.
13. A. Lau, "Military Leadership," in C. Cronin, Military Psychology: An
Introduction, (Needham, Heights, MA: Simon and Schuster Custom
Publishing, 1998).
14.Jacobs.
15.Walter F. Ulmer, "Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another
`Bridge Too Far?' " Parameters (Spring 1998), 4.
16.L.E. Atwater and Francis J. Yammarino, Personal Attributes as
Predictors of Superiors' and Subordinates' Perceptions of Military
Academy Leadership, Human Relations (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Inc.,
1993).
17.Lau.
18.Ibid.
19.James G. Hunt and John D. Blair, eds., Leadership on the Future
Battlefield (New York: Pergamon Press Inc., 1985).
20.Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of
Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969).
21.Anderson, Atwater, and Yammarino; Jacobs; Hunt and Blair; Ulmer.
22.Dixon.
23.Lau.
24.Paul Hersey, Kenneth H. Blanchard, and Dewey Johnson,
Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources,
7th Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1996).
25.Van Fleet and Yukl.
26.Ibid., 61.
27.FM 22-100, Military Leadership (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990).
28.Hersey, Blanchard, and Johnson (1996), 161.
29.Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of
Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources, 3d Edition
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977).
30.Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of
Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources, 2d Edition
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972); Hersey and Blanchard
(1969).
31.Hersey, Blanchard, and Johnson (1996)
32.Ibid.
33.L.I. Moore, "The FMI: Dimensions of Follower Maturity," Group and
Organizational Studies, Issue 1, 230.
34.Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard, Management of Organizational
Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources, 4th Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1982); P. Hersey and K. Blanchard, Management of
Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources, 6th Edition
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1993); Hersey and Blanchard
(1988).
35.Hersey, Blanchard, and Johnson (1996).
36.Ibid.
37.Ibid.
38.Ibid., 207.
39.Ibid.; R.A. Gumpert and R.K. Hambleton, "Situational Leadership:
How Xerox Managers Fine-Tune Managerial Style and Task Needs,"
Management Review, Issue 9.
40. Hersey, Blanchard, and Johnson (1996).
41.Ibid.
42.W. Norris and R. Vecchio, "Situational Leadership Theory: A
Replication," Group and Organization Management, Issue 17, 331-2.
43.George W. Yeakey, "Hersey and Blanchard's Situational Leadership
Theory: Military Applications," Doctoral Dissertation, NOVA
Southeastern University, 2000.
44.Atwater and Yammarino.
45.Lau.
46.Ulmer.
47.Hersey, Blanchard, and Johnson (1996).
48.C.F. Fernandez and R.P. Vecchio, "Situational Leadership Theory
Revisited: A Test of an Across-Jobs Perspective," Leadership Quarterly,
Issue 8, 67-84.
49.FM 22-100 (1999), 3-15.
50.Hersey, Blanchard, and Johnson (1996).
51.FM 22-100 (1999), 3-15.
52.Ibid., 3-16.
53.B.R. Cook, "Situational Leadership Styles of Air Force Commanding
Officer," University of La Verne, Doctoral Dissertation, Dissertation
Abstracts International, 53-07A, 2570.
54.FM 22-100 (1990).
55.FM 22-100 (1999).
56.Hersey and Blanchard (1969 and 1974).
57.S.D. Naylor, "Soldiers Blame Low Morale on Poor Leadership," Army
Times, (17 January 2000).
58.MAJ Keith B. Hauk and COL Greg H. Parlier, "Recruiting: Crisis and
Cures," Military Review (May-June 2000), 73.
59.GEN Dennis J. Reimer, "Leadership Doctrine—Turning Challenge into
Opportunity," Military Review (May-June 1999), 3.
60.LTC Donald M. Craig, "Designing a Battalion Leadership
Development Program," Military Review (May-June 1999), 7.
61.Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58, Leader Development for
America's Army (Washington, DC: GPO, 13 October 1994).
62.COL Maureen K. Leboeuf, "Developing a Leadership Philosophy,"
Military Review (May-June 1999), 28.
63.MAJ John M. Spiszer, "Leadership and Combat Motivation: The
Critical Task," Military Review (May June 1999), 66.
64.Hersey and Blanchard (1988).
65.Hersey, Blanchard, and Johnson (1996).
66.Ibid.
67.Ibid.
Major George W. Yeakey, U.S. Army, Retired, currently teaches
leadership for the U.S. Army Reserve Officer's Training Corps, Miami,
Florida, and is a management consultant for Odeon Ltd., a
multinational company operating in Poland, Russia, and Turkey. He
received a B.A. from Middle Tennessee State University, an M.A. from
the University of Oklahoma, and a Ph.D. from NOVA Southeastern
University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College. While on active duty, he served as operations officer,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, U.S. Army South and Joint Task
Force Panama, Quarry Heights, Panama; field artillery team chief,
Readiness Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; assistant professor,
Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, U.S. Air Force Academy;
organizational effectiveness staff officer, 212th Field Artillery Brigade;
and deputy installation commander, Herzo Artillery Base, Germany.
US Army