Rorty

Marx vislumbrou a ideia de simbiose entre atividade e produção do homem, mas o século XIX o fez canalizar o seu darwinismo e os seus conhecimentos de antropologia para a noção de trabalho. Não podia ser diferente. Assim, nos Manuscritos econômico filosóficos, ele chegou a escrever que toda a psicologia humana poderia ser compreendida a partir da fábrica.

The history of the reception of Richard Rorty´s work in Argentina can not be told without referring to Eduardo Rabossi and Alicia Páez, who must be considered as the first Argentine Rortians. Rabossi was one of the most important analytical philosophers in Latin America. Páez was a philosopher primarily educated in French thought who prematurely died at the beginning of the Nineties. I will show that the fact that it is possible to tell a story with two so different leading characters is part of what I will call " the Rortian Effect, " which is the opening to the possibility for a critical dialogue between philosophical traditions.

La historia de la recepción de la obra de Richard Rorty en la Argentina no puede contarse sin hacer referencia a Eduardo Rabossi y Alicia Páez, quienes deben ser considerados como los primeros Rortianos en dicho país. Rabossi fue uno de los más importantes filósofos analíticos de Latinoamérica. Páez fue una filósofa principalmente formada en el pensamiento francés que falleció prematuramente a principos de los´90. Argumentaré que el que sea posible contar una historia que tenga a estas figuras tan dispares como protagonistas es parte de lo que llamaré " Efecto Rorty, " esto es, la apertura de la posibilidad de un diálogo crítico entre tradiciones filosóficas.

Não se pode contar a história da recepção da obra de Richard Rorty na Argentina sem fazer referência a Eduardo Rabossi e Alicia Páez, que devem ser considerados como os primeiros rortyanos desse país. Rabossi foi um dos mais importantes filósofos analíticos da América Latina. Páez foi uma filósofa que se formou pricipalmente no pensamento francês, tendo falecido prematuramente no começo dos anos 90. Argumentarei que o fato de que se pode contar uma história que tem essas figuras tão díspares como protagonistas é parte do que chamarei "Efeito Rorty," isto é, a abertura da possibilidade de um diálogo crítico entre tradições filosóficas. __________________________________________________________ When I took the decision of writing about the reception of Rorty´s work in Argentina, I feared that my paper might simply develop into an exercise of unchained narcissism. My first reaction was to think that I had to expose some considerations about my own philosophical development, and about the texts of two friends of mine,

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This thesis examines the ways in which political journalists in the USA and UK talk about issues of truth and power as it relates to journalism’s role as the Fourth Estate. The theoretical basis comes from a critique of the two major structures underpinning the Fourth Estate, that of epistemology (the study of truth) and ideology (broadly, the study of power and ideas). This involves unpacking and critically examining the ability of news media to convey ‘true’ information and the ideological formations in which the news media production practice is situated. The epistemological theories of Realism, Pragmatism, Antirealism and Hyperrealism will first be elucidated in an in-depth theoretical discussion, focusing on the contributions of Baudrillard. Four major theories of ideology, that of personal ideological bias, chaos, control, and ideology as fetishistic disavowal will be examined, this time focusing on the work of Žižek.
This theoretical discussion is complimented by an analysis of interview questions relating to epistemological concerns and to ideology. The empirical data consists of twenty interviews conducted with political correspondents in the USA and UK. A version of critical discourse analysis is used to examine the ways in which journalists talk about the issues raised by the questions, what is termed their ‘discursive strategies.’ The categories for analysis are grounded in the discursive strategies used by the journalists themselves, examined to elaborate not simply the explicit content, but the deeper implicit meanings inherent in the way they answer.
This provided both an original theoretical discussion and an original set of empirically-derived data. It also allows us to further understand the role of journalism as the Fourth Estate, the types of ‘truth’ it brings to us, the types of ideologies that underpin the news production process via news media professionals, and how the system is maintained despite its inherent contradictions.

Richard Rorty’s Philosophy as Cultural Therapy

Summary

Richard Rorty is undoubtedly one of the most famous and most controversial philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century. Rorty's thought is the subject of numerous discussions, both in Poland and abroad. It has been said and written so much on the philosophy of the American pragmatist that it seems extremely difficult to add anything new. Most of the specific issues raised by Rorty have been profoundly analyzed and criticized. Moreover, Rorty's philosophy has been described as belonging to the various philosophical positions, as well as influences of other thinkers that can be found in it have been discussed. Due to the circumstances mentioned above, it seems that each new interpretation of Rorty’s philosophy should be able to answer the question about what exactly does it add to the existing state of the art.
The new element that this book adds to the current knowledge is a presentation of Rorty’s philosophy from “bird’s eye view” that aims to find an overall sense of it. The goal formulated above arises from the assumption that each philosophy may be interpreted as a process in which all particular issues eventually can be recognized as a part of a more or less coherent project. Specific problems and questions of Rorty’s thought are reconstructed here as subsequent steps that lead to a specific goal – this reconstruction can be understood as a travel upon the road that ends with recognizing an overall sense of a the “traveled” philosophy. Metaphor of cultural therapy included in the title of the book will serve as a guide in this journey.
The term “therapy” is a reference to a metaphor used by Rorty himself in his book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, where he says that its purpose is “to help their readers, or society as a whole, to break free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes”. The implementation of such therapy is understood as a rejection of traditional philosophical problems that should lead to focusing on new issues, which – from Rorty’s perspective – deserve extensive consideration. Therefore, Rorty’s therapy appears to be a rejection of old ways of thinking and creating new ones, as well as an attempt to build a new man and a new society.
This publication demonstrates that the therapy – in the sense presented above – is a suitable metaphor to describe the whole thought of American philosopher. The object of this therapy is culture. Within the book culture is understood in the sense of Jerzy Kmita’s socio-regulative theory – that is as a set of beliefs commonly respected within the particular community that regulates actions of its members. On the basis of what has been said about therapy and about the culture, it seems clear that labeling Rorty’s philosophy as “cultural therapy” means that it is presented as an attempt to create a new man and a new society by removing from their worldviews (or – using Rorty’s term – from their final dictionaries), some harmful, “infected” beliefs and desires, and proposing alternative, “healthy” ones. In this sense, we can look at Rorty’s philosophy as a set of shifts, e.g. from objectivity to solidarity, from epistemological certainty to social hope, from theory to narrative, from abstract to concrete, and from non-human to human aspects of reality. Therefore, the goal of Rorty’s cultural therapy is to transform people's beliefs, desires and final dictionaries and to make a cultural change.
The book contains five main chapters – each one is focused on three particular issues. The order of the chapters is set by the following rule: at first the most fundamental and primary issues – the main “sources of the disease” – are investigated. Every subsequent chapter contains issues that are based on positions described in the previous chapters. Therefore, therapy starts from the source of disease and is continued through its symptoms and consequences. Treatment contains not only elimination of  the “infected” beliefs and desires, but also proposes the alternative ones. Thus, each following chapter in less and less devoted to the treatment of “infected” desires and beliefs, and presents more of alternative beliefs and positive solutions. Therefore, we move from areas that Rorty considers to be – so to speak – a barren land, to the areas, which – according to the pragmatist – are worth comprehensive attention.
Chapter I concerns issues of mind, language and the Mirror of Nature – they appear to be the most fundamental, most basic. They can be perceived as the primary “sources of the disease” – issues discussed in the following chapters are their manifestations and consequences. Chapter II discusses representationism, essentialism and foundationalism, which appear to be the consequences of “disease sources” described in Chapter I. Similarly, chapter III deals with objectivity, relativism and truth that are effects of ideas put under treatment in chapter I and II. Chapter IV is devoted to Rorty’s account of science, literature and philosophy. It critiques traditional understanding of these realms and formulates alternative concepts of them that are not based on “infected” beliefs and desires that have been rejected in the previous chapters. Chapter V is the most “positive” one in the sense that it discusses ethical and socio-political issues, which are considered by Rorty as “healthy” and essential. The Conclusion summarizes all previous considerations by presenting Rorty’s thought as a coherent utopian project of making a cultural change.
The main part of the publication is supplemented by two appendixes. The first one presents Rorty’s political views. Yet, it does not concern his views as a philosopher, but – using his own words – as “a concerned citizen”. They are discussed not only on the basis of his scientific work, but also on the basis of his journalistic papers – they are characterized as complementary to the cultural therapy and as its natural extension. The second appendix contains an interpretation of Rorty’s philosophy through the prism of historical constructivism developed by Anna Pałubicka. In this part, Rorty’s thought is interpreted and criticized from the point of view of a theory external to it.
To summarize, this book attempts to organize Richard Rorty’s philosophy and to extract its essential claims, by considering the entire range of Rorty’s philosophical inquiries. It analyzes the detailed issues (such as those concerning the truth or liberal ironist) in order to perceive them as means designed to achieve a common goal that it to develop a cultural therapy. I am trying to show that Rorty’s philosophy is a coherent proposal of an utopian cultural change that can be understood as a theoretical mean to achieve a practical goal, which is changing human worldviews and – to put it in other words – transforming the way of thinking and the way of living.

W niniejszym szkicu poruszone zostały zagadnienia: (1) Rortiańskiego stosunku do problemów epistemologicznych, (2) Rortiańskiej etyki oraz (3) Rortiańskiej antyfilozoficzności, do których w swoim artykule pt. Pragmatyczna dekonstrukcja filozofii odniósł się Profesor Jacek Hołówka. Wymienione kwestie zostały zanalizowane z zamiarem rzucenia nowego światła na pytania i zarzuty sformułowane przez Hołówkę, a w szczególności w celu podjęcia namysłu nad tytułową tezą jego artykułu, dotyczącą pragmatycznej dekonstrukcji filozofii. Aby wyjaśnić istotę sporu, wprowadzam - zewnętrzną wobec dyskusji Hołówki z Rortym - aparaturę pojęciową, w ramach której można rozróżnić dwa typy wiedzy i dwa typy postaw, co sytuuje stanowiska obu badaczy na przeciwnych biegunach dokonanych rozróżnień. W świetle tej perspektywy oba stanowiska jawią się jako zasadniczo niewspółmierne, a obie filozofie jako poruszające się niejako po odmiennych płaszczyznach. Ponadto naszkicowana została skrótowo koncepcja realizmu kulturowego, jako pewnego rodzaju kompromis między Rortiańską dyskwalifikacją sporu realizmu z antyrealizmem (i generalnie całej epistemologii) a obroną sensowności owego sporu (oraz teorii poznania) w wydaniu Jacka Hołówki.

Although Dewey's influence has remained strong amongst the community of educators, his reputation amongst philosophers has had a remarkably volatile history. He was unquestionably the most influential figure in American philosophy until his death in 1952. Almost immediately after his death, however, Dewey's writings almost completely disappeared from the American philosophy syllabus. They were replaced by the analytic philosophers of the logical positivist tradition, who thought that philosophical problems could be solved by unraveling puzzles that came from a lack of understanding of proper language use. After several decades, however, the inadequacies of this view became unavoidably obvious, and the next generation of analytically trained philosophers began to find themselves saying things that sounded remarkably like Dewey. Many analytic philosophers began to use the word "pragmatist" to describe some aspect of their positions: Quine, Churchland, Davidson, Feyer...

It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. 

The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound.

Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward.

The better quality pdf is downloadible from here: "http://www.leoalmanac.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/LEAVol19No3-Mailman.pdf
Through recent artistic practices and technology of interactive systems for music, composition and improvisation have more and more blended and interconnected with each other – a sui generis situation now called comprovisation. The concept of comprovisation applies equally well to the spontaneous generation and manipulation of computer graphics, especially as such graphics are systematically coordinated audio-visually, while being subject to spontaneous manipulation by a performer.
This is explained in terms of the Fluxations and FluxNoisations Human Body Interfaces, interactive dance systems that generate music and graphics spontaneously in response to hand and body movement. They enable spontaneous expressive shaping of coherent complexity and variety. Thus a multi-layered multimodal experience arises. The aesthetic experience of this multimedia spectacle relates to experiences of various prior music and visual art of the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries, as well as to hypothetical physical realities. Thus a kind of cybernetic phenomenology of art is pursued and enacted through an embodied cybersynthesis of art with simulated alternate reality. Call it a pragmatic speculative realism, an adventurous technoetic ‘what if.’ As compared to more traditional forms of improvisation, the opportunities for risk-taking and aesthetic exploration rise to a new level of uncertainty, as the reactions of the improviser simultaneously draw from and target both visual and aural modalities, such that the intentions toward each fuse together."

The book seeks to demonstrate the following main points:

* Current debates between realists and antirealists (as well as objectivists and relativists) are significantly similar to early 20th century debates between realists and idealists which Pragmatism addressed extensively.

* Despite their debts to Dewey, neopragmatists such as Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam are reenacting realist and idealist stands in their debate over realism thus giving life to something shown fruitless by earlier Pragmatists.

* What is absent from the Neopragmatist's position is precisely what makes Pragmatism enduring: namely, its metaphysical conception of experience and a practical starting point for philosophical inquiry that such experience dictates.

* Pragmatism cannot take the "linguistic turn" insofar as that turn mandates a theoretical starting point.

* While Pragmatism's view of truth is perspectival, it is nevertheless not liable to relativism.

* Pace Rorty, Pragmatism need not be hostile to metaphysics; indeed, it demonstrates how pragmatic instrumentalism and metaphysics are complementary.


Preface
Abbreviations
ONE: INTRODUCTION
I. Realism, Antirealism, and Neopragmatism
II. Plan of this Book
TWO: DEWEY AND REALISM
I. Pragmatism Enters the Fray
II. Idealism, New Realism, and Critical Realism
III. Is Pragmatism Realistic?
IV. Dewey’s Pragmatic Realism
V. Conclusion
THREE: DEWEY AND IDEALISM
I. Is Pragmatism an Idealism?
II. Epistemology: Verification, Experience, Inquiry, and Signs
III. Implications of Epistemology: The External World and Knowledge of the Past
IV. Metaphysics: Antecedent Objects and The Philosophical Fallacy
V. Ethical Implications: Future Consequences, Practical Action, and the Threat of Relativism
VI. Conclusion
FOUR: RORTY, PUTNAM, AND CLASSICAL PRAGMATISM
I. The Reintroduction of Pragmatism
II. Rorty’s Interpretation of Dewey
III. Rorty’s Neopragmatism
IV. Putnam’s Interpretation of Dewey
V. Putnam’s Neopragmatism
VI. Conclusion
FIVE: NEOPRAGMATISM’S REALISM-ANTIREALISM DEBATE
I. Introduction
II. Terminology: "Realism" and its Contraries
III. Putnam’s Realism and Rorty’s Antirealism
IV. Rorty and Putnam’s Debate
V. Conclusion
SIX: BEYOND REALISM AND ANTIREALISM
I. What "Beyond" Means
II. Historical Parallels: Early Realists and Neopragmatists
III. The Theoretical Starting Point
IV. The Practical Starting Point
V. Pragmatism, Neopragmatism, and Philosophy’s Future Notes
Bibliography
Index

Joseph Conrad’s narrator Marlow, who features in ‘Youth’ (1898), ‘Heart of Darkness’ (1899), Lord Jim (1900), and Chance (1913), has been read as both a mouthpiece for Conrad and a distancing strategy which shields Conrad from some of the questionable elements of these four texts. By putting Conrad in conversation with Richard Rorty, and particularly by considering Marlow as a vehicle for Rorty’s philosophy of liberal ironism, I argue that Marlow is a multifaceted aspect of Conrad’s divided self. Furthermore, I suggest that Marlow is an effective vehicle for Rorty’s thought, because his narratives not only communicate a Rortyian ironism founded on contingency and ethnocentrism, but also promote attendance to suffering, the keystone of Rorty’s liberal politics.
Additionally, I suggest that the conversation between Rorty and Conrad produces an outcome more convincing than that communicated by their voices in isolation. This is because Conrad’s scepticism and awareness of cruelty soften the Rortyian tendency towards rhetorical utopianism. In particular, Conrad’s sense of burlesque and of the fine line between tragedy and comedy sound an unsettling note throughout his work, which enables the kind of ironic self-questioning which Rorty advocates, but which is not a feature of his style.
This conversational compatibility, as Rorty might have it, emerges from a close examination of Conrad’s language and technique: particularly his use of irony and complex narrative construction. The result is a sense of the self as divided and multiple but itself contingent upon wider communities that change and fragment depending on context. I suggest that Conradian irony is a powerful tool for self-evaluation and creation, and that although irony risks alienation, it can also be used as a way to connect to others and enlarge the perimeters of the communities in which we find meaningful exchange.

Abstract: The author seeks to show at least two theses. (1) That the statement of the title is compatible with the development of a theoretic and critical reason, centered on various discussions of problems. (2) That the same statement has a double sense: or it’s trivial (as Locke applied this term), or it can be understood like a transcendental proposition, since it establishes a synthetic condition for all possible philosophical activity, although it’s an insufficient condition.

Promotore del “neo-pragmatismo”, Richard MacKay Rorty è uno degli autori più influenti e controversi del pensiero contemporaneo. Il suo contingentismo raffigura e raccoglie in modo esemplare le provocazioni che provengono dal lungo processo di revisione dei sistemi filosofici che hanno scandito il ritmo della cultura occidentale.

After a discussion of the fundamental tropes of Rorty’s philosophy, in and beyond Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, and after describing an imaginary conversation between Rorty, Heidegger, Derrida, and Dewey, the paper- a sort of monography in a nutshell- aims to shed new light on the strategic figure of the ironist as developed by Rorty in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.
Who really is the Rortyan ironist? A comparison between the ironist and the Platonic character of Callicles clearly shows that Rorty’s irony does not correspond to Socratic or Platonic irony. From a close reading of relevant texts three ideas emerge: first, one can take an ironic stance despite its ability to support divergent metaphysical premises –Callicles is ironic in tone but foundationalist in metaphysics- while Rorty’s pragmatist appears ironic in tone and anti-foundationalist in metaphysics. Second, Callicles is a sort of public ironist; he feels pathos for the demos and the Athenian popular assembly;  the Rorty’s ironist appears as a private ironist looking for a hypothetical and detached conversation. And third, from the theatrical and literary point of view, Rorty’s ironist lacks the Greek character, the Greek mask, and Greek comicality.

There is a general consensus that pragmatism’s twenty-year renaissance produced two readily identifiable versions. One is typically called “classical” pragmatism (or simply “pragmatism”), the other “neopragmatism” (which I will call “linguistic pragmatism”). This newer form of pragmatism may be assessed by answering three questions: How does linguistic pragmatism “update” classical pragmatism? Why does linguistic pragmatism reject “experience” as a useful philosophical notion?
Why is linguistic pragmatism wrong about “experience”? I.e., why is experience indispensable to pragmatism?
My contention is that experience is methodologically inseparable from pragmatism, and linguistic pragmatism may neglect or extirpate experience only at the cost of rendering pragmatism overly theoretical, quarantined from practical action. Thus, linguistic pragmatism would revise pragmatism by eliminating the very features that explain the renewed and widespread enthusiasm for it.

The topic of epistemic normativity has come to the fore of recent work in epistemology, and so naturally, theories of knowledge, truth and justification have been increasingly held accountable to preserving normative epistemological
platitudes. Central to discussions of epistemic normativity are questions about epistemic agency and epistemic value. Here, our aim is to take up some of these issues as they come to bear on the rather unconventional brand of epistemology that was defended by Richard Rorty. Our purpose is to explore whether Rorty's epistemology - or perhaps his replacement for epistemology - can preserve these normative platitudes about epistemic agency, responsibility, achievement, and the value of knowledge. Our conclusion is a negative one: that Rorty's commitments leave him firmly at odds with some of the most plausible assumptions about epistemic agency and epistemic value.

The pragmatists were caught between two different philosophical movements and were equally critical of both. On the one hand, they were reacting against nineteenth century idealist philosophy, which often got hung up in metaphysical disputes that had no possibility of being resolved. But on the other hand, they were equally critical of the positivist’s belief that it was possible to not do metaphysics. Nineteenth century idealist philosophy is a dead horse in the twenty-first century, and thus the pragmatist’s arguments against it are of relatively little use today. But analytic philosophy has lived under the spell of positivism for over a half a century, and still has not figured out what should go in its place. Rorty captures this dilemma quite well when he refers to philosophers like Quine, Sellars and Davidson as “post-analytic philosophers”. The pragmatist alternative to positivism is an alternative which many of these post-analytic philosophers have been drifting towards. But as long as we assume that the pragmatist’s contributions to metaphysics and epistemology should be ignored, I believe that we will not be able to free ourselves from the last reverberations of the positivist hangover.

In this paper, I examine some of the modern debates between pragmatism and so-called “realism”, especially those between Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. My claim is that many of these debates are based on misunderstandings of the pragmatist tradition. If we rely on Dewey’s original ideas, rather than Rorty’s reinterpretations of Dewey, these problems can be radically transformed, and in many cases dissolved.

The field of interactive music systems (IMSs), beginning in the 1980s, is still relatively young and fast moving. The field of music theory-analysis, during the same period (since 1980), has undergone a major transformation in terms of technological innovations, flexibility, and breadth. The two fields have not really caught up with each other. It will be interesting to see what arises as they do — especially as both fields have become more concerned with the role of the body and embodied cognition. Framed in terms of contrasting epistemological orientations, this essay considers some relevant developments in IMSs, music cognition, and music theory and analysis, leading up to the present.  The most popular approaches to music cognition and to IMS design are rationalist (Ashby 2010), exploiting the ‘correct’ embodiments of music (Godøy 2004, Leman 2007, Paine 2009) based on affordances (Gibson 1977, Kelso 1998). This essay, however, advocates a pragmatist (Ashby 2010) approach inspired by music analysis and exploiting the potential of kinesthetic learning (associative learning). Prompted by a progressive approach to music analysis, theory, perception, and cognition (Dubiel 1999, Mailman 2007), interactive music technology can also be constructive, flexible, and progressive, by exploiting kinesthetic learning from immersion in new and unusual motion-to-sound mappings derived from dynamic formal processes in analysed music. In this way, immersive interactive systems offer an opportunity systematically to learn new associations based on principles theorised in response to analysis. Experience of these systems essentially ‘rewires the brain’, thereby exemplifying what Korsyn (2004) has attributed to Lewin’s (1986, 1987) approach to music perception: the ironist approach, as formulated by Rorty (1989). Thus a pragmatist ironist experimental (PIE) approach is articulated. Rather than committing to any particular ways music is already embodied, this approach acknowledges the flexible nature of embodied musical experience. It forges and uses interactive music technologies continually to redescribe and therefore reform how music is embodied, thereby disembodying to re-embody music, expanding how music is heard, contemplated and experienced.

Una consecuencia de la crítica formulada por Richard Rorty a la epistemología tradicional es el rechazo al veroteleologismo, esto es, a la tesis según la cual la verdad es el fin o la meta de la investigación. A partir del enfrentamiento con una serie de críticas provenientes tanto desde perspectivas " realistas " como desde posiciones pragmatistas de corte más decididamente peirceano, se intenta consolidar la posición antiveroteleologista. El debate se concentra, en consecuencia, en algunas consideraciones formuladas por Alvin Goldman y Akeel Bilgrami a favor del vero-teleologismo contra posiciones como la rortyana.

One of the consequences of Richard Rorty's critique of traditional epistemology is the rejection of veroteleologism, that is, the thesis according to which truth is the end or goal of inquiry. This article aims at consolidating the anti-veroteleological position, on the basis of a critical examination of a series of critiques made from both " realist " and Peircean-style pragmatist perspectives. Consequently, the debate centers on some considerations formulated by Alvin Goldman and Akeel Bilgrami in favor of veroteleologism and against positions such as Rorty's.

This essay argues that acknowledging the existence of mind-independent facts is a matter of vital importance, in that acquiescence before the layout of the world is something demanded of knowing agents from the most elementary empirical deliverance to the most abstract construct. Building on the idea that normativity requires the presence of more than one option to choose from, the essay shows how the cessation of one's life is the disjunctive alternative of any experiential episode. This much has been missed, it argues, because of a generalized failure to appreciate how even the simplest atomic contents embroil their subjects in acts of assent. Its account thus casts a new light on relativism and skepticism, revealing them to be provisional luxuries supported only by the cognitive labor of others.

Les pragmatistes soupçonnent la distinction entre vérité et justification d'être une de ces distinctions qui ne font pas de différence. L'objet de ce texte est d'établir que ce soupçon n'est pas fondé et combien au contraire est nécessaire, en pratique, l'usage du prédicat de vérité - aussi nécessaire que l'activité réflexive elle-même. En adoptant pour notre démonstration une conception logique de la vérité définie comme la notion la plus faible satisfaisant un "principe de décitation", le chemin parcouru est aussi une invitation à ne pas sous-estimer la valeur que les thèses dont s'est réclamé un certain  "déflationnisme" confèrent paradoxalement à la notion de vérité.

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Cette version en ligne est une version très légèrement corrigée de la version publiée en juin 2019 dans le volume Figures de la vérité dirigé par F. Rivenc.

Les corrections portent sur quelques formulations en particulier p.2 et p.15.

Post-Enlightenment liberalism faces a paradox: The liberal principle of legitimacy demands states justify their constitutional order in terms citizens can accept, but there is no uncontroversial comprehensive conception of justice on which to form the requisite consensus. Rawls resolves the paradox by embracing a pragmatism that abandons the concept of truth in the political forum to secure consensus and legitimacy.

It is not unusual to think of Rorty’s work as a success in rhetoric and a failure in political philosophy. In this article we re-evaluate this assessment by analyzing a typical feature of Rorty’s writing: his frequent use of “we so-and-so.” Taking stock of the existing literature on the subject we discuss how Rorty’s use of the “we” was received by peers and how he himself made sense of it. We then analyze Rorty’s oeuvre in order to show that a better understanding of his rhetorical “we” could make his politico-philosophical “we” more appealing. We suggest that Rorty’s pragmatist take on “ethnos” is preferable to other notions that are currently championed in political theory and philosophy.

Reviewed by Brian Schroeder, Rochester Institute of Technology While the name and thought of Gianni Vattimo is familiar to European philosophers, theologians, cultural and political theorists, and even the general public (he regularly writes commentaries for La Stampa, a major Italian newspaper in Turin, and was a member of the European Parliament), in North America he is comparatively little known outside the domain of continental philosophy. Yet he is the author of some thirty-two books and coauthor of another five, of which fourteen have been translated and published in English, and is regarded by many as one of today's most original and influential thinkers (if not the most, as another leading Italian philosopher, Pier Aldo Rovatti, attests). Vattimo is recognized principally for his philosophical approach known as il pensiero debole, or "weak thought," which for him has a positive connotation in its realization and affirmation of the present condition of existence, characterized by the increasing erosion of the traditional metaphysical and rational foundations of modernism. While this is indeed an expression of nihilism, he argues throughout the corpus of his work that nihilism need not be construed solely or at least primarily as reactive and destructive. Vattimo announces rather an "optimistic" nihilistic phase of intellectual and cultural realization that will lead to an actual ethical social and political transformation. In the present postmodern scenario of rapidly changing values, belief systems, geopolitical boundaries and epistemological foundations, the project of one such as Gianni Vattimo is sorely needed. The publication of Weakening Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Gianni Vattimo is thus a cause for celebration. This collection of very fine essays not only further establishes Vattimo's rightful place in contemporary European philosophy, it also takes up his call to advance the crucial active and affirmative engagement with thinking and society. Edited by Santiago Zabala, a former student of Vattimo's and presently researcher in philosophy at the Pontifical Lateran University of Rome, Weakening Philosophy is comprised of twenty-three essays, including one by Vattimo, which, while referred to as a response in the editor's introduction, is actually an original essay both summarizing the trajectory of his thinking as a whole and addressing it in light of the philosophies of Theodor Adorno and Emmanuel Levinas. As the subtitle states, the book is basically a

In this paper I outline and criticize Judith Shklar’s and Richard
Rorty’s ‘liberalism of fear’. Both political thinkers believe liberalism to be characterized by a fundamental opposition to cruelty, which they regard as the least liberal of the features that may distinguish any given human community. In order to demonstrate the limits of the Shklar–Rorty thesis, I make use, in the first place, of John Kekes’s critique of liberalism as to show that liberalism allows for cruelty in so far as it grants wider margins of agency to the members of the community. In the second place, I make use of Cesare Beccaria’s reflections on the cruelty implied by liberalism as such, in so far as this political doctrine endorses the institutions of penal justice and private property.

Richard Rorty has an ambiguous relationship with the aesthetic. On the one hand,
it is of crucial importance to his approach to philosophy, which in his eyes doesn’t have to
depend on argumentation or reason, but is grounded in imagination and the creation of
new vocabularies. On the other hand, he rejects (on anti-essentialist grounds) the field of
aesthetics as a legitimate philosophical and cultural discipline. This article explores three
major areas where Rorty valorizes the aesthetic dimension: the idea of interpretation in
the philosophy of language, the ethical ideal of self-creation, and the link between poetry
and social philosophy in his analysis of literature.

Die Ideen des Relativismus werden schon seit den philosophischen Auseinandersetzungen von Protagoras und Platon diskutiert. Nach Jahrhunderten eines geringen Interesses an diesem Thema lebte der Relativismus im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert wieder auf.  Vielen modernen Philosophen und Sozialwissenschaftlern kann eine Nähe zum Relativismus nachgesagt werden.  Auch der amerikanische Philosoph Richard Rorty und dessen philosophische Positionen werden mit dem Relativismus in Verbindung gebracht.  Diese Verbindung wird speziell in Bezug auf Rorty häufig als Vorwurf verwendet.  Der Relativismus sei eine inkonsistente Position, die nicht-wünschenswerte Folgen für die Gesellschaft mit sich bringe und der Moral ihren besonderen Stellenwert absprechen wolle. Aus der Einordnung als Relativist folgte so meist eine Ablehnung von Rortys Ansichten. Allerdings lehnte Rorty selbst diese Einordnung stets ab. Die vorliegende Arbeit soll sich mit der Frage auseinandersetzen, ob Rortys Position vernünftigerweise als relativistische  Position eingeordnet werden kann, oder ob diese Einordnung verworfen werden sollte. Da die genannte Einordnung, wie bereits angedeutet, als Vorwurf formuliert wurde, soll zudem die Frage behandelt werden, was für Rortys Werk davon abhängt, wenn die Einordnung Rortys als Relativist berechtigt wäre.

Dementsprechend soll zunächst vorgestellt werden, was der Begriff 'Relativismus' bedeutet. Daraufhin werden verschiedene Arten des Relativismus vorgestellt, die für die Analyse relevant sind. Da es keine allgemeine Definition des Relativismus beziehungsweise keinen "Relativismus simpliciter" gibt,  kann sich diese Arbeit nur auf bestimmte Definitionen des Relativismus nach bestimmten Hauptquellen verlassen. Nach diesen Hauptquellen scheint eine Präsentation von moralischem Relativismus einerseits und epistemischem Relativismus andererseits sinnvoll. Dies stellt den ersten Teil dieser Arbeit dar. Dieser Teil ist in erster Linie begriffsanalytisch.
Der zweite Teil der Arbeit untersucht, ob die im ersten Teil erarbeitete Definition des Relativismus auf die Positionen Richard Rortys angewandt werden kann. Dazu werden zwei Formen vorgestellt, wie Rorty als Relativist eingeordnet werden könnte. In der ersten Form wird Rorty aufgrund verschiedener abgelehnter Thesen, die er sich mit dem Relativismus teilt, als 'Negativer Relativist' eingeordnet. Diese Form der Einordnung wird argumentativ verworfen. In der zweiten Form, die daraufhin vorgestellt wird, basiert auf einer bestimmten Lesart des relativistischen Strangs in Rortys Werk. Diese positiven  Ansichten Rortys werden mit der vorherigen Definition des Relativismus abgeglichen.
Auf diese Betrachtungen folgt eine Untersuchung der Frage, was für Rortys Position davon abhängt, wenn er als Relativist eingeordnet würde. Neben verschiedenen Arten der Kritik, die dadurch von Relativismus-Kritik auch zu Rorty-Kritik werden könnte, soll vor allem auf die Inkohärenz von Rortys Werk aufmerksam gemacht werden, falls er ein Relativist ist.
Abschließend soll eine Perspektive auf Rortys Relativismus erarbeitet werden, nach der dieser Relativismus keine positive epistemische Theorie darstellt, sondern als Hinweis auf bestimmte Missstände der modernen Philosophie verstanden werden soll. Dieser zweite Teil der Arbeit ist in erster Linie argumentativ. Durch den Bezug auf verschiedene Autoren und aufgrund der speziellen Auslegung von Rortys Werk hat der Teil aber auch exegetische Elemente.

1. A verdade do jornalismo: as narrativas Os jornalistas acreditam que a verdade é fruto do trabalho de " mostrar os dois lados ". Eles apresentam uma tal pretensão por meio da frase: " nós somos profissionais da informação, para nós o que importa são os fatos ". Não é necessário muito para se perceber que se fatos possuem dois lados, nem sempre há só dois lados falando ou em disputa. Pode-se pensar em três lados, quatro lados e assim por diante, infinitamente. Ou seja, não há ponto de chegada. Assim, por um mero raciocínio lógico bem simples, vê-se que a última coisa que o jornalismo pode fazer, com tal técnica de ir mostrando " lados " , é nos dar a verdade ou " a Realidade Como Ele É " , segundo um quadro único final. Mas o jornalista pode, também, filosofar um pouco – afinal, nos cursos de jornalismo há a disciplina filosofia. O jornalista pode notar que o que ele chama de " fato " é sempre uma construção narrativa, mesmo que seja ele contando para ele mesmo o que viu. Nesse sentido, ele poderá ficar tentado a dar um salto a mais e ouvir Nietzsche: " não há fatos, só interpretações ". Ou então aprender com os historiadores aquilo que eles sempre souberam: o fato é uma construção intelectual, lingüística e, enfim, uma narrativa complexa. Sendo assim, o jornalista razoavelmente bem formado e inteligente deve, antes de tudo, dizer que o que ele faz é apresentar algumas narrativas, algumas histórias, e nada mais. A última coisa que esse profissional deve dizer é aquela frase tola do senso comum, " contra fatos não há argumentos ". É difícil pensar em um fato que não seja, ele próprio, uma construção argumentativa. Aprendemos na escola primária (ao menos a minha geração) a fazer " redação " e a fazer " descrição ". A segunda era feita a partir da observação de um quadro. Éramos instigados e cobrados no sentido de sermos " objetivos " , e ficávamos espantados em perceber que mesmo diante de um quadro simples, não fazíamos descrições com as mesmas palavras – e o professor nem sempre não dava uma mesma nota para descrições diferentes.  Paulo Ghiraldelli Jr. é filósofo, professor da ECA-USP, autor, entre outros, de Dez lições sobre Sloterdijk (Editora Vozes) e Para ler Sloterdijk (Editora Via Vérita). Tem desenvolvido em seu blog, ghiraldelli.pro.br, a ideia de " filosofia como crítica cultural " , na linha definida pelo filósofo Richard Rorty.

ABSTRACT
The question of whether Wittgenstein was a liberal philosopher has received less attention than the question of whether he was a conservative philosopher but, as Robert Greenleaf Brice has recently argued, there are hints of liberalism in some of his remarks, and some philosophers, like Richard Eldridge have argued that a kind of liberalism follows from Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Richard Rorty has also drawn liberal conclusions from a philosophical viewpoint which draws on Wittgenstein’s work and Alice Crary has suggested that the lessons learned from her own interpretation of Wittgenstein are “reflected in forms of social life that embody the ideals of liberal democracy”. Here I will argue both that Wittgenstein was not a liberal and that his philosophy does not imply a liberal viewpoint. The authors discussed here do not demonstrate that any broad ideological conclusions follow from Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks.
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KEYWORDS: Wittgenstein, Liberalism, Liberal Democracy, Brice, Eldridge, Rorty, Crary.

Richard Rortys Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität (1989). Die begründungstheoretische Verbindung von Utopie und Ironie 1. Einleitung: Rortys Verbindung von Utopie und Ironie als entscheidender Schritt der Selbstkorrektur des klassischen Utopiebegriffs auf der Begründungsebene Zwanzig Jahre nachdem scheinbar endgültig ihr Ende ausgerufen wurde, ist wieder die Rede von der "Gegenwart der Utopie" 1 . Der Problemdruck, der seit Thomas Morus in der Neuzeit politische Utopien hervorbrachte, bestehe nicht nur weiter, sondern habe sich sogar globalisiert. Die Auseinandersetzung um den Utopiebegriff kreise daher inzwischen primär um die Funktion der politischen Utopie und um das Problem, in welchen möglichen Gestalten sie sich Ausdruck verschaffen könne. In dieser Debatte betonen die Vertreter des klassischen Utopiebegriffs zu Recht die Lernfähigkeit des utopischen Diskurses und seine unausgeschöpften Potenziale der Selbstkorrektur. Selbstreflexivität und Selbstkritik würden schon seit Morus' Utopia zum seinem Kernbestand gehören. 2 Diese verdienstvolle Verteidigung des klassischen politischen Utopiebegriffs hat bisher eine wichtige Selbstkorrektur auf der Begründungsebene nicht thematisiert: Richard Rorty skizziert in Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität nicht nur die antifundamentalistische Begründungsutopie einer Gesellschaft liberaler Ironiker, sondern fordert darüber hinaus die Verbindung von Utopie und Ironie. Seine kontextualistische und zugleich romantische Entkopplung der Utopie von der Vernunft schwächt den begründungstheoretischen Geltungsanspruch der politischen Utopie entscheidend ab. Bei ihr handelt es sich um einen entscheidenden Beitrag zum sozialphilosophischen Utopiediskurs, der in seiner Tragweite durchaus vergleichbar ist mit der Wende von der Raum-zur Zeitutopie. Im Folgenden wird zunächst gezeigt, dass Rortys Haltung als pragmatistischer Liberaler zur politischen Utopie quer zu der Debatte zwischen Moderne und Postmoderne steht. Dabei hält er auch an konkreten politischen Utopien fest, sofern sich diese als "schwache" Utopien im Sinne des postmodernen Denkens von Gianni Vattimo verstehen (2.). Dann wird seine eigene "schwache" Begründungsutopie einer Gesellschaft liberaler Ironiker rekonstruiert. Ihr liegt die antiautoritäre Vision einer pragmatistischen und zugleich romantischen Kultur ohne Zentrum zugrunde. Rortys antifundamentalistische Utopie einer idealen liberalen Gesellschaft erweist sich dabei als moralisch motivierte Zeitutopie mit Verwirklichungsanspruch, die konventionell auf der inhaltlichen Ebene der Staatskonzeption ist, aber transformativ bezüglich der Begründungsebene (3.). Auf dieser Ebene ist auch der entscheidende Beitrag Rortys zum sozialphilosophischen Utopiediskurs angesiedelt: Die politische Utopie wird von der Vernunft entkoppelt und mit der Ironie verbunden. Ironie bedeutet hier Kontingenzbewusstsein und romantischer Sinn für die unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten der Neubeschreibung. Utopien als Erzählungen der Hoffnung sind für den Romantiker Rorty Produkte der Fantasie und nicht der Vernunft (4.). Das Fazit lautet, dass Rortys Verbindung von Utopie und Ironie mehr als bisher zur Bestimmung und Verteidigung des klassischen Utopiebegriffs in den Fokus der Utopieforschung gerückt werden sollte; und zwar gerade auch in dem Vergleich mit derjenigen des Thomas Morus (5.).

In this paper, after showing how the postmodern critiques of Enlightenment rationality apply to critical thinking, I argue that a critical discussion on any subject must assume specific principles of rationality. I then show how these principles can be used to critique and reject postmodern claims about the contextual nature of rationality.

La difficoltà di comprendere la Decostruzione, da Derrida stesso volutamente opacizzata nel significato e nel metodo, riporta il lavoro di Derrida al punto di partenza della domanda. Con un lavoro di scavo nel rapporto tra la filosofia di Derrida e i pensieri di Rorty e Nietzsche, si è cercato di far riaffiorare la domanda come, uno dei temi che ha accompagnato il pensiero filosofico di Derrdida lungo tutta la sua attività.

Caetano Veloso e Richard Rorty: Duas Utopias no Novo Mundo


Resumo: O Novo Mundo precisa se inventar como Utopia, é um novo lugar que deve criar seu sentido. Caetano Veloso e Richard Rorty são dois autores que caminham nessa direção utilizando-se de meios diferentes: o primeiro com a canção, o segundo com a filosofia. Nesse trabalho pretendo aproximar a idéia de Utopia Liberal de Richard Rorty do conceito de Utopia Lírica, criado por Renato Janine Ribeiro na análise da obra de Chico Buarque, que redescrito, aplicamos à obra do compositor baiano, como ferramenta para pensar a Música Popular Brasileira. Aproximando essas duas versões de um pensamento utópico poderemos contextualizar e problematizar os pontos comuns e as diferenças entre as perspectivas destes dois autores, marcados pela valorização da imaginação e pela critica da sede platônica de reunir Beleza e Justiça em uma única visão. Seguindo a trajetória da obra de Caetano, poderemos entender como se configura a idéia de “Esquerda Cultural” no Brasil e a forma como lidamos com as demandas do multiculturalismo. A idéia não é que um mesmo modelo de Utopia seja pertinente ao Novo Mundo, como afirma Caetano Veloso na letra de Fora da Ordem: “Eu não espero pelo dia em que todos os homens concordem/ Apenas sei de diversas harmonias bonitas possíveis sem juízo final”.

Esta obra pone en diálogo a Jürgen Habermas y Richard Rorty respecto del giro pragmatista de la filosofía llevado a cabo por Rorty. Partiendo de la réplica de Habermas a la controvertidas afirmaciones del pensador neopragmatista, se analiza la complejidad epistemológica de la obra de ambos. En este trabajo se sistematiza la contrarréplica que Rorty hace a las críticas de Habermas y se analizan los problemas fundamentales de la epistemología contemporánea.

http://www.apeironediciones.com/libros/Rorty-frente-a-la-filosof%C3%ADa-La-discusión-con-Habermas-en-torno-al-giro-pragmatista-Pilar-Salvá-Soria-p92750116

Rorty utiliza el lenguaje como una herramienta de su pragmatismo. Dentro de esta concepción pragmática propone, que el yo de la persona, carece de esencia, sino que es una expresión lingüística, una red tejida a través de varias historias o narraciones que la persona se va contando de ella misma y de lo que le sucede al estar en el mundo. Esto se convierte en un yo contingente, azaroso, que se va creando continuamente. Este yo puede ser cambiado, redefinido, en la medida que la persona va haciendo giros lingüísticos en su descripción de él mismo, o como dice Rorty, haciendo "redescripciones" de ese yo contingente. Se presenta la Terapia Narrativa como una herramienta que puede impactar y afectar estas descripciones del yo, para mover a la persona lejos del dolor y el sufrimiento, hacia un yo más estructurado y feliz.

In this article I examine the main conceptions of public reason in contemporary political
philosophy (Rawls, Habermas, critical theory) in order to set the frame for appreciating the
novelty of the pragmatist understanding of public reason as based upon the notion of
consequences and upon a theory of rationality as inquiry. The approach is inspired by
Dewey but is free from any concern with history of philosophy. The aim is to propose a
different understanding of the nature of public reason aimed at overcoming the limitations
of the existing approaches. Public reason is presented as the proper basis for discussing
contested issues in the broad frame of deep democracy.