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أتباع الشاه
يسرد الكتاب بأسلوب روائي شيق، يشبه قصص الرعب، أحداث انقلاب عام ١٩٥٣ الذي فجرته وكالة المخابرات المركزية الأمريكية في إيران؛ الانقلاب الذي أطاح برئيس الوزراء المنتخب، وبدأ خمسة وعشرين عامًا من الحكم الوحشي تحت قيادة شاه بهلوي، وظهر على أثره في الشرق الأوسط حركة الأصولية الإسلامية، وحركة معاداة الولايات المتحدة. هذا الكتاب اختارته صحيفة واشنطن بوست وإيكونوميست كأفضل كتب للعام، وهو كتاب لا غنى عنه لكل من يريد فهم خلفية الغزو الأمريكي للعراق.
336 pages, Paperback
First published July 17, 2003
About the author
Stephen Kinzer
23 books692 followersStephen Kinzer is an award-winning foreign correspondent who has covered more than 50 countries on five continents. His articles and books have led the Washington Post to place him "among the best in popular foreign policy storytelling." (source)
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March 26, 2022
“Things looked bleak for the plotters. They had lost the advantage of surprise. Several of their key agents were out of action. Their anointed prime minister, General Zahedi, was in hiding. The Shah had fled. Foreign Minister Fatemi, free after several hours in rebel custody, was making fiery speeches denouncing the Shah for his collaboration with foreign agents…Operation Ajax had failed. Radio Tehran reported that the situation was ‘well under control,’ and so it seemed. Shock waves reverberated through CIA headquarters in Washington. Then suddenly, around midevening, [Kermit] Roosevelt cabled a most unexpected message. He had decided to stay in Tehran and improvise another stab at [Mohammed] Mossadegh. The CIA had sent him to overthrow the government of Iran, and he was determined not to leave until he had done it…”
- Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror
The relationship between Iran and the United States has been so bad, for so long, that it seems like it’s always been that way.
In 1979, after the exiled Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was admitted into the United States for cancer treatment, Iranian revolutionaries stormed the American embassy and took 52 hostages, holding them for 444 days. In response, during the 1980s, the United States supported Iraq in a war that killed an estimated one-million Iranians, and which saw the use of chemical weapons. During the 1990s, the U.S. tightened sanctions against Iran, while after September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush gratuitously added it to an “axis of evil,” though none of the members (including North Korea and Iraq) had any role in the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington D.C. A corner might have been turned – ever so slightly – with the Iran nuclear deal, struck in 2015. However, in 2018, the forty-fifth president withdrew America from the deal, escalating tensions. Matters inched towards war when the United States assassinated Quds Force commander Qasemi Soleimani, and Iran responded with missile attacks on American bases in Iraq.
With all that’s happened, it’s hard to believe that things could have gone differently. But that is Stephen Kinzer’s conclusion in All the Shah’s Men, his concise, efficiently presented tale about the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953. According to Kinzer, this vigorous meddling with Iran’s sovereignty poisoned the well from which both countries are still drinking.
***
Both the chief virtue and chief flaw of All the Shah’s Men is its no-nonsense approach to its subject matter. At around 220 pages of text, Kinzer tells a big and complicated story in a fast-paced and pared down way. I never got lost, I effortlessly followed the progression of events, and I could probably give a decent summary at a cocktail party, before being asked to leave the cocktail party.
Nevertheless, the literary merits are a bit less obvious. At no single point did I feel excited to read this. I didn’t find a single bit of prose worth underlining, or a characterization that really leapt off the page. I am not saying this is poorly written or grammatically unsound or syntactically obtuse. Kinzer conveys his information with clarity and commendable structure. But my connection to the material was dutiful, not visceral, and while this is better than reading an internet summary, the gap between the two is not as large as you would like.
***
After a brief prologue detailing the first aborted attempt at a coup by the CIA, Kinzer backtracks all the way to antiquity, to Cyrus and Xerxes, for a sweeping look at Iranian history that starts before the common era and ends with the mid-twentieth century. Though this is obviously a mile-high view, I found it super-helpful, especially since I had practically zero prior knowledge about this event, or the larger circumstances in which it occurred. Kinzer has a clear passion for Iran and its culture, and that shines through in a book that is otherwise pretty workmanlike in its presentation. It also adds a bit of emotional heft to America’s betrayal of its own principles.
***
Kinzer also does a solid job laying out the immediate context in which the 1953 coup took place. Despite a subtitle strongly implying that the 21st century’s Age of Terror began in Tehran, he makes it clear that the “roots” are much deeper than that. (Published in 2003, it’s likely the misleading subtitle was an attempt to tie into the then-booming post-9/11 genre exploring the attack’s historical antecedents). In point of fact, the West’s intriguing in the Middle East began not with America, but with Europe, especially Great Britain, which needed oil for its battleships.
Much of this oil came from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, a British corporation – half-owned by the British Government – which had been founded in 1909. The AIOC single-mindedly exploited Iran’s natural resources for British profit, exerting absolute control over the reserves, refusing to allow audits, and subjecting Iranian workers to deplorable living conditions.
As it gradually lost its empire over the centuries, Great Britain never quite learned that you can only mercilessly expropriate for so long before there comes a reckoning. In Iran, that reckoning came in the form of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, who led the effort to nationalize AIOC.
Fumbling about for a response, Great Britain turned to the United States, which was then rather respected in Iran. Raising the spooky specter of Communists, the Dulles brothers quickly convinced a self-distancing (and plausibly-denying) Dwight Eisenhower to allow the CIA to fund a coup to overthrow Mossadegh and allow Pahlavi to consolidate his hold on power.
The ad hoc, much improvised plan worked, though it was not simply the dark arts of the CIA, but self-interested Iranians as well, that allowed it to – for lack of a better word – succeed. The consequences, though, were pretty dire. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s repressive regime ultimately led to revolution, the declaration of an Islamic Republic, and frayed-wire relations that might still someday spark into war.
***
It probably goes too far to lay all blame on the Dulles brothers or Winston Churchill or Kermit Washington. Avoiding shortsightedness is hard, because seeing the future is impossible. Not every bad thing after 1953 happened simply because of the coup. Nothing is inevitable, and there are always possibilities for people to act differently, no matter the past.
Still, in executing the coup, the United States in general, and the CIA in particular, made the same mistake it repeated throughout the Cold War: the failure to believe in its own product.
In its words, America tried to convince the world that its values – of freedom, openness, and self-determination – were demonstrably better than the tyranny, oppression, and censorship animating the Soviet Union. In its actions, though, the United States showed no trust in its system, and resorted to undermining popular will and supporting oppressive leaders in the misguided belief that any means justified the ends. The Cold War could have been a contest of ideas. Instead it was a race to the bottom, with the rulebook thrown aside.
The bargain proved bad, and for twenty-five years of the Shah, America destroyed its relationship with Iran, weakened its moral standing in the Middle East and around the globe, and made the world that much more dangerous.
- Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror
The relationship between Iran and the United States has been so bad, for so long, that it seems like it’s always been that way.
In 1979, after the exiled Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was admitted into the United States for cancer treatment, Iranian revolutionaries stormed the American embassy and took 52 hostages, holding them for 444 days. In response, during the 1980s, the United States supported Iraq in a war that killed an estimated one-million Iranians, and which saw the use of chemical weapons. During the 1990s, the U.S. tightened sanctions against Iran, while after September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush gratuitously added it to an “axis of evil,” though none of the members (including North Korea and Iraq) had any role in the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington D.C. A corner might have been turned – ever so slightly – with the Iran nuclear deal, struck in 2015. However, in 2018, the forty-fifth president withdrew America from the deal, escalating tensions. Matters inched towards war when the United States assassinated Quds Force commander Qasemi Soleimani, and Iran responded with missile attacks on American bases in Iraq.
With all that’s happened, it’s hard to believe that things could have gone differently. But that is Stephen Kinzer’s conclusion in All the Shah’s Men, his concise, efficiently presented tale about the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953. According to Kinzer, this vigorous meddling with Iran’s sovereignty poisoned the well from which both countries are still drinking.
***
Both the chief virtue and chief flaw of All the Shah’s Men is its no-nonsense approach to its subject matter. At around 220 pages of text, Kinzer tells a big and complicated story in a fast-paced and pared down way. I never got lost, I effortlessly followed the progression of events, and I could probably give a decent summary at a cocktail party, before being asked to leave the cocktail party.
Nevertheless, the literary merits are a bit less obvious. At no single point did I feel excited to read this. I didn’t find a single bit of prose worth underlining, or a characterization that really leapt off the page. I am not saying this is poorly written or grammatically unsound or syntactically obtuse. Kinzer conveys his information with clarity and commendable structure. But my connection to the material was dutiful, not visceral, and while this is better than reading an internet summary, the gap between the two is not as large as you would like.
***
After a brief prologue detailing the first aborted attempt at a coup by the CIA, Kinzer backtracks all the way to antiquity, to Cyrus and Xerxes, for a sweeping look at Iranian history that starts before the common era and ends with the mid-twentieth century. Though this is obviously a mile-high view, I found it super-helpful, especially since I had practically zero prior knowledge about this event, or the larger circumstances in which it occurred. Kinzer has a clear passion for Iran and its culture, and that shines through in a book that is otherwise pretty workmanlike in its presentation. It also adds a bit of emotional heft to America’s betrayal of its own principles.
***
Kinzer also does a solid job laying out the immediate context in which the 1953 coup took place. Despite a subtitle strongly implying that the 21st century’s Age of Terror began in Tehran, he makes it clear that the “roots” are much deeper than that. (Published in 2003, it’s likely the misleading subtitle was an attempt to tie into the then-booming post-9/11 genre exploring the attack’s historical antecedents). In point of fact, the West’s intriguing in the Middle East began not with America, but with Europe, especially Great Britain, which needed oil for its battleships.
Much of this oil came from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, a British corporation – half-owned by the British Government – which had been founded in 1909. The AIOC single-mindedly exploited Iran’s natural resources for British profit, exerting absolute control over the reserves, refusing to allow audits, and subjecting Iranian workers to deplorable living conditions.
As it gradually lost its empire over the centuries, Great Britain never quite learned that you can only mercilessly expropriate for so long before there comes a reckoning. In Iran, that reckoning came in the form of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, who led the effort to nationalize AIOC.
Fumbling about for a response, Great Britain turned to the United States, which was then rather respected in Iran. Raising the spooky specter of Communists, the Dulles brothers quickly convinced a self-distancing (and plausibly-denying) Dwight Eisenhower to allow the CIA to fund a coup to overthrow Mossadegh and allow Pahlavi to consolidate his hold on power.
The ad hoc, much improvised plan worked, though it was not simply the dark arts of the CIA, but self-interested Iranians as well, that allowed it to – for lack of a better word – succeed. The consequences, though, were pretty dire. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s repressive regime ultimately led to revolution, the declaration of an Islamic Republic, and frayed-wire relations that might still someday spark into war.
***
It probably goes too far to lay all blame on the Dulles brothers or Winston Churchill or Kermit Washington. Avoiding shortsightedness is hard, because seeing the future is impossible. Not every bad thing after 1953 happened simply because of the coup. Nothing is inevitable, and there are always possibilities for people to act differently, no matter the past.
Still, in executing the coup, the United States in general, and the CIA in particular, made the same mistake it repeated throughout the Cold War: the failure to believe in its own product.
In its words, America tried to convince the world that its values – of freedom, openness, and self-determination – were demonstrably better than the tyranny, oppression, and censorship animating the Soviet Union. In its actions, though, the United States showed no trust in its system, and resorted to undermining popular will and supporting oppressive leaders in the misguided belief that any means justified the ends. The Cold War could have been a contest of ideas. Instead it was a race to the bottom, with the rulebook thrown aside.
The bargain proved bad, and for twenty-five years of the Shah, America destroyed its relationship with Iran, weakened its moral standing in the Middle East and around the globe, and made the world that much more dangerous.
July 29, 2008
I just re-read this book in preparation for a book club. This book is the tragic story of a CIA operation that removed one of the only democratically elected leaders in the Middle-East. Mossadegh came into power and angered the British by nationalizing Iranian Oil and the British were determined to oust him from office. After Truman (who opposed a coup) left office and Eisenhower came to office, the Americans also signed on and actually conducted the coup. This story is so tragic (especially if you are Iranian) because although no one can say for certain what would have been, the fundamentalism that has taken over Iran and the entire middle east could have been averted with someone like Mossadegh in power. He was committed to the constitution and democracy. He was called the George Washington of Iran. His flaws were that he nationalized the oil and was not flexible in allowing the British any control of the company and he underestimated the cold war fears of the time. A lot of Anti-American hatred in Iran stems from this operation and the 1978 hostage crisis was a direct result of Iranian fears of a repeat of the 1953 CIA-led overthrow. I think the author could have done a lot more and the writing is certainly not flawless, but I give it five stars because I think everyone should read this book. Kinzer (the author) gives a truncated history of Iran and gets a lot of the psychology of the Iranian people right. I think he doesn't go far enough in saying that had Iran not fallen to Islamic fundamentalism in 1978, the entire Middle East would have been a different place today. The book, in my opinion, is not unjustifiably harsh on America. Eisenhower did not bear as much blame for this as churchill and the author places the blame mostly on two people in his cabinet who were very anxious about covert operations in many countries at the time and we certainly cannot underestimate the cold war fears that dominated the world psyche during the 1950s. But I just cannot help but feel depressed about this and just wonder what would have happened if the Iranian people were allowed to run their own country.
July 19, 2020
All the Shah's Men, Stephen Kinzer
All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror is a book written by American journalist Stephen Kinzer.
Following the 1941 Allied Invasion of Iran, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favour of his son Mohammad Reza Shah, who upheld the oil agreement with APOC, which by then had been renamed the "Anglo-Iranian Oil Company".
When the first democratically elected parliament and prime minister in Iran took power in 1950 they planned to seize the oil assets in Iran that had been developed by the British, violating the still running oil contract with British Petroleum.
The British government followed to court in Belgium's International Court, lost the case against Iran's new government and reacted by blockading the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, halting Iran's trade and economy. ...
تاریخ نخستین خوانش: روز بیست و سوم ماه می سال 2004 میلادی
عنوانها: «همه مردان شاه (کودتای 28مرداد و ریشه های ترور در خاورمیانه)»؛ «همه مردان شاه»؛ «همه ی آدمهای شاه»؛ نویسنده: استیون کینسر (کینزر)؛ تاریخ نخستین خوانش روز بیست و سوم ما می سال 2004میلادی
عنوان: همه مردان شاه (کودتای 28مرداد و ریشه های ترور در خاورمیانه)؛ نویسنده: استیون کینسر (کینزر)؛ مترجم: حسن بلیغ؛ مشخصات نشر تهران، دانشگران محمود، 1382، در 364ص، مصور، شابک 9647992033؛ کتابنامه دارد، موضوع: سیاست و حکومت، ایران، ایالات متحده، خاور میانه
عنوان: همه مردان شاه؛ نویسنده: استیون کینسر (کینزر)؛ مترجم: شهریار خواجیان؛ مشخصات نشر: تهران، اختران، 1382، در 367ص، مصور، شابک 9789647514422؛ کتابنامه دارد
عنوان: همه مردان شاه؛ نویسنده: استیون کینسر (کینزر)؛ مترجم: لطف الله میثمی؛ مشخصات نشر: تهران، صمدیه، 1383، در 360ص، مصور، شابک 96475790093؛
عنوان: همه مردان شاه؛ نویسنده: استیون کینسر (کینزر)؛ مترجم: حمید و سعید خاموش؛ مشخصات نشر تهران، کتاب آوند دانش، 1382، در 378 ص، مصور، شابک: ایکس - 964711429؛
این کتاب با عنوان «همه ی آدمهای شاه»، با ترجمه منیژه بهزاد (شیخ جوادی) نیز در انتشارات پیکان در سال 1382هجری خورشیدی منتشر شده است
تاریخ بهنگام رسانی 29/04/1399هجری خورشیدی؛ ا. شربیانی
All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror is a book written by American journalist Stephen Kinzer.
Following the 1941 Allied Invasion of Iran, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favour of his son Mohammad Reza Shah, who upheld the oil agreement with APOC, which by then had been renamed the "Anglo-Iranian Oil Company".
When the first democratically elected parliament and prime minister in Iran took power in 1950 they planned to seize the oil assets in Iran that had been developed by the British, violating the still running oil contract with British Petroleum.
The British government followed to court in Belgium's International Court, lost the case against Iran's new government and reacted by blockading the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, halting Iran's trade and economy. ...
تاریخ نخستین خوانش: روز بیست و سوم ماه می سال 2004 میلادی
عنوانها: «همه مردان شاه (کودتای 28مرداد و ریشه های ترور در خاورمیانه)»؛ «همه مردان شاه»؛ «همه ی آدمهای شاه»؛ نویسنده: استیون کینسر (کینزر)؛ تاریخ نخستین خوانش روز بیست و سوم ما می سال 2004میلادی
عنوان: همه مردان شاه (کودتای 28مرداد و ریشه های ترور در خاورمیانه)؛ نویسنده: استیون کینسر (کینزر)؛ مترجم: حسن بلیغ؛ مشخصات نشر تهران، دانشگران محمود، 1382، در 364ص، مصور، شابک 9647992033؛ کتابنامه دارد، موضوع: سیاست و حکومت، ایران، ایالات متحده، خاور میانه
عنوان: همه مردان شاه؛ نویسنده: استیون کینسر (کینزر)؛ مترجم: شهریار خواجیان؛ مشخصات نشر: تهران، اختران، 1382، در 367ص، مصور، شابک 9789647514422؛ کتابنامه دارد
عنوان: همه مردان شاه؛ نویسنده: استیون کینسر (کینزر)؛ مترجم: لطف الله میثمی؛ مشخصات نشر: تهران، صمدیه، 1383، در 360ص، مصور، شابک 96475790093؛
عنوان: همه مردان شاه؛ نویسنده: استیون کینسر (کینزر)؛ مترجم: حمید و سعید خاموش؛ مشخصات نشر تهران، کتاب آوند دانش، 1382، در 378 ص، مصور، شابک: ایکس - 964711429؛
این کتاب با عنوان «همه ی آدمهای شاه»، با ترجمه منیژه بهزاد (شیخ جوادی) نیز در انتشارات پیکان در سال 1382هجری خورشیدی منتشر شده است
تاریخ بهنگام رسانی 29/04/1399هجری خورشیدی؛ ا. شربیانی
November 21, 2022
The subject of this book is a coup aimed at overthrowing Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran. The author delves into the details of the coup and explores its ramifications that continue to be felt to this day.
"They stormed the American embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two American diplomats hostage for more than fourteen months."
The hostage-takers were enraged against Americans and their support for the deposed Shah who had been allowed into the United States. The US regarded this crime not only as barbaric but also inexplicable. But was it so inexplicable? Many Iranians feared that Americans would help the Shah return to power as they once did in 1953. What stood behind the fears of many Iranians that the US could help the Shah return to Tehran and to power?
In August 1953 the CIA with the help of some influential figures in Iran orchestrated a coup against Mossadegh. They encouraged and organized the mass protests against Mossadegh that resulted in chaos in the capital city of Tehran.
“The great mob that surged through the streets of Tehran on August 18 was partly mercenary and partly a genuine expression of people’s loss of faith in Mossadegh.”
Mossadegh was overthrown and, later, arrested. The Shah, who had been forced to flee Iran, returned and embarked on consolidating dictatorial power. That was the path that led to the Islamic revolution in 1979.
Mossadegh is remembered as a politician who nationalized Iranian oil and defied the British who had been exploiting Iranian national resources for decades. The British represented by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were not ready to relinquish what they saw as their legal right. The Iranian government led by Mossadegh was determined to defend their national interests and not step back from the brink of confrontation.
Mossadegh cut an enigmatic figure. TIME magazine chose him as its Man of the Year for 1951.
As the author notes, Mossadegh was not a pragmatist. He was more of a visionary and utopian. Had he been a pragmatic leader, he could have made different decisions and avoided a crises that eventually led to his downfall. He could have agreed to mediation offered by President Truman who wanted to avoid a stalemate.
This well-researched non-fiction book at times reads like a novel. The author did a good job documenting the coup of 1953 and the events, public and clandestine, that preceded it. First, the British tried to dismiss Mossadegh but failed. The Iranian government expelled many of the British agents from the country. Then the British decided to pass the baton to the Americans. Churchill aimed to convince the White House to take action. President Truman was against intervention in Iranian internal affairs.
Only after Eisenhower took office, the Americans were persuaded that the action was needed. Discussing those events we cannot overlook the time period in which they happened. The beginning of the second half of the twentieth century saw the war in Korea which for the US was the proof of a "relentless communist advance." The fear of the expansion of communist power was the factor that to a large extent shaped American policies back then. They could not allow Iran to be drawn into the orbit of the Soviets. While those apprehensions may be partly justified, Kinzer notes that there is no proof that the Soviets were indeed scheming to defend Mossadegh.
Meanwhile, it is difficult to predict how the events could have unfolded without the American intervention. The British blockade of Iranian ports had been suffocating the Iranian economy heavily dependent on exports of oil. Mossadegh had influential opponents. However, the role the US played in those events dealt a blow to the hopes for democracy and liberal ideas and paved the way for fierce anti-Western sentiments in Iran.
It seems that at that time few could have known that this coup would have such an impact both within and beyond Iranian borders. Stephen Kinzer highlights the negative impact that came out of this coup. The author points to a series of rather unintended consequences of the 1953 coup. Some of the short-term and long-term effects are the oppressive rule of the Shah, the Islamic Revolution, the rise of radicalism and fundamentalism, and terror attacks across the world.
Also, Kinzer briefly outlines Iran's history before Mohammad Reza, the last Shah. His father Reza, the first monarch of the Pahlavi dynasty with the reputation of a strongman, came to power in a country that was torn between foreign powers, mainly the British and the Russians at the time. He worked upon the internal contradictions and hatred against the discredited Qajar dynasty and proclaimed himself Shah. Reza Shah insisted his country be referred to as Iran. Persia was considered the name used mainly by foreigners.
"They stormed the American embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two American diplomats hostage for more than fourteen months."
The hostage-takers were enraged against Americans and their support for the deposed Shah who had been allowed into the United States. The US regarded this crime not only as barbaric but also inexplicable. But was it so inexplicable? Many Iranians feared that Americans would help the Shah return to power as they once did in 1953. What stood behind the fears of many Iranians that the US could help the Shah return to Tehran and to power?
In August 1953 the CIA with the help of some influential figures in Iran orchestrated a coup against Mossadegh. They encouraged and organized the mass protests against Mossadegh that resulted in chaos in the capital city of Tehran.
“The great mob that surged through the streets of Tehran on August 18 was partly mercenary and partly a genuine expression of people’s loss of faith in Mossadegh.”
Mossadegh was overthrown and, later, arrested. The Shah, who had been forced to flee Iran, returned and embarked on consolidating dictatorial power. That was the path that led to the Islamic revolution in 1979.
Mossadegh is remembered as a politician who nationalized Iranian oil and defied the British who had been exploiting Iranian national resources for decades. The British represented by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were not ready to relinquish what they saw as their legal right. The Iranian government led by Mossadegh was determined to defend their national interests and not step back from the brink of confrontation.
Mossadegh cut an enigmatic figure. TIME magazine chose him as its Man of the Year for 1951.
As the author notes, Mossadegh was not a pragmatist. He was more of a visionary and utopian. Had he been a pragmatic leader, he could have made different decisions and avoided a crises that eventually led to his downfall. He could have agreed to mediation offered by President Truman who wanted to avoid a stalemate.
This well-researched non-fiction book at times reads like a novel. The author did a good job documenting the coup of 1953 and the events, public and clandestine, that preceded it. First, the British tried to dismiss Mossadegh but failed. The Iranian government expelled many of the British agents from the country. Then the British decided to pass the baton to the Americans. Churchill aimed to convince the White House to take action. President Truman was against intervention in Iranian internal affairs.
Only after Eisenhower took office, the Americans were persuaded that the action was needed. Discussing those events we cannot overlook the time period in which they happened. The beginning of the second half of the twentieth century saw the war in Korea which for the US was the proof of a "relentless communist advance." The fear of the expansion of communist power was the factor that to a large extent shaped American policies back then. They could not allow Iran to be drawn into the orbit of the Soviets. While those apprehensions may be partly justified, Kinzer notes that there is no proof that the Soviets were indeed scheming to defend Mossadegh.
Meanwhile, it is difficult to predict how the events could have unfolded without the American intervention. The British blockade of Iranian ports had been suffocating the Iranian economy heavily dependent on exports of oil. Mossadegh had influential opponents. However, the role the US played in those events dealt a blow to the hopes for democracy and liberal ideas and paved the way for fierce anti-Western sentiments in Iran.
It seems that at that time few could have known that this coup would have such an impact both within and beyond Iranian borders. Stephen Kinzer highlights the negative impact that came out of this coup. The author points to a series of rather unintended consequences of the 1953 coup. Some of the short-term and long-term effects are the oppressive rule of the Shah, the Islamic Revolution, the rise of radicalism and fundamentalism, and terror attacks across the world.
Also, Kinzer briefly outlines Iran's history before Mohammad Reza, the last Shah. His father Reza, the first monarch of the Pahlavi dynasty with the reputation of a strongman, came to power in a country that was torn between foreign powers, mainly the British and the Russians at the time. He worked upon the internal contradictions and hatred against the discredited Qajar dynasty and proclaimed himself Shah. Reza Shah insisted his country be referred to as Iran. Persia was considered the name used mainly by foreigners.
February 9, 2017
لا جديد في هذا العالم إلا ما نجهله من التاريخ
لست من قراء التاريخ ربما لأن قراءة التاريخ تبدو ليّ سياسية إلى حد كبير حتى في ذلك الوقت الذي تقرأ به عن التاريخ الثقافي والفكري لأحد البلدان لا يمكن القراءة عنه بمعزل عن تاريخها السياسي لذا أجدني لا أفضل ذلك النوع من الكُتب لعدم تفضيلي بل ونفوري أحيانًا من السجالات السياسي، فليس هناك حقبة ما أو بلد ما تجذبني للقراءة في تاريخها، لكنني من وقت لآخر اختطف كتاب يتحدث عن فترة هامة ما بتركيز وتكثيف أشعر معه أنني حقًا عرفت كل شيء يخص تلك الحقبة وكأنني عايشتها مع معاصريها وقد كان من أهم الكُتب التي حالفني حظي معها هو كتاب الدين والدم إبادة شعب الأندلس الذي تحدث عن أزمة المورسكيين بعد أن تحولت الأندلس إلى أسبانيا، وها هو كتاب آخر عن حقبة شائكة أخرى يعيد إليّ شغف القراءة بعد انقطاع شهرين لأنهيه رغم كبر حجمه في أيام قليلة.
الكتاب يتحدث عن انقلاب إيران 1953 الذي نظمته كل من بريطانيا وأمريكا للإطاحة بحكومة محمد مصدق الرجل الديمقراطي ذو المبادئ الليبرالية الذي كان دفاعه عن الحرية وإيمانه بحق الثوار المعارضين له (والذين كان أكثر من نصفهم إن لم نقل جميعهم من أولئك الذين استأجرتهم المخابرات المركزية الأمريكية كي يساعدوها في عملية الانقلاب) أقول إن إيمانه بحقهم في أن يثوروا ورفضه تدخل قوات الشرطة لقمعهم حتى حين تحولت ثورتهم من السلمية إلى الوحشية والتخريب، والهجوم حتى عليه وعلى منزله الخاص هو ما كان أكبر الأسباب في نجاح الانقلاب وسقوط مصدق، فبأخطاؤه التي لم تكن سوى نية حسنة لا تُسمن ولا تغني من جوع وقت الأزمات مهد مصدق الطريق لسقوطه
ما الذي دفع محمد مصدق إلى ذلك المصير؟ لم تكن شعبيته ووطنيته ودفاعه عن مصالح شعبه هم فقط السبب، لكن خطؤه الأكبر وأنجازه الأكبر في آن واحد هو تأميمه الصناعة النفط الإيرانية التي كان يحتكرها الاستعمار البريطاني ويترك لإيران صاحبة الخير نفسها الفتات بل أن الأمر لم يقف عند ذلك الحد فقد كان البريطانيين يستغلون العمالة الإيرانية بأسوأ الطرق الممكنة دون حتى توفير ما يمكن لهؤلاء أن يعيشون به حياة شبه آدمية.
ستيفن كينزر في أحدى المواضع بالكتاب كان يتحدث أنه وفي مرحلة ما كان يمكن لمصدق قبول المفاوضات والوصول إلى حل وسط يخرج من خلاله كلا الطرفين رابحين لكن ومن وجهة نظر كينزر أيضًا فإن مصدق كان يعتبر أن ما يحدث هو قضية وطنية في الأساس غير المسموح بالتفاوض عليها ولم يكن ينظر لا للمكاسب التي يمكن تحقيقها ولا حتى للعواقب التي يمكن لها أن تحدث لكن أجدني ها هنا أختلف مع الكاتب الذي ذكر هو نفسه في كثير من المواضع كيف كانت بريطانيا تقوم بالمفاوضات بصلف وغرور وصلابة من ينتزع شيئًا حقه بالأساس وليس كأنها تقوم باغتصاب ما ليس لها، حتى أنها رفضت تعديل بنود عروضها والتنازل أكثر قليلاً فقد كانت كل ما تقوم بفعله حينها هو تعديل "صياغة" البنود لتبدو ألطف وكأن الشعب ورؤساؤه سُذج سيخضعون في كل الأحوال.
أحيانًا بعض القوى الإستعمارية تُسكرها قوتها حد العمى عما يمكن أن تشكله ثورة شعب مقهور ذي قضية من قوة تفوق قوتها أضعافًا مضاعفة!
إذا كان الخلاف إيراني/بريطاني فقط ما الذي دفع بالولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في خضم ذلك الصراع؟ بريطانيا وأمريكا ووفقًا لدور كل منهما كقوة عظمى في العالم يملكان الكثير من المصالح المشتركة بين بعضهم البعض على طريقة "هات وخد" لذا وبعد أن ظلت أمريكا طوال فترة حكم الرئيس ترومان تلعب دور الصديق لإيران والوسيط لبريطانيا وتحاول جاهدة رغم كل ما تنتظره البلدان منها أن تقف على الحياد، تغير موقف أمريكا مع انتقال السلطة من ترومان إلى أيزنهاور الذي كانت سياسته فيما يتعلق بهذا الملف هو الموافقة على التدخل لكن دعوني وشأني! فلم يكن يريد بعدها الإطلاع على أية تفاصيل فيما يخص عملية الانقلاب التي تسمى "أياكس" لذا وبعد هذه الموافقة اجتمعت العديد من القيادات البريطانية والأمريكية لتمويل ومتابعة عملية الانقلاب التي سيقوم بتنفيذها ثيودور روزفلت بالاستعانة بالأموال الطائلة التي بححوزته وبمساعدة عملاؤه الإيرانيين المجندين من الحكومة على رأسهم الشاه نفسه وخارجها وبشراء وحشد الغوغاء الذين قاموا بدور الثوار المعارضين لمصدق والمؤيدين لرجوع الشاه استطاع روزفلت تحقيق ما تمنى بعد محاولة أولى فاشلة وأخرى ناجحة فأن يقوم بالانقلاب على مصدق وتقديمه للمحاكمة ونفيه في أحدى القرى إلى أن توفاه الله وإعادة الشاه لعرشه لحكم دام بعدها خمسة وعشرين عام، خمسة وعشرين عام في خدمة الإنجليز!!
هناك علاقة طردية بين فساد الحاكم ومدة بقاؤه في الحكم، فكلما كان طاغية يملك من البطش ما يملك يستطيع حينها تكميم أفواه معارضيه وشعبه وكل من تسوّل له نفسه الثورة أو حتى أن يُظهر بعض الامتعاض على حكم مولاه، وكلما كان ذليل النفس مُنبطح أمام أسياده في الخارج كلما رضوا عنه وعن حكمه وتركوه على عرشه إلى أن يرث الله الأرض ومن عليها وإلى أن يقوم بتنفيذ كل أوامرهم ومصالحهم على حساب دولته ورعاياه لكنه حين يقف عثرة أمامهم سيصبح هو كبش الفداء الأول كي ينجون بأنفسهم!
الآن وبعد الثورة الإسلامية في إيران يبدو أن أمريكا تعض أصابعها من الندم على تدخلها الأول فقد تخلصت من خطر صغير لتأتي لنفسها –ودون أن تدري- بخطر أكبر بكثير
هذا كتاب صادم عن كيف للمؤامرات أن تكون، كيف تُحاك، وكيف يصبح وراءها عشرات المناصب الهامة وعشرات الأفكار الشيطانية، وملايين الملايين من الدولارات.
أنا كنت من أشد الساخرين من أولئك المؤمنين بنظرية المؤامرة، الذين يقومون بتعليق كل فشل/تعثر داخلى على شماعة الكيد الخارجي والذين يعتقدون أنهم محور الكون تترك القوى العظمي الخارجية مصالحها الخاصة لأجل الايقاع بدولة أو أمة أخرى هي ساقطة من الأساس دون الحاجة لتدخل.
لكنني الآن بتُ أعيّ أن نعم هناك ما يُسمى بنظرية المؤامرة بشكل يمثل أضعاف ما يمكن لعقلي الصغير هذا تخيله، هل هذا يعني أنني تركت جانب الساخرين من نظرية المؤامرة لأقف في الطرف الآخر وأقف موقف الدافع عنها؟ بالطبع لا فكلاهما تطرف؛ كل ما تغير في وجهة نظري هي أنها أصبحت أكثر إتزانًا، هناك مؤامرة من الخارج بالطبع لكنها لا تنفي المسئولية عن الداخل ولا تصلح كشماعة له لتعليق فشله فلم تكن لتنجح المؤامرة الخارجية لو لم يكن الداخل أجوف، هش، ضعيف الأساس.
كما أن أسلوب الكاتب رشيق، ممتع، شامل فاستطاع ربط ما حدث بالماضي بما يحدث الآن وتحليله بدقة واستخلاص نتائج بل وحلول مبهرة منه كما أنه غزير فلم يترك شخصية ما إلا وتحدث عنها بما يعطيك خلفية بسيطة عنها قبل أن يتحدث عن دورها في الانقلاب فلم تكن الشخصيات في حكايته تبزغ تلقائيًا من الفراغ بما يُشعرك بالارتباك والتيه.
حكايته؟ نعم فالكتاب أشبه بحكاية بوليسية من حكايات نبيل فاروق، أو فيلم أكشن/جاسوسية مع كثير من الخيال.
فمع كل ما تقرأ ستتعجب كيف كل هذا يحدث بكل تلك الدقة والخبث من خلف ظهورنا نُمارس مهنتنا الوحيدة ألا وهي؛ أن نكون نيام!
تمّت
September 9, 2024
“Soon after the Shah was overthrown, President Jimmy Carter allowed him to enter the United States. That sent Iranian radicals into a frenzy of rage. With the blessing of their new leaders, they stormed the American embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two American diplomats hostage for more than fourteen months. Westerners, and especially Americans, found this crime not only barbaric but inexplicable. That was because almost none of them had any idea of the responsibility the United States bore for imposing the royalist regime that Iranians came to hate so passionately. The hostage-takers remembered that when the Shah fled into exile in 1953, CIA agents working at the American embassy had returned him to his throne. Iranians feared that history was about to repeat itself.”
— All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of the Middle East Terror
This is the story of the oil-nationalization episode in Iran and the rise and fall of Mohammad Mosaddeq, the leader who embodied his people’s hopes for taking control of their destiny. This book however, is mainly concerned with depicting how the United States and the British governments tried to influence the event through gunboat diplomacy.
Stephen Kinzer doesn’t tell anything new and the almost care-free way by which he draws conclusions about the legacy of the coup diminishes the value of the book. To be fair, this is not a historical work and Kinzer has mostly relied on the works of other historians like Elm and Gasiorowski for creating his narrative. The problematic part is his handling of the events surrounding the coup and its aftermath. His depiction of the coup is basically a banal rehashing of the account offered by Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA field-operative who reputedly masterminded the coup and brought it to success, almost single-handedly.
Kinzer cares about Iran and his trip to Tehran for visiting the house that Mosaddeq stayed and lived his final years (which he chronicles in the epilogue of this book), shows that he is passionate about Iran and its fate. His passion is palpable in the account that he offers.
(His critical stance towards U.S. foreign policy throughout the past decades shows that he sees the hand of the United States in almost any development throughout the world and this book is not an exception. While it might have a certain charm for some that Kinzer takes an almost activist-like stance against U.S policies, it does no good for objective historical writing. His recent remarks about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and blaming it on NATO expansion further reveals his penchant for isolating the effects of U.S. policies and criticizing them out of context.)
In this book, Kinzer heavily overplays the role of the CIA in the ousting of Mosaddeq and by relying on Kermit Roosevelt’s account, this book suffers a lot from ignoring lots of important personalities and their actions which were significant in shaping the final outcome. He hasn’t even tried to corroborate the version offered by Roosevelt by cross-checking it with other sources. He ignores the role of internal opposition to Mosaddeq to the point of absurdity and apparently doesn’t have any problem with that: it fits into his narrative that the United States was the major cause of the 1979 revolution and its disastrous consequences. In the final chapter, he warns: “...[D]rawing conclusions about causes and effects is always dangerous.” But he has evidently ignored his own warning in writing his narrative.
He only devotes two chapters to the actual unfolding of the coup, the rest he uses to build the background and provide context and a summary of events leading up to 1953.
In the first chapter he tells what happened on 15th August during the first coup attempt. The most glaring problem here is a lack of details. I thought maybe he would describe the CIA planning in more depth later on, but he doesn’t delve any deeper and jumps right into describing the second stage of the coup in the penultimate chapter.
Then he goes back in time and spends two chapters giving a summary of Iran’s ancient history up until the point that Reza Khan became Shah and established the Pahlavi dynasty. His summary of Iran’s antiquity is filled with mythological romanticization of the Achaemenid Empire and basically gives a slapdash account of how great they were and how they ruled that monstrously big empire without too much oppression and without brutalizing their subjects. I am not well-versed in Iran’s ancient history, but I refuse to believe such generalized statements based on fragmentary evidence and archaeological findings. He then retells the oft-repeated tale of how the barbarian Arabs invaded Iran and destroyed its civilization by introducing and enforcing their Islam on the population; again he clings to a one-sided narrative.
Why did Kinzer feel the need to include these sections, I don’t know but I think he should’ve avoided that which would’ve made his book more coherent and less rambling. I understand that he included these chapters to make the book more accessible but it’s not like he had many pages to dedicate to this background-building. Partly because of that, this book is misleading at numerous points. A case in point is his description of the reign of Reza Shah, reducing him to a few botched and generalized paragraphs:
Starting with chapter 4, the book improves a lot. He starts by telling the story of George Reynolds who managed to strike oil in Masjed-Suleiman for the first time in Iran and then he gives a good account of how the British Empire managed to gain oil-concessions from the Qajar dynasty and establish the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which owned the oil-fields of Iran and managed to remain a dominant force with the blessing of the British government. These sections are among the best in the book. Kinzer manages to give you a good outline of the British Imperial policies with regards to Iran and how their obstinacy to fairly share their profits with Iranians and the ugly way they treated the workers of Abadan refinery, begot widespread resentment in the population. These grievances ultimately led to the nationalization movement which brought Mosaddeq to the pinnacle of power for the express purpose of nationalizing the oil. I really enjoyed that Kinzer doesn’t try to justify British policies at all and he manages to show them for what they were: naked exploitation of Iran’s oil. The fact that Iran probably wouldn’t have managed to extract its oil without their help doesn’t excuse their never-ending greed and their oblivious attitude to the suffering of Iranians.
After Mosaddeq nationalized the oil and the oil company, things came to a head. The British government didn’t want a deal without retaining (de facto if not de jure) control of the oil company and even though their position softened a bit overtime, their persistence was more than matched by that of Mosaddeq’s. Kinzer doesn’t criticize Mosaddeq openly but from early-on, he devotes paragraphs on his peculiar character that made him a great orator and a firebrand opposition leader but not a great statesman: “...[A] visionary rather than a pragmatist, preferring defeat in an honorable cause to what he considered shameful compromise.” This is actually a point of contention between historians: some believe that Mosaddeq made numerous mistakes in failing to make a compromise; others holding that the offers made by AIOC and the British government were not made in good faith and were not real attempts at a workable compromise. Kinzer doesn’t dwell on this and he settles for giving a broad summary of the proposals and then moves ahead.
There are not many faults that I can find in these middle chapters. There are some baseless claims that there are no end-notes to be found for but for the most part they are not earth-shattering. When Kinzer tries to describe the internal situation in Iran however, he is badly out of his depth. When he writes from the British and U.S. perspective, he does a commendable job; his sources are more diverse and he has a good command of the political line-up and policy making. His coverage of Mosaddeq’s speech in the Security Council and his meeting with Truman and Acheson are also remarkable.
Finally all efforts to find a compromise failed and the Eisenhower administration gradually relented to British pressure for ousting Mosaddeq. To some extent it can be said that the Eisenhower administration did so in the interest of safeguarding its alliance with Britain; not because of a real threat of communist takeover but because the United States needed British support in the international scene and knew that a failure to support them in this case will undoubtedly alienate the British government and will weaken their unified stance against the Soviet Union and China. Roger Goiran, the CIA chief in Tehran, vehemently opposed the coup and given the fact that he was responsible for dealing with the communist threat, it only strengthens the argument that the danger of a communist takeover was mostly a fabrication.
The situation became chaotic in 1953 and this is where Kinzer’s narrative goes off balance. The National Front started to split and numerous powerful groups (like the industrialists and the clergy) distanced themselves from Mosaddeq. This division, which had numerous causes, is mostly viewed as a result of foreign influence and the work of CIA and MI6 agents. By only relying on reports and correspondents of British and Americans, Kinzer fails to realize that this split most probably would’ve still happened as a result of the unstable political quagmire caused by the unresolved oil issues. He gives the impression that this shift in power dynamics was mostly the result of subversive activities which is far from the truth. Economic and diplomatic pressures from Britain and the United States had already taken their toll on the National Front, much more so than subversive activities.
Kashani’s split from the National Front — and his dissent against Mosaddeq — for example is solely attributed to the work of Rashidian Brothers and no ulterior motive is considered. The fact that Kashani was a power-hungry politician with some ties to Fada'iyan-e Islam terrorist cells (who had assassinated General Razmara in 1951), is not given that much weight. Kinzer doesn’t openly claim that the situation developed under the tight control of CIA and MI6, but by recounting the events through the prism of those agencies, he takes the power away from Iranian political actors. By doing so, he reduces the internal forces to mere pawns, trapped in a great game arranged by intelligence agencies, destined to play their designated roles. The element of chaos and confusion — inherent in any political upheaval — is almost nonexistent in his tale.
(Kashani was not the leader of Fada'iyan, a fundamentalist malcontent named Navvab Safavi was the man at the helm. Navvab saw himself big enough to condemn “apostates” to death and authorized assassinations in the hope of purging the land of corruption. The clerical establishment didn’t endorse him and even banned him and his fanatics from Qom.)
In the penultimate chapter, we finally get to the second stage of the coup. This section, like the first chapter, is again drawn from the memoirs of Kermit Roosevelt. Like the first chapter, the absence of detail cripples this chapter and I’m not convinced that the coup succeeded because of Roosevelt and CIA agents.
In short it goes on like this:
After the failed attempt on August 15, 1953 to remove Mosaddeq from power, top-level CIA officials and even Beedle Smith (the undersecretary of state) had assumed that Operation Ajax had failed. They urged the evacuation of key personnel. How the first attempt was supposed to succeed and what the actual plan to remove Mosaddeq was, is not elaborated. But Kermit Roosevelt decided to give it another try in defiance of his superiors. Roosevelt however had already managed to get Mohammad Reza Shah to sign two farmans (decrees): one for dismissing Mosaddeq, the other for appointing General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister. (In reality, the Shah and his court prepared the farmans but in Roosevelt’s tale, it was the CIA-agents who wrote them and Roosevelt who got the Shah to sign them.) After the first attempt failed, Shah fled Iran first to Iraq and then to Rome and was unhinged and unaware of the situation in Iran. In the meantime, Roosevelt had hidden Zahedi away in a house and Zahedi was biding his time, waiting to see what would happen. Then Roosevelt decided to organize a pro-Mosaddeq demonstration by using his agents and his vast network, which included members of the clergy and merchants of the bazaar and hooligans. The pro-Mosaddeq crowds marched the streets the next day and set fire to buildings and generally caused mayhem. Mosaddeq didn't use his forces to suppress the protesters. Then Roosevelt convinced Loy Henderson (U.S ambassador in Iran) to visit Mosaddeq. Loy Henderson told Mosaddeq that American citizens were being harassed by the disorderly mob and their lives were in danger. Mosaddeq became worried and ordered his troops to finally put an end to the demonstrations. He also ordered his supporters to stay home in the coming days. Now Roosevelt held the winning card; he would just need to organize a pro-Shah demonstration! The day after, pro-Shah demonstrators emerged on the streets. The officers and their troops however, who had clamped down on previous days protests, didn’t interfere with the crowds this time. The troops actually started to march alongside the crowd and seized key installations across the city one by one, silencing pro-Mosaddeq forces as they went. This sudden about-face of officers, was the result of the work of generals and officers involved in the coup who held pro-Shah sympathies and decided to end the Mosaddeq’s reign once and for all. The combined pro-Shah forces finally descended on Mosaddeq’s house and after fierce fighting, forces loyal to Mosaddeq surrendered and Mosaddeq took flight, until he surrendered himself a few days later. Meanwhile, Zahedi came out of hiding and rode to the radio station and announced that he was now prime minister and Mosaddeq was no longer in power, by the force of loyal decree.
Kinzer’s tale doesn’t offer much more detail than this. And by ignoring crucial information like the involvement of key generals in rallying the troops and the importance of the clergy in organizing the protests, his account gets distorted and is attributed mostly to the work of CIA agents. I don’t know if we can say Mosaddeq's government would have fallen even without Ajax. But I think we can say that the CIA didn’t play that big a part. For that I recommend Darioush Bayandor’s account of the coup.
Finally we get to the legacy of the coup. As for the claim that by removing Mosaddeq from power, the Iranian people came to resent the United States for meddling in Iran’s affairs, Bayandor points out in his book that Iranians couldn’t have known about the Ajax operation until it was publicized around 1980 (and further in 2000 by the Wilbur Document). The clerics' violent anti-American rhetoric however, started much sooner than that. Bayandor aptly points out that Iranians had a predilection to see the hand of foreigners in almost all major developments in their country. So if Mosaddeq’s government had collapsed through other means, the people probably would’ve still seen it as the work of Britain and the United States. It is true that the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah was weakened because he built his power on the ashes of Mosaddeq's government. But it is far-fetched to say that the Mullahs' rhetoric would’ve been less anti-American if Ajax hadn't happened. Actually, the future leader of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini (who was close in his thinking to Kashani) didn’t approve of Mosaddeq and his secular nationalism. Since 1979, the Islamic Regime has never paid any real tribute to Mosaddeq and has denounced him in different ways. In their version of events, Kashani is the real liberator who led the struggle for oil-nationalization; the very personality who worked to remove Mosaddeq from power. In this light, Madeleine Albright’s apology in 2000 seems to have given more ammunition to the Islamic Regime for portraying the United States as the Great Satan. If anything, by removing Mosaddeq from power (assuming that Ajax was responsible for that), the United States government worked in tandem with the revolutionary clerics.
— All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of the Middle East Terror
This is the story of the oil-nationalization episode in Iran and the rise and fall of Mohammad Mosaddeq, the leader who embodied his people’s hopes for taking control of their destiny. This book however, is mainly concerned with depicting how the United States and the British governments tried to influence the event through gunboat diplomacy.
Stephen Kinzer doesn’t tell anything new and the almost care-free way by which he draws conclusions about the legacy of the coup diminishes the value of the book. To be fair, this is not a historical work and Kinzer has mostly relied on the works of other historians like Elm and Gasiorowski for creating his narrative. The problematic part is his handling of the events surrounding the coup and its aftermath. His depiction of the coup is basically a banal rehashing of the account offered by Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA field-operative who reputedly masterminded the coup and brought it to success, almost single-handedly.
Kinzer cares about Iran and his trip to Tehran for visiting the house that Mosaddeq stayed and lived his final years (which he chronicles in the epilogue of this book), shows that he is passionate about Iran and its fate. His passion is palpable in the account that he offers.
(His critical stance towards U.S. foreign policy throughout the past decades shows that he sees the hand of the United States in almost any development throughout the world and this book is not an exception. While it might have a certain charm for some that Kinzer takes an almost activist-like stance against U.S policies, it does no good for objective historical writing. His recent remarks about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and blaming it on NATO expansion further reveals his penchant for isolating the effects of U.S. policies and criticizing them out of context.)
In this book, Kinzer heavily overplays the role of the CIA in the ousting of Mosaddeq and by relying on Kermit Roosevelt’s account, this book suffers a lot from ignoring lots of important personalities and their actions which were significant in shaping the final outcome. He hasn’t even tried to corroborate the version offered by Roosevelt by cross-checking it with other sources. He ignores the role of internal opposition to Mosaddeq to the point of absurdity and apparently doesn’t have any problem with that: it fits into his narrative that the United States was the major cause of the 1979 revolution and its disastrous consequences. In the final chapter, he warns: “...[D]rawing conclusions about causes and effects is always dangerous.” But he has evidently ignored his own warning in writing his narrative.
He only devotes two chapters to the actual unfolding of the coup, the rest he uses to build the background and provide context and a summary of events leading up to 1953.
In the first chapter he tells what happened on 15th August during the first coup attempt. The most glaring problem here is a lack of details. I thought maybe he would describe the CIA planning in more depth later on, but he doesn’t delve any deeper and jumps right into describing the second stage of the coup in the penultimate chapter.
Then he goes back in time and spends two chapters giving a summary of Iran’s ancient history up until the point that Reza Khan became Shah and established the Pahlavi dynasty. His summary of Iran’s antiquity is filled with mythological romanticization of the Achaemenid Empire and basically gives a slapdash account of how great they were and how they ruled that monstrously big empire without too much oppression and without brutalizing their subjects. I am not well-versed in Iran’s ancient history, but I refuse to believe such generalized statements based on fragmentary evidence and archaeological findings. He then retells the oft-repeated tale of how the barbarian Arabs invaded Iran and destroyed its civilization by introducing and enforcing their Islam on the population; again he clings to a one-sided narrative.
Why did Kinzer feel the need to include these sections, I don’t know but I think he should’ve avoided that which would’ve made his book more coherent and less rambling. I understand that he included these chapters to make the book more accessible but it’s not like he had many pages to dedicate to this background-building. Partly because of that, this book is misleading at numerous points. A case in point is his description of the reign of Reza Shah, reducing him to a few botched and generalized paragraphs:
If he had not alienated himself from almost every segment of Iranian society, and if he had kept a cadre of wise advisers around him instead of systematically exiling or murdering them, he might have been able to resist. Instead he found himself alone, his dreams shattered by his own narrow-mindedness, corruption, and boundless egotism.
Starting with chapter 4, the book improves a lot. He starts by telling the story of George Reynolds who managed to strike oil in Masjed-Suleiman for the first time in Iran and then he gives a good account of how the British Empire managed to gain oil-concessions from the Qajar dynasty and establish the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which owned the oil-fields of Iran and managed to remain a dominant force with the blessing of the British government. These sections are among the best in the book. Kinzer manages to give you a good outline of the British Imperial policies with regards to Iran and how their obstinacy to fairly share their profits with Iranians and the ugly way they treated the workers of Abadan refinery, begot widespread resentment in the population. These grievances ultimately led to the nationalization movement which brought Mosaddeq to the pinnacle of power for the express purpose of nationalizing the oil. I really enjoyed that Kinzer doesn’t try to justify British policies at all and he manages to show them for what they were: naked exploitation of Iran’s oil. The fact that Iran probably wouldn’t have managed to extract its oil without their help doesn’t excuse their never-ending greed and their oblivious attitude to the suffering of Iranians.
After Mosaddeq nationalized the oil and the oil company, things came to a head. The British government didn’t want a deal without retaining (de facto if not de jure) control of the oil company and even though their position softened a bit overtime, their persistence was more than matched by that of Mosaddeq’s. Kinzer doesn’t criticize Mosaddeq openly but from early-on, he devotes paragraphs on his peculiar character that made him a great orator and a firebrand opposition leader but not a great statesman: “...[A] visionary rather than a pragmatist, preferring defeat in an honorable cause to what he considered shameful compromise.” This is actually a point of contention between historians: some believe that Mosaddeq made numerous mistakes in failing to make a compromise; others holding that the offers made by AIOC and the British government were not made in good faith and were not real attempts at a workable compromise. Kinzer doesn’t dwell on this and he settles for giving a broad summary of the proposals and then moves ahead.
There are not many faults that I can find in these middle chapters. There are some baseless claims that there are no end-notes to be found for but for the most part they are not earth-shattering. When Kinzer tries to describe the internal situation in Iran however, he is badly out of his depth. When he writes from the British and U.S. perspective, he does a commendable job; his sources are more diverse and he has a good command of the political line-up and policy making. His coverage of Mosaddeq’s speech in the Security Council and his meeting with Truman and Acheson are also remarkable.
Finally all efforts to find a compromise failed and the Eisenhower administration gradually relented to British pressure for ousting Mosaddeq. To some extent it can be said that the Eisenhower administration did so in the interest of safeguarding its alliance with Britain; not because of a real threat of communist takeover but because the United States needed British support in the international scene and knew that a failure to support them in this case will undoubtedly alienate the British government and will weaken their unified stance against the Soviet Union and China. Roger Goiran, the CIA chief in Tehran, vehemently opposed the coup and given the fact that he was responsible for dealing with the communist threat, it only strengthens the argument that the danger of a communist takeover was mostly a fabrication.
The situation became chaotic in 1953 and this is where Kinzer’s narrative goes off balance. The National Front started to split and numerous powerful groups (like the industrialists and the clergy) distanced themselves from Mosaddeq. This division, which had numerous causes, is mostly viewed as a result of foreign influence and the work of CIA and MI6 agents. By only relying on reports and correspondents of British and Americans, Kinzer fails to realize that this split most probably would’ve still happened as a result of the unstable political quagmire caused by the unresolved oil issues. He gives the impression that this shift in power dynamics was mostly the result of subversive activities which is far from the truth. Economic and diplomatic pressures from Britain and the United States had already taken their toll on the National Front, much more so than subversive activities.
Kashani’s split from the National Front — and his dissent against Mosaddeq — for example is solely attributed to the work of Rashidian Brothers and no ulterior motive is considered. The fact that Kashani was a power-hungry politician with some ties to Fada'iyan-e Islam terrorist cells (who had assassinated General Razmara in 1951), is not given that much weight. Kinzer doesn’t openly claim that the situation developed under the tight control of CIA and MI6, but by recounting the events through the prism of those agencies, he takes the power away from Iranian political actors. By doing so, he reduces the internal forces to mere pawns, trapped in a great game arranged by intelligence agencies, destined to play their designated roles. The element of chaos and confusion — inherent in any political upheaval — is almost nonexistent in his tale.
(Kashani was not the leader of Fada'iyan, a fundamentalist malcontent named Navvab Safavi was the man at the helm. Navvab saw himself big enough to condemn “apostates” to death and authorized assassinations in the hope of purging the land of corruption. The clerical establishment didn’t endorse him and even banned him and his fanatics from Qom.)
In the penultimate chapter, we finally get to the second stage of the coup. This section, like the first chapter, is again drawn from the memoirs of Kermit Roosevelt. Like the first chapter, the absence of detail cripples this chapter and I’m not convinced that the coup succeeded because of Roosevelt and CIA agents.
In short it goes on like this:
After the failed attempt on August 15, 1953 to remove Mosaddeq from power, top-level CIA officials and even Beedle Smith (the undersecretary of state) had assumed that Operation Ajax had failed. They urged the evacuation of key personnel. How the first attempt was supposed to succeed and what the actual plan to remove Mosaddeq was, is not elaborated. But Kermit Roosevelt decided to give it another try in defiance of his superiors. Roosevelt however had already managed to get Mohammad Reza Shah to sign two farmans (decrees): one for dismissing Mosaddeq, the other for appointing General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister. (In reality, the Shah and his court prepared the farmans but in Roosevelt’s tale, it was the CIA-agents who wrote them and Roosevelt who got the Shah to sign them.) After the first attempt failed, Shah fled Iran first to Iraq and then to Rome and was unhinged and unaware of the situation in Iran. In the meantime, Roosevelt had hidden Zahedi away in a house and Zahedi was biding his time, waiting to see what would happen. Then Roosevelt decided to organize a pro-Mosaddeq demonstration by using his agents and his vast network, which included members of the clergy and merchants of the bazaar and hooligans. The pro-Mosaddeq crowds marched the streets the next day and set fire to buildings and generally caused mayhem. Mosaddeq didn't use his forces to suppress the protesters. Then Roosevelt convinced Loy Henderson (U.S ambassador in Iran) to visit Mosaddeq. Loy Henderson told Mosaddeq that American citizens were being harassed by the disorderly mob and their lives were in danger. Mosaddeq became worried and ordered his troops to finally put an end to the demonstrations. He also ordered his supporters to stay home in the coming days. Now Roosevelt held the winning card; he would just need to organize a pro-Shah demonstration! The day after, pro-Shah demonstrators emerged on the streets. The officers and their troops however, who had clamped down on previous days protests, didn’t interfere with the crowds this time. The troops actually started to march alongside the crowd and seized key installations across the city one by one, silencing pro-Mosaddeq forces as they went. This sudden about-face of officers, was the result of the work of generals and officers involved in the coup who held pro-Shah sympathies and decided to end the Mosaddeq’s reign once and for all. The combined pro-Shah forces finally descended on Mosaddeq’s house and after fierce fighting, forces loyal to Mosaddeq surrendered and Mosaddeq took flight, until he surrendered himself a few days later. Meanwhile, Zahedi came out of hiding and rode to the radio station and announced that he was now prime minister and Mosaddeq was no longer in power, by the force of loyal decree.
Kinzer’s tale doesn’t offer much more detail than this. And by ignoring crucial information like the involvement of key generals in rallying the troops and the importance of the clergy in organizing the protests, his account gets distorted and is attributed mostly to the work of CIA agents. I don’t know if we can say Mosaddeq's government would have fallen even without Ajax. But I think we can say that the CIA didn’t play that big a part. For that I recommend Darioush Bayandor’s account of the coup.
Finally we get to the legacy of the coup. As for the claim that by removing Mosaddeq from power, the Iranian people came to resent the United States for meddling in Iran’s affairs, Bayandor points out in his book that Iranians couldn’t have known about the Ajax operation until it was publicized around 1980 (and further in 2000 by the Wilbur Document). The clerics' violent anti-American rhetoric however, started much sooner than that. Bayandor aptly points out that Iranians had a predilection to see the hand of foreigners in almost all major developments in their country. So if Mosaddeq’s government had collapsed through other means, the people probably would’ve still seen it as the work of Britain and the United States. It is true that the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah was weakened because he built his power on the ashes of Mosaddeq's government. But it is far-fetched to say that the Mullahs' rhetoric would’ve been less anti-American if Ajax hadn't happened. Actually, the future leader of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini (who was close in his thinking to Kashani) didn’t approve of Mosaddeq and his secular nationalism. Since 1979, the Islamic Regime has never paid any real tribute to Mosaddeq and has denounced him in different ways. In their version of events, Kashani is the real liberator who led the struggle for oil-nationalization; the very personality who worked to remove Mosaddeq from power. In this light, Madeleine Albright’s apology in 2000 seems to have given more ammunition to the Islamic Regime for portraying the United States as the Great Satan. If anything, by removing Mosaddeq from power (assuming that Ajax was responsible for that), the United States government worked in tandem with the revolutionary clerics.
September 24, 2024
"My countrymen lack the bare necessities of existence. Their standard of living is perhaps the lowest in the world. Our greatest natural asset is oil. It should properly be our national industry and the revenue from it should go to improve our conditions of life."
"If the exploitation of our oil industry continues in which the Iranian plays the part of a mere manual worker, and if foreign exploiters continue to appropriate practically all of the income, then our people will remain forever in a state of poverty and misery."
"Wherever the former (Anglo-Persian Oil) company may operate in the future, it will never again operate in Iran. Neither by trusteeship nor by contract will we turn over to foreigners the right to exploit our oil resources."
-Excerpts from Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh's address to the United Nations Security Council in New York City, October 15-17, 1951
************
This book is about the 1953 British and American ouster of the democratic government of Iran and reinstatement of a despotic monarchy. It is also the story of PM Mossadegh, elected in 1951 and deposed in 1953. He was educated in Europe, Iran's first law PhD, a fighter for secular democracy and against foreign domination since 1905. From 1909 the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., called by Winston Churchill 'a prize beyond our wildest dreams' had been owned by Britain.
Stephen Kinzer, a NYT journalist and specialist in US plots to overthrow foreign governments published this book in 2003. He begins with a whirlwind tour of Iranian history from Cyrus the Great in 550 BC to Alexander the Great in 334 BC and Parthians to Sasanians. Zoroastrianism taught leaders gained legitimacy by just rule. Following the Arab conquest of 633 AD Islam was divided into Sunni and Shia branches. Shia believed that the Sunni caliphate had been corrupted.
After the Mongol conquest of 1220 the Safavid dynasty in 1501 established Iran as the center of Shia Islam. At the turn of the 17th century Abbas Shah combined modernization with tyranny, creating artistic marvels in Isfahan. In the mid-18th century Nadir Shah looted Delhi and lands around. The dissolute Qajars ascended to power during the 19th century selling off natural resources. Movements toward reform were delayed by a British-Russian partition in 1907.
Reza Shah, a strongman from northern Iran, overthrew the Qajars in 1926 collaborating with Britain as the Bolsheviks renounced claims on Iran. An admirer of Ataturk, Reza built roads, rails and banks, banned foreign property sales and constrained religion by authoritarian fiat. A fan of Mussolini and Hitler he ran afoul of the west in WWII, abdicating in 1941. Postwar profits from the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. soared as protests proliferated, leading to the rise of nationalists.
In 1950 communists advanced across Korea. The prior year the USSR tested a nuclear weapon and Mao won the civil war in China. Countries across eastern Europe had governments imposed by Moscow. Truman thought the developing world would adopt Marxism if the west didn't accept nationalism. Iran was at risk due to British refusal to compromise on oil leases. Churchill was PM again in 1951 and Eisenhower president in 1953. Britain needed oil to pay US war debts.
In 1951 Iran had nationalized oil fields exploited by Britain for over forty years. Ike took the opposite approach from Truman, who feared British intervention would drive Iran to Soviet aid. A CIA planned coup was put into motion within months of his inauguration, executed by Kermit Roosevelt Jr., grandson of Teddy. The goal was to overthrow Prime Minister Mossadegh and empower the son of Reza Shah. The plot was uncovered and military loyal to the Shah jailed.
Kermit was not daunted by the initial setback to the coup. He was backed by the Dulles brothers, Secretary of State and CIA Director, both cold war icons. Although foreign funded protests and propaganda painted Mossadegh as a Soviet pawn he remained a hero to Iranians for opposition to the British. US involvement wasn't widely known until after his overthrow in 1953. Mossadegh was under arrest to his death in 1967, a sad fate for a man who was a patriot and scholar.
Once Reza Shah Jr was reinstalled on the peacock throne his tenure lasted to the 1979 Islamic revolution. During the time he was a vassal of US and UK oil interests. A pampered and weak ruler he resorted to torture and imprisonment of his perceived enemies. Exiled and sick he was followed by angry mobs shouting "Death to the Shah!". He died in 1980. One of his former antagonists, the Ayatollah Khomeini, returned to lead the state and held fifty US hostages for over a year.
The US and UK were at odds in the early 1950's. Truman did not support prolonging empires, called by Secretary of State Dean Acheson 'whiff of grapeshot diplomacy'. PM Attlee and Foreign Secretary Bevin delayed invasion, unable to secure US and UN approval. Once Churchill and Eisenhower were in power the tables turned. United under pro-capitalism and anti-communism they defeated Iranian aspirations, later ushering in the Islamic state. Kinzer tells the story well.
Iran's struggle to modernize provokes questions. Should governments lease national resources? Should developed nations lease land from underdeveloped ones? Foreign investment could help develop domestic infrastructure. Aramco, the Arabian-American Oil Co., agreed to 50% royalties in 1950 while the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. was paying 15%. When contracts were canceled the UK chose embargos and considered armed invasion, an avoidable crisis.
After the restoration of the Shah a deal was struck for fifty-fifty sharing of oil revenue between Iran and a consortium of international companies. The UK retained 40% of the foreign half. The US bought a 40% share, the Dutch and France 10% each for $1B total. It was a very favorable arrangement for the west that lasted a quarter century until the revolution of 1979. The Shah presented Kermit a gold cigarette case and Eisenhower a ruby and sapphire encrusted peacock.
"If the exploitation of our oil industry continues in which the Iranian plays the part of a mere manual worker, and if foreign exploiters continue to appropriate practically all of the income, then our people will remain forever in a state of poverty and misery."
"Wherever the former (Anglo-Persian Oil) company may operate in the future, it will never again operate in Iran. Neither by trusteeship nor by contract will we turn over to foreigners the right to exploit our oil resources."
-Excerpts from Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh's address to the United Nations Security Council in New York City, October 15-17, 1951
************
This book is about the 1953 British and American ouster of the democratic government of Iran and reinstatement of a despotic monarchy. It is also the story of PM Mossadegh, elected in 1951 and deposed in 1953. He was educated in Europe, Iran's first law PhD, a fighter for secular democracy and against foreign domination since 1905. From 1909 the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., called by Winston Churchill 'a prize beyond our wildest dreams' had been owned by Britain.
Stephen Kinzer, a NYT journalist and specialist in US plots to overthrow foreign governments published this book in 2003. He begins with a whirlwind tour of Iranian history from Cyrus the Great in 550 BC to Alexander the Great in 334 BC and Parthians to Sasanians. Zoroastrianism taught leaders gained legitimacy by just rule. Following the Arab conquest of 633 AD Islam was divided into Sunni and Shia branches. Shia believed that the Sunni caliphate had been corrupted.
After the Mongol conquest of 1220 the Safavid dynasty in 1501 established Iran as the center of Shia Islam. At the turn of the 17th century Abbas Shah combined modernization with tyranny, creating artistic marvels in Isfahan. In the mid-18th century Nadir Shah looted Delhi and lands around. The dissolute Qajars ascended to power during the 19th century selling off natural resources. Movements toward reform were delayed by a British-Russian partition in 1907.
Reza Shah, a strongman from northern Iran, overthrew the Qajars in 1926 collaborating with Britain as the Bolsheviks renounced claims on Iran. An admirer of Ataturk, Reza built roads, rails and banks, banned foreign property sales and constrained religion by authoritarian fiat. A fan of Mussolini and Hitler he ran afoul of the west in WWII, abdicating in 1941. Postwar profits from the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. soared as protests proliferated, leading to the rise of nationalists.
In 1950 communists advanced across Korea. The prior year the USSR tested a nuclear weapon and Mao won the civil war in China. Countries across eastern Europe had governments imposed by Moscow. Truman thought the developing world would adopt Marxism if the west didn't accept nationalism. Iran was at risk due to British refusal to compromise on oil leases. Churchill was PM again in 1951 and Eisenhower president in 1953. Britain needed oil to pay US war debts.
In 1951 Iran had nationalized oil fields exploited by Britain for over forty years. Ike took the opposite approach from Truman, who feared British intervention would drive Iran to Soviet aid. A CIA planned coup was put into motion within months of his inauguration, executed by Kermit Roosevelt Jr., grandson of Teddy. The goal was to overthrow Prime Minister Mossadegh and empower the son of Reza Shah. The plot was uncovered and military loyal to the Shah jailed.
Kermit was not daunted by the initial setback to the coup. He was backed by the Dulles brothers, Secretary of State and CIA Director, both cold war icons. Although foreign funded protests and propaganda painted Mossadegh as a Soviet pawn he remained a hero to Iranians for opposition to the British. US involvement wasn't widely known until after his overthrow in 1953. Mossadegh was under arrest to his death in 1967, a sad fate for a man who was a patriot and scholar.
Once Reza Shah Jr was reinstalled on the peacock throne his tenure lasted to the 1979 Islamic revolution. During the time he was a vassal of US and UK oil interests. A pampered and weak ruler he resorted to torture and imprisonment of his perceived enemies. Exiled and sick he was followed by angry mobs shouting "Death to the Shah!". He died in 1980. One of his former antagonists, the Ayatollah Khomeini, returned to lead the state and held fifty US hostages for over a year.
The US and UK were at odds in the early 1950's. Truman did not support prolonging empires, called by Secretary of State Dean Acheson 'whiff of grapeshot diplomacy'. PM Attlee and Foreign Secretary Bevin delayed invasion, unable to secure US and UN approval. Once Churchill and Eisenhower were in power the tables turned. United under pro-capitalism and anti-communism they defeated Iranian aspirations, later ushering in the Islamic state. Kinzer tells the story well.
Iran's struggle to modernize provokes questions. Should governments lease national resources? Should developed nations lease land from underdeveloped ones? Foreign investment could help develop domestic infrastructure. Aramco, the Arabian-American Oil Co., agreed to 50% royalties in 1950 while the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. was paying 15%. When contracts were canceled the UK chose embargos and considered armed invasion, an avoidable crisis.
After the restoration of the Shah a deal was struck for fifty-fifty sharing of oil revenue between Iran and a consortium of international companies. The UK retained 40% of the foreign half. The US bought a 40% share, the Dutch and France 10% each for $1B total. It was a very favorable arrangement for the west that lasted a quarter century until the revolution of 1979. The Shah presented Kermit a gold cigarette case and Eisenhower a ruby and sapphire encrusted peacock.
October 23, 2022
4 ☆
During my entire life, I have regarded Iran and Iraq as part of the "troubled Middle East" with its occasional bursts of anger and violence directed at the United States. Even after 9/11, when the US launched military action in this region, I couldn't say that I could unravel the geopolitical complexities that characterize this corner of the world. I have now read a few nonfictions set in Iran in the 20th century, and none of them, including the latest, had been written in a purely objective tone. But at least, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror offered an explanation for the anti-Western sentiment.
Iran had been ruled by a monarch, the Shah (or "king"), for centuries. In the mid-1800s, the Qajar Dynasty under Nasir al-Din Shah began to sell concessions (ie. access) to Iran's natural resources to support a lavish lifestyle instead of benefitting his people. There were no terms of parity as Iran essentially became a cog in Great Britain's industrial empire. Perpetuating his father's practices, Muzzafir al-Din Shah had sold in 1901 the most pivotal concession in his country's history -- access to Iran's natural gas and petroleum for 60 years.
Political instability arrived with the 20th century as the populace began agitating for a constitution, the nascent seeds of democracy. Three distinct segments within Iran wrestled for power: the Qajar ruling clan, the Constitutional reformers, and the Islamic clerics. Simultaneously, Britain and the Russian Empire tussled to maintain their economic interests in Iran and in 1907, they accordingly signed a treaty, notably without any input from Iran. As Russia became engulfed by its own civil war and revolution, Britain took decisive steps which resulted in its effective sovereignty over Iran. In the 1920s, Reza, an uneducated but ambitious military leader, toppled the Qajar dynasty and ruled until 1941. His successor was his son, Mohammad Reza Shah. Neither dislodged British business interests nor its military presence.
Although it took nearly a decade to find oil, the company's patience had been generously rewarded. The British executives of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company possessed extractive colonial attitudes. They also had the solid backing of the British government, which had owned a 51 percent share in the company since 1913. By the mid-1900s, the abused Iranian workers could tolerate no more the management's profit-maximizing ethos. Mohammad Reza Shah was not effective on behalf of the Iranian oil workers.
Mohammad Mossadegh had been rising in popularity since he resumed his political career in the late 1940s. By 1951, he was on the brink of becoming the next Prime Minister of Iran. Mossadegh agreed to do so only if parliament accepted his proposal to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. On May 1, 1951, Anglo-Iranian's concession was revoked and it was replaced by the newly established National Iranian Oil Company.
After a century of involvement in Iran, Britain did not remain idle in the face of this loss. So when Mossadegh's administration expelled the British diplomats, they turned to their American allies for assistance. Author Stephen Kinzer firmly pointed his finger at specific employees of the British and American governments. President Harry Truman opposed any military intervention on behalf of British economic interests. But in 1952, Truman was replaced by Dwight Eisenhower, who heeded the anti-Communist strategies of his Secretary of State John Dulles [the one for whom the Washington DC Airport is named] and brother Allen Dulles [who became the head of the CIA]. With the approval of POTUS Eisenhower and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, a coup d'état (codenamed "Operation Ajax") had been successfully orchestrated against Iran's Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in August 1953.
Kinzer argued that the consequences of Operation Ajax have reverberated throughout the ensuing decades in the fraught international relationships. I found Chapter 12, in which he wrapped up his thesis, interesting even though I wasn't completely convinced. The author had cited academic research which concluded that many of the geopolitical tensions of the 21st century are the rotten fruit borne of the 1953 coup. I have no doubt that the 1979 US Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran was directly connected with Operation Ajax but I remain skeptical of the longer term repercussions. Given Ayatollah Khomeini's fervency, who is to say that he wouldn't have gained power without the US-led toppling of Mohammad Mossadegh?
Overall, I found All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror to be quite intriguing. I now have a better grasp of both Iran's modern history and, sadly, interference by the US government. The fact that it took me months to finish it is not a reflection on the writing but of my ability to become distracted by real life.
During my entire life, I have regarded Iran and Iraq as part of the "troubled Middle East" with its occasional bursts of anger and violence directed at the United States. Even after 9/11, when the US launched military action in this region, I couldn't say that I could unravel the geopolitical complexities that characterize this corner of the world. I have now read a few nonfictions set in Iran in the 20th century, and none of them, including the latest, had been written in a purely objective tone. But at least, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror offered an explanation for the anti-Western sentiment.
It is not far-fetched to draw a line from Operation Ajax through the Shah's repressive regime and the Islamic Revolution to the fireballs the World Trade Center in New York.
Iran had been ruled by a monarch, the Shah (or "king"), for centuries. In the mid-1800s, the Qajar Dynasty under Nasir al-Din Shah began to sell concessions (ie. access) to Iran's natural resources to support a lavish lifestyle instead of benefitting his people. There were no terms of parity as Iran essentially became a cog in Great Britain's industrial empire. Perpetuating his father's practices, Muzzafir al-Din Shah had sold in 1901 the most pivotal concession in his country's history -- access to Iran's natural gas and petroleum for 60 years.
Political instability arrived with the 20th century as the populace began agitating for a constitution, the nascent seeds of democracy. Three distinct segments within Iran wrestled for power: the Qajar ruling clan, the Constitutional reformers, and the Islamic clerics. Simultaneously, Britain and the Russian Empire tussled to maintain their economic interests in Iran and in 1907, they accordingly signed a treaty, notably without any input from Iran. As Russia became engulfed by its own civil war and revolution, Britain took decisive steps which resulted in its effective sovereignty over Iran. In the 1920s, Reza, an uneducated but ambitious military leader, toppled the Qajar dynasty and ruled until 1941. His successor was his son, Mohammad Reza Shah. Neither dislodged British business interests nor its military presence.
Although it took nearly a decade to find oil, the company's patience had been generously rewarded. The British executives of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company possessed extractive colonial attitudes. They also had the solid backing of the British government, which had owned a 51 percent share in the company since 1913. By the mid-1900s, the abused Iranian workers could tolerate no more the management's profit-maximizing ethos. Mohammad Reza Shah was not effective on behalf of the Iranian oil workers.
The riots that shook Abadan led many Iranians to rally to the workers' cause, partly out of instinctive sympathy but also because of the grossly unequal terms under which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company operated. In 1947, for example, the company reported an after-tax profit of £40 million-the equivalent of $112 million dollars-and gave Iran just £7 million. To make matters worse, it never complied with its commitment under the 1933 agreement with Reza Shah to give laborers better pay and more chance for advancement, nor had it built the schools, hospitals, roads, or telephone system it promised. Manucher Farmanfarmaian, who in 1949 became director of Iran's petroleum institute, was appalled by what he found at Abadan.
Mohammad Mossadegh had been rising in popularity since he resumed his political career in the late 1940s. By 1951, he was on the brink of becoming the next Prime Minister of Iran. Mossadegh agreed to do so only if parliament accepted his proposal to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. On May 1, 1951, Anglo-Iranian's concession was revoked and it was replaced by the newly established National Iranian Oil Company.
After a century of involvement in Iran, Britain did not remain idle in the face of this loss. So when Mossadegh's administration expelled the British diplomats, they turned to their American allies for assistance. Author Stephen Kinzer firmly pointed his finger at specific employees of the British and American governments. President Harry Truman opposed any military intervention on behalf of British economic interests. But in 1952, Truman was replaced by Dwight Eisenhower, who heeded the anti-Communist strategies of his Secretary of State John Dulles [the one for whom the Washington DC Airport is named] and brother Allen Dulles [who became the head of the CIA]. With the approval of POTUS Eisenhower and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, a coup d'état (codenamed "Operation Ajax") had been successfully orchestrated against Iran's Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in August 1953.
"My only crime," Mossadegh told his judges, "is that I nationalized the Iranian oil industry and removed from this land the network of colonialism and the political and economic influence of the greatest empire on earth."
Kinzer argued that the consequences of Operation Ajax have reverberated throughout the ensuing decades in the fraught international relationships. I found Chapter 12, in which he wrapped up his thesis, interesting even though I wasn't completely convinced. The author had cited academic research which concluded that many of the geopolitical tensions of the 21st century are the rotten fruit borne of the 1953 coup. I have no doubt that the 1979 US Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran was directly connected with Operation Ajax but I remain skeptical of the longer term repercussions. Given Ayatollah Khomeini's fervency, who is to say that he wouldn't have gained power without the US-led toppling of Mohammad Mossadegh?
Overall, I found All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror to be quite intriguing. I now have a better grasp of both Iran's modern history and, sadly, interference by the US government. The fact that it took me months to finish it is not a reflection on the writing but of my ability to become distracted by real life.
February 6, 2024
The overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh is one of the little known events that lead to Mohammad Reza Shah coming to power in Iran. This book looks at the tragic aftermath - and the continuing strife - that was a direct result of this act. It is very clear that because Mohammad Mossadegh wanted more oil profits for his country the US/UK decided he had to be replaced. A sad commentary on the limits of commitment given to elected officials who advocate for their people over global corporate interests.
March 24, 2017
Eye-opening, sad and infuriating read. Tells how the U.S. destroyed the birth of democracy in the middle east, which began in Iran, and now falsely accuses Iran as a sponsor of Mid-East terrorism, when in truth, it's the Saudis!
Always remember majority of Islamist terrorists are 'Sunni' Muslims, while Iran are Shia Muslims!
Always remember majority of Islamist terrorists are 'Sunni' Muslims, while Iran are Shia Muslims!
February 16, 2016
يبدو أن عليًا (كرم الله وجهه) يتجسد بين الحين والآخر في أرواح المتمردين والثوّار.
هذه قصة علي دون زيادة أو نقصان، في البداية يواجه أعداءه وفي النهاية يواجه أصدقاءه الذين انقلبوا عليه وتركوه وحيدًا.
مصّدق الذي حمل رسالة الديمقراطية فوق رأسه وكان أملًا عظيمًا وضوءًا ساطعًا وسط ظلمات من الجهل والتعصب والديكتاتورية.
الإرهاب صناعة غربية بالكامل.
هذه قصة علي دون زيادة أو نقصان، في البداية يواجه أعداءه وفي النهاية يواجه أصدقاءه الذين انقلبوا عليه وتركوه وحيدًا.
مصّدق الذي حمل رسالة الديمقراطية فوق رأسه وكان أملًا عظيمًا وضوءًا ساطعًا وسط ظلمات من الجهل والتعصب والديكتاتورية.
الإرهاب صناعة غربية بالكامل.
November 18, 2019
Outstanding -- a must-read for all who want to understand US/Iran relations. Author & audiobook narrator are great.
January 9, 2020
Wow, such a great book. I had read Kinzer’s “The brothers” a few years ago, about the Dulles brothers, and found it just as engaging, well-written, and well researched.
Kinzer has a real gift to write history that is deep, accurate and, at the same time, as gripping as a novel.
I’ve often found that many history books that are very engaging lack a certain depth or seriousness. “All the Shah’s men” does not — it’s both a gripping tale, almost a page turner, and a really good history book.
The only slightly negative thing I have to say about “All the Shah’s men” is the same that I had for “The brothers”: Kinzer is a passionate author, which is wonderful, but his political leanings tend to show - especially towards the end.
So when I think about this book I wonder: is it really offering an impartial account of history, by focusing so much on blaming the US for everything?
For example: how did it happen that the history of a country plundered mercilessly by British and Russian colonialists became the history of a country whose future has been “ruined by the US”?
When Kinzer traces a direct line from the 1953 coup to 9/11, it seems to me that he is drawing over-simplified lines through history. When he says that Islamic terrorism has its roots in 1953, he is visualizing “roots” that might be a bit too short.
But again, this is a fabulous read, that I would recommend to anyone who is curious about this fascinating period of history.
Also - since Herodotus’ times, history gets much more interesting if you insert a bit of bias and subjective narrative.... without that, it easily becomes a very dry collection of facts and sources.
And what a towering historic figure Mohammad Mossadeq was. Although, to be precise, his “historic persona” is what is towering, since he’s been romanticized into something like a movie star. However, the real man, as it clearly transpires from even just this book, was an uncompromising, deceitful and obsessive guy who with his rigidity put the people of his country at serious risk various times. That is not what a “great politician” does.
Kinzer, however, in his interviews, loves to buy into the “hero of the people” narrative.
Personally, I think heroes exist only in popular narratives, which are typically a fictionalization of reality.
If Iranians today have theater plays where Mossadegh is celebrated for being the greatest man of the 20th century, that is very good for their national spirit, but maybe not so good for truth.
(Same goes for Che Guevara, Simon Bolivar and everyone else whom popular history loves to celebrate as demi-gods. They are all human beings. Erm ... actually, worse: they were all men, and extremely self-absorbed and dominating ones).
Not only the reality of politics has no heroes - it also has no good guys and bad guys. This is the truth.
But this book seems to have its good guys and bad guys: the story goes that the magnificent "reforming" "democratic" leader of Iran Mohammed Mossadegh was overthrown solely by the evil CIA in the 1950s and put in place the "evil" "autocratic" and "unpopular" Shah who was overthrown in 1979 by the masses of Iran yearning to be free.
Yes of course the CIA plotted with the U.K. to support a regime change. But regardless of anything the United States did or did not do, the question is: what would have happened otherwise? There were many serious risks to global stability. Mosaddeq’s government was already in a deep crisis : he was bound to fall because of his strategic mistakes, and no one knows what could have happened after that - perhaps the shah was going to retain his throne and expand his power, or perhaps communist groups in Iran would have been backed by Russia.
Yet the narrative of exclusive American culpability has become so entrenched that it now shapes the way in which many Americans study and understand the history of U.S.-Iranian relations. It also influences how American leaders think about Iran. Including Obama.
For example, it is hard to see how Eisenhower could take advantage of Mossadeq’s mishaps when he was informed by his intelligence services that the “CIA presently has no group which would be effective in spreading anti-Mossadeq mass propaganda” and the “CIA has no group in Iran which could effectively promote riots demonstrating against Mossadeq.” (from recently declassified CIA documents)
In the fabled history of the coup, from such incapacity the CIA developed a resilient network that easily toppled a popular leader a few months later.
The truth might be in the middle: the CIA did that, but probably not on the scale that is often reported, and thanks to the help of many other powerful local groups.
For example, the idea of a coup was also strongly promoted by aggrieved Iranian politicians who believed that Mossadeq’s disastrous course was ill-serving their country. General Fazlullah confirmed the embassy’s view that a nascent anti-Mossadeq coalition already existed and could gain power with very limited American support.
Also, documentary evidence reveals that, far from acting as puppet masters, CIA operatives and U.S. embassy staffers in Tehran were surprised at the size and diversity of the 1953 crowds. The protesters who took to the streets were not merely thugs hired by the CIA; in fact, they represented a cross section of Iranian society. Mosaddeq’s defiance of the shah had outraged them and, in the words of one contemporaneous CIA assessment, had “galvanized the people into an irate pro-Shah force.”
So, many people were on the side of the Shah already.
In addition, Iranian military officers had their own reasons for plotting against Mosaddeq, and they required neither instigation nor instruction from Roosevelt. Under the shah, and during the rule of his father before him, the military and the monarchy were indivisible. The army was an essential pillar of the shah’s rule. That is why Mosaddeq -- who wanted to weaken the shah -- continuously purged the army’s officer ranks, cut the military’s budget, and hollowed out its institutions.
If you want to read a good review to balance off Kinzer’s book, check out Foreign Affairs’ article here: https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.fore...
Also, if you have Amazon prime, I would recommend the documentary “An American coup”, where you can see Kinzer himself being interviewed and presenting many chapters of this book.
Kinzer has a real gift to write history that is deep, accurate and, at the same time, as gripping as a novel.
I’ve often found that many history books that are very engaging lack a certain depth or seriousness. “All the Shah’s men” does not — it’s both a gripping tale, almost a page turner, and a really good history book.
The only slightly negative thing I have to say about “All the Shah’s men” is the same that I had for “The brothers”: Kinzer is a passionate author, which is wonderful, but his political leanings tend to show - especially towards the end.
So when I think about this book I wonder: is it really offering an impartial account of history, by focusing so much on blaming the US for everything?
For example: how did it happen that the history of a country plundered mercilessly by British and Russian colonialists became the history of a country whose future has been “ruined by the US”?
When Kinzer traces a direct line from the 1953 coup to 9/11, it seems to me that he is drawing over-simplified lines through history. When he says that Islamic terrorism has its roots in 1953, he is visualizing “roots” that might be a bit too short.
But again, this is a fabulous read, that I would recommend to anyone who is curious about this fascinating period of history.
Also - since Herodotus’ times, history gets much more interesting if you insert a bit of bias and subjective narrative.... without that, it easily becomes a very dry collection of facts and sources.
And what a towering historic figure Mohammad Mossadeq was. Although, to be precise, his “historic persona” is what is towering, since he’s been romanticized into something like a movie star. However, the real man, as it clearly transpires from even just this book, was an uncompromising, deceitful and obsessive guy who with his rigidity put the people of his country at serious risk various times. That is not what a “great politician” does.
Kinzer, however, in his interviews, loves to buy into the “hero of the people” narrative.
Personally, I think heroes exist only in popular narratives, which are typically a fictionalization of reality.
If Iranians today have theater plays where Mossadegh is celebrated for being the greatest man of the 20th century, that is very good for their national spirit, but maybe not so good for truth.
(Same goes for Che Guevara, Simon Bolivar and everyone else whom popular history loves to celebrate as demi-gods. They are all human beings. Erm ... actually, worse: they were all men, and extremely self-absorbed and dominating ones).
Not only the reality of politics has no heroes - it also has no good guys and bad guys. This is the truth.
But this book seems to have its good guys and bad guys: the story goes that the magnificent "reforming" "democratic" leader of Iran Mohammed Mossadegh was overthrown solely by the evil CIA in the 1950s and put in place the "evil" "autocratic" and "unpopular" Shah who was overthrown in 1979 by the masses of Iran yearning to be free.
Yes of course the CIA plotted with the U.K. to support a regime change. But regardless of anything the United States did or did not do, the question is: what would have happened otherwise? There were many serious risks to global stability. Mosaddeq’s government was already in a deep crisis : he was bound to fall because of his strategic mistakes, and no one knows what could have happened after that - perhaps the shah was going to retain his throne and expand his power, or perhaps communist groups in Iran would have been backed by Russia.
Yet the narrative of exclusive American culpability has become so entrenched that it now shapes the way in which many Americans study and understand the history of U.S.-Iranian relations. It also influences how American leaders think about Iran. Including Obama.
For example, it is hard to see how Eisenhower could take advantage of Mossadeq’s mishaps when he was informed by his intelligence services that the “CIA presently has no group which would be effective in spreading anti-Mossadeq mass propaganda” and the “CIA has no group in Iran which could effectively promote riots demonstrating against Mossadeq.” (from recently declassified CIA documents)
In the fabled history of the coup, from such incapacity the CIA developed a resilient network that easily toppled a popular leader a few months later.
The truth might be in the middle: the CIA did that, but probably not on the scale that is often reported, and thanks to the help of many other powerful local groups.
For example, the idea of a coup was also strongly promoted by aggrieved Iranian politicians who believed that Mossadeq’s disastrous course was ill-serving their country. General Fazlullah confirmed the embassy’s view that a nascent anti-Mossadeq coalition already existed and could gain power with very limited American support.
Also, documentary evidence reveals that, far from acting as puppet masters, CIA operatives and U.S. embassy staffers in Tehran were surprised at the size and diversity of the 1953 crowds. The protesters who took to the streets were not merely thugs hired by the CIA; in fact, they represented a cross section of Iranian society. Mosaddeq’s defiance of the shah had outraged them and, in the words of one contemporaneous CIA assessment, had “galvanized the people into an irate pro-Shah force.”
So, many people were on the side of the Shah already.
In addition, Iranian military officers had their own reasons for plotting against Mosaddeq, and they required neither instigation nor instruction from Roosevelt. Under the shah, and during the rule of his father before him, the military and the monarchy were indivisible. The army was an essential pillar of the shah’s rule. That is why Mosaddeq -- who wanted to weaken the shah -- continuously purged the army’s officer ranks, cut the military’s budget, and hollowed out its institutions.
If you want to read a good review to balance off Kinzer’s book, check out Foreign Affairs’ article here: https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.fore...
Also, if you have Amazon prime, I would recommend the documentary “An American coup”, where you can see Kinzer himself being interviewed and presenting many chapters of this book.
October 22, 2015
Iran has a long and distinct history. Beginning in the 6th century BC with Cyrus, followed by Xerxes and Darius and on to the present, Iran’s people have had a common identity. The adoption of Shiism in the 7th century AD imparted a common set of values. Since then Arabs, Mongols and Turks ruled Iran. In the 19th century the decadent Qajar rulers exploited Iran to support their opulent lifestyle. In 1925 they were overthrown by a British engineered coup conducted to thwart Russia. The British placed Reza Shah on the Peacock Throne. A brutal dictator, he worked to modernize Iran antagonizing the mullahs. Reza declared neutrality in WWII. The British responded by invading in 1941. They forced Reza out and put his 21 year old son Mohammad Reza in as the new Shah.
In 1908 the British discovered a huge oil deposit and founded the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Henceforth oil would dictate British policy and fuel Iranian nationalism culminating in the ascendancy in 1951 of Mohammad Mossadegh. The Swiss educated Mossadegh spent his life struggling for Iranian democracy and against the British and their puppets, the two Shahs. The British took practically all of the oil profit leaving a small amount to buy off the Shah. This one sided deal brought popular resentment against the British and the Shah as did the Brits condescending attitude towards the Iranians and their abysmal treatment of Iranian workers. Most important in this land proud of its history and religion was that of control. Iranians were furious that the British were running their country through the Shah. They would not accept subservience to this foreign power, particularly with respect to the oil that they felt was theirs. Inept and unrealistic British foreign policy ended in Mossadegh becoming Iranian Prime Minister. He quickly nationalized the oil fields.
The communist takeover of China and the Korean War changed the way America viewed Iran. Foreign policy was now cast in terms of the Cold War. Still President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson remained anti-colonial. They refused to support Britain’s hardline stand and proposals for direct intervention in Iran. Acheson sent his assistant secretary George McGhee to Iran then followed up with the experienced Averill Harriman to try to negotiate a peaceful resolution. Despite the persistent effort of both men the British and Iranians remained intransigent. Iran took over the oilfields but had no capacity to run them. The British had never trained the Iranian workers who lived in abject poverty. Britain pulled out all its management and technicians and production stopped.
Britain asked the United Nations to support its position and Mossadegh came to New York to respond. He was the first leader of a developing country to plead his case against a colonial power before the Security Council. Afterwards Truman invited him to Washington where Acheson, Harriman and McGhee spent fruitless hours trying to convince Mossadgh to compromise. Mossadegh then traveled to Egypt where nationalism would lead to the Suez crisis in a few years. He received a tumultuous hero’s welcome. Mossadegh had also achieved popularity in the US and graced the cover of Time Magazine as its 1951 “Man of the Year” beating out Eisenhower, MacArthur and Acheson.
Attempts at compromise stopped when Winston Churchill replaced Clement Attlee as Prime Minister. Churchill chided Attlee for pulling out of Iran when the British military could have easily settled the issue. The British began orchestrating a coup which was discovered and Mossadegh broke relations with Britain expelling all of its diplomats. The British however had a new hope, the election of Eisenhower who was running on a strong anti-communist platform. The British quickly brought CIA chief Allen Dulles and his brother, soon to be Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, into the fold. Foster and Allie immediately began plotting. Two months after Eisenhower’s inauguration in March of 1953 Ike signed off on their planned coup.
The plan required considerable coordination. Select a new leader to be Prime Minister, get the backing of the Shah, spread bribe money around, buy off the press, legislators, mullahs and the military; enlist street gangs and key army units, create riots and dissonance, blame it on Mossadegh, have him arrested and install their puppet. The CIA’s lead operative for the Middle East, Kermit Roosevelt, TR’s grandson, had been selected to craft and execute the plan. It almost worked, but as often happens, a few missteps in timing tipped off Mossadegh’s allies and he was spirited away to safety. However, Kermit had a lot of TR’s grittiness in him. Despite orders to leave the country he decided to try again. This time in August 1953 it worked. The Shah, who had fled Iran and checked into the Excelsior Hotel in Rome when the first coup failed, returned. Kermit had it all set up for him. The Shah thanked Roosevelt as did Churchill and Eisenhower who gave him the National Security Medal. Emboldened, the brothers, Foster and Allie, next went after Guatemala to overthrow another elected nationalist leader and replace him with a dictator. Kermit refused the Guatemala job and left the CIA a few years later, but always maintained the Iranian coup was justified.
The Shah became increasingly oppressive and after 26 years Iranians finally had enough, overthrowing him in 1979. The US government was clueless, unaware of how much the Shah and his main benefactor the US were hated. The Iranians never forgot who was behind the coup. The next big mistake was to invite the Shah to the US. This played right into the hands of Iranian extremists. Since the US had engineered one coup to put the Shah in power, the idea that the US was planning the same thing again had compelling logic to the Iranians. The takeover of the US embassy in Tehran and the hostage crisis were the immediate result. A regime that supported terrorists and destabilized the entire Middle East was the longer term result.
The 1953 US engineered coup in Iran profoundly changed history. Despite Mossadegh’s worldwide 1951 fame, few Americans today would likely know who he was or how America took him down. Yet in Iran he is remembered by all as a hero. Thus most Americans cannot understand how Iranians see the US and the world. In 2015 we are still bearing the repercussions of colonialism exacerbated by Cold War tunnel vision. Kinzer offers up an apt quote from Harry Truman,” There is nothing new in the world except the history you don’t know.”
Eisenhower and the brothers saw the world only in terms of global communism. Unlike Truman and Acheson, they did not believe that befriending nationalist leaders in countries confronting Western imperialism was a viable strategy. They were on the wrong side of history. Ike, Allie and Foster wreaked havoc in Iran, Guatemala, Viet Nam, the Congo and Cuba. For much more on this topic, Kinzer’s The Brothers is an excellent resource. Both books show how arrogance and superficial understanding led to short sighted interventionist policies that made the world less stable and less safe. Unfortunately this pattern has persisted well beyond Eisenhower and the brothers.
In 1908 the British discovered a huge oil deposit and founded the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Henceforth oil would dictate British policy and fuel Iranian nationalism culminating in the ascendancy in 1951 of Mohammad Mossadegh. The Swiss educated Mossadegh spent his life struggling for Iranian democracy and against the British and their puppets, the two Shahs. The British took practically all of the oil profit leaving a small amount to buy off the Shah. This one sided deal brought popular resentment against the British and the Shah as did the Brits condescending attitude towards the Iranians and their abysmal treatment of Iranian workers. Most important in this land proud of its history and religion was that of control. Iranians were furious that the British were running their country through the Shah. They would not accept subservience to this foreign power, particularly with respect to the oil that they felt was theirs. Inept and unrealistic British foreign policy ended in Mossadegh becoming Iranian Prime Minister. He quickly nationalized the oil fields.
The communist takeover of China and the Korean War changed the way America viewed Iran. Foreign policy was now cast in terms of the Cold War. Still President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson remained anti-colonial. They refused to support Britain’s hardline stand and proposals for direct intervention in Iran. Acheson sent his assistant secretary George McGhee to Iran then followed up with the experienced Averill Harriman to try to negotiate a peaceful resolution. Despite the persistent effort of both men the British and Iranians remained intransigent. Iran took over the oilfields but had no capacity to run them. The British had never trained the Iranian workers who lived in abject poverty. Britain pulled out all its management and technicians and production stopped.
Britain asked the United Nations to support its position and Mossadegh came to New York to respond. He was the first leader of a developing country to plead his case against a colonial power before the Security Council. Afterwards Truman invited him to Washington where Acheson, Harriman and McGhee spent fruitless hours trying to convince Mossadgh to compromise. Mossadegh then traveled to Egypt where nationalism would lead to the Suez crisis in a few years. He received a tumultuous hero’s welcome. Mossadegh had also achieved popularity in the US and graced the cover of Time Magazine as its 1951 “Man of the Year” beating out Eisenhower, MacArthur and Acheson.
Attempts at compromise stopped when Winston Churchill replaced Clement Attlee as Prime Minister. Churchill chided Attlee for pulling out of Iran when the British military could have easily settled the issue. The British began orchestrating a coup which was discovered and Mossadegh broke relations with Britain expelling all of its diplomats. The British however had a new hope, the election of Eisenhower who was running on a strong anti-communist platform. The British quickly brought CIA chief Allen Dulles and his brother, soon to be Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, into the fold. Foster and Allie immediately began plotting. Two months after Eisenhower’s inauguration in March of 1953 Ike signed off on their planned coup.
The plan required considerable coordination. Select a new leader to be Prime Minister, get the backing of the Shah, spread bribe money around, buy off the press, legislators, mullahs and the military; enlist street gangs and key army units, create riots and dissonance, blame it on Mossadegh, have him arrested and install their puppet. The CIA’s lead operative for the Middle East, Kermit Roosevelt, TR’s grandson, had been selected to craft and execute the plan. It almost worked, but as often happens, a few missteps in timing tipped off Mossadegh’s allies and he was spirited away to safety. However, Kermit had a lot of TR’s grittiness in him. Despite orders to leave the country he decided to try again. This time in August 1953 it worked. The Shah, who had fled Iran and checked into the Excelsior Hotel in Rome when the first coup failed, returned. Kermit had it all set up for him. The Shah thanked Roosevelt as did Churchill and Eisenhower who gave him the National Security Medal. Emboldened, the brothers, Foster and Allie, next went after Guatemala to overthrow another elected nationalist leader and replace him with a dictator. Kermit refused the Guatemala job and left the CIA a few years later, but always maintained the Iranian coup was justified.
The Shah became increasingly oppressive and after 26 years Iranians finally had enough, overthrowing him in 1979. The US government was clueless, unaware of how much the Shah and his main benefactor the US were hated. The Iranians never forgot who was behind the coup. The next big mistake was to invite the Shah to the US. This played right into the hands of Iranian extremists. Since the US had engineered one coup to put the Shah in power, the idea that the US was planning the same thing again had compelling logic to the Iranians. The takeover of the US embassy in Tehran and the hostage crisis were the immediate result. A regime that supported terrorists and destabilized the entire Middle East was the longer term result.
The 1953 US engineered coup in Iran profoundly changed history. Despite Mossadegh’s worldwide 1951 fame, few Americans today would likely know who he was or how America took him down. Yet in Iran he is remembered by all as a hero. Thus most Americans cannot understand how Iranians see the US and the world. In 2015 we are still bearing the repercussions of colonialism exacerbated by Cold War tunnel vision. Kinzer offers up an apt quote from Harry Truman,” There is nothing new in the world except the history you don’t know.”
Eisenhower and the brothers saw the world only in terms of global communism. Unlike Truman and Acheson, they did not believe that befriending nationalist leaders in countries confronting Western imperialism was a viable strategy. They were on the wrong side of history. Ike, Allie and Foster wreaked havoc in Iran, Guatemala, Viet Nam, the Congo and Cuba. For much more on this topic, Kinzer’s The Brothers is an excellent resource. Both books show how arrogance and superficial understanding led to short sighted interventionist policies that made the world less stable and less safe. Unfortunately this pattern has persisted well beyond Eisenhower and the brothers.
February 21, 2020
Part of what makes All The Shah's Men: An American Coup & the Roots of Middle East Terror so fascinating is Stephen Kinzer's ability to put all of the details into historical context and still formulate his story in a way that causes it to read like a spy novel at times. I initially read this book on the American involvement in Iran when I was awaiting an Iranian visa to visit a country that was officially listed as part of the "Axis of Evil".
While being very curious about the erstwhile Persia, most of the available media-supplied images of Iran were couched in extreme anti-American rhetoric, nary a hint about why the people of that land might be so antagonistic. Kinzer fills in the gaps & does so in an almost politically neutral manner. As the saying has it, "the devil is in the details" and the way the story of the CIA-led overthrow of an elected Iranian government unfolds, seems almost comic at times, with anti-Mossadegh protestors being somewhat randomly hired by the CIA, at times reminding one of an early scene from the recent film Argo. What happened hardly represnts a distinguished moment in American diplomatic history.
The historical backdrop on both Iran and America's dealings with that country, going as far back as President Woodrow Wilson seems to indicate that the U.S. sought to view Iran very differently than did our colonial British friends, so much so that in the mid-1920s an American envoy in Tehran reported that "Persians of all classes have unbounded confidence in America". And with a view to better understanding Iran, Steve Kinzer deftly manages to inform his reader on the rich cultural backdrop within the country, including these words from Rumi:
Obviously, this dose of Sufi metaphysics does not explain the storming of the U.S. embassy in 1979 but it serves to humanize Iran for the outsider perhaps more than any listing of the historical achievements of Cyrus the Great or Darius in ancient Persia. Iran has a very rich & complex history & Kinzer builds on that history so that a casual reader can begin to fathom the happenings in 1979 & what led up to that moment in history.
The author gives high marks to Dean Acheson, President Truman's secretary of state & together they reckoned in 1952 that an elected leader named Mossedegh, while perhaps imperfect, was still a step towards democracy & should be supported. However, that fall represented an election year change in the U.S. and with the installation of President Eisenhower & the Dulles brothers as secretary of state and head of the CIA and with ample prodding by Great Britain, America's stance on Iran took an abrupt shift.
Kinzer paints a very clear picture about some of the reasons for this change, including the situation in Korea in 1953 and as always during this era, the fear of global Communism, making Iran yet again part of the "Great Game" of international diplomacy. These were indeed dangerous times & the issue of "Containment" was a dominant approach to political reality around the globe. Quickly, Dean Acheson was perceived as weak in a situation that demanded American strength, even without a great deal of forethought.
Enter, Kermit Roosevelt as CIA bureau chief in Iran and you have a chapter of history that now seems almost improbable in the recounting of many of its elements but which led to the overthrow of a elected government in Iran and the installation of the Shah, guaranteeing a friendly face & cheap oil but ultimately coming home to haunt the United States some 25 years later. As was later said in justifying the regime's radicalism by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was seen as much more humane following Ayatollah Khomeini, "We are not liberals like Allende & Mossedegh, whom the CIA can snuff out".
All the Shah's Men is a comprehensive, thoughtful & exceedingly enjoyable attempt at rendering a very complicated event in American-Iranian relations and I highly recommend this & other books by Stephen Kinzer. And if you are feeling intrepid, I also recommend a visit to Iran, with the Iranian people among the most hospitable I have ever experienced.
*The 2nd photo image is that of Stephen Kinzer in front of a painting of John Foster Dulles, former secretary-of-state & architect of the American intervention in Iran in 1953.
While being very curious about the erstwhile Persia, most of the available media-supplied images of Iran were couched in extreme anti-American rhetoric, nary a hint about why the people of that land might be so antagonistic. Kinzer fills in the gaps & does so in an almost politically neutral manner. As the saying has it, "the devil is in the details" and the way the story of the CIA-led overthrow of an elected Iranian government unfolds, seems almost comic at times, with anti-Mossadegh protestors being somewhat randomly hired by the CIA, at times reminding one of an early scene from the recent film Argo. What happened hardly represnts a distinguished moment in American diplomatic history.
The historical backdrop on both Iran and America's dealings with that country, going as far back as President Woodrow Wilson seems to indicate that the U.S. sought to view Iran very differently than did our colonial British friends, so much so that in the mid-1920s an American envoy in Tehran reported that "Persians of all classes have unbounded confidence in America". And with a view to better understanding Iran, Steve Kinzer deftly manages to inform his reader on the rich cultural backdrop within the country, including these words from Rumi:
I hold no religion or creed; am neither Eastern nor Western; Muslim or infidel; Zoroastrian, Christian, Jew or Gentile; I come from neither land nor sea; am not related to those above or below; was not born near or far away; do not live either in Paradise or on this Earth; claim descent not from Adam & eve or the Angels above. I transcend body & soul. My home is beyond place & name. It is with the beloved, in a space beyond space. I embrace all & am part of all.
Obviously, this dose of Sufi metaphysics does not explain the storming of the U.S. embassy in 1979 but it serves to humanize Iran for the outsider perhaps more than any listing of the historical achievements of Cyrus the Great or Darius in ancient Persia. Iran has a very rich & complex history & Kinzer builds on that history so that a casual reader can begin to fathom the happenings in 1979 & what led up to that moment in history.
The author gives high marks to Dean Acheson, President Truman's secretary of state & together they reckoned in 1952 that an elected leader named Mossedegh, while perhaps imperfect, was still a step towards democracy & should be supported. However, that fall represented an election year change in the U.S. and with the installation of President Eisenhower & the Dulles brothers as secretary of state and head of the CIA and with ample prodding by Great Britain, America's stance on Iran took an abrupt shift.
Kinzer paints a very clear picture about some of the reasons for this change, including the situation in Korea in 1953 and as always during this era, the fear of global Communism, making Iran yet again part of the "Great Game" of international diplomacy. These were indeed dangerous times & the issue of "Containment" was a dominant approach to political reality around the globe. Quickly, Dean Acheson was perceived as weak in a situation that demanded American strength, even without a great deal of forethought.
Enter, Kermit Roosevelt as CIA bureau chief in Iran and you have a chapter of history that now seems almost improbable in the recounting of many of its elements but which led to the overthrow of a elected government in Iran and the installation of the Shah, guaranteeing a friendly face & cheap oil but ultimately coming home to haunt the United States some 25 years later. As was later said in justifying the regime's radicalism by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was seen as much more humane following Ayatollah Khomeini, "We are not liberals like Allende & Mossedegh, whom the CIA can snuff out".
All the Shah's Men is a comprehensive, thoughtful & exceedingly enjoyable attempt at rendering a very complicated event in American-Iranian relations and I highly recommend this & other books by Stephen Kinzer. And if you are feeling intrepid, I also recommend a visit to Iran, with the Iranian people among the most hospitable I have ever experienced.
*The 2nd photo image is that of Stephen Kinzer in front of a painting of John Foster Dulles, former secretary-of-state & architect of the American intervention in Iran in 1953.
February 11, 2018
بالرغم من معرفتي بنجاح عملية أجاكس التي قامت بها المخابرات الأمريكية للانقلاب على مصدق رئيس وزراء ايران ولكن عندما بدأ الكتاب بذكر أول محاولة للانقلاب والتي فشلت انتابني فرحة لأنتصار مؤقت و التغلب على أمريكا وبريطانيا وعملائهم وديكتاتورية الشاه
ملخص الانقلاب على مصدق هو ما يتم منذ سنوات فى جميع بلادنا وبلاد اخري , فموارد البلد وحتي الشعب نفسه مجرد وسيلة لحصول القوي العظمي على جميع خيرات البلد ومن يحاول فقط ان يقول هذا من حقنا يقتلوه او ينقلبوا عليه
مصدق رجل كان يحاول فقط ان يجعل نفط (البترول) إيران للشعب الإيراني , بدل من سرقته سنويا من بريطانيا
ولكي نفهم القصة يجب سرد بعض التورايخ والاحداث المهمة :
البداية من اتفاقية دارسي عام 1901 التي وافق عليها الملك مظفر الدين شاه لمنح البريطاني دارسي الحق الحصري فى النفط واستغلاله ونقله وبيعه لمدة 60 عام
اتفاقية عام 1907 لتقسيم ايران , هل تعلموا من وقعها روسيا وبريطانيا فهم اتفقوا على تقسيم ايران بينهم وابقاء فقط جزء بسيط محايد يديره الايرانيين ثم بعد التوقيع ابلغوا ايران بتلك الاتفاقية
بعد ثورة البلاشفة تركت روسيا كتر خيرهم ايران لبريطانيا فقط واصبح النفوذ كله لبريطانيا
اتفاقية عام 1919 الانجليزية الايرانيه في عهد احمد شاه وتعطي الاتفاقية للبريطانيا السيطرة على الجيش والخزانة وطرق النقل والمواصلات وشبكات الاتصالات , كان فاضل وزارة التنمية المحلية كانوا ياخدوها بالمرة
كانت اتفاقية دارسي تعطي 16% سنويا ًفقط للايرانيين وكان حوالى 47 الف استرليني عام 1920 وكان يعتبر مبلغ ضئيلا جدا بالنسبة للارباح والتي بالمناسبة لا يوجد حق لايران بمراجعة اى اوراق للشركة الفارسية البريطانية
عام 1933 يسقط رضا شاه اتفاقية دارسي فتذهب بريطانيا للتفاوض معه فيوافق على ان ايران تحصل على ارباح سنوية لا تقل عن 975 الف استرليني سنوياً وتغيير اسم الشركة للايرانية البريطانية ومد الاتفاقية لاثنين وثلاثين عاما أخري
خوف الغرب من تخطيط النازية لاستغلال ايران خلال الحرب العالمية كقاعدة هجوم , أدي الى دخول القوات السوفيتية والبريطانية ايران عام 1941 في عهد رضا شاه
بعد اضراب عمال النفط عام 1947 قرر مجلس النواب عدم منح اى امتيازات اخري لشركات أجنبية واعادة التفاوض بشأن الامتياز الحالى الممنوح للشركة الايرانية البريطانية ومن كتب مسودة ذلك القانون النائب محمد مصدق
مجلس الوزارء بأمر من الشاه بوافق على الاتفاقية التكميلية مع بريطانيا عام 1949 بضمان ارباح لا تقل عن 4 مليون استرليني لايران ولكن بدون مراقبة او اي حق لايران لادارة او مراجعة الشركة , ولكن مجلس النواب يرفضها ويعرض مصدق لأول مرة فكرة تأميم النفط لصالح الشعب الايراني
عام 1951 يوافق مجلس النواب على قرار تأميم النفط وبريطانيا تعرض اقتراح بمناصفة الارباح ولكن تم رفضه
والان ملخص بسيط جدا لما تم من بريطانيا أولا ثم امريكا فى عهد ايزنهاور للإطاحة بمصدق :
منع ايران من بيع اى كمية نفط لأي دولة , واذا ارادات اى دولة الشراء تمنعها بريطانيا دبولماسيا او بخروج الاسطول البريطاني لمنع الناقلات النفط
بناء شبكة بريطانية لتولي مصالح بريطانيا عن طريق عملائها , واخري امريكية والهدف منها تخريب البلد فى حالة سقوط مصدق ونجاح حزب تودا الشيوعي
دفع رشاوي وصلت الى ملايين لاعضاء مجلس النواب , صحافة , وزراء , رجال أعمال , شرطة وجيش , بلطجية لاثارة اعمال شغب ولنزول مظاهرات ضد مصدق, ومن ضمن افعالهم للايقاع بين الجبهة الوطنية التى يقودها مصدق ورجال الدين يقوم عملائهم بتهديد ومحاولة اغتيال وقصف وهمي لمنازل رجال الدين بأسم حزب تودا الشيوعي المؤيد لمصدق حتى يقال مصدق شيوعي ملحد
امريكا تقرر ميزانية تصل لعشرين مليون دولار للاطاحة بمصدق لأنها كانت تتوقع ان مقاومة مصدق من الممكن ان تسبب فوضي تتسبب فى تمكين حزب تودا بمعاونة السوفييت من السيطرة على ايران , وطبعا بريطانيا هدفها واضح النفط الايراني
والنهاية الاطاحة بمصدق ورجوع الشاه
عند نهاية الكتاب وقرب نجاح الانقلاب :
كل اللى جوايا اشتم وألعن امريكا على بريطانيا وحرقة الدم وانت بتقرأ كلامهم كأن النفط ده اساسا ملكهم واحنا اللى حرامية , وعلى العملاء اللي عشان منصب او فلوس يتحالفوا مع الاستعمار وعلى الرياضيين والنجوم اللي نزلوا مظاهرات تأييد للشاه وعلي الشعب الجاهل اللي بيصدق اى حاجة فى اعلام الشاه وينزل يأييده مع انه اكتر واحد ظلمه وسرقه , نجاح الانقلاب تاريخيا محسوما ولكن كأني كنت بتمني أنه مينجحش وفى اخر لحظة يفشل زي أول محاولة , وعلي فكرة عملية أجاكس التى قامت بها المخابرات الامريكية تم نشرها رسمي فى امريكا
ملخص الانقلاب على مصدق هو ما يتم منذ سنوات فى جميع بلادنا وبلاد اخري , فموارد البلد وحتي الشعب نفسه مجرد وسيلة لحصول القوي العظمي على جميع خيرات البلد ومن يحاول فقط ان يقول هذا من حقنا يقتلوه او ينقلبوا عليه
مصدق رجل كان يحاول فقط ان يجعل نفط (البترول) إيران للشعب الإيراني , بدل من سرقته سنويا من بريطانيا
ولكي نفهم القصة يجب سرد بعض التورايخ والاحداث المهمة :
البداية من اتفاقية دارسي عام 1901 التي وافق عليها الملك مظفر الدين شاه لمنح البريطاني دارسي الحق الحصري فى النفط واستغلاله ونقله وبيعه لمدة 60 عام
اتفاقية عام 1907 لتقسيم ايران , هل تعلموا من وقعها روسيا وبريطانيا فهم اتفقوا على تقسيم ايران بينهم وابقاء فقط جزء بسيط محايد يديره الايرانيين ثم بعد التوقيع ابلغوا ايران بتلك الاتفاقية
بعد ثورة البلاشفة تركت روسيا كتر خيرهم ايران لبريطانيا فقط واصبح النفوذ كله لبريطانيا
اتفاقية عام 1919 الانجليزية الايرانيه في عهد احمد شاه وتعطي الاتفاقية للبريطانيا السيطرة على الجيش والخزانة وطرق النقل والمواصلات وشبكات الاتصالات , كان فاضل وزارة التنمية المحلية كانوا ياخدوها بالمرة
كانت اتفاقية دارسي تعطي 16% سنويا ًفقط للايرانيين وكان حوالى 47 الف استرليني عام 1920 وكان يعتبر مبلغ ضئيلا جدا بالنسبة للارباح والتي بالمناسبة لا يوجد حق لايران بمراجعة اى اوراق للشركة الفارسية البريطانية
عام 1933 يسقط رضا شاه اتفاقية دارسي فتذهب بريطانيا للتفاوض معه فيوافق على ان ايران تحصل على ارباح سنوية لا تقل عن 975 الف استرليني سنوياً وتغيير اسم الشركة للايرانية البريطانية ومد الاتفاقية لاثنين وثلاثين عاما أخري
خوف الغرب من تخطيط النازية لاستغلال ايران خلال الحرب العالمية كقاعدة هجوم , أدي الى دخول القوات السوفيتية والبريطانية ايران عام 1941 في عهد رضا شاه
بعد اضراب عمال النفط عام 1947 قرر مجلس النواب عدم منح اى امتيازات اخري لشركات أجنبية واعادة التفاوض بشأن الامتياز الحالى الممنوح للشركة الايرانية البريطانية ومن كتب مسودة ذلك القانون النائب محمد مصدق
مجلس الوزارء بأمر من الشاه بوافق على الاتفاقية التكميلية مع بريطانيا عام 1949 بضمان ارباح لا تقل عن 4 مليون استرليني لايران ولكن بدون مراقبة او اي حق لايران لادارة او مراجعة الشركة , ولكن مجلس النواب يرفضها ويعرض مصدق لأول مرة فكرة تأميم النفط لصالح الشعب الايراني
عام 1951 يوافق مجلس النواب على قرار تأميم النفط وبريطانيا تعرض اقتراح بمناصفة الارباح ولكن تم رفضه
والان ملخص بسيط جدا لما تم من بريطانيا أولا ثم امريكا فى عهد ايزنهاور للإطاحة بمصدق :
منع ايران من بيع اى كمية نفط لأي دولة , واذا ارادات اى دولة الشراء تمنعها بريطانيا دبولماسيا او بخروج الاسطول البريطاني لمنع الناقلات النفط
بناء شبكة بريطانية لتولي مصالح بريطانيا عن طريق عملائها , واخري امريكية والهدف منها تخريب البلد فى حالة سقوط مصدق ونجاح حزب تودا الشيوعي
دفع رشاوي وصلت الى ملايين لاعضاء مجلس النواب , صحافة , وزراء , رجال أعمال , شرطة وجيش , بلطجية لاثارة اعمال شغب ولنزول مظاهرات ضد مصدق, ومن ضمن افعالهم للايقاع بين الجبهة الوطنية التى يقودها مصدق ورجال الدين يقوم عملائهم بتهديد ومحاولة اغتيال وقصف وهمي لمنازل رجال الدين بأسم حزب تودا الشيوعي المؤيد لمصدق حتى يقال مصدق شيوعي ملحد
امريكا تقرر ميزانية تصل لعشرين مليون دولار للاطاحة بمصدق لأنها كانت تتوقع ان مقاومة مصدق من الممكن ان تسبب فوضي تتسبب فى تمكين حزب تودا بمعاونة السوفييت من السيطرة على ايران , وطبعا بريطانيا هدفها واضح النفط الايراني
والنهاية الاطاحة بمصدق ورجوع الشاه
عند نهاية الكتاب وقرب نجاح الانقلاب :
كل اللى جوايا اشتم وألعن امريكا على بريطانيا وحرقة الدم وانت بتقرأ كلامهم كأن النفط ده اساسا ملكهم واحنا اللى حرامية , وعلى العملاء اللي عشان منصب او فلوس يتحالفوا مع الاستعمار وعلى الرياضيين والنجوم اللي نزلوا مظاهرات تأييد للشاه وعلي الشعب الجاهل اللي بيصدق اى حاجة فى اعلام الشاه وينزل يأييده مع انه اكتر واحد ظلمه وسرقه , نجاح الانقلاب تاريخيا محسوما ولكن كأني كنت بتمني أنه مينجحش وفى اخر لحظة يفشل زي أول محاولة , وعلي فكرة عملية أجاكس التى قامت بها المخابرات الامريكية تم نشرها رسمي فى امريكا
May 2, 2010
My S.F. Chronicle review from 2003:
Nearly two years after the shock of Sept. 11, 2001, it's fair to start poking through the legacy of U.S. foreign policy and raise troubling questions about the extent to which our own past misdeeds ultimately boomeranged on us. Few readers of "All the Shah's Men," by longtime New York Times foreign correspondent Stephen Kinzer, can come away without grave suspicions that Sept.
11 was in many ways a self-inflicted wound.
What American crime could explain so sensational a charge? Simply that U.S. leaders in the early 1950s lacked the courage of their convictions and did not really believe in democracy. Instead, despite the post-Stalin vacuum of power in the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower held his nose and gave the CIA the OK to overthrow the elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953.
If you've never heard of Mossadegh, don't feel bad. He appeared on the cover of Time magazine as "Man of the Year" for 1951, no small feat for a year when Henry Luce could easily have chosen Winston Churchill, Harry Truman or Ike. But in the years since his illegal ouster, Mossadegh has slipped into a deep obscurity, unless of course you happen to be Iranian. To most Iranians, he remains a potent symbol of freedom and the hope of democracy, and most have long been aware of the millions of dollars the CIA spent to topple his government, a dirty chapter in U.S. history finally owned up to during the Clinton administration.
"Why did you Americans do that terrible thing?" a relative of Mossadegh demands of Kinzer. "We always loved America. To us, America was the great country, the perfect country, the country that helped us while other countries were exploiting us. But after that moment, no one in Iran ever trusted the United States again. I can tell you for sure that if you had not done that thing, you would never have had that problem of hostages being taken in your embassy in Tehran. All your trouble started in 1953. Why, why did you do it?"
Why, why indeed? The short answer is that then as now, U.S. decision-makers based their choices on alarmist, highly ideological interpretations of short- term problems and left the toxic fallout to other administrations (and generations).
But by manipulating the Iranian media, renting thugs and bribing military officers, all to oust Mossadegh, the CIA virtually forced large numbers of Iranians to adopt a strident anti-Americanism. Desire for revenge against "the great Satan," seen in this context, is not nearly the puzzle it seemed to poor Jimmy Carter, hunkered down in the White House during the hostage crisis. The anti-Americanism that thrived in Iran's Muslim community soon spread to influence other radicals in the region, most especially Osama bin Laden.
Kinzer, co-author of "Bitter Fruit," a classic study of the CIA-sponsored coup against Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, emphasizes the importance of British influence in Iran, and in particular, the role of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Mossadegh nationalized the company only after the British ignored repeated American pleas to compromise and split profits 50-50 with the Iranians.
The smugness of British imperial disdain for the Iranians ought to serve as a bracing reminder to the contemporary reader of how unchecked global power can lead to a deep -- and deeply stupid -- form of arrogance. Before Mossadegh showed up at the U.N. in New York for a dramatic appearance, British delegate Gladwyn Jebb made a speech that showed a complete lack of understanding of the resentment imperialism could inspire.
Despite the appalling living conditions of workers at the company's huge oil refinery in Iran, as British directors lived nearby in luxury, Jebb sputtered on patronizingly about how the company's profiteering in Iran "must arouse the greatest admiration from the social point of view and should be taken as a model of the form of development which would bring benefits to the economically less-developed areas of the world."
The British had in fact discovered the oil in Iran, and had in fact built the refineries and assembled the fleet of tankers to transport it around the world. But the unwillingness of British leaders, including Churchill, to accept even a 50-50 split of the billions derived from Iranian oil was a costly miscalculation.
The truly sad part of the story concerns American willingness to take over as a pawn of the British, once Mossadegh had the good sense to evict all United Kingdom diplomats (and spies) from his country as their scheming to overthrow him reached fever pitch. The Dulles brothers, key aides to Eisenhower, did not argue that Mossadegh himself was a Communist or was likely to turn to the Soviets, only that they needed him removed to install Mohammed Rezah Shah and bolster him as a hedge against Soviet expansionism. As Kinzer notes, the Dulles brothers showed little awareness of what they were getting their country into with the first U.S. action to overthrow a foreign government.
"Their decision to make Iran the first battleground of their crusade may or may not have been wise, but they deserve to be judged harshly for the way they made it," he writes. "Even before taking their oaths of office, both brothers had convinced themselves beyond all doubt that Mossadegh must go. They never even considered the possibility that a coup might be a bad idea or that it might have negative consequences. History might view their action more favorably if it had been the result of serious, open-minded reflection and debate. Instead, it sprang from petulant impatience, from a burning desire to do something, anything, that would seem like a victory over communism. . . . Iran was the place they chose to start showing the world that the United States was no longer part of what Vice President Richard Nixon called 'Dean Acheson's college of cowardly Communist containment.' "
Steve Kettmann, editor of "Game Time," the new Roger Angell collection, lives in New York.
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi...
This article appeared on page M - 6 of the San Francisco Chronicle
Nearly two years after the shock of Sept. 11, 2001, it's fair to start poking through the legacy of U.S. foreign policy and raise troubling questions about the extent to which our own past misdeeds ultimately boomeranged on us. Few readers of "All the Shah's Men," by longtime New York Times foreign correspondent Stephen Kinzer, can come away without grave suspicions that Sept.
11 was in many ways a self-inflicted wound.
What American crime could explain so sensational a charge? Simply that U.S. leaders in the early 1950s lacked the courage of their convictions and did not really believe in democracy. Instead, despite the post-Stalin vacuum of power in the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower held his nose and gave the CIA the OK to overthrow the elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953.
If you've never heard of Mossadegh, don't feel bad. He appeared on the cover of Time magazine as "Man of the Year" for 1951, no small feat for a year when Henry Luce could easily have chosen Winston Churchill, Harry Truman or Ike. But in the years since his illegal ouster, Mossadegh has slipped into a deep obscurity, unless of course you happen to be Iranian. To most Iranians, he remains a potent symbol of freedom and the hope of democracy, and most have long been aware of the millions of dollars the CIA spent to topple his government, a dirty chapter in U.S. history finally owned up to during the Clinton administration.
"Why did you Americans do that terrible thing?" a relative of Mossadegh demands of Kinzer. "We always loved America. To us, America was the great country, the perfect country, the country that helped us while other countries were exploiting us. But after that moment, no one in Iran ever trusted the United States again. I can tell you for sure that if you had not done that thing, you would never have had that problem of hostages being taken in your embassy in Tehran. All your trouble started in 1953. Why, why did you do it?"
Why, why indeed? The short answer is that then as now, U.S. decision-makers based their choices on alarmist, highly ideological interpretations of short- term problems and left the toxic fallout to other administrations (and generations).
But by manipulating the Iranian media, renting thugs and bribing military officers, all to oust Mossadegh, the CIA virtually forced large numbers of Iranians to adopt a strident anti-Americanism. Desire for revenge against "the great Satan," seen in this context, is not nearly the puzzle it seemed to poor Jimmy Carter, hunkered down in the White House during the hostage crisis. The anti-Americanism that thrived in Iran's Muslim community soon spread to influence other radicals in the region, most especially Osama bin Laden.
Kinzer, co-author of "Bitter Fruit," a classic study of the CIA-sponsored coup against Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, emphasizes the importance of British influence in Iran, and in particular, the role of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Mossadegh nationalized the company only after the British ignored repeated American pleas to compromise and split profits 50-50 with the Iranians.
The smugness of British imperial disdain for the Iranians ought to serve as a bracing reminder to the contemporary reader of how unchecked global power can lead to a deep -- and deeply stupid -- form of arrogance. Before Mossadegh showed up at the U.N. in New York for a dramatic appearance, British delegate Gladwyn Jebb made a speech that showed a complete lack of understanding of the resentment imperialism could inspire.
Despite the appalling living conditions of workers at the company's huge oil refinery in Iran, as British directors lived nearby in luxury, Jebb sputtered on patronizingly about how the company's profiteering in Iran "must arouse the greatest admiration from the social point of view and should be taken as a model of the form of development which would bring benefits to the economically less-developed areas of the world."
The British had in fact discovered the oil in Iran, and had in fact built the refineries and assembled the fleet of tankers to transport it around the world. But the unwillingness of British leaders, including Churchill, to accept even a 50-50 split of the billions derived from Iranian oil was a costly miscalculation.
The truly sad part of the story concerns American willingness to take over as a pawn of the British, once Mossadegh had the good sense to evict all United Kingdom diplomats (and spies) from his country as their scheming to overthrow him reached fever pitch. The Dulles brothers, key aides to Eisenhower, did not argue that Mossadegh himself was a Communist or was likely to turn to the Soviets, only that they needed him removed to install Mohammed Rezah Shah and bolster him as a hedge against Soviet expansionism. As Kinzer notes, the Dulles brothers showed little awareness of what they were getting their country into with the first U.S. action to overthrow a foreign government.
"Their decision to make Iran the first battleground of their crusade may or may not have been wise, but they deserve to be judged harshly for the way they made it," he writes. "Even before taking their oaths of office, both brothers had convinced themselves beyond all doubt that Mossadegh must go. They never even considered the possibility that a coup might be a bad idea or that it might have negative consequences. History might view their action more favorably if it had been the result of serious, open-minded reflection and debate. Instead, it sprang from petulant impatience, from a burning desire to do something, anything, that would seem like a victory over communism. . . . Iran was the place they chose to start showing the world that the United States was no longer part of what Vice President Richard Nixon called 'Dean Acheson's college of cowardly Communist containment.' "
Steve Kettmann, editor of "Game Time," the new Roger Angell collection, lives in New York.
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi...
This article appeared on page M - 6 of the San Francisco Chronicle
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August 20, 2017همه مردان شاه (به انگلیسی: All the Shah's Men) عنوان کتابی از خبرنگار امریکایی استیون کینزر است. این کتاب کودتای ۲۸ مرداد را در قالب روایتی داستانی و رمانگونه مورد بررسی قرار میدهد.
مقدمه نگارنده
روزی به ضیافت معرفی کتاب یک خانم مسن ایرانی که خاطراتش را منتشر کرده بود، دعوت شدم. وی یک ساعت دربارهی زندگی پرماجرایش صحبت کرد و اگرچه هیچ سخنی دربارهی سیاست به میان نیاورد، به طور گذرا اشاره کرد که با محمّد مصدق، نخستوزیر سالهای ۱۳۳۰ ـ ۱۳۳۲ که سازمان اطلاعاتی مرکزی آمریکا (سیا) سرنگونش کرد، فامیل است.
پس از پایان سخنان وی، نتوانستم در برابر وسوسهی یک پرسش مقاومت کنم. گفتم: «نام مصدق را بردید. چه چیزی را دربارهی او یا کودتایی که علیه وی صورت گرفت به یاد میآورید یا میتوانید به ما بگویید؟» وی بلافاصله به هیجان و جنبوجوش افتاد و فریاد کشید: «چرا شما آمریکاییها به آن کار وحشتناک دست زدید؟ ما همیشه آمریکا را دوست داشتیم. آمریکا از نظر ما کشوری بزرگ و بیعیب و نقص بود؛ کشوری که در همان حال که دیگران ما را میچاپیدند، به ما کمک میکرد. امّا از آن تاریخ به بعد، هیچکس در ایران دیگر به آمریکا اعتماد ندارد.
مقدمه نگارنده
روزی به ضیافت معرفی کتاب یک خانم مسن ایرانی که خاطراتش را منتشر کرده بود، دعوت شدم. وی یک ساعت دربارهی زندگی پرماجرایش صحبت کرد و اگرچه هیچ سخنی دربارهی سیاست به میان نیاورد، به طور گذرا اشاره کرد که با محمّد مصدق، نخستوزیر سالهای ۱۳۳۰ ـ ۱۳۳۲ که سازمان اطلاعاتی مرکزی آمریکا (سیا) سرنگونش کرد، فامیل است.
پس از پایان سخنان وی، نتوانستم در برابر وسوسهی یک پرسش مقاومت کنم. گفتم: «نام مصدق را بردید. چه چیزی را دربارهی او یا کودتایی که علیه وی صورت گرفت به یاد میآورید یا میتوانید به ما بگویید؟» وی بلافاصله به هیجان و جنبوجوش افتاد و فریاد کشید: «چرا شما آمریکاییها به آن کار وحشتناک دست زدید؟ ما همیشه آمریکا را دوست داشتیم. آمریکا از نظر ما کشوری بزرگ و بیعیب و نقص بود؛ کشوری که در همان حال که دیگران ما را میچاپیدند، به ما کمک میکرد. امّا از آن تاریخ به بعد، هیچکس در ایران دیگر به آمریکا اعتماد ندارد.
May 15, 2013
Although over ninety, Dad is unusually active. He is a docent at the Dundee Historical Society and, thanks to the influence of his Danish wife, Lene, takes courses as a non-degree-seeking student at the Roosevelt University campus out in dreary Schaumburg, Illinois. He tends towards history and political science, having said at one time that he enjoys ganging up with the liberal teachers against his mostly right-wing, fellow suburban students. (Dad always was a pinkish Democrat.) This book was recommended by him after he'd taken some course which used it. He had asked it I'd read it and, having read Kinzer's other book about the overthrow of the Guatemalan government by the C.I.A. and having enjoyed that one, his recommendation was enough for me to obtain the thing. I wasn't disappointed.
The C.I.A. was set up under the Truman administration as an information collection agency of government responsible to the president. Later, when Allen Dulles, brother of Secretary of State Foster Dulles, came to head the agency, it became almost as much a disinformation and destruction agency devoted to its own aggrandizement and the supposed interests of the U.S.A. These interests were, then as now, not the long-term interests of people, but the short-term political interests of politicians representing the American ruling class and corporations. We overthrew the popular governments of Guatemala and of Iran in the interests of the United Fruit Corporation (for which one of the Dulles brothers had worked and in which the other was heavily invested) and of big oil, respectively. The consequences were years of dictatorship and, in the case of Iran, serious and well-founded suspicion towards the United States--as well as a shot in the arm boost for the least savory aspects of the C.I.A. from the Eisenhower period until the present day.
The C.I.A. was set up under the Truman administration as an information collection agency of government responsible to the president. Later, when Allen Dulles, brother of Secretary of State Foster Dulles, came to head the agency, it became almost as much a disinformation and destruction agency devoted to its own aggrandizement and the supposed interests of the U.S.A. These interests were, then as now, not the long-term interests of people, but the short-term political interests of politicians representing the American ruling class and corporations. We overthrew the popular governments of Guatemala and of Iran in the interests of the United Fruit Corporation (for which one of the Dulles brothers had worked and in which the other was heavily invested) and of big oil, respectively. The consequences were years of dictatorship and, in the case of Iran, serious and well-founded suspicion towards the United States--as well as a shot in the arm boost for the least savory aspects of the C.I.A. from the Eisenhower period until the present day.
May 30, 2020
فکر نمیکردم با خواندن یک کتاب تاریخی اشکم در بیاد.
ماجرا
ابتدای کتاب ماجرای روزهای منتهی به کودتا را از زاویه دید یک جاسوس آمریکایی و از فیلتر یک ذره بین روایت میکند. سپس یک فلش بک بسیار طولانی به تاریخ قبل از اسلام تا معاصر ایران زده میشود و مخاطب را با پیشینه ایران آشنا میکند. کمی در خصوص تفاوت ملت ایران با دیگر ملل مسلمان بحث میشود. شیعه شدن ایرانیان و سابقه تمدن به مخاطب گوشزد میشود.
در ادامه وارد انتقال قدرت از قاجار به پهلوی و نقش انگلیس در این میان میشود تا برسد به اتفاقات دهه 20 شمسی. آرام آرام جزییات بیشتری روایت میشود و نقش شخصیت های تاثیر گذار در سیاستهای ایران و غرب معرفی میشود.
روایت کتاب آنقدر ادامه پیدا میکند تا به روز کودتا میرسد. اینجا فلش بک تمام میشود و ادامه ماجرا تا زمان مرگ مصدق و بعد از آن به تاثیر این کودتا بر سیاستهای متقابل خاور میانه- به ویژه ایران- با غرب -بویژه آمریکا- میپردازد.
ملی شدن صنعت نفت؟
با خواندن این کتاب متوجه میشویم ملی شدن صنعت نفت دروغی بیش نبوده و نیست. در توجیه ضلم و ستمی که شرکت نفت ایران و انگلیس کرده است تصاویری از کاغذآباد و چادر آباد آبادان به مخاطب بین المللی نشان داده میشود. انگلیسها در طول 30 سال کرور کرور نفت به جیب زدند و بردند ولی چیزی جز کار بیشتر و فقر برای ایرانیان نمانده بود. محلههایی که اغلب کارگران و خانوادههای شان که همه ایرانی بودند در آن زندگی میکردند، خانه هایی از کاغذ و مقوا و پارچه در بدترین شرایط زندگی. آنطرف تر انگلیسیها در محلههای بریم و باوارده آبادان زندگی میکردند که هنوز بعد از گذشت بیش از 70-80 سال استاندارهای بی نظیری دارد. مجتمع هایی با بهترین امکانات زندگی.
بعد از کوتاه شدن دست انگلیسیها از صنعت نفت ایران نوبت کنسرسیوم آمریکایی-غربی شد. تنها چیزی که تغییر کرد نام شرکت بود که ملی شد.
در حال حاضر هم مناطق نفت خیز از آب آشامیدنی استاندارد برخوردار نیستند. شرایط و کیفیت زندگی پایین است. سیل و ریز گرد و نا امنی حاصل ملی شدن صنعت نفت شده. درآمدهای هنگفت نفت به جیب مدیران دولتی و معدود کارفرمایان میرود و کارگر از آن بی نصیب است. گویی نفت طلسم منحوس ایران است.
شاید "من و تو" هم باید این کتاب را بخواند
به نظرم فارغ از نظر من یا دیگری در خصوص نوع حکومت، این کتاب باید توسط کسانی که رضا شاه یا محمد رضا شاه پهلوی را طاهر و مطهر میدانند خوانده شود.
رفتار شاه با مصدق یا با شرکت انگلیسی و یا با آمریکایی ها خودش میتواند دید بهتری از اوضاع آن زمان بدهد. دوران پهلوی دوم فقط خیابان های بالا شهر تهران، سواحل رامسر و نوشهر نیست. کاباره های شیک و باشگاه های خارجی ها در آبادان یک بخش از ماجراست که زرق و برق زیادی دارند. اما هایی وجود دارند که بعنوان یک شاهد تاریخ میبایست همه را مد نظر قرار دهیم.
اصلا و ابدا قصد ندارم یک حکومت را تخریب یا تمجید کنم. قصدم این است که سیاهیِ اعمال یک حکومت نباید باعث شود حکومت های دیگر را سفید پنداریم.
مقایسه بین سیاستهای جمهوری اسلامی و حکومت پهلوی تفاوت های کمی را به دست میدهد. حبس خانگی مخالفان، ممنوعیت احزاب، زندان و شکنجه، قتل مخالف، فضای بسته جراید و سیاسی، بیگانه هراسی(شوروی). خر، همان خر است منتها پالانش عوض شده است.
تاثیر در دیدگاه مردم آمریکا
نظراتی که ذیل این کتاب توسط آمریکایی ها نوشته شده میتواند تاثیر آن را مشخص کند. قریب به اتفاق جمعیت آمریکا از تاریخ معاصر ایران و نقش کشورشان در آن چیزی نمیدانند. تنها چیزی که میدانند یک دشمنی بین دو کشور است. این کتاب بخشی از پرده ها را برداشته.
نویسنده تفسیر کرده است که این کودتا مسیر دموکراسی در خاور میانه، ایران و آمریکای جنوبی را تغییر داد. در کوتاه مدت به آمریکا این ایده را داد که میتواند به راحتی حکومت ها را تغییر داد و از موهبتهای تجاری بعد از آن استفاده کرد. کاری که با این ایران انجام شد یک نمونه موفق جلوه کرد.
اما در طولانی مدت تاثیر آن چیزی شد به نام بنیاد گرایی اسلامی در ایران و سایر کشورهای خاور میانه. طالبان، القاعده، حزب الله، حماس، داعش. اینها را نویسنده نتیجه کوته بینی آمریکا میداند که بعدها آتش آن دامن خود آمریکا را هم گرفت.
گاندیِ خاور میانه
در انتهای کتاب نویسنده سالهای بعد از انقلاب به ایران سفر میکند تا محل حبس خانگی مصدق در روستای احمد آباد را از نزدیک ببیند. ممانعتهایی برایش از طرف حکومت ایران ایجاد میشود. در انتها این نیت به اجرا در می آید. در مسیر ورود به روستا و حدود 50 سال بعد از مرگ مصدق، به دو پسر بچه 13-14 ساله برخورد میکند و میپرسد شما مصدق را میشناسید؟
بچه ها میخندند و میگویند مصدق کسی است که صنعت نفت را ملی کرده است.
تبلیغات و محدودیت ها تا چه اندازه توانسته یاد و خاطره این مرد بی نظیر و نستوه را مخفی کند؟
هنوز بین "مردم" مصدق نماد مقاومت است.
بی خود نیست که از او به نام "زعیم الشرق" یاد میشود. کسی که خاور میانه باید بیداری اش را مدیون او باشد.
من به نظرم لقب مناسب برایش "گاندی خاور میانه" است.
نسخه صوتی
من نسخه صوتی شده کتاب را که به نظر از تیغ سانسور جمهوری اسلامی نگذشته بود شنیدم. گوینده به اندازه ای تلفظ های اشتباه داشت که نیمی از کتاب را نمیدانستم از بلایی که به سر ملت ایران میآید گریه کنم و یا از بی سوادی گوینده بخندم.
خلاص
ماجرا
ابتدای کتاب ماجرای روزهای منتهی به کودتا را از زاویه دید یک جاسوس آمریکایی و از فیلتر یک ذره بین روایت میکند. سپس یک فلش بک بسیار طولانی به تاریخ قبل از اسلام تا معاصر ایران زده میشود و مخاطب را با پیشینه ایران آشنا میکند. کمی در خصوص تفاوت ملت ایران با دیگر ملل مسلمان بحث میشود. شیعه شدن ایرانیان و سابقه تمدن به مخاطب گوشزد میشود.
در ادامه وارد انتقال قدرت از قاجار به پهلوی و نقش انگلیس در این میان میشود تا برسد به اتفاقات دهه 20 شمسی. آرام آرام جزییات بیشتری روایت میشود و نقش شخصیت های تاثیر گذار در سیاستهای ایران و غرب معرفی میشود.
روایت کتاب آنقدر ادامه پیدا میکند تا به روز کودتا میرسد. اینجا فلش بک تمام میشود و ادامه ماجرا تا زمان مرگ مصدق و بعد از آن به تاثیر این کودتا بر سیاستهای متقابل خاور میانه- به ویژه ایران- با غرب -بویژه آمریکا- میپردازد.
ملی شدن صنعت نفت؟
با خواندن این کتاب متوجه میشویم ملی شدن صنعت نفت دروغی بیش نبوده و نیست. در توجیه ضلم و ستمی که شرکت نفت ایران و انگلیس کرده است تصاویری از کاغذآباد و چادر آباد آبادان به مخاطب بین المللی نشان داده میشود. انگلیسها در طول 30 سال کرور کرور نفت به جیب زدند و بردند ولی چیزی جز کار بیشتر و فقر برای ایرانیان نمانده بود. محلههایی که اغلب کارگران و خانوادههای شان که همه ایرانی بودند در آن زندگی میکردند، خانه هایی از کاغذ و مقوا و پارچه در بدترین شرایط زندگی. آنطرف تر انگلیسیها در محلههای بریم و باوارده آبادان زندگی میکردند که هنوز بعد از گذشت بیش از 70-80 سال استاندارهای بی نظیری دارد. مجتمع هایی با بهترین امکانات زندگی.
بعد از کوتاه شدن دست انگلیسیها از صنعت نفت ایران نوبت کنسرسیوم آمریکایی-غربی شد. تنها چیزی که تغییر کرد نام شرکت بود که ملی شد.
در حال حاضر هم مناطق نفت خیز از آب آشامیدنی استاندارد برخوردار نیستند. شرایط و کیفیت زندگی پایین است. سیل و ریز گرد و نا امنی حاصل ملی شدن صنعت نفت شده. درآمدهای هنگفت نفت به جیب مدیران دولتی و معدود کارفرمایان میرود و کارگر از آن بی نصیب است. گویی نفت طلسم منحوس ایران است.
شاید "من و تو" هم باید این کتاب را بخواند
به نظرم فارغ از نظر من یا دیگری در خصوص نوع حکومت، این کتاب باید توسط کسانی که رضا شاه یا محمد رضا شاه پهلوی را طاهر و مطهر میدانند خوانده شود.
رفتار شاه با مصدق یا با شرکت انگلیسی و یا با آمریکایی ها خودش میتواند دید بهتری از اوضاع آن زمان بدهد. دوران پهلوی دوم فقط خیابان های بالا شهر تهران، سواحل رامسر و نوشهر نیست. کاباره های شیک و باشگاه های خارجی ها در آبادان یک بخش از ماجراست که زرق و برق زیادی دارند. اما هایی وجود دارند که بعنوان یک شاهد تاریخ میبایست همه را مد نظر قرار دهیم.
اصلا و ابدا قصد ندارم یک حکومت را تخریب یا تمجید کنم. قصدم این است که سیاهیِ اعمال یک حکومت نباید باعث شود حکومت های دیگر را سفید پنداریم.
مقایسه بین سیاستهای جمهوری اسلامی و حکومت پهلوی تفاوت های کمی را به دست میدهد. حبس خانگی مخالفان، ممنوعیت احزاب، زندان و شکنجه، قتل مخالف، فضای بسته جراید و سیاسی، بیگانه هراسی(شوروی). خر، همان خر است منتها پالانش عوض شده است.
تاثیر در دیدگاه مردم آمریکا
نظراتی که ذیل این کتاب توسط آمریکایی ها نوشته شده میتواند تاثیر آن را مشخص کند. قریب به اتفاق جمعیت آمریکا از تاریخ معاصر ایران و نقش کشورشان در آن چیزی نمیدانند. تنها چیزی که میدانند یک دشمنی بین دو کشور است. این کتاب بخشی از پرده ها را برداشته.
نویسنده تفسیر کرده است که این کودتا مسیر دموکراسی در خاور میانه، ایران و آمریکای جنوبی را تغییر داد. در کوتاه مدت به آمریکا این ایده را داد که میتواند به راحتی حکومت ها را تغییر داد و از موهبتهای تجاری بعد از آن استفاده کرد. کاری که با این ایران انجام شد یک نمونه موفق جلوه کرد.
اما در طولانی مدت تاثیر آن چیزی شد به نام بنیاد گرایی اسلامی در ایران و سایر کشورهای خاور میانه. طالبان، القاعده، حزب الله، حماس، داعش. اینها را نویسنده نتیجه کوته بینی آمریکا میداند که بعدها آتش آن دامن خود آمریکا را هم گرفت.
گاندیِ خاور میانه
در انتهای کتاب نویسنده سالهای بعد از انقلاب به ایران سفر میکند تا محل حبس خانگی مصدق در روستای احمد آباد را از نزدیک ببیند. ممانعتهایی برایش از طرف حکومت ایران ایجاد میشود. در انتها این نیت به اجرا در می آید. در مسیر ورود به روستا و حدود 50 سال بعد از مرگ مصدق، به دو پسر بچه 13-14 ساله برخورد میکند و میپرسد شما مصدق را میشناسید؟
بچه ها میخندند و میگویند مصدق کسی است که صنعت نفت را ملی کرده است.
تبلیغات و محدودیت ها تا چه اندازه توانسته یاد و خاطره این مرد بی نظیر و نستوه را مخفی کند؟
هنوز بین "مردم" مصدق نماد مقاومت است.
بی خود نیست که از او به نام "زعیم الشرق" یاد میشود. کسی که خاور میانه باید بیداری اش را مدیون او باشد.
من به نظرم لقب مناسب برایش "گاندی خاور میانه" است.
نسخه صوتی
من نسخه صوتی شده کتاب را که به نظر از تیغ سانسور جمهوری اسلامی نگذشته بود شنیدم. گوینده به اندازه ای تلفظ های اشتباه داشت که نیمی از کتاب را نمیدانستم از بلایی که به سر ملت ایران میآید گریه کنم و یا از بی سوادی گوینده بخندم.
خلاص
September 8, 2020
১৯৫৩ সালের ১৫ আগস্ট ইরানের শ্রেষ্ঠ জাতীয়তাবাদী নেতা মোহাম্মদ মোসাদ্দেকের বিরুদ্ধে অভ্যুত্থান শুরু হয়। প্রথমদিন তাঁকে ক্ষমতাচ্যুত করতে ব্যর্থ হলেও ষড়যন্ত্র থেমে থাকেনি৷ মাত্র এক সপ্তাহের মাথায় মোসাদ্দেককে ক্ষমতাচ্যুত করা হয়। ব্রিটিশ ও মার্কিন গোয়েন্দা সংস্থা লাখ লাখ ডলার খরচ করে মোসাদ্দেককে সরিয়ে দিতে। সিআইএ এজেন্ট রুজভেল্ট ( রাষ্ট্রপতি রুজভেল্টের নাতি) এই অপারেশন আ্যজেক্স পরিচালনা করে। সিআইএ সবকিছুকে কিনে নিয়েছিল। বাদশাহ মোহাম্মদ রেজা শাহ আগে থেকেই মোসাদ্দেকের ওপর ক্ষিপ্ত ছিল। মোল্লারা মোসাদ্দেকের বিরুদ্ধে ফতোয়া দেওয়া শুরু করেছিল। সবচেয়ে প্রভাবশালী ধর্মীয় নেতা কিশানি ১০ হাজার ডলারের বিনিময়ে নিজেকে বিক্রি করে দেন। সকল গণমাধ্যম যুক্তরাষ্ট্রের প্রেসক্রিপশন মোতাবেক মোসাদ্দেকবিরোধী খবর ছাপাতো। গলিতে গলিতে মোসাদ্দেকের বিরুদ্ধে জনতাকে ক্ষেপানোর প্রজেক্ট হাতে নেওয়া হয়েছিল। মোসাদ্দেকের অপরাধ একটাই। সে ব্রিটিশ তেল কোম্পানি আ্যংলো-ইরানিয়ান তেল কোম্পানিকে জাতীয়করণ করেছিল। বাধা হয়ে দাঁড়িয়েছিল ব্রিটিশ সাম্রাজ্যবাদের।
সাংবাদিক স্টেফেন কিঞ্জার পুরো ইরানের ইতিহাসকে গল্পের মতো করে লিখেছেন। কাজার রাজবংশের পতন, কসাক বিগ্রেডের সেনা কর্মকর্তা রেজা খানের হঠাৎ পাহলবি রাজবংশের সূচনাকরণসহ এই বংশের কুর্কীতির ফিরিস্তি দিয়েছেন। ইরানের শ্রেষ্ঠ সম্পদ তেল কীভাবে ব্রিটিশ ও আমেরিকা লুট করেছিল তা শুনিয়েছেন।
আর হ্যাঁ, বলতে ভুলে গেছি। প্রধানমন্ত্রী মোসাদ্দেকের চাইতে ক্ষমতাচ্যুত মোসাদ্দেক অনেক বেশি শক্তিশালী। কারণ মোসাদ্দেক সারা বিশ্বের মজলুমের কাছে এক প্রেরণার নাম। যিনি শোষিত মানুষের পক্ষ নেওয়ায় হয়েছিলেন ক্ষমতাচ্যুত, আমৃত্যু থেকেছেন গৃহবন্দি।
কি��্জার সাহেব পশ্চিমা লোক। যতই ব্রিটিশ-আমেরিকার দোষ ত্রুটির কথা লেখেন না কেন নিজের পরিচয় ভুলতে পারেননি। তাই ১৯৭৯ সালের ইরানের বিপ্লবকে ভালো চোখে দেখা হয়নি তার৷ পর্যবেক্ষণে হয়েছেন পক্ষপাতপুষ্ট।
সাংবাদিক স্টেফেন কিঞ্জার পুরো ইরানের ইতিহাসকে গল্পের মতো করে লিখেছেন। কাজার রাজবংশের পতন, কসাক বিগ্রেডের সেনা কর্মকর্তা রেজা খানের হঠাৎ পাহলবি রাজবংশের সূচনাকরণসহ এই বংশের কুর্কীতির ফিরিস্তি দিয়েছেন। ইরানের শ্রেষ্ঠ সম্পদ তেল কীভাবে ব্রিটিশ ও আমেরিকা লুট করেছিল তা শুনিয়েছেন।
আর হ্যাঁ, বলতে ভুলে গেছি। প্রধানমন্ত্রী মোসাদ্দেকের চাইতে ক্ষমতাচ্যুত মোসাদ্দেক অনেক বেশি শক্তিশালী। কারণ মোসাদ্দেক সারা বিশ্বের মজলুমের কাছে এক প্রেরণার নাম। যিনি শোষিত মানুষের পক্ষ নেওয়ায় হয়েছিলেন ক্ষমতাচ্যুত, আমৃত্যু থেকেছেন গৃহবন্দি।
কি��্জার সাহেব পশ্চিমা লোক। যতই ব্রিটিশ-আমেরিকার দোষ ত্রুটির কথা লেখেন না কেন নিজের পরিচয় ভুলতে পারেননি। তাই ১৯৭৯ সালের ইরানের বিপ্লবকে ভালো চোখে দেখা হয়নি তার৷ পর্যবেক্ষণে হয়েছেন পক্ষপাতপুষ্ট।
May 25, 2017
تفو بر تو ای چرخ گردون تفو.
از لحاظ نوشتاری کت��ب بسیار خوش خوانی هست. عناوین هر فصل از جملات کلیدی داخل فصل انتخاب شدند که بسیار هنرمندانه و زیبا انتخاب شدند. ایده ی اصلی جناب کینزر اینه که پا گرفتن دیکتاتوری محمدرضا شاه، انقلاب اسلامی و نفرتی که ایرانیان از آمریکایی ها نشون دادند همگی حاصل کودتای 28 مرداد بودند که برای همیشه دیدگاه جهان سوم رو نسبت به آمریکا عوض کرد. انقلاب ایران الهام بخش بنیادگرایان اسلامی شد و 11 سپتامبر رو ایجاد کرد. اوایل خوندن فکر می کردم کتاب برام تکرار مکررات باشه چون خیلی از این حوادث رو به خاطر رشته ی دانشگاهیم خونده بودم ولی وقتی ادامه دادم حس کردم جذابیت نوشتاری این کتاب به قدری خوبه که مثل یک رمان خواننده رو جلو می بره و مشتاق شنیدن بقیه داستان می کنه. در کل این کتاب رو دوست داشتم و فکر می کنم همونطور که نویسنده هم در نظر داشته به طور ویژه باید انگلیسی ها و آمریکایی ها کتاب رو بخونند تا متوجه بشند که وضعی که امروز در این منطقه وجود داره همش از علل درونی نیست بلکه علل تاریخی خارجی هم نقش تأثیرگذاری در بوجود اومدن اون دارند.
از لحاظ نوشتاری کت��ب بسیار خوش خوانی هست. عناوین هر فصل از جملات کلیدی داخل فصل انتخاب شدند که بسیار هنرمندانه و زیبا انتخاب شدند. ایده ی اصلی جناب کینزر اینه که پا گرفتن دیکتاتوری محمدرضا شاه، انقلاب اسلامی و نفرتی که ایرانیان از آمریکایی ها نشون دادند همگی حاصل کودتای 28 مرداد بودند که برای همیشه دیدگاه جهان سوم رو نسبت به آمریکا عوض کرد. انقلاب ایران الهام بخش بنیادگرایان اسلامی شد و 11 سپتامبر رو ایجاد کرد. اوایل خوندن فکر می کردم کتاب برام تکرار مکررات باشه چون خیلی از این حوادث رو به خاطر رشته ی دانشگاهیم خونده بودم ولی وقتی ادامه دادم حس کردم جذابیت نوشتاری این کتاب به قدری خوبه که مثل یک رمان خواننده رو جلو می بره و مشتاق شنیدن بقیه داستان می کنه. در کل این کتاب رو دوست داشتم و فکر می کنم همونطور که نویسنده هم در نظر داشته به طور ویژه باید انگلیسی ها و آمریکایی ها کتاب رو بخونند تا متوجه بشند که وضعی که امروز در این منطقه وجود داره همش از علل درونی نیست بلکه علل تاریخی خارجی هم نقش تأثیرگذاری در بوجود اومدن اون دارند.
May 29, 2012
Great Britain via Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) wanted to secure its grip on Iran's oil. The United States wanted to prevent Iran from joining Russia and going communist. Iran wanted freedom, an Iran free of British imperialism.
These three nations, and their conflicting priorities, were on a collision course in the early 1950s, and it culminated in the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh, the popular Iranian prime minister who nationalized his country's oil industry and fought for an Iranian government that represented the will of the people.
Stephen Kinzer does a decent job of summarizing thousands of years of Persian history to provide the reader with adequate background to understand the actions and motivations of the Iranians he is writing about.
He paints a sympathetic portrait of Mossadegh as an uncompromisingly honest man who wanted nothing more than a free and independent Iran. Not only did he take on APOC, he pressured Iran's monarchy (often in the pocket of APOC) to accept a government that put elected officials above the monarchy.
Less flattering is portrayal of the Iranian monarchy. But it is the British that leave the worst impression in this tale. As for the Americans...perhaps that betrayal was the greatest of all to the Iranians.
Part history/politics, part fast-paced spy thriller, this book gives the reader insight into current Iran-U.S. relations.
These three nations, and their conflicting priorities, were on a collision course in the early 1950s, and it culminated in the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh, the popular Iranian prime minister who nationalized his country's oil industry and fought for an Iranian government that represented the will of the people.
Stephen Kinzer does a decent job of summarizing thousands of years of Persian history to provide the reader with adequate background to understand the actions and motivations of the Iranians he is writing about.
He paints a sympathetic portrait of Mossadegh as an uncompromisingly honest man who wanted nothing more than a free and independent Iran. Not only did he take on APOC, he pressured Iran's monarchy (often in the pocket of APOC) to accept a government that put elected officials above the monarchy.
Less flattering is portrayal of the Iranian monarchy. But it is the British that leave the worst impression in this tale. As for the Americans...perhaps that betrayal was the greatest of all to the Iranians.
Part history/politics, part fast-paced spy thriller, this book gives the reader insight into current Iran-U.S. relations.
January 10, 2020
We remain unable to recognize the dangers of unintended consequences. Such dangers should breed caution and a reluctance to engage in foreign adventures. Does each generation have to relearn this?
July 27, 2014
An alternate title of this book could be "United States: Strangler of Infant Democracies". It is pretty well known among scholars and international relations experts that anti-American Mideast terrorism has its roots in the US coup that overthrew Iran's first-ever democratically elected prime minister in 1953. This book explains the history of Iran, its governments, its oppression at the hands of colonialists, its exploitation by the British oil industry, and how Britain talked the United States into overthrowing the Iranian prime minister who threatened their oil profits. Yes, it really is that simple: the U.S. killed a democracy and installed a dictator solely so BP's profits would not be impacted.
The following quote by a British diplomat sums it up pretty well:
"The typical Iranian is motivated by an unabashed dishonesty, fatalistic outlook, and indifference to suffering. The ordinary Persian is unprincipled, eager to promise what he knows he is incapable or has no intention of performing, given to procrastination, lacking in perseverance and energy, but amenable to discipline. Above all, he enjoys intrigue and readily turns to prevarication and dishonesty whenever there is a possibility of personal gain. Although an accomplished liar he does not expect to be believed. They easily acquire a superficial knowledge of technical subjects, deluding themselves into the belief that it is profound. To deal with such people on an equal and respectful basis would of course be absurd."
You will read all about how Britons thought socialism and nationalization of industry were fine for their own civilized society, but that their oil fields in Iran required the heavy hand of colonial masters to function, due to the brutish and uncivilized ways of the locals. You will read all about how overthrowing nations is a game for those who do it professionally. You will also hear about the many Iranians whose dreams and hopes for democracy were dashed, and about the decades-long campaign within Iran to stomp out the memory of the brief moment in time when Iranians might have actually controlled their own destiny.
I highly recommend this book for anyone, but especially to those who want to know why "they hate us so much" in the Middle East. Iranians typically loved and respected America, back in the day--until they realized that America loved oil more than democracy. Think America won't overthrow a government just for oil? Think again. I highly recommend it also to those who believe that America is the protector and exporter of democracy to the world. Some myths need to be shattered.
The following quote by a British diplomat sums it up pretty well:
"The typical Iranian is motivated by an unabashed dishonesty, fatalistic outlook, and indifference to suffering. The ordinary Persian is unprincipled, eager to promise what he knows he is incapable or has no intention of performing, given to procrastination, lacking in perseverance and energy, but amenable to discipline. Above all, he enjoys intrigue and readily turns to prevarication and dishonesty whenever there is a possibility of personal gain. Although an accomplished liar he does not expect to be believed. They easily acquire a superficial knowledge of technical subjects, deluding themselves into the belief that it is profound. To deal with such people on an equal and respectful basis would of course be absurd."
You will read all about how Britons thought socialism and nationalization of industry were fine for their own civilized society, but that their oil fields in Iran required the heavy hand of colonial masters to function, due to the brutish and uncivilized ways of the locals. You will read all about how overthrowing nations is a game for those who do it professionally. You will also hear about the many Iranians whose dreams and hopes for democracy were dashed, and about the decades-long campaign within Iran to stomp out the memory of the brief moment in time when Iranians might have actually controlled their own destiny.
I highly recommend this book for anyone, but especially to those who want to know why "they hate us so much" in the Middle East. Iranians typically loved and respected America, back in the day--until they realized that America loved oil more than democracy. Think America won't overthrow a government just for oil? Think again. I highly recommend it also to those who believe that America is the protector and exporter of democracy to the world. Some myths need to be shattered.
March 4, 2024
There is a direct line starting with:
- Post WWII Communist Containment, to
- American support for the post WWII interests of the former colonial powers, to
- American support (in the name of anti-communism) of repressive dictators in the emerging world, who in turn quash nationalists fighting colonialism, to
- The CIA 1953 Coup in Iran, to
- The 1979 Fundamentalist Islamic Revolution in Iran, to
- The 444 day Iranian Hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, to
- The export of Islamic, Extremist Terror Campaigns, thanks to Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, to
- The rise of America-centric actions in the Middle East, at the expense of the Arab nations cooperating with America, which in turn gave traction to the extremism of
- Osama bin Laden, who engineered 9-11, which emboldened the Taliban, and the aspirations of the would-be caliphate of ISIL / ISIS . . .
And this direct line WAS DRAWN BY -- was CAUSED BY -- the very actions of the United States in the first place.
Who is to blame? America, and then, next, blame accrues to the arrogant colonial powers (the British, the French, and the Dutch) for their suppression of the legitimate nationalism in the nations these colonial powers subjugated. . . And don't forget the vast amount of blame earned by the Zionist thugs (and the foolish policy makers who supported them -- in the USA and in the UK) who added fuel to the Middle Eastern fire by looting, marginalizing, and terrorizing the Palestinian people.
When will the West ever learn? No wonder the world is seething.
- Post WWII Communist Containment, to
- American support for the post WWII interests of the former colonial powers, to
- American support (in the name of anti-communism) of repressive dictators in the emerging world, who in turn quash nationalists fighting colonialism, to
- The CIA 1953 Coup in Iran, to
- The 1979 Fundamentalist Islamic Revolution in Iran, to
- The 444 day Iranian Hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, to
- The export of Islamic, Extremist Terror Campaigns, thanks to Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, to
- The rise of America-centric actions in the Middle East, at the expense of the Arab nations cooperating with America, which in turn gave traction to the extremism of
- Osama bin Laden, who engineered 9-11, which emboldened the Taliban, and the aspirations of the would-be caliphate of ISIL / ISIS . . .
And this direct line WAS DRAWN BY -- was CAUSED BY -- the very actions of the United States in the first place.
Who is to blame? America, and then, next, blame accrues to the arrogant colonial powers (the British, the French, and the Dutch) for their suppression of the legitimate nationalism in the nations these colonial powers subjugated. . . And don't forget the vast amount of blame earned by the Zionist thugs (and the foolish policy makers who supported them -- in the USA and in the UK) who added fuel to the Middle Eastern fire by looting, marginalizing, and terrorizing the Palestinian people.
When will the West ever learn? No wonder the world is seething.
May 6, 2023
Stephen Kinzer's All the Shah's Men takes a hard look at Operation AJAX, the Anglo-American conspiracy to overthrow Iran's democratic government and install the Shah. Kinzer depicts the coup's machinations in detail both engrossing and utterly damning; the British hope to stymie the liberal-minded Mossadegh in defense of their empire, while the Americans frame their intervention in Cold War terms, graphically illustrating how fear of communist could be used to justify the most amoral decisions. (Of course, oil and corporate interests played the bigger part in their decision.) Part of what makes this book so compelling is Kinzer's obvious empathy for Iran, which sets it apart from other books which merely chronicle Western misdeeds: his portrayal of Mossadegh is often critical, pointing up his bizarre, erratic personality, while also showing how he represented the aspirations of a proud, ancient nation too long bullied by colonial powers. Sadly the West didn't take heed, and (Kinzer convincingly argues) sixty years of misery resulted from their decision.
November 24, 2022
Another case of nastiness by our rogue CIA. Kinzer also wrote a JFK Conspiracy book, same nastiness only we killed our own President.
I remember being at a Rock n Roll club in Houston back in the Carter Administration when the hostage crisis in Iran was going on. The band was playing the Beach Boys Barbara Ann but everybody was singing Bomb Bomb Bomb Iran. Most Americans had a lot of hate for the Khomeini regime back then, me included.
I have grown a lot in my thinking. It's books like this one that add to understanding, and less hate.
I disliked JFK for years, was a Reagan Republican. Reading books like John M Newman's JFK and Vietnam give me a totally different view of him. I really think he was going up against an establishment full of war mongers and if reelected in 1964 would have tried his best to get us out.
Instead The Man in the Shadows showed up once again just like he did in Iran, Guatemala, and in Sadaam's Iraq . Why Iraq when all or almost all the plane terrorists on 9/11 were from Saudi Arabia I have never understood.
I remember being at a Rock n Roll club in Houston back in the Carter Administration when the hostage crisis in Iran was going on. The band was playing the Beach Boys Barbara Ann but everybody was singing Bomb Bomb Bomb Iran. Most Americans had a lot of hate for the Khomeini regime back then, me included.
I have grown a lot in my thinking. It's books like this one that add to understanding, and less hate.
I disliked JFK for years, was a Reagan Republican. Reading books like John M Newman's JFK and Vietnam give me a totally different view of him. I really think he was going up against an establishment full of war mongers and if reelected in 1964 would have tried his best to get us out.
Instead The Man in the Shadows showed up once again just like he did in Iran, Guatemala, and in Sadaam's Iraq . Why Iraq when all or almost all the plane terrorists on 9/11 were from Saudi Arabia I have never understood.
May 25, 2019
Why should you read All the Shah's Men?
1. Stephen Kinzer is, in my opinion, the greatest journalist of our age.
2. Also, his expertise in the Middle East is almost nonpareil. (Refer to aforementioned point on his journalistic prowess)
3. If you want to learn about why the US really, actually, does not like Iran.
4. If you, like me, think that Iran could've been a world power under Mohammad Mossadegh.
5. If you don't believe the above statement, and need proof.
6. If you want a short, concise history of Shia Islam, and about Iran in general.
7. If you are a contemporary history aficionado.
8. If you want to know more about exactly how much the US (and Great Britain) has infringed upon other countries' rights.
9. If you want to learn more about how CIA operations work.
10. For any other reason you can think of.
Bottom line is, read the damn book. It's really, really good.
1. Stephen Kinzer is, in my opinion, the greatest journalist of our age.
2. Also, his expertise in the Middle East is almost nonpareil. (Refer to aforementioned point on his journalistic prowess)
3. If you want to learn about why the US really, actually, does not like Iran.
4. If you, like me, think that Iran could've been a world power under Mohammad Mossadegh.
5. If you don't believe the above statement, and need proof.
6. If you want a short, concise history of Shia Islam, and about Iran in general.
7. If you are a contemporary history aficionado.
8. If you want to know more about exactly how much the US (and Great Britain) has infringed upon other countries' rights.
9. If you want to learn more about how CIA operations work.
10. For any other reason you can think of.
Bottom line is, read the damn book. It's really, really good.
October 5, 2015
The book is fabulously researched, thought-provoking, and Kinzer really knows his stuff. It also helps that the writing style flows. This is a truly powerful read.
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