Power Sharing

Pointing to a number of informal dynamics in small societies that are supposed to
enhance cooperation and consensus, traditional studies on power-sharing posit that small states are
‘most likely’ candidates for stable, multiethnic democracy. These assumptions are, however,
challenged by the case study literature on small states which highlights a variety of informal
patterns that undermine democratic governance. Addressing this contradiction, the present paper
provides an in-depth analysis of power-sharing politics in Suriname, a small, culturally
heterogeneous country in South America that initially figured as a prominent case in consociational
theory. The analysis reveals that the smallness of Suriname strongly affects and shapes the nature
of democracy in the country. On the one hand, clientelism ensures that members of each ethnic
group included in power-sharing arrangements have access to state resources and services, thus
providing a large measure of political stability. On the other hand, clientelism undermines the
functioning of multiethnic democracy by a host of negative side effects, among which economic
and social dependency of citizens, executive dominance and authoritarian politics, endemic
corruption that goes largely unpunished, and state predation by elites. The upshot is that whereas
power-sharing arrangements in small societies might indeed be facilitated by a small population
size, there is a heavy price to pay in terms of the quality of democracy.

This article argues that the post-Dayton political organisation of Bosnia represents an exemplary illustration of the difficulties associated with the empirical application of the pluralist model of “consociational democracy”. The country’s political system has been predicated on the existence of consensus and the spirit of cooperation among the three ethnic groups without, however, offering any electoral or political incentives to their leaderships to cooperate. Also, the inclusion of several elements to the Dayton accords of a partition approach to conflict resolution has even encouraged the ethnic leaderships to maintain their nationalistic programs and their endeavours to exploit the aforementioned power-sharing arrangements. Indeed, the structural deficiencies of the Dayton agreement have permitted nationalists to continue implementing their ethnic
agendas and have accounted for the slow progress towards the implementation of the Bosnian peace process. Therefore, this article elaborates on the international policies in Bosnia, aimed at transforming the country into a viable multiethnic state, and highlights the significance of motivations for implementing the peace process.

Lebanese confessionalism is a unique political system, considered to be an example of
both the power-sharing model and Arendt Lijphart’s consociational democracy. It is regulated by the principles of inclusiveness and proportionality. It would not be unreasonable to assert that Lebanon would not have survived without confessionalism.
The following book, however, analyses the problem of rising popular discontent with the
confessional system, led by collective actors described in the book as Lebanese protest
movements, which are presented here as new social movements. The aim of the book is to analyse the factors that contributed to popular demands for the abolition of the system, to characterise these movements, and to evaluate the potential of these movements to mobilize people.

This chapter examines the prospects of a consociational compromise in Spain and Catalonia as a response to the protracted constitutional stalemate between the two governments. While Spain's transition to democracy in the late 1970s had a clear consociational tinge, it has since evolved toward the entrenchment of a majoritarian and mononational interpretation of the state, hostile to its plurinational reality and to minority nationalist aspirations in territories like Catalonia. Hitherto, no institutional resolution has been found to satisfy the demands of both sides. This chapter argues that consociational philosophy has much to offer to Spain and Catalonia. While a more consensual approach to politics is crucial to thawing the frosty relations between the pro-and anti-independence sides, the development of a fully-fledged consociational system has yet to gain much traction.

What are the core issues behind the recent protests? How are Algeria's complex political dynamics playing out with regards to the ongoing protests? What is the significance of Algeria to the wider region? What role do regional and international players have in the most recent developments? What are the possible outcomes of the political situation leading up to and after the April presidential elections?

This study examines factors that predict the formation of territorial autonomy arrangements for regionally concentrated ethnic communities. Territorial autonomies are institutional arrangements that allow ethnic groups to express their distinct identities while keeping the borders of host states intact. Although an extensive literature has investigated the capacity of autonomy arrangements to manage interethnic disputes, little research has addressed the precise origins of these institutions. The existing literature considers violent tactics as a primary factor that enables ethnic collectivities to attain territorial autonomy. In this study, the reasoning from the extant literature is juxtaposed with the arguments developed in the research on nonviolent opposition. Nonviolent movements enjoy moral advantage vis-à-vis violent groups. Moreover, peaceful tactics have the advantage of garnering attention for the concerns of ethnic groups without the liability of provoking the animosity or distrust created by violent conflict. Based on the analysis of a dataset representing 168 ethnic groups across 87 states from 1945 to 2000, it is found that the peaceful tactics groups employ when seeking greater self-rule is the single strongest predictor of the formation of autonomy arrangements. In particular, this study concludes that groups that rely on peaceful tactics, such as protests and strikes, and demand territorial autonomy, as opposed to an outright independence, have a greater potential to achieve territorial autonomy in comparison to those groups making extreme demands through the use of violence.

Institutional frameworks powerfully determine the goals, violence, and trajectories of identitarian movements—including secessionist movements. However, both small-N and large-N researchers disagree on the question of whether “power-sharing” arrangements, instead of repression, are more or less likely to mitigate threats of secessionist mobilizations by disaffected, regionally concentrated minority groups. The PS-I modeling platform was used to create a virtual country “Beita,” containing within it a disaffected, partially controlled, regionally concentrated minority. Drawing on constructivist identity theory to determine behaviors by individual agents in Beita, the most popular theoretical positions on this issue were tested. Data were drawn from batches of hundreds of Beita histories produced under rigorous experimental conditions. The results lend support to sophisticated interpretations of the effects of repression vs. responsive or representative types of power-sharing. Although in the short run repression works to suppress ethnopolitical mobilization, it does not effectively reduce the threat of secession. Power-sharing can be more effective, but it also tends to encourage larger minority identitarian movements.

Studies on dynamics of power relationship play a significant role in the collaborative governance literature because many issues and challenges in collaborative governance can be linked to power asymmetry in collaboration. This article proposes a contingency framework on power asymmetry in collaborative governance that includes six contingency factors of power sharing from contextual, network, and node perspectives. We focus on how each contingency factor influences the relationship between power sharing and the effectiveness of collaborative governance and suggest that, instead of focusing on the attempt to balance power and share power in collaboration, it will be more fruitful to design and implement collaborative arrangements based on the dynamic contingencies.

This article explores how civic mobilizations that emerge in deeply
divided societies navigate their ethnopolitical frameworks and assesses
their capacity to effect civic political change within such
contexts. The article examines these questions through the case of a
citizens’ protest and direct democracy movement that emerged in
the postwar state of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014. It concludes
that the movement adapted to its ethnicized political environment
by adopting an approach of limited political engagement and that,
rather than trying to effect short-term political change, it chose to
pursue a long-term shift in civic consciousness.

The book surveys comparative power sharing models implemented in societies that have faced identity-conflicts, with attention given to post-conflict design. It analyzes the success and pitfalls of international experiences before proposing a model for Syria. Contributors address the central question: which among the set of power-sharing agreements that have helped settle protracted identity-driven armed conflict can provide Syria with a platform for dialogue, negotiation, and conflict mitigation? The comparative analysis advanced in this book extracts lessons from countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Northern Ireland, the Philippines and Sudan. The prospect of a post-conflict distribution of power in Syria is then unraveled from different sectarian, ethnic and regional perspectives. The authors also address challenges of peacebuilding such as violent extremism, gender participation, resettlements, retributions, transitional justice, integration of armed groups and regional and international sponsorship.

In an era when democracy is claimed to be in crisis, citizens are portrayed as increasingly distrustful of politicians and political institutions, and change, if any, is expected to be coming from extra-institutional spaces, Albert Dzur invites us to seek and find the seeds of democratic change within the existing institutions of representative democracy. Dzur's work captures the difference 'democratic professionals' can make in these spaces and tells us about the fresh approach they bring to their everyday routines in schools, community centers, government agencies, and even prisons. What links 'democratic professionals' in different institutions is their aspiration to create power-sharing arrangements and collaborative thinking skills in places that are usually characterized as hierarchical and non-participatory. Dzur explains how 'democratic professionals' transform the way institutions function and find solutions to collective problems. Yet such transformative practices often elude the attention of democratic theorists as they fall outside of the established notions of democracy and democratic change. The following interview focuses on the relationship between democratic theory and practice, the difference between social movement actors and 'democratic professionals', and the challenges of bringing democratic change and sustaining it in existing institutions, organisations and work places.

The relative merits of both presidentialism and parliamentarianism have been widely discussed for well over two centuries. In the last generation, a comparative newcomer, ‗semi-presidentialism', has joined the intellectual fray 1 . As the case of the two earlier notions, such captive place-holding at High of course a reflection of the real-world political importance of what is at issue at levels like that of representation of community or its leadership. But in the latter's case, there is more: discussions of ‗semipresidentialism', quite clearly, present us with what amounts to what amount to both simpler and rather more complicated issues. I want to contend that this should not come as a surprise. If we take a close political look at ‗semi-presidential systems of government' it readily becomes clear that these are strange entities, indeed. At one level, this in little more than an expression of the hybridism of the notion. But we may go further than thisand I believe Timor-Leste provides us with a good case in point of a composite ‗altered' form of ‗semi-presidentialism', which we gain in scrutinizing.

Psychological empowerment is the perception that workers can help determine their own work roles, accomplish
meaningful work, and influence important decisions. Empowerment has been studied from different
perspectives, including employee perceptions, leadership behaviors, and management programs. Despite
positive rhetoric, programs designed to increase empowerment seldom achieve the benefits promised. Inconclusive
and seemingly contradictory outcomes stem from the fact that few companies give employees significant
control and access to management information. A half century of research suggests that empowerment
strategies can offer real benefits. We outline facilitating conditions for effective empowerment, including
characteristics of organizations, leaders, employees, and the work itself.

Consociationalism has become a key institutional mechanism for  managing conflict after civil war. Proponents argue that a period of consociational influence can contribute  to the erosion of ethnic cleavages and even  a society where ethnicity is depoliticized. Critics,
however, are sceptical of this claim and argue that consociationalism institutionalizes ethnic  identities and stymies the transition to a healthier democracy. In response, proponents outline a liberal model of consociationalism which limits the pre- determination of ethnicity in social and  political structures. Yet, problematically, consociations in postwar societies often provide guarantees of ethnic representation in order to entice belligerents to abandon violence for democracy. This issue of transitioning from a corporate consociation to a more liberal form requires sustained analysis. This paper examines this conundrum by examining contemporary Lebanese consociationalism. Given that ethnicity is central to debates about revising consociationalism, via
qualitative interviews with Lebanese political elites and civil society activists, the paper analyses how these subjects conceptualize ethnicity in contrasting ways which generate different approaches to consociationalism but which ultimately frustrate meaningful reform. It does this by exploring various debates to entrench, reform or transform Lebanese consociationalism.

Due to substantial generation and demand fluctuations in standalone green microgrids, energy management strategies are becoming essential for the power sharing purpose and regulating the microgrid voltage. The classical energy management strategies employ the maximum power point tracking (MPPT) algorithms and rely on batteries in case of possible excess or deficit of energy. However, in order to realize constant current-constant voltage (IU) charging regime and increase the life span of the batteries, energy management strategies require being more flexible, equipped with the power curtailment feature. In this paper, we propose a coordinated and multivariable energy management strategy to control the operation of a wind turbine and a photovoltaic array of a standalone DC microgrid, by controlling the pitch angle and the switching duty cycles, to ensure that they act as controllable generators. The proposed strategy is developed as a nonlinear model predictive control (NMPC) algorithm. It is shown that applying the proposed controller to a sample standalone dc microgrid, the battery bank is charged according to the IU charging regime. The variable load demands are also shared accurately between generators in proportion to their ratings. Moreover, the DC bus voltage is regulated within a predefined range, as a design parameter.

Consociational Democracy was the theory introduced by Arend Lijphart, a world renowned political scientist specializing in comparative politics. It's a power-sharing form of democracy often recommended to deeply divided societies because it guarantees group representation. This paper, first, aims to survey the knowledge of Consociational Democracy as conflict resolution in deeply divided societies. Second, to demonstrate its favourable conditions and how it works. Third, to show its critics. As result, it was found that Consociational Democracy can work under the condition that the conflict must be de-escalated and each parties can negotiate. This approach emphasizes much on elite's role.

Abstract: The comparison of domestic political structures is a missing component of the literature on the Cyprus conflict. This article reviews efforts to transform an antagonistic political structure to an agonistic one in Cyprus. Institutional frameworks produced by political engineering are scrutinized from a critical perspective. The article first examines governance and power-sharing proposals made by the Turkish and the Greek Cypriot negotiators. Then, two major power sharing approaches, namely consociationalism and the integrative model, are reviewed to compare and contrast different proposals brought to the negotiation table. In the conclusion section, missing and risky components of these proposals to establish a sustainable democratic federal structure in Cyprus are presented, and the future of consociationalist and integrative theories are discussed.

This thesis aims to examine the concept of ethnic domination and its manifestations in deeply divided places. In brief, ethnic domination can be defined as a means of managing ethnic differences in multiethnic contexts through asymmetrical power relations, in accordance to collective distinctions of an ethnonationalist ideology, whereby a group is subordinated to another holding the critical power, albeit not intent to directly eliminate the subaltern.
In the introduction and the first chapter, I shall deal with two core conceptualizations, ethnicity and the state, by proposing a ‘constructivist-structural’ approach towards ethnicity and emphasizing the role of the nationalizing state as an instrument of domination. When this process structures the ordinary politics, a hybrid political regime, the hegemonic ethnic state, could be revealed. Accordingly, I shall analyse Israel and Estonia, two prototypical cases of ethnic domination (also examined as most similar cases). The Israeli and Estonian examples would be helpful to observe six variables, detected by operationalizing ethnic domination properties on three political-institutional layers: (i) state-citizenship; (ii) government-parliament; (iii) parties and party system. Then, an overarching classification of political regimes and a definition of democracy in plural societies would be provided.
Secondly, I shall scrutinize the empirical cases in detail. In fact, Israel (considered within the Green Line) and Estonia have sizeable ethnonational minorities: the Palestinian citizens of Israel and the Russian-speaking group of the Soviet diaspora in Estonia. Moreover, they are dominated by majority groups (the Estonian and the Jewish) embracing ethnonational ideologies (Zionism and restorationism). The variables of ethnic domination would be thus retraced in the Estonian and Israeli experiences. In fact, both countries (i) adopt state centrism and hierarchizing citizenship policies in constitutional norms that disenfranchise or discourage minority participation; (ii) encompass an ethnic majoritarianism in government formation despite electoral preferences and the (mostly ethnic) opposition; (iii) reinforce ethnic cleavages in the ethnic party system in order to exclude minority parties or soften, through patronage or co-optation, minority claims by ethnic mainstream actors.
Finally, I will discuss the findings of the comparison. After having problematized ethnic domination and political stability, the tightening of the condition of the Palestinian citizens of Israel and the democratic evolution of ethnic politics in Estonia will be diachronically connected to internal and external factors.

This dissertation analyses the relationship between civil society and political leadership within the context of Zimbabwe’s protracted social conflict, particularly through the lens of land policy. Through the use of strategic informants, it yields important insights into the origins, form and impact of political leadership and civil society in a way that will expose the dynamics of elite and grassroots mobilisation and the political context in which land policy is either made or obstructed. Specifically, this dissertation examines two research questions. First, if political leadership is not representative of the citizenry, is land policy more likely to engender overt conflict? Second, if civil society has an autonomous role in the public sphere, is land policy more likely to benefit citizens? This dissertation also confronts an emerging empirical problem: the absence of descriptive data in regards to how civil society and political leadership have engaged in reforming land policy in Zimbabwe during the period of transition from 2008 to 2013. By measuring representation and autonomy – indicators of human needs satisfaction– this dissertation traced each phase of the protracted social conflict as it both helped to create the conditions for a liberation model of representation while simultaneously further exacerbating protracted social conflict within Zimbabwe.

After the government of Nepal signed a peace agreement with the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist in 2006 to end a 10 year civil war, local and international observers were surprised to see new fighting erupt in the Terai region of southern Nepal. The violence, however, was initiated not by either party to the civil war but by groups targeting both the state and the Maoists, polarizing citizens along ethnic issues largely unaddressed during the civil war.

In 2007, three of these groups joined forces to create a coalition called the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF).The UDMF’s stated goal is to transform the Terai into a single autonomous province of Madhes. To accomplish this, the UDMF has redefined the identity of those people living in the Terai and those outside of it, in turn exacerbating ethnic division and violence at the grassroots level.

This narrative has benefited the UDMF by binding otherwise disparate ethnic groups together, constructing a history of the Terai that makes it their exclusive political domain, polarizing society into a ‘Madhesi vs. Pahadi (Kathmandu valley)' dichotomy that scapegoats elite ethnicities for local problems, and dissociating Madhesi political leaders from their Maoist past. The UDMF uses political violence to draw attention to the plight of those from the Madhesi ethnic group, signing two peace agreements over the past year with political leaders in Kathmandu to push reform and articulate their grievances.

However, implementation of the agreements is complex and problematic. Nepal’s government is in a difficult spot: it committed to UDMF directives that, if implemented in their entirety, will likely increase conflict within the Terai while simultaneously fracturing the state and weakening Nepal’s fragile institutions.

A collection of articles on power-sharing in Asia and Oceania by Benjamin Reilly, Graham Hassall, Natalia Bahlawan, Rafał Kłeczek, and Krzysztof Trzcinski in Special Issue of ACTA ASIATICA VARSOVIENSIA, No. 30 (1), 2017, Edited by Krzysztof Trzcinski.
On combining institutions of different models of power-sharing see:
https://www.academia.edu/39989420/Hybrid_Power_Sharing_On_How_to_Stabilize_the_Political_Situation_in_Multi-segmental_Societies

This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution and sharing with colleagues. Other uses, including reproduction and distribution, or selling or licensing copies, or posting to personal, institutional or third party websites are prohibited. In most cases authors are permitted to post their version of the article (e.g. in Word or Tex form) to their personal website or institutional repository. Authors requiring further information regarding Elsevier's archiving and manuscript policies are encouraged to visit: http://www.elsevier.com/copyright a b s t r a c t This paper outlines a longitudinal study of struggles to control the public space of Belfast City Centre, the capital of Northern Ireland and a city divided by the competing political aspirations of British unionists and Irish nationalists. While the City Centre was once proscribed to nationalist groups, since 1993 nationalist groups have claimed equal use of this 'sacred space', once the spatial preserve of unionism. I examine this opening access of the City Centre in terms a shift from an 'ethnocratic' form of citizenship to one inflected by liberal multiculturalism, from one of ethnic exclusion to one informed by forms of power-sharing between nationalists and unionists. While many commentators have critiqued this form of conflict management for institutionalizing sectarianism and facilitating zero-sum conceptions of space, I argue that current strategies of creating a 'shared space' can be critically viewed as a successful form of liberal multiculturalism.

In this article, the authors discuss the use of power-sharing instruments in the Western Balkans. While the comparison will focus on the use of power-sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, there will be occasional references to Kosovo, the third country in the region that displays elements of power-sharing. We argue that the region has been a laboratory of power-sharing instruments, with rather mixed results. While in all three cases, power-sharing was part of a larger strategy of peacebuilding, and was, therefore, successful in ending violent conflict and supporting peaceful conflict resolution, the introduction of power-sharing has also had some negative side effects. We will discuss, in particular, the consequences of complicated political systems, veto rights, as well as far-reaching ethno-territorial autonomy. Furthermore, the article will asses the risk of blockages arising from complex political arrangements and resulting international mediation. A particular focus of the article will be to distinguish between federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina and alternative forms of autonomy (both territorial and non-territorial) in Macedonia and Kosovo. Rather than suggesting that power-sharing as such has failed in the region, we submit that the experience in the region suggests that: (a) there are no viable alternatives to power-sharing in the selected countries; (b) that different types of power-sharing need to be considered; and (c) that potential membership in the European Union continues to be the only incentive for the efficient implementation and application of power-sharing in the cases discussed.

This paper argues that current Western-backed approaches to conflict resolution in Kosovo have failed to alter Serbia’s policy toward the region and have contributed to the exacerbation of political tensions between Belgrade and Brussels, while deepening ethnic cleavages between Serb and Albanian communities. While there is no possibility of Kosovo returning to Serbia’s control, there is an equal unlikelihood that Serbian-populated regions of Kosovo, especially the north, will submit to Pristina’s authority. Most importantly, there is little hope that Kosovo can gain full international recognition and membership in international organizations without a compromise settlement with Serbia. While territorial partition has long been a suggested option, I conclude that the best possible solution for Kosovo, given the positions of all parties involved, is a process of significant decentralization beyond the internationally supported measures in the Ahtisaari Plan. A model of consociational power sharing is
one in which Serbian and Albanian municipalities are granted high levels of autonomy similar to arrangements made for Bosnia. While this solution may not be ideal and further weakens central authority, I argue that consociationalism reduces the problems
of ethnic conflict, encourages local self-government, and preserves the overall territorial integrity of Kosovo.

This paper draws on the recent experience of Kenya and Zimbabwe to demonstrate how power-sharing has played out in Africa. Although the two cases share some superficial similarities, variation in the strength and disposition of key veto players generated radically different contexts that shaped the feasibility and impact of unity government. Explaining the number and attitude of veto players requires a comparative analysis of the evolution of civil-military and intra-elite relations. In Zimbabwe, the exclusionary use of violence and rhetoric, together with the militarisation of politics, created far greater barriers to genuine powersharing, resulting in the politics of continuity. These veto players were less significant in the Kenyan case, giving rise to a more cohesive outcome in the form of the politics of collusion. However, we find that neither mode of power-sharing creates * The authors would like to thank Andreas Mehler and the participants of the 'Power-Sharing Agreements in Africa' conference (Hamburg), Gabrielle Lynch and the participants of the 'Democratization in Africa' conference (Leeds), Jocelyn Alexander, Owen Elliott, Susanne Mueller, Brian Raftopoulos, Timothy Scarnecchia, and two anonymous reviewers, for their insightful and helpful comments.

In this article, the author analyzes the term "power-sharing" (PS) in the context of power exercised within a state. He first examines the term in the very general sense, in which it can be applied to all types and dimensions of power-sharing between various groups and institutional entities. Second, the author examines the meaning of the term in the narrow sense, that is, the phenomenon of systemic power-sharing by groups (segments) whose membership is based on ascribed criteria such as common ancestors, relatives, or racial background, and/or cultural ones such as a common language, religion, or celebrations. The basic segmental units in this sense are nations (understood in the sociological sense), ethnic groups, or religious and denominational communities that form part of divided societies. Third, the article shows the differences between the principal models (types) of PS in the narrow sense: consociationalism, centripetalism, and hybrid power-sharing. Published in "Studia Polityczne" 2018, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 9-30.
For more on combining institutions of different models of power-sharing see:
https://www.academia.edu/39989420/Hybrid_Power_Sharing_On_How_to_Stabilize_the_Political_Situation_in_Multi-segmental_Societies

This paper analyses the power-sharing governments of South Tyrol and Northern Ireland. After a first theoretical part, I will focus on the government and on the President of the Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bozen and on First and the Deputy First Ministers and the executive of Northern Ireland, by describing the institutions and their historical development. The final comparative part will refer to the political context in both areas to explain the causes of power-sharing executives’ (in)stability. In complex regional consociations, this is directly influenced by the nature of autonomy. Where autonomy is fixed by constitutional and international norms, the executive will handle the shocks of the political system (as in South Tyrol). Viceversa, where autonomy can be de iure or de facto suspended and subjected to a partisan relationship with the centre (as in Northern Ireland), regional government will become instable.

Consociationalism is often proposed for societies deeply divided along ethnic lines, yet its recommendation remains contentious. Critics argue that it has a low rate of adoption, results in political immobilism, and entrenches the divisions it seeks to alleviate. Overlooked in much of the criticism, however, is the distinction between liberal and corporate forms of consociationalism, alternatively premised on the self-determination or predetermination of the ethnic groups involved in power-sharing. The article considers whether the critiques apply equally to both versions. Corporate consociation freezes a particular inter-group configuration in time, leading to drawn-out executive formation and, in some cases, to a cementing of divisions. However, liberal consociation runs into its own difficulties: consociational settlements are generally negotiated at the very point at which group identities are most politically salient and divisive. Under these conditions, groups are unlikely to settle for anything other than a guarantee of their share in power, thus making liberal consociationalism less likely to be adopted in negotiated settlements. The article also considers the factors enhancing the adoption of liberal consociational rules.

This thesis explored the relation between representation and stability, taking Lebanon and consociational system as a case study, comparing the 1957 and the 1960 elections.
The first half of this thesis explored the theoretical framework of the Lebanese political system and its history, while the second was an analytical comparison of the two elections. The results of the comparison was equivocal, the 1960 elections was significantly more representative than 1957 and the period following 1960 was much more stable than 1957’s.
In order to ascertain the relation between the two variables, this thesis tested the relationship between representation and stability to other significant factors, both internal and external that lead to the 1958 crisis. The results pointed toward the preeminence of representation among the different factors that influenced stability.
Finally, based on the previous findings, this thesis offered several electoral reform recommendations to strengthen the stability of Lebanon, by increasing representation. Faced with the prevalent aversion to change and reform by the current elites, and their entrenched interests, this thesis opted for gradual changes and small measured steps. Such as increasing the number of deputies, easing access to the political arena and carefully increasing the dose of proportionality.

In order to bolster sustainable peace building in violently divided societies, a normative suggestion is that efforts should be made to construct a shared public identity that overarches ethnic divisions. A number of different centripetal/ transformationist processes are identified as engineering a shared identity in comparison to consociational arrangements, which are accused of institutionalising ethnic differences and perpetuating conflict. These transformationist approaches essentially rest on the premise that because ethnicity is constructed it can be reconstructed into new, shared forms. Looking at Northern Ireland, we argue that there are limits to the extent that ethnicity can be reconstructed into shared identities. By analysing consociational and centripetalist/transformationist approaches to division, we conclude that although consociationalism will probably not deliver a common identity, it does provide a robust form of conflict regulation.

In Pakistan in recent times so much is written on the federal structure of the country, still research on Inter-Governmental Relations (IGR) is scarce. Nevertheless, some studies are available on the role of Council of Common Interests (CCI), National Finance Commission (NFC) and National Economic Council (NEC) as IGR forums but strangely very little is written on Inter-Provincial coordination (IPC) which has been functioning since 1972 as an important IGR forum in the governmental structure. Therefore, this is going to be a pioneering research on the origin, development and role of IPC in promoting intergovernmental relations in Pakistan. In this paper the roots of IPC are traced back to the Interprovincial Council set up by the section 135 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Then its development is traced through the 1956 constitution and formation of the Interprovincial Conference (IPC) using the Rules of Business 1973 leading up to the 18th Amendment that was passed in 2010. Moreover, it is explored how far the 18th amendment has changed the structure, size and functioning of IPC. The study shows the18th amendment on one hand has enhanced the importance of IPC but at the same time it has raised some serious questions about its future.

A 10-year civil war between the Government of Nepal and Communist Party of NepalMaoist formally ended in 2006 with an April ceasefire followed by a November peace agreement. In the post-conflict transitional period, Nepal turned to power sharing as a way to bring all sides of the conflict together, reduce the likelihood of a return to violence, and stabilize the country to create a favorable atmosphere for representative
elections. The institutionalization of power-sharing as a means to address the problem of who will decide on the country’s present and future had at least one successful outcome,
as Nepal held direct elections for the first time in its history on April 10th, 2008. Power sharing had two distinct phases: formal arrangements during the 18 months between the peace agreement and elections, and a more informal set of agreed-upon principles to complete unfinished reforms after elections. Unresolved issues include integration of the Maoist Army into the Nepal Army, composition of a National Security Council and human rights. Although the first phase of power sharing accomplished some key objectives, it also encouraged political stagnation and gave ‘old guard’ politicians an excuse to stay in power even after election results proved that citizens wanted otherwise. These power sharing arrangements should now be allowed to die with dignity. Continued delay of much-needed reforms will erode political progress made since the end of conflict, encouraging partisan spats and undermining faith in the new Constituent Assembly legislature. Further, new ‘power sharing’ ideas being floated by politicians and the press, including power dividing and decentralization to address the rise of ethnic politics, may irreversibly fracture the country in the name of keeping the peace.

This essay discusses the constitution of Cyprus from the viewpoint of the Austro-Marxist model of National Cultural Autonomy. The major aim is to inquire the relationship between NCA and (geopolitical) territoriality –an unexplored field in Non-Territorial Autonomy studies.
    We argue, first, that NCA is compatible with the presence of territorial aspirations or concerns insofar as these can be contained within the confines of the constitution of the multinational state. More generally, NCA, being a form of mastery over one’s own affairs, cannot be fully de-territorialized, even if it can be trans-territorialized, for one’s own affairs depend to a certain extent upon living in a specific place, where important social and political relations are articulated. The institutions of NCA may even be furnished with some degree of territorial jurisdiction in relation to matters, such as physical safety, which would naturally fallunder the competence of state organs.
    We also emphasize the importance of the state as the source of the legal and political authority and power of the institutions of NCA. In this regard, we point out that the constitution of the multinational state should be drafted in a way that would not allow some of the main actors to claim later that it was imposed. Moreover, local actors should be forced to assume responsibility to resolve the constitutional issues that will most probably arise after the creation of the multinational state. On the other hand, the constitutional autonomy of the local actors must be protected by all parties involved in the (re-)creation of that state. External involvement in the constitutional affairs of a deeply divided society may sometimes be inevitable, either for the sake of securing international peace or even for the simple reason that local political actors have been used to taking recourse to their “motherlands” in order to enhance their bargaining power and position. In such cases, the external powers should either avoid any intervention, or they must be prepared to be constructively engaged in what we term “deep internationalization”: the construction of multilateral forums, directed by the rules and principles of international law, whose primary purpose should be to enable the local actors to reach a settlement –or to give account before their constituencies for their failure to do so.
  The concept of territoriality implies that one should not blame territorial configurations for his/her inability to re-orient his/her territorial imagination (and the territorial imagination of his/her political constituency) towards a compromise with the “other”. On the other hand, territories point also to hard facts that cannot be brushed away –they may only be interpreted and used in a way that favors changes in the political attitudes that might –or might not– contribute to this or to the other outcome. The fluidity of the territory of Cyprus, and the fluidity of territoriality stemming both from within and from without the island, seem to determine the political fate of the people(s) on the island until today. But this is so only to the extent that those conditions enable certain political attitudes on the part of the first-interested parties to the Cyprus problem.

Lebanese political dynamics are often characterised by political confessionalism, neo-liberal economics, corruption, and its particularity as an Arab state with Western social orientations. Although these characterisations may seem, at times, contradictory, this article argues that they are part of a political structure that initially developed during the Civil War (1975-1990) that was sustained by Lebanon’s post-conflict power sharing agreement. This article builds on the critiques present in the developing scholarship on post-conflict power sharing, demonstrating how dynamics established as a consequence of the Civil War continued into the post-conflict period. This has led to the reproduction of sectarian boundary inflammation, limitations on democratic and civil society mobilisation, and political stagnation. The article concludes with an analysis of the 2015 Garbage Crisis as exemplary of sustained Civil War dynamics and the consequent constraints on civil society mobilisation caused by these dynamics.

Through a detailed examination of institutional discourses in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, this article demonstrates that formal political institutions may play a more layered role than is allowed by existing theories of nationalist and ethnic conflict. Competing institutional preferences of Bosniak, Serb, and Croat elites are not simply instruments for the achievement of collective or individual goals. They are symbolically salient expressions of collective identity as well. For Bosniak elites, the stated preference for a non-ethnicized territorial framework and majoritarian central government suggest the vision of a multiethnic, but not institutionally multinational, Bosnian political community. Their Serb and Croat counterparts, by contrast, insist on the continued ‘ethnicization’ of the territorial architecture and the central government apparatus. These preferences express an understanding of Bosnia as a state of three discrete political communities. Any attempts at comprehensive institutional reform must thus reckon with the opposing and deeply embedded visions of institutions-as-symbols. The theoretical implications of this work go well beyond the Bosnian case.

Given the increasing use of power-sharing arrangements to manage a wide range of political crises over the past five years it is more important than ever to turn a critical eye on the dynamics and outcomes of unity governments. This paper argues that two key factors shape the way that power-sharing functions in Africa: the distribution of violence (that is, whether any one party has a monopoly on victimhood or whether all parties have committed, and retain the capacity to commit, atrocities) and the level of elite cohesion (whether political leaders have developed norms of mutual accommodation that render it easier to find areas of common-ground). The first half of the paper identifies four main power-sharing dynamics in Africa based on different combinations of the distribution of violence and the level of elite cohesion: the politics of distrust, the politics of collusion, the politics of partisanship and the politics of pacting. The second-half of the paper then draws on evidence from Angola, Burundi, the DRC, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe to illustrate how such variations in the practice of power-sharing shape the prospects for reform.

Autor u radu kao predmet istraživanja analizira prisustvo i uticaj povoljnih uslova na održivost korporativnih konsocijacijskih sistema. Korporativne konsocijacije imaju specifično (rigidno) ustrojstvo političkih institucija i izviru iz jasno iskazanih etničkih, religijskih i lingvističkih identiteta društvenih segmenata, za razliku od liberalnih ili liberalno/korporativnih konsocijacija. Cilj rada je da se uz pomoć komparativne metode, tj. strategije najsličnijih slučajeva, na osnovu prisustva povoljnih uslova, objasne različiti ishodi političke održivosti i stabilnosti korporativnih konsocijacija koje u istraživačkom uzorku uključuju Belgiju od 1993, Bosnu i Hercegovinu od 1995, Liban od 1989 i od 1943-1975, i Kipar od 1960-1963. Svaki od povoljnih uslova koje autor primjenjuje u radu nema isti uticaj na objašnjenje različitih ishoda u pogledu održivosti korporativnih konsocijacija iz uzorka.     
Ključne riječi: korporativne konsocijacije, strategija najsličnijih slučajeva, povoljni uslovi, Belgija, Bosna i Hercegovina, Liban, Kipar