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A New Conception of War: John Boyd, the U.S. Marines, and Maneuver Warfare
In 1989, the Marine Corps formally adopted a theory of conflict called maneuver warfare and described its tenets in a short but revolutionary doctrinal manual simply titled Warfighting. This conflict theory evolved along two paths that wound their way through the landscape of the late Cold War period before coming together in 1989. A New Conception of War traces this story from the post–Vietnam War years to the present. The first path was forged by U.S. Air Force colonel John R. Boyd, whose ideas on warfare were shaped by a military career during the height of the Cold War and his own passion for challenging conventional wisdom in the search for new and useful ideas. The second path was navigated by many thinkers within the Marine Corps during a period of institutional soul-searching after Vietnam. Drawing on new and previously unpublished material from the major players of this period, including a full transcript of Boyd’s “Patterns of Conflict” lecture, A New Conception of War captures a period of remarkable intellectual ferment within the Marine Corps and the development of a unique conceptual framework for warfighting that continues to inspire Marines today.
360 pages, Paperback
Published August 1, 2018
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
December 31, 2018
A good book, providing an outline of the Marine Corps’ development of their Maneuver Warfare doctrine and the (potential) influences Col John Boyd had on that work. Starting off with an in-depth analysis of Boyd’s Creation & Destruction theories the author then jumps to the many linkages between those theories and Maneuver Warfare as envisaged by key Marines in the late 1980s. This process culminated in 1989 with the publication of General Gray’s FMFM-1, Warfighting, which provided the then Commandant’s “broad guidance in the form of concepts and values.” The author does an excellent job tracing the history of that process and the backgrounds of the main contributors to the Marines’ new warfighting philosophy. Colonel Boyd’s influence on the Marine Corps’ warfighting methods is generally not disputed, and this work does not seek to argue any under- or over-estimations of that influence. Instead it details the many commonalities between Maneuver Warfare as it developed in the 1980s and the general theories of war that Colonel Boyd was presenting at the same time, leaving it up to the reader to decide how much personal influence took place. Along the way the many arguments against both Boyd’s theories and Maneuver Warfare are given a fair representation, to the point that some are left without a full rebuke. All in all, a great book to learn more about John Boyd’s theories, the shaping of a new Marine Corps doctrine in the heady days of the late Cold War, and an understanding of how new military concepts rightly need long and arduous journeys before being fully understood.
January 16, 2021
I will preface this review by saying that the copy of the ebook I read this off of was messed up, and so that made that sometimes difficult to follow. Knowing that, I am disregarding any difficulty with following the narrative/writing for the purpose of this review.
This book was honestly disappointing. While a good history book and an interesting study in Boyd and the Marine Corps, it is so focused on the process of the creation of maneuver warfare that it neglects the theoretical underpinnings that the book seemed to be sold on. While there was some theoretical discussion of maneuver warfare, it was almost exclusively ancillary to the process discussions on how the Marine Corps adopted maneuver as a philosophy.
That said, it did give a very interesting history of how the Marine Corps adapted after Vietnam, and how that tied into the larger ongoing struggle of the Marine Corps to justify its existence. The discussion of the events that shaped that debate provide a good base of knowledge for how and why maneuver became the defining philosophy of the Corps.
This book was honestly disappointing. While a good history book and an interesting study in Boyd and the Marine Corps, it is so focused on the process of the creation of maneuver warfare that it neglects the theoretical underpinnings that the book seemed to be sold on. While there was some theoretical discussion of maneuver warfare, it was almost exclusively ancillary to the process discussions on how the Marine Corps adopted maneuver as a philosophy.
That said, it did give a very interesting history of how the Marine Corps adapted after Vietnam, and how that tied into the larger ongoing struggle of the Marine Corps to justify its existence. The discussion of the events that shaped that debate provide a good base of knowledge for how and why maneuver became the defining philosophy of the Corps.
May 6, 2024
Great deconstruction of the Maneuver Warfare concept and how to utilize deception, tempo, and massed firepower to dismantle a numerically and technologically superior enemy system, break their will to fight, and leave them unable to operate as a cohesive unit. Should be required reading for all infantry officers.
“In maneuver conflict, one generated and used ambiguity, deception, novelty, fast transient maneuvers, and focused thrusts to severely degrade an adversary’s ability to act coherently. The aim is to generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as disorient, disrupt, and overload those that the adversary depends upon, in order to magnify friction, shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about his collapse; or equivalently, uncover, create, and exploit many vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence many opportunities, to pull the adversary apart and isolate remnants for mop-up or absorption.”
“In maneuver conflict, one generated and used ambiguity, deception, novelty, fast transient maneuvers, and focused thrusts to severely degrade an adversary’s ability to act coherently. The aim is to generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as disorient, disrupt, and overload those that the adversary depends upon, in order to magnify friction, shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about his collapse; or equivalently, uncover, create, and exploit many vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence many opportunities, to pull the adversary apart and isolate remnants for mop-up or absorption.”
June 16, 2020
Pretty solid analysis of the Marine Corps' history of adaptation to new requirements and consistent threats to its existence. The argument is that after Vietnam, when the organization needed a new way of thinking about its roles and missions, Boyd's work kickstarted a new perspective and a way forward in the aforementioned endeavor. Brown's cited sources reveal he has absolutely done the research--above and beyond the better-known Boyd accounts by Coram and Hammond. His interviews with pertinent and influential Marine Corps leaders underline the importance of buy-in at the top when an organization changes course and pulls everyone out of his/her comfort zone and toward the next waypoint. It is a good read for those with interest in either the Marine Corps or Boyd, but it's best to have that foundational knowledge before rolling into this book.
August 7, 2021
The US military is an organization of interconnected warfighting functions. Each is a part of an enormous effort that resembles a lace doily where a center commands and controls the rest. The initiative of each function to operate within a whole organization of the 'doily' requires timing, precision, and teamwork. Brown's work captures the difficulties in being a Marine and also the resiliency of Marines.
May 21, 2024
Thorough and fresh story. Ian fills a gap by making a deeper connection from Boyd with USMC maneuver warfare development. This book sheds more light with primary source material of transcripts and interviews. It is a timely and important book as most of those involved in the development of maneuver warfare as a doctrine are no longer as actively involved. The context is key. Ian does a great job calling out where there was deeper meaning or misunderstanding of some very heady ideas.
September 24, 2022
Very niche subject, but if you're even considering reading this then you're probably the target audience. It's a very detailed deep dive into the history of the Marine Corps' effort to adopt maneuver warfare as its doctrinal warfighting philosophy. It's not as dry as you might expect (compared to Krulak's First to Fight, for example), and I actually found it all quite interesting and readable.
March 28, 2023
The title explains the books ideas. It explores Col Boyd and his theories, how they affected change in the Marine Corps. This is the authors attempt to bring the maneuver warfare ideals to a new generation of Marines. It is not necessarily a new concept.
Book contains three appendices, which shortens the actual story length.
Book contains three appendices, which shortens the actual story length.
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March 19, 2022Took me long enough to finish this one but it was so worth it! I read MCDP-1 last semester, but I had no clue just how much had gone into it so this book was great in revealing all of that.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews