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651 pages, Hardcover
First published January 29, 2009
The Visigoths in 418 could be a support for the empire, but fifty years later they were inimical to it. As argued earlier, the conquest of the grain heartland of Africa by the Vandals in 439, which the Romans mistakenly did not anticipate and resist, seems to me the turning point, the moment after which these potential supports might turn into dangers. Army resources lessened too much after that; the balance of power changed. By 476 even the Roman army in Italy may have started to think that landowning was desirable. And, not less important, local élites began to deal with the ‘barbarian' powers rather than with the imperial government, which was by now too distant and decreasingly relevant; the provincialization of politics marked the death knell for the western empire. In the East, the control by the empire of that other huge grain resource, the Nile valley in Egypt, was never under threat in this period, and the logistical structure of the empire remained untouched as a result. When the Persians and then the Arabs took Egypt, and also the Levant, from Roman control after 618, the East would however face a huge and rapid crisis as well. The eastern Roman empire (we shall from that point on call it the Byzantine empire) survived, but it was a close-run thing, and the eastern empire changed considerably as a result. (p.108)With the end of trans-Mediterranean trade the population of the City of Rome declined and de-urbanization was experienced throughout the West as commerce and trade became localized. The same happened later in the East except that some trans-Aegean trading continued. Regional trade around the Mediterranean gradually revived by the year 1000, but grain shipments common during the empire era never revived.
Above all, pilgrims went to Rome, something which becomes well attested in the late sixth century and developed substantially in the seventh and eighth. The Anglo-Saxons are particularly prominent in our evidence; Benedict Biscop and Wilfrid each went several times. The routes became well known, with the result that, as Boniface of Mainz said in 747, in many cities of Italy and Gaul all the prostitutes were English. (p.174-175)The following excerpt describes how the shrinking size of Byzantium increased its cultural homogeneity and how it prompted the switch from Latin to Greek.
It may be added that the empire was by now more culturally homogeneous, too; in 500 only a minority of the population of the eastern empire spoke Greek, and the official language was still, at least nominally, actually Latin, but by 700, after the loss of Syriac- and Coptic-speaking provinces, nearly everyone was a Greek-speaker, and the occasional Sclavenian and not-so-occasional Armenian were exotic. (p.264)The following excerpt addresses the process by which Orthodoxy in the East began to perceive itself as being separate from the Catholic pope of the West.
The second council of Nicaen condemned Iconoclasm uncompromisingly, refuting (and thus preserving) its theology point by point. It was, in effect, Second Nicaea which invented the theology of images which has remained a structural part of the eastern church. Many of the basic liturgical practices of Orthodox Christianity look back to 787. Images from now on—as never before—not only could be venerated, but had to be. And Nicaea not only invented Orthodoxy, but to a large extent invented Iconoclasm too, turning Constantine V's policies into a totalizing system, which they probably never had been at the time.The following excerpt explains why the history of the Arab controlled lands need to be included in a book about the "inheritance of Rome."
It is not fully clear why Eirene did this. She was certainly bothered by the religious break with the pope, who was by now close to the Frankish kings, and she wished to reunify Rome and Constantinople; her first formal announcement of her intentions was in a letter to Pope Hadrian I. … If Eirene could make herself empress by force, the only woman in Roman history to do so (or in European history before Ilizabeth of Russia in 1741), then she could also orchestrate the invention of Orthodox Christianity to bolster her power. Either way, however, the religious basis of imperial power took a new path from now on. (170-171)
And yet the early Arab period is crucial for us to confront. The caliphate did not rule any part of Europe before the Arab-Berber invasion of Spain in 711, but it cannot be excluded from a history of the Continent. For a start, it was the Arabs who broke in half the surviving section of the Roman empire in the seventh century, ending for ever its dream of continued Mediterranean hegemony, and forcing it to reinvent itself as the state we call Byzantium ... . Secondly, the caliphate was itself built on Roman foundations ... . Notwithstanding the difficulty and unfamiliarity of our narrative sources for it, it arguably preserved the parameters of imperial Roman society more completely than any other part of the post-Roman world, at least in the period up to 750; this is a paradox which it is essential to explore. Thirdly, the caliphate was simply richer and more powerful than any other post-Roman polity. (p.281-282)The following excerpt discusses why the Arab conquests were so successful. The speed of conquest isn't the surprising part; what is surprising is its longevity and relative permanence.
Given the exhaustion of the empires in the 630s, and the new-found religious unity of the Arabs, Arab victories and conquests are not in themselves extraordinary, and of course after the first great battles were won in 636-7 every Arab with a camel was likely to want to take part in the conquests and in the wealth they brought. What was less to be expected was that the conquesty would hold together. There can never have been many Arabs; Yemen is the only substantial part of the Arabian peninsula that can sustain more than a scattered, largely pastoralist, bedouin population, and even the Arabs who had for long settled in Roman-ruled Syria and Palestine seem to have been on the desert fringes there too, and therefore not so very numerous. Arab settlers would have been hugely outnumbered everywhere, and might not have withstood sustained revolts or Roman counterattack if their unity faltered; alternatively, they were at risk of being absorbed into local populations and losing their cultural identity ... . The absence of early revolts was fortunate (they would have been most dangerous in Iran, where the Persian aristocracy was a military one and early Arab settlement was more or less confined to Khurasan in the northeast); as for the surviving Romans/ Byzantines, they were in no military shape to take advantage of Arab civil wars. But the core reason for the survival of Arab rule as not only a political but also a cultural hegemony was not luck. Rather, it was the result of the decision (traditionally, and plausibly, ascribed to 'Umar I in 640-42) to settle the Arab armies, not as a landowning aristocracy as in the Germanic West, but as paid garrisons in newly founded cities (amsar), Kufa and Basra in Iraq, Mosul on the edge of the Iraq-Syria borderlands known as the Jazira, Fustat (the future Cairo) in Egypt, and others. The tax revenues of the provinces went to these garrisons above all, who thus were well rewarded for their separation from the sociopolitical life of the conquered population; being on the local diwan, the register of those entitled to army pay, was a coveted privilege, defended against newcomers as much as possible. 'Umar's policy succeeded; relatively little Arab landowning is recorded for any of these core provinces before 750 (although it seems to have been greater in Khurasan, where indeed Arab settlers were eventually Persianized, and also in the later conquest territories of Africa and Spain). This set the template for a structural separation between a paid army and the rest of civil—civilian—society which was greater even than in the Roman empire, and which marked most Muslim political systems ever after. (p.284-285)The 'Abbasid caliphate was the strongest and largest country in the world for a hundred years, but it eventually did break up into regional sovereignties. Its unity was gone, but the Muslim religion and Arabic language remained in most of its former territory.
One simple reason why the 'Abbasid caliphate broke up was that it was too large. Local societies were too different; communications were always slow; the caliphate was larger than the Roman Empire, and did not have a sea, with its relatively easy bulk transport, at its heart. (p.333)The following is a discussion of the size of the Charlemagne's Carolingian empire and the difficulty of maintaining control of its land.
The Carolingian empire was huge, larger than any subsequent state in Europe has ever been except for brief years at the height of the power of Napoleon and Hitler, and also extremely diverse, stretching as it did from the half-converted and roadless lands of Saxony to the old urban ancieties of Provence and Italy. How it could all be controlled, without the claborate fiscal and administrative system of the Roman empire or the caliphate, was an almost impossible challenge. Assembly politics was one part of it; so was army muster; and the palace, the court of the king or emperor, whether at Aachen or elsewhere, was furthermore a magnet lor the ambitious in every period, as they came to seek justice, gifts or preferment. (p.387)The Carolingian empire did not last. The first generation after Charlemagne had too many inheriting sons, and the second generation had too few.
In 887-8 the empire broke up into five kingdoms, with six or seven claimants, only one of whom was a male-line Carolingian. ... What destroyed Carolingian power was simply genealogy. There had always been too many Carolingians, given the presumption of political division the family had inherited from the Merovingian past. (p.401)I found the following discussion of spoken language during the Carolingian era of interest.
The more complex the Latin used by the educated strata, the further it departed from the Romance spoken by the huge majority of the population of the western and southern parts of the empire; the earliest form of French came to be seen as a separate language for the first time by authors precisely in the Carolingian period. And a high percentage of the Carolingian elite spoke German; ninth-century texts for the first time regularly described people as bilingual ... which implies that plenty of people were not. (p.413)A summary of the book's contents is provided in the concluding chapter. The author avers "six major shifts (or breaks) in the course of the six centuries covered by this book, three in the West, two in the East, and one in the North." He presents them in narrative form, but I have listed them below in abbreviated format.
... there were some efforts to translate the Bible into German (though certainly not into proto-French), but they did not get past Genesis and the Gospels, for the most part in poetic versions. (p.414)
1. Break-up of the Western Empire.One thing not mentioned in the above list, which the author may have considered to be part of Item 6 in the above list but which I think deserved to be called out specifically, is the socioeconomic/cultural movement toward development of the feudal system in the 9th and 10th centuries. It may not have been listed separately because feudalism actually reached its zenith after the year 1000.
2. Demise of Byzantine world and rise of Arab conquests.
3. Development in the West of a moralized political practice (i.e. linked state and semi-autonomous church)
4. Break-up of the caliphate.
5. End of the Carolingian world.
6. Development of numerous political and social hierarchies throughout Europe.