The Orthodox Church in Ukraine: A Century of Separation

The ORTHODOX CHURCH in UKRAINE

A CENTURY OF SEPARATION

NICHOLAS E. DENYSENKO

NIU Press

DeKalb, IL

© 2018 by Northern Illinois University Press

Northern Illinois University Press, DeKalb Illinois 60115

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

27  26  25  24  23  22  21  20  19  18          1  2  3  4  5

978-0-87580-789-8 (paper)

978-1-60909-244-3 (e-book)

Book and cover design by Yuni Dorr

Excerpts from the Tymofii Minenko archive at the University of Alberta in Edmonton used with permission.

Excerpts from Мартирологія Українських Церков, vol. 1: Українська Православна Церква [Martyrology of the Ukrainian Churches, vol. 1: The Ukrainian Orthodox Church], edited by Osyp Zinkewich and Oleksander Voronyn (Baltimore, MD: Smoloskyp Publishers, 1987), used with permission.

Excerpts from documents gathered by Mr. Yaroslaw Lozowchuk used with permission.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov

Dedicated to the memory of my grandparents,

PROTOPRESBYTER NICHOLAS METULYNSKY (2011)

and

MATUSHKA MARGARITA METULYNSKY (2015)

Вічна їм пам’ять!

Contents

Illustrations

Acknowledgments

Abbreviations and Conventions

Introduction

1. The First Autocephalist Movement and the Creation of the UAOC (1917–1930)

2. The Orthodox Church in Ukraine to the End of World War II (1939–1945)

3. The Ukrainian Diaspora (Canada and the United States)

4. The Orthodox Church in Ukraine during the Cold War (1945–1988)

5. Orthodoxy in Ukraine: The Late and Post-Soviet Period (1989–2016)

Conclusion

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Illustrations

FIGURE 1 St. Andrew Memorial Church in South Bound Brook, New Jersey. Photo by Elizabeth Symonenko. Used with permission.

FIGURE 2 Statue of Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivs’kyi in South Bound Brook, New Jersey. Photo by Elizabeth Symonenko. Used with permission.

FIGURE 3 Initiators of L’viv Pseudo-Sobor in 1946. Photo by Svitlana Hurkina. Used with permission.

FIGURE 4 Photo of Patriarch Mstyslav (Skrypnyk) at L’viv Orthodox Theological Academy (UOC-KP). Photo by Nicholas Denysenko.

FIGURE 5 The tomb of Patriarch Volodymyr (Romaniuk) of the UOC-KP in front of St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv. Photo by Nicholas Denysenko.

FIGURE 6 Photo of Patriarch Filaret (Denysenko) of the UOC-KP. Photo by Håkan Henriksson.

FIGURE 7 The tomb of Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) of the UOC-MP. Kyiv Percherska Monastery, Kyiv. Photo courtesy of Dukh i litera Publishing in Kyiv. Used with permission.

FIGURE 8 Dormition (Uspensky) Cathedral in Kyiv (UOC-MP). Photo by Nicholas Denysenko.

FIGURE 9 St. Michael’s Cathedral (UOC-KP). Photo by Nicholas Denysenko.

Acknowledgments

When I was an eighteen-year-old freshman at the University of Minnesota in 1990–1991, the world around me was changing. For the entirety of my young life, the possibility that the Soviet Union might collapse and that independent nations would emerge from the imperial wreckage amounted to a fool’s hope. By the end of 1991, it was hard for me to believe that Ukraine was independent. As a child, I attended the Ukrainian Orthodox parishes of my family, and our parish was always the one shepherded by my grandfather, the archpriest (and later protopresbyter) Nicholas Metulynsky. It was upon enrolling at the university and joining the Orthodox Christian Fellowship that I discovered that we were uncanonical and self-consecrated as adherents of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. The passions of youth prevented me from reflecting patiently on my encounters with my Orthodox Christian peers, so I took my frustrations to my grandfather. The next several years constituted a domestic crash course in the history of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. I would visit my grandparents’ home and immerse myself in his fascinating library of books and periodicals, trying to understand the perspective of my fellow Orthodox.

The experiences of my youth functioned as an introduction to a world that is even more complex than I had imagined it to be. My musical skills brought me to non-Ukrainian Orthodox parishes where I learned the unique histories of other traditions. Inspired by the legacy of Alexander Schmemann, I pledged myself to the cause of establishing an authentically local Orthodox Church in America, rooted in mission, by joining the Orthodox Church in America and attending its renowned St. Vladimir’s Seminary. Eventually, I immersed myself in liturgical studies, and have been blessed to land my first appointment, and tenure, at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles. My path continues to be blessed, as I begin a new chapter as Jochum Professor and chair at Valparaiso University in Indiana.

As I continued my work in liturgical studies, I never forgot my crash course in Ukrainian church history. I exchanged hundreds of e-mails on the chaotic church situation in Ukraine, and discovered that many of my peers had no knowledge of the Church in Ukraine. I wrote a handful of articles and essays in an attempt to explain the intra-Orthodox tensions in Ukraine for English-speakers These initial presentations evolved into a series of conference papers, and before I knew it, I already had collected much of the material needed for this book. My objective is the same as it was originally: to explain the situation of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine as clearly as possible. The primary purpose of the book is to illustrate how aspirations for autocephaly and church renewal caused the Orthodox Church in Ukraine to splinter over the span of one hundred years. The features and objectives of autocephaly developed a stigma of ecclesial illegitimacy, and the inability of church leaders to shed this stigma has deepened the divisions and sharpened intrachurch polemics. I hope I have achieved this objective with this book: let the reader decide.

Every study is the result of dialogue with others, and dozens of people have helped me think through the issues featured in this book. Amy Farranto has been a patient and devoted editor, gently guiding me through the publication process and encouraging me to make the changes needed to improve the text and its arguments. I’m very grateful to Amy for her devotion to publishing this book! Sincere thanks to Dr. Antoine Arjakovsky, Dr. Paul Gavrilyuk, Dr. Roy Robson, and Dr. Christine Worobec, who read multiple drafts and provided me with the critical insight needed to strengthen the manuscript and clarify its arguments. I extend my thanks to numerous people who have engaged me in discussion, especially Dr. Michael Andrec, Nataliya Bezborodova, George Demacopoulos, Fr. Andrii Dudchenko, Daniel Galadza, Fr. Peter Galadza, Brandon Gallaher, Jacob Grekhovetsky, Fr. Dellas Oliver Herbel, Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun, Fr. Paul Koroluk, Fr. Heorhii Kovalenko, Yaroslaw Lozowchuk, Petro Melnyk, Aristotle Papanikolaou, Fr. Michael Plekon, Dr. Constantine Sigov, Frank Sysyn, Halyna Teslyuk, and Fr. Roman Zaviyskyy. I have received encouragement from bishops of the churches who have answered questions and provided me with guidance on sources. Special thanks to Metropolitan Oleksandr (Drabinko) of the UOC-MP, who ensured that I received posthumously published works of the ever-memorable Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan), and Archbishop Yevstratiy (Zoria) of the UOC-KP, who answered my questions patiently. Metropolitan Yurii (Kalishchuk) of the UOCC, and Metropolitan Antony (Scharba) and Archbishop Daniel (Zelinsky) of the UOC-USA have also supported my efforts. Ms. Larissa Bulya of the UOC-USA library in South Bound Brook, New Jersey, sent me several hand-picked issues of the Ukrainian Orthodox Word for two projects.

This book would have been impossible without the gracious assistance of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta in Edmonton. I made two trips to Edmonton, one to deliver the Bohdan Bociurkiw memorial lecture in February 2015, and the other to immerse myself in the Tymofii Minenko archives and the Bohdan Bociurkiw Memorial Library. My second trip was made possible by the Anna and Nikander Bukowsky research grant I received from the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. Dr. Volodymyr Kravchenko and Ms. Iryna Fedoriw were terrific hosts, and Mr. James Franks made research in the archive a pleasant experience. I am especially grateful to Dr. Heather Coleman for numerous engaging discussions about Ukrainian and Russian history, and for her friendship.

In closing, I return to the beginning, the intense discussions about the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that occurred in my youth. As a young adult, I was entranced by the beautiful music of Kyrylo Stetsenko, priest and musician of the 1921 UAOC (1882–1922). His niece, Mrs. Kira Tsarehradsky, carried on the Ukrainian musical heritage in the Twin Cities area with skill and grace, and she shared many stories of family reminiscences of the UAOC with me, for which I am very grateful. Thanks to my parents, Eugene (d. 2005) and Olga (d. 2017), who encouraged us to learn about our heritage. My brother Greg and I learned more from our grandparents, Fr. Nicholas and Matushka Margarita, than we could have learned from books, so I dedicate this work to them. In 2016, my wife Tresja and daughter Sophia traveled to Kyiv and L’viv with me. They tolerated my passion and wonder with the unconditional love of family, and I thank them.

Abbreviations and Conventions

I am employing abbreviations and conventions in this book to assist the reader in making distinctions between church movements and their periodization. The following short glossary briefly defines each convention.

AUOCC. All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council. The AUOCC was created by the Kyiv eparchy in 1917 to prepare for the All-Ukrainian Church Council scheduled for 1918. The council consisted primarily of Church progressives who favored ecclesial autocephaly for the Church in Ukraine. The AUOCC was briefly disbanded in 1918 after the Kyivan eparchial assembly elected Antony Khrapovitsky as metropolitan of Kyiv and the Church in Ukraine began to prepare for the second session of the All-Ukrainian Council. The AUOCC reassembled in 1919 and aggressively pursued a program of Ukrainization within the Church in Ukraine, working with the local Soviet authorities to acquire permission to use temples for Ukrainian-language liturgical services. The AUOCC came into open conflict with the bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine and became the primary group seeking the creation of a Ukrainian Church liberated from Russian control and completely independent. The AUOCC’s efforts resulted in the creation and promulgation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1921. The AUOCC was the chief administrative organ of the 1921 UAOC until its liquidation by the Soviet state in 1930.

1921 UAOC. Refers to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church established in October 1921. The 1921 UAOC came into being in October 1921 when a council consisting of laity and clergy, most of whom were suspended or deposed, gathered and created their own episcopate by an innovative conciliar rite of ordination. No bishops participated in the council. The 1921 UAOC fiercely promoted liberation from the Moscow Patriarchate, Ukrainization of all aspects of church life, democratic and egalitarian principles of governance within the church, and the promotion of innovative canons that permitted bishops to be married. The 1921 UAOC grew rather rapidly until the Soviet state began to persecute it in 1926–1927; no Orthodox church in the world recognized the 1921 UAOC as legitimate. Several pejorative terms caricatured the 1921 UAOC, including uncanonical, samosviati (self-consecrated), bezblahodatni (without grace), and Lypkivtsi (disciples of Vasyl Lypkivs’kyi, the charismatic leader of the UAOC from 1921 to 1927). An extraordinary council assembled in 1930 to proclaim the self-liquidation of the 1921 UAOC; this council was orchestrated by the Soviet authorities.

1942 UAOC. Often referred to as the second rebirth of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the 1942 UAOC was created in German-occupied Ukraine in 1942 when the head of the Orthodox Church in Poland, Metropolitan Dionysii (Valedynsky), appointed Archbishop Policarp (Sikorsky) as the temporary administrator of the Autocephalous Church in Ukraine in late 1941. The 1942 the UAOC attained autocephaly when several bishops were consecrated to form an episcopate in February of that year. The church was de facto autocephalous, although its bishops officially designated Metropolitan Dionysii as their head. The 1942 UAOC was essentially a new church in Ukraine because they disavowed the canons and ecclesiology of the 1921 UAOC while retaining the first church’s program of Ukrainization and opposition to the Moscow Patriarchate. The 1942 UAOC rejected the pledge of loyalty made to the Soviet Union by Moscow metropolitan Sergei (Stragorodsky) in 1927, and maintained a consistent anti-Soviet, anti-Bolshevik platform. The bishops of the 1942 UAOC welcomed the Germans as liberators when they defeated the Soviets in 1941; this stance put the bishops of the 1942 UAOC (along with many other bishops in Ukraine and Russia) at odds with the leaders of the Moscow Patriarchate, who were nominally loyal to the Soviet state. The 1942 UAOC came into conflict with a cohort of bishops that reverted to the autonomous canonical status of the Church in Ukraine under the Moscow Patriarchate in 1941. This church became known as the Autonomous Church, and they favored the use of Church Slavonic in the liturgy. The conflict between the 1942 UAOC and the Autonomous Church became permanent when the 1942 UAOC received surviving clergy of the 1921 UAOC through a special rite of reception as opposed to a new ordination. The bishops of the 1942 UAOC left Ukraine and immigrated to Western Europe and North America beginning in 1945, following World War II.

1989 UAOC. Also known as the third rebirth of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the 1989 UAOC came into existence when parishes in L’viv and other cities in Western Ukraine defected from the Moscow Patriarchate to reconstitute the UAOC. The 1989 UAOC kept the primary principles of the 1942 UAOC, but in a new development, assigned itself patriarchal status. In June 1990, the 1989 UAOC elected Metropolitan Mstyslav (Skrypnyk) as its patriarch, strengthening its connection to the 1942 UAOC, as Mstyslav was one of the bishops ordained to the episcopate in German-occupied Ukraine. In June 1992, the UAOC held a council at which a merger was announced with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the leadership of Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko). At this time, the united churches changed the official name to Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyivan Patriarchate. In reality, three churches resulted from the merger, as a minority of bishops and parishes, including Patriarch Mstyslav, rejected the council and the merger, and remained within the UAOC. Furthermore, the vast majority of the bishops and parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Moscow rejected the merger and remained under the leadership of Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan), who was elected in a controversial bishops’ council held in Kharkiv in May 1992. For the purposes of this study, the 1989 UAOC refers to the church that existed up until the June 1992 council in Kyiv. After the June council, I refer to three distinct churches: UAOC (the small minority that rejected the June council), the UOC-KP (the church emerging from the council members who accepted its resolutions), and the UOC-MP (the church remaining under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate). KP and UOC-KP are equivalent. UGCC refers to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the large Byzantine-rite church that claims to be the legitimate heir of the Kyivan Metropolia, asserts patriarchal status, and that restored communion with the Roman Catholic Church at the Union of Brest in 1596. Most of the Orthodox laity rejected the union, and the patriarchate of Jerusalem restored the Orthodox hierarchy of the Kyivan Metropolia in 1620. The UGCC was coerced by Soviet officials to return to the Orthodox Church at a council in L’viv in 1946. The UGCC returned to Ukraine in 1989 and has often come into conflict with Orthodox churches, especially the Moscow Patriarchate.

EP. The book often refers to the EP, or Ecumenical Patriarchate: this is the ancient church of Constantinople, which is considered to be the first among equals within the family of Orthodox churches.

MP. Moscow Patriarchate.

Sobornopravnist’. Refers to the notion of church government by council. Similar to sobornost’ in nomenclature, sobornopravnist’ was actually democratic and egalitarian. The 1921 UAOC implemented sobornopravnist’ as the governing principle for the church, a system that significantly reduced the authority of synods and bishops within the church. Ukrainians debated the proper place of sobornopravnist’ within the life of the church throughout the twentieth century.

UAA Accession No. 2011–27. This accession number refers to specific materials taken from the Tymofii Minenko Collection at the archives of the University of Alberta Library in Edmonton. 2011–27 is the official accession number for this collection. As I cite sources from the collection throughout the study, I am using the following convention: 2011–27-Box #-File #, so the third number refers to the box and the fourth number refers to the file within the box.

Lozowchuk Archive. Refers to materials collected by Mr. Yaroslaw Lozowchuk via his extensive contacts with Orthodox leaders in Ukraine. I am deeply indebted to Mr. Lozowchuk for granting me permission to use the sources he provided.

Introduction

LIKE ITS NEIGHBORS IN CENTRAL Europe, Ukraine is a country of religious pluralism. Greek Catholics, Roman Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, and other churches and religious organizations have historical roots in Ukraine and remain active in the present day. Most Ukrainians identify themselves as Orthodox Christians, and among Ukraine’s Orthodox Churches a state of confusion prevails.¹ The Orthodox Church is the dominant religious organization in Ukraine, as it is in other East Slavic nations such as Russia, Belarus, Bulgaria, and Serbia. However, unlike the Orthodox populations in most of these other countries, Ukraine has three Orthodox churches that claim to be the legitimate heirs of the medieval Kyivan see (or metropolia), a church born from the legendary baptism of Kyiv by Grand Prince Volodymyr in 988. Today’s three Orthodox churches in Ukraine do not coexist peacefully. They are stuck in the cycle of an intrachurch polemical war, and each church appeals to political and ecclesial entities in and outside of Ukraine for endorsement of its legitimacy.

Within the global Orthodox church community, there is a dominant narrative referring to an episode in the early 1990s that catalyzed the disruption of church unity and led to Orthodox plurality in Ukraine. According to this version of events, Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko), who presided over the Orthodox Church in Ukraine from 1966 to 1992, fomented schism in the Kyivan Church when he voluntarily left the Moscow Patriarchate (MP) and merged with most of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) to form the Kyivan Patriarchate (KP) in June of 1992. This prevailing narrative asserts that Filaret was angered by the lack of support for Ukrainian autocephaly in Moscow and among a few of the bishops on the Kyivan Church’s synod. At the Bishops’Council of the Russian Orthodox Church held in March–April 1992, he was asked to submit his resignation, and agreed to do so, but then he rescinded and led those who followed him into schism. Filaret, for his part, claims that his promise to resign was extracted under pressure and that he acted responsibly when he returned to Kyiv to resume his church’s move towards autocephaly.

The turmoil among the Orthodox in Ukraine has implications beyond determining the truth between competing versions of events. For the Orthodox people of Ukraine, the current divorce among the Orthodox raises questions about the legitimacy of clerical ordinations, baptisms, and marriages, especially those performed in the Kyivan Patriarchate (KP) and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). Orthodox people belonging to these churches may be required to be rebaptized or remarried if they attend a Moscow Patriarchate (MP) parish. The sister Orthodox churches of the world need to know with whom they can pray and worship, and how to receive clerical and lay delegations representing the three churches. The Ecumenical Patriarchate (EP) and the MP disagree on who possesses the authority to adjudicate and mediate the Ukrainian problem, as they both claim to be the mother church of the Kyivan Metropolia. Their dispute compromises the authority of the EP within the global communion of Orthodox churches, as the MP’s history of granting autocephaly to churches in the twentieth century places it on an equal footing with the EP. The EP and MP continue to disagree on the mechanism for granting autocephaly to an Orthodox church, an issue related to their divergent interpretations of canon 28 of the Council of Chalcedon (451).² The dispute concerns primacy within the Orthodox Church, as the EP refers to canon 28 from the Council of Chalcedon as the authoritative text recognizing the primacy of the EP among the Orthodox Churches, an authority that would grant the EP the right to grant autocephaly to the Church in Ukraine, not the MP.³ The MP would stand to lose millions of people and thousands of parishes were the Church in Ukraine to become completely and permanently autocephalous. Ukraine has a great deal at stake. After the bloodshed from the wars of the twentieth century and the persecutions of the Soviet regime, Ukraine has struggled to attain stability and internal unity in the post-Soviet period. The Orange Revolution (2004), Maidan crisis (2013), annexation of Crimea (2014), and war in Eastern Ukraine (2014 to the present) are the results of Russian aggression and divisions among the Ukrainian people. The intense disputes among the Orthodox churches in Ukraine constitute a microcosm of the current political crisis, which is why President Petro Poroshenko and Ukraine’s parliament have repeatedly appealed to the EP and the Holy and Great Council in Crete to end the church war by granting the Ukrainian Church autocephaly and contributing to the liberation of Ukraine from Russian colonialism.

The Problem: Nationalism, Autocephaly, and Ukrainization

The rationale for Ukrainian autocephaly and its Ukrainianizing agenda are the central issues of dispute among the Orthodox churches in Ukraine. The relationship between national sovereignty and ecclesial autocephaly belongs to modernity, as the movement for church autocephaly coincided with the struggle to establish a Ukrainian republic in the early twentieth century.⁴ At the global level, the Orthodox Church has felt the impact of the emergence of the nation-state. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the patriarchate of Constantinople recognized the autocephaly of the churches in Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Poland. This action of establishing canonical territories in the Orthodox ecclesiological structural system responded to the changes caused by political reconfiguration. In 1872, the Synod of the Church of Constantinople protected the integrity of local churches’ ecclesial autocephaly from the heresy of ethnophyletism, in which a local church’s identity is exclusively national. The specter of ethnophyletism has hampered the movement for autocephaly in Ukraine for nearly a century as the chief ideologues of the Ukrainian autocephalous movement often had experience in serving as public officers or publicly declared themselves to be patriots. In all the phases of its modern history, aspirations for liberation from the oppressor (tsarist, Soviet, Nazi, and Russian) and the process of nation-building coincided with passionate pleas for ecclesial autocephaly. The national element of the Ukrainian Church movement has perhaps been the greatest obstacle to achieving recognition of ecclesial autocephaly.

Despite the coincidence of nation-building and the movement for autocephaly, the role of nationalism in the movement for Ukrainian Church independence is not easily settled. The rationale for Ukrainian autocephaly followed the modern template of Orthodoxy, which recognized the local church in the modern nation-state, as the larger regional structures corresponding to old imperial borders diminished. Furthermore, the autocephalous movement envisioned the restoration of the Kyivan Church and the return of its native traditions. The precedents established by the recognition of autocephaly of churches in neighboring states would thus apply to the Kyivan Church; it would be natural for this church to be autocephalous in an independent Ukrainian republic. The proposals for autocephaly included petitions for Ukrainization, especially the introduction of vernacular Ukrainian to the liturgy. Ukrainization proved to be the primary symbol of the uneasy relationship between autocephaly and Ukrainian nationalism, as Orthodox leaders and believers viewed it as either a legitimate organic development of Church traditions, or a Trojan horse for the promotion of nationalism.

This study aims to show how the failure of Orthodox Church leaders to reach a consensus on autocephaly and Ukrainization resulted in the splintering of the Church and a pattern of dispute that evolved from 1917 to 2016. I show how the separated churches developed public religious identities that were based primarily on their respective positions on autocephaly, Ukrainization, and the stigma of illegitimacy. One hundred years of polemical exchanges, statements, appeals, letters, and decrees by leaders of the separated Orthodox churches in Ukraine have contributed to the formation of these distinct identities. Each church’s public identity is shaped by the definitions articulated by its leaders, and those assigned to it by its opponents. My study also elaborates the development of a series of political theologies within the historical contexts of the churches. These theologies are based on liberation from external aggressors (especially the tsar), the compatibility of sobornopravnist’ with Western values of democracy, and the Russkii mir ideology that sought to restore an idealized image of medieval Rus’ on the basis of contemporary Russian nationalism.⁵

Historical Events That Shaped the Movement for Autocephaly and Ukrainization

Shifts in political boundaries, imperial allegiances, and church affiliations necessitated adjustment on the part of Ukrainians in the Kyivan Metropolia and created the conditions for autocephaly and Ukrainization at the dawn of the twentieth century. The first separation occurred when the episcopate of the Kyivan Metropolia ratified the Council of Florence and renewed communion with the Roman Catholic Church at the Union of Brest in 1596.⁶ Most of the laity rejected the union, and the Kyivan Metropolia was without an episcopate until Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem renewed it in 1620. The metropolia existed in a Polish orbit, and its Westernization resulted in the emergence of educational systems based on the Jesuit model, advocated by the laity and fully established by Metropolitan Petro Mohyla.⁷ In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the laity assumed leadership of the Church, an important episode in the history of the metropolia that the ideologues of the twentieth century sought to renew in their dream of the restoration of the Kyivan Metropolia.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries required another adjustment on the part of the metropolia, as the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654 brought Kyiv and the Church into the Muscovite orbit.⁸ The subjugation of the metropolia to the MP in 1686 completed the process of union. Ukrainians exercised considerable influence in the upper echelons of the Russian Church during this period, but there were also episodes of friction between Russians and Ukrainians, especially concerning the legitimacy of Kyivan Church traditions.⁹ The friction between peoples also had a political component, as Russian rulers attempted to quell Cossack rebellions, culminating in Ivan Mazepa’s alliance with the Swedes against the Russians in 1709. Empress Catherine II established firm control over the Zaporozhian Cossacks by abolishing their status of political autonomy and Russifying their elites.¹⁰ In the mid-nineteenth century Tsar Nicholas I punished the poet Taras Shevchenko, who dreamed of an independent Ukraine.¹¹ Decades of Russification followed in the late nineteenth century.

The imperial regime’s punishment of Ivan Mazepa in the eighteenth century and Taras Shevchenko in the nineteenth, as well as its Russification policies, transformed the figure of the tsar into an antagonist for Ukrainians in the twentieth century. When the twentieth-century movement for church renewal in the Russian empire introduced models for modernization of church life, such as the creation of conciliar structures strengthening the role of the laity, the creation of lay preachers, and the introduction of vernacular in the liturgy, and the tsarist regime collapsed, adjustments to new political and ecclesial conditions gained speed and resulted in the creation of a republic of Ukraine (June 1917) and eventual independence (January 1918), as well as the splintering of the churches in Ukraine.¹² The convergence of church renewal and political chaos created a perfect storm. In Russia, the Moscow Council of 1917–1918 restored the patriarchate (which had been abolished in the early eighteenth century), but had to defer many of the proposals that would introduce renewal because of a lack of funding and the fierce persecution of the Church by the Bolsheviks. The tsar was not the only public leader whose authority was rejected during the revolution: Orthodox bishops were unable to satisfy everyone who wanted church reform, and this was especially true in Ukraine. Ukraine provided an environment in which an alternative church could arise to challenge the authority of the MP, and a contingent of leaders that formed the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council (AUOCC) could sustain the movement for church renewal that they envisioned would be incarnate in a restored, renewed, and independent Kyivan Metropolia.

Autocephaly and Ukrainization at the Councils of 1918 and 1921

The literary corpus of two formative councils, the first in 1918, the second in 1921, provide the primary sources that inform us about the initial separation of Ukrainians from the MP and their disputes on autocephaly and Ukrainization. The 1918 All-Ukrainian Council was convoked in January 1918 at the request of the Church in Ukraine. The Moscow Council, which was still in session, blessed the convocation of the Ukrainian council, which met in three sessions. Until recently, most of the literature on this council could be found only in memoirs, historical monographs, and in information about the Moscow Council. In 2010, Andryi Starodub published the proceedings of the 1918 All-Ukrainian Council, which included a section that assessed the evidence.¹³ As Starodub mentions, the 1918 council was rejected by many Ukrainians, and there were many figures that remained in the patriarchate who viewed it as an inconsequential gathering. However, the 1918 All-Ukrainian Council is regarded as a canonical gathering and thus has implications for two of the most important features of this study.¹⁴ The council’s decisions to seek autonomy within the MP instead of autocephaly, and to reject the liturgical use of vernacular Ukrainian in favor of Church Slavonic became the first primary degree of separation between the Ukrainians and the synod in Ukraine.

The rejection of autocephaly and Ukrainization by the 1918 council catalyzed the initial separation of Orthodox Ukrainians from the Kyivan Metropolia of the MP. For the trajectory of Ukrainian Orthodox history in the twentieth century, the 1918 council was definitive. While the autocephalists rejected its authority, the Ukrainian Orthodox who remained within the Moscow Patriarchate viewed the 1918 council as the most recent ecclesial gathering establishing canonical structures in Ukraine. The 1918 council became pivotal when the Germans liberated Western Ukraine from Soviet rule in 1941, as one cohort of bishops in Volyn’ met at the Pochaiv Monastery and returned to the jurisdiction of Moscow in accordance with the resolutions of the 1918 council in Kyiv. Thus, loyalty to Moscow was not based solely on ideological positions, but also on the reception of the most recent councils of the Church.

The 1918 council brings us to the October 1921 council in Kyiv that resulted in the birth of the 1921 UAOC. These conciliar documents include both the proceedings and the conciliar declarations.¹⁵ I engage the conciliar documents and the correspondence between the 1921 UAOC and the MP as the primary sources for presenting the causes of separation within the Orthodox Church in Ukraine and the promotion of the objectives of the autocephalists. I also consult Iryna Prelovs’ka’s detailed account of the sources for the history of the Church and memoirs of the council published by the émigré Ukrainian Orthodox community, along with Tetiana Ievsieieva’s analysis of Orthodox Church groups during this period.¹⁶

The first part of this study shows how the 1921 UAOC relentlessly pursued the progressive objectives of the church renewal movement while also seeking the restoration of the Kyivan Metropolia. The establishment of a married episcopate through a renovated rite of episcopal consecration caused the stigma of ecclesial illegitimacy to become a permanent scar on the 1921 UAOC and its sympathizers, as traditional Orthodox who were sympathetic to autocephaly could not accept the UAOC because of its disregard for apostolic succession. All other components of modernization hailed by the UAOC, including Ukrainization and a conciliar-oriented ecclesiology, became attached to the stigma of illegitimacy and established a pattern of suspicion of Ukrainian autocephaly in the following decades. Therefore, the initial period of study establishes the features of public religious identities that formed rapidly during the Nazi occupation of Ukraine. The 1921 UAOC defined its identity through a desire for liberation from the tsar and the bishops loyal to him, its promotion of Ukrainization, and its reception of modernization. The exarchate defined itself by fidelity to canonical norms and traditions, such as the preservation of a monastic episcopate and the official use of Church Slavonic for the liturgy.

Autocephaly, Ukrainization, and Canonicity: World War II

The methods employed for achieving autocephaly and Ukrainization developed differently among Ukrainians who belonged to the Orthodox Church of Poland. I analyze the evolution of autocephalist aspirations and the resilience of the stigma of ecclesial illegitimacy through the second UAOC, which was established in German-occupied Ukraine in 1942 through the patronage of the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Poland. I discuss how autocephalists hailed the legitimacy of an independent Kyivan Metropolia through the tomos of autocephaly granted by the EP to the Church in Poland in 1924, a document that defined the subjugation of Kyiv to Moscow as uncanonical.¹⁷ Documents detailing synodal meetings and correspondence between bishops serve as the primary sources for narrating the emergence of the 1942 UAOC and the creation of the Autonomous Church in Ukraine, with their bishops meeting at the Pochaiv Monastery.¹⁸ I analyze these documents to show how Orthodox Ukrainians could not agree on the event that had binding authority for church organization in Ukraine (the 1924 tomos or the 1918 All-Ukrainian Council). I also show how attempts to implement liturgical Ukrainization complicated relations among Orthodox, while the UAOC’s decision to receive clergy ordained by the 1921 UAOC proved to be an insurmountable stumbling block. Chapter 2 also illuminates how alleged collaboration of UAOC leaders with Nazi officials enhanced the perception of illegitimacy associated with the movement for autocephaly. I discuss how these new developments contributed to the evolution of the public ecclesial identities of the Church in Ukraine, as illegitimacy continued to stigmatize the 1942 UAOC, while the autonomist preference for Church Slavonic and fidelity to the 1918 council and traditional liturgical practices was in continuity with the feature of canonicity.

Migration of Autocephaly and Ukrainization and the Political Theology of Democracy

Chapter 3 examines the Church in North America, which carried the banner in the émigré community for both Ukrainian national sovereignty and ecclesial independence. Two Ukrainian churches are profiled: the one in Canada, which was the largest Church numerically, and the one in the United States, which became the new center for the diaspora church on account of its first bishop, Archbishop Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), who later became metropolitan and then patriarch upon his return to Ukraine. This section demonstrates how the aspirations for autocephaly and the problem of ecclesial illegitimacy evolved in conditions outside of Ukraine. I analyze the persistent Ukrainian attempts to overcome the reputation of illegitimacy with three major actions. The UOC-USA corrected the ordination of Archbishop John (Teodorovych) in 1949 by celebrating the rite of monastic tonsure and the rite of ordination with the laying on of hands by two canonical bishops, ritual elements absent from his original ordination in 1921. I also examine the decision of the Canadian (and American) churches to renew communion with the EP in 1990 (Canada) and 1995 (USA), respectively. I discuss how efforts to attain canonical legitimacy were regarded by some people and parishes in Canada as threats to Ukrainian aspirations for autocephaly. Chapter 3 explores the development of a political theology anchored in democracy and freedom, as the UOC-USA exploited American political positions on religious rights in the Soviet Union to delegitimize the MP and attempt to liberate Ukraine’s Orthodox from their new captor, the USSR. These developments demonstrate the evolution of public religious identity in the context of immigration. The émigré churches’ sustained attempts to normalize relations with the EP and correct the ordination of Archbishop John illustrate their desire to legitimize Ukrainian autocephaly and gather all faithful into one united Church.

In chapter 4, I profile the patriarchal exarchate’s activity during the Cold War through the celebration of the millennium.¹⁹ This section profiles the life of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine with reference to the 1946 synod in L’viv that liquidated the Greek-Catholic Church. I discuss the material published in the exarchate’s Ukrainian-language periodical, Православний вісник, to demonstrate how the new narrative coalesced around the notion that all peoples of Rus’ were again gathered together in one church under Moscow. The promotion of a political theology sponsored by the MP is presented here as a justification of the USSR’s liquidation of the Greek-Catholic Church to eradicate the vestiges of Nazi fascism from the Unia.²⁰ Last, I illustrate the complexity of the multiple identities borne by Orthodox Ukrainians during the Cold War by drawing from the scholarship of Natalia Shlikhta on the subaltern strategies of resistance to the state employed by faithful, clergy, and hierarchs within the Church.

Post-Soviet Identities in Conflict: Ukrainian Autocephaly and Russian Nationalism

Chapter 5 examines post-Soviet developments in the public religious identity of the Orthodox churches in Ukraine. The primary topics are the dismissal of the 1989 UAOC on the basis of ecclesial illegitimacy,²¹ the emergence of a new crisis involving dispute about the methods for obtaining autocephaly within the UOC-MP, the creation of the UOC-KP and the rise of Patriarch Filaret (Denysenko), and the responses of the Church to the Russian nationalism espoused by Patriarch Kirill (Gundiaev)’s Russkii mir strategy.²² The chapter examines how Church leaders attempted to gain both state and popular support during epic events affecting Ukraine, including the 2004 Orange Revolution, the Maidan crisis, and the annexation of Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine. It also shows how the legacy of narratives of illegitimacy both defined the identities of the respective churches and imposed identities on their competitors. The UAOC’s election of Patriarch Mstyslav and promotion of Ukrainization retained the legacy of the diaspora churches, but were construed as illegitimate because of their connection to the 1921 UAOC. The KP also followed the path of the UAOC through its campaign for autocephaly and Ukrainization, but its appointment of Patriarch Filaret raised the question of legitimacy because of the MP’s deposition of Filaret from holy orders and anathematization from the Church. Change in the public religious identity of the UOC-MP was the most intriguing development of this period. The UOC-MP maintained its identity as the only officially canonical Church in Ukraine, but it also pursued modest Ukrainization during the tenure of Metropolitan Volodymyr. This church encountered a new dilemma when it found its post-Soviet destiny challenged by the introduction of the Russkii mir initiative, as it sought to balance its emerging Ukrainian identity with the demands of Russian nationalism promulgated by the MP.

The Orthodox churches in Ukraine continue to struggle through a crisis of separation and polemics that has steadily gained momentum since 1917. The instability of the Ukrainian state and the many wars that ravaged Ukraine left church leaders without the calm needed to systematically work through their disputes. Autocephaly, Ukrainization, and fierce competition for recognition of legitimacy have deepened the divisions among Orthodox people, and these fissures are detrimental to efforts toward unity. The remainder of this book narrates the separation of the churches in Ukraine, and the problems of the autocephaly agenda and the stigma of ecclesial illegitimacy. I hope that the rest of this story clarifies the problems of autocephaly and Ukrainization, their origins, development, and contributions to the public religious identities of the Orthodox churches in Ukraine, so that readers understand the complex layers of this story and become familiar with its details.

1

The First Autocephalist Movement and the Creation of the UAOC (1917–1930)

THIS CHAPTER NARRATES THE STORY of the attempt to establish autocephaly in a renewed Kyivan Metropolia in the early twentieth century. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church of 1921–1930 (1921 UAOC) took bold steps by recreating the Kyivan Metropolia on the foundational principles of liberation, Ukrainization, and modernization.¹ The main events leading up to the formation of the 1921 UAOC include the eparchial assemblies of 1917, the 1918 All-Ukrainian Council, and a series of confrontations between the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council (AUOCC) and the synod of bishops of the Ukrainian Exarchate (under the Moscow Patriarchate). This resulted in the restoration of a distinct public identity featuring liberation, newness, and a flattened ecclesiology. Plurality in Orthodox religious identity also emerged, as evidenced by Ukrainization within the patriarchal exarchate.

The Origins of the Ukrainian Autocephalist Movement

In the nineteenth century, a sense of