Air Asia Strategic Analysis
Air Asia Strategic Analysis
Air Asia Strategic Analysis
AIRASIA
THE BEST LOW-COST CARRIER AIRLINES IN THE WORLD
BY:
IWAN BUDHIARTA
P-46048
MALAYSIA – 2009
I. INTRODUCTION
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A low-cost carrier (also known as a no-frills or discount carrier) is an airline that offers low
fares but eliminates all “non-essential” services. The typical low-cost carrier business model
is based on:
– a single passenger class
– a single type of airplane (reducing training and servicing costs)
– a simple fare scheme (typically fares increase as the plane fills up, which rewards
early reservations)
– free seating (which encourages passengers to board early)
– direct, point to point flights with no transfers
– flying to cheaper, less congested secondary airports
– short flights and fast turnaround times (allowing maximum utilization of planes)
– "Free" in-flight catering and other "complimentary" services are eliminated, and
replaced by optional paid-for in-flight food and drink.
Simple Product
A typical low cost airline product is extremely basic. It focuses on getting passengers from
point A to B, cutting out all the “extras”. This means there are no meals, drinks or snacks
served free on board. In certain airlines, these may be purchased on request. The aircraft have
Narrow seating to permit greater capacity. Low cost airlines offer all-economy flights, with
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no additional space requirements for wider business class seating. This means more
passengers can be accommodated on each sector. There are no facilities for seat allocations as
this “free-seating” makes passengers board the flights early to get themselves a decent seat.
The pricing structures of low cost airlines allow for no additional schemes or sales promotion
Positioning
The low cost airlines the world over are known to target Non-business passengers, leisure
traffic and the price-conscious business passenger segment. The low cost model works best
on short-haul point-to-point traffic with high frequencies. These airlines have aggressive
marketing strategies and compete with all transportation carriers, including the road and
railway networks. Most Western low cost airlines fly to secondary airports which are cheaper
Low cost airlines have a very lean organization structure and operating costs are kept to the
bare minimum with low wages (as crew/staff requirements are low and generally freshers are
preferred), low airport fees, low costs for maintenance and cockpit training (as these are
aircraft fleet. Low cost carriers aim at achieving high resource productivity. This is generally
achieved due to short ground waits (as turnaround times are kept minimal due to
simpleboarding processes, no air freight, no hub services and short cleaning times). Selling
costs are also minimized as high percentage (if not 100%) of ticket sales is generated online,
eliminating the margins that would otherwise need to be passed on as commissions to travel
agents.
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Dato’ Sri Tony Fernandes: We fly to where others dare not fly or have given up. “Being an
unproven model, the low-cost, long-haul business is rather risky. But it is a feasible business
with tremendous growth opportunities, hence it qualifies for us to put our money on it,”
Fernandes explains. Fernandes and a group of individual investors, including Datuk
Kamaruddin Meranun and Datuk Seri Kalimullah Hassan, collectively hold a 48% stake in
AirAsia X.
The other prominent shareholders in AirAsia X include British billionaire Richard Branson’s
Virgin Group, with a 16% stake; Japanese conglomerate ORIX Corp with 10%; and Bahrain-
based Manara Infrastructure Fund with 10%. AirAsia holds the remaining 16% stake.
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Management Strategy
AirAsia’s goal is to establish itself as a leading low-cost carrier in Asia. The principle
components of AirAsia’s strategy are as follows:
Operational Excellence
• All staff are contributors – no ranks or hierarchy
• Continuous cost management
• Performance based remunerations and incentives
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Strategic Direction
Stage 5
Become a multi specialist
• Yield maximization for matured routes
• Significant ancillary composition
Stage 4
Pursue regional market domination. Optimise routes and development of new
secondary hubs
• Further enhance route network, venture destinations previously uncovered
• Yield enhancement due to benefits of maturity
• Ancillary expansion
Stage 2
IPO Capital Raising and become publicly traded company
• Strengthen financial sheets
• Improve company credibility & rating
• Ability to negotiate favourable terms with our suppliers
Stage 1
Entry to market. Aggressive brand building & recognition
• Introduction to the market
• Focus on market penetration
• Induce first time flyers & open up new market
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“Air transport has brought enormous and positive developments to Malaysia. Following
international principles with a focus on cost efficiency will help air transport play its role as a
catalyst for economic activity even amid the enormous crisis in the global economy. Efficient
air transport improves business competitiveness and supports tourism,” said Giovanni
Bisignani, Director General and CEO of the International Air Transport Association (IATA).
Six and a half years of flying, continuing growth and profits in every quarter since day one.
And Malaysia’s AirAsia is now claiming something more: it says it has the highest profit
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margin of any airline in the world. AirAsia came out tops in our finance category this year for
“delivering outstanding financial results and industry-leading profit margins while bringing
low-fare airline serice to Southeast Asia and now, through AirAsia X, to the long-haul
marketplace”.
"Six years ago, we began as a small airline with a RM40 million debt and two aircraft. We
have successfully turned the business around and had the most profound impact on the
aviation industry. True to form, we must believe that our achievements today add up to just
another beginning. We cannot rest on our laurels. The sky is high enough and wide enough to
accommodate our growth plans. It is up to us to rise to the occasion."
“When we first started, many people thought it was a crazy idea to offer low fares as it was
not economically viable,” says group chief executive Tony Fernandes.
“Especially with an airline with high aspirations like us, we were expected to fail. However,
with strong persistence and the right strategies, we persevered and we are now the leading
and largest low-cost carrier in Asia.”
The numbers tell a solid story. In the first quarter, revenues increased nearly one-third to
535.1 million ringgit ($167 million) and net profit soared to 161.2 million ringgit from 86.8
million ringgit. AirAsia claimed an operating margin of 24% and a net profit margin of 30%
during the period. Margins were even stronger in 2007, with its full-year operating margin
coming in at 35% and a net margin at 36%. AirAsia’s revenues reached $450 million in 2007.
AirAsia has also won long-running battles for more access under key bilateral air services
agreements. The Singapore-Malaysia market, for example, which for decades has remained
one of the most restrictive in Asia, finally opened up slightly earlier this year and AirAsia is
now flying on the lucrative Singapore-Kuala Lumpur route. There is more to come at the end
of this year when Association of Southeast Asian Nations members remove all restrictions on
air services between capital cities.
AirAsia has quite simply established itself as the largest and most profitable low-cost airline
group in Asia, and despite new challenges amid high fuel prices, regional head of finance
Rozman Bin Omar says: “There will always be demand for air travel whatever the fuel price
is. With very affordable low-fare offerings, people will trade down.” He adds that “we expect
to enjoy high profit margins in years to come”.
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IV. The Strategies: INCREASING FLIGHTS, ADDING ROUTES, BOOSTING
CAPITAL AMID RISING FUEL PRICES
AirAsia has once again delivered profit growth for the quarter, despite operating in a very
difficult economic environment characterised by record fuel prices, according to Tony
Fernandes, Group chief executive officer. "This is our 23rd consecutive profitable quarter.
This result shows the maturity of our marketing strategy whereby we are able to turn the
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traditionally weakest quarter and deliver strong results. Our new routes have performed
beyond expectations, with the Kuala Lumpur-Shenzhen route proving to be the best ever in
the airline's history, "said Fernandes through a statement.
Budget carrier AirAsia is increasing flights, adding routes and boosting capital investments, as
Europe's Ryanair Holdings (NASDAQ: RYAAY) and Southwest Airlines Co. (NYSE: LUV)
have cut capacity this year due to soaring fuel prices. Last month, AirAsia gave away a million
free seats, although passengers still had to pay taxes and fuel surcharges. The seven-year-old
company said that it is aiming to fill the vacuum as other airlines reduce capacity, betting that
more travelers will opt for budget flights amid a global economic downturn.
The strategy could backfire. Revenue for the quarter was RM462 million (Ringgit Malaysia) in
2007, a growth of 39% compared to the same period last year. These results come on the back of
25% growth in passenger volumes, driven by a 10% higher average ticket prices and a 54%
growth in ancillary income.
Capacity grew by 34% for the period and load factor was constant to last year's 79%. ''Despite
oil prices breaking new records, our cost improvement initiatives and the stronger Ringgit
Malaysia against the US dollar has retained our position as the lowest cost airline in the world.
The combination of higher yields with lower cost has boosted our profits significantly. Net
income for the period was at RM180 million, a 157% growth against last year's net income of
RM70 million,'' added Tony Fernandes.
Last month, AirAsia posted a 95 percent plunge in its net profit for April-June quarter to $2.9
million. The company attributed that mainly to a $23 million foreign exchange loss from a
weakened Malaysian ringgit, not weakness in its underlying business. Average load factor -- the
percentage of seats taken up in an airplane -- dipped to a still relatively strong 76 percent, from
80 percent in 2007.
The company said that it has a cash reserve of about $303 million but outstanding debts stand at
$1.6 billion, giving it a net debt position $1.3 billion. Debts are set to grow as it receives new
planes. The carrier has firm orders for 175 Airbus A320 planes, to be delivered gradually up to
2014, as part of fleet replacement and expansion.
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Chris Eng, analyst with OSK Securities in Malaysia, said AirAsia's growth prospects may be
curbed while its joint-ventures in Thailand and Indonesia are expected to remain in the red.
"It will be challenging but we believe AirAsia can survive," Eng said, citing its efficient
regional network and good cost control.
The International Air Transport Association has forecast a $5.2 billion loss this year for the
global airline industry. It said crude oil price, currently averaging $113 a barrel, is still 55
percent higher than the 2007 average price while passenger demand growth is slowing even
in Asia-Pacific. Fuel prices account for half of AirAsia's cost.
PIKOM, the National ICT Association of Malaysia, honoured two organizations and two
individuals at the PIKOM ICT Leaderships Awards 2008 at its Annual Dinner today. AirAsia
Bhd received the PIKOM ICT Organisation Excellence Award. The awards were presented by
the Minister of Science, Technology and Innovation Datuk Dr Maximus Johnity Ongkili at
the PIKOM Annual Dinner 2008 in Petaling Jaya. Receiving the awards were Dato’ Sri Tony
Fernandes (for AirAsia Bhd). PIKOM introduces the PIKOM ICT Leadership Awards, which
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is intended to honour and give due recognition to outstanding leaders in the ICT industry and
user community.
Prior to this, PIKOM has been organizing the PIKOM-Computimes ICT Awards since 1989
(later evolved to PIKOM National ICT Awards) to honour outstanding Malaysian ICT
companies, products and individuals in the field of ICT for their contribution to the industry
and society. For the category of PIKOM ICT Organisation Excellence Award, the recipient
must be an outstanding organisation that have successfully utilised ICT to run the operation
of its organisation effectively and created an environment that accelerates the all pervasive
use of ICT across all segments of the community. AirAsia certain fulfills the criteria.
The success of AirAsia as the region’s leading budget airline is reflected not only in its fast
growing passenger volume but also from the ICT perspective. It is very successful in the use
of ICT as a core business model, and it casts a major influence over all segments of society in
creating a compelling reason for the use of Internet booking and e-Commerce. AirAsia has,
almost literally overnight in corporate terms, demonstrated the strategic value of ICT to
increase the competitiveness of businesses, promoted online booking, and helped dispel the
myth that people are afraid to shop online because of network security fears.
AirAsia stated it has ‘never speculated on fuel prices in the past and will not speculate on fuel
prices going forward’. The airline stated it’s fuel-hedging strategy has ‘always been to hedge
fuel requirements whenever an attractively priced structure is available’, going on to say that
‘fuel hedging is an important component of our strategy as it provides us with clarity over our
cost structure; this will allow us to manage our seat inventory better and aids route
development. We are averse to risks and therefore believe in mitigating those risks by
removing variability and uncertainties from our business whenever suitable opportunities
arise.
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Prior to a trade being executed, one would have assessed the current operating and market
conditions before choosing the appropriate hedge. Therefore, the decision to hedge begins
with a view.’ At the time that the airline undertook its hedge in Jul-07, the airline had a view
that oil prices of above USD90/barrel will be a result of ‘excessive speculative market action
in that commodity’.
Fuel price volatility intensified in the later part of the 2007-2008 due to higher fuel
consumption projections, supply disruptions, geopolitical risk concerns, and the weakening of
the US Dollar. Due to the high volatility in oil prices, the airline is of the view that adopting a
static hedged approach (through fixed/plain vanilla swaps) at current price levels would
involve taking excessive risks. If one were to opt for a fixed swap now and should fuel prices
retrace subsequently, AIRAsia would be left with effectively an obligation to purchase
expensive fuel with no room to manoeuvre out of the position. Therefore, the airline opted for
a dynamic approach and layered fuel hedge structures. AIRAsia are confident that this is the
most suitable approach to manage the high volatile fuel prices and will continue to apply this
strategy in the future.
AirAsia continued on to sat that it approaches the fuel hedging subject “carefully” and that it
has ‘maintained a conservative stance which has resulted in positive contributions from our
past fuel hedges. This has ultimately benefited the Company in reducing the total fuel bill and
hence enhance our ability to offer low fares to our guests’.
Over the past two months, foreign funds have been reducing their exposure in airline stocks.
In fact, the majority of prominent LCCs around the world have experienced heavy sell
downs. Based on this, AirAsia stated it would be ‘inappropriate to lay the blame on our fuel
hedges as the reason for the decline in the Company’s share price’. With this fuel hedge in
place, and assuming that the strong demand and pick-up rate that we are seeing is sustainable,
the Company is in a sound position to deliver strong profit growth for the financial year -
barring any unforeseen events and circumstances.”
AirAsia has been profitable for all but the second half of 2008, when Mr Fernandes decided
to unwind fuel hedges before most other airlines took the plunge. After taking an initial hit,
AirAsia is now getting the full benefit of oil at $40 a barrel while some rivals are still paying
$100. That decision is typical of Mr Fernandes’s willingness to break ranks. When other
airlines slashed advertising during the SARS scare in 2003, AirAsia tripled its spending.
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“Expanding where demand is falling is a major concern because there is a risk of its ticket
sales not matching its capacity growth. Fact is, share prices move according to market
expectations, and the current market expectation is rather negative,” says an analyst.
However, some analysts do acknowledge that AirAsia’s strategy has well positioned the
group to emerge as one the strongest aviation players once the market condition improves.
“We defy logic. Our view is that people still want to travel in a down market, and they are
most likely going to trade down in order to save more money,” Fernandes says.
“Even if our regular customers may cut down on their travel with us, we will gain some new
customers who previously use premium flights,” he adds. The migration of passengers who
are price-sensitive has enabled AirAsia group to gain new ground. While the group’s focus
has always been on the non-business, leisure sector, it has, of late, seen the increase of
business travellers on its flights.
Azran opines that the current environment may hurt airlines in high-cost positions, but
AirAsia group is set to benefit from the slowing economy because of its ability to offer
comparatively lower fares. AirAsia believes that most passengers do not have loyalty to any
particular brand because their choices depend on ticket prices. “Therefore, we believe
demand for budget travel is here to stay,” Azran says, adding that AirAsia X is currently
operating on a positive cash flow because it has already sold tickets for travelling period of
up to the middle of next year.
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The closure of these airlines is boost to AirAsia’s market share and enhances its position as
the ultimate leader in the region’s low-cost sector, says a local analyst. Bahrain-based Perigon
Advisory, which manages the Manara Infrastructure Fund, is confident that AirAsia group has
the marketing know-how and X-factor to capitalise on such opportunities that arise from its
competitors falling out of the game. “The group has been able to take its business to
successful level because it has a deep understanding and discipline in following its low-cost
model,” says Perigon Advisory partner Michael Rodriguez. AirAsia has managed to ride
through the stormy period, with a net profit of RM9.42mil for the second-quarter (2Q) ended
June 30, 2008.
The figure represents a 95% year-on-year (y-o-y) decline, mainly due to its high translation
loss of RM77mil resulting from the weakened ringgit. The 65% y-o-y increase in its unit fuel
costs from US$86.20 per barrel to US$142.5 per barrel during the period had also eaten into
AirAsia’s profit. On a positive note, AirAsia actually recorded a rise in its passenger numbers
by 20% y-o-y from 2.3 million to 2.8 million for 2Q08, despite its average fares rising 16%
y-o-y from RM170 to RM198. Its revenue for the period under review rose an impressive
41% y-o-y from RM432mil to RM608mil.
These are factors that have provided AirAsia group the edge over its major rivals, some of
which are still using inefficient planes that are as old as 10 to 15 years and operate on a
complicated system that requires high maintenance.
In addition, the sharing of resources, such as the online booking platform and cabin crew,
between AirAsia and AirAsia X has enabled the group to operate on high economies of scale.
This is more to the benefit of AirAsia X, which according to Azran, is on track to achieve
profitability by next year.Azran also reveals that the group has hedged 100% of its fuel at
US$115 per barrel for up to the end of the year.
Despite having its flight destinations and frequencies severely limited by the Malaysian
government under a protectionism policy for MAS in the early days of its operations, AirAsia
has over the years built an amazingly strong brand presence in many international markets.
Many observers have attributed AirAsia’s success to the leadership of Fernandes. A great
strategy will not be effective if there is no team work, says H. Dale Ichida, the managing
director for aviation and alternative investments for ORIX Corp. “AirAsia has the right
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corporate culture to grow. There is no bureaucracy and Fernandes is easily accessible to his
staff members, hence enabling important discussions to take place on the spot. In a
competitive environment, corporate bureaucracy can impede growth,” Ichida says.
Virgin group’s Baxby and Perigon Advisory’s Rodriguez also believe that the management
philosophy practised by AirAsia group is the key element to its success. “Fernandes has used
his entrepreneurial skills, something which is intangible, to steer the company out of difficult
times before, and we believe his management philosophy will continue to promote the growth
of the group,” Rodriguez shares.
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VII. SWOT ANALYSIS of AIRASIA
>> STRENGTHS
Cost Differentiation :
Unit cost competitiveness is key to profitability for airlines because airlines have found it
extremely difficult to increase their revenues in the current environment. THE COST GAP IS
THE SOURCE OF SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE FOR LOW COST
CARRIERS …
A 2:1 differential exists between traditional full-service airlines’ unit costs and that of low-
cost carriers for a given stage length (route distance in miles). AirAsia has the following
sources of cost savings in comparison with the full service airlines :
Lean Product - AirAsia’s product is basic – minus hot meals, frequent flyer programmes,
decent legroom, and a full complement of air-hostesses.
More Seats per aircraft - No meal on board means you don't need the extra space for
storage. Instead, AirAsia has added seats. AirAsia has increased the seat factor by as much as
20 per cent by pulling out the business class, reducing the seat pitch (how far the seat can
incline), and throwing out a couple of galleys.
Reduced staff numbers – There is no need to clean the aircraft due to the absence of food
services. Also, there's no need for a crew of more than six, or even four, members.
Quicker turnaround times - While most full-service airlines like Jet take at least an hour to
leave an airport after landing there, AirAsiadoes it in 15-20 minutes for ATRs (and about 30
minutes for its new A320 service.) So, if AirAsia does six sectors a day, it can fly one
additional sector a day. This allows it to fly 20-30 per cent more than a full-service airline. On
an average, the conventional airlines fly their aircraft for 8-9 hours a day, while a low-cost
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carrier is able to keep its planes airborne for 11 hours a day. This allows AirAsia to make the
same revenue with fewer aircraft. Squeezing out more from the capital asset (aircraft)
simply lowers the fixed costs.
Low incidental costs - Even other costs, like costs of the crew, hangerage or even finance
costs are somewhat lower, in these airlines.
Economies of Scale - AirAsia uses limited types of aircraft in its fleet. This way it can move
pilots and cabin crews around, reduce training costs, and won't have to worry about carrying
spares for several different kinds of aircraft. This generates economies of scale.
E-distribution - AirAsia saves on distribution costs, which can be 11-15 per cent in a
conventional airline by not going through the travel agents and the existing central
reservation systems like Amadeus and Galileo. Instead, they sell through the Internet and call
centres. AirAsia does not issue a ticket, as it costs to print, mail and process tickets. What
passengers get instead is an electronic ticket (a booking number) when they make a
reservation. All this tots up to a saving of close to 40-45 per cent compared to full service
airlines. To take the examples from the West, leading low cost carriers, such as Southwest and
Ryanair, don’t operate on the low end of the airline cost curve; they occupy an entirely
different cost curve.
Brand Equity :
AirAsia will most certainly have a sustained mind share in the Asia Region consumer’s
psyche. They will always be remembered as the airline that took the initiative (and the risk)
to reshape an industry inside out. AirAsia’s CEO, Tony Fernandes will most certainly go
down in the annals of history as the man who changed the civil aviation dynamics in Asia
forever. AirAsia was the first airline that made air travel affordable to all Asians. This brand
equity is a major strength that AirAsia must successfully capitalize.
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>> WEAKNESSES
A fixed-cost perishable product – The major weakness of any airline is the very nature of
the product it offers. An airline seat is a fixed-cost perishable product. The incentive to fill
empty seats and fly underutilized aircraft is tremendous. This leads to price wars, with
airlines resorting to slashing fares in an attempt to fill seats, as it is better to fill seats at lower
prices rather than fly half empty planes.
Questionable on-time performance – Limited aircraft also means unavailability of standby
planes in the event of operational problems. At present, AirAsia is not known for maintaining
a good on-time performance. This will over time, erode brand equity and alienate the time-
conscious business traveler. Shaping up on-time performance records by eliminating sources
of teething troubles is critical.
>> OPPORTUNITIES
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Huge Market Potential - In a country of a billion people, the Indonesian aviation industry is
puny. Indonesia have 12 million people who travel by air every year against 3 million
passengers who fly everyday in the US, even though its population is one-fourth that of
Indonesia. Even if we assumed that only one-fourth of that large middle-class could afford
and would be willing to travel by air, it would call for at least a 5-6-fold increase in capacity.
This points to a huge opportunity for AirAsia and the aviation industry in general. However,
this large market is recognized by all and is the reason why new players are waiting to enter
the Industry to exploit this potential. It is pertinent to note that the number of air travelers in
Indonesia has grown during the last there of 2005-08 as compared to the same period last
year, as per estimates of Amadeus Worldwide.
Product differentiation – At present, AirAsia differentiates its no frills product by offering
less features at substantially low fares. However, this strategy will become generic with the
entry of low cost carriers waiting in the wings. At that stage, low cost competition will each
need to try and “be different”. Limited product differentiation is an opportunity, but must
be approached with extreme caution.
This has happened in the West and by trying to differentiate; some low-cost airlines also lose
their bearing and begin adding frills like assigned seating, hot meals and in-flight
entertainment to attract some of the more comfort-seeking customers. But that leaves them
exposed to being undercut by a new competitor who focuses exclusively on price. Anything
(like frills) that adds costs and reduces price competitiveness is a bad trade-off.
>> THREATS
Killer competition – The Asia Region skies are witnessing a bloody battle for market shares.
A much anticipated fare war has broken out across Asia Region skies. AirAsia is still a
gowing airline company, but a medium-big player in the Asia Region skies. They are
vulnerable to price cuts by large-existing players with deep pockets. Aviation experts are
betting could start a debilitating price war to push the fledgling no frills airlines off the
tarmac - permanently.
Oil price fluctuations – Oil price hikes spare no airline. Aviation turbine fuel (ATF) cost and
other operational costs (all government controlled) are the same for all airlines, whether it is a
low cost airline or not. This adds significantly to costs of carriers like AirAsia, especially
since fuel costs as a percentage of total costs are higher at 26% for low cost airlines,
compared to 20% for full service airlines.
Overcapacity – Aircraft manufacturers continue to build and deliver new aircraft, adding
new capacity. In off peak periods and on certain routes, this leads to overcapacity problems.
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Overcapacity fuels an imminent price war in the hope of filling empty seats. Worldwide,
overcapacity pressures have at times lowered ticket prices to unreasonable levels, eroding
bottom lines and acting as a threat.
Diminishing yields per passenger - Overall, industry-wide demand for air travel in Asia
Region has increased, but fares (average per flight) have not. Although more passengers are
flying, they are paying less to do so. Not only are full service airlines collecting less fare
revenue from the passengers they fly, they are also flying fewer passengers than they used to.
Low-cost airlines are flying more passengers at lower prices. Controlling costs and
maintaining cost differentiation is absolutely critical to overcome this threat.
Open skies policy – The opening up Asia Region skies to foreign carriers is being debated at
great length by the Regional Government. Should this happen, there will be an influx of
global players in the Regional market. Their long years of experience in markets abroad and
financial strength will be a threat to AirAsia.
Poor Airport Infrastructure – Airlines like AirAsia can buy more airplanes and put them in
the air. But how do they take the aircraft and people through the terminals? There are not
enough gates, not enough counter space, not enough parking bays.
Lack of secondary airport infrastructure - In Europe as well as the US, low-cost airlines
have one more way to shave off costs - but one that is a source of cost advantage unavailable
to AirAsia or its followers for some time to come. Abroad, low cost airlines avoid flying into
mainland airports and, therefore, don't incur high parking and landing fees.
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New Markets will be created through distinct customer segmentation. This echoes the vision
of AirAsia’s CEO, “We want people who had never boarded a plane or dreamt of flying to fly
with us.” Customers will continue to fall into segments with regard to demand for products
on offer. Not every airline will be able to satisfy every customer.
– The entrance of low-cost airlines will push customer segmentation
– There will be a sharper focus on customer segments, especially for short routes. This
is because the short routes are a “Dual Market” serviced by airlines for price-
conscious customers (low cost airlines) and for quality-conscious customers (full
service airlines)
– There will be stiffer competition for non-business passengers and price-conscious
business passengers on short routes
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The following are the possible future competitive scenarios that AirAsia may be faced with-
1. Competition within current business design :
AirAsia is currently facing killer competition from the full service airlines on common routes.
The objective of the full service carriers is obvious –
(i) Defend their existing markets, and
(ii) Retain a competitive edge by making their wide network a source of differentiation and
value addition.
All the airlines have used price measures to combat AirAsia, using innovative yield
management systems. Apex fares are the primary weapon of competition, which at their
lowest levels (30 days advance purchase) are even lower than AirAsia’s ticket prices.
Another competitive tool is to enhance frequencies on the sectors and step up customer
loyalty campaigns. There have also been a few cases of selective pricing strategies. The full
service carriers have selectively dropped fares on flights departing at the same time slot as
AirAsia, with even last minute deals that are as attractive as or even better than AirAsia.
However the competition laws, if enforced, can limit such trade practices.
For competition in this format, the following are the pre-requisites for success –
(i) The yield generations must allow scope for a “leeway” to permit the introduction of short-
term price measures through a competitive cost position. Quite obviously, such schemes can
be used to fill seats beyond the break even capacities.
(ii) An Extended network with optimized hub and high-performance yield management from
network carrier must be used as a differentiator.
(iii) The Resource availability (especially money) must be adequate to cushion the loss in
revenues from the price cuts.
(iv) The schemes must be designed to effectively avoid fair-trade violations and protect the
carrier’s dominant market position
(v) The quickness and effectiveness in direct marketing quotas of low priced seats is critical.
It is also essential to look at the possible pitfalls of this strategy. There is an imminent danger
of starting ruinous price wars and drop in average yields per passenger flown. This is already
happening in developed Western markets where airlines are seen to be flying more passengers
and substantially lower prices. This most certainly leads to an extra burden being placed on
profitability and earnings paving the way towards possible long term value destruction.
Full service airlines may use this strategy to capitalize on their economies of scale in the short
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term. It is possible to for them to take on smaller low cost carriers using “shock and awe”
pricing but in the long term, continued success prospects seem low. This is because there are
several instances seem across the world where full service airlines have failed when they tried
to pursue low pricing. It is a fact that a full service network business design is unsuitable for
low cost operations.
The key is to apply the low cost business design to product processes and cost elements. A
pre-requisite to success is the speed in implementing key low cost elements and more
importantly, the establishment of units with strictly parallel organization and independent
management.
The primary objective of this strategy would be to defend existing markets, although using a
different product. However, the carriers can establish and gain experience from their existing
business designs. The probable drawbacks for the full service airlines launching such off-
shoots could include-
(i) Distortion of customer perception and brand image
(ii) Danger of blurring distinction from mainline airline
(iii) Value destruction for the parent (full service airline) if low cost operation fails
It must be noted that worldwide, there are no successful examples to date of full service
airlines running successful low cost subsidiaries. There are several examples of failures. For
instance, Buzz (a no frills subsidiary of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines) and Virgin Express (the
no frills subsidiary of Richard Branson’s Virgin Atlantic) have never been successful. A
primary difficulty in implementation is the separation of business sectors/units on an
operational level.
The lack of differentiation leads to the product and service offerings on both carriers being
almost identical, though the pricing of the new airline cannot support the cost structures.
Manpower costs also tend to remain on par with the full service parent airline because the HR
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operations are centrally controlled. It is perhaps not part of the DNA of full service airlines to
offer a no frills product. However, the past failures still do not predicate certain failure for
future competition in this format. The model can succeed if operational differentiation is
successfully implemented at all levels.
Low cost Carriers will compete by building routes, innovative pricing and creating
reputations for safety and on-time performance. Maintaining strategic Cost differentiation is
critical to long term success. This is because the most the cost gap between competing
airlines, the more flexibility will be available to offer price cuts and gain market share from
the competition.
To succeed, low cost carriers will need to speedily implement key low cost elements in their
business design. An extended route system will most certainly be a key differentiator as
passengers would not need to look at different carriers to reach different destinations.
Building the network will require more airplanes and related manpower. Resource availability
becomes critical to achieve this goal. AirAsia has promoters who do not have deep pockets.
However, the airline is in the final stages of negotiation with banks and financial institutions
to tie up funding their future expansion plans.
The primary objective for low cost airlines competing within their own segment is to survive
and capture critical mass. The focus must be on growing large enough to ensure that the
competition cannot harm without maiming themselves. It is easy to compete with a small
carrier offering limited seats. But if a low cost airline grows large enough to offer a larger
number of seats, the smaller low cost carriers and full service airlines will not be in a position
to turn customers away by offering price cuts and selective pricing.
One of the major pitfalls to guard against is attempting to differentiate a low cost carrier by
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adding frills, thus losing strategic cost advantages. Every frill or service adds to cost and
reduced the strategic cost gap, thus curbing the flexibility to offer innovative price deals.
There are several examples in the West where low cost airlines were faced with hyper
competition within their own sector. They tried to “be different” and in the process, lost their
strategic positions. One of the examples is Debonair which started offering a two-class
product, with a frequent flyer programme and positioned its product as “low cost-high frills”.
Debonair went bankrupt in 1999, shortly after pursuing this hybrid strategy.
In India, Air Sahara is planning to reposition its product as a ‘low cost-high frills’ offering.
Possibility of success seems remote, especially since increased competition is reducing the
average yield per passenger and costs are on their way up. It is doubtful as to how Air Sahara
can afford to offer a high frills product at a substantially lower fare and still make a decent
margin ti sustain its operations. Vijay Mallya’s Kingfisher Airline also has plans to launch an
airline with such a “hybrid” business design.
Around the world, it has been observed that low cost airlines pursuing a generic business
design have emerged as the most successful. The moment they have started adding frills, they
have lost their source of competitive advantage by narrowing the strategic cost gap.
REFERENCES
www.AeroMorning.com
Alexander, Keith L. (2004). The Economics of Low Cost Carriers - All the Numbers Add
Down for the Nation's Low-Cost Carriers. Washington Post, Feb 29, 2004.
Economist, The (2004). Low Cost Airlines – Turbulent Skies. Economist Print Edition – July
89, 2004.http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=2897525
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www.Financialwire.net. COMTEX
Hecker, JayEtta Z. (2004, June 3). COMMERCIAL AVIATION - Despite Industry Turmoil,
Low-Cost Airlines Are Growing and Profitable. United States General Accounting
Office - Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives.
Kong, Ying & Le Dressay, Andre (2003). Spinning off low cost carriers – When does it
make sense? Journal of the Academy of Business & Economics, April 2003.
Schneiderbauer, Dieter & Fainsilber, Olivier (2002). Impact of Low Cost Airlines –
Summaryt of Mercer Study. Mercer Management Consulting.
Subramaniam, Ganapathy G. (2004). Cheap, cheerful & chock full. Times News Network,
Aug 27, 2004.
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