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Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945
In September 1944, the Allies believed that Hitler’s army was beaten and expected the bloodshed to end by Christmas. Yet a series of mistakes and setbacks, including the Battle of the Bulge, drastically altered this timetable and led to eight more months of brutal fighting. With Armageddon, the eminent military historian Max Hastings gives us memorable accounts of the great battles and captures their human impact on soldiers and civilians. He tells the story of both the Eastern and Western Fronts, raising provocative questions and offering vivid portraits of the great leaders. This rousing and revelatory chronicle brings to life the crucial final months of the twentieth century’s greatest global conflict.
584 pages, Paperback
First published November 16, 2004
About the author
Max Hastings
111 books1,546 followersSir Max Hugh Macdonald Hastings, FRSL, FRHistS is a British journalist, editor, historian and author. His parents were Macdonald Hastings, a journalist and war correspondent, and Anne Scott-James, sometime editor of Harper's Bazaar.
Hastings was educated at Charterhouse School and University College, Oxford, which he left after a year.After leaving Oxford University, Max Hastings became a foreign correspondent, and reported from more than sixty countries and eleven wars for BBC TV and the London Evening Standard.
Among his bestselling books Bomber Command won the Somerset Maugham Prize, and both Overlord and The Battle for the Falklands won the Yorkshire Post Book of the Year Prize.
After ten years as editor and then editor-in-chief of The Daily Telegraph, he became editor of the Evening Standard in 1996. He has won many awards for his journalism, including Journalist of The Year and What the Papers Say Reporter of the Year for his work in the South Atlantic in 1982, and Editor of the Year in 1988.
He stood down as editor of the Evening Standard in 2001 and was knighted in 2002. His monumental work of military history, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-1945 was published in 2005.
He is also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature.
Sir Max Hastings honoured with the $100,000 2012 Pritzker Military Library Literature Award for Lifetime Achievement in Military Writing.
Hastings was educated at Charterhouse School and University College, Oxford, which he left after a year.After leaving Oxford University, Max Hastings became a foreign correspondent, and reported from more than sixty countries and eleven wars for BBC TV and the London Evening Standard.
Among his bestselling books Bomber Command won the Somerset Maugham Prize, and both Overlord and The Battle for the Falklands won the Yorkshire Post Book of the Year Prize.
After ten years as editor and then editor-in-chief of The Daily Telegraph, he became editor of the Evening Standard in 1996. He has won many awards for his journalism, including Journalist of The Year and What the Papers Say Reporter of the Year for his work in the South Atlantic in 1982, and Editor of the Year in 1988.
He stood down as editor of the Evening Standard in 2001 and was knighted in 2002. His monumental work of military history, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-1945 was published in 2005.
He is also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature.
Sir Max Hastings honoured with the $100,000 2012 Pritzker Military Library Literature Award for Lifetime Achievement in Military Writing.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 244 reviews
February 19, 2013
Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945 is the definition of a 5 Star rating. Max Hastings chronicles the final battles to defeat Nazi Germany. He starts the story in August, 1944 with the Allies about to launch Op Market-Garden in the West and the Soviets drawn up along the Vistula, preparing for their next stage of the assault into Poland. Mr Hastings is able to take you effortlessly from the foxhole or tank turret to the highest levels of SHAEF or STAVKA. He makes it all interesting and shows the results of decision-making at all levels. All the while, he brings new information to light while briskly moving the story along. There wasn’t a single area that I found boring or uninteresting. Couldn’t put it down.
What I found most refreshing was Mr. Hastings honest and clear-eyed view of all sides. If you don’t like seeing your side of the conflict or performance of your forces criticized, I would avoid this book. Hastings hands out criticism where deserved and praise where earned. Everyone is subjected to his critical analysis. He got me reconsidering my impressions about events in this period. I like to put little markers where I find an anecdote or fact that struck me. This book is a forest of those markers, far more than I could ever discuss in a review. Some of the themes and events that stick out:
The Soviet command system struggled to successfully employ forces but had some extraordinary generals who knew how to employ massive forces—and were mostly indifferent to casualties incurred as long as the objective was achieved. They must have been very good at reading between the lines to accurately assess the situation:
Women Soviet soldiers performed many functions, both on the battlefield and behind the front. Although Hastings doesn’t spend a lot of time on the subject, he does bring in the women soldiers at various points. Some women were at the mercy of their commanders:
Clearing the Scheldt estuary and opening Antwerp was a job given to the Canadians by Monty. I really need to read about this operation because it was so crucial to success. It should have been ordered by Monty much earlier and the Canadians had a very tough time of it, compounded by a shortage of troops:
The performance of the soldiers of the Western Allies vs. German soldiers vs. Soviet soldiers is covered in many places. Hastings lays down the assessment that the western soldiers were amateurs raised in democracy and relied on technology and high explosives to win the war.
Hastings does not give high marks to almost any western general and believes the slow, methodical movement of allied armies in the west was due to fear of exposed flanks, reinforced by local counterattacks by the Germans. The Battle of the Bulge, Hastings argues, only made the high command more paranoid about bold moves. The German soldier fought fiercely right to the end:
Yanks vs. Brits:
Allied command vs. German command:
Many battles are covered in some detail along with generally excellent maps for big picture orientation. The Hürtgen Forest campaign comes in for special criticism:
The relationships between generals and leaders are often brought to light. The competition between Zhukov, Konev and Rokossovsky in the Battle of Berlin is highlighted. Many Soviet soldiers paid with their lives so one general could achieve success. Another area of friction was between Monty and Eisenhower. While Eisenhower is painted as no more than a competent manager, Monty is portrayed as insufferable:
Monty performed well in the bulge, yet shortly thereafter resumed his obnoxious ways.
I could go on extracting more quotes from the book. Hastings tears apart the air war strategy; he covers the plight of all the nations and people under the Nazi yoke and later under the iron grip of Stalin. He explains the terrible bloodbath in East Prussia and later in Berlin. He touches upon all the topics you want to hear about. I can’t say enough about how good this book is. Just read it.
What I found most refreshing was Mr. Hastings honest and clear-eyed view of all sides. If you don’t like seeing your side of the conflict or performance of your forces criticized, I would avoid this book. Hastings hands out criticism where deserved and praise where earned. Everyone is subjected to his critical analysis. He got me reconsidering my impressions about events in this period. I like to put little markers where I find an anecdote or fact that struck me. This book is a forest of those markers, far more than I could ever discuss in a review. Some of the themes and events that stick out:
The Soviet command system struggled to successfully employ forces but had some extraordinary generals who knew how to employ massive forces—and were mostly indifferent to casualties incurred as long as the objective was achieved. They must have been very good at reading between the lines to accurately assess the situation:
Women Soviet soldiers performed many functions, both on the battlefield and behind the front. Although Hastings doesn’t spend a lot of time on the subject, he does bring in the women soldiers at various points. Some women were at the mercy of their commanders:
Clearing the Scheldt estuary and opening Antwerp was a job given to the Canadians by Monty. I really need to read about this operation because it was so crucial to success. It should have been ordered by Monty much earlier and the Canadians had a very tough time of it, compounded by a shortage of troops:
The performance of the soldiers of the Western Allies vs. German soldiers vs. Soviet soldiers is covered in many places. Hastings lays down the assessment that the western soldiers were amateurs raised in democracy and relied on technology and high explosives to win the war.
Hastings does not give high marks to almost any western general and believes the slow, methodical movement of allied armies in the west was due to fear of exposed flanks, reinforced by local counterattacks by the Germans. The Battle of the Bulge, Hastings argues, only made the high command more paranoid about bold moves. The German soldier fought fiercely right to the end:
Yanks vs. Brits:
Allied command vs. German command:
Many battles are covered in some detail along with generally excellent maps for big picture orientation. The Hürtgen Forest campaign comes in for special criticism:
The relationships between generals and leaders are often brought to light. The competition between Zhukov, Konev and Rokossovsky in the Battle of Berlin is highlighted. Many Soviet soldiers paid with their lives so one general could achieve success. Another area of friction was between Monty and Eisenhower. While Eisenhower is painted as no more than a competent manager, Monty is portrayed as insufferable:
Monty performed well in the bulge, yet shortly thereafter resumed his obnoxious ways.
I could go on extracting more quotes from the book. Hastings tears apart the air war strategy; he covers the plight of all the nations and people under the Nazi yoke and later under the iron grip of Stalin. He explains the terrible bloodbath in East Prussia and later in Berlin. He touches upon all the topics you want to hear about. I can’t say enough about how good this book is. Just read it.
March 25, 2021
I will admit I wasn't sure how good this book would be before I read it. I had previously read "Overlord" by Max Hastings and found it to be slow and at times, boring. I am very pleased to report this book is so much better.
Hastings weaves together a chronicle of the Third Reich's last days, starting with events leading up to Operation Market Garden and continuing through the fall of Berlin and parts of the Allied occupation. Along the way he uses personal recollections from German, Russian, American and British Commonwealth soldiers, along with those of civilians who were caught up in the brutal events leading up to Germany's defeat. In my opinion, this is what makes this book shine--the personal words of those who were there. Gritty, unvarnished, tragic, at times humorous, and more often than not just incredibly compelling reading.
The leadership of the Americans, British, Germans and Russians are all examined. Virtually no one escapes criticism, but praise is given in equal doses. Some generals get a bit more harsher treatment than others, and I think it was all deserved, whether it's Montgomery's poor planning for Market Garden, Zhukov's strategy of taking Berlin before anyone else could claim the glory, or Patton's failed rescue attempt at Hammelburg.
This book is a must-read for anyone interested in the last days of the Third Reich. Well done!
Hastings weaves together a chronicle of the Third Reich's last days, starting with events leading up to Operation Market Garden and continuing through the fall of Berlin and parts of the Allied occupation. Along the way he uses personal recollections from German, Russian, American and British Commonwealth soldiers, along with those of civilians who were caught up in the brutal events leading up to Germany's defeat. In my opinion, this is what makes this book shine--the personal words of those who were there. Gritty, unvarnished, tragic, at times humorous, and more often than not just incredibly compelling reading.
The leadership of the Americans, British, Germans and Russians are all examined. Virtually no one escapes criticism, but praise is given in equal doses. Some generals get a bit more harsher treatment than others, and I think it was all deserved, whether it's Montgomery's poor planning for Market Garden, Zhukov's strategy of taking Berlin before anyone else could claim the glory, or Patton's failed rescue attempt at Hammelburg.
This book is a must-read for anyone interested in the last days of the Third Reich. Well done!
April 30, 2020
Διαβάζεται απνευστί, ιδίως οι προσωπικές ιστορίες των συμμετεχόντων έχουν μεγάλο ενδιαφέρον.
Ο Hastings αποδεικνύεται ικανότατος ιστορικός και συγγραφέας εξίσου.
Ο Hastings αποδεικνύεται ικανότατος ιστορικός και συγγραφέας εξίσου.
June 30, 2017
Very different approach to the history of World War II, as it is presented through the antidotes of participants both military and civilian. Like all large volumes, it cannot cover everything in this last year of the war, but offers teasers that make the reader realize that they didn't know about something that was covered and took a lesser space in another history. I know I will be looking for an in depth book on that last year in East Prussia, the winter of "blood and ice".
This was one of the first books that hinted at the weaknesses of both the American Commanders and the lack of training of the average American ground force, who prevailed not because of grand strategies, but but sheer numbers as they timidly advanced across Europe.
It was the first time that I became aware of the number of American troops that just abandoned battle, and melted into the European countryside....a luxury that soldiers and Marines in the South Pacific did not have as an option, nor was it an option in Korea or Vietnam or our wars in the Middle East. It was not an option for the Russian soldiers either as deserters were treated harshly, and the choice was to die fighting or die shirking with a minimal chance of survival and no real R & R, no trips to refresh your spirits.
The brutality of the last year of the war was astounding for those on the Eastern Front, especially for civilians. This text brought interesting perspectives, and for that alone it was a good read.
This was one of the first books that hinted at the weaknesses of both the American Commanders and the lack of training of the average American ground force, who prevailed not because of grand strategies, but but sheer numbers as they timidly advanced across Europe.
It was the first time that I became aware of the number of American troops that just abandoned battle, and melted into the European countryside....a luxury that soldiers and Marines in the South Pacific did not have as an option, nor was it an option in Korea or Vietnam or our wars in the Middle East. It was not an option for the Russian soldiers either as deserters were treated harshly, and the choice was to die fighting or die shirking with a minimal chance of survival and no real R & R, no trips to refresh your spirits.
The brutality of the last year of the war was astounding for those on the Eastern Front, especially for civilians. This text brought interesting perspectives, and for that alone it was a good read.
February 22, 2010
Max Hastings is one of the premier historians of the Second World War. Unlike Stephen Ambrose, who , while a very readable historian -- even knowing whom to plagarize (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_...) -- is as much a cheerleader as historian, Hastings presents objective analysis. It's fortuitous that he also happens to be a very good writer.
Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-1945 follows his Overlord D-Day and the Battle for Normandy. Hastings succeeds in explaining why the Germans fought so tenaciously even after the war was obviously lost. Within ten weeks after the landings at Normandy, the allies were at the Rhine. The Russians, without whom we could never have defeated Hitler, were pressing hard on the eastern front.
Hastings portrays the Wehrmacht as one of the premier armies of the world -- and also one of the most vicious in its treatment of civilians. We tend to forget the enormous casualties suffered in WW II that make WW I look like a walk in the park. The Russians alone, according to some estimates, suffered some forty million deaths (of course, Stalin was responsible for many of them through vicious reprisals and substantial incompetence.)
Hastings presents a convincing case that poor training of allied troops and less than inspired generalship by Montgomery and Eisenhower prolonged the war, which should have ended, her argues, by the end of 1944. [A book I recently finished reading, [book:Company Commander The Classic Infantry Memoir of World War II|182134], notes that George Marshall deliberately kept the numbers of troops down so as to allocate more resources to materiel production and naval and air resources.] The Red Army, while having more spectacular leadership, suffered from its callous treatment of its own troops. They responded with savagery against the occupied countries. The more democratic countries' armies were substantially more humane -- Americans never saw the Germans as the inhuman barbarians they considered the Japanese to be -- but relied on the advances of the Russians to tie down German SS units on the east which otherwise would have been used against the allies.
Democracies tend to be more cautious in war, having to be concerned with casualties. Hastings notes that the Red Army and Germans had no such concern and could be much more profligate with their armies.
On the other hand, Germans fighting to the bitter end, for whatever reason, be it indoctrination or saving Europe from the Asiatic hordes, meant that they had more time to kill Jews. Almost 500,000 Jews were shipped to concentration camps from Hungary in mid-1944.
A fascinating book .
Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-1945 follows his Overlord D-Day and the Battle for Normandy. Hastings succeeds in explaining why the Germans fought so tenaciously even after the war was obviously lost. Within ten weeks after the landings at Normandy, the allies were at the Rhine. The Russians, without whom we could never have defeated Hitler, were pressing hard on the eastern front.
Hastings portrays the Wehrmacht as one of the premier armies of the world -- and also one of the most vicious in its treatment of civilians. We tend to forget the enormous casualties suffered in WW II that make WW I look like a walk in the park. The Russians alone, according to some estimates, suffered some forty million deaths (of course, Stalin was responsible for many of them through vicious reprisals and substantial incompetence.)
Hastings presents a convincing case that poor training of allied troops and less than inspired generalship by Montgomery and Eisenhower prolonged the war, which should have ended, her argues, by the end of 1944. [A book I recently finished reading, [book:Company Commander The Classic Infantry Memoir of World War II|182134], notes that George Marshall deliberately kept the numbers of troops down so as to allocate more resources to materiel production and naval and air resources.] The Red Army, while having more spectacular leadership, suffered from its callous treatment of its own troops. They responded with savagery against the occupied countries. The more democratic countries' armies were substantially more humane -- Americans never saw the Germans as the inhuman barbarians they considered the Japanese to be -- but relied on the advances of the Russians to tie down German SS units on the east which otherwise would have been used against the allies.
Democracies tend to be more cautious in war, having to be concerned with casualties. Hastings notes that the Red Army and Germans had no such concern and could be much more profligate with their armies.
On the other hand, Germans fighting to the bitter end, for whatever reason, be it indoctrination or saving Europe from the Asiatic hordes, meant that they had more time to kill Jews. Almost 500,000 Jews were shipped to concentration camps from Hungary in mid-1944.
A fascinating book .
October 27, 2021
I bought this book sight unseen assuming it was written by a historian. After reading for a while, I suspected that the writer of this book wasn’t a historian at all. I was correct, he’s a journalist and former editor or right wing conservative newspapers The Daily Telegraph and Evening Standard.
In the foreword he claims that the “chief purpose” of the book was “objective analysis”. Nothing could be further from the truth.
I am of the view that no writing can be unbiased or wholly objective. What bothers me is the claim of “objective analysis” when the final result is the regurgitation of tired and standard cliché right wing talking points, while at the same time downplaying (or not even mentioning) events which doesn’t fit with his propagandist grand narrative.
The events on the Eastern front are rushed through, almost like an afterthought. But if someone on the Western front stubs his toe or drops his ice cream, prepare to read about it in great detail.
Three of the chapters are devoted to different themes, four cover the Eastern front and nine (!) the Western front.
Hastings describes the differences between the two fronts. In the West the allies don’t hate the Germans. There is an almost cordial, gentlemanlike relationship between the combatants, which he is careful to point out several times. In the East, however, Hastings never misses an opportunity to point out what vicious brutes the Russians are, and how they are seething with hatred for the Germans. Sure, he mentions in chapter 10 that “Hitler and his armies had aspired to enslave the Russian people, no more and no less” which is a half truth.
But when Hastings describes large parts of the Red Army as an “immense rabble of Mongols”, I actually have to question which side of the war he would have been on. Because that language is not far from the Nazi phrase “Asiatic hordes”.
To understand the actions of the Red Army you have to understand two basic concepts Hastings does not mention by a word.
Drang nach Osten predates the Nazis, and is basically about German colonial expansion into Slavic lands which are to be Germanized. See Israel for a modern day comparison. People today are probably more familiar with the Nazi version of the concept, Lebensraum. Hitler is quoted in Hitler, A Chronology Of His Life And Time as saying:
Generalplan Ost was Nazi Germany’s plan for what would happen with the Eastern territories. Roughly half or more of Russians were to be exterminated, a large part forcibly expelled to Siberia, and those who are allowed to remain will serve as slaves. Need I point out that Nazi Germany didn’t have a similar plan for the West?
Rape on the Eastern front was rampant, whereas it was not so on the Western front. The following quote from Surviving Hitler and Mussolini: Daily Life in Occupied Europe will suffice:
The suffering in the East, not at least including Russia, was immense. Nothing in the West came anywhere near it. The war on the Eastern front was a war of annihilation. What the Germans were doing, although they had no way of knowing it at the time, was sowing the storm.
Hastings laments the fate of “ethnic Germans” who were to be forcibly expelled. What was the ratio between the German “historic residents” and “recent immigrants” in the Eastern territories? How many of them lived on land stolen from the indigenous population? How many had profited from the Nazi expansionist colonial policy, including slave labor? Again Hastings doesn’t know, care or bother to tell us.
The phrase “recent immigrants” is an interesting choice of words, by the way. “Colonists” or “occupiers” would be more suited. But then again, that would complicate Hastings’ grand narrative.
When the Red Army finally struck back, it was time for the Germans to reap the whirlwind. Hastings pontificates about the glorious ideals of the West with tired platitudes about democracies and totalitarian states. While the Soviet Union, which apparently was no better than Nazi Germany, didn’t even hesitate to starve their own population and were fighting to expand its territory, the gallant West was altruistically fighting for freedom and democracy. Sure, Hastings briefly mentions that “many Americans were more troubled by the residual imperial ambitions of their British ally”, but that is as far as his discussion of Western colonialism goes.
Meanwhile, in the year preceding the events in this book, three million people died of famine in the British colony India, in Bengal alone. In part because Churchill’s War Cabinet denied India food imports (see for example Churchill's Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India During World War II).
And of course there is no mention of the growing American imperialism in the so-called “Banana Wars” or the Spanish-American War for that matter, where the US was literally awarded colonies.
If the Allied goal was to liberate Europe from the yoke of oppression, it doesn’t explain why the allies rigged elections in Italy, supported various authoritarian governments, including the military junta, in Greece, and supported the Franco dictatorship in Spain (which Britain even did before the war, see for example Franco's Friends: How British Intelligence Helped Bring Franco to Power in Spain)
Hastings does all in his power to gloss over (or not even mention) crimes - murder, looting and rape - perpetrated by the Allies on the Western front. Most likely because it doesn't fit with his propagandist grand narrative. Antony Beevor on the other hand paints a for more nuanced and frank picture in D-Day: The Battle for Normandy.
The actions of the Russians on the Eastern front are repeatedly described by Hastings as an “orgy”, be it of looting, murder or rape. Of course he doesn’t use the same word to describe the mass looting and rape on the Western front (see for example Taken by Force: Rape and American GIs in Europe during WWII: or Als die Soldaten kamen: Die Vergewaltigung deutscher Frauen am Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs).
Although there was widespread looting on the Western front, naturally the “Anglo-Americans were a great deal less brutal than the Russians”, and of course some gentlemanly Western soldiers feel really bad about it, which Hastings is careful to point out.
Rarely has chauvinist Westernism been so obvious. How many in the Western allies felt any guilt about mass murdering civilians in the strategic bombing campaign? Hastings himself has this to say about it:
Hastings rarely misses an opportunity to lament the fate of Germans on the Eastern front, only to go out of his way to whitewash allied crimes on the Western front. The Germans (including civilians) only have themselves to blame since they started it.
For example, the Soviet Union sinking the Wilhelm Gustloff gets more than three pages, or 1 261 words. When the British sink the Cap Arkona, which is carrying 5 000 concentration camp inmates, it’s brushed away with four sentences, or 87 words. (Actually, Hastings deserves credit for even mentioning Cap Arkona, something which Anthony Beevor doesn’t do in The Fall of Berlin 1945)
He devotes some pages to describe the effects of the Allied strategic bombing campaign on ordinary Germans. But I actually balked when I read the following:
First of all, Hastings' own book is brimming with "emotive language". And to dismiss this claim by saying that “some Germans” think the strategic bombing campaign was a war crime is propaganda on the highest level. You could compare it to the strategic fire bombing campaign in Japan, about which Robert McNamara had the following to say in the documentary Fog of War:
What the Americans did in Japan, they did in Germany, albeit on a smaller scale. There is no doubt that if the Germans had won the war, it would be British and American politicians and military leaders who would be swinging from the gallows.
Hastings has the following to say about Japan:
Again Hastings is carefully toeing the line of decades long right wing propaganda. To even imply that Japan was in any way “spared” is such a display of magnificent ignorance and arrogance that it boggles the mind. I would direct anyone interested in this to read Hiroshima Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath by Paul Ham, a journalist capable of critical thinking, as opposed to armchair general Hastings.
Then again, Hastings is the author who dismissed that one of the reasons for dropping the atomic bombs on Japan was a power demonstration against the Soviet Union as a “conspiracy theory”. I urge anyone interested in reading the work of a real journalist to pick up Paul Ham’s book:
Still, Hastings frantically tries to defend the atrocities carried out by the allies on the Western front:
Meanwhile, Basil Liddell Hart, had the following to say about the allied bombing campaign on the Western front in his private diary:
What is the moral difference between murdering civilians eye to eye or doing so en masse from the relative safety of a bomber? Why is the latter morally superior to the former? How does it make any difference to the civilian population? If you expect any kind of answer from Hastings you are mistaken.
In summation: The way Germany acted in their invasions of the Western and Eastern fronts, and the suffering the population under occupation endured, is very different. When the tides turned, the Soviet Union meted out the same punishment which they themselves had suffered in the hands of the Germans. Tit for tat. On the Western front, which had not experienced the same suffering as the in the East, the allies still responded with their own mass rape, murder and looting, although not on the same scale as in the East. How does that make the former reprehensible and the latter morally superior?
If there is supposed to be any substantial difference between democratic and authoritarian states, there must be something more than the way the leaders are selected. “They killed a million civilians, we only killed half a million civilians, therefore we’re better” is hardly any basis for claiming moral superiority. Why should authoritarian regimes be the standard for what is acceptable or not?
Paul Ham ends his book with the following words, which are just as applicable to the European theatre:
Nothing I have written is meant to excuse or downplay the atrocities carried out by the Soviet Union on the Eastern front. It is merely an attempt to put their actions into context, something which Hastings is reluctant to do.
Or simply don’t claim that your goal is “objective analysis”.
In the foreword he claims that the “chief purpose” of the book was “objective analysis”. Nothing could be further from the truth.
I am of the view that no writing can be unbiased or wholly objective. What bothers me is the claim of “objective analysis” when the final result is the regurgitation of tired and standard cliché right wing talking points, while at the same time downplaying (or not even mentioning) events which doesn’t fit with his propagandist grand narrative.
The events on the Eastern front are rushed through, almost like an afterthought. But if someone on the Western front stubs his toe or drops his ice cream, prepare to read about it in great detail.
Three of the chapters are devoted to different themes, four cover the Eastern front and nine (!) the Western front.
Hastings describes the differences between the two fronts. In the West the allies don’t hate the Germans. There is an almost cordial, gentlemanlike relationship between the combatants, which he is careful to point out several times. In the East, however, Hastings never misses an opportunity to point out what vicious brutes the Russians are, and how they are seething with hatred for the Germans. Sure, he mentions in chapter 10 that “Hitler and his armies had aspired to enslave the Russian people, no more and no less” which is a half truth.
But when Hastings describes large parts of the Red Army as an “immense rabble of Mongols”, I actually have to question which side of the war he would have been on. Because that language is not far from the Nazi phrase “Asiatic hordes”.
To understand the actions of the Red Army you have to understand two basic concepts Hastings does not mention by a word.
Drang nach Osten predates the Nazis, and is basically about German colonial expansion into Slavic lands which are to be Germanized. See Israel for a modern day comparison. People today are probably more familiar with the Nazi version of the concept, Lebensraum. Hitler is quoted in Hitler, A Chronology Of His Life And Time as saying:
"It is eastwards, only and always eastwards, that the veins of our race must expand. It is the direction which Nature herself has decreed for the expansion of the German peoples."
2nd ed. p. 201
Generalplan Ost was Nazi Germany’s plan for what would happen with the Eastern territories. Roughly half or more of Russians were to be exterminated, a large part forcibly expelled to Siberia, and those who are allowed to remain will serve as slaves. Need I point out that Nazi Germany didn’t have a similar plan for the West?
Rape on the Eastern front was rampant, whereas it was not so on the Western front. The following quote from Surviving Hitler and Mussolini: Daily Life in Occupied Europe will suffice:
Depending on the brutality of the warfare and on the particular circumstances in each occupied country, women were to a varying degree and in unknown numbers raped, abused and sexually harassed by German soldiers. In practice the German authorities tolerated rape as part of the warfare in eastern and southeastern Europe but not in the northern and western countries.
p. 90
The suffering in the East, not at least including Russia, was immense. Nothing in the West came anywhere near it. The war on the Eastern front was a war of annihilation. What the Germans were doing, although they had no way of knowing it at the time, was sowing the storm.
Hastings laments the fate of “ethnic Germans” who were to be forcibly expelled. What was the ratio between the German “historic residents” and “recent immigrants” in the Eastern territories? How many of them lived on land stolen from the indigenous population? How many had profited from the Nazi expansionist colonial policy, including slave labor? Again Hastings doesn’t know, care or bother to tell us.
The phrase “recent immigrants” is an interesting choice of words, by the way. “Colonists” or “occupiers” would be more suited. But then again, that would complicate Hastings’ grand narrative.
When the Red Army finally struck back, it was time for the Germans to reap the whirlwind. Hastings pontificates about the glorious ideals of the West with tired platitudes about democracies and totalitarian states. While the Soviet Union, which apparently was no better than Nazi Germany, didn’t even hesitate to starve their own population and were fighting to expand its territory, the gallant West was altruistically fighting for freedom and democracy. Sure, Hastings briefly mentions that “many Americans were more troubled by the residual imperial ambitions of their British ally”, but that is as far as his discussion of Western colonialism goes.
Meanwhile, in the year preceding the events in this book, three million people died of famine in the British colony India, in Bengal alone. In part because Churchill’s War Cabinet denied India food imports (see for example Churchill's Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India During World War II).
And of course there is no mention of the growing American imperialism in the so-called “Banana Wars” or the Spanish-American War for that matter, where the US was literally awarded colonies.
If the Allied goal was to liberate Europe from the yoke of oppression, it doesn’t explain why the allies rigged elections in Italy, supported various authoritarian governments, including the military junta, in Greece, and supported the Franco dictatorship in Spain (which Britain even did before the war, see for example Franco's Friends: How British Intelligence Helped Bring Franco to Power in Spain)
Hastings does all in his power to gloss over (or not even mention) crimes - murder, looting and rape - perpetrated by the Allies on the Western front. Most likely because it doesn't fit with his propagandist grand narrative. Antony Beevor on the other hand paints a for more nuanced and frank picture in D-Day: The Battle for Normandy.
The actions of the Russians on the Eastern front are repeatedly described by Hastings as an “orgy”, be it of looting, murder or rape. Of course he doesn’t use the same word to describe the mass looting and rape on the Western front (see for example Taken by Force: Rape and American GIs in Europe during WWII: or Als die Soldaten kamen: Die Vergewaltigung deutscher Frauen am Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs).
Although there was widespread looting on the Western front, naturally the “Anglo-Americans were a great deal less brutal than the Russians”, and of course some gentlemanly Western soldiers feel really bad about it, which Hastings is careful to point out.
All men who participate in wars find themselves obliged to do things which, if they are decent people, they afterwards regret. That was the case with many American and British soldiers, and some German and Russian ones, after the Second World War. More than a few were traumatized for years by events in which they had participated. Other Germans and Russians, however, including those who must be categorized as war criminals, suffered no guilts or doubts.
Chapter 16
Rarely has chauvinist Westernism been so obvious. How many in the Western allies felt any guilt about mass murdering civilians in the strategic bombing campaign? Hastings himself has this to say about it:
There sometimes seemed a peculiar bloodlessness about the routine of massed bomber operations in the final months of the war. The fliers tripped their switches 21,000 feet above Germany, and those who had not suffered misfortune or disaster went home to see that night’s movie or to head for the huge dance hall in London’s Covent Garden that was their favourite rendezvous.
Chapter 11
Hastings rarely misses an opportunity to lament the fate of Germans on the Eastern front, only to go out of his way to whitewash allied crimes on the Western front. The Germans (including civilians) only have themselves to blame since they started it.
For example, the Soviet Union sinking the Wilhelm Gustloff gets more than three pages, or 1 261 words. When the British sink the Cap Arkona, which is carrying 5 000 concentration camp inmates, it’s brushed away with four sentences, or 87 words. (Actually, Hastings deserves credit for even mentioning Cap Arkona, something which Anthony Beevor doesn’t do in The Fall of Berlin 1945)
He devotes some pages to describe the effects of the Allied strategic bombing campaign on ordinary Germans. But I actually balked when I read the following:
Some Germans today brand the bombing of their cities a war crime. This seems an incautious choice of words. It is possible to deplore Harris’s excesses without accepting that they should be judged in such emotive language.
Chapter 11
First of all, Hastings' own book is brimming with "emotive language". And to dismiss this claim by saying that “some Germans” think the strategic bombing campaign was a war crime is propaganda on the highest level. You could compare it to the strategic fire bombing campaign in Japan, about which Robert McNamara had the following to say in the documentary Fog of War:
LeMay said, "If we'd lost the war, we'd all have been prosecuted as war criminals." And I think he's right. He, and I'd say I, were behaving as war criminals. LeMay recognized that what he was doing would be thought immoral if his side had lost. But what makes it immoral if you lose and not immoral if you win?
What the Americans did in Japan, they did in Germany, albeit on a smaller scale. There is no doubt that if the Germans had won the war, it would be British and American politicians and military leaders who would be swinging from the gallows.
Hastings has the following to say about Japan:
Japan’s surrender in August 1945, before the Allies were obliged to invade its mainland, undoubtedly spared it from death and destruction on a scale to match that which took place in Germany.
Chapter 16
Again Hastings is carefully toeing the line of decades long right wing propaganda. To even imply that Japan was in any way “spared” is such a display of magnificent ignorance and arrogance that it boggles the mind. I would direct anyone interested in this to read Hiroshima Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath by Paul Ham, a journalist capable of critical thinking, as opposed to armchair general Hastings.
Then again, Hastings is the author who dismissed that one of the reasons for dropping the atomic bombs on Japan was a power demonstration against the Soviet Union as a “conspiracy theory”. I urge anyone interested in reading the work of a real journalist to pick up Paul Ham’s book:
Still, Hastings frantically tries to defend the atrocities carried out by the allies on the Western front:
But by the mid-twentieth century civilized societies imposed upon their military leaders parameters of humanity and respect for life. Thus it was that the least civilized combatants of the Second World War performed the most notable military feats achieved by flesh and blood. It was left to the Western allies to amaze the world by the deeds that could be accomplished through the brilliant application of technology and industrial might.
Chapter 16
Meanwhile, Basil Liddell Hart, had the following to say about the allied bombing campaign on the Western front in his private diary:
It would be ironical if the defenders of civilisation depend for victory upon the most barbaric and unskilled way of winning a war the world has seen.
What is the moral difference between murdering civilians eye to eye or doing so en masse from the relative safety of a bomber? Why is the latter morally superior to the former? How does it make any difference to the civilian population? If you expect any kind of answer from Hastings you are mistaken.
In summation: The way Germany acted in their invasions of the Western and Eastern fronts, and the suffering the population under occupation endured, is very different. When the tides turned, the Soviet Union meted out the same punishment which they themselves had suffered in the hands of the Germans. Tit for tat. On the Western front, which had not experienced the same suffering as the in the East, the allies still responded with their own mass rape, murder and looting, although not on the same scale as in the East. How does that make the former reprehensible and the latter morally superior?
If there is supposed to be any substantial difference between democratic and authoritarian states, there must be something more than the way the leaders are selected. “They killed a million civilians, we only killed half a million civilians, therefore we’re better” is hardly any basis for claiming moral superiority. Why should authoritarian regimes be the standard for what is acceptable or not?
Paul Ham ends his book with the following words, which are just as applicable to the European theatre:
Taken together, or alone, the reasons offered in defence of the bomb do not justify the massacre of innocent civilians. We debase ourselves, and the history of civilisation, if we accept that Japanese atrocities warranted an American atrocity in reply.
Nothing I have written is meant to excuse or downplay the atrocities carried out by the Soviet Union on the Eastern front. It is merely an attempt to put their actions into context, something which Hastings is reluctant to do.
Or simply don’t claim that your goal is “objective analysis”.
November 29, 2021
Brilliant summary of World War 2.
January 12, 2013
This book was seriously overrated. I read a few reviews before deciding to read it that considered it one of the best books of the year. There are, to be sure, some interesting points. The author points out how reluctant western allied soldiers were, and the emphasis on the fragility of the Anglo-American alliance was pretty interesting. But these are points that did not take about 500 pages to make. Indeed, aside from a few really gripping chapters (e.g., on the allied air war), the book was simply long-winded and repetitive. This was compounded by the author's incessant moralizing (more on this below) and the pedantic description of military details. Way too many dry passages about the minutia of military manouevers that really remind one of the history channel narration. It's not clear to me what detailed accounts of ammunition counts had to add, and the author seemed more intent on getting recollections of soldiers in print than on really giving the reader a feel for the battle scene.
I also found the book to be unduly harsh on the Soviet Union. The author repeatedly laments how the allies let Eastern Europe fall under Stalin's tyranny, and how Zhukov and his ilk were really quite horrific people. Fair enough, but in other areas the author let's his biases shine through. For instance, the author goes to considerable length repeatedly documenting how the Soviet Union singularly betrayed hopes for democracy in Poland, but utterly neglects how the American/British imposed military junta of Greece for instance violently persecuted labor unionists, communists and socialists there.
There were also several potentially interesting story lines the author just leaves dangling. He gives no more than a passing reference to some of the institutional racism that operated within the American presence in Europe. He sites the astounding statistic that something like 40% of death penalty cases the US military handled against their own soldiers were against African Americans, but this only mentioned in passing. Another example of what I see as a "missed opportunity" of sorts is the author's all-too brief mention of non-German SS units. If the central question of the book is why Germany fought a doomed struggle so doggedly, the question of how those non-Germans came to see the war, and how they dealt with repatriation, would seem insightful. Perhaps there just weren't enough eyewitness accounts.
In conclusion, I found this book disappointing. The author asks an interesting question and is upfront that a lot of what they have to say isn't particularly novel. But between the anti-Soviet preaching and the tedious discussions of military detail, I found that even the author's pretty good writing abilities couldn't salvage what became and unwieldy and needlessly drawn-out project.
I also found the book to be unduly harsh on the Soviet Union. The author repeatedly laments how the allies let Eastern Europe fall under Stalin's tyranny, and how Zhukov and his ilk were really quite horrific people. Fair enough, but in other areas the author let's his biases shine through. For instance, the author goes to considerable length repeatedly documenting how the Soviet Union singularly betrayed hopes for democracy in Poland, but utterly neglects how the American/British imposed military junta of Greece for instance violently persecuted labor unionists, communists and socialists there.
There were also several potentially interesting story lines the author just leaves dangling. He gives no more than a passing reference to some of the institutional racism that operated within the American presence in Europe. He sites the astounding statistic that something like 40% of death penalty cases the US military handled against their own soldiers were against African Americans, but this only mentioned in passing. Another example of what I see as a "missed opportunity" of sorts is the author's all-too brief mention of non-German SS units. If the central question of the book is why Germany fought a doomed struggle so doggedly, the question of how those non-Germans came to see the war, and how they dealt with repatriation, would seem insightful. Perhaps there just weren't enough eyewitness accounts.
In conclusion, I found this book disappointing. The author asks an interesting question and is upfront that a lot of what they have to say isn't particularly novel. But between the anti-Soviet preaching and the tedious discussions of military detail, I found that even the author's pretty good writing abilities couldn't salvage what became and unwieldy and needlessly drawn-out project.
February 22, 2021
Very readable and with the right balance of facts and figures, while not neglecting the human stories and personal accounts, which bring this terrible part of history to life.
An incredible book.
An incredible book.
December 12, 2016
-Götterdämmerung.-
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. Repaso concienzudo a los acontecimientos de la Segunda Guerra Mundial en Europa entre septiembre de 1944 hasta algunos meses después de la rendición de Alemania en mayo de 1945, centrada en el Ragnarök que vivieron los soldados y civiles alemanes, por insistencia de sus líderes y reacción recíproca de los líderes enemigos, bajo ataque de las tropas aliadas en dos frentes.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. Repaso concienzudo a los acontecimientos de la Segunda Guerra Mundial en Europa entre septiembre de 1944 hasta algunos meses después de la rendición de Alemania en mayo de 1945, centrada en el Ragnarök que vivieron los soldados y civiles alemanes, por insistencia de sus líderes y reacción recíproca de los líderes enemigos, bajo ataque de las tropas aliadas en dos frentes.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...
November 5, 2016
Many excellent reviews. I would only add that readers of any nationality involved in this final campaign of WW2 in Europe might have feelings of pride, embarrassment and shame! I had my 13th birthday in January 1945 and followed the printed news. Now it seems like a different war to our readings to-day!
April 28, 2011
read it, went back to the beginning, read it again. pretty splendid.
February 17, 2021
This is among the very best books about WWII, if not the best, I have read.
A must read for anyone with interest in WWII.
A must read for anyone with interest in WWII.
March 22, 2023
Hastings has accomplished an excellent analysis of the last year of WW II and the push to Germany. This book has extremely detailed and thorough data that lets the reader feel as though they are there in the midst of the events. Some have criticized Hastings for including personal anecdotes of some of the people involved (combatants and civilians on both sides) as detracting from the historicity of the book. I do not agree. The anecdotes bring the reader into the effects of the war on all levels, almost as a participant.
I also liked that Hastings succeeded in evaluating the various nations' militaries in a mostly unbiased manner. He did not gloss over the failures or shortcomings of any commander, their troops, or their operations. Hastings was just as brutal to English deficiencies and mistakes as he was to those of the Americans and Soviets. There is only one ethnic group that he denigrates without any supporting information or examples. These are the "Mongols" and the peoples from eastern and central Asia. A sample statement is: "The image of the Soviet soldier as an unfeeling brute was justified by the immense rabble of Mongols (that is, from Central Asia) and conscripts from the eastern republics who followed the spearheads." Why single out this "group" when later in the book he paints all Soviets with the same brush? Even with this questionable view, Hastings has done a remarkable job of delving through the propaganda of too many books about the war and has revealed the actual nature of the war, the leaders who planned it, the troops who executed it, and the people who were affected by it. And he does not shy away from revealing the moral failures of the German people.
I highly recommend "Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944 -1945" for those who want a deeply investigated and analyzed history of this era. The book is a standout in the history of WW II, and unfortunately has too many parallels with the world today.
I also liked that Hastings succeeded in evaluating the various nations' militaries in a mostly unbiased manner. He did not gloss over the failures or shortcomings of any commander, their troops, or their operations. Hastings was just as brutal to English deficiencies and mistakes as he was to those of the Americans and Soviets. There is only one ethnic group that he denigrates without any supporting information or examples. These are the "Mongols" and the peoples from eastern and central Asia. A sample statement is: "The image of the Soviet soldier as an unfeeling brute was justified by the immense rabble of Mongols (that is, from Central Asia) and conscripts from the eastern republics who followed the spearheads." Why single out this "group" when later in the book he paints all Soviets with the same brush? Even with this questionable view, Hastings has done a remarkable job of delving through the propaganda of too many books about the war and has revealed the actual nature of the war, the leaders who planned it, the troops who executed it, and the people who were affected by it. And he does not shy away from revealing the moral failures of the German people.
I highly recommend "Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944 -1945" for those who want a deeply investigated and analyzed history of this era. The book is a standout in the history of WW II, and unfortunately has too many parallels with the world today.
July 26, 2022
Buy.
This is an incredible book. One that surprised and taught me new things despite having read well over 100 books on the Second World War. Hastings explores topics in some depth that are only briefly touched upon by other authors. These topics include: the Red Army's ferocious pillaging of East Prussia, the motivations and will to fight of the respective combatants, the Western reliance on artillery, and the fact that it is but a small minority of soldiers that do the real offensive fighting.
Wonderfully written and presented. Highly recommended.
This is an incredible book. One that surprised and taught me new things despite having read well over 100 books on the Second World War. Hastings explores topics in some depth that are only briefly touched upon by other authors. These topics include: the Red Army's ferocious pillaging of East Prussia, the motivations and will to fight of the respective combatants, the Western reliance on artillery, and the fact that it is but a small minority of soldiers that do the real offensive fighting.
Wonderfully written and presented. Highly recommended.
May 15, 2019
I like Hastings writing. One thing about this book is the countless vignettes covering everything from Bradley’s distain for Monty to Hitler’s former bodyguard’s experience at the fall to a Red Army rifleman’s disgust with his countrymen’s behavior in Germany and everything in between, including civilians stories. Recommend.
December 26, 2010
In 1984 this British journalist wrote a book on the 1944 landing in Normandy and the subsequent Allied invasion of Nazi-occupied France. This book takes off where that one ends, in September 1944, and goes on until May 1945; during this period, Germany fought a war on two fronts. It has chapters on the ill-planned Operation Market Garden, the Warsaw Rising (which General Anders thought was madness), the Soviet conquest of East Prussia (a German woman told Hastings, "It was our Holocaust, but nobody cares"), the hungry winter of 1944-1945 in Holland, the Battle of the Bulge, and so on until the German surrender. The overall story is familiar to all educated people (but not to everyone, of course; Peter Novick's book on the Holocaust in American life cites the results of some poll where only 49% Americans knew that the Soviet Union fought on the same side as their country in World War II; I wonder if more or fewer modern-day Russians are aware that the United States fought on the same side as their country in World War II), but Hastings gives a lot of detail. Hastings is full of admiration for the Red Army, both ordinary soldiers and the generals, who he says were more skilled and showed more initiative than their Western Allied counterparts; he thinks that if Zhukov were in Eisenhower's shoes, he would have pursued the Germans after the failure of their Ardennes offensive instead of allowing them to escape and regroup. I used to work with an applied mathematician who was the oldest grandson of an American World War II hero; he once asked me, what I thought of Patton's idea of pushing the Russians out of Europe after having pushed away the Germans. I answered that it would have been unfair, not to mention politically infeasible; if Hastings is right, Patton would not have stood a chance because the Red Army of 1944-1945 fought better than Western Allied armies, and German soldiers considered it a relief to be transferred to the Western front.
Many ordinary people, both soldiers in all the armies and German civilians, get a chance to tell their story in Hasting's book. The most extraordinary one comes from a fighter pilot named Mikhail Devyataev, who was shot down over Germany in July 1944 and as a POW was sent to the slave labor camp in the German rocket center at Peenemünde. In February 1945 he and nine other prisoners commandeered the camp commandant's Heinkel plane and escaped by flying over the Baltic Sea. When they landed at the front and were discovered by a Red Army patrol, the NKVD didn't believe their story. The nine other former prisoners were sent to the penal battalions, where five of them died advancing into German minefields; Devyataev himself was imprisoned, and was only released a year later. As a former POW, Devyataev could not find a proper job; only in 1957 was his achievement recognized and he was made a Hero of the Soviet Union. The endnote says, "AI Mikhail Devyataev." [presumably, author's interview?] Now, popular Russian historian Igor Pykhalov says that some unnamed contemporary Russian media outlets claim that Devyataev was in the Gulag and was only released after Stalin's death; this is not so, objects Pykhalov; in Devyataev's own book Escape from Hell he says that he had never been imprisoned by the Soviets. Either Devyataev told one thing to Hastings and wrote something else in his book, or Hastings lied about what Devyataev told him, or Pykhalov lied about what Devyataev wrote in his book.
Many ordinary people, both soldiers in all the armies and German civilians, get a chance to tell their story in Hasting's book. The most extraordinary one comes from a fighter pilot named Mikhail Devyataev, who was shot down over Germany in July 1944 and as a POW was sent to the slave labor camp in the German rocket center at Peenemünde. In February 1945 he and nine other prisoners commandeered the camp commandant's Heinkel plane and escaped by flying over the Baltic Sea. When they landed at the front and were discovered by a Red Army patrol, the NKVD didn't believe their story. The nine other former prisoners were sent to the penal battalions, where five of them died advancing into German minefields; Devyataev himself was imprisoned, and was only released a year later. As a former POW, Devyataev could not find a proper job; only in 1957 was his achievement recognized and he was made a Hero of the Soviet Union. The endnote says, "AI Mikhail Devyataev." [presumably, author's interview?] Now, popular Russian historian Igor Pykhalov says that some unnamed contemporary Russian media outlets claim that Devyataev was in the Gulag and was only released after Stalin's death; this is not so, objects Pykhalov; in Devyataev's own book Escape from Hell he says that he had never been imprisoned by the Soviets. Either Devyataev told one thing to Hastings and wrote something else in his book, or Hastings lied about what Devyataev told him, or Pykhalov lied about what Devyataev wrote in his book.
August 7, 2017
Hastings repasa los sucesos entre el otoño de 1944 y mayo de 1945, centrándose en la lucha por Alemania. Aunque a los Balcanes e Italia nos les dedica atención, y pasa bastante por encima de la batalla de Berlín (directamente refiere a los lectores al libro de Beevor) hace un repaso completo a todos los demás aspectos de la lucha (bombardeos, política interna, prisioneros, batallas, logística, crímenes)
Lo más interesante del libro es su opinión de que los mandos y soldados ingleses y estadounidenses eran inferiores a sus contrapartidas soviéticas y alemanas. Aunque reconoce que el menor grado de salvajismo en el frente occidental limitaba a los generales aliados, Hastings no deja de criticar los errores de Eisenhower y Montgomery (ni siquiera Patton se salva de críticas por su divismo) Sin ir más lejos, en la narración de la batalla de Arnheim, atribulle directamente el fracaso de la operación a los fallos del Vizconde de El-Alamein y a la escasa calidad de las tropas británicas. No por ello deja de criticar la brutalidad y los errores de los comandantes rusos y alemanes (especialmente su desprecio por la vida de sus hombres) ni las atrocidades rusas, que tienen un capítulo específicamente dedicado a Prusia Oriental.
La tesis de Hastings es que los retrasos de los Aliados y la brutalidad del Ejército Rojo contribuyeron a hacer mucho peor la situación (unos por dejar abandonados a las víctimas, los otros por estimular la resistencia alemana al convencerles de que no tenían más opción que luchar o morir) En concreto, en el frente occidental, la prolongación de la guerra tubo consecuencias terribles para los prisioneros y la población holandesa (víctima de una hambruna en el invierno de 1944-1945), mientras que el terror a caer en manos de los rusos provocó una lucha mucho más dura y con muchas más victimas en ambos bandos.
Finalmente, el libro repasa la situación de Europa Oriental, y concluye que el comportamiento de Stalin, aunque brutal fue eficiente al asegurar sus objetivos y que los que plantean el abandono de esos países por los aliados no tienen en cuenta que no había nada que hacer sin provocar una nueva guerra.
Lo más interesante del libro es su opinión de que los mandos y soldados ingleses y estadounidenses eran inferiores a sus contrapartidas soviéticas y alemanas. Aunque reconoce que el menor grado de salvajismo en el frente occidental limitaba a los generales aliados, Hastings no deja de criticar los errores de Eisenhower y Montgomery (ni siquiera Patton se salva de críticas por su divismo) Sin ir más lejos, en la narración de la batalla de Arnheim, atribulle directamente el fracaso de la operación a los fallos del Vizconde de El-Alamein y a la escasa calidad de las tropas británicas. No por ello deja de criticar la brutalidad y los errores de los comandantes rusos y alemanes (especialmente su desprecio por la vida de sus hombres) ni las atrocidades rusas, que tienen un capítulo específicamente dedicado a Prusia Oriental.
La tesis de Hastings es que los retrasos de los Aliados y la brutalidad del Ejército Rojo contribuyeron a hacer mucho peor la situación (unos por dejar abandonados a las víctimas, los otros por estimular la resistencia alemana al convencerles de que no tenían más opción que luchar o morir) En concreto, en el frente occidental, la prolongación de la guerra tubo consecuencias terribles para los prisioneros y la población holandesa (víctima de una hambruna en el invierno de 1944-1945), mientras que el terror a caer en manos de los rusos provocó una lucha mucho más dura y con muchas más victimas en ambos bandos.
Finalmente, el libro repasa la situación de Europa Oriental, y concluye que el comportamiento de Stalin, aunque brutal fue eficiente al asegurar sus objetivos y que los que plantean el abandono de esos países por los aliados no tienen en cuenta que no había nada que hacer sin provocar una nueva guerra.
January 9, 2020
Loved it! Detailed history, many many accounts of particular skirmishes, battles or company stories mixed together with long analyses of operations and logistical details make for a very good read. Almost equal focus given to the Western and Eastern fronts, which I enjoyed. Completely worth the read for any history nerd.
November 1, 2008
The end of the war in Europe is often glossed over to a large extent in many of the general books about world war 2. The relatively short time between the Allied invasion in June of 1944 and the final defeat of Nazism in May of 1945 seemingly rushed through when compared to the preceding war years.
But with the D-Day landings, the loss of life in ground combat on the Western Front had only just restarted after a 4 year hiatus. On the Eastern Front, the casualty rate was even higher, far higher than may have been acceptable to the US or British peoples.
Max Hastings covers the last 12 months of the war in great detail and pulls no punches in highlighting the failings and foibles of some of the key figures charged with leading the brave men of all the armies to their destiny. The war may have been over by Christmas 1944, but dithering decsion making, inability to grasp corrctly the techniques of mobile warfare, stubborness and abject stupidity all contributed to prolonging the fighting.
The chance to speak to those who took part in this piece of history is slipping away as time takes it's grim toll. Without their input to underline the events, the rest of the excellent narritive would be wasted and greatly adds to the feelings of the impact of war has on soldiers and civilans alike.
Some novels you can't put down becasue the story is gripping; this story is real and you know the ending, but the path to the ending is no less gripping.
But with the D-Day landings, the loss of life in ground combat on the Western Front had only just restarted after a 4 year hiatus. On the Eastern Front, the casualty rate was even higher, far higher than may have been acceptable to the US or British peoples.
Max Hastings covers the last 12 months of the war in great detail and pulls no punches in highlighting the failings and foibles of some of the key figures charged with leading the brave men of all the armies to their destiny. The war may have been over by Christmas 1944, but dithering decsion making, inability to grasp corrctly the techniques of mobile warfare, stubborness and abject stupidity all contributed to prolonging the fighting.
The chance to speak to those who took part in this piece of history is slipping away as time takes it's grim toll. Without their input to underline the events, the rest of the excellent narritive would be wasted and greatly adds to the feelings of the impact of war has on soldiers and civilans alike.
Some novels you can't put down becasue the story is gripping; this story is real and you know the ending, but the path to the ending is no less gripping.
April 5, 2012
So far, so good. Very readable narrative.
Having completed the book, here is a passage that stands out for me:
"Matthew Ridgway, commanding XVII Airborne Corps, was absent in England when the German offensive (the Bulge, in December 1944) began. Gavin of the 82nd filled his place superbly through the first days, returning to his own division when the corps commander arrived. The force of Ridgway's personality is stamped upon every line of his correspondence, every record of his conversations. After days in which some senior officers who should have known better panicked, it is striking to contrast Ridgway's remarks to his formation commanders on Christmas Eve: "The situation is normal and completely satisfactory. The enemy has thrown in all his mobile reserves, and this is his last major offensive effort in this war. This Corps will halt that effort; then attack and smash him... I want you to reflect that confidence to the subordinate commanders and staffs in all that you say and do." "
Having completed the book, here is a passage that stands out for me:
"Matthew Ridgway, commanding XVII Airborne Corps, was absent in England when the German offensive (the Bulge, in December 1944) began. Gavin of the 82nd filled his place superbly through the first days, returning to his own division when the corps commander arrived. The force of Ridgway's personality is stamped upon every line of his correspondence, every record of his conversations. After days in which some senior officers who should have known better panicked, it is striking to contrast Ridgway's remarks to his formation commanders on Christmas Eve: "The situation is normal and completely satisfactory. The enemy has thrown in all his mobile reserves, and this is his last major offensive effort in this war. This Corps will halt that effort; then attack and smash him... I want you to reflect that confidence to the subordinate commanders and staffs in all that you say and do." "
March 13, 2010
It was the biggest battlefield in history, spreading from the English Channel to the Vistula River in Poland. The battlefield involved more humans, combatants and non-combatants, than any other battlefield. It claimed more lives. More guns and tanks and airplanes were massed across the battlefield than were seen before or since on a single continent. This battle ground was - Max Hastings’ title, “Armageddon, The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945.” Hastings is a master when writing of battles on the land and in the air, when writing of soldiers and POWs and civilians caught in desperate circumstances and people in death camps. His account is compelling. Some editors might have eliminated some of the anecdotal material - interviews with people/battle participants of all descriptions. The anecdotes do slow momentum but each is self-evidently precious. This book will remain valuable.
July 28, 2020
Max Hastings rarely disappoints and he has not done so here. How does the man weave so much information, facts, personal stories and detail into a 600 page book and still keep it a genuine page turner? A total master.
Just a suggestion: read Savage Continent by Keith Lowe directly after this. I read it a good while ago but it would be the perfect follow on .... and make you glad you live now and not then.
Just a suggestion: read Savage Continent by Keith Lowe directly after this. I read it a good while ago but it would be the perfect follow on .... and make you glad you live now and not then.
November 30, 2022
Can anyone tell me why Goodreads permit the publication of pathetic one star reviews?
August 30, 2021
Syksyllä 1944 Saksa oli käytännössä lyöty. Mitään voiton mahdollisuuksia natsivaltiolla ei ollut. Silti kesti vielä lähes vuoden, ennen kuin sota Euroopassa loppui. Max Hastingsin Armageddon pyrkii vastaamaan kysymykseen.
Olen lukenut Hastingsilta muutaman kirjan ja molemmat ovat olleet hyviä, jopa erinomaisia. Erityisesti vuoden 1914 tapahtumia käsitellyt Catastrophe oli mainio. Armageddon on sinällään pätevä mutta syvästi toispuolinen ja epätyydyttävä kuvaus maailmansodan loppuvaiheista.
Toisen maailmansodan historiankirjoitusta, erityisesti populaaria, on dominoinut länsirintamaa korostavat näkökulmat. Hastings vetää tämän melko lailla äärimmilleen. Konservatiivina hänellä ei ole itärintaman sotilaista, kenraaleista tai tapahtumista mitään positiivista sanottavaa. Market Gardenia, Ardenneita ja muita länsiliittoutuneiden operaatioita käsitellään yksityiskohtaisesti mutta itärintaman tapahtumissa joutuu tyytymään yleisluontoisuuksiin. Sota kuitenkin voitettiin idässä, että silleen olis varmaan tärkeä se itä kanssa.
Stalinismin inhoaminen on tietysti ymmärrettävää ja perusteltua. Neuvostoliitto Stalinin alaisuudessa oli äärimmäiseen sortoon perustuva totalitaristinen järjestelmä, jonka kontolla on vielä enemmän kuolemia kuin Natsi-Saksalla. Ei sellaisesta systeemistä kuulu tykätä. Kuitenkin Hastings ei tunnu näkevän oman inhonsa ylitse. Esimerkiksi väite siitä, että Neuvostoliiton sota oli lähtökohtaisesti vähemmän oikeutettu kuin länsiliittoutuneiden, on esimerkiksi vähintäänkin kummallinen. Neuvostoliitto lähti vastaamaan Saksan provosoimattomaan agressioon. Okei, joo vuoteen 1944 tultaessa Stalin kävi täyttä valloitussotaa mutta sillä ei lähdetty liikenteeseen.
Toinen häiritsevä seikka on yksittäisten neuvostotaistelijoiden väheksyntä. Heiltä on valittu mukaan vain kyynisiä, armottomia lainauksia, jotka korostavat Hastingsin antamaa kuvaa propagandan purematta nielleistä junteista. Neuvostoarmeijoiden naistaistelijoista tuodaan ensimmäisenä esiin, että monilla oli rakastajia sodan aikana. Anteron tekee mieli kysyä: mitä sitten? Kyl ne jätkätkin pani menemään mutta ei sitä kukaan tunnu paheksuvan. Ja muutenkin, Sodalla ei ole naisen kasvoja antoi aika erilaisen ja monipuolisemman näkökulman naistaistelijoiden kokemuksiin.
Enkä siis toki halua itse myös ruveta apologiksi – puna-armeijan sota Puolassa ja Saksassa oli äärimmäisen raakaa. Raiskaukset, teloitukset ja muut julmuudet olivat erittäin laajamittaisia. Hastingsin näkökulma on kuitenkin mielestäni nyanssiton. Varsinkin, kun hän tuntuu välillä olevan huomattavan ymmärtäväinen saksalaisia kohtaan, joiden valloitussota idässä oli vähintään yhtä julmaa, ehkä julmempaakin.
Varsinaiseen pääkysymykseen Hastings antaa tyydyttävän vastauksen: länsirintaman demokratioiden johtajat eivät olleet valmiita tekemään liikkeitä, jotka olisivat johtaneet sodan nopeampaan loppuun. Syinä tähän ovat sekä hajaantunut komentoketju, jossa amerikkalaiset haluavat tätä ja britit tätä sekä se, että demokratioiden johtajat eivät vain pysty hyväksymään operaatioita, joiden tappiot olisivat tähtitieteellisiä.
Kirjoittajana Hastings on erinomainen. Koin kuitenkin nämä konservatismin tuomat painotukset sekä keskittymisen länsiliittoutuneisiin sen verran harmittavaksi, että en osaa antaa enempää kuin kolmea tähteä.
Olen lukenut Hastingsilta muutaman kirjan ja molemmat ovat olleet hyviä, jopa erinomaisia. Erityisesti vuoden 1914 tapahtumia käsitellyt Catastrophe oli mainio. Armageddon on sinällään pätevä mutta syvästi toispuolinen ja epätyydyttävä kuvaus maailmansodan loppuvaiheista.
Toisen maailmansodan historiankirjoitusta, erityisesti populaaria, on dominoinut länsirintamaa korostavat näkökulmat. Hastings vetää tämän melko lailla äärimmilleen. Konservatiivina hänellä ei ole itärintaman sotilaista, kenraaleista tai tapahtumista mitään positiivista sanottavaa. Market Gardenia, Ardenneita ja muita länsiliittoutuneiden operaatioita käsitellään yksityiskohtaisesti mutta itärintaman tapahtumissa joutuu tyytymään yleisluontoisuuksiin. Sota kuitenkin voitettiin idässä, että silleen olis varmaan tärkeä se itä kanssa.
Stalinismin inhoaminen on tietysti ymmärrettävää ja perusteltua. Neuvostoliitto Stalinin alaisuudessa oli äärimmäiseen sortoon perustuva totalitaristinen järjestelmä, jonka kontolla on vielä enemmän kuolemia kuin Natsi-Saksalla. Ei sellaisesta systeemistä kuulu tykätä. Kuitenkin Hastings ei tunnu näkevän oman inhonsa ylitse. Esimerkiksi väite siitä, että Neuvostoliiton sota oli lähtökohtaisesti vähemmän oikeutettu kuin länsiliittoutuneiden, on esimerkiksi vähintäänkin kummallinen. Neuvostoliitto lähti vastaamaan Saksan provosoimattomaan agressioon. Okei, joo vuoteen 1944 tultaessa Stalin kävi täyttä valloitussotaa mutta sillä ei lähdetty liikenteeseen.
Toinen häiritsevä seikka on yksittäisten neuvostotaistelijoiden väheksyntä. Heiltä on valittu mukaan vain kyynisiä, armottomia lainauksia, jotka korostavat Hastingsin antamaa kuvaa propagandan purematta nielleistä junteista. Neuvostoarmeijoiden naistaistelijoista tuodaan ensimmäisenä esiin, että monilla oli rakastajia sodan aikana. Anteron tekee mieli kysyä: mitä sitten? Kyl ne jätkätkin pani menemään mutta ei sitä kukaan tunnu paheksuvan. Ja muutenkin, Sodalla ei ole naisen kasvoja antoi aika erilaisen ja monipuolisemman näkökulman naistaistelijoiden kokemuksiin.
Enkä siis toki halua itse myös ruveta apologiksi – puna-armeijan sota Puolassa ja Saksassa oli äärimmäisen raakaa. Raiskaukset, teloitukset ja muut julmuudet olivat erittäin laajamittaisia. Hastingsin näkökulma on kuitenkin mielestäni nyanssiton. Varsinkin, kun hän tuntuu välillä olevan huomattavan ymmärtäväinen saksalaisia kohtaan, joiden valloitussota idässä oli vähintään yhtä julmaa, ehkä julmempaakin.
Varsinaiseen pääkysymykseen Hastings antaa tyydyttävän vastauksen: länsirintaman demokratioiden johtajat eivät olleet valmiita tekemään liikkeitä, jotka olisivat johtaneet sodan nopeampaan loppuun. Syinä tähän ovat sekä hajaantunut komentoketju, jossa amerikkalaiset haluavat tätä ja britit tätä sekä se, että demokratioiden johtajat eivät vain pysty hyväksymään operaatioita, joiden tappiot olisivat tähtitieteellisiä.
Kirjoittajana Hastings on erinomainen. Koin kuitenkin nämä konservatismin tuomat painotukset sekä keskittymisen länsiliittoutuneisiin sen verran harmittavaksi, että en osaa antaa enempää kuin kolmea tähteä.
December 3, 2024
Max Hastings has long been my favorite military history author, weaving together individual stories of war into a narrative that provides insight into massive conflicts. Armageddon is the story of the tragedy of the last year of World War II in Europe. By the Summer of 1944, the Allies were advancing rapidly on both fronts and it appeared the war might be over in a few months. Instead, it lasted until May 1945, a period of death and destruction in Germany and neighboring countries unmatched in previous years, and accompanied by massive military casualties that continued until the very end of the war.
Hastings explains the strategic missteps and other factors that allowed Germany to regroup and mount a dogged and desperate defense. These missteps include the well-known debacle of Arnhem and surprise counter-attack in the Battle of the Bulge. But Hastings also attributes the slow progress to a cautious approach by the America and Britain relying on overwhelming firepower over mass infantry and tank assaults that avoided casualties but slowed the advance on the Western Front. He connects this approach to the fact that America and Britain were democracies with citizen-soldier armies, while the Nazis and Soviets were totalitarian regimes unconcerned with casualties. Hastings credits the Western Allies for leading consistently with their societies, albeit with less effectiveness than the experienced and resolute Germans and the relentless Soviet generals.
Whether or not you agree with Hastings' assessment, it is hard not to be struck by the tragedy of the story. It was very clear by late 1944 that Germany would lose, but rather than surrender before their own country had been invaded, the Germans fought for every city and town and the country was devastated and millions of their own citizens, soldiers on all sides, and Nazi slaves and victims died as a result. Even though it is hard to feel sympathy for the perpetrators of the conflict, especially when ongoing destruction was caused by their own refusal to surrender, it is also hard to justify actions like the ongoing Allied strategic bombing campaign. Dresden and other cities were incinerated primarily because America and Britain had a bunch of bombers sitting around and felt like they needed to use them to do something rather than for any true strategic purpose. The casual way in which German cities were laid waste and German civilians killed without any meaningful military gain refutes any claim that the atomic bombings of Japan were racially motivated. The overall conclusion is that World War II in Europe was far more destructive and deadly than it needed to be considering the inevitability of German defeat by 1944.
Hastings explains the strategic missteps and other factors that allowed Germany to regroup and mount a dogged and desperate defense. These missteps include the well-known debacle of Arnhem and surprise counter-attack in the Battle of the Bulge. But Hastings also attributes the slow progress to a cautious approach by the America and Britain relying on overwhelming firepower over mass infantry and tank assaults that avoided casualties but slowed the advance on the Western Front. He connects this approach to the fact that America and Britain were democracies with citizen-soldier armies, while the Nazis and Soviets were totalitarian regimes unconcerned with casualties. Hastings credits the Western Allies for leading consistently with their societies, albeit with less effectiveness than the experienced and resolute Germans and the relentless Soviet generals.
Whether or not you agree with Hastings' assessment, it is hard not to be struck by the tragedy of the story. It was very clear by late 1944 that Germany would lose, but rather than surrender before their own country had been invaded, the Germans fought for every city and town and the country was devastated and millions of their own citizens, soldiers on all sides, and Nazi slaves and victims died as a result. Even though it is hard to feel sympathy for the perpetrators of the conflict, especially when ongoing destruction was caused by their own refusal to surrender, it is also hard to justify actions like the ongoing Allied strategic bombing campaign. Dresden and other cities were incinerated primarily because America and Britain had a bunch of bombers sitting around and felt like they needed to use them to do something rather than for any true strategic purpose. The casual way in which German cities were laid waste and German civilians killed without any meaningful military gain refutes any claim that the atomic bombings of Japan were racially motivated. The overall conclusion is that World War II in Europe was far more destructive and deadly than it needed to be considering the inevitability of German defeat by 1944.
April 18, 2023
This book covers the period from the months following the Normandy landings to the end of the Second World War in 1945. It considers the advances on the main western and eastern fronts leading to the eventual capitulation of Germany. It does not attempt to provide a forensic division by division analysis of these advances into Germany but a broad perspective of the strategic decisions and ensuing battles. What differentiates this book from many others which cover this period is the attempt to provide the perspective of ordinary combatants on all sides and fronts. It is written in a prose style which is easy to follow and engages the reader. An interesting perspective of the concluding months of the bloodiest and most terrible events in the history of mankind. Recommended.
January 19, 2021
Why give up Berlin? Max Hastings brilliantly addresses several gaps about the final eight months of the European Theatre of WW2. The sacrifice Eastern Europe to the Iron Curtain is well explained, as well as the depiction of the hunger of an occupied peoples, the mass migrations of refugees across the landscape, and the significantly differing factors of the eastern and western battlefronts were all wonderfully illuminating. Critical reading for anyone studying this war.
January 16, 2019
I read dozens of Second World War books, and without hesitation, I can say that this book can enter the starting quintet.
It is a book that explains why the Allies didn't win the war immediately after landing in France and took another year to overthrow the Nazi army. Politics, intrigue, hate, and love combine this amazing history book and create a unique texture to understand one of the greatest riddles of the last century.
A must read !!!
It is a book that explains why the Allies didn't win the war immediately after landing in France and took another year to overthrow the Nazi army. Politics, intrigue, hate, and love combine this amazing history book and create a unique texture to understand one of the greatest riddles of the last century.
A must read !!!
October 28, 2020
Exceptional. Big Maxy is an apex predator of modern military history. Enlightening, shocking, overwhelming at times. Read this book, and hear how the two most evil empires in human history squared off against each other in a fight to the bitter end. Guest starring the Western Allies in the proverbial sidecar.
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