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Free Will
Goodreads Choice Award
Nominee for Readers' Favorite Nonfiction (2012)Belief in free will touches nearly everything that human beings value. It is difficult to think about law, politics, religion, public policy, intimate relationships, morality—as well as feelings of remorse or personal achievement—without first imagining that every person is the true source of his or her thoughts and actions. And yet the facts tell us that free will is an illusion.
In this enlightening book, Sam Harris argues that this truth about the human mind does not undermine morality or diminish the importance of social and political freedom, but it can and should change the way we think about some of the most important questions in life.
In this enlightening book, Sam Harris argues that this truth about the human mind does not undermine morality or diminish the importance of social and political freedom, but it can and should change the way we think about some of the most important questions in life.
96 pages, Paperback
First published March 6, 2012
About the author
Sam Harris
44 books8,752 followersLibrarian Note:
There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
Sam Harris (born 1967) is an American non-fiction writer, philosopher and neuroscientist. He is the author of The End of Faith: Religion, Terror and the Future of Reason (2004), which won the 2005 PEN/Martha Albrand Award, and Letter to a Christian Nation (2006), a rejoinder to the criticism his first book attracted. His new book, The Moral Landscape, explores how science might determine human values.
After coming under intense criticism in response to his attacks on dogmatic religious belief, Harris is cautious about revealing details of his personal life and history. He has said that he was raised by a Jewish mother and a Quaker father, and he told Newsweek that as a child, he "declined to be bar mitzvahed." He attended Stanford University as an English major, but dropped out of school following a life-altering experience with MDMA. During this period he studied Buddhism and meditation, and claims to have read hundreds of books on religion. In an August 21, 2009 appearance on Real Time with Bill Maher, Harris stated that he grew up in a secular home and his parents never discussed God. He has stated, however, that he has always had an interest in religion.
After eleven years, he returned to Stanford and completed a bachelor of arts degree in philosophy. In 2009, he obtained his Ph.D. degree in neuroscience at University of California, Los Angeles, using functional magnetic resonance imaging to conduct research into the neural basis of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty.
-source, plus more info
There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
Sam Harris (born 1967) is an American non-fiction writer, philosopher and neuroscientist. He is the author of The End of Faith: Religion, Terror and the Future of Reason (2004), which won the 2005 PEN/Martha Albrand Award, and Letter to a Christian Nation (2006), a rejoinder to the criticism his first book attracted. His new book, The Moral Landscape, explores how science might determine human values.
After coming under intense criticism in response to his attacks on dogmatic religious belief, Harris is cautious about revealing details of his personal life and history. He has said that he was raised by a Jewish mother and a Quaker father, and he told Newsweek that as a child, he "declined to be bar mitzvahed." He attended Stanford University as an English major, but dropped out of school following a life-altering experience with MDMA. During this period he studied Buddhism and meditation, and claims to have read hundreds of books on religion. In an August 21, 2009 appearance on Real Time with Bill Maher, Harris stated that he grew up in a secular home and his parents never discussed God. He has stated, however, that he has always had an interest in religion.
After eleven years, he returned to Stanford and completed a bachelor of arts degree in philosophy. In 2009, he obtained his Ph.D. degree in neuroscience at University of California, Los Angeles, using functional magnetic resonance imaging to conduct research into the neural basis of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty.
-source, plus more info
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 2,852 reviews
March 6, 2012
I like padding my reading challenge with ridiculously short books.
April 20, 2013
I am an agnostic which means I am firm in my belief that I have no idea what to believe. I don't know what is true and what isn't and no one, no matter how strong your faith, or how strong your lack of faith is.....you don't know either. You don't know what happens to you after you die. You pretty much have to die to find that out. You may really, really, really believe little alien souls are attached to your body and making your life miserable, and that the only way to make it all better is to blow your life savings in Clearwater Florida trying to rid yourself of these little bastards by way of a weird looking machine. It still doesn't make it true, it's purely your free will to believe it is.
Next to art, and generally making things that are pretty and/or interesting, I'm really fascinated with science. Books on the brain are something I generally gravitated towards which is why I picked up Free Will.
Sam Harris is obviously a very intelligent man he generally seems to know what he is talking about. But I can't digest what he is dishing out in Free Will. Basically, if I am following what he is saying (and it is possible I'm NOT) human beings have no free will.....excuse me?
Apparently there have been studies that prove that when we make the decision to do something our brain does the deciding first before we are even aware of our decision consciously. This is done with some fancy imaging machines that catch a blip of some sort go off before you do what you're going to do. So, of course we don't have free will.
I must be missing something.
My head hurts.
Somehow because we don't know what makes our brain decide something before we become aware of what it is that we are deciding we aren't actually deciding anything at all. Uhhh......ok? To me this strengthens the argument that we are something more than just our brains. Maybe....just maybe, what is making the brain do it's business is the energy (or soul if you like to call it that) that animates these meat suits we walk around in. Or not! I don't know but I believe someday science will figure out what that's all about. Science advances insanely fast. Right now I can probably take over a third world country with my Ipad. I can't even imagine what will be invented or discovered in the near future. So for Sam to jump to this conclusion seems premature.
It is more likely we have control over our decisions and that we are responsible for them than not. I believe we have free will to do the right thing despite our circumstances growing up.
I have the free will not to like Free Will all that much and you have the free will to disagree with me about that.....
Also reviewed on Shelfinflicted
Next to art, and generally making things that are pretty and/or interesting, I'm really fascinated with science. Books on the brain are something I generally gravitated towards which is why I picked up Free Will.
Sam Harris is obviously a very intelligent man he generally seems to know what he is talking about. But I can't digest what he is dishing out in Free Will. Basically, if I am following what he is saying (and it is possible I'm NOT) human beings have no free will.....excuse me?
Apparently there have been studies that prove that when we make the decision to do something our brain does the deciding first before we are even aware of our decision consciously. This is done with some fancy imaging machines that catch a blip of some sort go off before you do what you're going to do. So, of course we don't have free will.
I must be missing something.
My head hurts.
Somehow because we don't know what makes our brain decide something before we become aware of what it is that we are deciding we aren't actually deciding anything at all. Uhhh......ok? To me this strengthens the argument that we are something more than just our brains. Maybe....just maybe, what is making the brain do it's business is the energy (or soul if you like to call it that) that animates these meat suits we walk around in. Or not! I don't know but I believe someday science will figure out what that's all about. Science advances insanely fast. Right now I can probably take over a third world country with my Ipad. I can't even imagine what will be invented or discovered in the near future. So for Sam to jump to this conclusion seems premature.
It is more likely we have control over our decisions and that we are responsible for them than not. I believe we have free will to do the right thing despite our circumstances growing up.
I have the free will not to like Free Will all that much and you have the free will to disagree with me about that.....
Also reviewed on Shelfinflicted
April 8, 2012
It has been one of those odd times when I seem to be getting tripped over by the same sorts of ideas over and over again. I can't for the life of me tell you why I thought it was a good idea recently to read Freud's Interpretation of Dreams -like the proverbial mountain, it was just there. Then I was tossing up what to read next and there was this other book on the brain called Incognito and that was more or less on similar ground although, obviously quite updated. Both, though, stressed the fact that we are not quite as 'in control' of our selves as we tend to imagine we are.
Then a friend of mine yesterday sent me this link to a recent lecture by Sam Harris on this book: http://www.samharris.org/media/the-il...
I was about a third of the way through Foucault's The Order of Things and really didn't want to stop reading that for anything else - but this is so short... You can read it in a couple of hours. And what it has to say is so very important.
So much of what I have been reading lately confirms the idea that our inevitable feeling that we are free agents responsible for our actions and therefore blameworthy for them too is one of the most remarkable illusions there is to being human. But I think what is most interesting about this is that the part of me that knows this is true, that free will is an illusion, is still not strong enough to overcome my persistent feeling of being both free to choose and the chooser of my actions. I know neither of these are really the case and Harris's wonderful examples make this even more clear - but it is not just that I want to be blamed for my misdeeds, I still want to be praised for my good ones. Neither is appropriate, however - we do not exist, we are not 'individuals' but the results of endless influences on us at various moments and the notion that we persist as self-identical is yet another illusion. People find these conclusions terribly threatening, but really, they don't make a whole lot of difference. We cannot live a life outside the illusion of a self or of a self with free will. But that doesn't make either the self or free will any less illusions.
Yet again, this is a book that challenges our justice system - and one of the main events in my life in the last few years was sitting on a jury in a criminal justice case and having all of the stuff I've been reading about the reliability of memory and the problem of responsibility played out before my eyes. Sometimes it can be just as challenging to have your ideas confirmed as it is to have them disproved. It seems incomprehensible to me that we direct the smartest people in our society into the legal and justice system and yet they can sit through court case after court case and not see that the endless contradictions involved in the evidence presented to them makes the whole notion of 'reasonable doubt' a bit of a joke. But a justice system based on moral responsibility due to the free exercise of the will of the accused is simply in complete contradiction to what we know - KNOW - about what happens in our brains when we make decisions. This is not a minor matter - it ought to completely change the way we conduct criminal justice.
That it will not says more about the persistence of our prejudices than it does about anything else.
I've no idea why the universe has decided I need to pay particularly close attention to these questions at the moment, I've so much else I need to think about - but that just seems to be the way the world is.
Read this or watch the video - the video covers all the same ground, you won't miss much in not reading the book. It is, though, time we took the implications of the latest advances in brain science seriously.
Then a friend of mine yesterday sent me this link to a recent lecture by Sam Harris on this book: http://www.samharris.org/media/the-il...
I was about a third of the way through Foucault's The Order of Things and really didn't want to stop reading that for anything else - but this is so short... You can read it in a couple of hours. And what it has to say is so very important.
So much of what I have been reading lately confirms the idea that our inevitable feeling that we are free agents responsible for our actions and therefore blameworthy for them too is one of the most remarkable illusions there is to being human. But I think what is most interesting about this is that the part of me that knows this is true, that free will is an illusion, is still not strong enough to overcome my persistent feeling of being both free to choose and the chooser of my actions. I know neither of these are really the case and Harris's wonderful examples make this even more clear - but it is not just that I want to be blamed for my misdeeds, I still want to be praised for my good ones. Neither is appropriate, however - we do not exist, we are not 'individuals' but the results of endless influences on us at various moments and the notion that we persist as self-identical is yet another illusion. People find these conclusions terribly threatening, but really, they don't make a whole lot of difference. We cannot live a life outside the illusion of a self or of a self with free will. But that doesn't make either the self or free will any less illusions.
Yet again, this is a book that challenges our justice system - and one of the main events in my life in the last few years was sitting on a jury in a criminal justice case and having all of the stuff I've been reading about the reliability of memory and the problem of responsibility played out before my eyes. Sometimes it can be just as challenging to have your ideas confirmed as it is to have them disproved. It seems incomprehensible to me that we direct the smartest people in our society into the legal and justice system and yet they can sit through court case after court case and not see that the endless contradictions involved in the evidence presented to them makes the whole notion of 'reasonable doubt' a bit of a joke. But a justice system based on moral responsibility due to the free exercise of the will of the accused is simply in complete contradiction to what we know - KNOW - about what happens in our brains when we make decisions. This is not a minor matter - it ought to completely change the way we conduct criminal justice.
That it will not says more about the persistence of our prejudices than it does about anything else.
I've no idea why the universe has decided I need to pay particularly close attention to these questions at the moment, I've so much else I need to think about - but that just seems to be the way the world is.
Read this or watch the video - the video covers all the same ground, you won't miss much in not reading the book. It is, though, time we took the implications of the latest advances in brain science seriously.
Read
November 4, 2018This book is succinctly mind-blowing. After finishing reading (actually, listening to) it, I am solidly convinced that the conventional understanding of 'free will' is an illusion My only gripe regards his talk of moral responsibility: Harris raises some interesting questions (how can we hold criminals accountable if they are not in control of their actions?) but falls short of answering them to any satisfaction. I believe that this is due to the fact that such questions are unanswerable, I just wish Harris had either stressed this or given a more convincing response than the typical appeal to pragmatism.
I'd recommend this book to anyone willing to have a bit of an existential crisis upon the realisation that they didn't choose to read it. Heck, I didn't even choose to type this short review. And I'm about to not choose to stop.
I'd recommend this book to anyone willing to have a bit of an existential crisis upon the realisation that they didn't choose to read it. Heck, I didn't even choose to type this short review. And I'm about to not choose to stop.
April 29, 2021
Kick ‘Em While They’re Down
This is a book of academic philosophy written in popular form. In it Harris is primarily concerned with defending his position about the illusory nature of the idea of Free Will, principally against the philosopher Daniel Dennett. However, there is an important cultural background to this debate which Harris has refrained from alluding to, I suppose in deference to professional discipline. This background is theological and subtly pervades the entire debate. The political import of the debate can’t be appreciated fully without this context.
Free Will is a Christian heresy, and yet it is the apparent foundation of all Christian morality. As usual the source of the doctrine of universal human corruption, and therefore the inability to act with true freedom, is St. Paul. For Paul, according to his subsequent interpreters, particularly Augustine, a truly Free Will is only possible through the gift of grace from God. And this gift is dependent upon faith in Jesus Christ. So those who have never heard of Jesus cannot have Free Will; those who have heard of him and do not have faith in him cannot have Free Will; and even those who believe they have faith cannot be certain that it is sufficient to guarantee them the capacity for Free Will. The heresy that claims even the slightest deviation from this doctrine is called Pelagianism.
It turns out that advances in neurological and other biological sciences have confirmed at least half of the ancient Christian doctrine of corruption and lack of personal freedom. As human beings, we are subject not just to the desires that Paul (religious violence), Augustine (sex) and so many others (mostly about power in one form or another) have struggled with, but also to the random experiences that provoke equally random thoughts that on occasion lead to behaviours which we ultimately regret. Many of these behaviours will be considered immoral or even criminal for which most people consider sanctions or penalties appropriate, either administered in this world or another. As Harris puts it so succinctly, with only the slightest allusion to theology: “If you don’t know what your soul is going to do next, you are not in control.”
So, the deepest part of oneself is at least mysterious if not patently unwieldy - Dr. Freud concurs. But the other part of the Christian proposition, the gift of grace through faith, largely negates the moral impact of the idea of human spiritual corruption. If faith is not offered because of ignorance, the moral fault is God’s not humanity’s. If faith is offered and rejected, the only ‘crime’ is such rejection and not any subsequent unacceptable behaviour. Many Christians hold that the grace of faith is irresistible (and yet freedom-giving!), which implies real freedom not to sin once it is received. The actual behaviour of Christians is such, however, that either the irresistibility of grace is somewhat overstated, or it doesn’t possess the kind of divine transformative punch which is advertised.
Accordingly, Free Will presents a sort of cultural crisis among folk who share a Christian legacy. Despite the apparent availability of a get-out-of-jail-free card in not just the absence but also the condemnation of the concept of Free Will in Christian culture, it is maintained as a fundamental principle of ethics, politics, economics, many branches of psychology, and, crucially, the law. Harris’s message consequently is controversial when it should be accepted without much comment: “Free will is an illusion. Our wills are simply not of our own making. Thoughts and intentions emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control. We do not have the freedom we think we have.” Good traditional Christian doctrine. Yet it is generally rejected by the culture which claims a Christian heritage.
There’s a significant ancillary issue in the philosophical debate, therefore. Free Will is one of those contradictions of faith-based religion which most religionists would like to ignore because it means abjuring power over others. It is the signal topic in which faith runs aground as an obvious and public anti-social concept. It’s a ship that just doesn’t float in a sea of people with conflicting interests, aspirations, sometimes malicious intentions, and not infrequent violence. Faith, as a matter of universal human experience, does not mitigate any of these traits. In fact if Free Will existed anywhere, in anyone, by definition it would be exercised only in furtherance of the good and would therefore exempt its possessor from any negative judgement. In other words, those who have it are always innocent; and only the innocent could claim it.
That Free Will is some sort of feeling is true. It is our name for something like consciousness is a name for something. Perhaps they are the same thing. But if so we know very little about either phenomenon except that it is expressed as a feeling we think we share with others; but we can’t be entirely sure. It is not solipsistic to suggest that your feeling of Free Will is not anything like mine. Neither one of us has a clear idea what it might be. By suggesting that there was such an entity as the will at all (a politically important Christological topic in theology), Paul and Augustine and the rest planted a concept, like faith and grace, whose main function is to raise doubt and promote guilt about not having them.
The idea of freedom persists even if the associated feelings of religious faith and species-guilt have attenuated. What we’re left with is a psychological myth and a forensic category meant to assign Free Will to precisely those who cannot have it, namely those who do supposed evil things, most often the poor, uneducated, abused, genetically deficient human being. Free Will is claimed as the source of their guilt but Christian doctrine says it cannot be. This is hypocrisy of massive proportions. To what end? Functionally it is to exercise power in restricting freedom and to justify doing so.
Augustine was right in his condemnation of Pelagius, but for the wrong reasons. The issue is not corruption of something called the human Will; it is, as Harris says, the fabric of our being: “Choices, efforts, intentions, and reasoning influence our behavior—but they are themselves part of a chain of causes that precede conscious awareness and over which we exert no ultimate control.” To claim faith or grace as a sort of short-circuit to this process is what Christians have perennially done with no evidence whatsoever. Whatever is meant, or interpreted, by faith and grace is simply another one of the chain of causes.
Harris thinks that Free Will is not a result of conscious awareness but of a lack of it: “Our sense of our own freedom results from our not paying close attention to what it is like to be us.” I agree. It is an illusion that disappears as soon as one tries to attend to it. It has no subjective content as well as no objective existence. In this it is like faith and grace. And like them, Free Will has become a conceptual instrument of repression and justification for the exercise of arbitrary human power. I don’t think the philosophical debate is complete without this element.
Postscript: Vonnegut’s Billy Pilgrim sums up the situation neatly: “I've visited thirty-one inhabited planets in the universe, and I have studied reports on one hundred more. Only on Earth is there any talk of free will".
This is a book of academic philosophy written in popular form. In it Harris is primarily concerned with defending his position about the illusory nature of the idea of Free Will, principally against the philosopher Daniel Dennett. However, there is an important cultural background to this debate which Harris has refrained from alluding to, I suppose in deference to professional discipline. This background is theological and subtly pervades the entire debate. The political import of the debate can’t be appreciated fully without this context.
Free Will is a Christian heresy, and yet it is the apparent foundation of all Christian morality. As usual the source of the doctrine of universal human corruption, and therefore the inability to act with true freedom, is St. Paul. For Paul, according to his subsequent interpreters, particularly Augustine, a truly Free Will is only possible through the gift of grace from God. And this gift is dependent upon faith in Jesus Christ. So those who have never heard of Jesus cannot have Free Will; those who have heard of him and do not have faith in him cannot have Free Will; and even those who believe they have faith cannot be certain that it is sufficient to guarantee them the capacity for Free Will. The heresy that claims even the slightest deviation from this doctrine is called Pelagianism.
It turns out that advances in neurological and other biological sciences have confirmed at least half of the ancient Christian doctrine of corruption and lack of personal freedom. As human beings, we are subject not just to the desires that Paul (religious violence), Augustine (sex) and so many others (mostly about power in one form or another) have struggled with, but also to the random experiences that provoke equally random thoughts that on occasion lead to behaviours which we ultimately regret. Many of these behaviours will be considered immoral or even criminal for which most people consider sanctions or penalties appropriate, either administered in this world or another. As Harris puts it so succinctly, with only the slightest allusion to theology: “If you don’t know what your soul is going to do next, you are not in control.”
So, the deepest part of oneself is at least mysterious if not patently unwieldy - Dr. Freud concurs. But the other part of the Christian proposition, the gift of grace through faith, largely negates the moral impact of the idea of human spiritual corruption. If faith is not offered because of ignorance, the moral fault is God’s not humanity’s. If faith is offered and rejected, the only ‘crime’ is such rejection and not any subsequent unacceptable behaviour. Many Christians hold that the grace of faith is irresistible (and yet freedom-giving!), which implies real freedom not to sin once it is received. The actual behaviour of Christians is such, however, that either the irresistibility of grace is somewhat overstated, or it doesn’t possess the kind of divine transformative punch which is advertised.
Accordingly, Free Will presents a sort of cultural crisis among folk who share a Christian legacy. Despite the apparent availability of a get-out-of-jail-free card in not just the absence but also the condemnation of the concept of Free Will in Christian culture, it is maintained as a fundamental principle of ethics, politics, economics, many branches of psychology, and, crucially, the law. Harris’s message consequently is controversial when it should be accepted without much comment: “Free will is an illusion. Our wills are simply not of our own making. Thoughts and intentions emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control. We do not have the freedom we think we have.” Good traditional Christian doctrine. Yet it is generally rejected by the culture which claims a Christian heritage.
There’s a significant ancillary issue in the philosophical debate, therefore. Free Will is one of those contradictions of faith-based religion which most religionists would like to ignore because it means abjuring power over others. It is the signal topic in which faith runs aground as an obvious and public anti-social concept. It’s a ship that just doesn’t float in a sea of people with conflicting interests, aspirations, sometimes malicious intentions, and not infrequent violence. Faith, as a matter of universal human experience, does not mitigate any of these traits. In fact if Free Will existed anywhere, in anyone, by definition it would be exercised only in furtherance of the good and would therefore exempt its possessor from any negative judgement. In other words, those who have it are always innocent; and only the innocent could claim it.
That Free Will is some sort of feeling is true. It is our name for something like consciousness is a name for something. Perhaps they are the same thing. But if so we know very little about either phenomenon except that it is expressed as a feeling we think we share with others; but we can’t be entirely sure. It is not solipsistic to suggest that your feeling of Free Will is not anything like mine. Neither one of us has a clear idea what it might be. By suggesting that there was such an entity as the will at all (a politically important Christological topic in theology), Paul and Augustine and the rest planted a concept, like faith and grace, whose main function is to raise doubt and promote guilt about not having them.
The idea of freedom persists even if the associated feelings of religious faith and species-guilt have attenuated. What we’re left with is a psychological myth and a forensic category meant to assign Free Will to precisely those who cannot have it, namely those who do supposed evil things, most often the poor, uneducated, abused, genetically deficient human being. Free Will is claimed as the source of their guilt but Christian doctrine says it cannot be. This is hypocrisy of massive proportions. To what end? Functionally it is to exercise power in restricting freedom and to justify doing so.
Augustine was right in his condemnation of Pelagius, but for the wrong reasons. The issue is not corruption of something called the human Will; it is, as Harris says, the fabric of our being: “Choices, efforts, intentions, and reasoning influence our behavior—but they are themselves part of a chain of causes that precede conscious awareness and over which we exert no ultimate control.” To claim faith or grace as a sort of short-circuit to this process is what Christians have perennially done with no evidence whatsoever. Whatever is meant, or interpreted, by faith and grace is simply another one of the chain of causes.
Harris thinks that Free Will is not a result of conscious awareness but of a lack of it: “Our sense of our own freedom results from our not paying close attention to what it is like to be us.” I agree. It is an illusion that disappears as soon as one tries to attend to it. It has no subjective content as well as no objective existence. In this it is like faith and grace. And like them, Free Will has become a conceptual instrument of repression and justification for the exercise of arbitrary human power. I don’t think the philosophical debate is complete without this element.
Postscript: Vonnegut’s Billy Pilgrim sums up the situation neatly: “I've visited thirty-one inhabited planets in the universe, and I have studied reports on one hundred more. Only on Earth is there any talk of free will".
December 22, 2024
Goodreads’ very own relentless nincompoop is back at it again after conscientiously imbibing a great deal of medicinal grog until the rhetoric of my motor behavior rejects the very notion of the volitional as absurd, and, (As you will see. For you must helplessly follow the logic, because you are a being whose own agency is impugned and ridiculed daily by constraints both obvious and clandestine. A being who persists in an illusion of self determination that simply cannot be reconciled with the limits imposed by the system in which your corporeality is instantiated and maintained. A being who will stubbornly cling to this illusion, even while your own brain operates as a skilled insurgent, authoring your intentions and passing them through the Cartesian theater in order to sustain the useful fiction of a mind-body dualism which has been so thoroughly undermined by experiment as to rattle even the staunchest theologian inside the buried sanctum of their most private reservations. It is, even now, conducting your behavior along imperatives precipitated out of mass death on time scales geologic), the rejection will be so self-evident that this verbose treatise will appear as obscene as the fact that the living are a subset of the dead, and an exceptionally rare subset at that. So I balance yet another “Have you ever?” precariously atop my vacuous and embarrassingly overwritten oeuvre. Because I cannot do otherwise. The writer is a decanter of frosted glass with a troubled homunculus pitching its voice inside, a voice you do not necessarily recognize, or even claim as your own. And since the responsible parties which are alleged to exist within this construct of consciousness are on, according to the findings of neuroscience, permanent hiatus, I am powerless but to prattle on in this vein for extents interminable.
I do not like talking about books on this website - that is a recipe for disaster - and I can only hold accountable a series of mechanical events, starting with the meager load of burning hurt shot into my mother’s plumbing, that final squirt from which, nine months later, your narrator would be so reluctantly born, for this senseless journey you’re about to embark on. One that could only prove injurious to your ego. One that could very well result in such a diminution of your concept of ‘self’ that you will come to regard your grey matter as the high-kneed tiptoed skulk of a vaudeville fiend that it actually is. Conjuring images of philosophically inclined felines with kleptocratic claws fingering the naked gangly minds of public intellectuals who absently sip absinthe from the bowls of their own navels. (See now that you were unable to keep from populating your mind with the unorthodox images contained in this conceptual flash bang. You had as much say in this act of creation as the innocent bystander did when a canister exploded and activated all the photoreceptor cells in their oracular equipment, disturbed the fluid in their ear, and flattened the dense grass of their stereoecilla like a crop circle enthusiast, and through a weird, inverse pointillism, disintegrated and dispersed into blackness, the image which had preoccupied them before being Swatted by a crank caller. If I ask you now to think of an animal, whatever creature first appears to you will do so unbidden. Whatever explanations you produce to justify enshrining this beast in the spotlight of your attention and not some other, will all be post hoc rationalizations.) Protest if you will. You can’t help it, after all.
But behold! The moon hangs in the sky like some strange, half-eaten fruit, pregnant with otherworldly juices and memory is but a meager attempt to hold on to something long since lost, through a wrestling match in a wet, spongy organ. The connotations of these words, their full impact and their broader context, are still implicit, available only to those neural networks. Your memory is a conspiracy on the point of being uncovered. Your neurons are slyly stretching their dendrites, they cautiously lift their tentacles, scribbling their graffiti, unreadable for now, on the inside of the bone box. The white dress billowing under the drowned woman’s shoulders looks like the open, lifeless wing of an enormous angel. Yet the only reason why we hold on to this absurd notion is that little flesh machine lodged inside our skulls. It’s hooked on meaning and cohesion. Something clicks between the synchronicity waves of our neuronal fields and certain harmonic structures in our perception. That is all. An illusion. Nature, shrouded in veils, does not easily tolerate mere mortals to contemplate her in her naked state.
The last remnants of the mist have disappeared, the clouds are shredded into ribbons, and the sun is setting in a dusk gathered out of a few gasoline-soaked rags of indigo and some crimson-fingered dirty flames. The sounds of fucking, she has discovered, can easily be imitated by rhythmically beating a stalk of celery on a raw slab of filet mignon. Consider for instance, one trivial mystery of the brain, namely the remarkable split between its two halves (one half specializes in hentai, the other in complex geometrical approximations [citation needed]): It is a split that we never experience. Consider the deep miracle of eclectic synchronization, the 40 Hz quantum impulse of consciousness that rides on the waves of asynchronous brain activities: What we “are” amounts to nothing more than a ghostly apocalyptic rider on a nonexistent and yet very real horse. Consciousness is a theater in which we can see only perfectly predetermined or long-transpired acts, and yet we have the illusion of a freedom of improvisation unmatched by any jazz musician. Our brains are the authors of our lives. We are merely the actors. Cognitive psychology is a beautiful, never-ending enterprise. To lose yourself in the details of the mind, in phenomena that last for only a few milliseconds and then dissolve into the great melting pot of consciousness without leaving a trace, it’s like trying to guess the number and function of the cogs of a tiny machine encased in a steel box that has been welded shut, just by shaking it. There’s a warning sticker on the outside of the mind: Warranty void if opened. No user-serviceable parts inside.
The girls in Texas, Father said, walk on their toes like Siamese cats, and they carry their heads high on their elegant necks like pretty accessories that serve no practical purpose.
Fuck you, Sam Harris, I do what I want!
I do not like talking about books on this website - that is a recipe for disaster - and I can only hold accountable a series of mechanical events, starting with the meager load of burning hurt shot into my mother’s plumbing, that final squirt from which, nine months later, your narrator would be so reluctantly born, for this senseless journey you’re about to embark on. One that could only prove injurious to your ego. One that could very well result in such a diminution of your concept of ‘self’ that you will come to regard your grey matter as the high-kneed tiptoed skulk of a vaudeville fiend that it actually is. Conjuring images of philosophically inclined felines with kleptocratic claws fingering the naked gangly minds of public intellectuals who absently sip absinthe from the bowls of their own navels. (See now that you were unable to keep from populating your mind with the unorthodox images contained in this conceptual flash bang. You had as much say in this act of creation as the innocent bystander did when a canister exploded and activated all the photoreceptor cells in their oracular equipment, disturbed the fluid in their ear, and flattened the dense grass of their stereoecilla like a crop circle enthusiast, and through a weird, inverse pointillism, disintegrated and dispersed into blackness, the image which had preoccupied them before being Swatted by a crank caller. If I ask you now to think of an animal, whatever creature first appears to you will do so unbidden. Whatever explanations you produce to justify enshrining this beast in the spotlight of your attention and not some other, will all be post hoc rationalizations.) Protest if you will. You can’t help it, after all.
But behold! The moon hangs in the sky like some strange, half-eaten fruit, pregnant with otherworldly juices and memory is but a meager attempt to hold on to something long since lost, through a wrestling match in a wet, spongy organ. The connotations of these words, their full impact and their broader context, are still implicit, available only to those neural networks. Your memory is a conspiracy on the point of being uncovered. Your neurons are slyly stretching their dendrites, they cautiously lift their tentacles, scribbling their graffiti, unreadable for now, on the inside of the bone box. The white dress billowing under the drowned woman’s shoulders looks like the open, lifeless wing of an enormous angel. Yet the only reason why we hold on to this absurd notion is that little flesh machine lodged inside our skulls. It’s hooked on meaning and cohesion. Something clicks between the synchronicity waves of our neuronal fields and certain harmonic structures in our perception. That is all. An illusion. Nature, shrouded in veils, does not easily tolerate mere mortals to contemplate her in her naked state.
The last remnants of the mist have disappeared, the clouds are shredded into ribbons, and the sun is setting in a dusk gathered out of a few gasoline-soaked rags of indigo and some crimson-fingered dirty flames. The sounds of fucking, she has discovered, can easily be imitated by rhythmically beating a stalk of celery on a raw slab of filet mignon. Consider for instance, one trivial mystery of the brain, namely the remarkable split between its two halves (one half specializes in hentai, the other in complex geometrical approximations [citation needed]): It is a split that we never experience. Consider the deep miracle of eclectic synchronization, the 40 Hz quantum impulse of consciousness that rides on the waves of asynchronous brain activities: What we “are” amounts to nothing more than a ghostly apocalyptic rider on a nonexistent and yet very real horse. Consciousness is a theater in which we can see only perfectly predetermined or long-transpired acts, and yet we have the illusion of a freedom of improvisation unmatched by any jazz musician. Our brains are the authors of our lives. We are merely the actors. Cognitive psychology is a beautiful, never-ending enterprise. To lose yourself in the details of the mind, in phenomena that last for only a few milliseconds and then dissolve into the great melting pot of consciousness without leaving a trace, it’s like trying to guess the number and function of the cogs of a tiny machine encased in a steel box that has been welded shut, just by shaking it. There’s a warning sticker on the outside of the mind: Warranty void if opened. No user-serviceable parts inside.
The girls in Texas, Father said, walk on their toes like Siamese cats, and they carry their heads high on their elegant necks like pretty accessories that serve no practical purpose.
Fuck you, Sam Harris, I do what I want!
May 17, 2021
Lying / Free Will, Sam Harris
Sam Harris says the idea of Free Will "cannot be mapped on to any conceivable reality" and is incoherent. According to Harris, science "reveals you to be a biochemical puppet."
People's thoughts and intentions, Harris says, "emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control."
Every choice we make is made as a result of preceding causes.
These choices we make are determined by those causes, and are therefore not really choices at all.
Sam Harris also draws a distinction between conscious and unconscious reactions to the world.
Even without Free Will, consciousness has an important role to play in the choices we make.
Sam Harris argues that this realization about the human mind does not undermine morality or diminish the importance of social and political freedom, but it can and should change the way we think about some of the most important questions in life.
عنوانهای چاپ شده در ایران: «دروغ ، اراده ی آزاد؛»؛ «اراده آزاد»؛ «دروغگویی»؛ نویسنده: سام هریس؛ تاریخ نخستین خوانش روز شانزدهم ماه می سال 2015میلادی
عنوان: دروغ ، اراده ی آزاد؛ نویسنده: سام هریس؛ مترجم: خشایار دیهیمی؛ تهران، نشر گمان، چاپ اول و دوم 1393، در 138ص؛ شابک 9786009407286؛ عنوان دیگر: اراده آزاد؛ چاپ سوم و چهارم 1394؛ چاپ پنجم 1396؛ چاپ ششم 1397؛ موضوع راستگویی و دروغگویی؛ جبر و اختیار؛ از نویسندگان ایالات متحده آمریکا سده 20م
عنوان: اراده آزاد؛ نویسنده: سام هریس؛ مترجم مژگان ولدخانی؛ تهران: موسسه آموزشیتالیفی ارشدان، 1396؛در 79ص؛ شابک 9786008767770؛
عنوان: دروغگویی؛ نویسنده: سام هریس؛ مترجم مینو پرنیانی؛ تهران، آشیان، 1397؛ در 91ص؛ شابک 9786007293416؛
فهرست: سخن سرپرست مجموعه، ص 9؛ دروغ ص 17؛ اراده آزاد، ص 73؛
کتاب دارای دو بخش دیگرگونه است؛ همانگونه که از عنوان کتاب پیداست، نیمی از کتاب به درباره ی «دروغ» و نیم دیگر به «اراده ی آزاد» میپردازد، در بخش «دروغ» با دیدگاهی دیگرگونه به دروغ نگریسته اند، و در بخشی از نتیجه گیری چنین آمده است: «ما با دروغگوییمان امکان نگاه به جهان را آنچنان که هست، از دیگران دریغ میکنیم؛ بیصداقتی ما، نه تنها بر تصمیمهایی که دیگران میگیرند اثر میگذارد، بلکه غالبا معین میکند، آنها اساسا چه تصمیمهایی میتوانند بگیرند، و آن هم به طرقی که ما همیشه نمیتوانیم پیش بینی شان کنیم؛ هر دروغی، یک یورش مستقیم به خود مختاری آنهایی است که این دروغ را تحویلشان میدهیم»؛ در بخش «اراده ی آزاد» نویسنده با به چالش کشیدن گزینش ارادی، با سود جستن از برخی از پژوهشها بر این باور هستند که «اراده ی آزاد یا همان اختیار، توهمی بیش نیست، خواستنها و اراده ی ما، ساخته ی ما و به دست ما نیست؛ فکرها و نیات، از عللی دارای پس زمینه ای بر میآیند، که ما بر آنها آگاه نیستیم، و هیچ مهار آگاهانه ای، نمیتوانیم بر آنها بزنیم؛ ما آن آزادی را که فکر میکنیم داریم، نداریم.»؛
تاریخ بهنگام رسانی 26/02/1400هجری خورشیدی؛ ا. شربیانی
Sam Harris says the idea of Free Will "cannot be mapped on to any conceivable reality" and is incoherent. According to Harris, science "reveals you to be a biochemical puppet."
People's thoughts and intentions, Harris says, "emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control."
Every choice we make is made as a result of preceding causes.
These choices we make are determined by those causes, and are therefore not really choices at all.
Sam Harris also draws a distinction between conscious and unconscious reactions to the world.
Even without Free Will, consciousness has an important role to play in the choices we make.
Sam Harris argues that this realization about the human mind does not undermine morality or diminish the importance of social and political freedom, but it can and should change the way we think about some of the most important questions in life.
عنوانهای چاپ شده در ایران: «دروغ ، اراده ی آزاد؛»؛ «اراده آزاد»؛ «دروغگویی»؛ نویسنده: سام هریس؛ تاریخ نخستین خوانش روز شانزدهم ماه می سال 2015میلادی
عنوان: دروغ ، اراده ی آزاد؛ نویسنده: سام هریس؛ مترجم: خشایار دیهیمی؛ تهران، نشر گمان، چاپ اول و دوم 1393، در 138ص؛ شابک 9786009407286؛ عنوان دیگر: اراده آزاد؛ چاپ سوم و چهارم 1394؛ چاپ پنجم 1396؛ چاپ ششم 1397؛ موضوع راستگویی و دروغگویی؛ جبر و اختیار؛ از نویسندگان ایالات متحده آمریکا سده 20م
عنوان: اراده آزاد؛ نویسنده: سام هریس؛ مترجم مژگان ولدخانی؛ تهران: موسسه آموزشیتالیفی ارشدان، 1396؛در 79ص؛ شابک 9786008767770؛
عنوان: دروغگویی؛ نویسنده: سام هریس؛ مترجم مینو پرنیانی؛ تهران، آشیان، 1397؛ در 91ص؛ شابک 9786007293416؛
فهرست: سخن سرپرست مجموعه، ص 9؛ دروغ ص 17؛ اراده آزاد، ص 73؛
کتاب دارای دو بخش دیگرگونه است؛ همانگونه که از عنوان کتاب پیداست، نیمی از کتاب به درباره ی «دروغ» و نیم دیگر به «اراده ی آزاد» میپردازد، در بخش «دروغ» با دیدگاهی دیگرگونه به دروغ نگریسته اند، و در بخشی از نتیجه گیری چنین آمده است: «ما با دروغگوییمان امکان نگاه به جهان را آنچنان که هست، از دیگران دریغ میکنیم؛ بیصداقتی ما، نه تنها بر تصمیمهایی که دیگران میگیرند اثر میگذارد، بلکه غالبا معین میکند، آنها اساسا چه تصمیمهایی میتوانند بگیرند، و آن هم به طرقی که ما همیشه نمیتوانیم پیش بینی شان کنیم؛ هر دروغی، یک یورش مستقیم به خود مختاری آنهایی است که این دروغ را تحویلشان میدهیم»؛ در بخش «اراده ی آزاد» نویسنده با به چالش کشیدن گزینش ارادی، با سود جستن از برخی از پژوهشها بر این باور هستند که «اراده ی آزاد یا همان اختیار، توهمی بیش نیست، خواستنها و اراده ی ما، ساخته ی ما و به دست ما نیست؛ فکرها و نیات، از عللی دارای پس زمینه ای بر میآیند، که ما بر آنها آگاه نیستیم، و هیچ مهار آگاهانه ای، نمیتوانیم بر آنها بزنیم؛ ما آن آزادی را که فکر میکنیم داریم، نداریم.»؛
تاریخ بهنگام رسانی 26/02/1400هجری خورشیدی؛ ا. شربیانی
May 21, 2013
This is a booklet, not a book. I have been pondering the problem of free will for twenty years, it is a central part of the book I am just about to publish, so I was very interested to see what Mr. Harris had to say. I was extremely disappointed.
I was shocked by the shallowness of his arguments. The scientific evidence he draws on are experiments that I read about 15 years ago; I can’t understand why he doesn’t include the copious evidence against free will that neuroscience has amassed in the last decade. His other arguments seem adolescent or circular. There are no definitions of what “free,” or “free will” mean. He just blithely assumes that the meanings are obvious.
He begins his book with the statement that the cultural clash over the issue of free-will/determinism will be more explosive than that over evolution. But his discussion of the consequences of our culture letting go of the belief in free will is appallingly brief. He addresses the most obvious issue, crime, but that’s about it. Nothing about the more personal issues of shame and pride. Nothing about how this would affect my attitude towards someone who has hurt me, or how it would affect our cultural belief in a meritocracy where people deserve better compensation because of their abilities.
He ends with a flippant “proof” of his lack of free will by saying “I can end this book any time I want, and since I can’t think of anything else to say on the subject and I’m hungry I’m going to stop now.” I could think of a dozen things he hadn’t discussed right off the top of my head!
If you’re interested in free will, don’t read this book. First read Incognito, by David Eagleman, for the latest neuroscience research and what this means about free will. Then read The Atheist’s Guide to Reality, by Alex Rosenberg, for a thoughtful discussion of what no free will means for our society. Then read my new book, We Are ALL Innocent by Reason of Insanity, for insight on what no free will means for the individual, in addition to the culture. You can read my blog posts on free will here: http://www.innocentbyreasonofinsanity...
I did get one memorable idea from Mr. Harris’ book: “Don’t confuse determinism with fatalism,” but he got that idea from someone else (philosopher Daniel Dennett).
Frankly I can’t understand why this book was published. It is so light on substance it should have been a blog post. The only reason I could come up with was Mr. Harris thinks that free will is going to be a major issue in the near future, and he wanted to position himself as an authority and original source.
I was shocked by the shallowness of his arguments. The scientific evidence he draws on are experiments that I read about 15 years ago; I can’t understand why he doesn’t include the copious evidence against free will that neuroscience has amassed in the last decade. His other arguments seem adolescent or circular. There are no definitions of what “free,” or “free will” mean. He just blithely assumes that the meanings are obvious.
He begins his book with the statement that the cultural clash over the issue of free-will/determinism will be more explosive than that over evolution. But his discussion of the consequences of our culture letting go of the belief in free will is appallingly brief. He addresses the most obvious issue, crime, but that’s about it. Nothing about the more personal issues of shame and pride. Nothing about how this would affect my attitude towards someone who has hurt me, or how it would affect our cultural belief in a meritocracy where people deserve better compensation because of their abilities.
He ends with a flippant “proof” of his lack of free will by saying “I can end this book any time I want, and since I can’t think of anything else to say on the subject and I’m hungry I’m going to stop now.” I could think of a dozen things he hadn’t discussed right off the top of my head!
If you’re interested in free will, don’t read this book. First read Incognito, by David Eagleman, for the latest neuroscience research and what this means about free will. Then read The Atheist’s Guide to Reality, by Alex Rosenberg, for a thoughtful discussion of what no free will means for our society. Then read my new book, We Are ALL Innocent by Reason of Insanity, for insight on what no free will means for the individual, in addition to the culture. You can read my blog posts on free will here: http://www.innocentbyreasonofinsanity...
I did get one memorable idea from Mr. Harris’ book: “Don’t confuse determinism with fatalism,” but he got that idea from someone else (philosopher Daniel Dennett).
Frankly I can’t understand why this book was published. It is so light on substance it should have been a blog post. The only reason I could come up with was Mr. Harris thinks that free will is going to be a major issue in the near future, and he wanted to position himself as an authority and original source.
July 11, 2021
موضوع: اراده آزاد؟؟؟
"داشتن اراده آزاد توهمی بیش نیست. اراده و افکار ما، ساخته و پرداخته خود ما (ضمیر آگاه) ما نیستند. افکار و امیال همگ�� سر منشائی در گذشته و سوابق ما دارند که در آن ها دخل و تصرفی نداریم و از آن ها بی خبریم. "
به طور کلی محتویات کتاب با خوانده های قبلیم در خصوص عصب شناسی و مغز سازگار هستند. اشکال کتاب این بود که گزاره و استدلالش که در ادامه خواهم گفت زیادی در سطح کتاب تکرار شده و در یک پاراگراف جای می گیره.
استدلال کتاب (که البته جامعه علمی عصب شناسان بر روش اجماع دارن و به اثبات رسیده) این هست که هر فکری که به ذهن ما می رسه قبل از اینکه نسبت بهش آگاهی پیدا کنیم، در ضمیر نا خود آگاه ما ساخته و پرداخته شده.
مثلا من هر روز صبح یا چایی می نوشم، یا قهوه و یا هردو. امروز فقط چای نوشیدم. چرا قهوه را انتخاب نکردم؟ نمی دانم. این تصمیم توسط ناخودآگاه من گرفته شد. آیا می توانستم نظرم را عوض کنم و جای آن قهوه بنوشم؟ بله، اما این فکر هم اگر به ذهن من می رسید، در واقع ساخته و پرداخته شده توسط ناخودآگاه من بوده.
گواه این فرآیند فکری دستگاه اف ام آر آی هست که می تونه در هر زمان نشون بده کدام قسمت مغز در حال فعالیت هست. یکی از کشف های بزرگی که توسط این دستگاه انجام شده بررسی افکار هست. دستگاه نشون می ده قبل از اینکه یک فکر به ضمیر خودآگاه ما برسه، حدود 700 میلی ثانیه قبل توسط ضمیر نا خودآگاه به وجود اومده.
مثال جالبی که در یکی از کتاب های عصب شناسی خوندم این بود که می گفت اینکه فکر کنیم ما به وجود آورنده افکارمان هستیم مانند این هست که تیترهای یک روزنامه رو مطالعه کنیم و بپنداریم که باعث و بانی اتفاقاتی که اون تیتر رو رقم زدن ما هستیم.
به طول خلاصه، امیال و اف��ار در ذهن ما ساخته نمی شوند، بلکه پدیدار می شوند.
خلاصه هایی از کتاب
1. Let's look at some experience:
The physiologist Benjamin Libet famously used EEG to show that activity in the
brain’s motor cortex can be detected some 300 milliseconds before a person feels that
he has decided to move.
Another lab extended this work using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI): Subjects were asked to press one of two buttons while watching a “clock” composed of a random sequence of letters appearing on a screen. They reported which letter was visible at the moment they decided to press one button or the other. The experimenters found two brain regions that contained information about which button subjects would press a full 7 to 10 seconds before the decision was consciously made. More recently, direct recordings from the cortex showed that the activity of merely 256 neurons was sufficient to predict with 80 percent accuracy a person’s decision to move 700 milliseconds before he became aware of it. These findings are difficult to reconcile with the sense that we are the conscious authors of our actions. One fact now seems indisputable: Some moments before you are aware of what you will do next—a time in which you subjectively appear to have complete freedom to behave however you please—your brain has already determined what you will do.
2. You can do what you decide to do—but you cannot decide what you will decide to do.
به کسانی که به این مبحث علاقه دارند قویا کتاب زیر رو توصیه می کنم:
Incognito: The Secret Lives of the Brain
"داشتن اراده آزاد توهمی بیش نیست. اراده و افکار ما، ساخته و پرداخته خود ما (ضمیر آگاه) ما نیستند. افکار و امیال همگ�� سر منشائی در گذشته و سوابق ما دارند که در آن ها دخل و تصرفی نداریم و از آن ها بی خبریم. "
به طور کلی محتویات کتاب با خوانده های قبلیم در خصوص عصب شناسی و مغز سازگار هستند. اشکال کتاب این بود که گزاره و استدلالش که در ادامه خواهم گفت زیادی در سطح کتاب تکرار شده و در یک پاراگراف جای می گیره.
استدلال کتاب (که البته جامعه علمی عصب شناسان بر روش اجماع دارن و به اثبات رسیده) این هست که هر فکری که به ذهن ما می رسه قبل از اینکه نسبت بهش آگاهی پیدا کنیم، در ضمیر نا خود آگاه ما ساخته و پرداخته شده.
مثلا من هر روز صبح یا چایی می نوشم، یا قهوه و یا هردو. امروز فقط چای نوشیدم. چرا قهوه را انتخاب نکردم؟ نمی دانم. این تصمیم توسط ناخودآگاه من گرفته شد. آیا می توانستم نظرم را عوض کنم و جای آن قهوه بنوشم؟ بله، اما این فکر هم اگر به ذهن من می رسید، در واقع ساخته و پرداخته شده توسط ناخودآگاه من بوده.
گواه این فرآیند فکری دستگاه اف ام آر آی هست که می تونه در هر زمان نشون بده کدام قسمت مغز در حال فعالیت هست. یکی از کشف های بزرگی که توسط این دستگاه انجام شده بررسی افکار هست. دستگاه نشون می ده قبل از اینکه یک فکر به ضمیر خودآگاه ما برسه، حدود 700 میلی ثانیه قبل توسط ضمیر نا خودآگاه به وجود اومده.
مثال جالبی که در یکی از کتاب های عصب شناسی خوندم این بود که می گفت اینکه فکر کنیم ما به وجود آورنده افکارمان هستیم مانند این هست که تیترهای یک روزنامه رو مطالعه کنیم و بپنداریم که باعث و بانی اتفاقاتی که اون تیتر رو رقم زدن ما هستیم.
به طول خلاصه، امیال و اف��ار در ذهن ما ساخته نمی شوند، بلکه پدیدار می شوند.
خلاصه هایی از کتاب
1. Let's look at some experience:
The physiologist Benjamin Libet famously used EEG to show that activity in the
brain’s motor cortex can be detected some 300 milliseconds before a person feels that
he has decided to move.
Another lab extended this work using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI): Subjects were asked to press one of two buttons while watching a “clock” composed of a random sequence of letters appearing on a screen. They reported which letter was visible at the moment they decided to press one button or the other. The experimenters found two brain regions that contained information about which button subjects would press a full 7 to 10 seconds before the decision was consciously made. More recently, direct recordings from the cortex showed that the activity of merely 256 neurons was sufficient to predict with 80 percent accuracy a person’s decision to move 700 milliseconds before he became aware of it. These findings are difficult to reconcile with the sense that we are the conscious authors of our actions. One fact now seems indisputable: Some moments before you are aware of what you will do next—a time in which you subjectively appear to have complete freedom to behave however you please—your brain has already determined what you will do.
2. You can do what you decide to do—but you cannot decide what you will decide to do.
به کسانی که به این مبحث علاقه دارند قویا کتاب زیر رو توصیه می کنم:
Incognito: The Secret Lives of the Brain
December 31, 2012
On Free Will & Crime: How should society react to violent crime?
Glancing at the cover might have been more than enough to guess the full contents of this one...
Harris is right to an extent, but as many have already done, his argument is too easy to poke holes in. This is primarily because the argument depends on the definition/boundary that he imposes on it. It makes for a good argument in a monologue but will fall apart in a dialogue.
This is not to say that there is no merit in what he concludes on the basis of his hypothesis. He uses it to identify the true nature of crime and how society should react to it:
If sneezing was a crime and someone violated it, can we become riled enough about it to conduct mass protests? What if all (or most) violent crimes are like that at a fundamental level - involuntary? Can we move our justice system away from a system based on punishment to one based on correction/isolation. Can we start feeling fear and pity to offenders instead of anger and revenge? These threads make the book a must read, especially in the light of the mass hysteria that has gripped Delhi (and the whole nation) in the wake of the poor unnamed girl's unfortunate death. Maybe I will elaborate on my thoughts on this subject at a later date, coward that I am.
February 6, 2023
Whoever said that there are no absolutes in philosophy must have surely had the topic of free will in mind. I've never heard more compelling arguments for such opposing points of view, each with its own existential hyperbole of quintessential conflubbery (yes, I just made up my own word, as a determinist I had no other choice).
If you're committed to the mental calisthenics necessary to tackle the tentacled titan that is Free Will, you owe it to yourself to seek out Daniel Dennett's Elbow Room for further reality altering points of view. Both are well written, though Harris is not as long-winded and Dennett is not as callous and self-absorbed.
If you're committed to the mental calisthenics necessary to tackle the tentacled titan that is Free Will, you owe it to yourself to seek out Daniel Dennett's Elbow Room for further reality altering points of view. Both are well written, though Harris is not as long-winded and Dennett is not as callous and self-absorbed.
June 30, 2022
شمار اندکی از ما قاتل یا دزد هستیم، اما همهمان دروغ میگوییم و بسیاری از ما قادر نیستیم همین امشب دل آسوده به رختخواب برویم بی آنکه در طول روز چندین و چند دروغ گفته باشیم. صفحه ۲۴ کتاب
صداقت هدیهای است که ما میتوانیم به دیگران بدهیم. صداقت درضمن منبع قدرت و موتور محرک سادگی و آسودگی است. صفحه ۲۶ کتاب
اکثر ما حالا دردمندانه میدانیم که اعتماد ما به حکومت، شرکتها، و دیگر نهادهای عمومی را دروغهایی که از آنها شنیدهایم سست کرده است. دروغها باعث تسریع در شروع جنگها یا کش آمدن و طولانیتر شدن آنها شده است. صفحه ۶۳ کتاب
دروغهای بزرگ، بسیاری از افراد را به عدم اعتمادی غیر ارادی به مقامات حکومتی کشانده است. درنتیجه، حالا دیگر امکان ندارد حرفی اساسی درباره تغییر آب و هوا، آلودگی محیط زیست، وضع تغذیه انسانها، سیاست اقتصادی، کشمکشهای خارجی، داروها و دهها موضوع دیگر مطرح شود و درصد بزرگی از مخاطبان تردیدهای فلجکنندهای نسبت به آنها ابراز نکنند، حتی اگر منبع آن از معتبرترین منابع خبری باشد. صفحه ۶۴ کتاب
نیاز دولتها به پنهان کردن اسرار دولتی امری بدیهی است. اما نیاز حکومت به فریب دادن مردمش بهنظر من بسیار اندک و قریب به صفر است -سرابی اخلاقی است. درست وقتیکه فکر میکنیم دلیلی برای آن یافتهایم، میفهمیم واقعیت جور دیگری است و صدمهای که آشکار شدن فریب حکومتها به بار میآورد بهکلی جبران ناپذیر است. صفحه ۶۶ کتاب
ما پدر و مادرمان یا زمان و مکان تولدمان را انتخاب نکردهایم. ما جنسیت یا بسیاری از تجربههای زندگیمان را انتخاب نکردهایم. ما کنترلی بر ژنها یا نحوه رشد مغزمان نداریم و حالا مغز ما دست به انتخابهایی میزند بر پایه ترجیحات و باورهایی که در طول زندگیمان بر آن بار شدهاست -چه با ژنهای مان، چه بنا بر پرورش یافتن جسمانی مان از لحظهای که شکل گرفتهایم، و کنش و واکنشهایی که با دیگران، اتفاقات و اندیشهها داشتهایم. در اینجا آزادی ما کجاست؟ آری، ما آزادیم هر کاری که همین حالا میخواهیم بکنیم. اما امیال ما از کجا آمدهاند؟ صفحهی ۱۱۳ کتاب
کمتر مفهومی بوده است که دامنه بیرحمی بشر را بیش از اندیشه روح فناناپذیری که مستقل از همه تأثیرات مادی است، از ژنها گرفته تا نظامهای اقتصادی، گسترش داده باشد. در چارچوب دینی، اعتقاد به ارادهی آزاد پشتوانه انگاره گناه است -که بهنظر میرسد نهفقط مجازات خشن در این زندگی را توجیه میکند، بلکه مجازات ابدی در زندگی بعدی را هم به همچنین. صفحه ۱۲۷ کتاب
محافظهکاران غالباً از فردگرایی یک بتواره میسازند. بسیاری از آنها انگار اصلا هیچ آگاهیای از این ندارند که چگونه فردی باید حتما خوشاقبال باشد تا در هر زمینهای در زندگیاش موفق باشد، و هیچ فرقی نمیکند که چقدر سخت کار کند. آدم باید خوشاقبال باشد تا اساساً بتواند کار کند. آدم باید خوشاقبال باشد تا با هوش و ذکاوت از نظر جسمی سالم باشد، و در میانسالی بر اثر بیماری همسرش ورشکست نشود. بیوگرافیهای مردان خودساخته را بخوانید و خواهید دید که موفقیت آنان کاملاً بستگی به شرایط پسزمینهای دارد که خود آنها دستی در به وجود آمدنش نداشتهاند و صرفاً از آن بهرهمند شدهاند. هیچ شخصی را بر روی این زمین نمیتوان یافت که ژنهای اش، یا کشور محل تولدش، یا شرایط سیاسی و اقتصادی مؤثر بر پیشرفتش در لحظات حیاتی و بحرانی را معین کرده باشد. صفحات ۱۳۳-۱۳۴ کتاب
صداقت هدیهای است که ما میتوانیم به دیگران بدهیم. صداقت درضمن منبع قدرت و موتور محرک سادگی و آسودگی است. صفحه ۲۶ کتاب
اکثر ما حالا دردمندانه میدانیم که اعتماد ما به حکومت، شرکتها، و دیگر نهادهای عمومی را دروغهایی که از آنها شنیدهایم سست کرده است. دروغها باعث تسریع در شروع جنگها یا کش آمدن و طولانیتر شدن آنها شده است. صفحه ۶۳ کتاب
دروغهای بزرگ، بسیاری از افراد را به عدم اعتمادی غیر ارادی به مقامات حکومتی کشانده است. درنتیجه، حالا دیگر امکان ندارد حرفی اساسی درباره تغییر آب و هوا، آلودگی محیط زیست، وضع تغذیه انسانها، سیاست اقتصادی، کشمکشهای خارجی، داروها و دهها موضوع دیگر مطرح شود و درصد بزرگی از مخاطبان تردیدهای فلجکنندهای نسبت به آنها ابراز نکنند، حتی اگر منبع آن از معتبرترین منابع خبری باشد. صفحه ۶۴ کتاب
نیاز دولتها به پنهان کردن اسرار دولتی امری بدیهی است. اما نیاز حکومت به فریب دادن مردمش بهنظر من بسیار اندک و قریب به صفر است -سرابی اخلاقی است. درست وقتیکه فکر میکنیم دلیلی برای آن یافتهایم، میفهمیم واقعیت جور دیگری است و صدمهای که آشکار شدن فریب حکومتها به بار میآورد بهکلی جبران ناپذیر است. صفحه ۶۶ کتاب
ما پدر و مادرمان یا زمان و مکان تولدمان را انتخاب نکردهایم. ما جنسیت یا بسیاری از تجربههای زندگیمان را انتخاب نکردهایم. ما کنترلی بر ژنها یا نحوه رشد مغزمان نداریم و حالا مغز ما دست به انتخابهایی میزند بر پایه ترجیحات و باورهایی که در طول زندگیمان بر آن بار شدهاست -چه با ژنهای مان، چه بنا بر پرورش یافتن جسمانی مان از لحظهای که شکل گرفتهایم، و کنش و واکنشهایی که با دیگران، اتفاقات و اندیشهها داشتهایم. در اینجا آزادی ما کجاست؟ آری، ما آزادیم هر کاری که همین حالا میخواهیم بکنیم. اما امیال ما از کجا آمدهاند؟ صفحهی ۱۱۳ کتاب
کمتر مفهومی بوده است که دامنه بیرحمی بشر را بیش از اندیشه روح فناناپذیری که مستقل از همه تأثیرات مادی است، از ژنها گرفته تا نظامهای اقتصادی، گسترش داده باشد. در چارچوب دینی، اعتقاد به ارادهی آزاد پشتوانه انگاره گناه است -که بهنظر میرسد نهفقط مجازات خشن در این زندگی را توجیه میکند، بلکه مجازات ابدی در زندگی بعدی را هم به همچنین. صفحه ۱۲۷ کتاب
محافظهکاران غالباً از فردگرایی یک بتواره میسازند. بسیاری از آنها انگار اصلا هیچ آگاهیای از این ندارند که چگونه فردی باید حتما خوشاقبال باشد تا در هر زمینهای در زندگیاش موفق باشد، و هیچ فرقی نمیکند که چقدر سخت کار کند. آدم باید خوشاقبال باشد تا اساساً بتواند کار کند. آدم باید خوشاقبال باشد تا با هوش و ذکاوت از نظر جسمی سالم باشد، و در میانسالی بر اثر بیماری همسرش ورشکست نشود. بیوگرافیهای مردان خودساخته را بخوانید و خواهید دید که موفقیت آنان کاملاً بستگی به شرایط پسزمینهای دارد که خود آنها دستی در به وجود آمدنش نداشتهاند و صرفاً از آن بهرهمند شدهاند. هیچ شخصی را بر روی این زمین نمیتوان یافت که ژنهای اش، یا کشور محل تولدش، یا شرایط سیاسی و اقتصادی مؤثر بر پیشرفتش در لحظات حیاتی و بحرانی را معین کرده باشد. صفحات ۱۳۳-۱۳۴ کتاب
July 7, 2021
3.5
راجع به این کتاب، دو جلسه بحث جذاب و جنجالی با چند نفر از دوستان عزیز دل داشتیم که تازه فقط بخش اول کتاب یعنی "دروغ" رو شامل شد و به قسمت دوم و جنجالیترش یعنی "اراده آزاد" نرسیدیم.
بنظرم کتاب خیلی جنجالی هستش، هر چند خیلی خوب نتونسته مساله رو تشریح کنه. از این جهت به عنوان یک کتابی که دستتون بگیرید و یک کله بخونید چون حجمش کمه یا کتابی که توی اتوبوس بخونید یا صوتی گوش بدید ابدا پیشنهاد نمیکنم.
بعضی از دوستان توی ریویو قسمت اول کتاب رو خیلی سطحی عنوان کردن. من کاملا مخالفم. بنظرم اونقدر که بخش اول چالشبرانگیزه بخش دوم نیست. چون بخش "اراده آزاد" یک مساله علمی هستش که هر چند جنجالیه اما قابل انکار نیست و مدارک علمی موجود راهی جز پذیرفتن و تلاش برای درک و هضم اون باقی نمیذاره.
اما تعریف کردن اینکه چه چیز دروغه و چه چیزی نیست، مسالهای به غایت دشواره و اگر توی اینترنت هم سرچ کنید به چیزهای خیلی جالبی برخواهید خورد.
پیشنهاد میکنم حتما گروهی خونده بشه و در موردش بحث بکنید. در واقع یکی از بهترین کتابها برای گروهی خوندن هست. مطمئننا اختلاف نظرهای خیلی زیادی خواهید داشت و طی بحث خیلی چیزها دستتون میاد. با اینحال بازم لازمه بگم که خود کتاب بنظر من نتونسته درست و حسابی توضیح بده و در هر دو مورد لازمه از منابع تکمیلی استفاده بشه.
بزودی ریویو مفصلی برای این کتاب مینویسم.
بخونید. ارزشش رو داره بنظرم.
راجع به این کتاب، دو جلسه بحث جذاب و جنجالی با چند نفر از دوستان عزیز دل داشتیم که تازه فقط بخش اول کتاب یعنی "دروغ" رو شامل شد و به قسمت دوم و جنجالیترش یعنی "اراده آزاد" نرسیدیم.
بنظرم کتاب خیلی جنجالی هستش، هر چند خیلی خوب نتونسته مساله رو تشریح کنه. از این جهت به عنوان یک کتابی که دستتون بگیرید و یک کله بخونید چون حجمش کمه یا کتابی که توی اتوبوس بخونید یا صوتی گوش بدید ابدا پیشنهاد نمیکنم.
بعضی از دوستان توی ریویو قسمت اول کتاب رو خیلی سطحی عنوان کردن. من کاملا مخالفم. بنظرم اونقدر که بخش اول چالشبرانگیزه بخش دوم نیست. چون بخش "اراده آزاد" یک مساله علمی هستش که هر چند جنجالیه اما قابل انکار نیست و مدارک علمی موجود راهی جز پذیرفتن و تلاش برای درک و هضم اون باقی نمیذاره.
اما تعریف کردن اینکه چه چیز دروغه و چه چیزی نیست، مسالهای به غایت دشواره و اگر توی اینترنت هم سرچ کنید به چیزهای خیلی جالبی برخواهید خورد.
پیشنهاد میکنم حتما گروهی خونده بشه و در موردش بحث بکنید. در واقع یکی از بهترین کتابها برای گروهی خوندن هست. مطمئننا اختلاف نظرهای خیلی زیادی خواهید داشت و طی بحث خیلی چیزها دستتون میاد. با اینحال بازم لازمه بگم که خود کتاب بنظر من نتونسته درست و حسابی توضیح بده و در هر دو مورد لازمه از منابع تکمیلی استفاده بشه.
بزودی ریویو مفصلی برای این کتاب مینویسم.
بخونید. ارزشش رو داره بنظرم.
December 2, 2017
Nietzsche is said to have said that he wished to say more in a couple lines than most philosophers could say in an entire book. The scheme may very well have been met by the great 19th century thinker, as each sentence could be dissected and interpreted in such ways that they beget numerous debates and discussions still. Sam Harris has expressed no such ambition, but if there is a modern philosopher/scientist to whom such a description could be accredited, it would be him (although he may be less difficult to take in than Nietzsche). The straightforwardly named Free Will could prove to be one of the more important books (or pamphlets) written in the coming years. The recent onslaught of neuroscience books may seem fashionable; an intellectual fad of sorts (as much could be said for the so-called new/neo-atheist ‘movement’ for which Harris was arguably the progenitor), but the merits and contentions of Dr. Harris cannot be chalked up to barren hype. Within his own lifetime, it is not unreasonable to think we may see a book entitled Why Sam Harris Matters (No, not by me, yet) being published. Perhaps he is destined, er, headed for a Nobel Prize. (Hey, it’s likelier than a Templeton Prize).
Controversy:
What would the implications be if the scientific consensuses become one of “free will is an illusion”? After all, the notion of free will has long been a definitive characteristic of what it is to be human. Given how many people still reject scientific consensus on matters like evolution, it is safe to assume that such a declaration would not change society at large w/r/t their belief in free will. Some significant portion of the population wouldn’t even find out about the shift, I’d wager. Free Will is largely assumed from the outset. We (or they) initiate conversations on morality with statements like “because we have free will, we…”, and “Free will has allowed for us humans to…”, and my favorite “God gave us free will so that we may choose…” It is used as a tool in a debate about morality, accountability, and responsibility, when it should often be part of the debate itself. Classical moralists (as I refer to them as) seem to think that the aim of those who would argue against the existence of free will is to absolve heinous murderers, rapists and other criminals of any wrong-doing. The problem in this sort of criticism is immediately apparent. Ask anyone (free will advocate or not) if they would feel comfortable with a known serial rapist/murderer/human-organ-collector/explosives-enthusiast/psycopath living across the street from them. The answer would invariably be NO, or perhaps, WHAT THE HELL KIND OF IDIOTIC QUESTION IS THAT? To seriously answer otherwise would itself be indicative of psychopathy. What makes people appeal to such paranoid accusations, as if neuroscience is all a conspiracy to set Charles Manson free? The emotional responses we have to murder are as hard-wired into us as digestion and waste excretion. The desire for vengeance when we feel wronged is entirely natural, but this has no particular bearing on what ‘motivation’ there was on the part of the offender. Free will, in the context of anti-life activities, is an excuse to justify why we want retribution, but to put it as simply (and boldly) as I can, we don’t need an excuse for these desires. Solidarity and empathy account for much in these matters. We empathize with family members of murder victims because we don’t want our loved one taken from us in such a manner. This all seems rather obvious, but people talk about justice as if it depends on punishing people for having the minds they have, which, ultimately, may have been no more capable of choosing to do what they did than we have to sleep when our bodies (or brains) tell us we are tired. We would still have a duty to keep offenders of livelihood and civilization away from functional society. (“If we could incarcerate earthquakes and hurricanes for their crimes…”, we would). Not to dwell too long on the point, but the objections of this sort are purely emotional, and that is justification in-and-of itself for wanting to kill someone for killing someone else. In a roundabout way, it further proves the absence of free will. Do we have control over how we feel about people? Do we really, as religious moralists assume, have the power to forgive? The problem, as Harris points out, is that we have absolutely no say in who we are. We are born with all the proclivities that we will come to live with, whether it be a dormant neurological disorder that will spring up in our thirties, or a predisposition for cancer that develops a tumor in our frontal cortex and could fundamentally ‘change’ who we are. Psychopaths don’t choose to be psychopaths any more than people with down-syndrome choose to have down-syndrome.
Questions to Consider:
If we had free will, would we ever be able to do what we did, when we could have done something else instead? Did I have a choice to phrase that question differently? If I went back and changed the way I phrased the question, did I have a choice to keep it as it was? Did you have a choice to read it? Once you read it, do you have a choice to forget it? Are you asking yourself if I have a choice to shut the fuck up? Did you have a choice about whether or not you asked yourself that question?
A Coming Intellectual Feud?
Harris ensues a friendly dissent from philosopher Daniel Dennett and the compatibilists, who “generally claim that a person is free from any outer or inner compulsions that would prevent him from acting on his actual desires and intentions.” Whatever we ‘decide’ to do is determined by something that we could not have ‘decided’ to think, or on past events which are already done and irreversible. To make it clear, we are incapable of doing anything which does not occur to us to do. Harris has received much criticism from Dennett’s students and fans. Hopefully I can look forward to a debate between the two greats.
Choosing to Conclude My Thoughts:
Where do our ideas come from? When we have good ideas, it cannot be said that we chose to have them. The depressing loathsomeness which shadows a good idea that doesn’t last long enough to make it on the page occurs because that idea had nothing to do with me as a conscious agent determining which thoughts to hang on to and which to dispose of; leaving only the memory that I had a good idea, without allowing me to process again what that idea was. (If this review sucks, the above sentence is my excuse as to the reason).
I can’t think of anything else to write about this book at the moment, and can’t wait to post it any longer, “and where is the freedom in that?”
Controversy:
What would the implications be if the scientific consensuses become one of “free will is an illusion”? After all, the notion of free will has long been a definitive characteristic of what it is to be human. Given how many people still reject scientific consensus on matters like evolution, it is safe to assume that such a declaration would not change society at large w/r/t their belief in free will. Some significant portion of the population wouldn’t even find out about the shift, I’d wager. Free Will is largely assumed from the outset. We (or they) initiate conversations on morality with statements like “because we have free will, we…”, and “Free will has allowed for us humans to…”, and my favorite “God gave us free will so that we may choose…” It is used as a tool in a debate about morality, accountability, and responsibility, when it should often be part of the debate itself. Classical moralists (as I refer to them as) seem to think that the aim of those who would argue against the existence of free will is to absolve heinous murderers, rapists and other criminals of any wrong-doing. The problem in this sort of criticism is immediately apparent. Ask anyone (free will advocate or not) if they would feel comfortable with a known serial rapist/murderer/human-organ-collector/explosives-enthusiast/psycopath living across the street from them. The answer would invariably be NO, or perhaps, WHAT THE HELL KIND OF IDIOTIC QUESTION IS THAT? To seriously answer otherwise would itself be indicative of psychopathy. What makes people appeal to such paranoid accusations, as if neuroscience is all a conspiracy to set Charles Manson free? The emotional responses we have to murder are as hard-wired into us as digestion and waste excretion. The desire for vengeance when we feel wronged is entirely natural, but this has no particular bearing on what ‘motivation’ there was on the part of the offender. Free will, in the context of anti-life activities, is an excuse to justify why we want retribution, but to put it as simply (and boldly) as I can, we don’t need an excuse for these desires. Solidarity and empathy account for much in these matters. We empathize with family members of murder victims because we don’t want our loved one taken from us in such a manner. This all seems rather obvious, but people talk about justice as if it depends on punishing people for having the minds they have, which, ultimately, may have been no more capable of choosing to do what they did than we have to sleep when our bodies (or brains) tell us we are tired. We would still have a duty to keep offenders of livelihood and civilization away from functional society. (“If we could incarcerate earthquakes and hurricanes for their crimes…”, we would). Not to dwell too long on the point, but the objections of this sort are purely emotional, and that is justification in-and-of itself for wanting to kill someone for killing someone else. In a roundabout way, it further proves the absence of free will. Do we have control over how we feel about people? Do we really, as religious moralists assume, have the power to forgive? The problem, as Harris points out, is that we have absolutely no say in who we are. We are born with all the proclivities that we will come to live with, whether it be a dormant neurological disorder that will spring up in our thirties, or a predisposition for cancer that develops a tumor in our frontal cortex and could fundamentally ‘change’ who we are. Psychopaths don’t choose to be psychopaths any more than people with down-syndrome choose to have down-syndrome.
Questions to Consider:
If we had free will, would we ever be able to do what we did, when we could have done something else instead? Did I have a choice to phrase that question differently? If I went back and changed the way I phrased the question, did I have a choice to keep it as it was? Did you have a choice to read it? Once you read it, do you have a choice to forget it? Are you asking yourself if I have a choice to shut the fuck up? Did you have a choice about whether or not you asked yourself that question?
A Coming Intellectual Feud?
Harris ensues a friendly dissent from philosopher Daniel Dennett and the compatibilists, who “generally claim that a person is free from any outer or inner compulsions that would prevent him from acting on his actual desires and intentions.” Whatever we ‘decide’ to do is determined by something that we could not have ‘decided’ to think, or on past events which are already done and irreversible. To make it clear, we are incapable of doing anything which does not occur to us to do. Harris has received much criticism from Dennett’s students and fans. Hopefully I can look forward to a debate between the two greats.
Choosing to Conclude My Thoughts:
Where do our ideas come from? When we have good ideas, it cannot be said that we chose to have them. The depressing loathsomeness which shadows a good idea that doesn’t last long enough to make it on the page occurs because that idea had nothing to do with me as a conscious agent determining which thoughts to hang on to and which to dispose of; leaving only the memory that I had a good idea, without allowing me to process again what that idea was. (If this review sucks, the above sentence is my excuse as to the reason).
I can’t think of anything else to write about this book at the moment, and can’t wait to post it any longer, “and where is the freedom in that?”
March 27, 2024
I’m not sure, even after reading this, if I have free will or not. Most days, I seem to exist in my thoughts guiding actions that were the same as the day before. And the older I get I realise I am behaving more or less as I did as a child, tempered slightly by adult responsibilities hammered into me by time and necessity.
The author uses the studies ten years back that indicated a microsecond of neurological activity in the motor cortex of the brain precedes our decision to act, say move our hand, kick a football. This means that impulses, made up of unconscious drives, heredity, learned behaviours etc, drive our actions. And therefore, the thing we call ourself isn't really in charge of the whole thing. So, no free will.
There’s a philosophical point of view opposing this called the compatibalism whose adherents say that that cluster of idiosyncrasies we call heredity, behaviour, learning, impulse etc is the boundary of our being that makes us. So when we make decisions, because we are that bundle of being, we are the agent of those decisions.
Naturally, this all has implications over who is responsible, or if anyone is responsible for things like crimes. And there’s a bunch of scenarios beloved of ethicists that ask us to judge whether a murder committed by a person with say a recent brain tumour is the same as an angry person behaving on impulse and so on. It’s funny how when scenarios are placed before us we easily understand the idea of personal agency, but when we are now confronted by this evidence from science of our neurological pathways, the whole business becomes murky.
Then I watched a brief video from my intellectual guide to critical thinking the methuselah like Noam Chomsky (please dear God, let him live to 900 years old, because future generations need him too.) who thinks that all this neurological evidence points to is that much of our thinking comes from a kind of unconscious place – for instance I’m watching a lot of Youtube videos and no longer have to choose what I watch because the algorithm regularly brings me Noam Chomsky. And it is likely that the Youtube algorithm can identify who and what I am from my viewing history – it sounds impressive when I say I listen to Noam Chomsky and gardening, but then I also impulsively watch snippets of old sitcoms. I tend then to think I have little agency and might as well go out and… choose what to have for lunch based on wild impulses I cannot control.
_______
I listened to a video on Youtube by Robert Sapolksy on Alex O'Connor's video channel on free will, fascinating.
The author uses the studies ten years back that indicated a microsecond of neurological activity in the motor cortex of the brain precedes our decision to act, say move our hand, kick a football. This means that impulses, made up of unconscious drives, heredity, learned behaviours etc, drive our actions. And therefore, the thing we call ourself isn't really in charge of the whole thing. So, no free will.
There’s a philosophical point of view opposing this called the compatibalism whose adherents say that that cluster of idiosyncrasies we call heredity, behaviour, learning, impulse etc is the boundary of our being that makes us. So when we make decisions, because we are that bundle of being, we are the agent of those decisions.
Naturally, this all has implications over who is responsible, or if anyone is responsible for things like crimes. And there’s a bunch of scenarios beloved of ethicists that ask us to judge whether a murder committed by a person with say a recent brain tumour is the same as an angry person behaving on impulse and so on. It’s funny how when scenarios are placed before us we easily understand the idea of personal agency, but when we are now confronted by this evidence from science of our neurological pathways, the whole business becomes murky.
Then I watched a brief video from my intellectual guide to critical thinking the methuselah like Noam Chomsky (please dear God, let him live to 900 years old, because future generations need him too.) who thinks that all this neurological evidence points to is that much of our thinking comes from a kind of unconscious place – for instance I’m watching a lot of Youtube videos and no longer have to choose what I watch because the algorithm regularly brings me Noam Chomsky. And it is likely that the Youtube algorithm can identify who and what I am from my viewing history – it sounds impressive when I say I listen to Noam Chomsky and gardening, but then I also impulsively watch snippets of old sitcoms. I tend then to think I have little agency and might as well go out and… choose what to have for lunch based on wild impulses I cannot control.
_______
I listened to a video on Youtube by Robert Sapolksy on Alex O'Connor's video channel on free will, fascinating.
May 20, 2015
Sam Harris’s book is essay length, and a wonderfully easy read, considering it presents some revolutionary ideas. The overriding one being his questioning of free will.
He tells us that various scientific experiments have shown beyond doubt that we reach decisions in our brains unconsciously - before we reach decisions consciously via the sense of “I think” that we know so well. These unconscious decisions are shaped by our genetics, our upbringing, our physiology, our culture, our current situation and so forth, and they well up from the depths of our being, not from the conscious decision-making self that appears to govern the way we negotiate life.
When we casually decide to phone someone, the idea just floats into our consciousness from our unconscious. The desire for the call comes seemingly out of a void. That is something that most of us can easily accept. But Harris would argue that so does the idea we want to marry so-and-so, or take that new job. Even when we think we deliberate consciously and robustly about such matters, we are in fact just making stories up about decisions already made unconsciously.
So, in Sam Harris’s eyes ‘free will’ is in fact just a quirk of how we experience ourselves. It’s a useful tool in helping us bring everything together, and creating a sense of control, but it isn’t real. It’s just a feeling.
I found his arguments remarkably persuasive.
Besides his concept of free will being just a sensation, he also speaks very interestingly about criminality, and how we need to rethink our attitudes, and the way we regard and treat criminals in the light of current research. His ideas call for understanding rather than punitive or vengeful responses, even for the most appalling and cruel crimes. That doesn't mean we shouldn't remove some people from society, but he argues that we could be treating people more logically and perhaps more kindly than we do. If there is no free will then none of us can help what we have done up to this point in time. Our influences (genetics/upbringing/current situation etc) have brought us to where we are, for better or worse.
This doesn't mean things can't change in the future, but change takes on a different character. Unconscious factors will still decide outcomes.
Throughout Harris’s book he mentions Daniel Dennet, a philosopher and cognitive scientist who has argued extensively against his ideas about free will. Dennet’s response to Harris’s book can be found HERE. I found it much more difficult to understand than Harris’s book, and didn’t really come to grips with it at all, but then I do find philosophical arguments very challenging.
There is also a lecture HERE by Sam Harris which covers most of the points raised in the book, although for me the book was a much better vehicle for the transmission of his ideas.
As for me, I am now feeling my way around as someone who accepts their momentum comes from the unconscious. I’m glad to report that nothing has changed. I’m not lying in front of television all day thinking “what the heck” or “if my unconscious is in charge I might as well let go of the reins.” (Although if I did that it would still be a reflection of ideas from the unconscious....) But at some level I have taken on board this new idea, and I will be interested to see how well it works out for me. Like a new coat, I am still not sure how well it fits. We shall see.
He tells us that various scientific experiments have shown beyond doubt that we reach decisions in our brains unconsciously - before we reach decisions consciously via the sense of “I think” that we know so well. These unconscious decisions are shaped by our genetics, our upbringing, our physiology, our culture, our current situation and so forth, and they well up from the depths of our being, not from the conscious decision-making self that appears to govern the way we negotiate life.
When we casually decide to phone someone, the idea just floats into our consciousness from our unconscious. The desire for the call comes seemingly out of a void. That is something that most of us can easily accept. But Harris would argue that so does the idea we want to marry so-and-so, or take that new job. Even when we think we deliberate consciously and robustly about such matters, we are in fact just making stories up about decisions already made unconsciously.
So, in Sam Harris’s eyes ‘free will’ is in fact just a quirk of how we experience ourselves. It’s a useful tool in helping us bring everything together, and creating a sense of control, but it isn’t real. It’s just a feeling.
I found his arguments remarkably persuasive.
Besides his concept of free will being just a sensation, he also speaks very interestingly about criminality, and how we need to rethink our attitudes, and the way we regard and treat criminals in the light of current research. His ideas call for understanding rather than punitive or vengeful responses, even for the most appalling and cruel crimes. That doesn't mean we shouldn't remove some people from society, but he argues that we could be treating people more logically and perhaps more kindly than we do. If there is no free will then none of us can help what we have done up to this point in time. Our influences (genetics/upbringing/current situation etc) have brought us to where we are, for better or worse.
This doesn't mean things can't change in the future, but change takes on a different character. Unconscious factors will still decide outcomes.
Throughout Harris’s book he mentions Daniel Dennet, a philosopher and cognitive scientist who has argued extensively against his ideas about free will. Dennet’s response to Harris’s book can be found HERE. I found it much more difficult to understand than Harris’s book, and didn’t really come to grips with it at all, but then I do find philosophical arguments very challenging.
There is also a lecture HERE by Sam Harris which covers most of the points raised in the book, although for me the book was a much better vehicle for the transmission of his ideas.
As for me, I am now feeling my way around as someone who accepts their momentum comes from the unconscious. I’m glad to report that nothing has changed. I’m not lying in front of television all day thinking “what the heck” or “if my unconscious is in charge I might as well let go of the reins.” (Although if I did that it would still be a reflection of ideas from the unconscious....) But at some level I have taken on board this new idea, and I will be interested to see how well it works out for me. Like a new coat, I am still not sure how well it fits. We shall see.
December 19, 2019
So,
–the concept of free will is "fundamentally incoherent"
–rather, everything is entirely determined, except also random
–this is supported by one particular result in cogsci
–since there is no free will there are no doings, just happenings
–if doings are incoherent and there are only happenings, then our penal institutions punish people not for what they do but what happens to them
–so what we should DO is TAKE ACTION to reform our institutions accordingly
–also I would like to thank my wife for all she DID for this book
LOL
–the concept of free will is "fundamentally incoherent"
–rather, everything is entirely determined, except also random
–this is supported by one particular result in cogsci
–since there is no free will there are no doings, just happenings
–if doings are incoherent and there are only happenings, then our penal institutions punish people not for what they do but what happens to them
–so what we should DO is TAKE ACTION to reform our institutions accordingly
–also I would like to thank my wife for all she DID for this book
LOL
June 27, 2016
"إن أفكاره الأنيقة دائما ما تستفزنا"
حيققة أني مارست الإنكار في بداية قراءتي للكتاب ,
لم أكن أقدر حينها على احتمال صدمة أنني لست ما أعتقده, أنني لا أمتلك تلك الإرادة الحرة التي أُعملها في الأشياء,
ولكن مع تتابع الصفحات, وعندما اقتربت من منتصف الكتاب تقريبا بدأت أميل لفكرته,
ولما لا أميل لها؟!
ألم أقل دوما بأن الجاني لابد وأنه كان مضطرا نوعا ما لارتكابه ما نعتقده نحن شرا, لابد أن هناك ما أوصله لهذا!!
أليس ما قاله سام هاريس في هذا الكتاب هو بلورة لتلك الجملة السابقة!!
نحن لا نمتلك الإرادة الحرة, وليس الهدف من العقاب بحد ذاته بل التأهيل وإعادة التوجيه كي لا تتكرر ثانية!!
من الكتب اللي غيرت نقطة في طريقة تفكيري, أو بالأحرى بلورت جزء منه بطريقة أكثر احترافية
**
تحديث بتاريخ 6/3/2015, وبعد تقريبا أربع شهور, أنا الآن أعتنق أفكار سام هاريس عن الحتمية و حرية الإرادة
January 17, 2023
"You are not controlling the storm, and you are not lost in it. You are the storm." - Sam Harris
"It’s true that human persons don’t have contra-causal free will. We are not self-caused little gods. But we are just as real as the genetic and environmental processes which created us and the situations in which we make choices. The deliberative machinery supporting effective action is just as real and causally effective as any other process in nature. So we don’t have to talk as if we are real agents in order to concoct a motivationally useful illusion of agency, which is what Harris seems to recommend we do near the end of his remarks on free will. Agenthood survives determinism, no problem." - Tom Clark (excerpt)
"It’s true that human persons don’t have contra-causal free will. We are not self-caused little gods. But we are just as real as the genetic and environmental processes which created us and the situations in which we make choices. The deliberative machinery supporting effective action is just as real and causally effective as any other process in nature. So we don’t have to talk as if we are real agents in order to concoct a motivationally useful illusion of agency, which is what Harris seems to recommend we do near the end of his remarks on free will. Agenthood survives determinism, no problem." - Tom Clark (excerpt)
February 24, 2016
من قرأ في علم الكلام لابد أنه تعرض كثيرًا لحرية الإرادة كأحد أهم القضايا التي تناقشها الفرق
ما بين المعتزلة وإيمانهم بحرية الإنسان ومسئوليته عن تصرفاته وسلوكه
ومن ثم استحقاقه للثواب والعقاب سواء دنيوي أو أُخرويّ
وما بين الأشاعرة ونظرية الكسب لديهم، التي لا تستطيع فهم اتجاهها وإلى أيهما أقرب
لحرية الإرادة ومسئولية الإنسان أم للجبر
��ما بين الجبرية، ونفيهم لقدرة الإنسان على الفعل
حين كنت اقرأ رأي الجبرية كنت أشعر بالسخف
وأن الفكرة لا تستحق حتى بذل جهد لتفنيدها أو حتى محاولة التفكير فيها
لكن إذا كان للكتاب -بالنسبة ليّ- من فائدة
فهي أنه في المقام الأول جعلني أدرك أنه لا يجب الاستخاف بفكرة ما مهما بدت سخيفة وتافهة
قبل أن تفكر بها جيدًا وتقوم بالنظر إليها من جميع الأوجه
الأفكار يجب أن يُنظر لها بنوع من القدسية والاحترام
وفي المقام الثاني قام بإثارة أفكار وتساؤلات جديدة في موضوع
كنت تعتقد أنك تتبنى عنه رأي حاسم ومحدد
رغم أنه ناقشها بشكل سريع وركيك، حتى مع استخدامه علم النفس والفسيولوجي كدليل
ربما هذا لصغر حجم الكتاب، وربما لأن الفكرة متهافتة من الأساس
لكنها في النهاية تستحق قراءة أعمق
تمّت
ما بين المعتزلة وإيمانهم بحرية الإنسان ومسئوليته عن تصرفاته وسلوكه
ومن ثم استحقاقه للثواب والعقاب سواء دنيوي أو أُخرويّ
وما بين الأشاعرة ونظرية الكسب لديهم، التي لا تستطيع فهم اتجاهها وإلى أيهما أقرب
لحرية الإرادة ومسئولية الإنسان أم للجبر
��ما بين الجبرية، ونفيهم لقدرة الإنسان على الفعل
حين كنت اقرأ رأي الجبرية كنت أشعر بالسخف
وأن الفكرة لا تستحق حتى بذل جهد لتفنيدها أو حتى محاولة التفكير فيها
لكن إذا كان للكتاب -بالنسبة ليّ- من فائدة
فهي أنه في المقام الأول جعلني أدرك أنه لا يجب الاستخاف بفكرة ما مهما بدت سخيفة وتافهة
قبل أن تفكر بها جيدًا وتقوم بالنظر إليها من جميع الأوجه
الأفكار يجب أن يُنظر لها بنوع من القدسية والاحترام
وفي المقام الثاني قام بإثارة أفكار وتساؤلات جديدة في موضوع
كنت تعتقد أنك تتبنى عنه رأي حاسم ومحدد
رغم أنه ناقشها بشكل سريع وركيك، حتى مع استخدامه علم النفس والفسيولوجي كدليل
ربما هذا لصغر حجم الكتاب، وربما لأن الفكرة متهافتة من الأساس
لكنها في النهاية تستحق قراءة أعمق
تمّت
February 4, 2017
دو تا مقالهی کتاب و به خصوص اولی در حدی نیستند که توی کتاب چاپ بشند. شاید می شد این دو تا رو توی چند قسمت برای یه روزنامه یا نشریه فرستاد و اونجا چاپ کرد. مقالهی اول که بیشتر به یه شوخی شبیه هست و بهتره ازش بگذریم
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اما مقالهی دوم خواسته و تلاش کرده تا یه عقیده ی غالب رو به چالش بکشه. از نظر سم هریس ارادهی آزاد یه توهم هست و چیزی به اسم ارادهی آزاد وجود نداره. سم هریس سه طرز تفکر غالب رو بیان میکنه و میگه تا حالا جبرباوری و اختیار باوری رو خیلی به چالش کشیدن. اما کم پیش اومده که سازگاری باوری [ارادهی محدود به جبر محیطی] به چالش کشیده بشه. ایدهی جذابی که البته باز هم خوب پرورده نشده. حرف هریس این هست که میگه ممکنه کسی بگه من الان دلم میخواد قهوه بخورم و قهوه خوردم: این یعنی اراده دارم. اما این یه توهمی از اراده هست. تو چرا تو اون لحظه چایی نخواستی؟ انتخاب تو وابسته به هزاران هزار عامل ریز و درشت هست که باعث شده تو تو اون لحظه ی خاص دلت قهوه بخواد. میشه روی این ایده مانورهای خوبی داد. اما به نظرم همهی اینها برمیگرده به درک ما از زمان. وقتی که "بعد" از اتفاق به تاثیر اراده فکر میکنیم اون رو به نظر بیتاثیر میبینیم. اما "پیش" از اینکه اتفاقی رخ بده "امکان"های متعددی پیش روی ماست که محدودیتش رو محیط و ظرفیتهای ما تعیین میکنه... یعنی باز هم به نظر می رسه سازگاریباوری نظرگاه درستتری به این مسئله هست
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پیشنهاد میکنم اگه وقت کردید مقالهی دوم این کتاب رو برای طرح سوال توی ذهنتون بخونبد
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اما مقالهی دوم خواسته و تلاش کرده تا یه عقیده ی غالب رو به چالش بکشه. از نظر سم هریس ارادهی آزاد یه توهم هست و چیزی به اسم ارادهی آزاد وجود نداره. سم هریس سه طرز تفکر غالب رو بیان میکنه و میگه تا حالا جبرباوری و اختیار باوری رو خیلی به چالش کشیدن. اما کم پیش اومده که سازگاری باوری [ارادهی محدود به جبر محیطی] به چالش کشیده بشه. ایدهی جذابی که البته باز هم خوب پرورده نشده. حرف هریس این هست که میگه ممکنه کسی بگه من الان دلم میخواد قهوه بخورم و قهوه خوردم: این یعنی اراده دارم. اما این یه توهمی از اراده هست. تو چرا تو اون لحظه چایی نخواستی؟ انتخاب تو وابسته به هزاران هزار عامل ریز و درشت هست که باعث شده تو تو اون لحظه ی خاص دلت قهوه بخواد. میشه روی این ایده مانورهای خوبی داد. اما به نظرم همهی اینها برمیگرده به درک ما از زمان. وقتی که "بعد" از اتفاق به تاثیر اراده فکر میکنیم اون رو به نظر بیتاثیر میبینیم. اما "پیش" از اینکه اتفاقی رخ بده "امکان"های متعددی پیش روی ماست که محدودیتش رو محیط و ظرفیتهای ما تعیین میکنه... یعنی باز هم به نظر می رسه سازگاریباوری نظرگاه درستتری به این مسئله هست
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پیشنهاد میکنم اگه وقت کردید مقالهی دوم این کتاب رو برای طرح سوال توی ذهنتون بخونبد
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June 14, 2012
So, Sam Harris an atheist and a neuroscientist
He begins his book by telling a shocking story of how some burglars robbed, child-abused, raped, tortured and set a family's house on fire and killing them apart from the father who survived.
He then says that one of them had shown signs of remorse and attempted suicide a couple of times, and the other had repeatedly been raped as a child, and both of these men had been suffering from brain tumors.
He concludes that if any one of us had been in their shoes, traded places, atom for an atom, we would have done the very same thing, since their actions aren't built upon free will but upon their past experiences and certain circumstances which resulted the action.
This is his introduction to the reader I guess, assuming that free will is an illusion, and that their is no such thing as an immortal soul.
He further explains, I quote:
"Our wills are simply not of our own making. Thoughts and intentions emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control. We do not have the freedom we think we have."
In the Unconscious Origins of the Wills he lists some scientific experiments which proves that a person's decision to move or chose or talk is (700) milliseconds before he become aware of it.
He then assumes that if there was a "perfect nueroimaging device" as silly as this name he chose, he then says; the device will predicts what actions you will do seconds earlier, what magazines you will read, how many lines, and what words are you going to speak! and since there is no such thing, he comes to a conclusion based on this hypothesis and the basic scientific experiments that there is no such thing as free will. Ta-da!
First he explains the inability to control your will by saying this:
"You are not controlling the storm, and you are not lost in it. You are the storm"
How can you be the storm (actions) when you are the one causing it? (and yet he says you're not responsible for it). so neither one of these answers solves the dilemma. If I am the storm, I am in control of it, how can past experiences be the cause of my actions and yet I be the storm? and [I] isn't even responsible for it?
Making it more confusing, he goes out saying:
"You can do what you decide to do- but you cannot decide what you will decide to do"
What's funny is that he admits that research has shown a decrease in morality when people know that they don't have free will and their actions are decided based on their past... and then he says that himself is an example for good morals without free will?!
I totally agree that background conditions can affect your choice and decisions but its not an ultimate effect for everyone, apart from those who suffer brain tumors, the majority have the responsibility and freedom of will to decide what to do.
At some point he admits that strict punishment - rather than mere containment or rehabilitation - is necessary to prevent certain crimes. But he still thinks that murderers aren't aware and responsible for their decisions and that they are blameless..
I think he had fate mixed with free will, since in one of his example he ask himself why did he quit training 20 years ago and then suddenly decided to come back, of course, he explains it as not his will, but on certain conditions like after reading Rory Miller's book Meditations on Violence. He then concludes that if you bought this book after reading this, you had no will over it, even if you bought it and put it on the shelf and not read it, its not your will, and even more if you decided not to buy it after reading this its not your will! .. thinking he's a smart ass by saying this, but proved the opposite actually, since this is called Fate, destiny, predestination or what we call in Islam "Qadar" , it has nothing to do whatsoever with free will.
He further demonstrate that laziness is like diligence a neurological condition, that we have no control of it..
Again, an atheist and biologist fails to describe the inner soul and mind of us humans..
August 28, 2021
Although Sam Harris is a neuroscientist rather than a theologian, he prosecutes his case against free will in this book with religious zeal rather than scientific objectivity and rigor. He constantly and repeatedly makes uncorroborated blanket statements that the reader is evidently supposed to take on faith. The book reads like a lawyer's brief—and not a very good one at that (I speak as a retired litigation lawyer)—rather than a dispassionate scientific or philosophical inquiry.
Harris, like many other contemporary critics of free will, appears to rest most of his deterministic argument on a famous 1983 experiment by Benjamin Libet, as supplemented by some later experiments. Harris states (8-9):
"The physiologist Benjamin Libet famously used EEG to show that activity in the brain’s motor cortex can be detected some 300 milliseconds before a person feels that he has decided to move. [Endnote omitted.] Another lab extended this work using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI): Subjects were asked to press one of two buttons while watching a 'clock' composed of a random sequence of letters appearing on a screen. They reported which letter was visible at the moment they decided to press one button or the other. The experimenters found two brain regions that contained information about which button subjects would press a full 7 to 10 seconds before the decision was consciously made. [Endnote omitted.] More recently, direct recordings from the cortex showed that the activity of merely 256 neurons was sufficient to predict with 80 percent accuracy a person’s decision to move 700 milliseconds before he became aware of it. [Endnote omitted.]"
Harris acknowledges (93n2), without citing any sources, that "Libet and others have speculated that the concept of free will might yet be saved: Perhaps the conscious mind is free to 'veto,' rather than initiate, complex action. This suggestion has always seemed absurd on its face—for surely the neural events that inhibit a planned action arise unconsciously as well." (Emphasis added.)
I submit that the verbalisms "speculated," "always seemed absurd on its face" and "surely" are not scientific or philosophical proofs of anything. Indeed, they are reminiscent of theological arguments for which Harris, in so many contexts here and elsewhere, expresses nothing but disdain.
Apart from the foregoing peremptory dismissal, Harris does not discuss the actual arguments that Libet and others have made in favor of free will against scientific determinism. I received Libet's last book, Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), today (April 1, 2018). Chapter 4 is entitled "Intention to Act: Do We Have Free Will?" In this chapter, Libet states that science can neither prove nor disprove either scientific determinism or free will: neither is falsifiable pursuant to Karl Popper's criterion for proper use of the scientific method. For example, Libet observes that the deterministic perspective of Daniel M. Wegner, whom Harris quotes and cites, has "no crucial evidence that proves its validity. No experimental test has even been proposed in which this theory could be falsified. Without any possibility of falsification, one can propose anything without any fear of being contradicted (as Karl Popper explained)." (Libet, 152). Libet also establishes that scientific evidence does not exist to prove that the conscious veto (derided by Harris and others) has a preceding unconscious origin. (Libet, 145-47). Libet also elaborates on the experimental evidence establishing such a veto. I might add that the entire Libet experiment is based on simple events involving the motor system. It is questionable, in my mind, whether such experiments can be extrapolated to more abstract matters such as whether one should undertake an action in the future, for which one has ample time for deliberation.
There is much in Libet's Chapter 4 and in his book generally that I cannot set forth in the present review of Harris's book. Moreover, I will be doing extensive and intensive reading of the literature on determinism versus free will during the next several months. I have only begun my investigation. Let me close, however, with Libet's final judgment (156) on this issue:
"My conclusion about free will, one genuinely free in the nondetermined sense, is that its existence is at least as good, if not a better, scientific option than is its denial by natural law determinist theory. Given the speculative nature of both determinist and nondeterminist theories, why not adopt the view that we do have free will (until some real contradictory evidence appears, if it ever does)? Such a view would at least allow us to proceed in a way that accepts and accommodates our own deep feeling that we do have free will. We would not need to view ourselves as machines that act in a manner completely controlled by known physical laws."
Alan E. Johnson
April 1, 2018
AUGUST 28, 2021 NOTE:
My recently published book Free Will and Human Life discusses Sam Harris’s Free Will on pages 34-35. In general, my book discusses arguments against free will (Chapter 1), arguments for free will (Chapter 2), and my own views about free will (Chapter 3). Alan E. Johnson
Harris, like many other contemporary critics of free will, appears to rest most of his deterministic argument on a famous 1983 experiment by Benjamin Libet, as supplemented by some later experiments. Harris states (8-9):
"The physiologist Benjamin Libet famously used EEG to show that activity in the brain’s motor cortex can be detected some 300 milliseconds before a person feels that he has decided to move. [Endnote omitted.] Another lab extended this work using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI): Subjects were asked to press one of two buttons while watching a 'clock' composed of a random sequence of letters appearing on a screen. They reported which letter was visible at the moment they decided to press one button or the other. The experimenters found two brain regions that contained information about which button subjects would press a full 7 to 10 seconds before the decision was consciously made. [Endnote omitted.] More recently, direct recordings from the cortex showed that the activity of merely 256 neurons was sufficient to predict with 80 percent accuracy a person’s decision to move 700 milliseconds before he became aware of it. [Endnote omitted.]"
Harris acknowledges (93n2), without citing any sources, that "Libet and others have speculated that the concept of free will might yet be saved: Perhaps the conscious mind is free to 'veto,' rather than initiate, complex action. This suggestion has always seemed absurd on its face—for surely the neural events that inhibit a planned action arise unconsciously as well." (Emphasis added.)
I submit that the verbalisms "speculated," "always seemed absurd on its face" and "surely" are not scientific or philosophical proofs of anything. Indeed, they are reminiscent of theological arguments for which Harris, in so many contexts here and elsewhere, expresses nothing but disdain.
Apart from the foregoing peremptory dismissal, Harris does not discuss the actual arguments that Libet and others have made in favor of free will against scientific determinism. I received Libet's last book, Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), today (April 1, 2018). Chapter 4 is entitled "Intention to Act: Do We Have Free Will?" In this chapter, Libet states that science can neither prove nor disprove either scientific determinism or free will: neither is falsifiable pursuant to Karl Popper's criterion for proper use of the scientific method. For example, Libet observes that the deterministic perspective of Daniel M. Wegner, whom Harris quotes and cites, has "no crucial evidence that proves its validity. No experimental test has even been proposed in which this theory could be falsified. Without any possibility of falsification, one can propose anything without any fear of being contradicted (as Karl Popper explained)." (Libet, 152). Libet also establishes that scientific evidence does not exist to prove that the conscious veto (derided by Harris and others) has a preceding unconscious origin. (Libet, 145-47). Libet also elaborates on the experimental evidence establishing such a veto. I might add that the entire Libet experiment is based on simple events involving the motor system. It is questionable, in my mind, whether such experiments can be extrapolated to more abstract matters such as whether one should undertake an action in the future, for which one has ample time for deliberation.
There is much in Libet's Chapter 4 and in his book generally that I cannot set forth in the present review of Harris's book. Moreover, I will be doing extensive and intensive reading of the literature on determinism versus free will during the next several months. I have only begun my investigation. Let me close, however, with Libet's final judgment (156) on this issue:
"My conclusion about free will, one genuinely free in the nondetermined sense, is that its existence is at least as good, if not a better, scientific option than is its denial by natural law determinist theory. Given the speculative nature of both determinist and nondeterminist theories, why not adopt the view that we do have free will (until some real contradictory evidence appears, if it ever does)? Such a view would at least allow us to proceed in a way that accepts and accommodates our own deep feeling that we do have free will. We would not need to view ourselves as machines that act in a manner completely controlled by known physical laws."
Alan E. Johnson
April 1, 2018
AUGUST 28, 2021 NOTE:
My recently published book Free Will and Human Life discusses Sam Harris’s Free Will on pages 34-35. In general, my book discusses arguments against free will (Chapter 1), arguments for free will (Chapter 2), and my own views about free will (Chapter 3). Alan E. Johnson
December 21, 2017
در بهترین حالت می شود گفت که دو مقاله کتاب با هم در تضاد هستند [و انتخاب آنها توسط آقای دیهیمی در یک کتاب را تصادفی نمی دانم]؛ یکی از محاسن تصمیم بر راستگویی در هر شرایط می گوید و دیگری از رد اختیار در تصمیم گیری ها! درحالیکه مقاله اول به جز چند مثال حرف جالبی ندارد، مقاله دوم اعتبار کلی کتاب را پایین می آورد و با رویکردی یک طرفه به مبحث، نگاه ایدئولوژیک نویسنده را هم بیان می کند. من اسم چنین روایت شبه علمی و فلسفی را سوءاستفاده از علم در خدمت منافع غیرعلمی می گذارم که در نهایت نه به نفع علم است و نه فلسفه
August 20, 2012
Whether there is free will or not is an open question, but this book throws very little light on the subject. Full of assertions and absolutist thinking, it sets up the problem and the definition of terms in such a way that "no free will" is necessarily the conclusion. If free will means that the conscious mind (the everyday ego or the "monkey mind" of the Buddhists) has to have full awareness, control, and origination of all impulses, thoughts, and desires down to their very furthest roots, then of course there is no free will. He says several times in the same sentence that our choices are both "mysterious" and "determined," which is not a happy combination - if they are mysterious, how do you know for sure that they're determined, unless it is an article of faith? To me his argument is like saying that if scientists don't understand why the Big Bang happened and what state it originated from to the farthest regress, it can't possilbly be a valid concept since it doesn't answer every why and what and how down to the most remote root cause the author can imagine. I was surprised to see he was a philosophy major, after reading this book.
September 13, 2015
This essay is a brief treatise on what author, Sam Harris, calls the “illusion of free will”. In his typical “Harris” fashion, he demonstrates that the popular conception of free will as that which allows us to “do what we want to do without any outer or inner compulsions” is in fact a confusion. We, humans, are no more than the product of our genes and our past life experiences - both of which we can’t exert much influence upon. In a more scientific term, it’s our “neurons” that determine our thoughts and actions before we are even conscious of them. Harris claims that this “truth” does not entail the end of morality. We can still have social and judicial institutions that make valid judgements about people without invoking their wills. “It may be that a sham form of retribution would still be moral”, he says, but “once we recognize that even the most terrifying predators are, in a very real sense, unlucky to be who they are, the logic of hating(as opposed to fearing) them begins to unravel.”
May 27, 2017
Free Will is a short but informative book (judging by its length calling it an essay would probably be more accurate) looking to prove that free will is an illusion, and I have to say, it managed to convince me.
Despite the daunting subject, Haris' ideas are clear and easy to grasp which is something I really appreciate in non-fiction. So many authors get so tangled in their ideas that they forget that what they're writing isn't meant just for them.
It was great, food for thought for a very long time. I highly recommend it.
Despite the daunting subject, Haris' ideas are clear and easy to grasp which is something I really appreciate in non-fiction. So many authors get so tangled in their ideas that they forget that what they're writing isn't meant just for them.
It was great, food for thought for a very long time. I highly recommend it.
February 6, 2017
کتاب شامل دو مقاله از سام هریس است. مقالهی اول در مورد «دروغ» بیشتر با این نگاه که دروغ چیز خوبی نیست حتی جاهایی که ممکن است به نظر برسد کار خوبی انجام میدهیم و مقالهی دوم در مورد «ارادهی آزاد» که خلاصهی نتیجهگیریاش این بود که ارادهی آزاد (اختیار) توهمی بیش نیست
به نظرم مقالهها (به خصوص مقالهی اول) به اندازهی کافی چالش برانگیز نبود و بیشتر به این شکل بود که نظریهاش را میگفت و در راستای تایید نظریهاش مثالهایی میآورد و کمتر سراغ سویههای مخالف نظریهاش میرفت.
به نظرم مقالهها (به خصوص مقالهی اول) به اندازهی کافی چالش برانگیز نبود و بیشتر به این شکل بود که نظریهاش را میگفت و در راستای تایید نظریهاش مثالهایی میآورد و کمتر سراغ سویههای مخالف نظریهاش میرفت.
June 11, 2018
ربما لم افهم من قبل ما قاله الكاتب جيدا هو لم يقل ان الانسان ليس لديه حرية اختيار بالمعنى الذي افهمه انا لحرية الاختيار. هو لم يقصد ان الانسان لا يختار هو قصد ان اختياراته محكومة بمتغيرات داخلية (معدنه الاصلي) ومتغيرات خارجية (دراسة تعليم محاضرات وعظ ديني...) فالانسان طيلة حياته يتعرض للتدريب من المحيط الخارجي فهو يشبه الحرباء يتلون بتلون بيئ��ه هل هذا يعني انه لا يمكننا انقاذه. لا بل يمكن تغييره هو يجب ان يختار ان يغير بيئته ان يغير ارتباطاته شيء من الخارج سياتي وسيدفعه لكي يتغير قد يكون هذا الشيء عبارة كلمة كتاب...هذا ما يفعله وعاظ الدين عندما يجعلون الانسان يتطلع نحو المثل العليا هذا ما تفعله الحكومات عندما تضع قوانين هي في واقع الامر ظالمة فعندما تسجن مبتدئ في الجريمة مع مجرم تعود الجريمة فانت تقتل عنصر الخير بداخله
الانسان ربما ليس لديه حرية اختيار لكن ان تقول له لديك حرية اختيار هو في حد ذاته من المؤثرات الخارجية التي ستجعله يختار
ان التدريب الذي تتلقاه من الخارج بالاضافة الى التدريب الذي تلزم به نفسك مضاف الى المزاج هو الاستعداد الذي ولد معك هو من يصنع من انت. انك تقوم بكل فعل يحقق لك الرضى عن الذات وراحة الضمير والبال. ان كل الاديان العظيمة والشرائع المقدسة جاءت لكي تجعلك تتطلع الى المثل العليا بحيث تتسامى فيها شيئا فشيئا الى ذروة ترى فيها لذتك القصوى في سلوك يعود عليك وعلى الاخرين بالخير
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هذه مراجعتي القديمة
الكتاب غير مقنع اتفق مع فكرة ان هناك اسباب ادت بالمجرم مثلا لارتكاب الجريمة اذن عوض عقابه يجب اعادة تاهيله او علاجه اذا كان يعاني من مرض لكن ان
تلغي حرية الاختيار بطريقة مطلقة وتعتبر الانسان كالة تتحكم فيه مجموعة من المتغيرات وافكاره وتصرفاته ليست سوى نتيجة هذه المتغيرات فهذا مخيف.
الانسان ربما ليس لديه حرية اختيار لكن ان تقول له لديك حرية اختيار هو في حد ذاته من المؤثرات الخارجية التي ستجعله يختار
ان التدريب الذي تتلقاه من الخارج بالاضافة الى التدريب الذي تلزم به نفسك مضاف الى المزاج هو الاستعداد الذي ولد معك هو من يصنع من انت. انك تقوم بكل فعل يحقق لك الرضى عن الذات وراحة الضمير والبال. ان كل الاديان العظيمة والشرائع المقدسة جاءت لكي تجعلك تتطلع الى المثل العليا بحيث تتسامى فيها شيئا فشيئا الى ذروة ترى فيها لذتك القصوى في سلوك يعود عليك وعلى الاخرين بالخير
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هذه مراجعتي القديمة
الكتاب غير مقنع اتفق مع فكرة ان هناك اسباب ادت بالمجرم مثلا لارتكاب الجريمة اذن عوض عقابه يجب اعادة تاهيله او علاجه اذا كان يعاني من مرض لكن ان
تلغي حرية الاختيار بطريقة مطلقة وتعتبر الانسان كالة تتحكم فيه مجموعة من المتغيرات وافكاره وتصرفاته ليست سوى نتيجة هذه المتغيرات فهذا مخيف.
November 27, 2012
The author definitely sheds some light on aspects of free will that I never really considered. It is a powerful message that he is trying to convey with the limitations of the length of this book. At times I found myself nodding my head and agreeing with the author, but ultimately, I could not convince myself of his views on free will. His arguments start out very promising, but then falter and lose momentum as he tends to digress with meager examples and statements. I finished the book feeling an emptiness and despair equivalent to that of a cliff-hanger for movies. I would have preferred a more in-depth analysis and perhaps a more organized structure to really bring out his points. Regardless of its flaws, the author still manages to invoke an uncertainty of the freedom that we so boisterously say we have.
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