NEITHER CATAPULTS NOR ATOMIC BOMBS

I do have some significant criticisms of “Catapults Are Not Atomic Bombs”, beginning with DeVries’ definition of decisiveness in regard to technology focuses on specific weapons. I would not argue with DeVries’ exposé of the belief that the English longbow was some sort of super-weapon. My problem is that I think they have “thrown out the baby with the bathwater” – that anyone who is trying to understand war must appreciate that technology is one of the key determinants.

It is understandable that DeVries has taken this approach, since, as Ronald Kline explained, ‘‘historians and sociologists of technology have discredited the tenet of technological determinism, so much so that it has become a critic’s term and a term of abuse in their academic circles.’’

Now, twenty years after DeVries’ article appeared, historians are questioning the refutation of technology driving history. In 2015, Daniel Dafoe endeavoured to create a new way to reincorporate technological determinism back into history. Dafoe states that “we can situate deterministic theories along a continuum, with harder determinists putting more emphasis on the autonomy and power of technology, and softer determinists allowing for more social control and context.” By challenging the orthodoxy of anti-determinism, however, Dafoe also demands that we provide some sort of structure to understanding the role that technology does play in history, specifically in the history of warfare.

If Dafoe is right, that technology can drive fortress. The is one of the crucial determinant technologies in Parker’s theory. The search for revolutionary technological change in the preindustrial world is very difficult indeed.