It seems obvious that phenomenally conscious experience is something of great value, and that this value maps onto a range of important ethical issues. For example, claims about the value of life for those in Permanent Vegetative State (PVS); debates about treatment and study of disorders of consciousness; controversies about end-of-life care for those with advanced dementia; and arguments about the moral status of embryos, fetuses, and non-human animals arguably turn on the moral significance of various facts about consciousness. However, though work has been done on the moral significance of elements of consciousness, such as pain and pleasure, little explicit attention has been devoted to the ethical significance of consciousness.
In this book Joshua Shepherd presents a systematic account of the value present within conscious experience. This account emphasizes not only the nature of consciousness, but also the importance of items within experience such as affect, valence, and the complex overall shape of particular valuable experiences. Shepherd also relates this account to difficult cases involving non-humans and humans with disorders of consciousness, arguing that the value of consciousness influences and partially explains the degree of moral status a being possesses, without fully determining it. The upshot is a deeper understanding of both the moral importance of phenomenal consciousness and its relations to moral status.
This book will be of great interest to philosophers and students of ethics, bioethics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.
This book is an attempt to ground the moral status of creatures in their conscious experiences. Specifically, Shepherd argues that the moral status a creature has depends on its ability to evaluate and feel the emotional effects of conscious experiences.
Some of this book is technical, and it uses a bit of jargon that I wasn't familiar with, such as comparing the "shape" of conscious experiences. So while the proposal is interesting, I didn't exactly find all of the reasoning compelling. It seems like Shepherd makes several leaps that aren't fully elucidated.
Toward the end of the book, Shepherd addresses some applications of his model. For example, since many animals have the types of conscious experiences that grant moral status, he argues that we ought not set human beings apart as having a special moral status. One major weakness, I think, is in Shepherd's analysis of cognitive disabilities in human beings. While he recognizes that these issues are complex, his model most clearly should entail that severely cognitively disabled humans would have a lower moral status. But he refuses to draw that conclusion himself. So it seems he doesn't fully trust his own model.
Overall, it was a good read. Shepherd is a great writer, which made the book enjoyable throughout. If you're interested in ethics, this would be a good book to check out.
Elegantly written, concise, original—and open access! While I wish it were longer and more substantial, it’s an accessible, intriguing and compelling foray into the question of what if anything makes consciousness valuable.