Germany Still Hasn’t Stepped Up

In late February 2022, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stood before his country’s parliament and declared that Germany would undertake a Zeitenwende, or an epochal turning point. The war in Ukraine, Scholz declared, demanded that Berlin rethink its role in the world—and in particular, its aversion to using force, rooted in the country’s sense of guilt over its Nazi past. He promised new investments in the country’s underfunded military, calling for “airplanes that fly, ships that can set out to sea, and soldiers who are optimally equipped for their missions.” He argued that his country had an obligation to defend democracy. And he pledged that Germany, long Europe’s dominant economic power, would now become a true geopolitical force.

Among Germany’s allies, Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech was warmly received. For well over a decade, many of these countries have waited for Germany to lead Europe. But unfortunately, Scholz’s deeds have not matched his words. Despite his pledges, the German military remains underfunded. And although Berlin is one of Ukraine’s staunchest supporters, Germany’s tepidness about arming Ukraine and its weariness about isolating Russia have tarnished its credibility.

In Berlin’s absence, other European states are trying to lead the continent. France is advocating for European autonomy from the United States, and Poland claims to be the new security power on the continent. But neither effort is receiving any traction. French President Emmanuel Macron has won himself few fans by suggesting Europe would ignore a Chinese attack on Taiwan, and the rest of the continent has no desire for the kind of joint European military Macron has suggested the EU needs. Poland will remain on the continent’s political margins until it adheres to EU principles on the rule of law. As a result, the United States will be the de facto power best able to manage Europe’s security architecture for the foreseeable future.

But the Zeitenwende could eventually make Berlin a better partner for Washington, one that can help guarantee European security even if it continues to shy away from primary leadership. Indeed, the war has already undoubtedly pushed Germany out of its comfort zone. Berlin, for example, is quickly reworking its energy infrastructure after having spent years being dependent on Russia, and it is becoming a green energy power. It is striving to diversify its economy and strengthen its diplomatic ties with the developing world. Germany, however, will need to make good on its military pledges and better respond to the needs of its allies for its pivot to be a full success.

TALK IS CHEAP

Within the European Union, no state can match Germany’s might. It is the bloc’s most populous country, with roughly 15 million more people than France. It has, by far, the EU’s biggest economy. It possesses capabilities—such as its manufacturing base and its investments in science and research—that are unmatched by any of its peers. That is why so much of Europe, particularly the EU’s eastern states, were happy to hear about Scholz’s plans for a more globally assertive Berlin. It would mean Germany’s military weight would finally be commensurate with its economic weight.

But in the 14 months since Scholz spoke, it is apparent that the effort has come up short. As part of his speech, for example, Scholz pledged to create a $100 billion special fund for the German military, designed to help it modernize after years of neglect. But when Eva Högl, the parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces, presented the commission’s annual report for 2022 in mid-March, she said not a cent of the fund had actually reached German soldiers. Thanks to bureaucratic inertia and lingering trauma over Germany’s role in World War II, only a third of it has been earmarked for projects. The money will only be disbursed when orders for F-35 fighter jets and Chinook helicopters are fulfilled, which will take time. Higher interest rates, meanwhile, have decreased the actual amount in the armed forces’ coffers. The result is that the Bundeswehr—the German military—remains threadbare.

The armed forces are struggling in other ways, as well. Scholz promised that Germany would spend the equivalent of at least two percent of its GDP on the military but has not yet met this target. The Bundeswehr may also have a hard time mustering 30,000 troops for NATO in a continued and high state of readiness by 2025, as Scholz promised Germany would. And although Berlin has started delivering heavy weapons to Ukraine, it did so only after months of cajoling from allies.

Germany has promoted its own interests in the guise of doing what’s best for the EU.

Part of the reason why Germany remains behind is that it is still heavily reliant on the United States. Take, for example, the controversy over providing Ukraine with battle tanks. Germany makes Leopard tanks, a piece of equipment that would be particularly useful to Ukraine not only for its fearsome firepower but also for its relatively large stock in Europe and easy maintenance. Yet Scholz spent weeks refusing to even allow other countries that own Leopards, such as Poland, to transfer them to Ukraine. (When selling arms to another country, Germany retains the right to forbid the buyer from transferring them to a third party.) It was not until Washington agreed to deliver its much more cumbersome Abrams tanks to Ukraine that Germany relented. Berlin ultimately needed American cover before it acted.

Although coordination with Washington is essential, this type of dependence is not pragmatic. During the Trump administration, the United States was erratic in how it treated Berlin and the rest of western Europe, prompting then Chancellor Angela Merkel to declare it was time for Europe to “take our fate into our own hands.” But Scholz’s Zeitenwende has done little to help Germany get the continent to bolster its conventional military capabilities. Indeed, it has done little to help Berlin lead Europe at all. Germany’s relationship with France is strained over Macron’s push for autonomy and France’s nuclear power industry, both of which Berlin opposes. Poland has rightly criticized Germany over ignoring its security concerns in the past, but Warsaw also bashes Germany for not paying Poland World War II reparations.

Many European states are similarly hesitant to fully follow Berlin and for an understandable reason: Germany has often turned off partners by promoting its own interests in the guise of doing what’s best for the EU. Most recently, for example, Berlin overturned already agreed upon EU legislation that mandated members phase out fossil-fuel-driven cars, ostensibly because the policy was not technology friendly (since it discounted car fuels made from carbon-captured technology), but really to protect the German auto industry. Berlin also tried, and failed, to prevent the EU from classifying nuclear energy as sustainable. If Berlin really wants to strengthen Europe, it must learn to take other countries into account as it crafts its policies.

BREAKING THE HOLD

But Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech was not merely empty rhetoric. In several areas, Germany has indeed begun projecting power in ways that can help its allies. The country’s new defense minister, Boris Pistorius, may be behind on modernizing Germany’s military, but unlike his predecessors, he is clearly trying. Heading the German defense ministry is typically not a coveted post, but Pistorius has quickly established a rapport with the country’s troops and relishes wearing military gear and participating in military exercises. He has not been bashful about requesting more funds. And he understands that the military must coordinate more closely with Germany’s industrial base to refill stockpiles and adapt to today’s challenges.

If Pistorius can succeed in improving communication between the military and German manufacturers, he may be able to do more than just make the German armed forces formidable. He could also make Germany into a leading arms exporter for its allies in Asia and Europe. Berlin can further bolster its export potential by committing to longer-term purchases, along with other procurement reforms, that will give manufacturers more certainty. It can also help by providing allies with more leeway to transfer German equipment to a third party. Germany is one of the Western world’s leading exporters, so if it embraces its arms industry, it will have an impressive capacity to give its allies the weapons they need.

Berlin is already working to become an energy power. After Russia invaded Ukraine, Germany was able to erect liquefied natural gas terminals at lightning speed, allowing it to wean itself off Russian supplies. The war has also hastened Germany’s drive toward renewable energy, where it had recently lost its edge to China. Now, Germany is poised to become a market leader in green hydrogen, which could also create climate-friendly links between Berlin and developing economies.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also taught Germany the importance of diversifying its supply chains and the danger of relying on authoritarian partners. That does not mean Berlin has been able to shift all its trade; the government has had trouble moving the German economy away from its tight ties to China. But Scholz has made a concerted effort to engage with and gain access to markets in the global South. While hosting the Group of Seven meeting last year, for example, Scholz invited a variety of developing countries to join, which leaders from Argentina, India, Indonesia, Senegal, and South Africa ultimately did. Scholz has traveled to Brazil, India, Indonesia, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, and Vietnam to discuss trade and investment, in part to avoid being dependent on China. These trips also serve a valuable diplomatic purpose. By meeting with these countries, Scholz is making Germany into a credible interlocutor between the West and global South democracies.

The Zeitenwende, then, is clearly a significant inflection point for Germany. Yet so long as Berlin drags its feet on its military, the government will not be an effective transatlantic partner, preventing the United States from largely focusing on security in the Indo-Pacific. Scholz seems to recognize this, and he has admitted that his country needs “a new strategic culture” to complete the promised pivot. That make take a generation, but Scholz is laying the groundwork for Germany’s next epoch.