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Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How it Can Succeed Again
Making Social Science Matter presents an exciting new approach to social science, including theoretical argument, methodological guidelines, and examples of practical application. Why has social science failed in attempts to emulate natural science and produce normal theory? Bent Flyvbjerg argues that the strength of social science is in its rich, reflexive analysis of values and power, essential to the social and economic development of any society. Richly informed, powerfully argued, and clearly written, this book provides essential reading for all those in the social and behavioral sciences.
212 pages, Paperback
First published January 17, 1997
About the author
Bent Flyvbjerg
16 books82 followersBent Flyvbjerg is a Danish economic geographer. He is the Villum Kann Rasmussen Professor at the IT University of Copenhagen.
His research focuses on management of megaprojects, including the Olympic Games, and cities.
He is the author or editor of 10 books and more than 200 papers in professional journals and edited volumes. His publications have been translated into 19 languages.
Research interests:
Decision Making, Risk, Project Management, Infrastructure, Cities
His research focuses on management of megaprojects, including the Olympic Games, and cities.
He is the author or editor of 10 books and more than 200 papers in professional journals and edited volumes. His publications have been translated into 19 languages.
Research interests:
Decision Making, Risk, Project Management, Infrastructure, Cities
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Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews
July 6, 2012
This is a shockingly honest and self-critical book about sociology. If you took a women's studies or humanities class in college, you could be excused for thinking that the entire field is dominated by intellectually dishonest hacks. If you'd read much on your own by the time you got to the classroom like I had, you probably also found it difficult to contain yourself throughout the lectures. Fyvbjerg hopes to change that. See, the social sciences have a strange relationship with the scientific method. They want the respect that comes with the findings but none of the rigor that goes along with adhering to its rules.
Aristotle wrote of three types of knowledge: epistme (scientific), techne (technical know-how) and phronesis (understanding and ethics). Instead of trying to shoehorn the study of people into epistme, Fyvbjerg asks social scientists to embrace phronesis. He wants them to abandon the idea that you can distill an infinite amount of human variables into some predictive theory and focus on asking a few simple questions about the subjects they study. "Where are we going?" "Who benefits and who loses?" "Is this desirable?" I've written about phronesis before, and I described it as sort of a practical, intuitive understanding. MSSM is saying that we deserve social scientists who practice this kind of expert knowledge, rather than pseudo-scientists looking for confirmation of their political beliefs.
I have one criticism of this book. It's written in exactly the kind of dense, academic style that he's supposedly trying to get us to give up. As a result, it often feels like it exists in some Ivy League vacuum, rather than the real, gritty world that social sciences live in. It's the wrong tone for a book of this kind of importance and its influence has suffered accordingly. If you can push through it, you realize that you can skip whole sections and pages without missing anything. This is bad for him but good for you. Definitely read this.
Aristotle wrote of three types of knowledge: epistme (scientific), techne (technical know-how) and phronesis (understanding and ethics). Instead of trying to shoehorn the study of people into epistme, Fyvbjerg asks social scientists to embrace phronesis. He wants them to abandon the idea that you can distill an infinite amount of human variables into some predictive theory and focus on asking a few simple questions about the subjects they study. "Where are we going?" "Who benefits and who loses?" "Is this desirable?" I've written about phronesis before, and I described it as sort of a practical, intuitive understanding. MSSM is saying that we deserve social scientists who practice this kind of expert knowledge, rather than pseudo-scientists looking for confirmation of their political beliefs.
I have one criticism of this book. It's written in exactly the kind of dense, academic style that he's supposedly trying to get us to give up. As a result, it often feels like it exists in some Ivy League vacuum, rather than the real, gritty world that social sciences live in. It's the wrong tone for a book of this kind of importance and its influence has suffered accordingly. If you can push through it, you realize that you can skip whole sections and pages without missing anything. This is bad for him but good for you. Definitely read this.
Read
March 6, 2022So if we turn back the time to the '90s, when something called “science wars” was something people in the academy really cared about, Bent Flyvbjerg attempted to write an analytical but passionate cri de coeur for the social sciences, rooted largely in the Aristotelian concept of phronesis and the deeply humanistic ideas of Hubert Drefyus, particularly his hierarchy of expertise. Now phronesis is a fascinating concept, and something tells me I'll be invoking it in cocktail party conversations over the next few months. And I like Dreyfus, although I feel like there's something a bit suspect in his concept of expertise – putting that one on the back-burner for the moment. From there, Flyvbjerg makes some claims about the case study, many of which are sane and sensible (corresponding roughly to why, for example, biologists study a drosophila fly rather than thousands of species) and many of which seem a bit silly and flippant. I do basically agree with Flyvbjerg's conception of social science, but there seems to be a missing piece. I can't figure out what it is.
November 25, 2021
Read this book for a seminar at university, where I read a master in Strategic Urban and Regional Planning. My lecturer had praised this book beforehand, saying that Flyvbjerg was a kind of celebrity within social science circles (try to say that three times fast!) and that this book would really showcase why. And well, it was a good book! As someone who has studied only social science, the "fuzzy" science, I really enjoyed seeing social science's return vs the natural science, which it always has been considered "below". That natural science is better than social science because the results of the natural science is more straightforward (yes, 1 plus 1 equals 2) and that social science is harder to pinpoint (why do humans act like this?). My fiancée, on the other hand, as studied natural science all of his student life and thus hosts the belief that he read something way more difficult than me because my subjects are so "fuzzy". But as Flyvbjerg says: we cannot really compare the two sciences because they answer two completely different questions. We need them both within society and science itself. I do have some more critical perspectives towards the book. Flyvbjerg chooses to use Aristotle a lot. And Foucault. Socrates and Plato are also mentioned. Foucault is the more recent of all of these minds - and he died in 1984. Aristotle died 322 before the birth of Jesus fucking Christ. Sorry for the bad words everybody, but this book is mainly supported on theories from 2000 years ago. Have social science really not evolved since then? There is also an apparent lack of female perspectives in the book. The only time female scientists/thinkers/etc are mentioned is when Flyvbjerg briefly talks about feminism. So you can add a male thinker's perspectives that were born 2000 years ago, but not one contemporary female thinker? Such a shame.
September 22, 2024
Une tentative de redirectionner la méthodologie et l’essence même des sciences sociales alors que l’univers académique essaie de rendre ce domaine d’études semblable à celui des sciences de la nature. Une proposition de reconfigurer la manière qu’on doit percevoir sa rationalité et sa valeur. L’auteur appelle a une science sociale « phronétique » dans laquelle le but n’est pas de créer des théories, mais bien de contribuer à la rationalité pratique de la société - selon ses valeurs, ses intérêts et ce qui est désirable à son égard.
Texte écrit de manière extrêmement complexe ce qui rend la lecture lourde et difficile. Les sujets sont intéressants, mais on ne peut s’empêcher de penser que l’auteur complexifie le texte juste pour le rendre moins accessible.
Aussi, gros problème, l’auteur mentionne une vingtaine d’auteurs qui ont contribué à la littérature des sciences sociales. Cependant, il a mentionné seulement une ou deux auteurEs à travers le livre et ce, seulement quand il est question du féminisme…. Comment c’est possible??
En gros la morale du livre c’est : don’t try to be something you’re not!
Texte écrit de manière extrêmement complexe ce qui rend la lecture lourde et difficile. Les sujets sont intéressants, mais on ne peut s’empêcher de penser que l’auteur complexifie le texte juste pour le rendre moins accessible.
Aussi, gros problème, l’auteur mentionne une vingtaine d’auteurs qui ont contribué à la littérature des sciences sociales. Cependant, il a mentionné seulement une ou deux auteurEs à travers le livre et ce, seulement quand il est question du féminisme…. Comment c’est possible??
En gros la morale du livre c’est : don’t try to be something you’re not!
January 3, 2016
Dylan Wiliam recommended this book recently when I asked him what were the best books on situated professional judgement, and it didn't disappoint. Flyvbjerg's ultimate topic is 'what can we know about human action' and in what form this knowledge comes. He explores the nature of learning, using the framework from the Dreyfus brothers, and in doing so distinguishes between novice learning, which is rule based; and expert learning, which is 'intuitive, holistic and based on a high volume of concrete experience', and whose rules cannot be verbalised.
This distinction and realisation is hugely powerful, and relates nicely to models of complexity (such as the Cynefyn framework) and models of organisational development, like the Powell's OIQ.
The interesting and powerful thing is that this theory, and the extensive research behind it, has not made it into thinking about learning goals. This seems a massive oversight of all those interested in curriculum, assessment and indeed learning itself - the model explains a great deal of the difficulties those trying to implement standards based assessment in naive ways face. It is hard to understand why the exploration of the separate of novice and expert learning is not a mainstream pressing concern of educators involved in writing curriculum or constructing assessments.
This distinction and realisation is hugely powerful, and relates nicely to models of complexity (such as the Cynefyn framework) and models of organisational development, like the Powell's OIQ.
The interesting and powerful thing is that this theory, and the extensive research behind it, has not made it into thinking about learning goals. This seems a massive oversight of all those interested in curriculum, assessment and indeed learning itself - the model explains a great deal of the difficulties those trying to implement standards based assessment in naive ways face. It is hard to understand why the exploration of the separate of novice and expert learning is not a mainstream pressing concern of educators involved in writing curriculum or constructing assessments.
January 28, 2021
A fascinating and eye-opening book about proper social research with special emphasis on case studies. Highly recommended for those within social and behavioural sciences.
September 10, 2022
What is the difference between social sciences and natural sciences? Which side is 'better? Is theory-building even possible for the social sciences? Is it desirable for social sciences to emulate the natural sciences as a predictive accumulative field of knowledge? Or are humans too complicated in their behaviour to ever predict?
If even a single question interests you, you should read this book. The book is very interesting, since it explains why the social sciences manoeuvre on a dead end road. However, the book is also informative and constitutive, since the author provides a way out, using primarily Aristotle and Foucault.
If even a single question interests you, you should read this book. The book is very interesting, since it explains why the social sciences manoeuvre on a dead end road. However, the book is also informative and constitutive, since the author provides a way out, using primarily Aristotle and Foucault.
July 15, 2014
It may be a defining book of the social sciences, assuming that social scientists care to read it. His calls for a phronetic social science are timely, and cannot be dismissed. The Aristotelian turn in the social sciences is becoming more and more evident, from International Relations ("the practice turn") to Philosophy (Macintyre and Gadamer) to Sociology and Anthropology (Foucault, Bourdieu and Robert Putnam).
I personally liked the sections where he elaborated on how the skill-acquisition model is absolutely fundamental to understanding human action. It would be quite interesting to further develop his model within the framework Macintyre proposes and using the hermeneutics of Gadamer.
I personally liked the sections where he elaborated on how the skill-acquisition model is absolutely fundamental to understanding human action. It would be quite interesting to further develop his model within the framework Macintyre proposes and using the hermeneutics of Gadamer.
October 20, 2008
As a graduate student, this was a really useful book to read. Flyvbjerg offers a refreshingly practical way out of the post-modern navel gazing that paralyzed many in my generation. It even is a helpful salve against the recurring existential crisis that plagues me as an academic because it offers clear, practical tools for research practice. Unlike most Foucaultians, he favors practical application over endless, fruitless discourse.
September 23, 2024
"What is the use of political science ?"
According to the author, political science is not a science designed to produce universal or predictive theories, like natural sciences. Flyvbjerg argues that the very nature of political, social and cultural phenomena, rooted in varying contexts, makes it impossible to search for general laws but excels at practical and ethical reflection.
The author based his reflexion on a concept of Aristotle, phronesis, which occupies a central place in his vision of political science. For a society to flourish politically, economically and culturally, Flyvbjerg emphasizes the importance of phronesis, to which he adds the importance of power, to engage in reflection and discussion on values, ethics, and collective interests. Unlike the natural sciences, political science must focus on concrete dilemmas, on what is good or bad for society, in a practical and contextual framework. For example, Flyvbjerg believes that social and political scientists must embrace phronesis to engage in public debate and encourage dialogue on social issues. It is not a question of formulating theories but of providing practical answers to political problems, while taking into account the values, interests and power dynamics at stake in each specific context.
In conclusion, political science has a crucial function: it must help to inform public debate, encourage citizen participation and foster collective deliberation on issues of common interest. Political and social sciences are the best equipped disciplines to deal with values and interests that shape society. They allow us to think not only about the means of achieving objectives, but also about the very purposes of these objectives in order to overcome this sentence by Richard Livingstone: ‘‘if you want a description of our age, here is one: the civilization of means without ends’’.
According to the author, political science is not a science designed to produce universal or predictive theories, like natural sciences. Flyvbjerg argues that the very nature of political, social and cultural phenomena, rooted in varying contexts, makes it impossible to search for general laws but excels at practical and ethical reflection.
The author based his reflexion on a concept of Aristotle, phronesis, which occupies a central place in his vision of political science. For a society to flourish politically, economically and culturally, Flyvbjerg emphasizes the importance of phronesis, to which he adds the importance of power, to engage in reflection and discussion on values, ethics, and collective interests. Unlike the natural sciences, political science must focus on concrete dilemmas, on what is good or bad for society, in a practical and contextual framework. For example, Flyvbjerg believes that social and political scientists must embrace phronesis to engage in public debate and encourage dialogue on social issues. It is not a question of formulating theories but of providing practical answers to political problems, while taking into account the values, interests and power dynamics at stake in each specific context.
In conclusion, political science has a crucial function: it must help to inform public debate, encourage citizen participation and foster collective deliberation on issues of common interest. Political and social sciences are the best equipped disciplines to deal with values and interests that shape society. They allow us to think not only about the means of achieving objectives, but also about the very purposes of these objectives in order to overcome this sentence by Richard Livingstone: ‘‘if you want a description of our age, here is one: the civilization of means without ends’’.
March 4, 2020
For me, this is a must-read book for social scientists. The author excavates the wisdom of the Aristotelean virtues to substantiate his arguments about the needs to performing a phronesis research approach. He includes the understanding of power taken from Foucault's works into the method to show that there is still a "blank spot" in the analysis of institutions in general. The result of it is that social science is a matter of continuous seeking and redefinition of value rationality. Also, social science can be more practical by including the analysis of power and be closer to the ethical issues: "who gains and who loses" and "what should be done". This book is an important book to understand in what ways social science can contribute to solving today's societal problems, such as climate change and justice, democratic government, sustainable development, etc..
January 1, 2019
I had high hopes for this book, they were not realized. Some original thought but it quickly becomes a defense and apology for qualitative research methods, especially the case study. The end reads like a personal vendetta against how city planning is conducted. The book contains some very strong claims, for example the sentence ‘Plato was wrong’ without sufficient argument to back up a astounding claim. It is important to note that the author is not a trained philosopher and it shows in the contradiction contained in the argument. If you are looking for a good book on the philosophy of social science, this is not it.
July 5, 2021
This book opened my eyes… the aristotelian concept of „phronesis“ (once again) proofs very helpful to unterstand the intellecual virtue of practical knowledge. I recommend to accompany this read with the foundational works of american pragmatism by Dewey and Pierce.
October 8, 2017
Content is great if you can get beyond the poorly worded sentences.
January 2, 2019
This book was a required text for a class called “Philosophy and Research” class I took last 2018-2 semester in SNU. Noticing a trend in the research world that over-emphasizes the natural science way of doing research, Bent Flyvbjerg, the author argues that this approach does not suffice to cover the complexities and ever-changing nature of Social Study’s subject; society and people. He proposes an alternative way of looking and doing social science research called phronetic research, the name itself came from phronesis, which is one of Aristotle’s three conceptions of knowledge.
Phronetic Research, argues Flyzbjerg, is one that focuses on these four value-rationality questions:
1. Where are we at?
2. Is it desirable?
3. Who loses and who wins? And by what mechanism?
4. What should we do next?
My opinion? It is an intriguing book, but definitely not an easy read. Because although it is a book about qualitative research method instead of taking the usual procedural style like Creswell‘s Research Design Book, the author builds his points by drawing arguments of various classic and modern philosophers (from Plato and Aristotle to Foucault and Nietszche). Adding to this is the fact that the professor for this class was a philosopher, so while reading the book I felt like I was studying for a philosophy class instead of a research method. Hm, maybe the class was built to be more of a methodology class rather than a research method one.
Phronetic Research, argues Flyzbjerg, is one that focuses on these four value-rationality questions:
1. Where are we at?
2. Is it desirable?
3. Who loses and who wins? And by what mechanism?
4. What should we do next?
My opinion? It is an intriguing book, but definitely not an easy read. Because although it is a book about qualitative research method instead of taking the usual procedural style like Creswell‘s Research Design Book, the author builds his points by drawing arguments of various classic and modern philosophers (from Plato and Aristotle to Foucault and Nietszche). Adding to this is the fact that the professor for this class was a philosopher, so while reading the book I felt like I was studying for a philosophy class instead of a research method. Hm, maybe the class was built to be more of a methodology class rather than a research method one.
January 10, 2020
This book gives such enlightenment. As a novice researcher in social sciences, I found that this book is super relevant!
October 11, 2020
Hegde sir told me to read this when I said I wanted to learn Sociology. I have strange feelings about this book. I have no idea why he told me t read it. Hmm
February 28, 2023
veldig bra men hjelpes er det ingen som klarer å skrive uforvirrende om foucault???
January 7, 2015
I recently finished this book, and am still pondering my impressions. Overall, it is well-written, including perhaps the only approachable treatment of Continental Post-Modernists I've come across. I highly recommend it for anyone interested in philosophy of [social] science.
The book begins with Aristotle's cleavage of "knowing" into three types: episteme, techne, and phronesis. The author argues that natural sciences focus on episteme and techne, following in the footsteps of Plato; phronesis has never received the same prominence in Western scientific tradition. From this beginning the author makes two assertions and essentially argues if A, then B. First assertion: social sciences can never achieve the same epistemic depth and sophistication as the natural sciences. Second assertion/conclusion: the social sciences are well-positioned to examine phronetic knowing, and since the epistemic project is doomed to failure, social scientists should re-focus their efforts on phronesis.
In my opinion, the weakest part of the book is the argument that social sciences can never achieve superb epistemic knowledge. The author sets up a bit of a straw man argument. Obviously individuals are not predictable in the same way that physical objects are. I have two counters to his argument. First, social sciences have done well with stochastic models, where the expected behavior of groups is relatively predictable, whereas behavior of individuals is not. The entire advertising and political propaganda industry is built on this knowledge. Second, there are plenty of natural sciences (such as meteorology) where phenomena cannot be predicted with long-term accuracy, but local models of temporally-bound behavior are useful. My argument back to the author is that epistemic social science can provide useful, context-bound knowledge; the definition of epistemic knowledge as "context free" is an unnecessary constraint.
The argument for a phronetic social science logically stands on its own, and does not require negating the epistemic social science program for justification. Here is where the book shines - calling for a serious investigation into power and values in social phenomena, without getting mired in the mind-numbing rhetoric of post-modernism. I plan on re-reading some of these chapters to really digest the implications for my own work in education research.
The book begins with Aristotle's cleavage of "knowing" into three types: episteme, techne, and phronesis. The author argues that natural sciences focus on episteme and techne, following in the footsteps of Plato; phronesis has never received the same prominence in Western scientific tradition. From this beginning the author makes two assertions and essentially argues if A, then B. First assertion: social sciences can never achieve the same epistemic depth and sophistication as the natural sciences. Second assertion/conclusion: the social sciences are well-positioned to examine phronetic knowing, and since the epistemic project is doomed to failure, social scientists should re-focus their efforts on phronesis.
In my opinion, the weakest part of the book is the argument that social sciences can never achieve superb epistemic knowledge. The author sets up a bit of a straw man argument. Obviously individuals are not predictable in the same way that physical objects are. I have two counters to his argument. First, social sciences have done well with stochastic models, where the expected behavior of groups is relatively predictable, whereas behavior of individuals is not. The entire advertising and political propaganda industry is built on this knowledge. Second, there are plenty of natural sciences (such as meteorology) where phenomena cannot be predicted with long-term accuracy, but local models of temporally-bound behavior are useful. My argument back to the author is that epistemic social science can provide useful, context-bound knowledge; the definition of epistemic knowledge as "context free" is an unnecessary constraint.
The argument for a phronetic social science logically stands on its own, and does not require negating the epistemic social science program for justification. Here is where the book shines - calling for a serious investigation into power and values in social phenomena, without getting mired in the mind-numbing rhetoric of post-modernism. I plan on re-reading some of these chapters to really digest the implications for my own work in education research.
December 15, 2010
This is a fantastic book that I wish I'd read when it came out in 2001. Offers a compelling case for eschewing the trend toward everything quantitative and the attempt to make social science a "hard" science. Instead Flyvbjerg, a Danish economic geographer, argues for a methodology he dubs "phronesis", based on Aristotelian principles and carried out via careful fieldwork, "thick" description, and a series of critical questions that take into account the essential role of power. His chapter on Foucault and Habermas is brilliant.
February 3, 2016
Flyvberg is arguing that social science should increasingly withdraw from the "Science Wars" with the natural science, a battle it will inevitably lose. Instead, the social science should assert their role as an alternative form of science. Instead of focusing on techne (technial knowledge) and episteme (scientific knowledge), social sciences should look at phronesis (wisdom). The discipline, Flyvberg asserts, should embrace interpretivism, and use this as a means to pursue research with normative implications on the lives of people.
August 16, 2016
Very interesting and thought-provoking book. Helped renew my enthusiasm that this field of social science, that I've gradually got further into during my PhD, can produce valuable and relevant work.
I also enjoyed Flyvbjerg's prose style (of course with the aid of his translator into English from the Danish original) which is engaging, straight-forward, and gradually renders and draws out the relevance of other authors well known for their difficulty to read and appreciate (Nietzsche, Foucault) to engaging with complex social issues.
I also enjoyed Flyvbjerg's prose style (of course with the aid of his translator into English from the Danish original) which is engaging, straight-forward, and gradually renders and draws out the relevance of other authors well known for their difficulty to read and appreciate (Nietzsche, Foucault) to engaging with complex social issues.
December 15, 2015
Not the most concise explanation why social science is loosing The Science War against the natural science, but I would still highly recommend the book. One of the best written books about the changing purpose of social science. I've expected simple comparisons but I found something wider and more questioning.
January 11, 2010
If I could have given this 4.5 stars, I would have. It's an excellent book, but I'm mostly enamored of the theory laid down in chapters 1-4. You can see my summary of the book and some light critique in my next blog post: http://tinyurl.com/y8cptbg
June 19, 2009
so so great at harnessing philosophy to talk about social science
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