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Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps
Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps
Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps
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Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps

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Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps, prepared for the Historical Division, EUCOM, by a committee of former German generals and general staff officers, deals with the principles of combat in the vast woodlands and swamps of European Russia. The main author and all other contributors have drawn upon their own extensive experience on the Eastern Front and that of their allies, especially the Finns, to present the actual lessons learned from the events of the war. When the study was translated and prepared for publication, every effort was made to retain the point of view, the expressions, and even the prejudices of the original authors.

The reader is reminded that publications in the GERMAN Report SERIES were written by Germans from the German point of view. Throughout this study, any mention of “normal methods” or standard infantry tactics refers to German combat doctrines, and applies to units organized and equipped in accordance with German regulations. Similarly, the recommendations contained in the final section are made against the background of German methods of individual and unit training before and during World War II.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateMay 3, 2021
ISBN9781839747847
Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps

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    Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps - U.S. Army

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    © Barakaldo Books 2020, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

    Publisher’s Note

    Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

    We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

    HISTORICAL STUDY

    COMBAT IN RUSSIAN FORESTS AND SWAMPS

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    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    Contents

    TABLE OF CONTENTS 5

    PREFACE 6

    FOREWORD 7

    SECTION I—MILITARY ASPECTS OF RUSSIAN FORESTS AND SWAMPS 9

    SECTION II—GENERAL TACTICAL PRINCIPLES 12

    Command 12

    Arms and Services 15

    SECTION III—COMBAT INTELLIGENCE, RECONNAISSANCE, AND OBSERVATION 18

    SECTION IV—TROOP MOVEMENTS 20

    SECTION V—DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT 24

    SECTION VI—ATTACK 26

    SECTION VII—DEFENSE 29

    SECTION VIII—RETROGRADE MOVEMENTS 32

    SECTION IX—COMBAT UNDER SPECIAL CONDITIONS 34

    SECTION X—CONCLUSIONS 37

    MAPS 40

    REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 41

    PREFACE

    Combat in Russian Forests and Swamps, prepared for the Historical Division, EUCOM, by a committee of former German generals and general staff officers, deals with the principles of combat in the vast woodlands and swamps of European Russia. The main author and all other contributors have drawn upon their own extensive experience on the Eastern Front and that of their allies, especially the Finns, to present the actual lessons learned from the events of the war. When the study was translated and prepared for publication, every effort was made to retain the point of view, the expressions, and even the prejudices of the original authors.

    The reader is reminded that publications in the GERMAN Report SERIES were written by Germans from the German point of view. Throughout this study, any mention of normal methods or standard infantry tactics refers to German combat doctrines, and applies to units organized and equipped in accordance with German regulations. Similarly, the recommendations contained in the final section are made against the background of German methods of individual and unit training before and during World War II.

    FOREWORD{1}

    In conformance with the assignment, this study had to be confined to a discussion of tactical principles. The author’s lucid and methodical presentation fully corresponds with the experiences reported to me by our combat forces during the Russian campaign.

    Apart from tactical principles, however, another problem calls for serious consideration: The problem of education and training, of teaching self-confidence to young men of military age and of training them in the art of improvisation. The need for this training is pointed out in the final section of this study.

    Furthermore the presence of vast forest and swamp regions, as encountered in Eastern Europe, must be taken into consideration in the planning of military operations. Future planners will have to make certain that extensive areas of woodlands and swamps are not permitted to assume more than tactical importance. The German command in Russia was not always successful in this respect, partly because it did not see clearly all the elements involved and partly because it did not succeed in driving the enemy away from the large wooded and swampy areas. On the contrary, there were numerous occasions when we deliberately drove the Russians into the swamp, assuming that this would prevent them from interfering with the further course of operations. That proved to be a fatal error.

    When the enemy has been maneuvered into a large forest and swamp region, the area cannot be sealed off by the same methods as a beleaguered fortress. Even a force with great numerical superiority will never have enough men available for such a task. It was also our experience that Russian forces, once they were driven into wooded and swampy areas, were extremely difficult to attack by normal means and could hardly ever be completely destroyed. On countless occasions,

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