US Pakistan Relations

This article attempts to explain the implications of withdrawal of foreign military forces from Afghanistan in 2014 onwards. The implications for regional security and economy are explained with the help of proposed rational choice model which, it is posited, is applicable to the case of Afghanistan. Methodologically, this study used qualitative methods approach to collect primary data in terms of interviews and survey. Besides, the study aims at testing its hypotheses, namely, lack of planning in the post-war period leads to more conflicts, and collaboration among regional powers can help achieve peace and economic stability. As a result of its model-guided empirical analysis, this study finds the post-withdrawal situation in Afghanistan, to be more complicated. This complexity could be (re)solved positively if the engaged actors prefer to negotiate. If not, divergence of interests would lead to more confrontation and, hence, chaos beyond the South Asian region.

President Trump’s tweet regarding Pakistan’s “lies and deceit” may have offended the country’s officials but did not come as a surprise. For them and all those familiar with the nature of US-Pakistan alliance, it was apparent that Trump administration will usher in a suspicious phase of the relationship which had been prevalent far more frequently than the so-called “honeymoon phases." Exceptions within US-PK relations are not the rough patch periods but times when both allies were cordial, cooperative, and on good terms. To understand why these actors embarked on an alliance, and how the nature of this alliance changed, this paper focuses on US-Pakistan ties during the Eisenhower administration and provides more detailed analysis from the Pakistani perspective.

Pakistan is for good reason and now in the light of tangible evidence is convinced of India, using its strategic influence in Afghanistan against Pakistan. The fact that US is mum on India’s role in mitigating problems for Pakistan from Afghanistan does not help the situation.
US refusal to connect the dots between violence in Afghanistan and conflict between Pakistan and India suits both India and Afghanistan. The three conveniently blame Pakistan for regional conflict escalation. US is blinded by this view in its dealings with Pakistan. It is convinced that Pakistan is a lost cause. It’s a part of the problem and not a solution and chooses to engage out of sheer compulsion. This is further endorsed by a very active Indian lobby in Washington DC, which leaves no stone unturned to endorse this view.
Pakistan is for good reason and now in the light of tangible evidence is convinced of India, using its strategic influence in Afghanistan against Pakistan. The fact that US is mum on India’s role in mitigating problems for Pakistan from Afghanistan does not help the situation.
US refusal to connect the dots between violence in Afghanistan and conflict between Pakistan and India suits both India and Afghanistan. The three conveniently blame Pakistan for regional conflict escalation. US is blinded by this view in its dealings with Pakistan. It is convinced that Pakistan is a lost cause. It’s a part of the problem and not a solution and chooses to engage out of sheer compulsion. This is further endorsed by a very active Indian lobby in Washington DC, which leaves no stone unturned to endorse this view.

This chapter explores Pakistan’s foreign policy towards the United States by tracing them through the Cold War all the way back to its inception in 1947. The chapter delves into the historical circumstances that gave rise to Pakistan’s regional and international security imperatives to understand how relations with the United States became one of its main concerns. The chapter then moves to explore the dynamics of the Cold War which solidified the relationship in the face of the Soviet threat. However, while Pakistan’s foreign policy had specific needs which remained consistent throughout time, it was the divergences emerging from the United States which led to periods of uncomfortable alliances and embitterment.  The divergences that occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War had strong ramifications for Pakistan who came to view the US as an untrustworthy ally. Finally the chapter will also provide a detailed analysis of Pakistan’s move away from dependence on the US replacing its previous patron with China. In this way the chapter covers and analyses three different temporal intervals, the Cold War, the War in Afghanistan and the War on Terror to provide a detailed landscape of the variations in Pakistan’s foreign policy.

In assessing Pakistan’s response to the ongoing ‘global
war on terrorism’ in Afghanistan, this paper presents two
sets of arguments; first, I argue that Pakistan’s strategic
interests constituting secure and peaceful borders along
with internal strength, development and prosperity, are
annulled rather than furthered by the Strategic Depth
policy framework, adopted and pursued for the last three
decades. Although this framework has allowed Pakistan
to maintain a semblance of regional military power balance
with India, yet it has led to a rise of extremism and
militancy within Pakistani society and to a loss of internal
sovereignty.

The four texts analysed share some common themes: territory, conflict, sovereignty and cooperation. Rivers Divided set the tone by highlighting the hydro-political significance of Kashmir over which India and Pakistan fought three wars. Since the much-hyped Indus Waters Treaty failed to resolve the Kashmir conflict, it gradually lost relevance for conflict resolution in a dissimilar setting; for example the Farakka barrage in the Bengal basin. The contested notions of territoriality and sovereignty factored into elite decision making that, on the one hand, perpetuated mutual mistrust and misgivings and, on the other, embedded conventional rivalry that took a nuclear turn in the 1970s onward. The past decades have only added to strategic uncertainty in the South Asian region, posits India-Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy. Importantly, the state institutions, both civil and military, in the subcontinent seem to have lost faith in creating peaceful conditions for coexistence. Faith, Unity, Discipline has, thus, provided with useful insights about the role, functions and outreach of one of the powerful state institutions in Pakistan, the ISI that views India in rival terms. In addition, The Spy Chronicles provides a detailed discussion of the challenges that hinder normalization in India-Pakistan relations, and the opportunities being missed in the past and the ones available presently. If the two countries are able to revisit, and revise their revisionist policy and posture and stride in building bilateral confidence, the toughest of issues can be resolved. In order to do so, however, both the states will have to reorient its institutional mind-set, remould state nationalism and re-work on antagonistic populism; which, by default, demand further studies on the subject.

In this article, we address five of the most egregious and pernicious myths that the Pakistani foreign and security policy establishment has propagated to promote what they deem to be Pakistan’s vital interests. These myths have contributed to
flawed U.S. policies toward Pakistan and have alienated India, the dominant power in the region with which the United States has sought greater cooperation since 2000. We then turn to a discussion of the implications of our analysis for the
future of U.S. policy toward the country and the region.

Pakistan and the US have enjoyed an uneven relationship since the creation of Pakistan. While Pakistan did benefit from the US assistance to modernize its military and defense capabilities, the perceptions are varied due to diverging interests. Looking through an idealist prism, Pakistan's hopes were dampened on numerous occasions, due to the US policy which is primarily conceived through realist perspective. Of late there is a realization that other regional and extra‐regional players are also significant and there is a need to establish durable relations with other regional states and powers like, for example, Russia, Turkey, Iran and Central Asian Republics as well. Continuation of such policies would require foresight, realizing the role and objectives of states seeking regional hegemony and identifying the limits of cooperation with the US, which was ignored in the past.

This book analyses problems of governance, development and environment affecting contemporary Pakistan, issues that lie at the centre of federal and provincial policy deliberations, formulation and implementation. Perspectives on Contemporary Pakistan offers a comprehensive assessment of these policies, or their lack thereof. Authors from a variety of disciplines empirically and conceptually evaluate the latest developments, events and data regarding law and order, economic under-performance, social intolerance and climate crisis. The book offers varied perspectives on state sovereignty, civil-military relations, spousal violence, rural development, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, nuclear governance and transboundary climate risk.

To understand the significance of the Taliban to Pakistan, it is important to understand the historically fraught ties not only between India and Pakistan, but also between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. While it is commonly believed that Pakistan’s relationship with groups such as the Taliban emerged during the anti-Soviet jihad, this is a considerable understatement of the relationship. In fact, Pakistan’s dalliance with Islamist politics and Islamist militant groups in Afghanistan dates back to the earliest days of Pakistan’s independence. This attests to the enduring security challenges that Pakistan perceives in Afghanistan. Whether these fears are founded or not, Pakistan acts upon them as if they are fact.

Pakistan – unlike the United States – is asymmetrically motivated to stay the course in Afghanistan. Having successfully manipulated jihadi groups for decades, Pakistan has grown
insouciant about its ability to continue riding this tiger. However, recent developments such as the announced death of Mullah Omar and the splits within the Taliban, as well as the emergence of ISIS in Afghanistan and Pakistan, raise the stakes for Islamabad. It is unlikely that Pakistan will
be able to regain the kind of control that it exercised over the Taliban in the past. The most likely outcome is ever-deepening violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Unfortunately, as the world saw on 9/11, the sequelae of these developments are not likely to be confined to Afghanistan or Pakistan.

The democratic credentials and institutions of Pakistan are explained as weak
because of the division within society between modern secular and traditional
religious positions. Today, the society of Pakistan faces the issue of religious
extremism. While attempting to identify the causes of violent extremism and the
socio-economic conditions, class divisions, and societal inequalities that direct
Pakistanis toward extremism and militancy, this article argues that education is the
most important solution that will save Pakistani society from the ills of extremism

This article attempts to explain the implications of withdrawal of foreign military forces from Afghanistan in 2014 onwards. The implications for regional security and economy are explained with the help of proposed rational choice model which, it is posited, is applicable to the case of Afghanistan. Methodologically, this study used qualitative methods approach
to collect primary data in terms of interviews and survey. Besides, the study aims at testing its hypotheses, namely, lack of planning in the post-war period leads to more conflicts, and
collaboration among regional powers can help achieve peace and economic stability. As a result of its model-guided empirical analysis, this study finds the post-withdrawal situation in Afghanistan, to be more complicated. This complexity could be (re)solved positively if the engaged actors prefer to negotiate. If not, divergence of interests would lead to more confrontation and, hence, chaos beyond the South Asian region.

Pakistan and the US have enjoyed an uneven rela onship since the crea on of Pakistan. While Pakistan did benefit from the US assistance to modernize its military and defence capabili es, the percep ons are varied due to diverging interests. Looking through an idealis c prism, Pakistan's hopes were dampened on numerous occasions due to the US policy which is primarily conceived through realist perspec ve. Of late there is a realiza on that other regional and extra‐regional players are also significant and there is a need to establish durable rela ons with other regional states and powers like, for example, Russia, Turkey, Iran and Central Asian Republics as well. Con nua on of such policies would require foresight, realizing the role and objec ves of states seeking regional hegemony and iden fying the limits of coopera on with the US, which was ignored in the past.

The Sino-Pakistan relations have been known as higher as Himalayas and as deeper as Indian Ocean. The aim of this paper is to discuss the counter balance of India & United States in South Asia Region through Military and nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan. This study discusses the military cooperation and security dimensions of Pakistan–China friendship which has been based on shared strategic interests and political goals. In this paper, we investigate the major conventional arms transfer from China to Pakistan from 1965 to 2013. China also provides nuclear expertise and material to Pakistan when the latter started to build its nuclear program. This paper would also analyze the cooperation between Pakistan and China to counter terrorism and the balance of power in region. Because these two countries are not only good neighbors, but are all weather friends and allies as well.

After ten years of precarious military, intelligence and other security cooperation between Pakistan and the United States, the two countries could not be more at odds. Worse, as much as they despise each other,
they both know that their security depends in varying degrees upon the other. However, at the time of writing, the way forward is far from this obvious.

This chapter will first briefly summarize the enduring challenges that Pakistan presents. It will then examine how the peculiar and suboptimal impasse has come about. The author argues that the looming 2014 date,
when the United States will begin scaling back kinetic activities in Afghanistan, may present new opportunities for the United States to re-optimize its position in the region.

Belief that images have become the critical 'weapon' in contemporary warfare has enjoyed great currency in the past decade. This belief rests upon certain understandings about the impact visual footage of terrorist attacks or still images of the abuse of prisoners have had on public opinion in different parts of the world. These understandings, in turn, reflect simplistic models of representation and mediation in which citizens are assumed to know little of the 'true' situation of war but are easily and primarily shocked by unexpected graphic images. To explore these relationships, this article presents analysis of original research from a three-year study of military practitioners, media coverage of security events, and collaborative audience ethnography across towns and cities in the UK. While military practitioners feel frustration that communicating with publics is 'like talking to a brick wall', analysis of audience interpretations of Abu Ghraib and other events suggests varied and negotiated understandings in which audiences account for processes of mediation as well as reflect on the event being represented. Images cannot necessarily be considered primary to explaining how an individual interprets a news story, and, to the extent and manner in which images do matter, this often depends on what longer historical narratives such images are situated within – by media or audiences themselves. No image is intrinsically shocking. For policymakers concerned with public diplomacy, for journalists and for audiences themselves there is a need for further research into the role images – Weber's 'visual language' – play amid today's conditions of diffused war.

This essay primarily focuses on the bilateral relations between
Pakistan and India and how the United States of America (USA),
despite New Delhi’s mantra of bilateralism and non-interference
doctrines, has been effectively roped in by the latter and made an
active stakeholder; and how the de-hyphenation of India and Pakistan
by the US after the Cold War, has adversely affected regional
Lastly, how the pursuit of independent strategic objectives
by each of the three state-actors, has affected mutual relations in the
contemporary times, and what policy objectives Pakistan can pursue
in the coming decades.

Pakistan needs to reconcile its relations with the US on a sustained basis by revisiting its approach to the US concerns in and around Pakistan. The latter should realise the world is going geo-economically than geo-politically and cooperation is preferred to conflict. China-US and India-China trade ties are an example.

There's a critical divergence of interests between Washington and Islamabad which has left both the countries trying to walk the diplomatic tight rope. The recent diplomatic tiff between both the countries, to restrict the diplomatic movement has also added to the already tense relations.

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) offers economic incentives for regional and extra-regional stake holders. OBOR is an evolving concept grounded in economic globalization. Pakistan maintained transnational relations with both the US and China in the past and, onward, the former should continue to maintain the same. The US ought to engage Pakistan, with whom it has a history of bilateral relations and people-to-people contact,  beyond Afghanistan for its own sake as it will afford the US strategic and economic leverage required for strategic stability in the south Asian region.

This chapter examines the state of U.S.-Pakistan relations a decade after the events of 9/11.  In this chapter, I propose a somewhat radical way of reframing our relations with Pakistan.  In 2009, I argued that if U.S. efforts to persuade Pakistan to abandon its strategic use of militants and other policies deleterious to U.S. interests and international security failed, then the “United States and its partners will have to reorient their efforts toward containing or mitigating the various threats that emanate from Pakistan.”  I believe that the time has come to adopt this approach and the United States should take advantage of the drawdown in Afghanistan to make such a strategy possible. There are several components of this proposed approach, which I lay out herein. This is a chapter in in Joachim Krause and Charles King Mallory, IV Eds. Afghanistan, Pakistan and Strategic Change: Adjusting Western regional policy (London: Routledge, 2013): pp. 221-234.

T. V. PAUL 1079 major conceptual categories. One can be called "decisional influence," that is, the ability of one actor to influence, by bargaining, the foreign and domestic policy decisions of another. The second category may be termed "structural influence," which has three dimensions. The first arises from enduring interaction patterns among states of asymmetric power and resources. These asymmetries allow the supplier of those goods that are not easily replaceable at tolerable cost (in this context, arms) a degree of structural influence over the recipient. The structural influence of the supplier varies with the level of the recipient's desire for certain goods and the extent of its control over the goods. Furthermore, it is determined by the ability of the recipient to find a substitute supplier of the desired goods. The second dimension of structural influence is derived from the asymmetrical ordering of the international system. In the broader systemic context, influence patterns are determined by such structural factors as the distribution of power in the system as a whole and the role of a given state in that distribution. Outcomes in interstate relationships can be heavily affected by system structure and the behavior of great powers. Accordingly, great powers who are also major suppliers of arms to smaller powers would enjoy structural influence that is derived from their superior power position in the international system. 1 The multipolar supply pattern in the arms trade, even during the height of the bipolar era, brings forth a third dimension of structural influencethat is, the influence a recipient develops over a supplier through an arms transfer relationship. During the Cold War, this reverse influence arose from two major factors. First, although the international system during this period comprised two major blocs, there were other centers of power that supplied arms to the developing countries, and second, the U.S.-Soviet competition increased the strategic leverage of states that could offer something tangible to the superpowers who, in turn, cultivated these relationships for the continuation of their structural conflict. Decisional influence is instrumental in nature. It is the tangible, direct, and short-term bargaining power that comes with arms supply. Decisional power may be reflected at the foreign policy-process level when the recipient makes specific decisions in tune with the wishes of the supplier as a result of the arms aid. In an ideal, one-way influence relationship of the

The change in interna onal order from unipolar to mul polar has resulted in change of US priori es. South Asia faces new challenges amid these changes. US concerns over a range of issues like terrorism, Islamic militancy and nuclear prolifera on coupled with the rise of Russia and China have resulted in the US re-posturing towards the Asia Pacific. Economic incen ves in Asia also offer the US and European powers an urge to adopt Asia centric economic policy. In this newly evolving security paradigm, India is encouraged by the US to play a cri cal role in the containment of China. Pakistan is therefore becoming less important for Washington and would have to seek new rela onships with newly emerging powers namely Russia and China by offering lucra ve economic incen ves.

Pakistan has recently witnessed an increase in incidents of terrorism especially in Balochistan ─ where key CPEC projects such as Gwadar port are hosted. Though Pakistani security forces have thwarted such attacks, the likelihood of further terror attack cannot be ruled out. If the menace of terrorism continues, it will carry negative implications for CPEC. For example, trans-regional foreign investment from the Gulf countries may get deferred. Similarly, the situation in Afghanistan is still unstable where the humanitarian crisis is affecting innocent lives on a daily basis. The US has reportedly decided to allocate half of the 7 billion frozen Afghanistan’s financial assets to the victims of 9/11 and the remaining half to be put in the fund for Afghanistan, and not to the Taliban. China and Pakistan need to engage the US and its allies such as from Scandinavia in a meaningful manner to help Afghanistan have its funds back – along with the much-needed global economic assistance to feed the poor and hapless Afghans. In addition, Pakistan and China need to talk about trade in sports goods too. Pakistan has exported high-quality sports products to, for example, the European Union in the past and it can do the same with China whose interest in hosting mega sports events such as the Beijing Olympics has doubled in recent years.

Pak-US relations under Bush administration historically reached at its peak. It was the result of his doctrine known as 'Bush Doctrine'. It resulted in constituting a fundamental shift in US foreign policy. This work tried to dig out that how Bush decided to framed his own strategies and way of using power and influence for the pursuit of USA national interests. Unlike president Clinton, president Bush focused on securing geo-strategic rather geo-economic interests. It is also tried to high light that what compelled Bush administration to tilt towards Pakistan. It includes especially inexorable geographical position of Pakistan in the region, so was preferred by US policy makers in this region. Bush even ignored US policy to promote democracy and supported undemocratic rule of General Pervez Musharraf, as his rule was inevitable to secure US national interests in the region. Authorities in Pakistan promised to assist US in its war on terror. It was the same role of Pakistan for which it was

India-Pakistan conflict continues to be dangerous given recent events of air attacks by India, and a captured Indian pilot by Pakistan. These have significant geopolitical repercussions for both Delhi & Islamabad, but how should Washington DC navigate the terrain.

The US-Pakistan relations were historically grounded in the Cold War oriented realist understanding of international politics. The choice matrix was strategically constrained for the third world which either preferred the USSR-led communist system of politics and economy or allied with the US-guided capitalist bloc. In such a strategic context, the post-colonial state of Pakistan chose to ally with Washington on account of multiple factors, ranging from the proto-elite with ‘western’ professional and educational background to the ideological abhorrence of communism – which, according to the expanding religious elite, was anti-Islam.

People in the west relate everything of the socio-political life to reason, rationality and objectivity which are the characteristics of science and enlightenment. Yet they forget the conflation of science and religion which were the main themes in Christendom. The writer mainly focuses upon the relation between religion and violence in this book and stresses upon the fact that violence has a central place in almost all of the religions of the world.

Last weeks have seen the emergence of news that the US government is attempting to gain a possibility of operating from a military base in Pakistan. While there has been no clear official confirmation of such negotiations between Washington and Islamabad yet, this option, it is claimed, is being considered due to the withdrawal of most of the American forces from Afghanistan. A base in Pakistan would give the US a possibility to conduct intelligence and military missions in Afghanistan against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the so-called Islamic State and other radical Islamic outfits (e.g. by using drones). However, such base would not play a significant role in weaking the Taliban. Moreover, its establishment does not appear likely. This commentary explains why.

People in the west relate everything of the socio-political life to reason, rationality and objectivity which are the characteristics of science and enlightenment. Yet they forget the conflation of science and religion which were the main themes in Christendom. The writer mainly focuses upon the relation between religion and violence in this book and stresses upon the fact that violence has a central place in almost all of the religions of the world.

The state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) has remained, for the last 70 years, bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Indeed, the two countries fought their first war (1947-48) and had their latest standoff (February 2019) in and around Kashmir. In the wake of the first India-Pakistan war over J&K, the international community, especially the United Nations, stepped in and urged the two sides to agree on a ceasefire in April 1948.
Moreover, the UN appointed a commission to monitor the ground situation in order to prevent escalation along what then was called ‘line of ceasefire’. It is pertinent here to state the historical fact that it was India led by Nehru which took the matter of the state of Jammu & Kashmir to the UN Security Council. The former accepted the principle of self-determination for the people of J&K.

The change in international order from uni-polar to multi-
polar has resulted in change of US priorities. South Asia
faces new challenges amid these changes. US concerns
over a range of issues like terrorism, Islamic militancy and
nuclear proliferation coupled with the rise of Russia and
China have resulted in the US re-posturing towards the
Asia Pacific. Economic incentives in Asia also offer the US
and European powers an urge to adopt Asia centric
economic policy. In this newly evolving security paradigm,
India is encouraged by the US to play a critical role in the
containment of China. Pakistan is therefore becoming less
important for Washington and would have to seek new
relationships with newly emerging powers namely Russia
and China by offering lucrative economic incentives.

The paper examines why states seek nuclear weapons, using Pakistan as a case study. Islamabad's quest for nuclear status is examined from both an economic and a strategic perspective, and the country's ideological foundations are examined in order to better understand this policy. The paper examines both China's and the United States' role in Pakistan's nuclear program, and their respective interests and motivations. The last section deals with Dr Khan and his network.

Afghanistan is currently at the centre stage of not only international but also domestic politics. The situation in the neighbouring country is once again casting a shadow on the delicate Pakistan-US ties. Over the recent months, Pakistani leaders, including Prime Minister Imran Khan, have categorically stated that they will not provide any military bases to US forces as they withdraw from Afghanistan.

Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan nister Imran Khan’s one-year-old government has been struggling with  a perilous situation in that Pakistan is going through its worst economic crisis while relations with the United States also hit rock bottom. Khan’s meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, in July 2019, however, has set the stage for significant improvement in U.S.-Pakistani relations. For Washington, Islamabad is a critical piece of the U.S. exit strategy from neighboring Afghanistan, and the world’s fifth-largest nation could play a key role in the broader American imperatives with regard to Asia. To achieve both these short and long-term objectives, the Trump administration will need to support Khan’s economic reform agenda.

In this paper, we will able to see the Pakistan-US relations deteriorated after the 1965 war. United States not only banned the military aid but being an ally not came to help Pakistan in 1965 war. Later, President Nixon left embargo on the military aid to Pakistan which later again banned during the event of 1971 war. Nixon was not willing to impose embargo on military aid but owing to opposition of the State Department he has to ban the military aid. At the time of East Pakistan dispute, Pakistan looking toward US for help. During 1971 crisis, Pakistan helped US to travel Kissinger to China, and arranged a meeting with a fully secret plan. During Indo-Pak war of 1971, India was supported by Soviet Union, and Pakistan has the support of United States. Pakistan was dependent on the United States for military and economic aid. Yahya Khan, who wanted to solve the dispute of East Pakistan but has no such result, which later cause for the separation of East Pakistan