

Report on my latest visit to Tripoli, Libya

19 to 22 April 2013

Summary

I visited Tripoli from 19th-22nd April, 2013, in my capacity as the European Parliament's Standing Rapporteur on Libya.

I met with members of the **General National Congress (GNC)** and its Legal and Constitutional Committee, **Justice Minister Salah Marghani**, **Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammed Abdelaziz**, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated **Justice and Development Party**, **Mohamed Sawan**; as well as the Political Bureau Adviser of the liberal of the parliamentary group of the **National Forces Alliance**, **Dr. Daw A. Aboudawia**. I also engaged with different civil society actors and constitutional experts.

Approximately eighteen months have passed since the end of the armed uprising that toppled the oppressive regime of Muammar Qadhafi. The challenges now faced by the Libyan transitional authorities in establishing a functioning democratic State are as significant as they have been since the GNC came into office in August 2012, and since the Government of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan was appointed in October 2012.

I noticed that real progress has been made in the five months since I was last in Libya: the authorities are more coherent, resolute and organised, civil society groups are highly active, and there are diverse efforts to inform the Libyan public about the transitional political process, particularly regarding the drafting of the constitution. The return to functioning basic public services has also started to make a visible difference in improving everyday life in Tripoli.

Worryingly though, armed groups continue to operate without subordination to a central State command, in a country with only nominal Armed Forces and Police, awash with arms and with general disregard for the mistrusted legal and judicial systems inherited from Qadhafi. The precarious state of security and judicial institutions means that abuses remain rife. Militias remain armed and continue to be essential providers of security. However, they often also become the source of insecurity, particularly when used by certain local forces to intimidate the Government and Congress, as has seen these last days with armed groups blocking Ministries to press for the passing of the Political Isolation Law. There is also a real and growing threat that financially-backed and armed Islamist groups use this security vacuum and weak governance to increase their influence in the country.

As a result of what I have seen and heard in this visit and the evolution I perceived, **I call on the EU Commission and Council to consider Libya as a priority nation in external policy and to engage with real and sustained application in Libya-EU**

relations at this critical juncture in Libya's transition. The EU must be more forthright in forming a partnership with the Libyan authorities against the insidious and dangerous security threats that the country faces.

I returned to Brussels on Monday 22nd April, following what was a highly productive visit, and it was **with sadness and shock that I received news of the attack on the French Embassy in Tripoli** on Tuesday 23rd April. This act of terror, in absolutely no way, represents the attitudes of the Libyan people towards their European and international partners. Libyans perceive such heinous acts as attacks on their country and people, meant to thwart their revolution on to an undemocratic path, by exploiting the extreme vulnerabilities of their security capacities. **One more reason for the EU to increase engagement with Libya instead of withdrawing, and to prioritize cooperation in the security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration (SSR/DDR) fields: is that, after all, Libya's security is actually Europe's security.**

Introduction

Main points I raised in the talks with my Libyan interlocutors:

- The **security situation** in the country and its spill-over effects in neighbouring countries, due to the uncontrolled deposits of armaments, widespread weapons and the absence of state controlled security forces.
- The position of **women in Libyan society** today, particularly regarding their participation in the constitutional drafting process in order to ensure a constitution that protects their rights; questioning the influence of Islamist groups on the human rights of women.
- The current status of the **constitutional drafting process**, whether a structured road map and timeline had been established for the process, and whether all groups in Libyan society are being given a fair chance to contribute
- The **persecution of minorities**, particularly religious minorities; the **treatment of sub-Saharan African immigrants**, and the conditions of prolonged detention without trial for thousands of foreigners and nationals who served as combatants for Qadhafi; trials of top level Qadhafi relatives and officials.
- How best to **strengthen the cooperation between the EU** and the new Libyan authorities, including parliamentary exchanges.

1. Latest developments on the security landscape in Libya

1.1

On 19th April, I met with **General Michael Smith**, the Director of Security with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The role of his team is to help the Libyan authorities devise a security action plan; this includes working with the Libyan Government, as well as GNC committees on Home Affairs, National Security and Defence. These committees often complain about their lack of capacity to fulfil their mandated roles, including requirements as basic as premises in which to work.

Detailed terms of reference for the respective areas of security governance were drawn up by UNSMIL, however before the appointment of the Government of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan; there were no interlocutors with which to coordinate. Now though, there has been buy-in and application on the part of the Libyan Government to the **Security, Justice and Rule of Law Development Plan**. This plan is a result of the London and Paris Summits where the Libyan authorities met with members of the international community to clearly define their priorities and needs, and to develop a practical road map for achieving their objectives.

Gen. Smith outlined that the current Government has demonstrated that securing the country's border is its security priority, out of the six focal areas under the security category of the Development Plan. A recent joint **EU-UN Border Management Workshop** highlighted the value in bringing the different entities involved together to assess and discuss border security. The **CSDP mission** to assist on building capacity for border security is just starting to be set in, and most likely will be fully deployed later in the year - **which is far too little, too late, in my opinion**

The UN Sanctions Committee, set up pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1970 (2011), often visits Libya to assess the sanctions still in place following the fall of the Qadhafi regime. UNSC Resolution 2095 (2013) adopted a highly cautious relaxation of the arms embargo imposed on Libya, removing the requirement of the approval of the Sanctions Committee for the supply of non-lethal military equipment for humanitarian or protective use. The Libyan authorities have complained about the difficulty of countering armed groups when they cannot freely procure arms under the continued restrictions.

Security in the Eastern region of Libya still presents a highly difficult governance issue for the Tripoli-based authorities, a situation aggravated following the murder of the US Ambassador and other American diplomats of 11th September 2012. It is clear that there are Islamist armed groups operating relatively openly in the Eastern region. There are also frequent attacks on State security forces by other armed groups that are not operating on the basis of radical Islam, but rather on political grounds with the majority of attacks being retribution for Qadhafi-era crimes.

International assistance to the Libyan authorities must be steadfast in stemming the tide of these attacks by tackling the problem of impunity for these lawless armed men. The legitimate Libyan authorities are experiencing intense levels of fear and intimidation that are restricting their ability to enforce the rule of law; and they must be equipped with the necessary resources to meet these challenges.

1.2

A Libyan entity that is being widely heralded as successful in making real gains towards the security of the country is the **Warriors Affairs Commission**. Under the stewardship of Managing Director Mustafa Elstagezly, the Warriors Affairs Commission is focussing on empowering, training and integrating young revolutionaries through initiatives such as comprehensive vocational training programs, both in Libya and abroad, and providing funding for entrepreneurial ventures. The Commission is conducting interviews with many ex-revolutionary fighters and is noting the psychological and education needs of these young men.

1.3

An issue that is currently prominently worrying stakeholders in the Libyan transition is the **insidious presence of hard-line Islamist groups in country**. Most of my interlocutors say there is evidence of a destabilizing activity of certain groups that are attempting to enforce their political will under the guise of religion in Libya, operating either by infiltrating or forming armed militia, and also by financing mosques and the social services they provide to communities. This is having a visible **impact on two main areas: the security landscape and the rights of women in Libya**.

Most of my Libyan contacts believe that both the **EU and Libya must now shape their relations in a united, coherent and forceful stance against these radical elements**, which are well armed and funded -- mostly from Qatari and Saudi sources, I was told -- and work to impose a Salafist version of Islam that is alien to the conservative but moderate Maliki traditions that most Libyans follow.

1.4

I met with members of the **Libyan National Party (LNP)**, a liberal political movement with leaders known for their longstanding opposition to Qadhafi. They have been the subject of frequent attacks and persecution by radical groups in Libya. There is a case currently before the Libyan Courts involving two members of the LNP, who have been charged with insulting the Prophet because of arguing in favour of women's rights to participate in political life. This particular case is well-known throughout Libyan politics but the Libyan authorities seem to be intimidated to act decisively in protecting the freedom of this Party to operate. This is a crucial test case which the EU should take up with the Government and GNC and where EU visible interest could make a difference, namely by strengthening the hand of those understanding the danger of this precedent.

1.5

Another important factor that will contribute to the security of Libya, several sources including Libyan businessmen pointed out to me, is the speedy return of international companies that have invested in projects in the country and have yet to return after the revolution. These companies now have an interlocutor in the Libyan Government and even in the relevant committees at the Congress. The economic development and job creation that will stem from their return can make a huge contribution to the stabilization of the country.

1.6

I believe the EU should take more often the initiative of releasing calculated statements and interacting with the Libyan Government and the GNC regarding the resolve to bring to accountability the criminal gangs and their leaders currently active in Libya.

Many of my contacts also stressed the **critically urgent need for the EU to do more in its partnership with Libya in SSR/DDR programmes**. Above and beyond the recently initiated civilian CSDP border management and surveillance mission that has been deployed to Libya; the country now needs serious and exerted cooperation from the EU on SSR/DDR.

2. Meeting with Justice Minister Salah Marghani

On 20th April I met with Justice Minister Salah Marghani in his offices in Tripoli. He stressed that it is critical for the EU to continuously and clearly raise the importance for the new Libya to be a country respecting human rights, justice and the rule of law. He also gave me worrying examples of **attacks by armed groups on his own office and on convoys of the judicial police** transporting prisoners to trial; but he insisted that the Ministry of Justice is determined to send a message to the leadership of criminal groups that they will be held morally and legally accountable for their actions.

There is currently a basic training programme for judicial police and prison guards, and there have so far been 700 graduates from this programme. The Minister is considering advanced training programmes; however after a recent spate of attacks, an option is being mooted to bolster the judicial police into a more equipped and stronger force. Whatever the decision, the Minister says, **strong support from the international community is crucial in this capacity-building.**

I raised with Minister Marghani the issue of **arbitrary detentions and detention centres** that are being operated by militia groups outside State control. He assured me that all known detention centres in Libya have been transferred into the control of the Ministry of Justice, and that the process of screening prison guards is now taking place. He also highlighted that there has been a recent Ministerial decision taken to construct a high-capacity detention centre in Misrata; a facility that will accommodate approximately 2,000 detainees. Trials are being prepared, but require retrained judiciary and also a reinforcement of the security for the judicial professionals: many are afraid to proceed with trials for personal security reasons.

Regarding the **trials of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi and Abdullah al-Senussi**, the Minister explained that the conversation with the ICC hinges on Libya's ability to prove that it can hold fair trials for these people in Tripoli. International technical support and observation of the trials will be crucial.

3. Meeting with the Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammed Abdelaziz

In my meeting with Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammed Abdelaziz, he raised some issues to me that he believes to be of high importance to the current stage of the Libyan transition to democracy. Regarding EU-Libya relations, he too emphasised the **urgent need to see the provision of expertise and resources in the security field by the EU to the Libyan authorities.**

An issue that Minister Abdelaziz said is vital to the development of the country and for the confidence of the people of Libya in the new authorities is the **recovering of stolen assets** stashed abroad by the former regime. He also brought to my attention his concerns about the **Political Isolation Law**, if it is not implemented in a transparent and precise manner.

4. Latest developments on the Libyan constitutional drafting process

4.1

The Libyan Supreme Court ruled that the Constitutional Assembly - the body that will draft the new Libyan constitution - should not be selected by way of national elections. Appointment of its members was, thus, to be made by the GNC. Yet, subsequently, the GNC formed a Commission for Dialogue, which reached out to Libyan civil society actors and the general public, and it was established that the **majority of the Libyan people wanted to elect the Constitutional Assembly**. The GNC then determined there will be a national election, which means that the process will take up more time.

A highly important role has now been assumed by the Committee that will draft the electoral law for the election of the Constitutional Assembly. This Committee is composed of eighteen individuals, and **GNC 2nd Vice-President Mr. Saleh Makzoum** insists that it fairly represents all of the major demographics in Libya, with female members and representatives of the Amazigh, Tabu, and Tuareg ethnic groups. There are three members who are GNC members, with the remainder representing civil society and members of the legal community. **From 21st April, the electoral law drafting Committee has been given a timeline of one-and-a-half months to present the draft law to the GNC for approval.**

4.2

On 20th April, I hosted a discussion with a **panel of Libyan constitutional experts and members of international NGO's** involved in engaging with the Libyan authorities in the process of drafting their constitution. One of the members of the Committee tasked with drafting the electoral law for the Constitutional Assembly is Judge Naiema, and she is strongly advocating for the implementation of a **minimum quota of women to be on the Constitutional Assembly**, in order to ensure that women's human rights, international human rights law and treaties ratified by Libya are fully enshrined in the new constitution.

Although opinion varies on the role that **Sharia law** should take in the Libyan constitution, Libyans are currently involved in a constructive debate on this topic and they insist that the international community should not be afraid of a Saudi-esque model of Sharia being adopted, as this does not correspond in any way with the popular, moderate version of Islam that prevails in Libya.

These constitutional experts are very aware of the task at hand of educating, enlightening and **informing the Libyan population about the constitutional process**; and this, they say, will take place through a comprehensive campaign to engage all constituencies and minorities in Libyan society.

4.3

On April 20, I also met with members of the **GNC's Legal and Constitutional Committee**, and they were able to highlight some aspects of the drafting process that they are currently focussing on. For example, a discussion that is currently ongoing is whether to have elections based on lists of candidates for the Constitutional Assembly, where drafters would be elected in groups; or to elect them as individuals; or indeed some hybrid mix of the two.

The GNC has also now approved the re-mobilisation of the same **High National Election Commission** that was involved in the successful July 2012 national elections, as recommended by the EU Election Assessment Mission, headed by Mr. Alexander Graf Lambsdorff MEP. This is positive for the prospects of the smooth running of a national Constitutional Assembly election, as this Commission has undergone training with international institutions and will carry over its experience earned from last year's elections.

A characteristic that the Constitutional Assembly is widely expected to possess is its equal geographic composition in accordance with the three historical regions of Libya. It is expected to be composed of a group of sixty members, with twenty representatives elected from Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan respectively.

I was informed that the **Constitutional Assembly will not be in existence for another 6-8 months**; at which point they will have 120 days to draft a constitution and present it to the GNC for approval.

I suggested to the GNC Legal and Constitutional Committee and to the Libyan Foreign Minister that, following the Tunisian example, Libya might find it useful to seek the expertise from the **Venice Commission** in exploring the diverse solutions found in other constitutions, as a contribution to its own constitutional debates and drafting process.

5. Latest developments on the proposed Libyan Political Isolation Law

5.1

I met with **Mr. Abdulrahman Shater**, who was an elected Member of the GNC from urban Tripoli, before he was **disbarred by the Integrity Committee** on April 9. Mr. Shater told me that he was informed he had been disbarred because of several references to Qadhafi's Green Book that he made during his career as a journalist and then as Commissioner of the Libyan Chamber of Commerce. He argues that the process is arbitrary and selective. Outlining other examples of individuals -- including from rival political parties -- who have been disbarred by the Integrity Committee, Mr. Shater expressed grave concern about the practice of disbarring people where there is little or no justification or sense in doing so. He is formally appealing the decision to disbar him.

5.2

At the headquarters of the **National Forces Alliance**, which is the largest political group in the GNC and is led by Mr. Mahmoud Jibril, the former Interim Prime Minister of Libya under the National Transitional Council Government, I met with **Dr. Daw A. Aboudawia**, who is the Political Bureau Director of the party. Dr. Aboudawia informed me that the GNC is making rapid progress in developing and becoming more effective in its role. For example, the members have begun to engage in inter-party political dialogue on important issues, as opposed to the prominence of animosity and unwillingness to engage that came before.

Dr. Aboudawia stressed that the Political Isolation Law should be designed to be clearly based on the concrete actions of individuals, and it must ask whether someone committed crimes under Qadhafi's regime. In his opinion if there is a vague, blanket application of such a law, then Libyans will have not learned anything and will be simply reverting back to the methods of the former regime.

5.3

This was a sentiment shared by other interlocutors in the Government and the GNC who encourage dialogue in the GNC regarding the introduction of this law, since they fear that **if implemented in the wrong manner, it could have a devastating impact on Libya's evolution.**

Such risks are clearly illustrated by the **news that came out yesterday about the passing of the law, following a week of ministerial buildings in Tripoli having been besieged by armed militias.**

The law was overwhelmingly passed and lists posts held under Qadhafi that, if held by an individual at any time from 1969-2011, that individual will be excluded from holding any high position in Libya for ten years. There is to be the Political Positions Standards Implementation Authority set up to decide on exclusion cases. The law comes into force one month from 5th May 2013.

The most worrying thing about this newly passed law is its vagueness, and the potential it now has to expel for ten years individuals, including members of Government and Congress, who may have not been involved in the commission of crimes under Qadhafi and who are highly valuable actors in Libya's transition and future development. Such names that are expected to be barred include: GNC President Mohammed Magarief and former Interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jbril.

5.4

In my opinion, **the EU must increase efforts to engage in dialogue with the Libyan authorities**, and in particular with GNC members -- who call for a more proactive approach by the European Parliament and national parliaments -- regarding the caution required in implementing such a law, that could potentially have a **crippling impact on governance capacity and could be a source of political destabilization in Libya.**

6. Current situation for women in Libya

6.1

I continuously raised the different pressing questions regarding the present environment and future prospects for women in Libya. Although there are some elements in Libya trying to oppress women under the guise of Islam, I met some inspirational people who are determined to enforce the human rights of women and they are engaging everyday in this effort. These women are also calling for a quota for women on the Constitutional Assembly.

6.2

According to **GNC 2nd Vice-President Mr. Makzoum**, women are now playing a very active role in Libyan political life on several different platforms: the GNC and its committees, the electoral law drafting Committee for the Constitutional Assembly elections, and also there are Libyan women members of the Arab Parliament. These women in Libyan politics are not simply acquiescing to the positions taken by the male-dominated major political blocs; but rather these women are mobilising themselves and loudly campaigning for their interests. A new bloc has been formed in the GNC of 32 women members, who have joined together to defend the rights of women in the drafting of new Libyan law. And this bloc was to meet with the drafters of the electoral law for the Constitutional Assembly elections. Regarding pressure on women from fundamental Islamists, Mr. Makzoum adamantly insisted that there are no such factions in power in Libya; and that even the Islamist-leaning groups in Libyan politics realise the importance of women's rights.

6.3

On April 21, I hosted a meeting of representatives from a range of **Libyan women's CSO's**. I met several highly motivated women. Despite the struggles and the pressures that they face, due to radical elements that are taking advantage of the security and power vacuum since the revolution, they are organising themselves and refuse to be intimidated in their work.

They pointed out that **the challenge facing women in Libya currently is not one of laws and regulations, but rather a social and cultural challenge**: perceptions need to change through education and social debate. They -- and indeed the vast majority of Libyans I spoke to during my visit -- are not worried about the imposition of Islam in law or in the constitution, because, they say, if one looks closely at the principles of Islam, women are highly protected. The problem is rather created by groups in Libya currently with different political and other motivations, interpreting Islam to suit their interests.

Some of these CSO's had set up a women's community centre, which included much needed psychosocial services to help women in abusive family relationships. They stressed how important it was to enable these women to gain capacities and become financially independent and showed much interest in finding out about EU possible support to **establish micro-credit schemes**.

6.4

Throughout my engagements, I raised concerns and continuously enquired about a **recent Fatwa issued by the Grand Mufti Al Ghariani which calls for the temporary ban on Libyan women marrying foreigners**; this Fatwa was subsequently endorsed by the Ministry for Social Affairs.

I received reassurance from GNC and Government members that the Fatwa's issued by the Mufti are simply his own opinion and are not binding on Congress or the Government, even though his position is enshrined in Libyan law.

I also received reassurance from the leaders of the Justice and Development Party, which is aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood and which is known in Libya as such, that this ban would only be temporary and until there are clear institutions established governing the laws of marriage.

Some people I spoke to believe that, although he played a hugely important role during and after the revolution, the Grand Mufti should not now be involving himself in the political issues of the country.

7. Perceptions of Libyan youth

I met with Libyan youth CSO's, who were able to paint a picture of the current landscape in Libya for their activities; and it is certainly a positive outlook.

Beyond the crucial role that Libyan youth played in the uprising against the Qadhafi dictatorship, **the youth continues to be actively involved in initiatives to enlighten the Libyan public** on the constitutional process, to advocate for training and re-integration of armed militias, to engage with the GNC and provide an important check on their activities, and to educate Libyans on the destructive nature of racism and other forms of discrimination.

I raised with CSO's activists the **persecution of African migrants in Libya and the need to press society to support a legal protection status for them**, since Libya would always need migrant workers for the functioning of essential services and economic development. They outlined to me how Qadhafi created a dysfunctional class system in Libya which allowed a culture of control and ignorance to fester and embed itself in society. This combined with the issue of sub-Saharan African mercenaries fighting for Qadhafi against the uprising, has resulted in a very difficult situation, particularly affecting many jailed foreigners on suspicion of war crimes. They acknowledged this is a matter that civil society needs to debate and be educated about and where GNC should play a crucial role.

8. Update on the Libyan General National Congress (GNC)

8.1.

2nd Vice-President of the GNC Mr. Makzoum informed me that there is a highly significant Bill regarding **transitional justice** currently passing through the GNC. GNC members have been engaging in seminars to gain a further understanding on transitional justice mechanisms and the constitutional process.

The GNC has also recently passed and implemented decisive laws criminalising torture, kidnappings and discrimination; and criminalising the unauthorised carrying of weapons in public places.

I pressed Mr. Makzoum on the importance for the GNC to pass a law on the **legal status of migrants in Libya**.

Continuous dialogue with the Government is a priority for the GNC in order to secure short term projects, according to Mr. Makzoum. He added that this is due to the serious problems caused by poverty and young people being left idle.

8.2

In my meeting with the GNC's Legal and Constitutional Committee, I got an insight into the work that they do. The Committee is responsible for reviewing laws that are proposed by the Government or by civil society actors. The Committee is focussing its efforts on laws that are urgent to the current stage of the Libyan transition; for example they have adopted emergency measures regarding wounded revolutionaries.

9. Asset recovery assistance

The Libyan members of Congress and Government asked about **European facilitation for Libya to recover assets stolen by the former regime** and were very interested to hear of the European Parliament coming debate and initiative on asset recovery assistance to Arab Spring countries in transition.

Also the Minister for Foreign Affairs Abdelaziz insisted that this was an issue of extremely high political importance for Libya.

The Libyan authorities have now allocated a Committee within the Libyan Government to engage in the recovery of these stolen assets, and all politicians I spoke to are intensely eager to engage with an EU counterpart on this subject.

10. Meeting with leader of the Justice and Development Party (linked to the Muslim Brotherhood)

I had a very substantive meeting with **Mr. Mohamed Sawan**, the leader of the Justice and Development Party, and two of his senior colleagues.

I was led to understand that, even within their own party, there are very intense debates regarding the role of women in law, about what must be the constitution, transitional justice, disarmament and other key issues.

Mr. Sawan was eager to get my thoughts on the situations in Egypt, Tunisia, and on the conflict ravaging Syria. He pointed out that the international community is displaying double standards in its relations with these countries, in particular while strongly condemning missteps of Muslim Brotherhood forces and overlooking violence or other wrongdoings from liberal parties and supporters - Egypt was clearly prominent in his concerns.

Conclusion

As Rapporteur on Libya, every time I travel there **I am told by the Libyan authorities and civil society members that the international community needs to be more engaging in its interactions with Libya.**

There are clearly immense challenges coming down the line that will have to be met aggressively and decisively in cooperation between the Libyans and their international allies. As stated above, **I have found the Libyan interlocutors to be more coherent, determined and organised than ever;** and as a result of this and other obvious progress, **I remain highly optimistic about the future of this country, provided the EU does what it needs to do, without losing more time.**

Both sides in EU-Libya relations must now raise their hands and critically assess weaknesses that, on the ground, are glaringly obvious. Since the international community began giving assistance to Libya in its quest for freedom and the establishment of a democratic society that would protect the fundamental rights of its citizens, **so much has been promised so firmly and eloquently by Heads of State and senior UN and EU officials.** The time to deliver on these promises of meaningful and tangible assistance is **now** -- this is a matter of critical urgency.

The EU must assist Libya in facing the challenges of disarmament, demobilization and integration (DDR), which must proceed in parallel with reform of the security sector(SSR),- that implies going well beyond the border security assistance to which the EU has already committed. **Retraining and reinforcement of the judiciary** must also be a priority as part of EU general assistance in building governance capacity.

Equally, the democratically mandated Libyan authorities must now courageously utilise all means available to them in mobilising the silent Libyan majority in demanding the downing of arms and the cessation of destabilising activities by armed groups; as well as taking decisive action in confronting corruption and violence.

Finally, I stress that **my visit was facilitated excellently by the EU Delegation in Tripoli,** although its resources and conditions of operation, including crippling security requirements, are in **urgent need of revision and reinforcement** by the HR/VP - EEAS.

Ana Gomes, MEP