Ancient and Medieval Wargaming

Introduction

This book represents a sequel to and development of my earlier work, Wargaming: An Introduction (also published by Sutton). While my previous book covered all periods of wargaming by providing rules and an appropriate selection of army lists, this one specialises in the Ancient and Medieval periods. The aim is to provide a much more comprehensive examination of one of the most exciting epochs of wargaming, by greatly expanding the numbers of army lists, and providing some historical perspective.

One major change from my last book lies in the number of rulesets. I felt that the nuances of this epoch are best covered by four different sets of rules for each defined period: the Biblical age (3000 BC–500 BC); the Classical age (500 BC–AD 300); the Dark Ages (300–1100); and the Medieval age (1100–1485). However, the reader should rest assured that the rules systems for each period are essentially identical to that printed in Wargaming: An Introduction; all use the same core concepts, and are intended to be both simple and playable. However, the use of four different sets of rules allows for the subtle variations in each period to come to the fore (it also effectively prevents the contests between Ancient Egyptians and Wars of the Roses English armies, that are a lamentable feature of the many wargames competitions that use a generic ruleset covering the entire epoch from 3000 BC to AD 1485).

Each period is allocated five chapters. The first of these provides historical perspective; it outlines the major military (and occasionally political) developments. This should give any wargamer some useful contextual information, and hopefully give him or her the encouragement to pursue an interest by consulting the reading list provided. All wargamers should appreciate that there really is so much more to this hobby than playing games; the history of each individual period is absolutely fascinating, and an understanding of it will enrich the gaming experience immensely.

The second chapter in each section explains how I interpret the historical background in the wargaming context; in particular, I define the troop types that perform on the wargames table. The rules themselves form the third chapter.

The fourth chapter covers the army lists for the relevant epoch. Devoting an entire book to the Ancient and Medieval period allows me not only to cover a large number of armies, but also to greatly expand the format of each list. Every wargames force therefore contains far more than just the composition of each army and a brief interpretive paragraph. I am also able to include a set of special rules for each force; a diagrammatic representation of how armies can deploy on the wargames table; a guide to the availability of figures and their suitability for use in other wargames forces (with the best will in the world, no wargamer could possibly collect all the armies in this book: the opportunity of having units serve in more than one force does, however, allow for the rapid acquisition of extra wargames armies); a reading list; and finally some snippets of historical information and (where possible) a primary source quotation.

The final chapter of each section covers a wargames battle report. Each of these is based upon a famous historical battle. I start by stating what happened in the real life engagements, and then describe the events that ensued when the encounter was reproduced as a wargame. Hopefully, the reader will feel encouraged to follow suit; either by reproducing the battles described or (even better) research other momentous encounters and wargame them.

I end the book with some appendices covering wargames figures: the sizes and scales available; current prices (these are inevitably likely to change, and are only included as a general guide); and a list of useful addresses.

Having bought this book, the reader is about to sample the wargames period with the greatest variety of armies, and some of history’s more fascinating personalities – now you too can be Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Queen Boudicca, King Arthur, William the Conqueror or Henry V. Who could possibly resist such a temptation?

Chapter 1

Biblical Warfare

3000 BC–500 BC

KEY EVENTS

A NOTE ON CHRONOLOGY

One of the greatest drawbacks in the study of this period is the lack of any reliable chronology until the year 763 BC (the latter date being identified thanks to the accurate modern backdating of a solar eclipse noted by Assyrian chroniclers). The last fifteen years have seen a challenge to the conventional dating, which has naturally enough been referred to as the New Chronology (which will doubtless become the Old Chronology over the next century or so). This new approach has been endorsed by Nigel Stillman in his Chariot Wars (Warhammer Historical Wargames, 1999), and has been followed by me.

To simplify the argument somewhat, the New Chronology rests upon archaeological evidence that the Egyptian 21st and 22nd Dynasties reigned concurrently in different parts of Egypt, rather than in succession as previously assumed. This actually helps matters greatly for any historian, since the new dating effectively abolishes the previous 350-year chronological gap from which no evidence has survived. With no fallacious gulf, there is no otherwise inexplicable ‘dark age’. The New Chronology also provides support for the account provided in the history books of the Old Testament, and can in addition be confirmed by radiocarbon dating from Egyptian excavations (which previously tended to be ignored by scholars on the grounds that it rather inconveniently contradicted the conventional dating).

Readers who wish to examine the arguments supporting the New Chronology in greater detail might like to consult the following books:

James, Peter et al. Centuries of Darkness, Pimlico, 1991

Rohl, David. A Test of Time, Century, 1995

WHY WARFARE DEVELOPED

Warfare needs civilisation (although any decent civilisation neither wants nor needs warfare). This somewhat cryptic statement needs clarification. In essence, organised warfare can only occur between distinct political entities, be they formal states, an identifiable band of rebels, or a homogenous tribal grouping. It can therefore be seen that Stone Age hunter-gatherers may have fought between themselves, but such contests (even when involving different groups) were brief clashes that could not be dignified with the epithet of ‘warfare’. Wars only started when humans settled in territories where greater food reserves could be garnered by cultivating land, rather than by following herds of wild animals around and killing beasts as required. One of the first environments where climatic conditions proved conducive to permanent settlement was what we now call the Middle East, especially the areas around the Rivers Tigris, Euphrates and Nile.

Once settlement occurred, civilisation could develop. Cities grew, and literacy arose; the latter being an aid to trade, a facilitator of good administration and a means of glorifying the local ruler and his favoured god(s). It is a somewhat depressing fact that the desirability of acquiring culture, poetry and philosophy provided little impulse for the development of literacy.

However, once small states arose, they began to find themselves at war with each other. By far the best explanation of why this state of affairs arose can be found from the great philosopher Thomas Hobbes:

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal courses of quarrel. First, competition: secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation.

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), quoted in Dawson, Doyne, The First Armies, Cassell, 2001, p. 14.

Although I would argue that man has no natural predisposition towards strife, unlike Hobbes (his rather gloomy thesis takes no account of the equally powerful human impulses of compassion for the plight of the helpless and disabled), his account does provide a good summary of the possible causes of strife. All three occurred in the first real civilisations, namely the Sumerian city states that grew in what is now Iraq. The original impulse was to seek safety and security, which explains the early development of fortified cities. However, a run of bad harvests would create a scarcity of resources, resulting in competition between neighbouring cities, and the consequent growth of aggressive campaigning and pitched battles. Finally, Kings found it necessary to assert their political primacy, both over proximate political entities and their own nobility. As a result, such monarchs would engage in warfare, commemorating their victories in court propaganda extolling both the king and his god(s).

The Sumerian states did moreover have new and potent weaponry at their disposal. Whereas the flints and wooden clubs of Stone Age man could prove lethal, the invention of bronze allowed for the development of infinitely more dangerous pointed weapons (such as spears, swords and arrows). Moreover, the domestication of asses and eventually (albeit not by the Sumerians) horses resulted in the invention of the war chariot.

BIBLICAL INFANTRY

Although forming a large proportion of all Biblical armies, infantry was not highly regarded. This was principally due to the fact that the nobility fought from chariots, and spent little time with their foot soldiers. As a consequence of this neglect, many early Biblical armies only provided the most basic equipment for their infantry. They tended to be given a wooden shield and metal helmet for protection, but no body armour. Their chief weapon was the spear, either a long version used to thrust, or a shorter type that could be thrown at very close range (up to 10 or 20m). Provided that the infantry remained in the close formation that is clearly depicted on existing pictorial evidence, they could both engage their enemy counterparts with reasonable effectiveness, and ward off any frontal assaults from chariots.

Other foot soldiers were even less comprehensively equipped. These were unprotected by any armour or shield, but were given javelins (which could be thrown between 30 and 50m). Such skirmishers operated in dispersed formation; their role was to avoid hand-to-hand combat, and protect the flanks of close-order infantry. Nevertheless, the chief role of foot soldiers did not lie in pitched battle. Their major functions were to besiege and garrison fortresses (in which sphere chariots were utterly useless) and to protect friendly chariots from surprise attack, both by guarding the latter on the march and by providing sentry duty at night.

To generalise somewhat, infantry were regarded as the poor relations of chariots – a fact of which they were all too aware. Consisting as they did of conscripted men, neglected by the noble elite, and given limited protective equipment, morale and performance tended to be low. The one great exception to this was the army of New Kingdom Egypt, whose infantry eventually acquired body armour (albeit not metallic) in addition to their shields, as well as a degree of training which served them well. As a rule however, all foot (including the Egyptians) was far from highly disciplined, and as a result proved vulnerable to archery and chariot attack.

ARCHERY

Although simple bows had been around ever since the Stone Age, their effectiveness was limited by their short range (no more than 100m at best). All this changed by the time of the Akkadian Empire, which saw some foot soldiers (operating at close order) equipped with a new weapon, the so-called composite bow. This used a combination of wood, horn and sinew. It worked on the basis that when drawn, the ends of the bow would be pulled back to a much greater extent than the centre (the old bows, being made solely of wood, effectively had even pressure exerted all the way along the weapon). This allowed for much greater velocity for the arrow, and hence an increase both in range (up to 250m) and penetrative power. All this had major implications. Close-order Biblical Infantry was now vulnerable to long-range archery; the spearmen’s limited discipline and enthusiasm made them especially vulnerable to effective bowfire.

As a consequence, foot archers equipped with composite bows proved to be important auxiliaries to spearmen. The Babylonian armies followed the Akkadians in equipping some troops with bows, and the Egyptian archers eventually replaced their simple wooden weapons with the composite version, after being subjected to its ill effects at the hands of the Hyksos invaders.

However effective it may have been in the hands of foot soldiers operating in close-order formation, the composite bow really came into its own as the weapon of choice for chariot warriors, to whom we must now turn.

CHARIOT WARFARE

As soon as asses became domesticated, the Sumerians hit upon the idea of using them as draught animals for battle wagons, and the chariot was born. It was however rather primitive at this stage. Of somewhat ramshackle construction, with four heavy solid wheels, and drawn by asses (onagers) noted chiefly for their foul temperament and contrary disposition, Sumerian chariots were not at first glance an especially formidable weapon – especially as the fighting crewman (as opposed to the unarmed driver) was equipped with javelins rather than a composite bow. Moreover, the onagers could only be controlled by having the chariot driver’s reins attached to a nose ring, as the bit had not yet been devised. Some writers have therefore assumed that such limited performance meant that Sumerian chariots were little more than personnel carriers, being used to transport the warrior to the decisive point of the battlefield, at which time he would dismount and fight on foot.

Such a conclusion may appear plausible, but it would be mistaken. For one thing, modern tests with replicas of Sumerian chariots have shown them to be surprisingly manoeuvrable. Accordingly, it is possible to envisage their being used to drive up to javelin range, discharge a few missiles, and either retire or charge the enemy. For although it is true that the aforementioned modern tests showed that nothing would induce asses to charge a solid obstacle, bodies of men only form a rigid wall for as long as their morale holds. It is certainly possible to envisage a unit of Sumerian chariots head towards a body of enemy infantry with apparently murderous intent, which would have the effect of seeing the latter waver and run from the (socially superior) noble charioteers.

It is therefore clear that chariots could either engage their enemy equivalents with missilry; or fire at enemy infantry in order to create panic, prior to charging at their victims and thereby inducing a rout. The potential of the chariot was greatly increased once horses were introduced into the region, originally by Aryan invaders crossing the Caucasus Mountains into what is now Turkey. Although too small to ride, the early horses were easily domesticated (unlike the onagers), and provided excellent draught animals for chariots, whose construction was now greatly improved. New craftsmanship had by now created a much lighter vehicle than the Sumerian battle cart, and the new chariot only needed two light spoked wheels, as opposed to the four heavy and solid ones of the Sumerian version. The development of the composite bow, and the eventual use of quilted protection for horses and bronze armour for the crew served to create a formidable war machine. The chariot could advance with great speed, pepper the enemy with arrows, and retire or charge home as appropriate. Provided that clashes occurred on open terrain rather than in uneven rocky areas, the chariot dominated the Biblical battlefield.

Other developments followed. Many armies took to having a force of light infantry skirmishers accompany the chariots, either on foot or (I would maintain the more likely scenario) on the vehicles themselves prior to dismounting and engaging the enemy with javelin fire. Later chariots, especially in the Hittite and Assyrian armies, had a tendency to become heavier, carrying extra crew and being far more prepared to charge enemy units and engage them at close-quarters, rather than indulge in long-range skirmishing.

Chariots were undoubtedly the rulers of the Biblical battlefield. However, they were potentially vulnerable. The first problem was one of logistics. Any chariot force required a veritable army of carpenters, and a large supply of wood to keep it in the field. Consequently, a support network of cities was necessary – and if one of these fell to the enemy, the army would either be forced to retreat, or suffer unacceptable chariot losses owing to attrition. Of equal importance, chariotry could only dominate the arena for as long as enemy infantry proved vulnerable to archery. This would only be the case while foot soldiers remained poor relations; once they acquired discipline and esprit de corps, the ascendancy of chariots could be challenged – and with the invasions of the Sea Peoples, the gauntlet was well and truly thrown down.

THE SEA PEOPLES

The civilised parts of the Ancient world were always prone to mass migrations, and occasionally mass invasions. That of the Sea Peoples did, however, prove particularly destructive, causing as it did the end of the Hittite and Mycenean Greek empires, and the survival of the Egyptian New Kingdom only after a particularly bitter struggle.

The term ‘Sea Peoples’ is a convenient shorthand for groups of invaders from the Balkans, Sardinia, Sicily and Italy. They had originally served as mercenary infantry in the great kingdoms of the Middle East, and had carried news of wealth back to their homelands. As a consequence, the invasions started just after the Iron Age had begun.

The Sea Peoples were largely infantry armies operating in loose formation. This was essentially a compromise between the close order of Biblical infantry, and the dispersed formations of skirmishers. They could therefore move faster than close-formation foot, were not disordered by rocky or other potentially disruptive terrain, and could outclass skirmishers in hand-to-hand combat. They should have been defeated habitually by close-order foot in open terrain, but this does not seem to have happened. The fact was that the Sea Peoples were well led and highly motivated, in some contrast to the conscripts they opposed. With their nobles fighting in the ranks of the infantry, the Sea Peoples foot were able to dominate most of their foes. In essence, enemy bowfire did not demoralise them, and they could in any event move into close combat quite quickly – thereby reducing the time they were to be subjected to enemy bowshot.

The Sea Peoples were equipped with javelins, giving them a missile capability. However, they also had a long sword which, once penetrating beyond enemy spearpoints, could inflict great execution at close quarters. Moreover, the Sea Peoples tended to be equipped with superior iron weaponry, and also iron breastplates. Their round shields were large enough to be used for protection, but small enough to allow unimpeded use of the sword in close combat. All in all, the Sea Peoples presented a major challenge to the old empires, and demonstrated just how important it was to have an effective and well-equipped infantry force (one reason the Egyptians were able to resist the invasions was because their foot soldiers had body armour as well as a shield). The lesson was not lost upon the rising power of Assyria.

THE NEW ASSYRIAN ARMY

The kingdom of Assyria had always been surrounded by potential enemies, and its rulers appreciated that a high-quality army was essential if it was to survive. The creation of the New Assyrian Empire saw the arrival of the most formidable military machine yet devised.

The key to Assyrian success lay in the widespread use of iron weaponry, and the institution of a regular disciplined army. Mixed divisions of infantry, cavalry and chariots were created, which trained and campaigned together during spring and summer; the troops only returned to the fields to collect the harvest each autumn.

The most decisive Assyrian weapon was its Heavy Infantry arm. This was essentially close-order infantry operating in the Biblical tradition, but with the training and discipline more usually associated with the Sea Peoples. Half the men in each unit had thrusting spears, the rest being equipped with a composite bow. All had iron body armour; the spearmen had round shields too. The combination of disruptive archery and aggressive infantry whose close-order formation rendered it formidable in hand-to-hand combat, made for a terrifying instrument of war.

Other infantrymen formed auxiliary units. They had similar weaponry to the Heavy Infantry, but lacked body armour. They fought in a similar manner to the Sea Peoples, adopting a loose-order formation that was particularly effective in difficult terrain. As such, the auxiliary infantry provided useful and valued support for their heavier counterparts.

As already mentioned, the Assyrians were great advocates of heavy chariots. With a crew of three armoured fighting men equipped with thrusting spears (in addition to the unarmed driver), and pulled by four horses protected by quilted armour, the Assyrian chariot was a distinctly frightening weapon. It proved that the old king of the battlefield was still a vital weapon.

However, chariots eventually found themselves largely replaced by cavalry in the Assyrian battle order. Once horses became strong enough to bear the weight of riders it became inevitable that they would be ridden into battle. Despite not reaching their full potential owing to the lack of stirrups, cavalry could still be very useful on the battlefield. Indeed, the Scythian invaders who wrought such havoc in the seventh century BC consisted largely of light horse archers. Nevertheless, the Assyrians had a formidable cavalry arm of their own. They were equipped along the lines of Heavy Infantry units, with half the men having spears, and the rest composite bows. All had iron body armour, but were unshielded; horsemanship had not yet reached the stage where riders could both carry a shield and control their mounts. The Assyrian cavalry nevertheless proved very useful on the battlefield, although probably not as effective as chariots. The reason the latter were eventually replaced by the former was due to sound logistical factors: chariots needed a huge support network of carpenters and a ready supply of wood in order to function; cavalry required none of these, and military mathematics soon dictated that four separate horsemen would prove more useful in the long run than a single chariot drawn by four animals. Chariots were defeated by economic rather than tactical considerations; cavalry were only slightly less effective, but were much cheaper.

With such a magnificent army, the Assyrians acquired a huge empire. Few other states dared to resist them on the battlefield, and those who defended fortresses were dealt with ruthlessly. The Assyrians would butcher the garrison of any city that opposed them, and would not only deport surviving civilians, but would scatter them throughout the empire. This served to prevent any reassertion of ethnic identity; the unfortunate victims were separated from their compatriots, and also merely existing as a source of forced labour for their Assyrian overlords. The Assyrian empire may have been great in terms of its conquests; its art also has a certain grandeur, but does in a sense encapsulate the Assyrian dilemma. For the empire’s art was devoted entirely to depiction of military accomplishments; the more refined aspects of life were not illustrated. The New Assyrian regime may have been a great empire; it was emphatically not a great civilisation.

As a consequence of their cruelty, the Assyrians only