Post-Soviet Transformation

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

La caída del Muro de Berlín en 1989 dejó a Cuba a la deriva con millones de naufragios personales: sus habitantes, marineros de la utopía socialista. La crisis económica ?eufemísticamente nombrada por el gobierno Período Especial? transformó radicalmente la vida en una isla que, al decir de Zoé Valdés, ?pretendía construir el paraíso?. ¿Y qué hacer cuando fracasa el proyecto de tu vida? O peor: ¿qué hacer cuando fracasa el proyecto de nación? Aferrarse a la barba de Fidel Castro, unos; lanzarse al mar en balsas, entre tiburones, otros; resistir las inclemencias del tiempo como las centenarias columnas carcomidas de la Habana Vieja, a la intemperie y desnudos en la noche sin fin, la mayoría. Apretar los dientes y remar.
Naufragios de fin de siglo. Relatos, crónicas y entrevistas sobre el Período Especial en Cuba constituye un testimonio de estas experiencias. El libro brinda un retrato holístico de la sociedad cubana de la época, pues relata la historia de personas de diversa procedencia en lo social, demográfico y económico. Entre otros testimoniantes, se encuentran Alicia Quiala Silva, traductora de ruso en la frustrada central nuclear de Juraguá (Cienfuegos); José Luis Rodríguez, ministro de Finanzas y Precios (1993-1995) y de Economía y Planificación (1995-2009); el reconocido periodista José Alejandro Rodríguez, del diario nacional Juventud Rebelde; y los trabajadores de Minas de Matahambre (Pinar del Río), considerada en su tiempo el yacimiento de cobre en explotación más profundo del mundo, a más de 1.600 metros bajo el nivel de mar.

Kotlomanov A.O. Twilight Biennale: Russian art life as if it mattered. Vestnik SPbSU. Arts, 2018, vol. 8, issue 2, pp. 320–324. (In Russian)
Котломанов А.О. Сумерки биеннале: российская художественная жизнь, как если бы она имела значение // Вестник СПбГУ. Искусствоведение. 2018. Т. 8. Вып. 2. С. 320–324.

In the process of decommunisation, Ukraine has toppled all its Lenin monuments. This book documents the inglorious fate of these Soviet statues, following their often violent removal. Photographer Niels Ackermann and journalist Sébastien Gobert have scoured the country in search of the remains of these toppled figures. They are found in the most unlikely places: Lenin inhabits gardens, scrap yards and store rooms. He has fallen on hard times –  cut into pieces, daubed with paint, turned into a Cossack or Darth Vader. Yet despite every attempt to reduce their status, the monuments retain a sinister quality, resisting all efforts to separate them from their history.

Myroslava Hartmond's introductory essay puts Niels and Sébastien's journey across Ukraine into historical and global perspective, highlighting the uniqueness of the Leninfall phenomenon and the significance of their work in the context of post-Soviet studies.

160x200 mm hardback
176 pages
ISBN 978-0-9931911-7-6
Published in 2017

Purchase from publisher here:
http://fuel-design.com/publishing/looking-lenin/

Biketova E., Chernyshov Yu. NATION-BUILDING IN THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS AND EUROPEAN COMPONENT IN BELARUSIAN IDENTITY (World Economy and International Relations, 2018, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 94-103)

The Republic of Belarus has a complex national identity due to its historic roots and borderline position as a country between the West and the East. The policy of nation-building presupposes the use of a wide range of means for the national identity formation “from above”: official ideology, foreign policy, language policy, mythmaking,
“memory policy”. The current situation is characterized by two conflicting trends in national identity politics: the official level concept of “Belarussianness” (promoted by such campaigns as “The Taste of Belarusian Language” or “We are Belarusians”), and the European direction managed by opposition forces. The main goal of this
article is to evaluate the European component of Belarusian national identity. Moreover, it is attempted to define the role of this component in the process of Belarusian identity construction at the official level, with special attention
to nation-building policy in the long run. The authors come to a conclusion that nation-building policies in the Republic of Belarus have radically changed over the years of independence. Three periods can be singled out: 1991–1994 (“Lithuanian” period), 1994–2010 (“Soviet” period), 2010–2017 – Belarusian national period with
a mix of Lithuanian, Soviet, European and neo-Belarusian symbols and identities. Since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, the nation-building process in Belarus has been based on the idea of the Belarusian state as a borderland – a country with an ambivalent history and cultural heritage, long existence in the context of confrontation between the
Polish-Lithuanian and Russian components. The Belarusian political system is demonstrating trends of evolution in the European direction regarding foreign policy, ideology, law, culture, living standards. This is manifested in the dynamics of Belarusian national identity and identity policy appealing to borderline history and cultural heritage.

1 Гудков Л. Время и история в сознании россиян. Часть II // Вестник общественного мнения. 2010. № 2. С. 18. 2 Ср. монумент Победы на Поклонной горе, представляющий собой стелу в виде «трехгранного штыка русской винтовки», длина которой (1418 дециметров) соответствует количеству дней в Великой Отечествен-№ 0 6 ( 74) 2010

Built in 1980, the Linnahall Concert Hall in Tallinn, Estonia, is a fairly recent but nonetheless controversial Soviet monument. Having been highly praised on its completion for its bold architectural solution, within a decade its close associations with the previous regime meant that it had fallen into disrepute. Developers, who realised the economic potential of the site, were quick to seize on its controversial history and called for its destruction. Andres Kurg looks at the changing role of the Linnahall in Tallinn over time and asks what the future might now hold for it. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

ნაშრომი განიხილავს საქართველოს ეკონომიკური გარდაქმნების ისტორიას სსრკ-ს
დაცემის შემდგომ 1991 წელს დამოუკიდებლობის აღდგენის, დემოკრატიული
ახელმწიფოს დაფუძნების, გეგმიური ეკონომიკიდან ლიბერალური საბაზრო ეკონომიკისკენ გარდაქმნისა და ევროკავშირთან ახლო ინტეგრაციის მცდელობების განმავლობაში. ნაშრომი ასევე მიმოიხილავს ამ პერიოდში ეკონომიკურ განვითარებაზე მოქმედ სხვადასხვა პოლიტიკურ თუ სოციალურ ფაქტორებს.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukrainians and Russians have been living peacefully in two separate and independent states for nearly a quarter of a century. Much has been said about the cultural and historical links between these two ‘brotherly’ countries, but also about the tensions between the two countries’ different perspectives on nation building and democratisation processes (Jakubanecs, Supphellen, and thorbjørnsen, 2005; Janmaat, 2000; laba, 1996; Prizel, 1998; Puglisi, 2003; Shulman, 1998; Szporluk, 2000; Velychenko, 1992). Although Russian leaders, in the manner of an older brother, have consistently labelled Ukraine as the central element of Russia’s ‘near abroad’ (cameron and orenstein, 2012; Rywkin, 2003; trenin, 2006), the citizens and their foreign policies preferences have historically (i.e. on gas, on the Georgian War, on the EU and nAto) converged and diverged several times over the course of the last twenty-plus years.
Yet, even though there were sensitive moments during the last twenty-plus years of Ukraine-Russia relations (october 1996 crisis, 2004 orange Revolution, gas crisis of January 2006, gas crisis of January 2009), the events of 2014 (the Euromaidan Protests, the annexation of Crimea, and the ongoing conflict in the Donbas3) are predicted by social scientists to not only sour formal relations between the two states, but also between ‘ordinary’ citizens. While there are many ‘myths’ about the way brother Russians and Ukrainians view the ‘other’ state and its people, the reality is much more complex, permeating with conflict, competition, and ideological disagreements, as in any other family. in such critical times, we must stop and ask: do Russians and Ukrainians view the events of the last year differently? or are there points of convergence? do these events affect the way Russians see Ukraine and Ukrainians see Russia? if so, how? And can we identify any shifts in views overtime from before the 2014 crisis to today? Data on the topic is difficult to find and even more difficult to assess. This is specifically the case when so many contextual variables are in flux and when little, if any, of the available data consists of either a repeated and duplicated schedule of questions, or a panel (following citizens and their views) tracking preferences over time.
Thus, we must scour a variety of polls conducted at different times, by different institutions, to map out the views of Ukrainians and Russians.

"Representations", N. 129, Winter 2015.

The essay analyzes the project of maintaining the body of V. I. Lenin in the Mausoleum in Moscow for the past ninety years, focusing on the unique biological science that developed around this project, and the unexpected political role this body has performed.

The massacre of the protesters and the police during the “Euromaidan” mass protests on February 18-20, 2014 in Ukraine contributed to the overthrow of the Ukrainian government and ultimately to a start of the civil war in Donbas, Russian military interventions in Crimea and Donbas, the annexation of Crimea and an international conflict between the West and Russia. However, in spite of its importance to the politics of Ukraine and global politics this mass killing have been central subject of only a couple of studies. These studies concluded that the Maidan massacre of the protesters was a false flag operation and that far right organizations were involved in the mass killing of both police and the protesters. However, the dominant narrative promoted by the governments and the media in Ukraine and the West attributed the Maidan massacre of the protesters to the government forces and mostly ignored killings of the police. The official investigation by the Prosecutor General Office of Ukraine charged Berkut special police commanders and members with the massacre of the Madian protesters on Viktor Yanukovych orders and publicly stated that Berkut policemen and Internal Troops servicemen were killed by unknown persons of unknown allegiance.

The research question is as follows: What does a large volume of various evidence made public for the first time by the Maidan massacre trials and government investigations reveal about which of the political forces were involved in this politically crucial case of mass killing? This paper analyzes more than 350 hours of video recordings of the Maidan massacre trials and information concerning investigations of this massacre in over 2,000 official court decisions in Ukraine, media interviews of prosecutors, Maidan and Berkut lawyers, and Ukrainian media reports about these trials and investigations. It examines court testimonies of wounded protesters and relatives of the killed protesters, results of forensic ballistic and medical examinations and investigative experiments, and videos and photos of the Maidan massacre shown during the trials. A video appendix includes brief relevant videos of the Maidan massacre and information from the recordings of the Maidan massacre trial. The 55 minute long online video appendix with added English-language subtitles is compiled from brief synchronized segments of on-site reports by American, Belgian, Belarusian, British, Finish, French, Dutch, German, Polish, Russian, Spanish, and Ukrainian TV correspondents and social media videos by various Maidan protesters who filmed this massacre on February 20, 2014.

The study finds that the Maidan massacre investigations and trials revealed a variety of evidence, such as results of forensic examinations and testimonies of many wounded protesters, which shows that at least the absolute majority of the protesters were killed and wounded from Maidan-controlled locations and that the investigation and trials were for this reason stonewalled. The analysis  shows patterns of ineffective and delayed Maidan massacre trials and the GPU investigations, trumped-up charges, and ignoring, reversing, and covering-up of the evidence, which was revealed by the GPU own investigation and which pointed to the massacre of the protesters and the police by “snipers” in the Maidan-controlled buildings and not by the Berkut police. The paper discusses implications of this study for understanding the Maidan massacre and the conflict in Ukraine and the international conflict over Ukraine.

This chapter presents a summary of analysis, evidence, and findings of a study of the “snipers’ massacre” of “Euromaidan” protesters and policemen on the Maidan in Ukraine on February 20, 2014. This mass killing was a turning point in the Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in a conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This massacre led to an overthrow of the government of Viktor Yanukovych and a Russian annexation in Crimea, a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, and Russian military intervention in support of separatists in these regions. The question is which side was involved in the “snipers’ massacre.” This study relies on rational choice and Weberian theories of rational action. It employs interpretative and content analyses of a large number of different sources. The analysis shows that armed groups of concealed Maidan shooters first killed and wounded policemen on the Maidan and then protesters. Armed groups of “snipers” and parts of leadership of the far right organizations, such as the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland, were involved in various capacities in the massacre. This mass killing was misrepresented by the media and the governments in Ukraine and the West.

Н ачиная с периода поздней перестройки и по сей день судьба тела Ленина, хранящегося на протяжении почти 90 лет в мавзолее на Красной площади, не перестает вызывать яростные споры. В последние годы в попу лярных и академических публикациях это тело все чаще сравнивают с мощами христианских святых. Сравнения эти обычно проводятся в довольно приблизитель ных терминах, поскольку особого знания о том, что из себя представляет материальность этих тел -особенно тела Лени на, -у пишущих нет. Вместо обсуждения конкретных фактов обычно просто высказывается мысль, что советский режим с самого начала подразумевал провести аналогию между те лом Ленина и телами православных святых, поскольку такая аналогия якобы была режиму выгодна с идеологической точки зрения. А далее следует известный, но не слишком подтверж денный фактами аргумент: в малообразованной стране с силь ной православной традицией нетленное тело Ленина должно было автоматически восприниматься населением как тело коммунистического святого. И это якобы добавляло режиму легитимности 1 . Аргументы эти, казалось бы, сами собой на прашиваются, но именно их кажущаяся очевидность вызывает сомнение. Как уже было сказано, эти аргументы не основаны на глубоком знании того, что же из себя в действительности представляет тело Ленина и как именно «режим» пытался его сохранить.

open in browser PRO version Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API Pro-Russian separatists stand guard at the site of the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 crash, near the village of Hrabove in Ukraine's Donetsk region. (Maxim Zmeyev/Reuters)

This paper is intended as a preliminary guide to the energy elites of the three main oil and gas exporting countries in Central Asia, and as a practical tool for foreign actors seeking to understand who is who, who makes decisions and who their interlocutors are in those countries.

Appendix 1 provides extensive tables listing identified members of the elites in the three countries and some of their main attributes. These listings are meant to be used as a reference work.

In addition to functioning as a reference work, the paper attempts to extract some comparative points about the energy elites of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. First of all, it is clear that they share some important features. They are largely technocratic, in the sense that a majority in all three countries have higher technical education that is directly relevant for the petroleum sector. Most have studied in their own home country, Russia or other post-Soviet countries, and are more than 45 years of age.

There are however also important differences among the countries. For instance, Kazakhstan’s energy elite is younger than that of the other two, and more of them have studied in Western Europe or the USA.

Business and politics are closely linked in all three countries, but this is expressed in different ways. In Turkmenistan, it is difficult to identify a domestic business elite distinct from politics, because of the rigid state control over business development. The Turkmen energy elite is also closely associated with the ruling party, the Democratic Party. Similarly close links between the ruling party and the energy elite are evident in Kazakhstan, where most members of the energy elite are affiliated with the Nur Otan party. The energy elite in Kazakhstan was previously more independent, but this has changed with the establishment of a dominant political party. The Kazakh business elite, however, is not affiliated with the ruling party to the same degree as in Turkmenistan. This can be explained by the dominant role of the energy sector in the national economy, which provides impetus for political control over energy resources. In both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the state still controls the energy resources and related companies, directly and in detail. The importance of family connections within and between the different elites is evident in all three countries, with several cases of close relatives of political figures controlling key businesses or energy positions.

Review article on the books:
Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism. By Charles Clover. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016.
The Gumilev Mystique: Biopolitics, Eurasianism, and the Construction of Community in Modern Russia. By Mark Bassin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016.
Eurasianism and the European Far Right: Reshaping the Europe-Russia Relationship. Edited by Marlene Laruelle. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015.
Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir. By Anton Shekhovtsov. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017.

Monuments and memorials are built forms with commemorative as well as political functions.
They articulate selective historical narratives, focusing attention on events and individuals that
are preferred by elites, while obliterating what is uncomfortable for them. Articulating historical
narratives, monuments can set cultural and political agendas. Thus, elites design monuments
striving to reinforce their political power and to legitimise the dominant dynamics of inclusion
and exclusion. Nevertheless, individuals differently interpret and use monuments in ways elites
might have never envisioned.
This paper claims that advancing the understanding of the connections between semiotics
and cultural geography can be useful to explore how the built environment conveys meanings
and how these meanings are variously interpreted at societal levels. To do so, this chapter develops a theoretical framework that conceives the interpretations of monuments and memorials
as depending on three interplays: a) between the material, symbolic and political dimensions;
b) between designers and users; and c) between monuments, the cultural context and the built
environment.
These ideas are explored through a comparative analysis of two monuments in Estonia: the
Victory Column, a war memorial in Tallinn, and the so-called “Kissing Students”, a fountain-sculpture complex in Tartu.

This study refers to which dynamics should history be built on while
structuring a state. In this sense, function of history in building a state has been tried
to be determined through historiography that has been carried out in Azerbaijan for
the last two centuries. Thus, role of history, as a constructive element, in building a
state has been pointed out both theoretically and practically.
Azerbaijani historiography on which a feudal historiography tradition limited
to eastern Mohammedanism was prevailing methodologically in the 18th century
could make progress only after the Russian occupation in the 19th century.
Azerbaijani history started to be considered as a part of Turkish history under the
nationalism idea in early 20th century while it has been written in line with Russianguided
Marxist-Leninist views and on the basis of dialectic materialism as the Soviet
regime became prevailing on Azerbaijani life. In this time period, some subjective
approaches to Azerbaijani historiography had been seen and historical realities had
neglected. In particular, several subjects such as history-writing, history training and
establishing national identity had been tried to be re-formed in a Sovietic point of
view in order to be able to damage socio-cultural and political bonds between
Turkish-speaking populations. Azerbaijani historiography was also affected by these
policies designed especially for Turkish-speaking region.
Azerbaijani intelligentsia captivated by nationalism movement with the
dismemberment of the Soviet Union attempted to construct a new nation. The
principle of being national for Azerbaijan has come into existence together with
becoming free from Sovietic elements. On the other hand, duality experienced in
determining the context of nation concept leads to discussions on sincerity. The
national identity that was based on Turkish ethical structure in Elçibey period was
tried to be constructed on a cosmopolite population in Aliyev period which was
similar to the Soviet point of view.
The said fact has affected historiographical activities inevitably. Azerbaijani
history that is still tried to be formed depending on understandings from Soviet
period is now under construction through a cosmopolite structure limited to a
geographical area which is heritage of Soviet historiography. In conclusion,
Azerbaijani historiography suffers from not being able to draw away from Soviet
historiography. Despite all these complications, mission fastened on history in
nation-state construct of the Republic of Azerbaijan holds its validity.

At first the EuroMaidan, seemed like something we have seen before: the ‘Orange Revolution’. We were brought back to 23 November 2004, when observers of Ukrainian politics were shocked when they witnessed a sea of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians, joined activists and opposition party members in a moment of mass mobilization. While Ukraine had previously experienced several smaller protest events, such as the 1986 Chornobyl disaster protests, the 1991 Revolution on the Granite, and the 2001 Ukraine Without Kuchma protests, the sheer size of the 2004 protests and the fact that participation quickly shifted to a majority made of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians was unprecedented (Onuch 2014a). First heralded as a democratic awakening and the first step to Europeanization, but after the election of Viktor Yanukovych (the villain of the ‘Orange Revolution’) as president in 2010, academics agreed that for a variety of reasons, including protest fatigue, Ukraine would not see another mass-­‐‑mobilization any time soon (Meirowitz and Tucker 2013). Thus, when the November 2013 protests grew to 800,000, political scientists had to go back to the drawing board. It was happening again, and again they did not see it coming. While it seemed like déjà vu, it was very different and not least because it was happening with the events of 2004 as the precedent. This chapter’s aim is to analyse and contextualizes the EuroMaidan as a critical case of mass protest, by placing it in comparative reference to the ‘Orange Revolution’. First, the chapter will briefly outline the data used. Second, the chapter will highlight some key writing on mobilization and activism in Ukraine and identify potential contributions of this analysis to the literature. The majority of the text will assess the EuroMaidan mobilization. Employing interview and focus groups data collected by the author, we will be able to contrast and compare the parameters and trajectories of two protest waves (duration, location, and geographical diffusion); the central actors involved in the mobilization process and their main claims. At each step highlighting the convergence and divergence between the 2004 and 2013/14 mass mobilizations. Finally, once the main boundaries of the mobilization have been mapped out, the chapter will address the recent focus among the media and social scientists alike on: the rise of the right, the rise of violence, and the ‘new’ role of social media in the EuroMaidan mobilizations. This initial analysis seeks to provide a blue print for larger studies of the EuroMaidan mobilizations and in the conclusion will highlight key hypotheses for future testing.

We were  ying over the seemingly endless white space of permafrost for over an hour when my companion, a woman in her mid-thirties, pulled me towards the helicopter window: “Look over there, to the right.” She paused.  ere, in the distance, I saw a red-yellow  ame rising high above the ground,  lling the sky with black smoke. “ ey burn all day long,” she added. As we continued towards the village of Seyakha, one of the northernmost settlements in the northwest of the Yamal Peninsula, drilling rig followed drilling rig. Connected by webs of roads and pipelines, these iron rigs penetrated the tranquil- lity of the seemingly endless white landscape of the tundra, which was once exclusively populated by Nenets reindeer herders, and which is still home to one of the largest reindeer herds in the world.

The focus of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it outlines the geopolitical rationale behind contemporary Russian expansionism, as well as presents the asymmetric mechanisms utilized by Russia to solidify its authority in the post-communist space. The four commonly used theoretical frameworks explaining Russian expansionism were described and critically assessed. Apart from this, the Russian and foreign political philosophic thought of the 19-21 centuries was referred to, to trace the evolution of the Russian Byzantium-type governing tradition and national identity. On the other hand, the paper assesses the features of post-colonial Ukrainian political culture and unveils premises for the emergence of its statehood in the 1990s. The major differences between Russian and Ukrainian political cultures and identities are emphasized. Finally, the hypothesis tested is that a democratic Ukraine – strengthened by cooperation with its Western allies – will become an obstacle of Russian expansionism in the future.

Like Weimar Germany, contemporary Russia is home to fascist actors and widespread nationalism. But unlike interwar Germany, the party system in post-Soviet Russia is heavily manipulated and civil society remains underdeveloped. This means that fascists have not had a chance to use elections or to penetrate civil society in order to build up political support. The continuing presence of a resolutely authoritarian, yet non-fascist “national leader” (Vladimir Putin) keeps the country from becoming a liberal democracy but it also, for now, makes it less likely that the regime will become fascist.

This article examines the ways in which Azerbaijan’s energy abundance and the energy diplomacy the latter made possible—combined with inherent weaknesses attending the state’s young post-colonial polity—conditioned the limits of the desirable by which the country’s post-independence elite was guided and, as such, limited the range of directions—cognitive and spatial—in which Azerbaijan’s foreign policy evolved during the first decade following independence.  The study then examines how energy-induced growth in state capacity on the one hand, and the perceived failure of the state’s previous practices to help resolve outstanding security problems on the other, coupled with the effects of a number of endogenous and exogenous shocks (particularly, the colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine; Kosovo’s recognition by the West; the Russia-Georgia 2008 war; global economic crisis; and Turkey’s short-lived attempt at rapprochement with Armenia) and the perceptual shifts those shockwaves worked to engender, served to broaden the spatial and conceptual boundaries within which Azerbaijan’s foreign policy practices were conceived and effected, including by virtue of the energy resources the country has got in possession.  The paper concludes by tracing the particular ways in which the broadening and deepening of the country’s foreign policy practices have occurred.

This 3 minute-long online video appendix shows shooting from directions of Maidan-controlled buildings and areas in directions of Maidan protesters during the Maidan massacre in Kyiv in Ukraine on February 20, 2014 and a massacre of Maidan protesters in Khmelnytskyi on February 19, 2014. The bullet trajectories are made clearly apparent by means of the latent content analysis of well-known videos of these massacres. The latent content analysis of the videos with help of slow motion and zooming along with photos of these bullet holes visually shows trajectories of bullets from Maidan-controlled buildings and areas located on the side and in the back of the protesters, while the police was on the ground level in front of them. The latent content analysis reveals the bullet impact points, their sequence, and vertical and horizontal directions. It visually shows for the first time flying bullets, debris, and bullet casings in the videos at the same time when these videos filmed killing and wounding of many Maidan protesters in the same spots.
              This video appendix is created from brief segments of videos and from photos for research purposes to illustrate findings of the academic studies of the Maidan massacre (Katchanovski, 2015, 2017/2018). Various segments of these videos were shown to estimated several hundred million people by major television networks in at least several dozen countries, including Ukraine, the US, the Canada, Germany, France, Poland, Italy, Russia, and Japan, and on various websites and social media sites. These videos were presented by the Ukrainian and Western media and the official investigation in Ukraine as evidence that the protesters were massacred by the Berkut police.
            The content analysis findings are consistent with results of forensic medical examinations, which were made public during the Maidan massacre trial and which revealed that the absolute majority of killed and wounded protesters were shot from top and side or back directions. They are also consistent with videos of “snipers” and spotters in these buildings, and with military prosecutor office investigation finding that a 71-old female protester was killed and a number of other protesters in Khmelnytskyi were wounded from the Security Service of Ukraine headquarters veranda, when it was occupied by Maidan protesters (Video appendix A). Similarly, more than 200 witnesses, primarily Maidan protesters, testified publicly in the Maidan massacre trial, mass media, and social media about “snipers” in these Maidan-controlled buildings and areas. In particular, 40 wounded protesters testified publicly about being shot from these locations and about “snipers” there (Video appendix B). The official investigation denies that there were any “snipers” in these buildings.

This essay focuses on a paradoxical transformation that happened within Soviet ideological discourse at the very end of perestroika, around 1990-91. The Party's attempts to revitalize Soviet ideology by returning to the original word of Lenin unexpectedly produced the opposite result. The unquestionable external Truth from which Soviet ideological discourse drew its legitimacy-and that had always been identical with Lenin's wordsuddenly could no longer be known. This shift launched a rapid unraveling of the Soviet communist project. At the center of this unexpected transformation was the search for the true Lenin-a kind of Lenin that Soviet party theorists, bureaucrats, historians, and scientists hoped was still hidden in the midst of his unpublished texts and unknown facts of his biology, life, and death.

From the end of the First World War Kaunas, second biggest city of Lithuania, developed thanks to urban enlargements during Interwar, soviet and post- soviet period.
The modern part of Kaunas, outside the historical centre, was built mainly during the 1920s and the 1930s, when it was proclaimed new temporary capital of Lithuania after the polish occupation of Vilnius. In this period, following international artistic waves born in Western Europe and America, like Modernism, Functionalism and Art Deco, the most symbolic buildings of Kaunas were realised, still considered heritage of national importance and promoted by the municipality.
After the Second World War, Lithuania became a soviet republic and Kaunas was transformed in industrial centre; by the way, soviet regime could never impose itself totally in the field of architecture, since the bond with pre- war culture was too strong. So, together with examples of "pure socialist architecture", even soviet buildings influenced by interwar period and western- origin artistic movements were created.
The post- soviet period, from 1991, has been characterised by a return to Interwar architecture; many contemporary buildings are inspired to Interwar ones, while soviet heritage is under process of demolition or transformation, raising debates between schools of thought about preserving or erasing it.
The previous century and the beginning of the 21st century have left interesting architectural heritage rich in symbology and transmission of values; sometimes it is appreciated, sometimes hated and deleted, sometimes criticized but conserved. Kaunas, city of a democratic republic not oppressed anymore after the fall of the Soviet Union, is trying to rebuild its past, overcoming its "trauma" and showing its history to the international scenario.

The decline of the communist regime in the late 1980s stimulated decentralizing processes
within the Russian Orthodox Church; a final result being the emergence of Eastern Christian
Churches in independent Ukraine: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate,
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous
Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Throughout the next two and
a half decades the Ukrainian religious landscape has been simultaneously characterized by
sharp conflicts and a search for ways of peaceful coexistence between various confessions;
ecumenical initiatives, and asserting one’s “canonicity” against the “schismatic” others; attempts
by some Churches to act as civil agencies and national institutions; attempts by the state under
President Yanukovych to revive a “state” Church following the Russian model; moves towards a
Local Ukrainian Orthodox Church and also towards “Russkii mir” (The Russian World). Crucial
issues are — the Churches’ search for their place in the post-Soviet Ukrainian realm and their
choices of models for coexistence with Ukrainian officialdom and society. In its approach the
article provides a general profile of each Church, examines state policies towards religion and
the Church in independent Ukraine, and describes a turning point, that being the Revolution
of Dignity’s deep influence on the Churches’ perceptions of themselves and their place in
Ukrainian life.
Key Words: Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Ukrainian society, state-church relations.

Have there been changes in political institutions, parties, leaders, and regional political orientations in Ukraine after the "Orange Revolution"? If so, are the changes revolutionary or evolutionary? Most previous studies refer to the 2004 presidential elections and mass protest actions as a revolution. To test this claim, this article analyzes political changes in Ukraine. Survey data are used to compare changes in pro-Russian and pro-Western orientation, support for major parties in the 2002, 2006, and 2007 parliamentary elections, and support for leading presidential candidates since the 2004 presidential elections. The implications of these changes for development of democracy in Ukraine are also considered.

En las dos últimas décadas muchos autores y cineastas residentes dentro o fuera de Cuba se han referido al contexto del Período Especial en sus creaciones artísticas. En este ensayo quisiera reflexionar sobre las modalidades de la representación del hambre, su exploración e incluso explotación. El análisis de un corpus de películas y novelas que se relacionan con el Período Especial me ha llevado a proponer cuatro «estrategias» que se alejan cada vez más del mundo referencial marcado por la penuria: estereotipo, contraste, relegación al segundo plano, metonimia (en el sentido de desplazamiento). Ilustraré cada una de estas «estrategias» comentando brevemente películas como Alicia en el Pueblo de Maravillas (Díaz Torres), Suite Habana y Madagascar (Fernando Pérez) y novelas como El hombre, la hembra, el hambre (Daína Chaviano), Te di la vida entera (Zoé Valdés), Las Bestias (Ronaldo Menéndez), El Rey de La Habana (Pedro Juan Gutiérrez), Silencios (Karla Suárez), La sombra del caminante (Ena Lucía Portela). Terminaré con el estudio de Las comidas profundas de Antonio José Ponte que reúne y rebasa las estrategias propuestas. Mis análisis revelan que estas diferentes « estrategias » sirven objetivos específicos en el campo de la ética, la estética y la poética de estas expresiones artísticas.

Котломанов А.О. Паблик-арт: страницы истории. Современное русское искусство в общественном пространстве. Часть 1. Монументальная скульптура. Вестн. С.-Петерб. гос. ун-та. Сер. 15. Искусствоведение. 2015. Вып. 4. С. 55—65.
Kotlomanov A.O. Public art: the pages of history. Contemporary Russian art in the public space. Part 1: Monumental sculpture. Vestnik SPbSU. Series 15. Arts, 2015, issue 4, pp. 55–65 (In Russian).
The article continues the series of publications on the topic of public art. It looks at some trends of Russian art life, the key subject is monumental sculpture of 1990–2000s. The article presents a comparative analysis of the strategies of the Western public art and public art of the Soviet Union. It highlights the work of Zurab Tsereteli that characterizes the situation of the traditional monumental sculpture as a whole. The author also focuses on some of the works of Ernst Neizvestny, Mihail Chemiakin and Rezo Gabriadze representing an alternative method of expressing ideas in the sculpture material. The final conclusions of the article are connected with the analysis of the possibility of development in Russia new forms and methods of public art.

This chapter analyses the issue of democracy in Ukraine and major factors which determine the prospects for democracy in the one of the largest European countries. The research question is as to how Ukraine fares in terms of common democracy criteria. The related question is as to which factors or obstacles affect democracy in Ukraine, specifically after the “Euromaidan.”  The major measures of democracy, such as the Polity and Freedom House indexes, show that Ukraine did not turn into a democracy as a result of the “Euromaidan.” The Polity index and various evidence, specifically concerning the violent political transition during the “Euromaidan,” suggest a relative movement towards greater authoritarianism. Such development contrasts with relative democratization of Ukraine after it gained independence following a collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and after peaceful mass protests and an additional round elections during the “Orange Revolution” prevented an attempt to seize power with help of falsification of election results.

However, the changes in the state of democracy in independent Ukraine and the application to Ukraine of various factors, which previous studies identified as promoting or hindering democracy, indicate that consolidated liberal democracy or consolidated autocracy are unlikely to take root in Ukraine. Such factors include the economic development level, semi-democratic political values, historical legacies, political institutions, political leadership, civil society, and European Union integration. The effect of Ukrainian diaspora on democracy in Ukraine is a factor that requires further research.

Soviet-art is more often considered an instrument of politics than a full-fledged art-movement. Because of its subjection to communist ideology, the visual heritage of the USSR is still subject of current heated political debate. In this paper I give a brief background on public artworks and socialist modernism in architecture, to consequently observe policies and standpoints taken by politicians in Ukraine towards these visual remnants of the past.

In order to investigate the phenomenon of "Russian culture" in Central Asia (which, for the purposes of this paper will inevitably be limited to the three countries where the presence of Russians and other Russophones is still numerically significant: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan), the author will proceed from, first of all, the specificity of Russians' self-designation in the "imperial peripheries" and, secondly, the character of imperial penetration into the region. The course of events on these two "fronts" largely explains the formation, especially in urbanized territories of Central Asian states, of a Russified and modernized segment of Kyrgyz, Kazakhs and Uzbeks, who are tangibly different from their rural co-ethnics in terms of lifestyle, values, linguistic and cultural orientations, etc. Both the titular elites and the Russified segments of titular populations have retained if not an emotional, but, at the very least, a steady pragmatic interest in preservation of the Russian linguistic and cultural milieu.
This Russian linguistic and cultural space (RLCS), within which specific cultural norms, knowledge, values and behavioral modes are circulated and practiced, embraces not only social actors of various ethnic origins, but also formal and informal institutions and cultural networks that are mostly based in the Russian language. The goal of this paper is to investigate the dynamics of the RLCS as it is experienced by the urban populations of the Central Asian states in the post-Soviet period as well as to reveal historical roots of the current situation and the factors working for maintenance or shrinkage of the RLCS itself.

Keywords: Russian cultural-linguistic space (RCLS) in Central Asia; rise of RCLS through the lens of colonization and urbanization in the region; specifics of "Russian culture" in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan; factors working for maintenance/shrinkage of RCLS; universal (supra-ethnic) character of urban culture in Central Asia.

Цели данной статьи – анализ динамики русскоязычного культурно-лингвистического пространства (РЛКП) в Центральной Азии (в том его виде, в каком это пространство существует в городах региона), а также выявление факторов, способствующих его сохранению (расширению) или «сжатию» в постсоветский период. Имеется в виду культурно-языковое пространство, в пределах которого задействованы особые культурные нормы, знания, ценности и поведенческие паттерны, которое включает социальных акторов различного этнического происхождения (а не только самих русских), а также (не)формальные институты и социальные сети, опирающиеся преимущественно на русский язык. В статье раскрывается исторический контекст формирования РЛКП в Киргизии, Казахстане и Узбекистане, а также специфика вовлечённости в него трёх названных стран. Затронут вопрос о том, нуждается ли «русская культура» в постоянной поддержке извне, со стороны России, или же в регионе действуют факторы, способствующие её самовоспроизводству на «местной» почве.

Ключевые слова: русскоязычное культурно-лингвистическое пространство; история становления сквозь призму колонизации и урбанизации; специфика "русской культуры" в Казахстане, Киргизии и Узбекистане; факторы сохранения и "сжатия"; универсализм городской культуры в Центральной Азии.

While it is common wisdom that “identity matters” in Ukrainian politics, we still lack a robust understanding of precisely when and how it matters. Reflecting challenges facing the broader interdisciplinary field of comparative identity politics, authors frequently bring to their analyses very different notions of the nature of identity itself, skipping a rigorous examination of these notions in an effort to get right to documenting the effects of identity. Similarly, identity is frequently operationalized in quantitative studies without much discussion of the implications of selecting one particular measure over another or of what precisely each measure is reflecting, not to mention what might have changed over time. While we do have nuanced research on Ukrainian identity, it tends not to address the evolution of identity over time or the moments and conditions of identity change. Such issues are particularly important for current research since identities and their associated meanings may shift or “harden” during severe crises or conflicts like those that unfolded in Ukraine during 2013–14. The five original articles that make up this special issue1 all address these challenges, with important implications for how we understand Ukrainian politics after the EuroMaidan.

In Russia, civil society engagement with the petroleum sector is surprisingly rich and varied for a country that is ranked low on most democracy-related indicators. This chapter finds that there is a lively and varied public debate, with business associations, research institutes, independent experts, indigenous organizations and the few surviving independent media actively and often competently analysing and commenting on a broad range of issues related to the oil and gas sector. Russians were early users of social media, which occasionally also function as a platform for discussion of petroleum policy issues. However, the real impact of civil society on decision-making and policy formulation in the petroleum sector is not as great as the diversity of actors and discussion might imply. One key reason is the tight government control over mainstream media outlets. The situation for free speech and civil society worsened steadily from around 2004 to 2016. As in neighbouring Kazakhstan, the Russian population puts a high premium on stability over freedom. While a central concern in this book is whether the media and civil society have any influence on the petroleum sector, in Russia the paradoxical situation is that the relationship is often reversed: the gas company Gazprom, rather than another organizational vehicle, is used by the government to control key mass media; and the oil company Yukos played a central role in promoting civil society until its main owner Mikhail Khodorkovskiy was arrested and the company was carved up.

The following thesis discusses the history of economic transitions in Georgia, starting from restoration of independence in 1991 following the fall of the USSR, and progressing towards efforts to establish a democratic state, to make a transition from command economy to the liberal market-one, and to integrate closely with the European Union. The thesis also overviews some political or societal factors, that influenced economic developments at the time.
First Chapter discusses the two main approaches of post-communist economic transition: Shock Therapy and Gradualism, briefly describes a classical example of Shock Therapy application in Poland, i.e. Balcerowicz Plan.
Second chapter examines the initial post-communist transition stages that took place in Georgia in the nineties mostly during Eduard Shevardnadze’s presidency. It overviews successful and unsuccessful reforms of Shock Therapy together with accumulated errors that set foundation for Rose Revolution of 2003.
Third chapter overviews the political “package”, that Mikheil Saakashvili inherited from previous administration and focuses on successful and infamous reforms carried out by his administration.
Fourth chapter explores the history of EU-Georgia relations, Georgia’s recent political developments and current stand on these relations, economic implications of signing DCFTA agreement and how DCFTA is different from FTA, how Georgia complies with the EU Economic Governance, and analyses the chances of Georgia’s preference of ECU over the EU.
The main conclusions are that domestic armed conflicts, declaration of independence by Abkhazia and South Ossetia, post-war infrastructural and social problems, massive corruption, inexistence of proper state institutions, lack of government’s cohesion and expertise on future economic strategies contributed to failure of Shock Therapy, which contributed to the happening of peaceful Rose Revolution. Even though the new government embarked upon a fast track of reforms to liberalize the market, eradicate corruption and harmonize domestic legal system with that of the EU, spontaneity, strategy inconsistency, populist programs, elite corruption and massive violation of human rights resulted in change of government in 2012. Nevertheless, Georgia has been dedicated to Eurointegration, especially after the Rose Revolution. Despite the raised fears about Russia’s actual leverage in the ENP countries right before when Georgia is about to sign Association Agreement with DCFTA component, Georgian government is positive about successful outcome. However, EU’s enlargement fatigue has produced discussions on ENP being a substitute for membership. Therefore, it should be kept in mind that the membership should, by no means, be the ultimate goal of Georgia, but rather approximation with the EU should be regarded as a means of becoming a truly European state or a state of European values.