Democracy in Suburbia

CHAPTER ONE

The Rise of a Suburban Demos

SPRING VALLEY, TEXAS, is a small suburb west of Houston. Like its neighbors Bunker Hill and Hunter’s Point, Spring Valley is not particularly well named: it sits on a pancake-flat prairie, has no identifiable water sources, endures a swamplike climate, and, being a few miles from downtown, is more urban than a good portion of Houston proper. As a town, Spring Valley does not have much of a municipal identity. It has no main street, no parks, no monuments, no library; for much of its history, it ran city business out of a nondescript office next to a convenience store. Socially, it is very homogeneous, composed mostly of three-bedroom homes on half-acre lots inhabited by white, middle-class families. With its homeowning population largely supportive of its restrictive zoning codes, few issues ever cause controversy. Spring Valley is a very quiet place where residents mostly keep to themselves. In the past few decades, Spring Valley has also become the typical American town.

Over the past half century, a tremendous change has occurred in the types of places Americans call home. In 1950, most Americans resided in either large cities or small, rural towns. Today, most Americans live somewhere in between; places outside of big cities but still within greater metropolitan areas—places like Spring Valley, places commonly known as suburbs. These suburbs are dissimilar to both their urban and their rural counterparts. Unlike older, central cities, they are often very singular in their social composition and land use—many contain nothing but homes, nothing but white people, or nothing but the affluent. Unlike rural towns, suburban places are highly interconnected with and dependent on a larger metropolis. Whereas people in rural towns typically worked and shopped in the same place, suburbanites often pursue each activity in other locales. Suburbanization has been one of the biggest changes in American society over the past fifty years. It has affected the ways Americans relate to their families, friends, and neighbors, understand local government, and experience community.

Yet, despite the enormity of this suburban transformation, its implications for American democracy are largely unknown. While the social consequences of suburbanization, such as racial segregation and urban sprawl, are well documented, the effects of America’s suburban expansion on its basic mechanisms of democratic government are not understood. Take, for example, civic participation. Recent trends suggest a possible negative relationship between suburbanization and political and civic engagement. Over the past four decades, as Americans have been moving to suburbs, they have also become less likely to vote, less attached to political parties, and less trusting of their political institutions.¹ Many scholars believe that the past decades have brought not just the erosion of America’s civil society but a disturbing loss of community and fellowship among citizens. From Robert Putnam’s requiem for bowling leagues to Alan Ehrenhalt’s lamentations for the lost city, from Ray Suarez’s remembrances of communities long gone to Thomas Geoghegan’s elegy for a public citizenship, a chorus of scholars and journalists have recently pronounced civil society and community in America to be in ill-health.²

In these criticisms, suburbs like Spring Valley have been fingered as likely suspects. Whether it is the shape of their houses, the design of their neighborhoods, or their absence of public spaces, suburbs are routinely accused of stifling the social interaction, sense of membership, and democratic engagement that once existed in America’s cities and towns.³ Along with this loss of community, suburbanites allegedly have lost the capacities and incentives to be involved in public affairs. In other words, Americans do not vote, do not trust their government, or do not join the PTA partly because the physical design and social composition of suburbs are keeping them isolated and preoccupied with private concerns. In his exhaustive analysis of the decline of civic engagement in America over the past thirty years, Robert Putnam estimates that suburbanization and sprawl are accountable for about 10 percent of the problem.⁴ The suburb, as architects Andres Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk argue, is the last word in privatization and spells the end of authentic civic life.⁵

Like most assertions about the suburbs, however, such claims are without any empirical basis. We have no real evidence on whether suburbanites are less civically engaged than nonsuburbanites or what impact, if any, suburban social environments are having on America’s democratic processes. Suburbs like Spring Valley may now be the typical American town, but we have little understanding of how they affect Americans’ commitment to their communities or their ability to govern themselves. This absence of knowledge comes largely from three sources.

First, most of us are unclear about what exactly a suburb is. Most places that are within a metropolitan area but not part of the central city are counted as suburbs, yet this usage is confusing because it equates places that are quite different in form and composition—for example, wealthy Beverly Hills, eclectic Santa Monica, residential Walnut, and impoverished Compton are all one kind of place (suburb), as distinguished from Los Angeles (city). Given the wide diversity of places that are within metropolitan areas but outside of central cities, such crude taxonomies do more to obfuscate than to clarify the real picture of suburban life. Architectural commentaries are not very useful either. Suburban civic malaise is often attributed to the absence of public spaces, the predominance of single-family homes with garage facades, and the prevalence of private yards; yet none of these studies enumerate how many suburbs actually have these characteristics or whether such traits are unique to suburban areas.⁶ Indeed, large portions of Los Angeles, Houston, and Orlando have these suburban traits, while many suburbs—like Cranbury, New Jersey, or Petaluma, California—more closely resemble traditional small towns. The concept of the suburb has become saddled with so many stereotypes and misconceptions that most people have little understanding of what really distinguishes America’s cities and suburbs from each other.⁷

Second, critics of suburbs have been equally vague about how suburban environments may distort the process of democracy. Most studies of local politics in America are of large cities, with scholars wrangling over whether cities are dominated by a governing elite or subject to more pluralistic political pressures.⁸ Little research on local politics, however, has focused on suburbs. Meanwhile, other critics who bemoan the loss of community or civil society rarely specify what these terms mean or why they are important for democratic organization.⁹ A protean term like civil society can include activities as diverse as gathering informally with neighbors and going to the gym,¹⁰ and it is not clear that all such activities are either essential or beneficial for democratic governance. As was demonstrated in Weimar Germany, a strong civil society is no guarantee of stable democratic institutions or peaceful coexistence among the citizenry.¹¹ In their preoccupation with vague notions of community, most criticisms of suburbs have largely ignored other essential questions of democratic governance. For instance, do suburbs limit or enhance the ways that citizens can govern themselves? Does suburbanization create any biases in the democratic process? If citizens in suburbs are less civically engaged, does this necessarily undermine their ability to govern themselves? Most critiques of suburbs and community do not address these questions.

Third, after decades of research, no conclusive evidence exists on whether or not suburban environments actually do shape individual civic or political behavior. Most assertions about suburban civic life are based on either pure speculation or case studies of individual places done in the 1950s and 1960s.¹² Interestingly, these early works mostly portrayed suburbs as hotbeds of participation, with the typical suburbanite frantically running from one type of civic activity to another. Some even described suburbs as embodying the democratic ideal. Although these studies provide interesting descriptions of particular communities, they do not reveal whether any differences that may exist between suburban and nonsuburban residents are systematic. In other words, it is impossible from a study of one suburban community to determine whether the activity level in that place is universal to suburbs or something specific to that locale. To draw conclusions about suburbs as a whole, the researcher must examine a wide range of places to see whether consistent differences arise. Unfortunately, the few studies that employ such data (i.e., cross-sectional surveys of large populations) use only crude city/suburb dichotomies or sample from only a few cities.¹³ Not surprisingly, these studies have found few effects of suburban contexts on civic behavior, leading some to question whether suburbs have any consequence for American democratic life.¹⁴

In short, America may be a nation of suburbs and its citizens may be disengaged from civic affairs, but we still have no idea whether these phenomena are related or what their larger democratic consequences may be. Yet scores of academics, journalists, and public commentators continue to assert that Americans have lost a sense of community and civic responsibility, and that suburbs are, somehow, to blame. Are suburbs really affecting the ways Americans interact with their communities? If so, is this a cause for alarm? Or are suburbs simply the unfortunate victims of an intellectual and cultural bias? This book seeks to answer these questions.

GENERAL ARGUMENT OF THE BOOK

In the pages to follow, I will argue that suburbanization is undermining the optimal functioning of America’s local democratic institutions. Local government is important primarily because it provides an accessible and small-scale arena for the resolution of social and economic conflict. According to what I term the authentic governance principle, America’s municipalities and other local institutions, as instruments of state governments, should function so as to bring together most people within a geographic vicinity to collectively solve problems related to their area. Local political institutions, as democracies, should be organized so as to directly articulate, or maximize the representation of parties to, conflicts within a particular region. Local governments best perform these functions by maximizing citizen input on salient issues for all residents of a community.

At first glance, suburbs hold great promise for meeting the standards of the authentic governance principle. One of the primary by-products of suburbanization is the movement of Americans living in large metropolitan areas into smaller municipal jurisdictions. Today, more urbanized Americans are governed by smaller municipalities than ever before. These smaller local governments allow citizens to come together in more intimate and immediate settings to resolve their political differences. As I show in chapter 2, residents of smaller places are more engaged in community affairs and active in civic life. Learning the practices of compromise, consensus, and organization building among their neighbors, citizens become better skilled in the difficult art of self-governance. Through the growth of these smaller polities, suburbanization promises the cultivation of a richer democratic practice.

Yet the potential benefits of small-town government are lost in the economic and racial segregation that suburbs promote. According to an authentic governance principle, municipalities need to adequately encompass the social cleavages and disagreements that occur among people within a particular area. Suburbs often distort this conflict mandate by dividing citizens along class and racial lines. Many suburban governments are constituted solely by people of one class, one race, or one type of land tenure. When municipal borders separate citizens in such ways, social conflicts that once existed among citizens are transformed into conflicts between local governments. This transformation of conflict, as I show in chapters 3 through 6, deters citizen involvement in local civic life.

To elucidate the consequence of this citizen demobilization, I offer a second new concept, civic capacity. The term refers to the extent to which a community’s members are engaged in both political and civic activities. In many ways it is akin to the concept of social capital that has recently been popularized by James Coleman and Robert Putnam. Social capital refers to the social connections between individuals that facilitate action.¹⁵ Like notions of human or physical capital, social capital is a resource individuals utilize to achieve their goals. In Putnam’s now famous argument, individuals gain social capital primarily by participating in voluntary organizations, an activity that builds networks and norms of reciprocity and trust and leads to greater health, happiness, and well-functioning societies.¹⁶ But where social capital is primarily a measure at the individual level, civic capacity refers to communities. Individuals may hold stocks of social capital; communities have civic capacity. Moreover, where Putnam’s understanding of social capital is based primarily in voluntary, nongovernmental action (indeed, political participation is an outgrowth of social capital), civic capacity is not so constrained. It refers to all types of civic and political activities, be they softball leagues or political campaigns.

Civic capacity is crucial for sustaining the well-being of America’s democracy. In the United States, we ask a lot of our local governments. They must adjudicate between different interests, aggregate information from their constituents, and perform a multitude of functions with little control over productive resources. To meet their social needs and facilitate the process of self-rule, American localities traditionally have relied on the voluntary activities of their residents. In other words, localities have relied upon their civic capacity to maintain the functioning and promote the well-being of society. Just as an economy profits from its unpaid working sector, such as housekeeping and child rearing, so a polity benefits from its unpaid civic sector. Localities with greater civic capacity have more human resources available to identify and prioritize social problems, lobby for governmental solutions, and find alternatives where public resources are unavailable. Democracies with low civic capacity have fewer resources to solve social problems and are more likely to be subject to greater tensions, through riots, corruption, or civil disorder. Democracies with greater civic capacity not only will be more responsive to social problems but will have more citizens offering extrainstitutional solutions, thus providing greater social stability.

Suburbanization, by segregating the population and suppressing citizen involvement in community affairs, is depriving many localities and metropolitan areas of their civic capacity and thus their ability to solve many contemporary social problems. Extreme concentrations of urban poverty, high degrees of racial segregation, and the rampant sprawl of unplanned growth are all predicaments of metropolitan life, the geographic community in which most Americans live. These social ills continue to defy solution partly because of the political divisions between cities and suburbs. At the institutional level, suburban political fragmentation puts local governments in competition with each other and inhibits intermunicipal cooperation.¹⁷ And, as I will show in my empirical analysis, suburban segregation demobilizes citizens and deprives metropolitan areas of valuable human resources to address these problems. By encouraging certain residents to tune out local politics or to see themselves as different from the greater metropolis, suburban institutions are depriving the metropolitan community of vital civic capacity. Consequently, social problems that require institutional cooperation and active citizen involvement are going unaddressed. Unplanned growth and sprawl and severe economic and racial segregation contribute to high levels of traffic congestion, pollution, and periodic social unrest. These social ills have cost lives, billions of dollars in property damage, and unquantifiable losses in America’s quality of life. If such problems are to be solved, the civic capacity of localities must be increased.

How can this be done? Just as the problems of suburban democracy are institutional in origin, so must be their solutions. By institutional change, I do not mean necessarily the form of local government; as I show in chapter 7, replacing council-manager with mayor-council governments or other such reforms will not enhance the civic capacity of a municipality. Rather, the institutional change must be with the way that municipal borders are drawn and land-use decisions are made. The social and economic segregation causing suburban civic withdrawal is the consequence of municipalities’ having inordinate power to determine who lives within their borders. If local democracy is to be reinvigorated, the current structure of municipal government needs to be reconfigured. Previous research in both large cities and rural areas demonstrates that when local institutions bring together a variety of perspectives, political solutions that consider all citizen viewpoints can be found.¹⁸ This logic needs to be applied to suburbs. Municipalities must be small enough to generate community among residents but socially and economically representative of the greater metropolitan area, so that citizens do not distance their immediate community from that of their greater surroundings. This could serve to make institutions more cooperative and could reintegrate citizens into the public realm. Local institutions need to function as arenas that bring together the diverse elements and interests of the metropolis, not ones that keep them apart. In chapter 8, I will comment more on how this can be done. Let me now offer some clarification of the central ideas of this study.

DEFINING A SUBURB

Ask most people to describe a suburb, and they will probably conjure images of ranch homes, tree-lined streets, and quiet neighborhoods. It is a picture of residential repose and domestic peace, minivans and soccer moms, and daily commutes and weekend barbecues. The reality of suburbanization is, of course, more complex. Suburbanization actually has been a number of different processes of development that have been occurring for over 150 years. Some suburbs started primarily as residential, middle-class communities; others began life as industrial enclaves situated around large employers; and others still were once rural hamlets that are now transformed by shopping malls and housing developments. Some older suburbs have retained their segregated and residential character, while other suburbs have morphed into large commercial or industrial districts. The vast expansion of suburban areas since 1950 has created an enormous variety of places that exist outside of urban areas. Social analysts have coined a host of terms—such as inner-ring and outer-ring suburb, ex-urb, post-suburb, trans-burb, and edge city—in an effort to capture this diversity. The range of places that now fall under the suburban moniker creates a big dilemma for anyone trying to determine what a suburb exactly is.

According to the categorization scheme provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, a suburb could be considered any part of a metropolitan area that is not in the central city. A metropolitan area is a major population center composed of a central city of at least 50,000 people and the surrounding county or counties that are densely populated and economically interconnected with the central city. In 1990, as illustrated by map 1.1, there were 329 different metropolitan areas ranging in size from the 18 million people in the greater New York area to 56,735 people in Enid, Oklahoma. These large metropolitan areas contain an enormous variety of cities, towns, townships, villages, and other municipalities, designated by the census as places. All places that are not central cities within metropolitan areas typically get counted as suburbs.

The census scheme, however, does not offer much assistance for distinguishing suburbs from either central cities or each other. Take the example of New Jersey, a state composed almost entirely of suburbs. The U.S. Census Bureau has classified the entire state as part of a metropolitan area, yet New Jersey has few dominant cities. Newark is overshadowed by New York City, while Trenton and Camden are eclipsed by nearby Philadelphia. The remainder of New Jersey’s municipalities and townships, while meeting the census definition of suburbs, are hardly uniform: Elizabeth and Hoboken are gritty and industrial, Montclair is middle-class and racially diverse; Short Hills is affluent and residential; Princeton has office parks, a university, and shopping malls; Cranbury and Hopewell still retain the flavor of small, rural towns. If all these places are considered suburbs, then how do we distinguish them, not only from cities like Philadelphia and New York, but from each other as well? Aside from their smaller size, middle-class Montclair, affluent Short Hills, and rural Hopewell have little in common that distinguishes them from gritty Elizabeth or academic Princeton.

Map 1.1. Metropolitan Areas in the United States, 1990

The observations of architectural commentators are not very useful either. Many critics of suburbs focus on certain environmental characteristics, like uniform single-family homes widely spaced with fenced, private yards; solely residential communities composed of nothing but mass-produced tract homes; or residential developments oriented primarily around maximizing privacy and ease of automotive transportation. Indeed, an entire architectural design movement has arisen in response to the isolating and privatizing characteristics of America’s suburbs. New urbanist communities such as Seaside, Florida, or Laguna West, California, seek to integrate housing, workplaces, and shopping in new patterns to restore public spaces and rebuild the community that is putatively absent in so many contemporary suburbs.¹⁹

Yet not all suburbs share these isolating characteristics—many, like Petaluma, California, or Concord, Massachusetts, were quintessential small, rural towns that were swallowed up by expanding nearby metropolitan areas. Many older suburbs, like New Rochelle, New York, are celebrated for their pro-civic orientation. And not all large cities have neighborhoods that promote social interaction. Significant parts of Houston, Phoenix, and Jacksonville are composed of residential neighborhoods with single homes, large yards, and high fences. While many of these commentators’ assertions about the alienation and privatization of suburban designs are provocative and important to consider, most architectural criticisms are simply too vague and unspecified to meaningfully designate places in the contemporary metropolis.

Clearly, a new way of classifying metropolitan places is needed. Toward this end I start with the following deductions. When we address the democratic implications of suburbanization, the most important factor to consider is the distinct political identity of the suburb. Suburbanization is, as Michael Danielson argues, primarily a political phenomenon.²⁰ At the most basic level, municipal boundaries are what separate central cities from suburbs and suburbs from one another. Spring Valley, Texas, is physically contiguous with neighboring Houston but is a separate social and political community by virtue of its municipal government. Municipal boundaries, by dividing the metropolitan population into distinct political entities, also create communities with particular interests, interests that often compete with those of other municipalities.²¹ With particular zoning laws and municipal ordinances, suburban governments thus shape the social composition of the community. Town government is also the most primary unit of American democracy: it defines political membership, the agenda of local politics, and the ways people interact. Municipal policies determine who lives in a community, what activities take place, what public issues its residents face, and even what types of public space it contains. When we think of suburbs in terms of their political institutions, all incorporated places within metropolitan areas, from the smallest hamlet to the largest city, can be considered as similar units of analysis. Despite their many differences, giant Houston and tiny Spring Valley are fundamentally comparable as units of democracy. For this study, I will not be comparing suburbs to central cities or analyzing just suburban places; rather, I will be examining all municipalities within a metropolitan area (central cities, suburbs, edge cities, etc.) and counting them as comparable measurement units.

But if all municipalities within a metropolitan area are equivalently similar as units of analysis, then what are the most appropriate characteristics by which these places can be distinguished from one another? This query has no easy answer. In today’s diverse metropolis, municipalities can be distinguished by hundreds of traits ranging from their sewage facilities to their street widths. Unfortunately, previous research on America’s cities is not very useful in providing a definitive list. Classic theories of urban sociology from Louis Wirth differentiated large cities from rural areas by their size, density, and social heterogeneity.²² Although large central cities resemble each other in these ways, not all suburbs are uniformly small, sparse, and homogeneous. Nor are the observations of contemporary critics useful, because many civically offending traits, such as the absence of public spaces or the presence of privatizing architectural forms, are so difficult to specify. For example, are streets public spaces? If so, then would not wider streets, an often criticized characteristic of the modern suburb, be counted as more public space? Are the negative effects of private yards more important than the positive effects of front porches? Even if one could answer these questions, it is not clear how they would translate into easily quantifiable measures.

To properly distinguish among municipalities in the contemporary metropolis, we need to look beyond simple city/suburb dichotomies and find indicators that are easily measured. In the recent historical development of American metropolitan areas, there are six dominant trends in place differentiation.²³ As America suburbanized over the past fifty years, its cities and towns have become increasingly distinguishable by these six characteristics:

1. Population size. The most distinguishing aspect of suburbanization has been the migration of the metropolitan population away from large central cities to smaller and medium-size places. Whereas in 1950 most urbanized Americans lived in large cities of over 100,000 in population, today most people live in smaller places. This diminution in the size of the typical metropolitan place is the very essence of suburbanization. In their most rudimentary form, suburbs represent the fragmentation of metropolitan areas into smaller political units. However, not all suburbs are identically small. Some hold only a few hundred residents, while others, like Garland, Texas, or Livonia, Michigan, contain over 100,000 people. Population size thus distinguishes all places in the contemporary metropolis.

2. Economic composition. With the political fragmentation of the metropolis, American cities have become increasingly distinguished by their affluence and economic composition. Until recently, most American cities contained a wide assortment of social classes and were within a relatively narrow economic range of each other. With suburbanization, however, America’s cities have become highly stratified by their affluence. Some communities are desperately poor, with a median household income below $20,000 a year; others are quite affluent, with median household incomes well over $150,000 a year. In this stratification, these places have become distinguishable not just by their wealth but by their economic homogeneity. Many places, like Short Hills, New Jersey, are inhabited almost solely by wealthy people, while older, industrial towns, like Camden, New Jersey, are populated largely by the poor. Affluence thus differentiates not just America’s citizens but its cities as well.

3. Racial composition. Although America’s cities have always held ethnic neighborhoods, most larger municipalities were still ethnically and racially mixed places. As with affluence, suburbanization has taken the racial divisions that once separated neighborhoods within cities and institutionalized them with municipal boundaries. Today, most African Americans and Latinos living in metropolitan areas are concentrated in a few neighborhoods of central cities or a handful of minority suburbs, while most whites live in predominantly white suburbs. These racial divisions do not simply mirror economic status. In many metropolitan areas there exist both poor white suburbs, such as Merrionette Park, Illinois, and middle-class suburbs with significant minority populations like Cheverly, Maryland. Race itself has become a distinguishing characteristic of the American city.

4. Land use. For most of its history, America’s cities had a combination of residential, industrial, and commercial areas. Because of limited transportation resources most people needed to be close to their work, and most people traveled to downtown areas for shopping and entertainment. But with suburbanization and the expansion of the highway system, the accessibility of transportation made possible by the automobile has also served to differentiate places by their land use. In today’s metropolis, places are now composed solely of homes (Spring Valley, Texas), or businesses (Industry, California), or are even noted for their shopping malls (King of Prussia, Pennsylvania). Although a large portion of suburbs are residentially predominant, not all are bedroom communities. Many still retain a mixture of commercial and residential sites. In today’s polymorphous metropolis, land use distinguishes suburbs both from central cities and from other suburbs.

5. City age. The rapid expansion of suburban areas in the past thirty years has made city age an important characteristic for distinguishing American cities. Much of this expansion has been part of a larger regional migration to new metropolitan areas in the Sun Belt such as Jacksonville, Houston, Phoenix, and Atlanta. In many of these places, new communities with over 20,000 residents have sprung up within a couple of years. Meanwhile, many older cities and suburbs in the Northeast and Midwest have either ceased growing or lost population. In the ever expanding American metropolis, age has become an increasingly prominent community trait.

6. Political institutions. It