Labour Law in Zimbabwe

CHAPTER ONE

DEFINITION, PURPOSE AND SOURCES OF LABOUR LAW

What is labour law?

In a narrow perspective, labour law refers to the collection of legal rules which govern the employment relationship. In a broad sense, labour law covers not only the rules which govern the employment relationship but also embraces the rules regulating the existence and operation of all the institutions of the labour market, such as trade unions, employers’ organizations, the State in its dual capacity as employer and regulator and the labour dispute resolution entities.

The following statement from Deakin and Morris aptly captures the scope of labour law:

Labour law stems from the idea of ‘subordination of the individual worker to the capitalist enterprise’; it is above all, the law of dependent labour, and hence is specific to those categories of economic relationship which in some way involve the exchange of personal service or services for remuneration. Labour law is concerned with how these relationships are constituted, a role which in common law systems is accorded primarily to contract, and with how they are regulated, a role shared by the common law and social legislation but also by extra-legal sources such as collective bargaining and workplace custom and practice. Its scope accordingly extends from the individual to the collective, from the contract of employment to relations between the institutions of organised labour and capital and to the conduct and resolution of conflicts between them.¹

The element of ‘subordination’ appears central to the scope of labour law. Other leading authors have said:

Labour law is concerned with ‘labour or work’ which is done in a position of subordination, that is, when an employee works under the command, the authority and the control of an employer, when the work is not carried out in a position of subordination, as in the case of self-employment, labour law does not apply. If work is done in such a position, the employee enjoys the full protection of labour law and of social security... Labour law can thus be described as the body of rules which governs the relationship between employers and employees who carry out their labour or work in a subordinate position.²

A distinction should be made between individual labour law and collective labour law. The former deals with the law regulating the individual relationship between the employer and employee, while the latter covers the law regulating the collective relations in the labour market, such as that between an employer and a trade union or a group of workers or that between a group of employers (or employers’ organization) and a trade union.

Purposes of Labour Law

Labour law has two main purposes:

•To perform the social function of protecting employees from the full operation of market forces through creating a minimum floor of rights for employees, such as maximum hours of work, protection from unfair dismissals and minimum wages. This is a social justice purpose. Some authors have expressed this purpose in the following words:

The traditional purpose of labour law is to protect employees from encroachments on their personal life, from economic disadvantages and from health risks associated with the exercise of a particular job. Past experience has shown that contractual freedom of employer and employee and the responsibility of the employer for the safety and health of his employees do not guarantee the social and health-related protection that is required.³

•To balance the inequality of bargaining power inherent in the employment relationship by facilitating the operation of organized labour as a countervailing force to capital. In this regard, labour law facilitates the operation of workers organizations, sets out the framework for collective bargaining and creates a platform for the withdrawal of labour as a countervailing tool in the hands of organized labour.

Sources of Labour Law

Like any other branch of law, labour law is found in four main sources, namely legislation (statutes), common law, custom and authoritative texts. Brief statements on each of these sources are relevant.

Legislation (statutes)

Legislation is the most extensive source of labour law in Zimbabwe. Legislation as a source of labour law comes in four forms: the Constitution, Acts of Parliament, delegated legislation and international legal instruments.

The Constitution

The Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe and any law inconsistent with it is invalid.⁴ The obligations imposed by the Constitution are binding on every person.⁵ Several provisions of the Constitution are part of the labour law of the country. The most significant provisions are in Chapter 4 (Declaration of Rights) and include freedom from forced or compulsory labour,⁶ equality and non-discrimination,⁷ freedom of assembly and association⁸ and freedom of profession, trade or occupation.⁹ Above all, section 65 provides for labour rights in the following manner:

1. Every person has the right to fair and safe labour practices and standards and to be paid a fair and reasonable wage.

2. Except for members of the security services, every person has the right to form and join trade unions and employee or employers’ organizations of their choice, and to participate in the lawful activities of those unions and organizations.

3. Except for members of the security services, every employee has the right to participate in collective job action, including the right to strike, sit in, or withdraw their labour and to take similar concerted action, but a law may restrict the exercise of this right in order to maintain essential services.

4. Every employee is entitled to just, equitable and satisfactory conditions of work.

5. Except for members of the security services, every employee and employer has the right to –

a. engage in collective bargaining;

b. organize and form or join federations of such unions and organizations.

6. Women and men have a right to equal remuneration for similar work.

7. Women have a right to fully paid maternity leave for a period of at least three months.

The impact of Chapter 4 of the Constitution on any other law is extended by section 46(2), which requires every court, tribunal, forum or body to promote and be guided by the spirit and objectives of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any enactment. This provision is of particular relevance to the Labour Court and arbitrators when interpreting labour legislation.

In its own words, section 46(2) provides:

When interpreting an enactment, and when developing the common law and customary law, every court, tribunal, forum or body must promote and be guided by the spirit and objectives of this Chapter.

Outside Chapter 4, the Constitution has numerous and detailed provisions regulating employment by the State. These include the Civil Service,¹⁰ conditions of service and tenure of members of the judiciary,¹¹ security services,¹² conditions of service of employees of independent Commissions,¹³ the clerk and other employees of Parliament,¹⁴ and the conduct of employees of provincial and local government.¹⁵

Acts of Parliament

The principal Act of Parliament in labour law is the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]. This Act applies to all employers and employees ‘except those whose conditions of employment are otherwise provided for in the Constitution’.¹⁶ The main group of employees ‘whose conditions of employment are otherwise provided for in the Constitution’ is that of members of the Civil Service. There are two pieces of legislation covering this group, namely the Public Service Act [Chapter 16:04] and the Health Service Act [Chapter 15:16].

Section 3(3) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] is specific about its non-application to members of the disciplined forces of the State or members of any disciplined force of a foreign State who are in Zimbabwe under an agreement to which Zimbabwe is a party and to any other employees of a State designated by the President through a statutory instrument. For all employers and employees covered by the Labour Act, any other piece of legislation which may apply to them only has validity if it is consistent with the Labour Act. This is by virtue of section 2A(3) which provides:

This Act shall prevail over any other enactment inconsistent with it.

The impact of this provision is that other pieces of legislation may regulate labour matters to an extent not inconsistent with the Labour Act. For example, provisions regulating labour matters in the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] are valid as long as they are not inconsistent with the Labour Act. This provision has put to rest the controversy about whether or not the Labour Act is superior to other pieces of legislation on labour matters. The controversy had arisen in matters involving local authorities and public bodies and enterprises.

The main problem was that the relevant Act contained provisions purporting to provide for conditions of service of employees and termination of employment. Were such provisions overridden by the Labour Relations Act which was the title of Labout Act until it was changed in 2003? As regards parastatals, the High Court was for some time divided over the issue. In Nyakanyanga v Postmaster-General,¹⁷ Gibson J held that section 3 of the Labour Relations Act did not impliedly repeal section 20 of the PTC Act, which gave the corporation power to, inter alia, ‘appoint, upon such terms and conditions as the Board may deem fit, and to suspend or discharge any such persons.’ Accordingly, the Labour Relations Act did not apply to the PTC.¹⁸ This view was rejected by Smith J in Masasi v PTC¹⁹ who held that section 3 of the Labour Relations Act was clear enough to be a modification of the PTC Act.

The Supreme Court finally settled the issue in Gumbo v Norton-Selous Rural Council.²⁰ In that case, the appellant, who was an employee of the respondent, had been dismissed in terms of section 62(3) of the then Rural Councils Act.²¹ The Labour Relations Act had not been followed. Section 62(3) empowered the council to terminate employment on three months notice if a resolution to that effect had been passed by a majority of the councillors entitled to sit on a council. The employee argued that the dismissal was unlawful because the council had not complied with the Labour Relations Act. On its part, the employer (the council) contended that the Labour Relations Act did not apply because it did not override the procedure specifically set out in the Rural Councils Act.

The Supreme Court held that in deciding whether the Labour Relations Act applied to an institution set up by statute, the specific wording of the relevant statute had to be examined to see whether or not it overrode the Labour Relations Act. The issue was one of statutory interpretation. In that case, it was held that section 62(3) of the Rural Councils Act merely gave the rural councils the powers that ordinary common law employers already had and did not override the Labour Relations Act. The dismissal was therefore held invalid for failure to comply with the Labour Relations Act.²²

In Matamisa v City of Mutare²³ the High Court was called upon to determine whether the dismissal of a town clerk in terms of section 139 of the Urban Councils Act was valid. Chinhengo J held that section 139 had not overridden the Labour Relations Act and therefore the latter applied to the termination of employment by urban councils. On appeal this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in City of Mutare v Matamisa²⁴ where it was held that section 139 overrode the Labour Relations Act in that, had the Legislature required further approval in addition to that of the Local Government Board, it would have said so. As this decision related solely to section 139, which dealt with town clerks and other senior employees, it left the question open regarding junior urban council employees whose termination was governed by section 141. In City of Mutare v Fanuel Mudzime and Others,²⁵ the Supreme Court reached a conclusion similar to that in the Matamisa case. It held that had the Legislature intended the Labour Relations Act to apply in addition to the procedure set out in section 141, it would have said so. The absence of that express reference meant that the Labour Relations Act did not apply.

The Labour Act applies to contracts of employment between international organizations and their employees because, as a general rule, immunity from suit and legal process does not extend to an act jure gestionis (of a private law character) such as a contract of employment. Immunity only extends to an act jure imperii (a sovereign or public act).²⁶

Delegated Legislation

Delegated legislation is promulgated in the form of statutory instruments. Two types of delegated legislation are sources of labour law: direct and indirect. Direct delegated legislation refers to statutory instruments made by the Minister in terms of an enabling labour statute such as the Labour Act or the Public Service Act. There are several statutory instruments in this category that have substantive labour law provisions. These include Labour Court Rules, 2006 (SI 59/2006), Labour (National Employment Code of Conduct) Regulations, 2006 (SI 15/2006), Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Regulations, 2003 (SI 217/2003), Labour Relations (HIV and AIDS) Regulations, 1998 (SI 202/1998), Public Service Regulations, 2000 (SI 1/2000) and Health Service Regulations, 2006 (SI 117/2006). Indirect delegated legislation refers to collective bargaining agreements. In terms of the Labour Act, a collective bargaining agreement attains a legal and binding effect after registration.²⁷ On publication as a statutory instrument, a collective bargaining agreement attains the same legal status as any other delegated legislative instrument. Its provisions automatically bind the relevant employers and employees and render void any contractual stipulations inconsistent with it.

International labour instruments

The main international labour instruments are the Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour Organization (ILO). In the ILO system, Conventions are a form of legislation binding on Member States that ratify them. Some Conventions, called ‘core conventions’, bind every member of the ILO, regardless of ratification. Recommendations are not binding but act as guidelines for Member States. International labour instruments are not automatically part of our labour legislation. To be part of our law, such an instrument must be incorporated into the law through an Act of Parliament.²⁸ However, in the absence of incorporation through an Act of Parliament, international labour instruments are a source of labour law in two respects. First, they may be referred to as evidence of customary international law, which is part of the law of Zimbabwe unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.²⁹ Almost all ‘core’ conventions of the ILO are evidence of customary international law. Secondly, it is now mandatory for every court and tribunal, when interpreting legislation, to adopt any reasonable interpretation which is consistent with both customary international law and any international convention, treaty or agreement which is binding in Zimbabwe.

Common Law

The common law is that portion of the law that is not derived from legislation and emanates from a collection of legal rules and principles made by judges in the course of resolving issues brought before the courts.³⁰ In Zimbabwe, the common law is not exclusively based on judicial precedent. It also includes principles of law derived from Roman-Dutch law (a fusion of Roman law and medieval Dutch law which occurred in Holland over a considerable period but had ended by the close of the sixteenth century) and English law. Roman-Dutch law not already reflected in judicial precedent is found in the writings of the old Dutch jurists such as Voet and Grotius.

Zimbabwe’s legal history has led to a state of affairs where its common law is made up of judicial precedent (built on the principles of Roman-Dutch law and elements of English law) and that portion of Roman-Dutch Law not reflected in previous cases. Notwithstanding the dominance of legislation, the common law still constitutes a substantial portion of labour law in Zimbabwe. The Constitution requires the courts, when developing the common law, to do so with a view to promoting the spirit and objectives of the Bill of Rights.³¹ In the field of the assessment of damages for unlawful dismissal, common law principles have reigned supreme.³²

The courts have held that the common law can only be altered by explicit provisions of the Labour Act or other legislation.³³ Thus, section 2A of the Labour Act which sets out the broad objectives of the Act and states that the Act prevails over any other Act inconsistent with it is not a wholesale alteration of the common law.³⁴

The Constitution gives the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court and High Court inherent power to develop the common law, taking into account the interests of justice and the provisions of the Constitution.³⁵ If this jurisdiction is exercised vigorously, many common law rules in labour law will give way to the principles of fair play arising from section 65 of the Constitution. For example, termination on notice for no reason and without giving the employee an opportunity to be heard cannot survive. The South African Supreme Court of Appeal has exercised similar jurisdiction to develop the common law to incorporate an implied contractual right not to be unfairly dismissed.³⁶

Custom

A custom is a rule that has become binding in the course of time by virtue of habitual observance. A custom is legally binding if it satisfies four requirements, namely if it is reasonable, long-binding, certain and uniformly observed.³⁷ Custom has little impact as a source of labour law. However, some customs at a workplace or in an industry may become a basis of legal rules. A custom may also be referred to in the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.

Authoritative Texts

The views of leading authors and commentators on labour law are a very persuasive authority where neither legislation nor case law is directly in point. The persuasive nature of an opinion depends, inter alia, on the standing of the author, the reputation of the author among judges, the scholarly level of the piece of work involved and the degree to which the nature of the presentation is convincing.³⁸

1Deakin and Morris (1995) p. 1.

2Blanpain and Engels (1996) p. 28.

3Halbach et al. (1991) p. 25.

4Section 2(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013.

5Section 2(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013.

6Section 55.

7Section 56.

8Section 58.

9Section 64.

10 Chapter 10.

11 Chapter 8, Part 2.

12 Chapter 11.

13 Chapter 12, section 234.

14 Chapter 6, section 154.

15 Section 266.

16 Section 3(1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]

17 HH 19/1989.

18 See also Musendekwa v Posts and Telecommunications Corporation w 33/1991.

19 1991 (2) ZLR 73(HC).

20 1992 (2) ZLR 403(S).

21 Chapter 211.

22 See also Mukundu v Chairman, Mutasa RDC 2002 (1) ZLR 469 (S).

23 1997 (2) ZLR 122(H).

24 1998 (1) ZLR 512(S).

25 SC 91/1999.

26 See The International Committeee of the Red Cross v Phyllis Sibanda & Munyama Ngangura SC48/03.

27 Section 80(2) of Labour Act [Chapter 28:01].

28 Section 327 (2)(b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013.

29 Section 326 (1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013.

30 See Madhuku (2010) pp. 15-25.

31 Section 46 (2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013.

32 See Chapter 8.

33 Hama v NRZ and United Bottlers v Kaduya 2006(2) ZLR 150(S).

34 United Bottlers v Kaduya.

35 Section 176 of the Constitution.

36 See Old Mutual Assurance Co. SA v Gumbi (2007) 8 BLLR 699 (SCA); and Boxer Superstores, Mthatha & Anor v Mbenya (2007) 8 BLLR 513 (SCA). 37 Madhuku (2010) p. 25.

38 Madhuku (2010) p. 32.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORY OF LABOUR LAW

Introduction

The history of labour law in Zimbabwe effectively begins with the colonial occupation of the territory. Before colonialism, the feudal economy of the various kingdoms and territories that constituted what is now Zimbabwe, had no wage labourers so there could be no law regulating the rendering of services in return for wages.

It has been said that:

The contract of employment moved towards the centre of the legal stage only with the advent of capital and large scale employment in factories. Before that Blackstone assigned the contract of employment to the law of domestic and family relations.¹

In February 1888, Lobengula signed the Moffat Treaty, in which he is said to have agreed that ‘he would refrain from entering into any correspondence or treaty with any foreign State without the previous knowledge or sanction of Her Majesty’s Commissioner of South Africa’.

The importance of this Treaty was that it provided a shaky ‘legal basis’ for British penetration of Zimbabwe. Later, Lobengula sealed this ‘legal basis’ by signing the Rudd Concession where he is said to have agreed to grant Cecil Rhodes and his people ‘the exclusive charge over all metals and minerals situated and contained in my Kingdom and principalities, together with full power to do all things they may deem necessary to win and procure the same’.

This last phrase was taken to give Rhodes some power to exercise Governmental control. By necessary implication, the ‘full power to do all things… necessary to win and procure’ minerals included the power to promulgate labour laws for the regulation of working conditions in mines.

In October 1889, the British Government granted a Royal Charter to Rhodes’ Company, the British South African Company (BSAC). Armed with the Charter, the BSAC occupied Zimbabwe in September 1890. The Charter gave the Company the power to administer the territory and establish Governmental power.

Under the scheme of the Charter, laws were to be made in two main ways:

(a) By Ordinances promulgated by the Secretary of State in Britain on the advice of the Board of directors of the BSAC. Effectively these Ordinances were initiated by the Company.

(b) By Proclamations issued by the High Commissioner at the Cape.

After the defeat of Lobengula in 1894, a third mechanism of lawmaking was added, namely the making of Regulations by the Administrator.

First Component of Labour Law: Proclamation of 10 June 1891

On 10 June 1891, the first important instrument relevant to labour was promulgated. This was a Proclamation by the High Commissioner at the Cape which provided that the law to apply in Zimbabwe was to be the law applying at the Cape of Good Hope as at that date.

The main significance of the Proclamation was that it introduced the common law applying at the Cape as the common law of Zimbabwe. That common law was largely Roman-Dutch but it also had English law elements. This meant that the courts were empowered to refer to Roman-Dutch Law and to some aspects of the English common law.

The Proclamation also meant that Cape statutes in existence on 10 June 1891 automatically became part of the law in Zimbabwe.

Second Component of Labour Law: Hut Tax Ordinance of 1894

The next set of law was concerned with ensuring that Africans would have no option but to seek wage employment.

The Hut Tax Ordinance of 1894 (Ordinance No 5 of 1894) imposed a hut tax on African residences on what was termed Crown land. As noted by the Colonial Office:

The usual inclination is to kill two birds with one stone,… to appropriate land with a view to starving the natives into working for the white expropriators.

The idea was to force Africans to seek wage employment. Although the Ordinance was opposed by some sections of the Colonial Office, it became operational at the end of 1894. There was heavy resistance by Africans leading to the First Chimurenga of 1896-97.

Third Component of Labour Law: Public Service Regulations, 1898

With the growth of the Governmental apparatus after the defeat of Africans in 1897 and the enactment of the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1898, a civil service of some sort emerged. It was therefore necessary to regulate work in the civil service and this was done thorough the Civil Service of Rhodesia Regulations, 1898. The main purpose of the Regulations was to create a Civil Service, and they provided for the following:

(a) all persons appointed by the Administrator (except Judges of the High Court) were to be regarded as members of the Public Service;

(b) persons were to be appointed firstly on probation for at least 12 months and thereafter could be permanently employed. The probationary period was not to be longer than 18 months;

(c) the power to make or unmake the rules regulating Public Service employment was vested in the Administrator;

(d) drunkenness was a serious act of misconduct and a person could be dismissed from the Public Service for ‘habitually using intoxicating liquor to excess’.

Fourth Component of Labour Law: Natives Employment Ordinance, 1899

The purpose of this Ordinance was to control the recruitment of African labour with a view to ensuring that African workers were not taken out of the territory for employment in other territories. There was now a heavy demand for labour and it had become big business to be involved in the recruitment of workers.

The Ordinance required the licensing of any person who wanted to act as a recruitment agent for African employees. It prohibited the recruitment of Africans for work outside the territory and made it a criminal offence to contravene its provisions. It was later repealed by the Native Labour Regulation Ordinance, 1911, the major purpose of which was to improve, and make more severe, the restrictions on the recruitment of African workers for work outside the territory. It also introduced a system of labour inspections whereby the Administrator was empowered to appoint inspectors to inquire into any grievances by natives. The inspectors were also required to ‘enquire into and determine all breaches of discipline by any native labourer’.

Fifth Component of Labour Law: Master and Servants Ordinance, 1901

This was the first substantive piece of legislation dealing with rights and duties of employers and employees. It applied to the individual employment relationship and did not cover collective labour relations.

Its definition of a ‘worker’ – described as ‘servant’ – included both whites and blacks and was as follows:

Any person, whether of European or Native or other origin, employed for hire, wage, or other remuneration to perform any handcraft or other bodily labour in domestic service, mining, agriculture, trade or manufacture.

Although the Ordinance did not distinguish between races and covered all workers, its enumeration of the various types of work in the definition of ‘servant’ meant that Government workers were not covered. These remained under the 1898 Regulations.

The main provisions of the Ordinance were (i) that a written contract of employment could not exeed three years, (ii) the period of notice to terminate a contract was generally one month, (iii) a married woman could not enter into a contract of employment without the consent of her husband, (iv) there was paid sick leave of one month, and (v) more fundamentally, it criminalized breaches of the employment contract. It was a criminal offence for a worker to commit any of the following forms of misconduct at the work place:

(a) refusal to commence duties at the time stipulated;

(b) absence from work without lawful excuse;

(c) becoming intoxicated during working hours;

(d) disobedience to a lawful command.

Interestingly, conviction under the Ordinance did not have the effect of cancelling the contract of employment. In terms of section 3 of Chapter 4 of the Ordinance:

the servant or apprentice shall be bound to return to his Master immediately after having complied with the terms of his punishment in order to serve the unexpired period of his service.

Sixth Component of Labour Law: Industrial Dispute Ordinance, 1920

Up to the enactment of this Ordinance, no attempt had been made to regulate collective labour relations. The law had been concerned with the recruitment of workers and the regulation of the individual contract of employment. But by 1920, workers were becoming an organized group and labour disputes had become inevitable. Accordingly, some dispute resolution mechanisms had to be put in place.

The purpose of this Ordinance was to provide a system of dispute settlement. It was only concerned with disputes of a collective nature. It was targeted at the white working class, although this was not said in the Ordinance.

It provided for the creation of conciliation boards appointed by the Administrator. These were tasked with resolving disputes referred to them by the Administrator. The focus was mainly wage disputes and this Ordinance suggests that some system of collective bargaining was already beginning to take shape.

Seventh Component of Labour Law: Industrial Conciliation Act, 1934

This Act repealed the Industrial Dispute Ordinance of 1920 and became the first piece of legislation recognizing the existence of trade unions. However, it did not apply to Africans. This was achieved through the definition of an ‘employee’ as ‘any person engaged by an employer to perform for hire or reward work in any undertaking… but shall not include a native’.

The Act created an officer, called the Registrar of Trade Unions, whose duties were to register trade unions and employers’ organizations. Its significant contribution is that it mothered the concept of ‘one industry, one union’. Section 5 of the Act provided that before the Registrar could register a trade union, he had to be satisfied that in the area in respect of which the trade union sought to cover there existed no other trade union which had been registered under the Act, and was ‘sufficiently representative’ of the interests concerned.

The 1934 Act also created Industrial Councils, which are the predecessors of the current National Employment Councils.

Eighth Component of Labour Law: Industrial Conciliation Act, 1945

This repealed the 1934 Act. It did not change the exclusion of natives from its scope. The purpose seems to have been to provide a more elaborate framework for the registration of trade unions and employers’ organization and for the operations of industrial councils.

Ninth Component of Labour Law: Industrial Conciliation Act, 1959

This Act was passed in the face of the militancy of African trade unions that had not been recognized up to that stage. It did not include the provision excluding African workers from the ambit of labour legislation. However, it still maintained, in an unclear manner, the division between white and African workers. This was done in two ways:

(a) trade unions registered under the 1945 Act were deemed registered under the Act. This gave advantage to white trade unions;

(b) it allowed for the registration of trade unions based on skills. White workers claiming certain skills could register a trade union almost exclusively for themselves.

The Act also created an Industrial Court headed by a president, and made provision for Industrial Boards, which could be appointed to investigate and make recommendations in undertakings which had no trade union.

In dealing with African trade unions, it had a long section prohibiting the use of trade union funds for political purposes.

Post-independence Developments

At independence on 18 April 1980 labour law was regulated by three main statutes: individual labour law by the Master and Servants Act (Chapter 268), collective labour law by the Industrial Conciliation Act (Chapter 267) and Public Service labour law by various Public Service Regulations. Post-independence developments adopted a piecemeal approach to labour law reform.

First Post-independence Development: Minimum Wages Act, 1980 (Act No. 4 of 1980)

This was the first piece of labour legislation in the post-independence period. It proclaimed, in its long title, that its purpose was ‘to make provision for the fixing, enforcement and collection of minimum wages, to prohibit discrimination in the payment of wages and to provide for matters incidental to or connected with the foregoing’. Its main pillar was that it empowered the Minister of Labour to promulgate minimum wages to specified classes of employees and to direct their payment.² Section 5 of the Act specified the effect of a minimum wage notice. It provided as follows:

5. Where the Minister has made a minimum wage notice –

(a) no employer shall contravene any provision of such minimum wage notice;

(b) every contract and every agreement, determination or regulation made in terms of any enactment relating to the employment of an employee to whom such minimum wage notice relates shall be construed with such modifications, qualifications, adaptations and exceptions as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with such notice;

(c) every agreement or arrangement of any kind whatsoever, express or implied, whether made before or after the date of commencement of such minimum wage notice, by an employer or employee to whom such notice relates, which conflicts with such notice, shall, to the extent of such conflict, be of no force or effect.

An employer could not terminate the contract of employment solely on the ground of the requirement to pay a minimum wage.³

Second Post-independence Development: Employment Act, 1980 (Act No. 13 of 1980)

This Act repealed the Master and Servants Act (Chapter 268) and dealt with individual labour law only. The Act itself did not include many substantive provisions, but it created a framework for the Minister to regulate employment. Section 5(3) of the Act empowered the Minister to make regulations providing for:

•the rights of employees;

•the deductions which may be made from the wages of employees;

•the hours of work by employees;

•the leave, including sick leave, that shall be granted to employees;

•the provision of accommodation, food, clothing, fuel, transport and other benefits and allowances for employees;

•the establishment of pension, sick, medical, holiday, provident, insurance and other funds for employees and the levying of contributions by employers and employees thereto;

•special conditions for female and juvenile employees including the prohibition of the employment of persons below a specified age.

The formula adopted was to leave almost the entire scope of individual employment law in the hands of the Minister. It was clearly a short-term measure to buy time for a more comprehensive labour statute. However, not all matters were left to the Minister. The Act itself prohibited summary dismissal except in a narrowly defined set of circumstances such as wilful disobedience to a lawful order given by the employer, lack of skill which the employee had professed to possess, habitual or substantial neglect of duties and absence from work without the permission of the employer or without reasonable excuse.⁴

Third Post-independence Development: Resorting to the Emergency Powers Act (Chapter 83)

The new Government found reason to resort to the Emergency Powers Act [Chapter 83] to deal with labour matters. Termination of employment and the establishment of workers committees were some of the matters dealt with under this Act.

Termination of employment was regulated by the Emergency Powers (Termination of Employment) Regulations, 1982.⁵ The regulations prohibited any employer from terminating any contract of employment by notice unless both parties mutually agreed or the employer obtained written approval from the Minister. Summary dismissal in certain circumstances was permitted.⁶

Fourth Post-independence Development: Labour Relations Act, 1985 (Act No 16 of 1985)

This Act became the mainstay of post-independence labour law. Although it has been amended several times, it is still the law in place to this day. It deals with both individual and collective labour law. It repealed the Employment Act, the Minimum Wages Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act. It is not necessary to summarise the main provisions of this Act as they constitute the main pillars of our current legislation. However, it is instructive to note the following:

•the Act entrenched a two-tier labour relations system. It covered all employees except those ‘whose conditions of employment are otherwise provided for by or under the Constitution’. The latter are Government workers under the Public Service;

•it entrenched a set of rights for workers regarding trade union membership. The principle of ‘one industry, one union’ was protected;

•it protected centralized collective bargaining, with every registered trade union having an automatic right to be recognized by the employer for collective bargaining purposes;

•the right to strike, although granted to workers, was severely restricted;

•it provided extensive scope for Government intervention in employment matters. One such intervention was the prohibition of summary dismissal through Ministerial regulations.

Generally, the Act reflected a broadly pro-worker orientation that was condemned by the capitalistic sector.

Fifth Post-independence Development: 1st Amendment of the Labour Relations Act (Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1992)

This Act was the first amendment of the Labour Relations Act, 1985. The amendments were designed to accommodate the dictates of a new economic policy thrust of Government, styled ESAP (Economic Structural Adjustment Programme). A key feature of this policy was deregulation of the labour market. The most far-reaching amendment was to demolish the principle of ‘one industry, one union’. It was argued that a trade union monopoly in any one industry militated against labour market flexibility. However, the removal was half-hearted because it did not completely take away the Registrar’s discretion to refuse registration to a trade union which was not ‘substantially representative’ of the workers purportedly sought to be represented. The result of the amendment was that, while more than one trade union could now be registered in any industry, the Registrar still retained the discretion to refuse registration to what were considered to be frivolous trade unions.

The amendment also widened the definition of ‘managerial employees’ who were prohibited from trade union membership. Further, these ‘managerial employees’ were not allowed to belong to the same workers’ committees as non-managerial employees but could establish their own. It repealed the old section 23(1) and substituted the following:

Subject to this Act and any regulations, employees employed by any one employer may appoint or elect a workers’ committee to represent their interests:

Provided that no managerial employee shall be appointed or elected to a workers’ committee, nor shall a workers’ committee represent the interests of managerial employees, unless such workers’ committee is composed solely of managerial employees appointed or elected to represent their interests.

Other aspects of the 1992 amendments were the shortening of the labour dispute settlement process and the demise of reinstatement.⁷

Sixth Post-independence Development: Public Service Act, 1995

This development did not involve any amendments to the Labour Relations Act, 1985. On the contrary, it was meant to consolidate the two-tier labour relations system existing in the country, whereby the Labour Relations Act did not apply to employees ‘whose conditions of employment are otherwise provided for by or under the Constitution’.⁸ The Public Service Act was enacted to supplement the Constitution in regulating labour relations for Public Service workers. This was being done for the first time in the history of the country. Up to this point, it had been sufficient to regulate Public Service employment through regulations only. The purpose of this Act was aptly captured in the memorandum to the Bill that gave rise to the Act:

At present the control and management of the Public Service is vested exclusively in the Public Service Commission, a body whose powers and functions are set out in Chapter VII of the Constitution. The purpose of this Bill (Act) is to redistribute those responsibilities between the Ministry responsible for the Public Service and the Public Service Commission, and to prescribe and regulate the conditions of service of public servants.

The Act subjected the Public Service Commission to a number of Ministerial controls, the most important being a requirement to consult the Minister over issues such as the creation or abolition of posts and the determination of terms and conditions of employment. For example, section 19(1) of the Act provided that:

Subject to this Act and the Constitution, the conditions of service applicable to members of the Pubic Service, including their remuneration, benefits, leave of absence, hours of work and discipline, shall be determined by the Commission in consultation with the Minister.

Seventh Post-independence Development: Export Processing Zones Act (Chapter 14:07)

This Act was enacted at the end of 1994 as part of what was claimed to be Government’s efforts to attract foreign investment. Section 56 of the Act provided that:

(1) the Labour Relations Act [Chapter 28:01] shall not apply in relation to licensed investors operating and employees employed in an export processing zone;

(2) the Authority may, in consultation with the Minister responsible for the administration of the Labour Relations Act [Chapter 28:01] provide rules for conditions of service, termination of service, dismissal from service and disciplinary proceedings that apply in export processing zones.

These provisions were far-reaching. They ousted the Labour Relations Act from the EPZs and left the workers at the mercy of the common law. The Act created a new category of workers who were outside the ambit of the Labour Relations Act. It was only in 1998 that the EPZ Authority enacted regulations governing employment for those workers. The regulations provided for terms and conditions of employment that were inferior to those in the Labour Relations Act.⁹

Eighth Post-independence Development: 2nd amendment of the Labour Relations Act (Labour Relations Amendment Act, 2002)

This Act brought several major amendments to the Labour Relations Act, 1985. It was the culmination of close to ten years of debate on labour law reforms, during which several drafts were written and discarded. The original intention had been to bring into force a completely new Labour Act but the Government eventually settled on effecting reforms through an Amendment Act. The first change made by this amendment was to rename the ‘Labour Relations Act’ as the ‘Labour Act’.

The second change was very far-reaching. Except for the dispute settlement system, it harmonized labour law by bringing Public Service workers under the ambit of the Labour Act. Thus, all workers in Zimbabwe were to be under the same labour legislation. For this reason, the amendment was christened by many in the field of labour relations as ‘The Harmonised Labour Act’. The third change was the introduction of the concept of ‘unfair dismissal’. Fourthly, it added generous leave conditions for employees, including granting some paid leave for trade union officials while on trade union duties, and providing for full pay for a female employee on maternity leave. The fifth change introduced a new framework for labour dispute resolution, with particular emphasis on conciliation and arbitration while imposing more restrictions on the right to strike. At the apex of the new labour dispute settlement system, it established the Labour Court, which replaced the Labour Relations Tribunal.

Ninth Post-independence Development: 3rd amendment of the Labour Act (Labour Amendment Act, 2005)

This Act made further amendments to the Labour Act. Most of the amendments were minor and appear to have been aimed at remedying some defects in the 2002 amendments. However, there were three major amendments. The first was to reinstate the old position of a two-tier labour relations system, whereby Public Service workers were not governed by the Labour Act. It repealed section 3 and substituted the following:

(1) this Act shall apply to all employers and employees except those whose conditions of employment are otherwise provided for in the Constitution;

(2) for the avoidance of any doubt, the conditions of employment of members of the Public Service shall be governed by the Public Service Act [Chapter 16:04].

The second amendment was the widening of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. This was achieved by granting to the Labour Court ‘the same powers of review as are exercisable by the High Court in respect of labour matters’.¹⁰ The third amendment was the repeal of section 56 of the Export Processing Zones Act [Chapter 14:07] so that employees in EPZs were brought within the ambit of the Labour Act.

Tenth Post-independence Development: Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013

A new Constitution came into force on 22 May 2013, replacing the 1980 (Lancaster House) Constitution. It provides for labour rights in its Bill of Rights. Labour rights are captured in section 65, which has been reproduced in full in Chapter 1. Although it is too early to assess in detail, the provisions of the new Constitution will have a major impact on the development of labour law. Some of the implications will be discussed in the next chapters under the appropriate subjects.

1Grogan (1998) p. 3.

2See section 3 of the Act.

3See section 7 of the Act.

4See section 8 of the Act.

5SI 714B/1982.

6See Tavengwa v Marine Centre (Pvt) Ltd 1984 (2) ZLR 173 (H).

7For a fuller discussion, see Madhuku (1998) p. 34.

8See section 3 of the Labour Act.

9See Export Processing Zones (Employment) Rules, 1998 (SI 372/1998).

10 See section 89(d1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01].

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT: FORMATION AND OPERATION

Introduction

The contract of employment is the basis of labour law. It can be traced to the Roman concept of the locatio conductio, i.e. the letting and hiring of services. There were three types of locatio conductio:

•locatio conductio rei – letting and hiring of a specified item in return for money payment;

•locatio conductio operis – letting and hiring of services by an independent contractor;

•locatio conductio operarum – letting and hiring of personal services in return for money.

It is the last category that forms the basis of the modern contract of employment. It is therefore important to determine whether or not an employment relationship (locatio conductio operarum) exists, as distinct from a relationship of an independent contractor (locatio conductio operis). The duties and rights of employers and employees only arise if an employment relationship exists.

Defining an employment relationship

It is not always easy to say whether or not an employment relationship exists. The Labour Act defines ‘employee’ as ‘any person who performs work or services for another person for remuneration or reward on such terms and conditions as agreed upon by the parties or as provided for in this Act, and includes:

(a) in circumstances where, even if the person performing the work or services supplies his own tools or works under flexible conditions of service, the hirer provides the substantial investment in or assumes the substantial risk of the undertaking; or

(b) in any other circumstances that more closely resemble the relationship between an employee and employer than that between an independent contractor and a hirer of services.

This definition sheds little light on what it is that separates the contract of employment from that of an independent contractor. Reference must therefore be made to the guidance developed by the courts. Five tests have been used:

•the control test;

•the organization/integration test;

•the economic reality test;

•the mutuality of obligation test;

•the multiple or dominant impression test.

The control test is based on the control of the employer over the employee. The test says that an employment contract exists if the employer prescribes not only what work has to be done but also how it is to be done. An independent contractor is controlled only as to what must be done and not how it is to be done. The leading case on the control test is Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Macdonald,¹ where it was said:

[O]ne thing appears… beyond dispute and that is that the relation of master and servant cannot exist where there is a total absence of the right of supervising and controlling the workman under the contract; in other words, unless the master not only has the right to prescribe to the workplace what work has to be done, but also the manner in which such work has to be done.²

The main limitation of the control test is that the element of control is not essential in a substantial number of employment contracts, particularly those where a person is employed to exercise skill or expertise according to his/her own judgment.

The organization test was formulated in the English case of Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison Ltd v McDonald [1952] 1 TLR 101:

One feature which seems to run in the instances is that under a contract of service, a man is employed as part of the business and his work is done as an integral part of the business, whereas under a contract for services, his work although done for the business, is not integrated into it but is only accessory to it.

The main problem with this test is that it is difficult to measure the extent of integration required to make a person an employee. It is for this reason that the South African Appellate Division rejected it as vague and difficult to apply in Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner.³

The economic reality test has been expressed as follows by Deakin and Morris:

The test of business or ‘economic’ reality essentially asks whether the worker is in business on his or her own account, as an entrepreneur, or works for another who takes the ultimate risk of loss or chance of profit.⁴

The problem with this test is that it may suggest that a professional is always an employee as long as he/she does not have an identifiable business of his/her own. This is not the case as shown by the English case of Hall v Lorimer.⁵ In that case, Lorimer was a skilled television technician who worked for about 20 separate companies on short-term contracts. He was held not to be an employee of any of the companies he worked for, despite not having an identifiable business of his own. The court said:

…the question, whether the individual is in business on his own account, though often helpful, may be of little assistance in the case of one carrying on a profession or vocation. A self-employed author working from home or an actor or singer may earn his living without any of the normal trap-pings of a business… the most outstanding feature… is that Mr Lorimer customarily worked for 2 or more production companies and that the vast majority of his assignments… lasted for only for a single day.⁶

The economic reality test is subject to the statutory modification implied by the definition of ‘employee’ in section 2 of the Labour Act. The definition says that a person is an employee even where he/she ‘supplies his own tools’ if the employer provides ‘the substantial investment in or assumes the substantial risk of the undertaking’. This means that supplying one’s own tools is not a sufficient consideration in determining whether or not one is in business on one’s own account: whenever it arises, the question of substantial investment or assumption of risk by the other party must be considered as well.

The mutuality of obligation test is said to arise from the fact that, while the contract of employment is a contract to render services in return for wages, it has a second tier of obligations consisting of mutual promises of future performance. ‘One possible consequence of this is that work relationships in which the second tier of obligations is lacking do not constitute contracts of employment… In general, the mutuality test is an exclusionary one – the absence of mutuality will most likely defeat a claim of employee status, without in itself being a sufficient condition’.⁷

The multiple or dominant impression test applies no single factor but purports to weigh a variety of factors which indicate the existence or otherwise of a contract of employment. No single factor is decisive. For example, the control element is merely one of the factors to be taken into account. After weighing all the factors, the court determines whether or not the ‘dominant impression’ is that of an employee or independent contractor. This was the test applied in the case of Southampton Assurance Company of Zimbabwe Ltd v Mutuma & Anor.⁸ In that case, the respondent signed a contract to work as an insurance agent and his main conditions of service included (i) receiving no salary but remuneration by way of a commission, (ii) working hours left at his own discretion, (iii) no entitlement to vacation leave, sick leave or any other form of leave, and (iv) no requirement to devote the whole of his working day to his duties. When the respondent approached a labour relations officer in terms of the Labour Act to challenge the termination of his contract as an insurance agent, the insurance company opposed the proceedings, arguing that the respondent was not an employee, and therefore was not covered by the Act. The High Court held that the respondent was not an employee but an independent contractor and therefore was not covered by the Labour Act.

In Medical Association of South Africa & Ors v Minister of Health & Anor⁹ the question was to determine whether or not part-time district surgeons were employees of the State. As part of the restructuring of district Health Services, the State terminated their contracts summarily, arguing that they were independent contractors and therefore the State was not bound by the procedures set out in the Labour Act. The Labour Court held them to be employees after considering the following factors: (i) the doctors rendered personal services; (ii) the doctors were expected to be ‘at the beck and call’ of the employer 24 hours a day; (iii) the employer was obliged to pay a ‘contractual salary’, even in the absence of any actual work being performed; and (iv) the employer exercised some control over the way in which the doctors rendered their services.¹⁰ The court made the following useful description of the ‘dominant impression test’:

The dominant impression test, it seems, entails that one should have regard to all those considerations or indicia which would contribute towards an indication whether the contract is that of service or a contract of work and react to the impression one gets upon a consideration of all such indicia.¹¹

It would appear that the trend around the world is to prefer the multiple or dominant impression test. In applying this test, the following caution must be borne in mind: ‘The assessment of whether a person is an employee or self-employed does not involve a mechanical exercise of running through a check list. It is necessary to stand back and assess the whole picture which emerges from the accumulation of the details’.¹²

The role of the parties in determining whether or not a contract of employment exists

The parties may expressly say that theirs is not a contract of employment. The typical situation is where the provider of personal services signs a contract where it is expressly provided that he/she is an independent contractor and not an employee. The law appears clear: the courts will look at the reality of the situation to determine whether or not there is a contract of employment. The mere say-so of the parties does not bind the courts. To do otherwise would be to allow the parties to defeat the intentions of the Legislature in putting in place legislation meant to protect vulnerable employees. This is a matter of public policy. Authority for this position of the law is found in English law.¹³ In Ferguson v John Dawson & Partners (Contractors) Ltd,¹⁴ Megaw LJ said:

…a declaration by the parties, even if it were incorporated in the contract, that the workman was to be, or was to be deemed to be, self-employed, an independent contractor, ought to be wholly disregarded – not merely treated as not conclusive – if the remainder of the contractual terms, governing the realities of the relationship, showed the relationship of employer and employee.¹⁵

The reason for this approach, according to the judge, is that the courts had to give adequate recognition to the power of statutory regulation to override the common law and this necessarily meant that it could not be open to the parties themselves ‘by their own whim, by use of a verbal formula, unrelated to the reality of the relationship, to influence the decision on whom the responsibility for the safety of workmen, as imposed by statutory regulations, should rest’.¹⁶ In Young Woods Ltd v West¹⁷ the court ignored a clause in the contract describing a sheet metal worker as self-employed and held him to be an employee after examining the reality of the relationship. However, in a difficult case where the circumstances are evenly balanced, the parties’ description of their relationship may be decisive.¹⁸ The parties’ description has considerable weight where the provider of personal services is a highly qualified professional who is fully aware of the costs and benefits of describing oneself as an independent contractor.¹⁹

Essentials of contract of employment

There are three important elements of a contract of employment:

•Agreement to make personal services available

•Remuneration

•Subordination

Agreement to make personal services available

The agreement is governed by the ordinary principles of the law of contract. No specific formalities are required by law, and the contract need not be in writing. Section 12(1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] states:

Every person who is employed by or working for any other person and receiving or entitled to receive any remuneration in respect of such employment or work shall be deemed to be under a contract of employment with that other person, whether such contract is reduced to writing or not.

The requirement in section 12(2) for the employer to ‘inform the employee in writing’ of a set of specified particulars merely imposes an obligation on the employer to supply the information and does not require the parties to sign a written contract.²⁰ The statement of particulars is not the contract itself nor is it even conclusive evidence of the contract. The effect of the particulars required by section 12(2) appears to be aptly captured in the following remarks in System Floors (UK) Ltd v Daniel:²¹

[They] provide strong prima facie evidence of what were the terms of the contract between the parties but [do] not constitute a written contract between the parties. Nor are the statements of the terms finally conclusive, at most they place a heavy burden on the employer to show that the actual terms of the contract are different from those which he has set out in the statutory statement.

A contract of employment, like any other contract, may be vitiated by mistake or misrepresentation. A common occurrence is where the prospective employee makes a fraudulent misrepresentation, which induces the employer to enter into the contract. In such a situation, the contract of employment is voidable at the instance of the employer. The employer is entitled to rescind the contract. In other words, it is declared null and void. The facts of Posts and Telecommunications Corporation v Winfreda Ndakaiteyi Mhaka²² are instructive. The PTC advertised for the post of Manager, Commercial Services (Postals). It required a person with a degree in Social Sciences or any other business-related disciplines and five years experience. A postgraduate qualification in Marketing, or an MBA, was to be ‘an added advantage’. Mhaka misrepresented her years of experience. One of the referees on her CV was her husband. PTC discovered the misrepresentation after she had worked for them for over six months and completed her probation period. It was established that she had made a fraudulent misrepresentation that induced the PTC to employ her. The contract was set aside. However, regarding restitution, it was conceded by the employer that there could be no claim for the recovery of salary and benefits paid to her because she had provided quality service to the PTC. The general rule that rescission entails restitution in integrum was not applied on the facts of this case.

There are two important aspects in which the general principles of the law of contract are ousted: anti-discrimination and the employment of children and young persons.

Anti-discrimination

The freedom of the employer to choose an employee of his/her choice is subject to the anti-discrimination provisions imposed by legislation. Section 56 of the Constitution, which is binding on every person, and binds every employer, grants every person the ‘right not to be treated in an unfairly discriminatory manner’. The relevant provisions are as follows:

56(3) Every person has the right not to be treated in an unfairly discriminatory manner on such grounds as their nationality, race, colour, tribe, place of birth, ethnic or social origin, language, class, religious belief, political affiliation, opinion, custom, culture, sex, gender, marital status, age, pregnancy, disability or economic or social status,