Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is intended to be a legally binding instrument capable of forcing the international community to pursue widespread nuclear disarmament through the adoption of a stigmatizing strategy by the proponents of the treaty and the States that are parties to it. However, as it will be shown in this article, the treaty proves to be an extremely inadequate instrument for achieving this end due to three types of inconsistencies present in it and in its negotiation process: Normative, institutional and practical. In reviewing all the shortcomings related to these inconsistencies, we may ask ourselves to what extent the treaty is really necessary in order to achieve the end it pursues. As a contribution to both the academic debate and the practice of nuclear disarmament, the article will conclude with an original proposal to address the issue of generalized nuclear disarmament through the institutional mechanisms present in the current non-proliferation regime.

“In a complex geostrategic global environment issues like nuclear non-proliferation and enforcement of multiple international nuclear laws and treaties becomes even more critically important.  Nations faced with serious security challenges consider nuclear weapons an ultimate deterrence against their superior adversaries in conventional weapons. This security driven global political construct have compounded the issue of nuclear proliferation even more.
From a moral standpoint, the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and control regimes seems like a straight forward global obligation but today’s complex geopolitical realities are being dictated by the strategic goals of major power players in the world. Getting into the brass-tacks of historical perspective of nuclear proliferation in context of grand geo-strategy of major political forces in the world explains why the issue of nuclear proliferation is still endangering the global peace and why have we not been able to make the world a place without nuclear weapons despite adopting various control regimes. It is noteworthy fact that all members of P-5 club (US, UK, USSR, China and France) became nuclear states through proliferation in one form or other. This also explains why many of the nuclear control treaties have not been rectified by these major political players. 
So far, nuclear control regimes have failed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and keeping the evolving strategic developments in Middle East, Asia Pacific and South Asia in mind, it seems that this trend would continue as long as these issues would be used not for their indenting purposes but to achieve some vested interests of international power brokers.
This paper examines how on one hand the campaign of nuclear non-proliferation was used by various nuclear states as a policy tool to further their own political and strategic agendas while on the other hand they proliferate or facilitate the proliferation of nuclear weapons to their allies (Israel, India) in order to secure their long term strategic goals. In this backdrop, the paper also examines the loopholes in existing nuclear control regimes and how these are being exploited. In the end, paper purposes various suggestions on regional, multilateral and international levels to make the world more secure place by making the existing control regimes more transparent and effective.”

At the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime lie international agreements, such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, nuclear co-operation agreements and nuclear export control agreements. States, however, do not always comply with their obligations under these agreements. In response, this article proposes nuclear arbitration as an alternative solution to the non-compliance problem.

World attention was focused on Kuala Lumpur in June of this year when international representatives met with North Korean officials to try and prise open the North's nuclear facilities for inspection. This effort has been ongoing since the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NTP) in 1985; signing the agreement has not meant access.

In view of the security assurances that the United States gave Ukraine under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, a move by Washington to appease Moscow would be another crack in the splintering international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Acquiescence to Russia’s territorial gains in Ukraine would further undermine the already-shattered 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), one of the world’s most important multilateral agreements.