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The Peloponnesian War
For three decades in the fifth century B.C. the ancient world was torn apart by a conflict that was as dramatic, divisive, and destructive as the world wars of the twentieth century: the Peloponnesian War. Donald Kagan, one of the world’s most respected classical, political, and military historians, here presents a new account of this vicious war of Greek against Greek, Athenian against Spartan. The Peloponnesian War is a magisterial work of history written for general readers, offering a fresh examination of a pivotal moment in Western civilization. With a lively, readable narrative that conveys a richly
detailed portrait of a vanished world while honoring its timeless relevance, The Peloponnesian War is a chronicle of the rise and fall of a great empire and of a dark time whose lessons still resonate today.
detailed portrait of a vanished world while honoring its timeless relevance, The Peloponnesian War is a chronicle of the rise and fall of a great empire and of a dark time whose lessons still resonate today.
511 pages, Paperback
First published May 12, 2003
About the author
Donald Kagan
114 books223 followersDonald Kagan (May 1, 1932 – August 6, 2021) was a Lithuanian-born American historian and classicist at Yale University specializing in ancient Greece. He formerly taught in the Department of History at Cornell University. Kagan was considered among the foremost American scholars of Greek history and is notable for his four-volume history of the Peloponnesian War.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 241 reviews
December 4, 2013
This book is rightly considered an historical masterpiece, but a few flaws kept me from thoroughly enjoying it.
Kagan's scholarship is tremendous, as is his breadth of knowledge on the subject. His style is generally entertaining, with a very British style of dry humor that tend to make history books much more readable to a wide audience.
My main fault with the book is his ideological biases which are extremely transparent. For example, he is pro-democracy to the point of forgiving the assembly voting for heinous murders because they were "relatively" fair and forgiving for the time period. From reading his other works, I understand his love of modern democracy, however it is quite anachronistic to apply our modern notions of democracy to ancient Athens. Athens should not be given a moral carte blanche because they were a democracy and, coincidently, we are today governed by democratic principles. At times, Kagan comes disturbingly close to rationalizing gross abuses by the Athenian democrats. A modern person should not praise the Athenians for being a democracy, they should condemn them for being imperialists.
Kagan takes pains to make the Spartans into incompetent villians. Their victories are accidental and their losses require little explanation. Their leaders are faulted for being overwhelmingly conservative and not taking advantage of moments of Athenian weakness, yet, when a dynamic Spartan leader emerges-like Brasidas or Lysander- he is faulted as being a sinister imperialist.
The message is fairly clear: Imperialism is fine if it is used to install a puppet government which happens to be a democracy; Imperialism is a great evil if you use it to install oligarchic government. This ideology is very familiar to modern neo-conservatives schooled in the "democracy is always right" mindset. Whether or not this idea is valid today, imposing it on Greek society of 2400 years ago is, as I said above, anachronistic and totally wrong.
Kagan's scholarship is tremendous, as is his breadth of knowledge on the subject. His style is generally entertaining, with a very British style of dry humor that tend to make history books much more readable to a wide audience.
My main fault with the book is his ideological biases which are extremely transparent. For example, he is pro-democracy to the point of forgiving the assembly voting for heinous murders because they were "relatively" fair and forgiving for the time period. From reading his other works, I understand his love of modern democracy, however it is quite anachronistic to apply our modern notions of democracy to ancient Athens. Athens should not be given a moral carte blanche because they were a democracy and, coincidently, we are today governed by democratic principles. At times, Kagan comes disturbingly close to rationalizing gross abuses by the Athenian democrats. A modern person should not praise the Athenians for being a democracy, they should condemn them for being imperialists.
Kagan takes pains to make the Spartans into incompetent villians. Their victories are accidental and their losses require little explanation. Their leaders are faulted for being overwhelmingly conservative and not taking advantage of moments of Athenian weakness, yet, when a dynamic Spartan leader emerges-like Brasidas or Lysander- he is faulted as being a sinister imperialist.
The message is fairly clear: Imperialism is fine if it is used to install a puppet government which happens to be a democracy; Imperialism is a great evil if you use it to install oligarchic government. This ideology is very familiar to modern neo-conservatives schooled in the "democracy is always right" mindset. Whether or not this idea is valid today, imposing it on Greek society of 2400 years ago is, as I said above, anachronistic and totally wrong.
June 12, 2024
A message from History
2,400 years ago two groups of Greek states fought a 27 year war which ruined both of them. One group, led by Athens, was democratically-inclined though “democracy” was limited to a certain class. The other, led by Sparta, was certainly oligarchic, though due to limited technology anyone’s dictatorial powers were limited. In that small area that stretched from Sicily to Greece, the Aegean islands, and the coast of present-day Turkey, groups of supporters of oligarchy and democracy fought repeated civil wars, pulled coups constantly, and consistently massacred one another. This was outside the actual war which ultimately drained all Greece and led to diminished population and impoverished economies. If you can remember the names of all the leaders, all the states and battles, it will be a miracle, but it isn’t necessary to remember Miletus, Aegina, Naupactus, Thebes, etc. The book has a set of excellent maps—both of geography and of battles. It is a masterly work of history which not only tells the story, but makes consistently intelligent comments from the perspective of the 21st century.
I read this book because I’d heard about the Peloponnesian War all my life, but never knew what it was about except that it involved Athens vs. Sparta. But quickly, as I read, I realized that the worth of the book for most readers is not in the details I just mentioned above. No, the value of Kagan’s work is that it provides a mirror for any student of human existence, showing that our nature has not changed and politics have not changed. The alliances of today only mirror those of 2,400 years ago, the fortunes of leaders remain the same, the rise of opportunists the same, the follies of war and civil unrest the same. In particular, the rise and fall of faith in democracy remind me of today’s America.
At one point in Athens young aristocrats began to assassinate political enemies. “The popular assembly and council still met, but members of the [pro-oligarchy] movement now controlled the agenda and were the only ones to speak, for their opponents were terrified into silence. ‘If anyone should speak in opposition, he was immediately killed in some convenient way’. The perpetrators were tolerated, subject to neither investigations, arrests, charges or trials.”
I predict such a situation in the not-distant future in my own country.
The final result was that Macedon and Persia dominated the Greeks though Sparta nominally won the war. Athens rebounded soon afterwards, but never regained its power. Now, with weapons never dreamed of in the days of triremes and hoplites, the mere survival of the human race can be brought into question if we succumb to our all-too-human tendencies to fight instead of using reason. We still have demagogues, we have far better propaganda than before, and we still have masses of people who follow charlatans blindly. I am quite pessimistic.
August 9, 2022
2,400 years ago two groups of Greek states fought a 27 year war which ruined both of them. One group, led by Athens, was democratically-inclined though “democracy” was limited to a certain class. The other, led by Sparta, was certainly oligarchic, though due to limited technology anyone’s dictatorial powers were limited. In that small area that stretched from Sicily to Greece, the Aegean islands, and the coast of present-day Turkey, groups of supporters of oligarchy and democracy fought repeated civil wars, pulled coups constantly, and consistently massacred one another. This was outside the actual war which ultimately drained all Greece and led to diminished population and impoverished economies. If you can remember the names of all the leaders, all the states and battles, it will be a miracle, but it isn’t necessary to remember Miletus, Aegina, Naupactus, Thebes, etc. The book has a set of excellent maps—both of geography and of battles. It is a masterly work of history which not only tells the story, but makes consistently intelligent comments from the perspective of the 21st century.
I read this book because I’d heard about the Peloponnesian War all my life, but never knew what it was about except that it involved Athens vs. Sparta. But quickly, as I read, I realized that the worth of the book for most readers is not in the details I just mentioned above. No, the value of Kagan’s work is that it provides a mirror for any student of human existence, showing that our nature has not changed and politics have not changed. The alliances of today only mirror those of 2,400 years ago, the fortunes of leaders remain the same, the rise of opportunists the same, the follies of war and civil unrest the same. In particular, the rise and fall of faith in democracy remind me of today’s America.
At one point in Athens young aristocrats began to assassinate political enemies. “The popular assembly and council still met, but members of the [pro-oligarchy] movement now controlled the agenda and were the only ones to speak, for their opponents were terrified into silence. ‘If anyone should speak in opposition, he was immediately killed in some convenient way’. The perpetrators were tolerated, subject to neither investigations, arrests, charges or trials.”
I predict such a situation in the not-distant future in my own country.
The final result was that Macedon and Persia dominated the Greeks though Sparta nominally won the war. Athens rebounded soon afterwards, but never regained its power. Now, with weapons never dreamed of in the days of triremes and hoplites, the mere survival of the human race can be brought into question if we succumb to our all-too-human tendencies to fight instead of using reason. We still have demagogues, we have far better propaganda than before, and we still have masses of people who follow charlatans blindly. I am quite pessimistic.
August 9, 2022
April 14, 2012
This book is wonderful because it takes Thucydides classic text--itself a wonder--and fills in the gaps, or corrects the ancient text where necessary. Thucydides is cited throughout in a manner reminiscent of the notation used to cite Biblical chapter and verse. In addition, Kagan refers to the writings of Plutarch, Xenophon, Diodorus, Socrates, Aristophanes, and others, especially for the last seven years of the war, a period Thucydides does not cover. Like any scholar worth his salt, Kagan is conversant with the scholarly consensus, with which he is for the most part in step, though he occasionally offers alternative scenarios. Much of the book is simply riveting. Like when the Spartan general Brasidas retakes Amphipolis, or the naval battle fought late in the war for control of the Hellespont. Woven throughout is the longer story of the Athenian turncoat, Alcibiades. Professor Kagan preceded this one-volume history with a four-volume history of the war that took him around 20 years to write. That 4-volume series is a much more detailed consideration of political motives and military strategy. But with this single volume, Kagan was able to produce a fast-moving tale, full of incident and colorful description. I am not a great reader of military histories; most, in my experience, are a boring slog. But because of Kagan's previous in-depth consideration of the same events, and the need to get the story told in a mere 485 pages, the result is a taut, compressed narrative that moves briskly and bears the reader delightedly along.
April 1, 2014
I liked this book. No, I am not a history professional. I picked it up because i wanted to know more about what happened. I had skimmed reviews and seen the general approval of the book when it came out so i gave it a chance. I am glad I did. I read lots of programming books so i have - ( believe it or not, follow me here) low tolerance for boredom. A low tolerance because if the information is not useful why am I reading it? This book was great because it changed my mindset from "How is this useful to me?" to "Now what the hell are they going to do?" Reading this made me feel as if I was there at the time. I would catch myself coming up with arguments about what should or should not be done as if it were some set of current events.
I am going to give Kagan the best compliments I can
1) After reading this book I want to read more about the ancient world.
2) This book will be my standard to compare other history books to.
3) I will come back and re-read this book.
I have read other criticisms about this book and I don't get them.
Kagan is supposed to have a pro democracy bias. Okay, he's cheering for the Athenians. I don't feel that my understanding is horribly marred because he is pro Athenian and I don't get the feeling he is trying to sell war bonds for Athens. The other part about notes and appendices I probably wouldn't read them. I am enthused about the book. I want to learn more. I am not a professional trying to catch Kagan in an error.
Great book
I am going to give Kagan the best compliments I can
1) After reading this book I want to read more about the ancient world.
2) This book will be my standard to compare other history books to.
3) I will come back and re-read this book.
I have read other criticisms about this book and I don't get them.
Kagan is supposed to have a pro democracy bias. Okay, he's cheering for the Athenians. I don't feel that my understanding is horribly marred because he is pro Athenian and I don't get the feeling he is trying to sell war bonds for Athens. The other part about notes and appendices I probably wouldn't read them. I am enthused about the book. I want to learn more. I am not a professional trying to catch Kagan in an error.
Great book
June 3, 2024
I don't recommend this book for complete newcomers to the time period. It's very detailed, but in a fast-paced and interesting way (not dense) but there are just too many terms, places, and too much context to really be enjoyed without having some foundation first.
I recommend reading Anthony Everitt's Rise of Athens to get an overview of the time period and then dive into this rich narrative of imperial greed, human ambition, and warhawking mob rule. I loved this book.
Except for the Argive Alliance. No one can make the Argive Alliance interesting.
I recommend reading Anthony Everitt's Rise of Athens to get an overview of the time period and then dive into this rich narrative of imperial greed, human ambition, and warhawking mob rule. I loved this book.
Except for the Argive Alliance. No one can make the Argive Alliance interesting.
December 17, 2020
This was an excellent explanation and examination of the Peloponnesian War, the war that effectively broke the prestige and power of the Greek City states. Kagan does a great job of both explaining the events (battles, diplomacy, politics), how they fit into the larger picture, and why they occurred.
For being a book about a war there were relatively few open battles fought. It was primarily a conflict of military positioning, diplomatic intrigue (both between Greek City states and with outside powers like the Persian Empire), and economics. On top of that there was massive unrest within city states between democratic factions and oligarchic factions leading to unprecedented massacres and violence.
Kagan makes clear how much the war destroyed Greek norms with tragic results, it tore apart communities, led to the profaning of religious sites, and generally made life in Greece miserable for everyone, even if they were neutral. Kagan take away from the War (Which lasted decades punctuated by unstable peace periods) was how much of it could be avoided but, due to existing political constraints placed the main actors, was not.
The Peloponnesian War was a tragedy both for the destruction left in its wake and for all the missed opportunities to turn off the road of ruin that were not taken.
For being a book about a war there were relatively few open battles fought. It was primarily a conflict of military positioning, diplomatic intrigue (both between Greek City states and with outside powers like the Persian Empire), and economics. On top of that there was massive unrest within city states between democratic factions and oligarchic factions leading to unprecedented massacres and violence.
Kagan makes clear how much the war destroyed Greek norms with tragic results, it tore apart communities, led to the profaning of religious sites, and generally made life in Greece miserable for everyone, even if they were neutral. Kagan take away from the War (Which lasted decades punctuated by unstable peace periods) was how much of it could be avoided but, due to existing political constraints placed the main actors, was not.
The Peloponnesian War was a tragedy both for the destruction left in its wake and for all the missed opportunities to turn off the road of ruin that were not taken.
January 17, 2016
The Peloponnesian War by Donald Kagan
4 Stars
Most countries and its citizens make two mistakes when contemplating war. Those are assumptions are 1) the war will unfold precisely in the way the proposed strategy dictates and 2) the war can be quickly won. That is true today and it was true in 431 BC. Approximately fifteen years into a tenuous thirty year peace treaty between Athens and Sparta, ,the hegemonic powers of Greece, war erupted. While Sparta is/was known for its prominence fighting, its strength lay in fighting on land in the traditional phalanx formation. Athens held the upper hand on the seas. Understanding his city's strengths and witnesses, Pericles, the most trusted leader in Athens, proposed a defensive strategy. Under Pericles the Athenians would concentrate its citizens behind the city's walls and wait out the Spartans. The city's treasury could sustain its citizens in this manner, based on the known factors, for 3-3 1/2 years. However, plague erupted in Athens and with large numbers of people in close quarters conditions were ripe to make this a devastating event. Ironically, Pericles succumbed to the disease and Athens was left with a vacuum in leadership at a time that three distinct camps had formed over the war's strategy. What was to be a short war turned into almost three decades of war, a shifting political landscape for Athens, and the decline of Athenian prominence.
For my formal studies we were required to have one modern and one ancient area of focus. My ancient area of focus was ancient Greece. I will admit I've always struggled reading or studying the Peloponnesian War. I think the main reasons for that are 1) it is such a prolonged war and 2) the layout of the cities involved. I've never had a good mental math and some of the choices in attacks just don't seem logical. But, Kagan does an excellent job providing an abundance of maps that provide the perfect balance of detail for the reader to follow. This is one of the best books I've read on this war in terms of readability. Kagan is at his best when he is describing the politics behind the war. His treatment of the oligarchic revolution, overturning democracy for a time, is concise yet thorough.
Because the cities pre-Phillip of Macedon are so different many people express a particular affinity for one city-state over another. I admit up front, I'm an Athenian girl. I adore the Athenians. So, does Kagan. So, my one complaint is that he is incredibly biased towards the motivation behind the Athenians. Yes, it was utterly amazing that the Athenians lasted as long as they did, but there were some real missteps in their execution of the war. Rather than analyze those thoroughly, Kagan defends their rationale. For this, and the lack on notes, I couldn't give it five stars.
4 Stars
Most countries and its citizens make two mistakes when contemplating war. Those are assumptions are 1) the war will unfold precisely in the way the proposed strategy dictates and 2) the war can be quickly won. That is true today and it was true in 431 BC. Approximately fifteen years into a tenuous thirty year peace treaty between Athens and Sparta, ,the hegemonic powers of Greece, war erupted. While Sparta is/was known for its prominence fighting, its strength lay in fighting on land in the traditional phalanx formation. Athens held the upper hand on the seas. Understanding his city's strengths and witnesses, Pericles, the most trusted leader in Athens, proposed a defensive strategy. Under Pericles the Athenians would concentrate its citizens behind the city's walls and wait out the Spartans. The city's treasury could sustain its citizens in this manner, based on the known factors, for 3-3 1/2 years. However, plague erupted in Athens and with large numbers of people in close quarters conditions were ripe to make this a devastating event. Ironically, Pericles succumbed to the disease and Athens was left with a vacuum in leadership at a time that three distinct camps had formed over the war's strategy. What was to be a short war turned into almost three decades of war, a shifting political landscape for Athens, and the decline of Athenian prominence.
For my formal studies we were required to have one modern and one ancient area of focus. My ancient area of focus was ancient Greece. I will admit I've always struggled reading or studying the Peloponnesian War. I think the main reasons for that are 1) it is such a prolonged war and 2) the layout of the cities involved. I've never had a good mental math and some of the choices in attacks just don't seem logical. But, Kagan does an excellent job providing an abundance of maps that provide the perfect balance of detail for the reader to follow. This is one of the best books I've read on this war in terms of readability. Kagan is at his best when he is describing the politics behind the war. His treatment of the oligarchic revolution, overturning democracy for a time, is concise yet thorough.
Because the cities pre-Phillip of Macedon are so different many people express a particular affinity for one city-state over another. I admit up front, I'm an Athenian girl. I adore the Athenians. So, does Kagan. So, my one complaint is that he is incredibly biased towards the motivation behind the Athenians. Yes, it was utterly amazing that the Athenians lasted as long as they did, but there were some real missteps in their execution of the war. Rather than analyze those thoroughly, Kagan defends their rationale. For this, and the lack on notes, I couldn't give it five stars.
May 30, 2019
Well, I have definitely learned why it’s so important to separate the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government
January 14, 2008
A single volume history by the author of a multi-volume account of this epic conflict, The Peloponnesian War reads a little like a cliff notes version. It never quite comes to life, seems all summary, rather than a re-telling informed by the larger work. It is also long on military chronology and short on culture and revealing political context. Still one is struck by how Athenian leaders were held accountable for results, facing exile, fines, replacement, even execution. We are three plus years into the disaster that is Iraq and no one has been held accountable—not for bad strategy, bad intelligence, bad cooperation on planning and execution on that planning. Rumsfeld, Rice, Wolfowitz, Cheney, their aides and allies in the inside fighting between departments and factions, all live to whine and finger point and continue their mis-conceived actions. Kagan manages a serviceable one volume history but not an exciting and engrossing one. It remains an imperial morality tale, overreaching and hubris will get you every time.
July 28, 2019
Not much that my review can add to what has already been said, so I will say only a little on this work.
Most people love this book, and I wanted to. And I adore ancient history, however this book I found to be a chore to get through. I just didn't find it as engaging as so many others did, which puts me in the minority.
Partly this is the clear and obvious bias that Kagan has for Athens.
As another reviewer pointed out, Spartan successes were always accidental, according to Kagan, and Athens democracy wiped away any moral failings by that state (of which there were legion) merely because it was a democracy.
In a way, it seemed to be a bit of a neo-conservative polemic, and less of a genuine history of the wars themselves.
Not to say that Kagan's book is not of any worth, far from it. It is still the best single volume on the war I have encountered, and Kagan's analysis of how Sparta benefited from the war (hint, they really didn't). Sparta's imperialistic policies were no better than Athens' which started the war to begin with.
Sparta lacked the resources Athens could draw on to sustain their hegemony, and the war had risen to promise the Polis of Thebes, who was strong enough to form their own hegemony over Greece a generation later, and thrashing Sparta in warfare to boot.
In terms of the war itself, Kagan does a fairly good job of at least mentioning every major, and most minor, military encounters of the war.
First and foremost, this was a naval war, hoplite, or land, battles were relatively rare. And there was only one really large land battle, Mantinea in 418, which happened to be a Spartan triumph. And this may surprise some, but Sparta actually lost more of her battles than those she emerged victorious from.
The Athenians, militarily, did exceptionally well both at sea and on land.
What hurt Athens was her image as the oppressor of the Greeks. Sparta's rallying cry of freedom for the Greeks (as in restoring the sovereignty of individual Poleis, or national sovereignty in modern parlance) resonated with enough Greek city states to strategically overstretch Athens.
And yes, the famed Athenian disaster with their Sicilian adventures and the destruction of the entire force they sent to Syracuse is well covered, and probably the best section of the entire book.
And that was truly the Athenian's Achilles Heel.
Athens simply stretched herself too far, and her imperial meddling angered too many Greek Polis', who revolted, and outside states like Syracuse (who became a staunch Spartan ally), and even the Persian Empire who saw support for Sparta as a way of permanently weakening all of the Greeks.
(Seeing as how in only a little over two generations from the end of the war, a forcibly united Greece under Macedonian rule annihilated the Persian Empire, this has to stand as a truly epic strategic failure.)
Even so, the Peloponnesian War should stand as a warning against those who assume any war entered into can be won swiftly and decisively. This one lasted a whole generation, devastated the entire region, lead to a regional economic, and demographic decline that lasted another whole generation, and all of the major players, Athens, Sparta, Corinth, Thebes, Syracuse, all of them showcased tremendous elasticity and the ability to strategically bounce back from seemingly decisive disasters.
Much like it took far more than a Verdun or a Stalingrad to finally end the power of the German state, in two world wars, so too could these ancient states crawl back to their feet following traumatic defeats.
While not a fantastic book, to my way of thinking, neither was it a bad or useless one. I can still recommend this one, just have to warn others that your mileage may vary.
Most people love this book, and I wanted to. And I adore ancient history, however this book I found to be a chore to get through. I just didn't find it as engaging as so many others did, which puts me in the minority.
Partly this is the clear and obvious bias that Kagan has for Athens.
As another reviewer pointed out, Spartan successes were always accidental, according to Kagan, and Athens democracy wiped away any moral failings by that state (of which there were legion) merely because it was a democracy.
In a way, it seemed to be a bit of a neo-conservative polemic, and less of a genuine history of the wars themselves.
Not to say that Kagan's book is not of any worth, far from it. It is still the best single volume on the war I have encountered, and Kagan's analysis of how Sparta benefited from the war (hint, they really didn't). Sparta's imperialistic policies were no better than Athens' which started the war to begin with.
Sparta lacked the resources Athens could draw on to sustain their hegemony, and the war had risen to promise the Polis of Thebes, who was strong enough to form their own hegemony over Greece a generation later, and thrashing Sparta in warfare to boot.
In terms of the war itself, Kagan does a fairly good job of at least mentioning every major, and most minor, military encounters of the war.
First and foremost, this was a naval war, hoplite, or land, battles were relatively rare. And there was only one really large land battle, Mantinea in 418, which happened to be a Spartan triumph. And this may surprise some, but Sparta actually lost more of her battles than those she emerged victorious from.
The Athenians, militarily, did exceptionally well both at sea and on land.
What hurt Athens was her image as the oppressor of the Greeks. Sparta's rallying cry of freedom for the Greeks (as in restoring the sovereignty of individual Poleis, or national sovereignty in modern parlance) resonated with enough Greek city states to strategically overstretch Athens.
And yes, the famed Athenian disaster with their Sicilian adventures and the destruction of the entire force they sent to Syracuse is well covered, and probably the best section of the entire book.
And that was truly the Athenian's Achilles Heel.
Athens simply stretched herself too far, and her imperial meddling angered too many Greek Polis', who revolted, and outside states like Syracuse (who became a staunch Spartan ally), and even the Persian Empire who saw support for Sparta as a way of permanently weakening all of the Greeks.
(Seeing as how in only a little over two generations from the end of the war, a forcibly united Greece under Macedonian rule annihilated the Persian Empire, this has to stand as a truly epic strategic failure.)
Even so, the Peloponnesian War should stand as a warning against those who assume any war entered into can be won swiftly and decisively. This one lasted a whole generation, devastated the entire region, lead to a regional economic, and demographic decline that lasted another whole generation, and all of the major players, Athens, Sparta, Corinth, Thebes, Syracuse, all of them showcased tremendous elasticity and the ability to strategically bounce back from seemingly decisive disasters.
Much like it took far more than a Verdun or a Stalingrad to finally end the power of the German state, in two world wars, so too could these ancient states crawl back to their feet following traumatic defeats.
While not a fantastic book, to my way of thinking, neither was it a bad or useless one. I can still recommend this one, just have to warn others that your mileage may vary.
April 6, 2018
500 trang sách về cuộc đối đầu 30 năm giữa hai thành bang mạnh nhất Hy Lạp cổ là Athens và Sparta. Có nhiều điểm khá thú vị về nền dân chủ Athens, về cách thức hai thành phố này tiến hành chiến tranh, về những sự rồ dại và sai lầm ngớ ngẩn của những người tham gia, và chủ yếu từ phía Athens nhưng mình quá lười để viết ra cụ thể.
Cuốn này là viết tóm tắt lại từ công trình 4 tập của Donald Kagan, chuyên gia hàng đầu về lịch sử chiến tranh cổ Hy Lạp. Ưu điểm là tác giả quá thông hiểu về thời đại và nhân vật nhưng nhược điểm có lẽ là hơi quá nhiều chi tiết nên khó nhớ và dễ lẫn với nhưngx người chưa quen lắm với lịch sư vùng đất này thế kỷ thứ 5 TCN, ví dụ với vô số tên các thành bang và tên nhân vật na ná nhau.
Đọc cuốn này để lấy tinh thần đọc Thucydides nào.
Cuốn này là viết tóm tắt lại từ công trình 4 tập của Donald Kagan, chuyên gia hàng đầu về lịch sử chiến tranh cổ Hy Lạp. Ưu điểm là tác giả quá thông hiểu về thời đại và nhân vật nhưng nhược điểm có lẽ là hơi quá nhiều chi tiết nên khó nhớ và dễ lẫn với nhưngx người chưa quen lắm với lịch sư vùng đất này thế kỷ thứ 5 TCN, ví dụ với vô số tên các thành bang và tên nhân vật na ná nhau.
Đọc cuốn này để lấy tinh thần đọc Thucydides nào.
July 3, 2022
唐納德‧卡根(Donald Kagan)是戰後美國希臘史的名家，其四卷本伯羅奔尼撒戰爭的專著，被公認是最詳盡的研究作品；幾年前華東師範大學出版社引進了第一卷《伯羅奔尼撒戰爭的爆發》，其餘三卷據說也將陸續翻譯。本書是作者聽從建議，專門針對“一般讀者”重新濃縮改寫而成，省去了學術性的研究，以增加可讀性，也讓有興趣的人可以有比較沒壓力的選擇。
這場以斯巴達人跟雅典人為主，發生在古典時期的漫長戰爭，讓希臘人在西元前五世紀所締造的黃金時代就此落幕，其箇中原由，是富有教益的故事。在華文圈，修昔底德的《伯羅奔尼撒戰爭》早有中文，幾年前又推出過新的注釋版，相關研究的書，有一本《獨一無二的戰爭》跟以雅典海軍為主體的《海上霸主》(最近剛出繁體版)，還不算太寂寞。
而國際關係圈最近出現一個辭彙：“修昔底德陷阱”，指的就是斯巴達跟雅典之間，新舊霸主是否必然爆發衝突的問題，這是一種借古喻今，但這場戰爭本來就有許多國關學者也把它視為經典案例。例如知名的學者奈伊(Joseph Nye)就在他的教科書中開不小篇幅剖析。而歷史學者對此也有各種不同的看法，莫衷一是。而這場戰爭也常常被聯想到二十世紀初的那兩場大戰，不論是爆發的情況，經過及影響，總讓人覺得歷史是不斷重複的。不論如何，伯羅奔尼撒戰爭都是熱門的討論。
伯羅奔尼撒戰爭的故事，之前提到的兩本書，筆者都閱讀過，已經有個梗概的了解，但之前我也閱讀過他那四卷本的頭一卷，非常欣賞其寫作方式，於是又繼續看了這本，果然不負所望。雖然以像蘭克這樣的大名家都主張應該讓“史料自己說話”，但其實也不是所有讀者都喜歡如同學者般的鑽研史料，卡根在本書中所做的，是一種引導跟剖析。他除了將戰爭的始末詳細的述說之外，還加入了許多自己的意見，不論是各個事件的走向，人物的決定，其功過，及批判修習底德史料等，都可看到他的見解。先不論其看法是否公允客觀，但對讀者來說，卻是非常有幫助的。而我個人則最喜歡閱讀這樣的作品，某種程度上來說，這也算是一種交流與對話。
這場戰爭有幾個主題值得討論。
首先是當然是戰爭的爆發是否無可避免。
卡根的意見是認為，兩個大國當然不可能都一心求戰，鷹派跟鴿派彼此之間互相制衡。麻煩的地方在於，有時戰爭的開始卻是相關兩大國以外的小勢力引發，不管是一戰還是希臘人都是如此。由伯羅奔尼撒聯盟中成員科林斯引起的一系列騷動，牽連了雅典的介入，雖然斯巴達人並不想干涉，但身為盟主的他如果放任不管勢必損及其威信，最終導致霸權崩潰，於是就這樣被綁架，這無疑是種諷刺之處。相對於斯巴達人的身不由己，雅典人則要看伯里克利。卡根指出，這位深謀遠慮的領袖，在他的思考裡面，眼下的體系並不穩定，雅典在當時的陸戰中無法取勝，但斯巴達人卻不敢下海，於是伯里克利決定用堅壁清野的戰術，建立長牆死守不出，然後利用海上騷擾敵人後方，消耗伯羅奔尼撒人的鬥志與物資，迫使對方最終願意坐下來談判，並從此不敢再輕啟戰端，這樣才能真正的維持兩造的長期和平，達成一種有效威嚇。因此，伯里克利的想法中便存在了一種“早打晚打不如現在打”的念頭，對於和平的努力便不是那麼盡力。卡根對此給予了批評，他認為這種戰略在理論上看來是相當完美，但現實上，在尚武的希臘社會，這種避戰做法卻只會引來更大的輕視，伯里克利可以憑著自己的威信說服雅典人遵從，但卻無法逼使斯巴達人真的如其所願，而這位領袖卻堅信自己的想法無誤，於是就決心把自己的城邦引入一場難以停歇戰火之中。
這感覺就像是一戰時，施里芬計畫對於德國的影響，它綁死了參謀本部堅持先西後東的戰略靈活性。軍事上也許有明確的目標計畫是明確的，但在政治上把自己的選擇限縮就屬不智了。今天仍有許多人用這樣的思維決定政策，無疑是危險跟值得警惕。
這場戰爭改變了古希臘人的許多面貌，習慣、風俗等，《獨一無二的戰爭》這本書整理的比較好，但卡根也有提及。
其中一個面向就是殘酷的內戰。
古希臘本來就是一個政體的實驗場，許多古往今來的人類政體在那兒都可以找到類似的案例，寡頭、獨裁、民主等。而人們為了孰優孰劣有時候必須訴諸武力，這在戰爭時候變得更加激烈。
克基拉(Coryra)島原本是雅典的盟友，寡頭派向斯巴達幫助下一度發動政變奪權成功，嗣後民主派也找來外援反擊。接著就展開一連串的大清洗，殘忍的屠殺。所有人都只忠於自己的派系，親情、道義、倫理都被置之腦後，為了自己的意識形態，什麼都可不顧。而我們對此不當陌生，二十世紀初期的西班牙，戰後的希臘等地的內戰，都可見到。
不過我們也不用太悲觀，事實上還是有人有得到教訓。雅典在戰敗後曾一度寡頭化，而色拉西布洛斯(Thrasybulus)等溫和派領導恢復了民主後，卻沒有如其他城邦那樣展開秋後算帳，而是致力達成階級和解。他們只處死跟放逐了元兇首惡，對於其他次要的人物則予以大赦。於是雅典儘管也經過內戰，卻沒有損失太大的元氣就回到了常態。這雖然是個老生常談，但所謂“仁者無敵”也不該無限上綱，事實上正確的做法是糖跟鞭子缺一不可。凱撒希望用寬容來和解羅馬共和後的腥風血雨，但他沒有肅清那些跟自己利益永遠不能妥協的死硬派，最終導致失敗，所以奧古斯都就記取了教訓來個“斷捨離”，真正建立了長久的和平。
戰爭的後期，歷史的進程取決在四個人的身上：亞西比德(Alcibiades)、尼基亞斯(Nicias)、色拉西布洛斯(Thrasybulus)跟來山德(Lysander)。前三位是雅典的主要政治人物，最後一位則是結束戰爭的男人。
先講亞西比德好了。此人是伯里克利的親戚，年少得志，人長得帥，口若懸河，聰明而擅權變，最重要的是，他野心勃勃，是沒有道德束縛的危險分子。雅典人對此人又愛又恨，他確實是有才能，但對民主體制卻是最大的危害。能夠制衡他的則是其死對頭尼基亞斯，此人出身舊貴族，以穩重謙和的美德爭取人們的信任，但隱藏在這背後卻是優柔寡斷跟無能。雅典人相信他跟亞西比德可以互補，可惜這是天大的誤會。
西西里遠征是亞西比德力主的，卡根指出，決定是公民大會下的，而且一開始其實他們的冒險是很克制的，雅典投入的兵力有限，就算損失也不會傷及根本。關鍵在於之後的政爭。出於對亞西比德的不信任，雅典指派尼基亞斯跟拉馬庫斯跟他一同出征。尼基亞斯本人是持反對立場，可他害怕被指責而不敢明言，於是耍了個小聰明想透過強調敵人敘拉古的強大來逼退公民大會，結果反而讓雅典人投入了更大的賭注，這是他導致的第一個錯誤。而且更讓人無言的是，大軍剛出征，雅典城內發生一起嚴重的瀆神事件，不管當時還是後世都沒辦法完全證明誰是兇手，可是當時的風向把嫌疑指向了正在領軍的亞西比德，結果就這樣，一個剛剛抵達敵境的統帥要被招回來審判這種不可思議的事情發生了。
隨著亞西比德的流亡，指揮權落到尼基亞斯手上，而我們知道，雅典遠征軍統帥是滿心不想打仗的。卡根評論此人時，基本上是把西西里慘敗的罪責歸咎在他身上，此人最不可被原諒的不是他戰敗，而是始終不敢面對這個現實。當戰況開始不利時，如果他能夠承擔起責任及時撤退，那雅典頂多失了顏面，至少還能保住裡子，但此時他卻是不記取教訓的，又耍了一次小聰明。尼基亞斯派使者回雅典只說敵人有增援，所以要嘛就多派援軍，不然就放棄撤退，再不然就是換人，就是不肯承認面臨失敗。且他這樣等於把責任拋向了公民大會去決定，但此時雅典根本不清楚西西里真正發生了什麼事情。於是他們又再次增加了籌碼，派遣了援軍，這等於是把所有家當都丟進去了。人類都有一種賭徒心理，特別是強���，更加輸不起，或許更該被指責的是尼基亞斯，這是第二個錯誤。而最終的悲劇在於，當西西里遠征已經確定失敗時，尼基亞斯為了挽救自己的名譽死活不肯撤退而讓雅典軍失去了最後機會，全軍覆沒便成為定局。後來雅典人也終於看透尼基亞斯的真面目，在設立紀念碑的時候忽略了此人，特別是他最後主動投降，相對於另外一位主帥德摩斯梯尼(Demosthenes)拒絕被俘而自殺(注意，不要跟稍晚的那位演說家混淆)。雖然這樣的狀況雅典自己也要負上責任，這下文會談到。
於是歷史上也留下一個話題就是，如果亞西比德從頭到尾完全指揮這場戰役是否就能避免悲劇。這個問題並不容易回答，卡根也沒想過。事實上是，助長此役失敗亞西比德多少也有關係，當時他逃亡到斯巴達，洩漏了母邦許多機密，雖說情由可原，但多少也知道其本性如何。相對於此二人，雅��人還算幸運，此時接手的是前面提過的色拉西布洛斯(Thrasybulus)，他是亞西比德的支持者，出身富裕之家，是個有才能，冷靜自持，支持有限民主的溫和派人士，曾多次挽救雅典民主於寡頭派之手，並在西西里慘敗後控制住局勢，卡根說：「他沒有亞西比德依舊可以完成任務，但亞西比德沒有色拉西布洛斯就一事無成。」由此可見其答案為何。我個人小小見解以為，如果此公出生在羅馬，尚不失為龐培，但在雅典，就只能是亞西比德了。
而當時，對雅典跟亞西比德都十分不幸的是來山德的出場。此人也是這場戰爭中的產物，以他低微的出身本不該有此地位，但當時斯巴達的戰爭機器也開始衰弱，而且此人還有母邦最缺的海戰天分！來山德跟亞西比德一樣都是野心分子，但他更加懂得收斂鋒芒，甚至能卑躬屈膝的向波斯王子小居魯士靠攏，取得其援助跟支持，贏得勝利跟自己的榮耀。在扮演救世主方面，顯然就打趴了亞西比德，儘管兩人的下場差不多。
來山德的存在只是雅典覆敗的原因之一，更大的關鍵是阿吉紐西戰役。雅典此役任命了包括伯里克利的小兒子在內十名將軍指揮，他們分工合作取得奇蹟般的勝利，但卻在戰後面臨一大難題。在當��，希臘風俗中，替戰死同袍收拾遺體下葬是首要任務，但當時斯巴達殘軍已逃，放之不管隨時會捲土重來，雅典已經沒有餘力縱虎歸山，而當時在海上也不容許回頭再處置。爭論許久後，最終將軍們請當時以平民身分來幫忙的色拉西布洛斯收拾戰場，他們前往追敵，可惜這麼一耽擱，最終卻是兩頭空，斯巴達人已去遠，而海上突如其來的風暴讓作業無法進行。
回到雅典，這件事情居然壓倒了勝利的喜悅而炸開了鍋，尤其是在部分野心政客的煽動下，公民大會追究十位將軍的責任而判處其死刑(有兩位先逃了)！儘管我們可以嘗試理解當時的情況，但不論如何包括卡根在內，都認為此一處罰太過嚴厲。而這個結果不但害死了雅典僅剩下的有經驗的良將，也讓牽扯在內的色拉西布洛斯被冷凍，更重要的是之後的接手者變的戰戰兢兢，綁手綁腳，以致於被來山德所趁，最終大敗，把雅典的剩餘力量全輸乾淨。
這是攻擊雅典民主的人們最常提及的點，而事後公民們把責任推給了煽動的政客，仿如不是自己下的決定，顯然也是一種不可取的行為。同樣犯錯的還有迦太基，而羅馬人則總是給予敗者機會。失敗並不可恥，關鍵在於能否記取教訓。之前在西西里島潰敗不願被俘而自殺的德摩斯提尼第一次出道也是敗績，但他很快就證明了自己，並成為常勝的名將，那場潰敗如果不是受制於尼基阿斯，也許他有機會力挽狂瀾或讓事情不至於如此糟糕。而反過來說，導致悲劇的尼基阿斯之所以寧屈辱的死在敵手也不願意回國，或許他早見到兩者之間差不了太多，而情願垂死掙扎置同胞安危於不顧，更何況這是其從頭到尾都不想打的一役！這些苦果，都是雅典自己種下的，必須自己承擔。
這場戰爭沒有勝利者。出於自身的考慮，來山德對雅典寬大的處置，也讓這個城邦沒多久就恢復元氣，重新建立了“第二帝國”。
但損失的是回不來的。
很快，不論是斯巴達、底比斯、雅典甚至是波斯，都成為馬其頓的亞歷山大霸業中的部分，而這個征服者的登場時間卻是用瞬間來形容也不過分。
卡根告訴我們，希臘人用血留給後人的教訓是，無論如何都不要輕啟戰端，特別是兩個強國之間，多半兩敗俱傷；還有用有利於己來判斷敵人並作計畫開戰，十之八九都是悲劇(哪怕像伯里克利也誤判了)。儘管我們也承認，二十世紀初的歐洲人完全沒把這當一回事。
本書是我在2016年內閱讀過的眾多書中，除了《羅馬革命》之外，另外一本最具教益的書，也強烈的推薦給大家。另外，更推薦花點時間去看看伯里克利那篇著名的對陣亡將士的葬禮演說，不仔細看你不會發現那是兩三年前的人寫的文章。
這場以斯巴達人跟雅典人為主，發生在古典時期的漫長戰爭，讓希臘人在西元前五世紀所締造的黃金時代就此落幕，其箇中原由，是富有教益的故事。在華文圈，修昔底德的《伯羅奔尼撒戰爭》早有中文，幾年前又推出過新的注釋版，相關研究的書，有一本《獨一無二的戰爭》跟以雅典海軍為主體的《海上霸主》(最近剛出繁體版)，還不算太寂寞。
而國際關係圈最近出現一個辭彙：“修昔底德陷阱”，指的就是斯巴達跟雅典之間，新舊霸主是否必然爆發衝突的問題，這是一種借古喻今，但這場戰爭本來就有許多國關學者也把它視為經典案例。例如知名的學者奈伊(Joseph Nye)就在他的教科書中開不小篇幅剖析。而歷史學者對此也有各種不同的看法，莫衷一是。而這場戰爭也常常被聯想到二十世紀初的那兩場大戰，不論是爆發的情況，經過及影響，總讓人覺得歷史是不斷重複的。不論如何，伯羅奔尼撒戰爭都是熱門的討論。
伯羅奔尼撒戰爭的故事，之前提到的兩本書，筆者都閱讀過，已經有個梗概的了解，但之前我也閱讀過他那四卷本的頭一卷，非常欣賞其寫作方式，於是又繼續看了這本，果然不負所望。雖然以像蘭克這樣的大名家都主張應該讓“史料自己說話”，但其實也不是所有讀者都喜歡如同學者般的鑽研史料，卡根在本書中所做的，是一種引導跟剖析。他除了將戰爭的始末詳細的述說之外，還加入了許多自己的意見，不論是各個事件的走向，人物的決定，其功過，及批判修習底德史料等，都可看到他的見解。先不論其看法是否公允客觀，但對讀者來說，卻是非常有幫助的。而我個人則最喜歡閱讀這樣的作品，某種程度上來說，這也算是一種交流與對話。
這場戰爭有幾個主題值得討論。
首先是當然是戰爭的爆發是否無可避免。
卡根的意見是認為，兩個大國當然不可能都一心求戰，鷹派跟鴿派彼此之間互相制衡。麻煩的地方在於，有時戰爭的開始卻是相關兩大國以外的小勢力引發，不管是一戰還是希臘人都是如此。由伯羅奔尼撒聯盟中成員科林斯引起的一系列騷動，牽連了雅典的介入，雖然斯巴達人並不想干涉，但身為盟主的他如果放任不管勢必損及其威信，最終導致霸權崩潰，於是就這樣被綁架，這無疑是種諷刺之處。相對於斯巴達人的身不由己，雅典人則要看伯里克利。卡根指出，這位深謀遠慮的領袖，在他的思考裡面，眼下的體系並不穩定，雅典在當時的陸戰中無法取勝，但斯巴達人卻不敢下海，於是伯里克利決定用堅壁清野的戰術，建立長牆死守不出，然後利用海上騷擾敵人後方，消耗伯羅奔尼撒人的鬥志與物資，迫使對方最終願意坐下來談判，並從此不敢再輕啟戰端，這樣才能真正的維持兩造的長期和平，達成一種有效威嚇。因此，伯里克利的想法中便存在了一種“早打晚打不如現在打”的念頭，對於和平的努力便不是那麼盡力。卡根對此給予了批評，他認為這種戰略在理論上看來是相當完美，但現實上，在尚武的希臘社會，這種避戰做法卻只會引來更大的輕視，伯里克利可以憑著自己的威信說服雅典人遵從，但卻無法逼使斯巴達人真的如其所願，而這位領袖卻堅信自己的想法無誤，於是就決心把自己的城邦引入一場難以停歇戰火之中。
這感覺就像是一戰時，施里芬計畫對於德國的影響，它綁死了參謀本部堅持先西後東的戰略靈活性。軍事上也許有明確的目標計畫是明確的，但在政治上把自己的選擇限縮就屬不智了。今天仍有許多人用這樣的思維決定政策，無疑是危險跟值得警惕。
這場戰爭改變了古希臘人的許多面貌，習慣、風俗等，《獨一無二的戰爭》這本書整理的比較好，但卡根也有提及。
其中一個面向就是殘酷的內戰。
古希臘本來就是一個政體的實驗場，許多古往今來的人類政體在那兒都可以找到類似的案例，寡頭、獨裁、民主等。而人們為了孰優孰劣有時候必須訴諸武力，這在戰爭時候變得更加激烈。
克基拉(Coryra)島原本是雅典的盟友，寡頭派向斯巴達幫助下一度發動政變奪權成功，嗣後民主派也找來外援反擊。接著就展開一連串的大清洗，殘忍的屠殺。所有人都只忠於自己的派系，親情、道義、倫理都被置之腦後，為了自己的意識形態，什麼都可不顧。而我們對此不當陌生，二十世紀初期的西班牙，戰後的希臘等地的內戰，都可見到。
不過我們也不用太悲觀，事實上還是有人有得到教訓。雅典在戰敗後曾一度寡頭化，而色拉西布洛斯(Thrasybulus)等溫和派領導恢復了民主後，卻沒有如其他城邦那樣展開秋後算帳，而是致力達成階級和解。他們只處死跟放逐了元兇首惡，對於其他次要的人物則予以大赦。於是雅典儘管也經過內戰，卻沒有損失太大的元氣就回到了常態。這雖然是個老生常談，但所謂“仁者無敵”也不該無限上綱，事實上正確的做法是糖跟鞭子缺一不可。凱撒希望用寬容來和解羅馬共和後的腥風血雨，但他沒有肅清那些跟自己利益永遠不能妥協的死硬派，最終導致失敗，所以奧古斯都就記取了教訓來個“斷捨離”，真正建立了長久的和平。
戰爭的後期，歷史的進程取決在四個人的身上：亞西比德(Alcibiades)、尼基亞斯(Nicias)、色拉西布洛斯(Thrasybulus)跟來山德(Lysander)。前三位是雅典的主要政治人物，最後一位則是結束戰爭的男人。
先講亞西比德好了。此人是伯里克利的親戚，年少得志，人長得帥，口若懸河，聰明而擅權變，最重要的是，他野心勃勃，是沒有道德束縛的危險分子。雅典人對此人又愛又恨，他確實是有才能，但對民主體制卻是最大的危害。能夠制衡他的則是其死對頭尼基亞斯，此人出身舊貴族，以穩重謙和的美德爭取人們的信任，但隱藏在這背後卻是優柔寡斷跟無能。雅典人相信他跟亞西比德可以互補，可惜這是天大的誤會。
西西里遠征是亞西比德力主的，卡根指出，決定是公民大會下的，而且一開始其實他們的冒險是很克制的，雅典投入的兵力有限，就算損失也不會傷及根本。關鍵在於之後的政爭。出於對亞西比德的不信任，雅典指派尼基亞斯跟拉馬庫斯跟他一同出征。尼基亞斯本人是持反對立場，可他害怕被指責而不敢明言，於是耍了個小聰明想透過強調敵人敘拉古的強大來逼退公民大會，結果反而讓雅典人投入了更大的賭注，這是他導致的第一個錯誤。而且更讓人無言的是，大軍剛出征，雅典城內發生一起嚴重的瀆神事件，不管當時還是後世都沒辦法完全證明誰是兇手，可是當時的風向把嫌疑指向了正在領軍的亞西比德，結果就這樣，一個剛剛抵達敵境的統帥要被招回來審判這種不可思議的事情發生了。
隨著亞西比德的流亡，指揮權落到尼基亞斯手上，而我們知道，雅典遠征軍統帥是滿心不想打仗的。卡根評論此人時，基本上是把西西里慘敗的罪責歸咎在他身上，此人最不可被原諒的不是他戰敗，而是始終不敢面對這個現實。當戰況開始不利時，如果他能夠承擔起責任及時撤退，那雅典頂多失了顏面，至少還能保住裡子，但此時他卻是不記取教訓的，又耍了一次小聰明。尼基亞斯派使者回雅典只說敵人有增援，所以要嘛就多派援軍，不然就放棄撤退，再不然就是換人，就是不肯承認面臨失敗。且他這樣等於把責任拋向了公民大會去決定，但此時雅典根本不清楚西西里真正發生了什麼事情。於是他們又再次增加了籌碼，派遣了援軍，這等於是把所有家當都丟進去了。人類都有一種賭徒心理，特別是強���，更加輸不起，或許更該被指責的是尼基亞斯，這是第二個錯誤。而最終的悲劇在於，當西西里遠征已經確定失敗時，尼基亞斯為了挽救自己的名譽死活不肯撤退而讓雅典軍失去了最後機會，全軍覆沒便成為定局。後來雅典人也終於看透尼基亞斯的真面目，在設立紀念碑的時候忽略了此人，特別是他最後主動投降，相對於另外一位主帥德摩斯梯尼(Demosthenes)拒絕被俘而自殺(注意，不要跟稍晚的那位演說家混淆)。雖然這樣的狀況雅典自己也要負上責任，這下文會談到。
於是歷史上也留下一個話題就是，如果亞西比德從頭到尾完全指揮這場戰役是否就能避免悲劇。這個問題並不容易回答，卡根也沒想過。事實上是，助長此役失敗亞西比德多少也有關係，當時他逃亡到斯巴達，洩漏了母邦許多機密，雖說情由可原，但多少也知道其本性如何。相對於此二人，雅��人還算幸運，此時接手的是前面提過的色拉西布洛斯(Thrasybulus)，他是亞西比德的支持者，出身富裕之家，是個有才能，冷靜自持，支持有限民主的溫和派人士，曾多次挽救雅典民主於寡頭派之手，並在西西里慘敗後控制住局勢，卡根說：「他沒有亞西比德依舊可以完成任務，但亞西比德沒有色拉西布洛斯就一事無成。」由此可見其答案為何。我個人小小見解以為，如果此公出生在羅馬，尚不失為龐培，但在雅典，就只能是亞西比德了。
而當時，對雅典跟亞西比德都十分不幸的是來山德的出場。此人也是這場戰爭中的產物，以他低微的出身本不該有此地位，但當時斯巴達的戰爭機器也開始衰弱，而且此人還有母邦最缺的海戰天分！來山德跟亞西比德一樣都是野心分子，但他更加懂得收斂鋒芒，甚至能卑躬屈膝的向波斯王子小居魯士靠攏，取得其援助跟支持，贏得勝利跟自己的榮耀。在扮演救世主方面，顯然就打趴了亞西比德，儘管兩人的下場差不多。
來山德的存在只是雅典覆敗的原因之一，更大的關鍵是阿吉紐西戰役。雅典此役任命了包括伯里克利的小兒子在內十名將軍指揮，他們分工合作取得奇蹟般的勝利，但卻在戰後面臨一大難題。在當��，希臘風俗中，替戰死同袍收拾遺體下葬是首要任務，但當時斯巴達殘軍已逃，放之不管隨時會捲土重來，雅典已經沒有餘力縱虎歸山，而當時在海上也不容許回頭再處置。爭論許久後，最終將軍們請當時以平民身分來幫忙的色拉西布洛斯收拾戰場，他們前往追敵，可惜這麼一耽擱，最終卻是兩頭空，斯巴達人已去遠，而海上突如其來的風暴讓作業無法進行。
回到雅典，這件事情居然壓倒了勝利的喜悅而炸開了鍋，尤其是在部分野心政客的煽動下，公民大會追究十位將軍的責任而判處其死刑(有兩位先逃了)！儘管我們可以嘗試理解當時的情況，但不論如何包括卡根在內，都認為此一處罰太過嚴厲。而這個結果不但害死了雅典僅剩下的有經驗的良將，也讓牽扯在內的色拉西布洛斯被冷凍，更重要的是之後的接手者變的戰戰兢兢，綁手綁腳，以致於被來山德所趁，最終大敗，把雅典的剩餘力量全輸乾淨。
這是攻擊雅典民主的人們最常提及的點，而事後公民們把責任推給了煽動的政客，仿如不是自己下的決定，顯然也是一種不可取的行為。同樣犯錯的還有迦太基，而羅馬人則總是給予敗者機會。失敗並不可恥，關鍵在於能否記取教訓。之前在西西里島潰敗不願被俘而自殺的德摩斯提尼第一次出道也是敗績，但他很快就證明了自己，並成為常勝的名將，那場潰敗如果不是受制於尼基阿斯，也許他有機會力挽狂瀾或讓事情不至於如此糟糕。而反過來說，導致悲劇的尼基阿斯之所以寧屈辱的死在敵手也不願意回國，或許他早見到兩者之間差不了太多，而情願垂死掙扎置同胞安危於不顧，更何況這是其從頭到尾都不想打的一役！這些苦果，都是雅典自己種下的，必須自己承擔。
這場戰爭沒有勝利者。出於自身的考慮，來山德對雅典寬大的處置，也讓這個城邦沒多久就恢復元氣，重新建立了“第二帝國”。
但損失的是回不來的。
很快，不論是斯巴達、底比斯、雅典甚至是波斯，都成為馬其頓的亞歷山大霸業中的部分，而這個征服者的登場時間卻是用瞬間來形容也不過分。
卡根告訴我們，希臘人用血留給後人的教訓是，無論如何都不要輕啟戰端，特別是兩個強國之間，多半兩敗俱傷；還有用有利於己來判斷敵人並作計畫開戰，十之八九都是悲劇(哪怕像伯里克利也誤判了)。儘管我們也承認，二十世紀初的歐洲人完全沒把這當一回事。
本書是我在2016年內閱讀過的眾多書中，除了《羅馬革命》之外，另外一本最具教益的書，也強烈的推薦給大家。另外，更推薦花點時間去看看伯里克利那篇著名的對陣亡將士的葬禮演說，不仔細看你不會發現那是兩三年前的人寫的文章。
May 5, 2017
In 1969 Donald Kagan published the first volume of what was to become his tetralogy entitled "A New History of the Peloponnesian War." After some 1300 pages and the publication of the final volume in 1987 you would think that Mr. Kagan would be quite finished with that particular war. Especially since there were and still remain the highest accolades for his Peloponnesian opus magnus in scholarly, historical and literary circles. Nonetheless, Kagan embarked upon a re-write of his four volumes for the "21st century general reader." The one-volume result of that re-visitation with ancient Hellas is the The Peloponnesian War published in 2003.
Kagan still feels strongly -- as asserted in his Introduction -- that there is much to be learned from the war beyond merely dry, narrative history. Lessons can be gleaned about human nature, the roles of inspired leadership and craven ambition, how roll-of-the-dice serendipity can manifestly change outcomes, how varying and conflicting approaches to governance can (will?) inevitably lead to conflict, how war makes a savage of all. He is right about those lessons, but then many wars throughout our tumultuous history can teach us, though they seem more lessons we divine after the fact rather than learn from before the next crisis approaches. What makes this war 'special' was that it happened 24 centuries ago and arguably, in many ways, we have just been riffing on the same chord ever since.
Without the gift of Thucydides' own monumental narrative of the first 20 years of the war it is pretty clear that our knowledge and understanding of both the lessons and facts of that cataclysmic war would be fundamentally different and significant less. Thucydides continues to be the prime source of all things Peloponnesian War-related. Kagan -- as does other writers -- understands this and references him often. Though, as befits a preeminent Classics scholar, he doesn't just blindly quote the ancient but on occasion doesn't hesitate to call into question, via shrewd analysis, a Thucydidan assertion. Though Thucydides gets major billing, other Greek and Roman historians including Xenophon, Diodorus, Plutarch, are referenced as well.
No bibliography is provided nor is there footnoting. You will need to turn to the tetralogy for those "scholarly" features. The maps are both copious and superior. In fact if someone decided to re-publish the tetralogy I would suggest using the maps from the The Peloponnesian War.
Kagan's handling of the significant players -- Pericles, Cleon, Alcibiades, Nicias, Lysander, Demosthenes, Brasidas and others is generally balanced, nuanced, and astute. For some, especially the first four mentioned, one really gets a sense of them as three-dimensional, and not just flat historical figures. Cleon, for example, is usually portrayed merely as the prototypical and archetypal demagogue. Perhaps that is not too far off the mark and yet Kagan paints a not entirely negative portrait of him: "No more than Pericles did he flatter the masses." The trajectory of Alcibiades' career is particular fascinating and is well-handled by Kagan. Was he a wily tactician and a charismatic politician, a patriot and a traitor, a self-serving manipulator of all and anyone? Apparently the answer is 'yes.' Kagan shows us all facets of this intriguing character but assesses rather then judges both his behavior and his impact on the war.
If one wanted to read just one book on the Peloponnesian War this might be the one. You will come away understanding how Athens and Sparta and other city-states arrived at war. You will also be led through the see-saw fate of the antagonists with no confusion as Kagan's writing is lucid and linear. You will appreciate how the players -- leaders and their states -- maneuvered sometimes successfully and often not through the 27 years of war with alliances forming, dissolving, re-forming, repeat. A minor quibble is that the conclusion is only 5 pages long and seems really inadequate compared to the proceeding 484 pages.
The one main criticism I have with Kagan's presentation of this war in this book is that at times -- often, in fact -- I found myself wanting more: more details, more depth, more history. This book is a summary of sorts of Kagan's early tetralogy and that really was his intention so we should not fault him. Nonetheless, for me, I suspect I will find deeper details in those 1300 pages, and look forward to beginning that journey.
Kagan still feels strongly -- as asserted in his Introduction -- that there is much to be learned from the war beyond merely dry, narrative history. Lessons can be gleaned about human nature, the roles of inspired leadership and craven ambition, how roll-of-the-dice serendipity can manifestly change outcomes, how varying and conflicting approaches to governance can (will?) inevitably lead to conflict, how war makes a savage of all. He is right about those lessons, but then many wars throughout our tumultuous history can teach us, though they seem more lessons we divine after the fact rather than learn from before the next crisis approaches. What makes this war 'special' was that it happened 24 centuries ago and arguably, in many ways, we have just been riffing on the same chord ever since.
Without the gift of Thucydides' own monumental narrative of the first 20 years of the war it is pretty clear that our knowledge and understanding of both the lessons and facts of that cataclysmic war would be fundamentally different and significant less. Thucydides continues to be the prime source of all things Peloponnesian War-related. Kagan -- as does other writers -- understands this and references him often. Though, as befits a preeminent Classics scholar, he doesn't just blindly quote the ancient but on occasion doesn't hesitate to call into question, via shrewd analysis, a Thucydidan assertion. Though Thucydides gets major billing, other Greek and Roman historians including Xenophon, Diodorus, Plutarch, are referenced as well.
No bibliography is provided nor is there footnoting. You will need to turn to the tetralogy for those "scholarly" features. The maps are both copious and superior. In fact if someone decided to re-publish the tetralogy I would suggest using the maps from the The Peloponnesian War.
Kagan's handling of the significant players -- Pericles, Cleon, Alcibiades, Nicias, Lysander, Demosthenes, Brasidas and others is generally balanced, nuanced, and astute. For some, especially the first four mentioned, one really gets a sense of them as three-dimensional, and not just flat historical figures. Cleon, for example, is usually portrayed merely as the prototypical and archetypal demagogue. Perhaps that is not too far off the mark and yet Kagan paints a not entirely negative portrait of him: "No more than Pericles did he flatter the masses." The trajectory of Alcibiades' career is particular fascinating and is well-handled by Kagan. Was he a wily tactician and a charismatic politician, a patriot and a traitor, a self-serving manipulator of all and anyone? Apparently the answer is 'yes.' Kagan shows us all facets of this intriguing character but assesses rather then judges both his behavior and his impact on the war.
If one wanted to read just one book on the Peloponnesian War this might be the one. You will come away understanding how Athens and Sparta and other city-states arrived at war. You will also be led through the see-saw fate of the antagonists with no confusion as Kagan's writing is lucid and linear. You will appreciate how the players -- leaders and their states -- maneuvered sometimes successfully and often not through the 27 years of war with alliances forming, dissolving, re-forming, repeat. A minor quibble is that the conclusion is only 5 pages long and seems really inadequate compared to the proceeding 484 pages.
The one main criticism I have with Kagan's presentation of this war in this book is that at times -- often, in fact -- I found myself wanting more: more details, more depth, more history. This book is a summary of sorts of Kagan's early tetralogy and that really was his intention so we should not fault him. Nonetheless, for me, I suspect I will find deeper details in those 1300 pages, and look forward to beginning that journey.
June 10, 2013
This book should be called The History of Athens During the Peloponnesian War for while it is generally agreed that this war was fought between two huge blocs lead by Athens and Sparta, it has a very thorough description of the history of Athens during the period and much less about Sparta. Perhaps the history of Sparta is much less recorded, but in the end the Spartans were made to look like a menace around Athens, or more aptly a bunch of goons who could do nothing right, except getting lucky at times, and renegading on their oaths all the time. But since I'm no historian, Prof Kagan might actually be accurately describing the facts. Alas, I felt it a little overboard and in the end felt perversely glad that Athens fell.
That said, I have a lot of respect for the author insofar as his scholarship is concerned. He clearly has referred to as many sources as he could, made comparisons, analysed and synthesized, before making his conclusion. Readers who are interested in this would do well to read the very last bit of the book on the sources. It is not just a reflection of Prof Kagan's scholarship, but even those of the authors to whom he referred.
Finally, I became interested in this history because I heard Prof Kagan's lectures on iTunesU. He can be an engaging speaker, and now I know, he knows how to write history like a novel.
That said, I have a lot of respect for the author insofar as his scholarship is concerned. He clearly has referred to as many sources as he could, made comparisons, analysed and synthesized, before making his conclusion. Readers who are interested in this would do well to read the very last bit of the book on the sources. It is not just a reflection of Prof Kagan's scholarship, but even those of the authors to whom he referred.
Finally, I became interested in this history because I heard Prof Kagan's lectures on iTunesU. He can be an engaging speaker, and now I know, he knows how to write history like a novel.
April 19, 2020
Thucydides (and his later colleagues) masterfully, if not interestingly, described the long and brutal Peloponnesian War. This in itself was a marvelous achievement, without which we would have no record of the monumental struggle. But Mr. Kagan has taken it to a higher level with this book, in which he synthesizes the story into modern language, with appropriate references and quotes from the original sources, turning it into a highly accessible and fascinating history. His explanations and inferences illuminate the basic events, and the accompanying maps lend clarity to the text. This book was on my shelf for quite a while, and I admit to approaching it with some trepidation, but I am happy to report that it is thoroughly enjoyable. Among other things, it's surprising that even after 2300 years, so little has changed in the motivations and follies of countries and their leaders. Highly recommended.
January 15, 2017
War is a very messy business. That is the main lesson of this book. It's cruel, morals deteriorate in no time, it's fueled by egos and money and vague political ideologies and it is surprisingly random and subject to the whims of nature and pure luck.
The research for this is impeccable. Absolutely amazing how the author manages to bring to life events that happened 2.400 years ago. One gets a thorough and caleidoscopic insigt into the myriad af variables that shaped ancient warfare.
The research for this is impeccable. Absolutely amazing how the author manages to bring to life events that happened 2.400 years ago. One gets a thorough and caleidoscopic insigt into the myriad af variables that shaped ancient warfare.
January 26, 2020
Kagan's far too appreciative of Athenian democracy in this work. So much so that he forgives many of their faults and forgetting to praise Spartan society. This subject is great and truthfully a great read. I wanted to rate this a 4 with my quibbles being generally echoed in the top reviews. The ratting being as high as it is however made me think the rating for this work needs to be knocked down a few pegs, especially since the author's values determine too much of how it reads.
December 2, 2021
A Distant Mirror
The Pelopnnesian War by Donald Kagan.
Please give my Amazon review a helpful vote - https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-re...
Previously, I've read Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War in the Landmark edition, which has the best maps of any other book on the series. I listened to this book as an audiobook and I should have kept some maps handy. Nonetheless, Kagan takes the reader through the very long war and makes a greater sense of the players and the war than I got from Thucydides. When I next read Thucydides, I suspect my grasp of events will be much heightened.
What struck me in listening to the book this time - the Fall of 2021 - was how events in Athens mirror our own age. Certainly, the war broke out because of Spartan fear that Athenian imperialism might undermine its leadership of Greece, and by Athenian fear that the loss of Corcyra's fleet might end their empire. The war began in a holding action by Athens on the mainland and an effort to maintain its empire so as to wear down Sparta. This Periclean plan failed and Athens changed its policies to become more aggressive everywhere.
The fortunes of the war ebbed and flowed. There were moments when it seemed like Sparta was down for the count, and then it was Athen's turn to face disaster. Much of the war was at the periphery in Thrace, Sicily, and western Asia Minor. Kagan's book explains the reason for the Sicilian expedition. I had always wondered why so much of Athen's military resources was lost so far away from Greece. The answer was that it was originally intended as a minor expedition that simply grew and grew. Likewise, I knew Alcibiades as a character from The Symposium, and as having a bad odor, but he repeatedly shows up in the latter stages of the war as a politician, scoundrel. exiled in Sparta, exiled in Persia, returned to Athens, and exiled finally.
Socrates shows up also in the only time he acted as a magistrate to be the only man to vote against the unjust execution of a military leader. Interestingly, this book gave me a deeper insight into Plato's Apologia, namely, many generals took off for former enemies when they thought that the return to Athens would mean execution or fines. It doesn't say a lot for Athenian democracy that it executed losing generals, giving them the encouragement to flee to enemies, taking their knowledge of Athenian strategies and secrets with them, but it certainly shows the limits of Athenian loyalty. Compare that to Socrates who is said to have explained that he would not flee Athens, although given the chance, because it had given him everything even if his loyalty and steadfastness meant an unjust execution. It seems the target of the Apologia may have been more political.
Other poets and playwrights show up in Kagan's narration. The amazing thing to understand is that just outside of Athens, which was creating a brilliant epoch of literature and philosophy, there was a war going on.
The end stage of democracy in Athens when there was a coup to install an oligarchy ("the 500") and change the constitution should be a lesson to Americans about how easy it can be to lose democracy. (Of course, there was a counter-coup that brought back the democracy.) One feature that Kagan didn't really explore was the ideological dimension of democracy and oligarchy. Athens installed democracies to secure its position; Sparta installed oligarchies. Was there an overall political debate that one was superior to the other? I suspect that if there was, oligarchy would have been normative.
Ultimately, Athens lost one naval battle too many against the forces of Sparta and Persia. Sparta, which had started the war proclaiming that it was fighting for Greek autonomy, ended up ceding the Greek cities of western Asia Minor to the Persians. Within 50 years, Sparta would lose its hegemony to Thebes.
This war was the Ur-war, the prototype. It is worth studying.
The Pelopnnesian War by Donald Kagan.
Please give my Amazon review a helpful vote - https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-re...
Previously, I've read Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War in the Landmark edition, which has the best maps of any other book on the series. I listened to this book as an audiobook and I should have kept some maps handy. Nonetheless, Kagan takes the reader through the very long war and makes a greater sense of the players and the war than I got from Thucydides. When I next read Thucydides, I suspect my grasp of events will be much heightened.
What struck me in listening to the book this time - the Fall of 2021 - was how events in Athens mirror our own age. Certainly, the war broke out because of Spartan fear that Athenian imperialism might undermine its leadership of Greece, and by Athenian fear that the loss of Corcyra's fleet might end their empire. The war began in a holding action by Athens on the mainland and an effort to maintain its empire so as to wear down Sparta. This Periclean plan failed and Athens changed its policies to become more aggressive everywhere.
The fortunes of the war ebbed and flowed. There were moments when it seemed like Sparta was down for the count, and then it was Athen's turn to face disaster. Much of the war was at the periphery in Thrace, Sicily, and western Asia Minor. Kagan's book explains the reason for the Sicilian expedition. I had always wondered why so much of Athen's military resources was lost so far away from Greece. The answer was that it was originally intended as a minor expedition that simply grew and grew. Likewise, I knew Alcibiades as a character from The Symposium, and as having a bad odor, but he repeatedly shows up in the latter stages of the war as a politician, scoundrel. exiled in Sparta, exiled in Persia, returned to Athens, and exiled finally.
Socrates shows up also in the only time he acted as a magistrate to be the only man to vote against the unjust execution of a military leader. Interestingly, this book gave me a deeper insight into Plato's Apologia, namely, many generals took off for former enemies when they thought that the return to Athens would mean execution or fines. It doesn't say a lot for Athenian democracy that it executed losing generals, giving them the encouragement to flee to enemies, taking their knowledge of Athenian strategies and secrets with them, but it certainly shows the limits of Athenian loyalty. Compare that to Socrates who is said to have explained that he would not flee Athens, although given the chance, because it had given him everything even if his loyalty and steadfastness meant an unjust execution. It seems the target of the Apologia may have been more political.
Other poets and playwrights show up in Kagan's narration. The amazing thing to understand is that just outside of Athens, which was creating a brilliant epoch of literature and philosophy, there was a war going on.
The end stage of democracy in Athens when there was a coup to install an oligarchy ("the 500") and change the constitution should be a lesson to Americans about how easy it can be to lose democracy. (Of course, there was a counter-coup that brought back the democracy.) One feature that Kagan didn't really explore was the ideological dimension of democracy and oligarchy. Athens installed democracies to secure its position; Sparta installed oligarchies. Was there an overall political debate that one was superior to the other? I suspect that if there was, oligarchy would have been normative.
Ultimately, Athens lost one naval battle too many against the forces of Sparta and Persia. Sparta, which had started the war proclaiming that it was fighting for Greek autonomy, ended up ceding the Greek cities of western Asia Minor to the Persians. Within 50 years, Sparta would lose its hegemony to Thebes.
This war was the Ur-war, the prototype. It is worth studying.
July 28, 2015
Quite the commitment, and this is the condensed version, so hats off to anyone who's read the four volume edition. It's a mighty work of erudition this, and I'd say that some background in the subject will help. It's not easy to get into and Kagan doesn't write with the accessibility and warmth and actual liveliness (aliveness?) that Tom Holland managed so well in Persian Fire (albeit this is a slightly different epoch), so it takes some getting used to, but before long I was hooked into the narrative and the incredible journey of the Peloponnesian War.
The War itself was vast, and you get the distinct feeling that Kagan writes from the Athenian perspective. Perhaps that's inevitable, because most of the history is recorded by Athenians and that's undoubtedly just the nature of a flourishing democracy at work. Some commentators liken Kagan's approach to some sort of liberal predilection, he just hates the oligarchs because he's a bleeding heart socialist. I don't think that's the case, but the Spartans don't come across especially richly in this account. They were mostly just curmudgeonly and obtuse and hell-bent on bashing democracy wherever it reared its rather finely-feathered head. But whether or not Kagan is 'down' on the Lacedaemonians, it's true that the approach of the narrative does make it difficult to feel much sympathy for them.
The Athenians don't get off lightly either, and usually it's because of politicians. It seems that 2000 years of 'progress' hasn't progressed very much because politicians today are just as prone to hubris and self-serving policy as they were in Ancient Greece. Nicias was, frankly, a dithering fool, and Alcibiades a vain, glory-seeking turncoat of the worst kind. But in a way, these human foibles and failings make much of the story of the great war; and great it was, drawing in city-states far and wide, with a cast of characters that gives George RR Martin a run for his money (meaning the literary Martin, not the televised).
A fabulous work and so entirely enjoyable that I was very sad to have finished it. I rather wished I'd gone for the four volume expanded edition!
The War itself was vast, and you get the distinct feeling that Kagan writes from the Athenian perspective. Perhaps that's inevitable, because most of the history is recorded by Athenians and that's undoubtedly just the nature of a flourishing democracy at work. Some commentators liken Kagan's approach to some sort of liberal predilection, he just hates the oligarchs because he's a bleeding heart socialist. I don't think that's the case, but the Spartans don't come across especially richly in this account. They were mostly just curmudgeonly and obtuse and hell-bent on bashing democracy wherever it reared its rather finely-feathered head. But whether or not Kagan is 'down' on the Lacedaemonians, it's true that the approach of the narrative does make it difficult to feel much sympathy for them.
The Athenians don't get off lightly either, and usually it's because of politicians. It seems that 2000 years of 'progress' hasn't progressed very much because politicians today are just as prone to hubris and self-serving policy as they were in Ancient Greece. Nicias was, frankly, a dithering fool, and Alcibiades a vain, glory-seeking turncoat of the worst kind. But in a way, these human foibles and failings make much of the story of the great war; and great it was, drawing in city-states far and wide, with a cast of characters that gives George RR Martin a run for his money (meaning the literary Martin, not the televised).
A fabulous work and so entirely enjoyable that I was very sad to have finished it. I rather wished I'd gone for the four volume expanded edition!
May 27, 2016
Professor Kagan's history-lite books are great reads for those interested in Greek studies and not willing to assault the translated Classical works or incapable of reading Ancient Greek. "The Peloponnesian War" is less a work of historical analysis than an aggregation of information concerning the total duration of the war from all sources not just Thucydides. This is a condensed version of his scholarly four-volume “A New History of the Peloponnesian War”: “The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War”, “The Archidamian War”, “The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition”, and “The Fall of the Athenian Empire”.
While chronicle history has declined within the profession its appeal to the amateur is still very, very strong. Kagan attempts to take us into the mind of a nation in the sense of people with a shared culture and identity torn by strategic forces of power and empire. This is no small feat when your historical subject dates from the 5th century B.C.E., a time just at the edge of the historical record and the dawn of the Western tradition. The book is organized from the origins of the strife through the failure of the Periclean strategy to the debacle of Sicily and the triumph of Lysander. Piecing together scraps of documents, bits of rock, the results of contemporary research, and, of course, Thucydides, Kagan breathes life and horror into this chronicle of Man’s first recorded total war.
Perhaps, most importantly, this is an American book. It is not meant to be staid or highbrow. It is written for the common man and our American Empire. The Classical tradition has never been more accessible to Americans and English readers around the world. And the good doctor leaves us with a warning, a note of foreboding on empires and foreign wars: "…it was a tragic event, a great turning point in history, the end of an era of progress, prosperity, confidence and hope, and the beginning of a darker time”.
While chronicle history has declined within the profession its appeal to the amateur is still very, very strong. Kagan attempts to take us into the mind of a nation in the sense of people with a shared culture and identity torn by strategic forces of power and empire. This is no small feat when your historical subject dates from the 5th century B.C.E., a time just at the edge of the historical record and the dawn of the Western tradition. The book is organized from the origins of the strife through the failure of the Periclean strategy to the debacle of Sicily and the triumph of Lysander. Piecing together scraps of documents, bits of rock, the results of contemporary research, and, of course, Thucydides, Kagan breathes life and horror into this chronicle of Man’s first recorded total war.
Perhaps, most importantly, this is an American book. It is not meant to be staid or highbrow. It is written for the common man and our American Empire. The Classical tradition has never been more accessible to Americans and English readers around the world. And the good doctor leaves us with a warning, a note of foreboding on empires and foreign wars: "…it was a tragic event, a great turning point in history, the end of an era of progress, prosperity, confidence and hope, and the beginning of a darker time”.
September 24, 2014
A thorough, well-researched history of the Peloponnesian war, as the unimaginative and rather boring title suggests. Kagan does a great job describing the background to the war, the key players and all the related issues. His analysis is usually top-notch and thorough, although he sometimes seems to lose track; for example going on and on about how Pericles was irrational in entering the war on the basis of honor instead of reason.
Still, the narrative is solid and the maps are pretty good and in enough quantity. Kagan’s writing is clear and straightforward, and he does a great job making sense of the whole war. Near the end of the book, the writing gets slightly more tedious and is basically a chronology.
Unfortunately, Kagan does a surprisingly poor job providing background on all the related non-military matters. There is very little on lifestyle or culture and the like; odd since most ancient-history are usually careful to do that due to our own general unfamiliarity with the era. Even weapons and tactics are given only superficial treatment. Also, the conclusion fails to provide a “big picture” of the war’s ultimate impact and aftermath. Also, oddly, the book is peppered with in-text citations, as if this is a research paper instead of a book.
Still, the narrative is solid and the maps are pretty good and in enough quantity. Kagan’s writing is clear and straightforward, and he does a great job making sense of the whole war. Near the end of the book, the writing gets slightly more tedious and is basically a chronology.
Unfortunately, Kagan does a surprisingly poor job providing background on all the related non-military matters. There is very little on lifestyle or culture and the like; odd since most ancient-history are usually careful to do that due to our own general unfamiliarity with the era. Even weapons and tactics are given only superficial treatment. Also, the conclusion fails to provide a “big picture” of the war’s ultimate impact and aftermath. Also, oddly, the book is peppered with in-text citations, as if this is a research paper instead of a book.
July 20, 2016
I should have read The Peloponnesian War before I read Xenophon's Anabasis. Xenophon's work takes place shortly after the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) and that event sets the context of the relationship between the Athenian Greeks and the Spartans. One can see generals like Demosthenes and Lysander as influencing how Xenophon would have led, as well as learn what was expected of Athenian commanders both on the battlefield and in the realm of politics.
Donald Kagan is apparently the world's foremost expert on this event, and his works on it seem unassailable. Kagan's goal is to bring his academic research into a format more relevant to the modern reader who is familiar with modern wars and politics. While some reviews on Amazon have criticized this work as being "dry" or "too detailed," I disagree; it was a long and historically consequential war involving various people groups and cultures and is more than just "Athenians" vs. "Spartans." It is also "Ionians" vs. "Dorians" and others. The modern reader (myself) may tend to forget that in this period there was no united "Greece," the Aegean was all loose affiliations of independent and democratic city states that fell under the influence of larger city states. Spartans and Athenians had differing cultures and political structures and did not get along.
One is struck by the parallels between this war and 20th century wars. You have a problem/conflict in a far-off territory supported by a superpower, which begins to pull in other regional powers and eventually grows into a major war between superpowers. What looks like a quick-and-easy war turns into a costly quagmire. Democratic institutions get subverted in the name of defending the country, and much blood and treasure is robbed from future generations. During the war, people do things so far outside cultural norms and accepted morality that it cracks the very foundations of their civilizations. The question of how to have "peace with honor" for both sides in a potential stalemate becomes the issue. Bold speeches lead to disastrous actions, and popular sentiment changes with news of each battle's result. Borders get redrawn setting the stage for future conflicts.
Greece early on was moving from a true democracy to a "republic of the first citizen," where a general or other man of consequence had actual power and sway beyond statutes. By the end of the war, many of its cultural institutions were badly undermined and it was no longer an empire.
In the first phase of the war, the "Archidamian War," Athens was influenced by Pericles to adopt a defensive strategy-- to resist until the Spartans see they cannot be beaten. To rely heavily on its naval advantage while Sparta relies on its superior infantry. After Pericles death, the Athenians begin having some success on offense and adopt a more aggressive strategy. Good tactics and luck swing the war into Athens' favor, but they overreach at a point where they could have achieved very favorable terms with Sparta and expanded their empire. Instead, the Spartans achieve some victories and sue for a more favorable peace.
In the interim, both Sparta and Athens wage a sort of proxy war by supporting opposite sides of other regional conflicts. Athens and their allies experience major defeats, which is foreboding for the next chapter of the conflict.
When Athenian allies are attacked by Spartan-backed Syracusans in Sicily, Alcibiades convinces the Athenian assembly to mount a massive expedition to crush Syracuse and incorporate Sicily into the empire. After this meets with disastrous defeat, Alcibiades is convicted of treason and flees to Sparta-- effectively turning traitor and convincing the Spartans to follow his advice in attacking Athens! Athens ends up doubling down on its Sicilian campaign, resulting in almost the complete destruction of its navy, infantry, and the loss of city states as the balance of power shifts in Sparta's favor. Nicias opposes the Sicilian expedition but gets appointed as a general, and ends up the last remaining general on the expedition after Alcibiades is arrested and others are killed. Generals who experienced bad results in the battlefield, even if there were a good excuse, were routinely disgraced, tried, executed, or banished. Demosthenes suggests the army retreat to defend Athens but Nicias hesitates both due to fear of returning to Athens and because of a solar eclipse that soothsayers say is an omen to wait before retreating. The Syracusans press the attack and destroy the Athenian forces and execute Nicias and Demosthenes.
While Athens now fears mass uprisings and Spartan conquest, the Spartans face the problem of not having a strong enough navy to finish off the Athenians and Alcibiades convinces them to seek alliance with Persia for help. The Spartan's supposed desire to defeat Athens "for the independence of Greek states" becomes subverted to their desire for victory as they're willing to sacrifice Greeks to Persian rule.
Meanwhile in Athens in 411 B.C., a group of 400 wealthy Athenians stage a coup, replacing Athenian democracy with oligarchic rule and eliminating lower classes from serving on juries or being able to participate in government. They promise that it will be "temporary" in order to save money and prevent the demise of Athens and will eventually restore democracy to a larger group of 5,000. The 400 desire to change the Constitution to bring back Alcibiades, who they falsely believe has Persian support and can enlist Persian help to to defend Athens. They elect Alcibiades as general and he now plays his newfound power as a sort of negotiation chip with the Persians. The coup fails as the outraged navy at Samos depose their generals and elect new ones, now with a desire to attack Athens and restore democracy by force. Kagan does a good job explaining the players in the complicated political intrigue, from moderates who calculatingly went along with the 400 to those who really would eliminate Athenian democracy in the name of defense. As the coup falls apart, the moderates execute the extremists, building monuments to their treachery. The 400 become the 5,000, and eventually Athens reverts to full democracy. Meanwhile, the Persians who had promised aid to Sparta are slow in delivering and the price the Spartans pay is costly in terms of money and morale.
Alcibiades and the Athenian navy score some victories against the Peloponnesians, and the Spartans sue for peace-- which the Athenians reject because they would not accept the status quo with so many of their former colonies, including Byzantium and Ephesus, under Spartan control.Eventually, the Peloponnesian forces allied with Persia and led by Lysander defeat the Athenian navy decisively in 406 B.C. (ending Alcibiades' command) and in 404 B.C., effectively wiping out the Athenian navy. Lysander kills all his prisoners, which hardens Athenians' resolve to hold out under siege. The Athenians negotiate a final peace where they agree to give up their colonies and raze their walls, but maintain their liberty.
Lysander and the Spartans then impose their will on Athens and other colonies, setting up oppressive oligarchies and extractive institutions. "Greek independence" was never actually intended. However, Sparta would end up facing costly revolts and wars with Thebes and conflicts with Persia that would eventually cause its demise. Within a year of the peace treaty, Athens had restored its democracy, rebuilt its walls, and restored many of its colonies. The cost of the war was high, with about half of the adult male population of Athens wiped out by either war, plague, or famine.
I learned a great deal from this epic work, I give it 5 stars.
Donald Kagan is apparently the world's foremost expert on this event, and his works on it seem unassailable. Kagan's goal is to bring his academic research into a format more relevant to the modern reader who is familiar with modern wars and politics. While some reviews on Amazon have criticized this work as being "dry" or "too detailed," I disagree; it was a long and historically consequential war involving various people groups and cultures and is more than just "Athenians" vs. "Spartans." It is also "Ionians" vs. "Dorians" and others. The modern reader (myself) may tend to forget that in this period there was no united "Greece," the Aegean was all loose affiliations of independent and democratic city states that fell under the influence of larger city states. Spartans and Athenians had differing cultures and political structures and did not get along.
One is struck by the parallels between this war and 20th century wars. You have a problem/conflict in a far-off territory supported by a superpower, which begins to pull in other regional powers and eventually grows into a major war between superpowers. What looks like a quick-and-easy war turns into a costly quagmire. Democratic institutions get subverted in the name of defending the country, and much blood and treasure is robbed from future generations. During the war, people do things so far outside cultural norms and accepted morality that it cracks the very foundations of their civilizations. The question of how to have "peace with honor" for both sides in a potential stalemate becomes the issue. Bold speeches lead to disastrous actions, and popular sentiment changes with news of each battle's result. Borders get redrawn setting the stage for future conflicts.
Greece early on was moving from a true democracy to a "republic of the first citizen," where a general or other man of consequence had actual power and sway beyond statutes. By the end of the war, many of its cultural institutions were badly undermined and it was no longer an empire.
In the first phase of the war, the "Archidamian War," Athens was influenced by Pericles to adopt a defensive strategy-- to resist until the Spartans see they cannot be beaten. To rely heavily on its naval advantage while Sparta relies on its superior infantry. After Pericles death, the Athenians begin having some success on offense and adopt a more aggressive strategy. Good tactics and luck swing the war into Athens' favor, but they overreach at a point where they could have achieved very favorable terms with Sparta and expanded their empire. Instead, the Spartans achieve some victories and sue for a more favorable peace.
In the interim, both Sparta and Athens wage a sort of proxy war by supporting opposite sides of other regional conflicts. Athens and their allies experience major defeats, which is foreboding for the next chapter of the conflict.
When Athenian allies are attacked by Spartan-backed Syracusans in Sicily, Alcibiades convinces the Athenian assembly to mount a massive expedition to crush Syracuse and incorporate Sicily into the empire. After this meets with disastrous defeat, Alcibiades is convicted of treason and flees to Sparta-- effectively turning traitor and convincing the Spartans to follow his advice in attacking Athens! Athens ends up doubling down on its Sicilian campaign, resulting in almost the complete destruction of its navy, infantry, and the loss of city states as the balance of power shifts in Sparta's favor. Nicias opposes the Sicilian expedition but gets appointed as a general, and ends up the last remaining general on the expedition after Alcibiades is arrested and others are killed. Generals who experienced bad results in the battlefield, even if there were a good excuse, were routinely disgraced, tried, executed, or banished. Demosthenes suggests the army retreat to defend Athens but Nicias hesitates both due to fear of returning to Athens and because of a solar eclipse that soothsayers say is an omen to wait before retreating. The Syracusans press the attack and destroy the Athenian forces and execute Nicias and Demosthenes.
While Athens now fears mass uprisings and Spartan conquest, the Spartans face the problem of not having a strong enough navy to finish off the Athenians and Alcibiades convinces them to seek alliance with Persia for help. The Spartan's supposed desire to defeat Athens "for the independence of Greek states" becomes subverted to their desire for victory as they're willing to sacrifice Greeks to Persian rule.
Meanwhile in Athens in 411 B.C., a group of 400 wealthy Athenians stage a coup, replacing Athenian democracy with oligarchic rule and eliminating lower classes from serving on juries or being able to participate in government. They promise that it will be "temporary" in order to save money and prevent the demise of Athens and will eventually restore democracy to a larger group of 5,000. The 400 desire to change the Constitution to bring back Alcibiades, who they falsely believe has Persian support and can enlist Persian help to to defend Athens. They elect Alcibiades as general and he now plays his newfound power as a sort of negotiation chip with the Persians. The coup fails as the outraged navy at Samos depose their generals and elect new ones, now with a desire to attack Athens and restore democracy by force. Kagan does a good job explaining the players in the complicated political intrigue, from moderates who calculatingly went along with the 400 to those who really would eliminate Athenian democracy in the name of defense. As the coup falls apart, the moderates execute the extremists, building monuments to their treachery. The 400 become the 5,000, and eventually Athens reverts to full democracy. Meanwhile, the Persians who had promised aid to Sparta are slow in delivering and the price the Spartans pay is costly in terms of money and morale.
Alcibiades and the Athenian navy score some victories against the Peloponnesians, and the Spartans sue for peace-- which the Athenians reject because they would not accept the status quo with so many of their former colonies, including Byzantium and Ephesus, under Spartan control.Eventually, the Peloponnesian forces allied with Persia and led by Lysander defeat the Athenian navy decisively in 406 B.C. (ending Alcibiades' command) and in 404 B.C., effectively wiping out the Athenian navy. Lysander kills all his prisoners, which hardens Athenians' resolve to hold out under siege. The Athenians negotiate a final peace where they agree to give up their colonies and raze their walls, but maintain their liberty.
Lysander and the Spartans then impose their will on Athens and other colonies, setting up oppressive oligarchies and extractive institutions. "Greek independence" was never actually intended. However, Sparta would end up facing costly revolts and wars with Thebes and conflicts with Persia that would eventually cause its demise. Within a year of the peace treaty, Athens had restored its democracy, rebuilt its walls, and restored many of its colonies. The cost of the war was high, with about half of the adult male population of Athens wiped out by either war, plague, or famine.
I learned a great deal from this epic work, I give it 5 stars.
March 1, 2023
“The Suicide of Greece”
The 30 year Peloponnesian War was conflict on a scale that the Greeks had never known. It snuffed out the ascendant democracy of Athens and many other cities, had immense costs in life, property, and economy, and set the stage for the world-wide empire of Alexander the Great less than a century later. Kagan rightly compares this war to World War 1 for the Greeks, as it so totally influenced the culture and radically changed the understanding of war.
How then, can one begin to understand this titanic conflict? Kagan, having produced 4 lauded scholarly volumes on the war, has here decided to create a manageable history for the normal reader using his considerable expertise, and does so flawlessly.
He probes the sources with adequate suspicion, provides fitting critiques of the strategy of each party or leader in the war, and gives praise and condemnation where necessary without being overly biased or moralistic— all while retaining a sympathetic view of the human cost of warfare.
For anyone interested in learning about the Peloponnesian War, one of Western Tradition’s most famous conflicts and teachers, look no further than this book.
Edited:
I’d also like to address Donald Kagan’s supposed bias. I didn’t feel that the author was overly biased in any way, and would actually congratulate him on doing such a good job in this respect, so easy it is for the modern historian to fall into the Athenian camp by way of the inherited Western Tradition. While Kagan does point out inconsistencies in morality, flaws in strategic/tactical plans, and atrocities in the killing and enslavement of whole cities, he does so in such a way as to not impute 21st century morality onto the Greek city-states of the 5th century BC. It seems to me that anyone crying bias at this history is perhaps being overly sensitive to it, as Kagan constantly points out problems with the Athenians as well, especially in his treatment of Nicias. In fact, he makes an especially poignant critique of the Athenians in their execution of the victorious generals of Arginusae, showing how it ultimately contributed to the loss of the war. While the Spartans are characterized as overly conservative, he does so only to the extent that they actually were, and gives the readers insights as to why the Spartans would have chosen to conduct themselves in this manner. Overall, I feel comfortable recommending this book to anyone looking for an evenhanded treatment of the Peloponnesian War.
The 30 year Peloponnesian War was conflict on a scale that the Greeks had never known. It snuffed out the ascendant democracy of Athens and many other cities, had immense costs in life, property, and economy, and set the stage for the world-wide empire of Alexander the Great less than a century later. Kagan rightly compares this war to World War 1 for the Greeks, as it so totally influenced the culture and radically changed the understanding of war.
How then, can one begin to understand this titanic conflict? Kagan, having produced 4 lauded scholarly volumes on the war, has here decided to create a manageable history for the normal reader using his considerable expertise, and does so flawlessly.
He probes the sources with adequate suspicion, provides fitting critiques of the strategy of each party or leader in the war, and gives praise and condemnation where necessary without being overly biased or moralistic— all while retaining a sympathetic view of the human cost of warfare.
For anyone interested in learning about the Peloponnesian War, one of Western Tradition’s most famous conflicts and teachers, look no further than this book.
Edited:
I’d also like to address Donald Kagan’s supposed bias. I didn’t feel that the author was overly biased in any way, and would actually congratulate him on doing such a good job in this respect, so easy it is for the modern historian to fall into the Athenian camp by way of the inherited Western Tradition. While Kagan does point out inconsistencies in morality, flaws in strategic/tactical plans, and atrocities in the killing and enslavement of whole cities, he does so in such a way as to not impute 21st century morality onto the Greek city-states of the 5th century BC. It seems to me that anyone crying bias at this history is perhaps being overly sensitive to it, as Kagan constantly points out problems with the Athenians as well, especially in his treatment of Nicias. In fact, he makes an especially poignant critique of the Athenians in their execution of the victorious generals of Arginusae, showing how it ultimately contributed to the loss of the war. While the Spartans are characterized as overly conservative, he does so only to the extent that they actually were, and gives the readers insights as to why the Spartans would have chosen to conduct themselves in this manner. Overall, I feel comfortable recommending this book to anyone looking for an evenhanded treatment of the Peloponnesian War.
November 23, 2020
Pretty good overall, definitely a really interesting period in history, lots of interesting characters, told in a compelling narrative format that makes it easy to stay engaged with.
I'd say there are a couple of main weaknesses: First, the way it is told, more as a story than as a robust historical account. Though the last section of the book does give some interesting information about the sources he relied on, he doesn't integrate as much meta-textual analysis as I would have liked. I am thus left assuming that he is effectively retelling Thucydides. As a major scolar of the Peloponnesian War, I have no doubt that he is reflecting the modern understanding and interpretation of Thucydides, but he doesn't really go into that very often. There are numerous other sources, plus archeological evidence -- how does that relate to the story that Thucydides tells? I suppose that would ahve taken a long book and made it potentially unweildy (his academic version of this book is, after all, four volumes long). But still, would have appreciated a bit more of it.
I also just found parts hard to follow -- I think the book could have afforded something to keep track of all of the characters, with frustratingly similar names -- a short glossary or list of mini-biographies would have been handy to have as a reference.
Finally, the most frustrating part was the maps. They were scattered unpredictably throughout the book, were often duplicative (two maps were literally identical, with just different titles). They also wasted huge amounts of empty space -- listing random cities and locations that were unmentioned in the book, but failing to mention locations that were! Very frustrating, especially for a book that relies so heavily on understanding the complex geospacial politics of Classical Greece.
I think it is good for what it sets out to do, but I wouldn't call this a general interest history book. If you're interested in the ancient world, or Greece, then check this out! But if you're just looking for something interesting about history, maybe push this a bit further down your list.
I'd say there are a couple of main weaknesses: First, the way it is told, more as a story than as a robust historical account. Though the last section of the book does give some interesting information about the sources he relied on, he doesn't integrate as much meta-textual analysis as I would have liked. I am thus left assuming that he is effectively retelling Thucydides. As a major scolar of the Peloponnesian War, I have no doubt that he is reflecting the modern understanding and interpretation of Thucydides, but he doesn't really go into that very often. There are numerous other sources, plus archeological evidence -- how does that relate to the story that Thucydides tells? I suppose that would ahve taken a long book and made it potentially unweildy (his academic version of this book is, after all, four volumes long). But still, would have appreciated a bit more of it.
I also just found parts hard to follow -- I think the book could have afforded something to keep track of all of the characters, with frustratingly similar names -- a short glossary or list of mini-biographies would have been handy to have as a reference.
Finally, the most frustrating part was the maps. They were scattered unpredictably throughout the book, were often duplicative (two maps were literally identical, with just different titles). They also wasted huge amounts of empty space -- listing random cities and locations that were unmentioned in the book, but failing to mention locations that were! Very frustrating, especially for a book that relies so heavily on understanding the complex geospacial politics of Classical Greece.
I think it is good for what it sets out to do, but I wouldn't call this a general interest history book. If you're interested in the ancient world, or Greece, then check this out! But if you're just looking for something interesting about history, maybe push this a bit further down your list.
Read
May 12, 2017Where I’m staying this week had Donald Kagan’s The Peloponnesian War on a shelf. Curious, I checked it out and got swept up immediately. Democratic Athens vs. oligarchic, militaristic Sparta in fifth century B.C. A war that lasted nearly thirty years, Greeks fighting Greeks. Virtually every major aspect of the conflict resonates in a contemporary context as well, whether it is the threats democratic societies face from factionalism and tribalistic mentalities, the damage that can be done by charismatic, huge-ego leaders, or the role of intelligence, as opposed to ignorance and lack of judgement, in guiding a people. Kagan’s a leading expert on the war and a fine writer. Along with all the history, I’m also getting a granular geography lesson when it comes to Greece—if a day ever comes where I get to visit Athens and the coasts and the islands, I’ll have a solid sense of the land and seas. —Phil (https://www.bookish.com/articles/frid...)
December 8, 2019
Книжка, яка без перебільшення заслуговує називатися шедевром сучасної історіографії! Дональд Каґан узяв за основу класичну працю Фукідіда, сучасника і безпосереднього учасника подій, твори кількох пізніших авторів (Ксенофонт, Арістотель, Діодор, Плутарх), а також останні археологічні дані. Його ґрунтовні знання експерта з міжнародних відносин та військового історика дозволяють максимально об'єктивно аналізувати політичні реалії того часу, мотиви осіб, відповідальних за приняття ключових рішень, фактори їхніх перемог і фатальні прорахунки, що призводили до катастрофічних поразок.
Крім того, це видання є скороченою версією більш розгорнутої, 4-томної праці Каґана, тому за своєю насиченістю деталями, динамікою та напруженістю книжка місцями близька до трилера. За 27 років війни, описаних у ній, кожна зі сторін стільки разів була буквально за крок як до перемоги, так і до поразки, що мимоволі я шкодував про те, що знав наперед, чим усе закінчиться...
Крім того, це видання є скороченою версією більш розгорнутої, 4-томної праці Каґана, тому за своєю насиченістю деталями, динамікою та напруженістю книжка місцями близька до трилера. За 27 років війни, описаних у ній, кожна зі сторін стільки разів була буквально за крок як до перемоги, так і до поразки, що мимоволі я шкодував про те, що знав наперед, чим усе закінчиться...
April 1, 2017
Condensed version of a multi-volume academic study into the war between Sparta and Athens in the 5th century 400BC, the book is mainly based around a famous historic account of the war by a contemporary of the events (often regarded as the first real history book) but at many times uses other sources to challenge the biases in that account. Due to the original detail this account is also very detailed – often describing what were no more than minor skirmishes with a handful of dead on each side – but the writing style and the careful chapter ordering and introduction as well as the detailed maps make it a good read which would really only be improved by a timeline and more summaries.
October 7, 2024
Quite a commendable achievement in historical non-fiction writing! I think I've read a lot of work from this genre (idk if that's a good thing yet), often times writers stay true to the history so much that the writing becomes a chore to read - it's difficult covering life when you are not a writer by profession. Kagan bypasses this by leaving out the 'he said this' style of history writing and choosing to utilize a more standard story-like language. It's super detailed, obviously takes a while to read through, but I enjoyed it! Makes the world of Assassins Creed: Odyssey a lot more understandable.
November 1, 2024
Good, if you really want a thorough history of the Peloponnesian war, but disappointing if you're coming from On the Origins of War (also by Kagan) and expecting something similar.
Pros:
* An excellent resource for the topic, more complete than Thucydides as he has a couple thousand more years of scholarship to build on.
* Not afraid to challenge said modern scholarship, or Thucydides On the other hand.
Cons:
* Less interesting than either Thucydides or on the Origins of War.
*Too much simping for democracy. I.e., bends over backwards far too frequently to defend at all costs democracy as a form of government.
Pros:
* An excellent resource for the topic, more complete than Thucydides as he has a couple thousand more years of scholarship to build on.
* Not afraid to challenge said modern scholarship, or Thucydides On the other hand.
Cons:
* Less interesting than either Thucydides or on the Origins of War.
*Too much simping for democracy. I.e., bends over backwards far too frequently to defend at all costs democracy as a form of government.
Want to read
January 27, 2020FYI Right now there are only volumes 1&2 of this available at Kindle of what will be 4 volumes eventually. But The Peloponnesian War by Thucydides is available at Kindle for FREE if you want to get started?
LLR
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