Mentalism

I examine Skinner's objections to mentalism, concluding that his only valid objections concern the "specious explanations" that mentalism might afford, and their fostering explanations that are incomplete, circular, or faulty inother ways. Unfortunately, themere adoption of behavioristic terminology does not solve that problem. It camouflages the nature of "private events," while providing no protection from specious explanations. I argue that covert states and events are causally effective, and may be sufficiently different in their nature to deserve a name other than "behavior." To call such events "mental" does not force a dualistic metaphysics: Such a distinction can be easily assimilated by an "emergent behaviorism." Emergent behaviorism will make explicit use of theories. It will be inductive and pragmatic, and will evaluate hypothetical constructs in terms of their utility inclarifying and solving the outstanding problems of the discipline.

Özet: Arda Denkel'in Anlam ve Nedensellik adlı kitabında önerdiği anlam kuramı, üç temel iddia üzerinde inşa edilmiştir. Bunlardan ilki, "anlam taşıyan bir im ile anlam arasındaki ilişki nedir?" sorusuna kitabın verdiği şu yanıttır: "Anlamlılığın temeli, tek tek bireylerden bağımsız olarak var olan, ancak onların yaşam ortamları içinde bilip tanıdıkları kimi bağlantıların iletişim amacıyla kullanılmalarında yatıyor". Bu iddiaya Dışsal Bağlantı İddiası adını verelim. İkincisi, "anlamı ilgilendiren zihinsel bir boyutun söz konusu olduğu" iddiasıdır. Bu iddiaya Zihinsel Boyut İddiası adını verelim. Üçüncüsü ise, "iletişim ve anlamın oldukça belirgin bir biçimde izlenebilen bir evrim geçirerek sonuçta dil aşamasına ulaşan bir gelişim çizgisi oluşturduğu" iddiasıdır. Bu iddiaya Anlamın Evrimi İddiası adını verelim. Bu makalede, Dışsal Bağlantı ve Zihinsel Boyut İddiaları üzerine eğilmek istiyorum. Öncelikle bu iki iddianın mevcut halleriyle muğlak olan içeriklerini netleştirip bu iddiaların yaslandığı gerekçelerin ayrıntılı bir tasvirini sunacağım. Daha sonrasında ise, Denkel'in anlam kuramının bu iki iddianın tutarlı bir sentezini oluşturamadığını göstermeye çalışacağım.

This paper uses the findings of two art-science research projects to reveal insights into how brains work and how we think about how brains work. It uses these insights to suggest ways that art can engage more critically with neuroscience. During the One Thousand Mindreaders art-science research project, one thousand people were taught a little-known skill developed by Victorian stage mindreaders. By holding someone’s hand and feeling their subconscious muscle movements, participants could find objects hidden in a room and duplicate unseen drawings that person had made earlier. The research suggests that such physical experiences of the embodied nature of thought can challenge the dominant neurocentrism of neuroscience discourse. An art-science research study of a direct-to- consumer EEG Brainwear device is then used to explore the history of scientific attempts
to capture images of thoughts from early thoughtography to current neurotechnology. This history reveals the dangerously seductive allure of brain imaging technologies and the thought images they produce. Critical Neuroscience is a recent interdisciplinary initiative that encourages social, historical, and philosophical studies of neuroscience and the implications of recent advances in the field. There has been a call for a ‘Critical NeuroArt’ that responds to the concerns of ‘Critical Neuroscience’. This paper suggests that such a Critical NeuroArt can benefit from art practices that have a quintessentially performative and embodied nature. It argues for utilising previously institutionally excluded art practices with a rich and relevant history of engagement with neuroscience and philosophy of mind.

[1] Stoff ist Kraft (≈ being is energy). [2] Wesen ist Werden (≈ being is becoming). [3] Sein ist Sosein (≈ being is qualit(ativit)y. [4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein (≈ being is mind). [1]–[3] are plausible metaphysical principles, and there are also good reasons for favouring [4], i.e. panpsychism or panexperientialism, above all other positive substantive proposals about the fundamental nature of concrete reality. More strongly: unprejudiced consideration of what we know about concrete reality obliges us to favour panpsychism over all other substantive theories. This is not simply because panpsychism is the most ontologically parsimonious view—given that the existence of conscious experience is certain, and that panpsychism doesn’t posit the existence of any kind of stuff other than conscious experience. A question arises as to why metaphysicians have posited the existence of something for which there is no evidence: non-experiential concrete reality—especially since physics is completely silent on the question of the intrinsic non-structural nature of reality.

This paper evaluates the relevance of the mentalism-behaviorism (MB) dichotomy in economics in light of recent debates and subsequent arguments in favor of mental-ism. The MB dichotomy in economics has historical ties to debates in the history and philosophy of science concerning the foundations of psychological ex-planation. I argue that there are two problems with current conceptions of the MB dichotomy as it pertains to how economists and decision researchers interpret and gather evidence. First, it is unclear what the MB dichotomy pertains to or is about exactly—which is to say, economists and decision researchers may have different motivations for endorsing mentalism and/or for opposing behaviorism. Second, and more importantly, it is unclear how the MB dichotomy is supposed to improve or advance empirical research in economics and decision research—in particular, supporters of mentalism have the difficult task of clarifying what mentalism entails or consists in (beyond vapid appeals to folk psychology). In response to the first problem, I consider two common motivations for endorsing mentalism: one motivation appeals to the choice-theoretic foundations of economics; the other appeals to scientific practice in economics. In response to the second problem, I argue that the MB dichotomy likely won’t advance or improve scientific practice in contemporary economic settings because neither mentalism (nor behaviorism) are equipped to analyze and resolve explanatory problems that are unique to non-choice data, i.e. psychological and neuroscientific data. I conclude by discussing the limitations of functionalism, the mainstay of the mentalism defense book, and suggest alternative schema to the MB dichotomy, some of which are employed in neighboring areas of the cognitive and behavioral sciences.

This essay appears in a remarkable collection of essays entitled "Octagon: The Quest for Wholeness, Volume 2", that is edited by Hans Thomas Hakl (Gaggenau, Germany: H. Frietsch Verlag, 2016). Hakl undertook the daring project to publish this series of essays on a variety of subjects that he considers to mirror his library "dedicated to religious studies, philosophy and esotericism in particular". My contribution scrutinizes the (controversial) hagiography of the Polish-Jewish born Wolf Messing having become famous in Russia.

THESE PAGES CONTAIN ALL THE INFORMATION YOU WILL NEED TO UNDERSTAND THE MYSTERY OF LIFE.

IT IS A RESTORATION OF PARMENIDES', ABOUT REALITY, 2,000 YEARS OVERDUE.

THIS WORK IS A REVOLUTION IN THOUGHT REVEALING THE SECRET ANCIENT KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE. IT'S BREATHTAKING REVELATIONS EXPLAIN HOW FAKE HISTORY, RELIGIOUS PROPAGANDA AND A CENSORED EDUCATION CORRUPTED YOUR LIFE.

THE ANCIENT WISDOM WAS SUPPRESSED AND HUMAN EVOLUTION RETARDED. WHERE DID I COME FROM? WHY AM I HERE? HAS THE MODERN WORLD GOT IT WRONG? YES! THERE IS A REASON WHY YOU EXIST. KNOW IT NOW! ESCPAE THE MADNESS.

WHERE DID I COME FROM? WHY AM I HERE? WHAT IS THE SELF?

HAS THE MODERN WORLD GOT IT WRONG? YES!

THERE IS A REASON WHY YOU EXIST. KNOW IT NOW!
https://www.amazon.com/dp/B086Y6LQ95

Wolf Messing (1899-1974) was a Polish Jew and in particular circles a quite well known psychic stage performer, to whose name nowadays are attached a number of persistent stories. A handful of anecdotes woven together with some hard facts have turned Messing into a legendary figure. The Indian guru Sri Sathya Sai Baba (1926/1929-2011) and his followers have aided in the expansion of the mythology around Messing. This study scrutinizes the anecdotes of Messing's life that Sri Sathya Sai Baba incorporated in his own narrative.

The aim of the paper is to present the main conceptions in the cotemporary philosophy of mind. The debate is narrated in two ways: The first approach concerns the ontology of mind, with the questions such as: What is the nature of mind?; What is the relation between mind and body?; Is the mind reducible to its physical basis? The second approach has an epistemological character where
especially the problem of self-knowledge in the frame of the discussion between externalism and internalism is pointed out. The last part of the article gives an evaluation of the actual situation in the philosophy of mind which on the one hand tries to evolve in the direction of cognitive science but on the other hand stays in the frame of the traditional philosophy. The reason of it is the nature of the questions, which cannot be answered only by means of scientific disciplines.
It means that in contrast to the cognitive science the philosophical account of the mind-body problem is the preferred one.

Keywords
Philosophy of mind, mind-body problem, externalism, internalism, cognitive sciences

The Twin Earth scenario assumes reference to natural kinds is unique and never changes (rigid designation), and that we can give justice to the intuition of reference-permanence and things having a deep structure only by pushing meaning outside the brain or mind (semantic externalism). This, I'll show, doesn't follow. Besides, the intuition itself is misconstrued here. To say the term “water” expressed a thought or concept or belief denoting H2O before its actual discovery around 1750, is to make a claim without real content and be guilty of after-the-fact rationalizing. If anything, Twin Earth undercuts the theory of semantic externalism and its core-notion of rigid designation. A pluralized, descriptivist model of reference, I claim, is a better fit for our scientific data and ordinary intuitions either way.

This thesis offers a philosophical perspective on the different conceptions of agency and choice as they are understood and employed in economics and behavioral decision research—this perspective is two-fold: on the one hand, philosophical analysis can clarify ambiguities in definitions and concepts that can and do arise within interdisciplinary research. This is of particular importance given how philosophical concepts such as mind, cognition, and intentionality feature in economic studies of rational choice. Hence, one project of this thesis is to subject contemporary research on questions about agency and choice to such philosophical scrutiny. On the other hand, the questions and topics discussed in this thesis can be understood as an exercise in philosophy of science: they deal explicitly with questions and topics that pertain to the theoretical and empirical practices of scientists. This includes traditional microeconomic disciplines, such as decision and game theory, as well as interdisciplinary collaborations in behavioral economics, neuroeconomics, and experimental psychology.

Second language acquisition/competence does not happen pronto; it gradually and steadily evolves. It is the result of painstaking, but constant language input and output processes. According to Ellis (2008), there are four theoretical perspectives of language inputs: the behaviorist, mentalist, interactionist, and socioculturalist viewpoints. All the perspectives agree that input plays a role in L2 acquisition. They differ, however, on the nature, degree of the role and its importance. This paper examines first, the role/ importance of input in L2 acquisition based on the four theoretical viewpoints. Then, it isolates Krashen's (1985) Input Hypothesis for further examination and discuss. It concludes that despite the criticisms from some quarters against it, Kreshen's Input Hypothesis may remain topical in L2 discourse for a long time in the future.

textabstractThis thesis offers a philosophical perspective on the different conceptions of agency and choice as they are understood and employed in economics and behavioral decision research—this perspective is two-fold: on the one hand, philosophical analysis can clarify ambiguities in definitions and concepts that can and do arise within interdisciplinary research. This is of particular importance given how philosophical concepts such as mind, cognition, and intentionality feature in economic studies of rational choice. Hence, one project of this thesis is to subject contemporary research on questions about agency and choice to such philosophical scrutiny. On the other hand, the questions and topics discussed in this thesis can be understood as an exercise in philosophy of science: they deal explicitly with questions and topics that pertain to the theoretical and empirical practices of scientists. This includes traditional microeconomic disciplines, such as decision and game theor...

Evidentialism and mentalism enjoy much popularity. In fact, mentalist evidentialism is often considered the most plausible internalist approach towards epistemic justification. However, mentalist evidentialism does not amount to a comprehensive theory of epistemic justification. In their attempt to complete their epistemological system and to answer the question of why experiences are justifiers, Conee and Feldman supplement mentalist evidentialism with explanationism. They take principles of best explanation to be the fundamental epistemic principles. In this paper, I show that explanationist mentalist evidentialism is plagued by severe shortcomings. What is more, I argue for an alternative in the spirit of Conee and Feldman's internalism that avoids the problems of explanationism, offering a straightforward commonsense account of epistemic justification. The fundamental epistemological principles are phenomenological principles.

In this paper, I shall show that for Husserl (1) evidence determines epistemic justification and (2) evidence is linked to originary givenness in the sense that one’s ultimate evidence consists of one’s originary presentive intuitions. This means that in contemporary analytic terminology Husserl is a proponent of evidentialism and mentalism. Evidentialism and mentalism have been introduced into current debates by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Finally, I shall highlight that there is one significant difference between Husserl and Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. While Conee and Feldman argue that the fundamental principles of epistemology are principles of best explanation, Husserl opts for phenomenological principles as the most fundamental epistemic principles. The main difference is that for Husserl experiences gain their justificatory force by virtue of their phenomenal character, namely their originary givenness.

Is Matter Real? Are Concepts Real?

The Curse of Reification: A World Problem

"Every thing is of the nature of no thing." Parmenides of Elea

Has the modern world got it all wrong?

An Old Answer for a New Problem: Implications of Ancient Philosophy for the Modern Scientist, Cosmogonist and Educator

Are the foundations of science rock solid? Do we really understand the cosmogonies of the Ancients upon which the development and integrity of modern beliefs rest? Has the Truth been obscured, perhaps corrupted? It is widely held that Democritus was an atomist, but what did his concepts "atom and void" and "reality" mean in those times? Have "atoms" and "matter" been objectified through "reification"; originally understood as concepts, have they become real things that distort the devolving, modern, reified world-view? Is reification the World's - and the individual's - greatest problem?

This morning I intended to get out of bed when my alarm went off. Hearing my alarm, I formed the intention to get up now. Yet, for a time, I remained in bed, irrationally lazy. It seems I irrationally failed to execute my intention. Such cases of execution failure (as I call it) pose a challenge for Mentalists about rationality, who believe that facts about rationality supervene on facts about the mind. For, this morning, my mind was in order; it was my (in)action that apparently made me irrational. What, then, should Mentalists say about the phenomenon of execution failure? The phenomenon of execution failure, and the puzzle it raises for Mentalists, have rarely been discussed. This paper addresses the puzzle in two parts. First, it argues (against John Broome) that execution failure is a real phenomenon. It is possible for agents to irrationally fail to act on their present-directed intentions. It follows that Mentalists in the philosophy of action must solve the puzzle of explaining what is irrational about cases of execution failure. Second, this paper begins the search for such a solution. It considers six possible resolutions to the puzzle, arguing that none is obviously the most attractive. These resolutions include a requirement of overall conative consistency, an appeal to the norm of intention consistency, a form of Volitionalism, an appeal to factive mental states, and a proposal due to Garrett Cullity, and a novel requirement of proper functioning.

There are three main positions on animalthought: lingualism denies that non-linguistic animalshave any thoughts; mentalism maintains that theirthoughts differ from ours only in degree, due totheir different perceptual inputs; an intermediateposition, occupied by common sense and Wittgenstein,maintains that animals can have thoughts of a simplekind. This paper argues in favor of an intermediateposition. It considers the most important arguments infavor

The present study investigates the combined effects of different amounts of comprehension-based and form-focused instruction on skill-based proficiency and knowledge of grammatical structures of beginner-level efl students. Specifically, the study addresses the following research questions : 1) Does a basically comprehension-based program of instruction supported by form-focused instruction help beginner-level efl learners improve/develop their listening, reading and writing abilities more than a basically form- focused program of instruction? 2) Does a basically form-focused program of instruction help beginner-level efl learners improve their knowledge of grammatical structures more than a basically comprehension-based program of instruction? One experimental and one control group, each containing 20 lycee prep level Turkish efl students, participated in the study. The subjects in the experimental and control groups were randomly selected from among lycee prep classes in two diffe...

This is the second part of a jungian analysis of the drives which bring us to 'do magic' (in the broadest sense) in the contemporary world.
The model follows the analysis presented in another essay, "Magus. Dangerous kids and the seduction of power".

The view that human communication is essentially a matter of sharing mental states, especially communicative intentions, has been immensely influential in pragmatics and beyond. Drawing together and elaborating various lines of criticism, I argue that this influence has been mostly harmful; in particular, it has misdirected research on the evolution and development of language and communication.

The first movements of the table were markedly similar to those from the previous sittings, causing all the sitters to rise from their chairs. The pervading smell of incense, relaxing yet not intoxicating, and the light from a 60 watt redbulbed lamp filled the room. A sudden depression in temperature had been felt by those present and recorded by the self-registering thermometer -this was accompanied immediately with the table, which was tipping moments before, ignoring the laws of gravity altogether. It levitated a total of three times.

The present study investigates the combined effects of different amounts of comprehension-based and form-focused instruction on skill-based proficiency and knowledge of grammatical structures of beginner-level efl students. Specifically, the study addresses the following research questions : 1) Does a basically comprehension-based program of instruction supported by form-focused instruction help beginner-level efl learners improve/develop their listening, reading and writing abilities more than a basically form- focused program of instruction? 2) Does a basically form-focused program of instruction help beginner-level efl learners improve their knowledge of grammatical structures more than a basically comprehension-based program of instruction? One experimental and one control group, each containing 20 lycee prep level Turkish efl students, participated in the study. The subjects in the experimental and control groups were randomly selected from among lycee prep classes in two diffe...

This paper aims to revisit the psychological concept of representation (Vorstellung) as it was theorized by Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) at the beginning of the 19th century. I show that, by defining the representation both as an 'act' (the fact of being effectively present in consciousness) and a 'content' (what the act refers to), Herbart proposed a new ontological approach of mental states that would be crucial for the fate of psychology and psychology-related disciplines until the early 20th century. First, I discuss the tenets of Herbart's psychological thought, by showing that he advocated a mentalist and analytical psychology of which Vorstellung is the key notion. Second, I  analyze his crucial conceptual distinction between 'the fact of representing' (das Vorstellen) and 'what is represented' (das Vorgestellte). Third, I demonstrate how Herbart's “dialectics of the act and the content” raised new concerns about the quality and the intensity, the reality and the existence of mental states. Fourth, I show that, besides the representations, Herbart also identified non-representational mental states, that is, acts of consciousness that do not express any content, among which feelings (Gefühle), to which he ascribed a 'metacognitive' function. In conclusion, I emphasize the signifiance of the Herbartian concept of Vorstellung for 19th-century psychology and its potential close relatedness with Brentano's theory of intentionality.

This article advances the case for 'normative behaviourism' – a new way of doing political philosophy that tries to turn facts about observable patterns of behaviour, as produced by different political systems, into grounds for specific political principles. This approach is applied to four distinct problems at the heart of the ideal/nonideal theory and moralism/realism debates: (1) How to distinguish good from bad idealisations; (2) how to rank options of variable feasibility, cost, and danger; (3) how to distinguish legitimate acceptance of a given political system from acceptance based on coercion or false consciousness; (4) how to translate abstract principles into concrete institutions. Objections against the general viability of normative behaviourism, and against the types of behaviour it tracks, are also considered.

This is the first part of a jungian analysis of the drives which bring us to 'do magic' (in the broadest sense) in the contemporary world.
The model is completed in a second essay, "Divinus. Readers' beliefs and the problem of truthfulness".

Der Begriff ›Gepflogenheit‹ hat in Wittgensteins Philosophie eine zentrale Stellung. Da dieser Begriff jedoch bis heute nur wenig erforscht worden ist, soll seine Relevanz in diesem Beitrag herausgearbeitet werden. Der Übergang von der Regel zur Regelfolge wird durch den Begriff der ›Gepflogenheit‹ vollzogen. 1 Konkret geht es um die Frage, inwieweit eine Regelfolge eine Handlung begründen kann, ohne dass sich dabei Widersprüche ergeben würden. Der bisherige Versuch, Handlung auf der Grundlage von Regeln zu bestimmen, ist nach Wittgenstein zum Scheitern verurteilt. Der Grund für dieses Scheitern lässt sich auf folgende Art beschreiben: Wenn jemand gefragt würde, ob sein Tun mit einer Regel vereinbar sei, so müsste er zur Erklärung der Vereinbarkeit subjektive Kriterien einführen. Die Widerlegung dieser Argumentation lautet so: Die Regel für jedes Handeln gründet auf Deutung, wobei mit »deuten« ein Vorgang gemeint ist, bei dem ein in der Regel enthaltener Begriff durch einen anderen Ausdruck ersetzt wird. Diese Substituierung erweist sich jedoch als subjektiv und daher als rein willkürlich. Daher sollen objektive Kriterien gesucht werden, die es ermöglichen, eine Beziehung zwischen Regel und Handlung herzustellen. Am Beginn unserer Überlegungen steht ein einfaches Gedankenexperiment in Form eines Rätsels: Stellen wir uns vor, eine wandernde Person gelange an eine Weggabelung mit mehreren Wegweisern. Aus den Schildern sind die Entfernungen zu bestimmten Ortschaften in Kilometerzahl angegeben. Nehmen wir an, zwei entgegengesetzte Wegweiser mit unterschiedlichen Distanzangaben führten zu ein und demselben Ort. Auf dem nach rechts zeigenden Wegweiser steht eine Distanz von 7 Kilometern Länge, während ein in gerade Richtung deutender Wegweiser nur eine Kilometerzahl von 5,4 km anzeigt. Nun steht der Wanderer vor der Wahl: An welchen Wegweiser soll er sich halten? Grundsätzlich kann man annehmen, dass die Angaben auf einem Wegweiser auf einem kausalen Zusammenhang zwischen Ort, Richtung und Distanz basieren. Würde sich der Wanderer beispielsweise aufgrund von Müdigkeit oder Eile für die kürzere Distanz

Although multitudes of contemporaries use psychoanalysis to explain their actions to one another, we hardly manage to discern a social phenomenon in the widespread recourse to this analytical idiom.  For we have grown accustomed to the asocial image of psychoanalysis articulated by S. Freud: it would be born in a radical self-observation, by an individual who discovers her repressed desires by freeing herself from the expectations of others.  This image ultimately has its roots in a Cartesian conception of the relationship to oneself, according to which it precedes any relationship to others.  However, this hypothesis has been the subject of sharp criticism by J. Dewey and G. H. Mead, who argue that the relationship with oneself develops through interactions with social partners.  The confrontation of their “emergent” theory of the mind with the one implicit in the asocial theory of psychoanalysis enables us, by placing the analytical soliloquy in the context of the interaction in which it emerges, to replace this asocial conception (which in the end is nothing but a hypostasis of this soliloquy) with a more realistic approach of psychoanalysis.

Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 1 mai 2019. Corela-cognition, représentation, langage est mis à disposition selon les termes de la licence Creative Commons Attribution-Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale-Partage dans les Mêmes Conditions 4.0 International. La cognition humaine saisie par le langage : de la sémantique cognitive au médiationnisme Vincent Nyckees Si l'on en croit une opinion répandue chez les partisans de la sémantique cognitive, la seule « alternative » à l'objectivisme 1-et, par conséquent, la seule théorie cognitive possibleserait un expérientialisme de type mentaliste, celui-là même qu'ils défendent et illustrent dans leurs travaux. D'où il résulterait que toute contestation de la sémantique cognitive signerait un retour à l'objectivisme tant critiqué. Cette conviction repose manifestement sur le raisonnement suivant : • les significations linguistiques ne peuvent être analysées adéquatement dans le cadre objectiviste parce qu'elles requièrent la compréhension humaine ; • elles sont par conséquent de nature conceptuelle et doivent être analysées intégralement par référence à des mécanismes mentaux. Nous voudrions montrer dans cet article que cette inférence ne s'impose pas, que le rejet de l'objectivisme ne nous réduit pas au mentalisme et qu'une autre linguistique cognitive est possible, si l'on entend par linguistique cognitive une approche : i) qui estime que toute signification est nécessairement relative à la compréhension humaine ; ii) qui se fixe pour objectif d'éclairer aussi précisément que possible les processus selon lesquels les sujets humains confèrent du sens aux unités, aux structures et aux énoncés linguistiques. Nous nous proposons deux objectifs complémentaires. Nous voulons d'abord faire état des très sérieuses objections que soulèvent selon nous les thèses de la sémantique cognitive actuelle, du fait, essentiellement, de leur mentalisme, autrement dit de la réduction univoque des significations linguistiques qu'elles proposent à des représentations mentales préexistantes. Nous prendrons essentiellement pour référence de notre analyse la grande construction théorique, véritable « système sémantique » à quatre mains, élaborée dans une étonnante synergie par Lakoff et Johnson dans leurs ouvrages respectifs de 1987, ouvrages qui présentent, bien plus que leurs La cognition humaine saisie par le langage : de la sémantique cognitive au mé... Corela, HS-6 | 2007 La cognition humaine saisie par le langage : de la sémantique cognitive au mé... Corela, HS-6 | 2007 10 Ce mentalisme est, à l'époque de Women…, essentiellement innéiste, à la fois nativiste et expérientaliste selon les propres termes de Lakoff 12 (XV, 146 et chap. 17). La cognition humaine saisie par le langage : de la sémantique cognitive au mé...

D'innombrables contemporains ont recouru et recourent encore à la psychanalyse pour se rendre compte de leurs actions les uns aux autres. Plusieurs chercheurs demeurent pourtant réticents à considérer cette pratique comme un phénomène social. À la suite de Sigmund Freud, ils considèrent la psychanalyse comme le fruit d'une découverte se produisant dans les marges du monde social, dans une introspection libérée des exigences critiques d'autrui. En dernière analyse, cette image d'une psychanalyse asociale de la psychanalyse repose sur une conception cartésienne de la relation à soi, qui dépeint celle-ci comme si elle précédait toute communication avec autrui. Or, en réalité, comme J. Dewey et G. H. Mead l'ont montré, l'observation de soi, loin de précéder la communication avec autrui, découle de celle-ci. La comparaison des critiques de la théorie de l'esprit de Descartes réalisée par Freud, d'une part, et par Dewey et Mead, d'autre part, permet non seulement de mieux comprendre ce qui les distingue, mais aussi – en montrant que l'aveu muet du désir dans le soliloque psychanalytique fait partie intégrante du travail de coordination que des partenaires d'actions sociales accomplissent en nommant leurs désirs – de remplacer la conception asociale de la psychanalyse par une conception plus réaliste.

The witnesses of desire: Freud, Dewey, Mead and the contested relevance of sociology of psychoanalysis

Abstract
Countless contemporaries have turned to psychoanalysis to provide one another with accounts of their actions. Yet, many researchers are reluctant to consider this practice as a social phenomenon. Following in the footsteps of Sigmund Freud, they think of psychoanalysis as the fruit of a discovery on the fringes of the social sphere, in a self-observation freed of the critical demands of others. Ultimately, this picture of asocial psychoanalysis is based on a Cartesian conception of the relationship to oneself, as this relationship is described as preceding any communication with others. However, as John Dewey and George H. Mead showed, self-observation, far from preceding communication with others, derives from it. The comparison of critiques of Descartes' theory of the mind, by Freud on the one hand and by Dewey and Mead on the other, not only affords a better understanding of their distinctive features but also enables us—by showing that the mute avowal of desire in psychoanalytical soliloquy is an integral part of the coordination that partners of social actions accomplish by naming their desires—to replace the asocial conception of psychoanalysis with a more realistic understanding.

Many philosophers claim that intuitions are evidential. Yet it is hard to see how introspecting one's mental states could provide evidence for such synthetic truths as those concerning, for example, the abstract and the counterfactual. Such considerations have sometimes been taken to lead to mentalism---the view that philosophy must concern itself only with matters of concept application or other mind-dependent topics suited to a contemplative approach---but this provides us with a poor account of what it is that philosophers take themselves to be doing, for many of them are concerned with the extra-mental facts about the universe. Evidentialism therefore gestates a disaster for philosophy, for it ultimately demands an epistemology for the investigation into such matter as the abstract and the modal that simply will not be forthcoming. We make a different suggestion: That intuitions are inclinations to believe. Hence, according to us, a philosophical argument does well, as a soc...

Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 1 mai 2019. Corela-cognition, représentation, langage est mis à disposition selon les termes de la licence Creative Commons Attribution-Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale-Partage dans les Mêmes Conditions 4.0 International. La cognition humaine saisie par le langage : de la sémantique cognitive au médiationnisme Vincent Nyckees Si l'on en croit une opinion répandue chez les partisans de la sémantique cognitive, la seule « alternative » à l'objectivisme 1-et, par conséquent, la seule théorie cognitive possibleserait un expérientialisme de type mentaliste, celui-là même qu'ils défendent et illustrent dans leurs travaux. D'où il résulterait que toute contestation de la sémantique cognitive signerait un retour à l'objectivisme tant critiqué. Cette conviction repose manifestement sur le raisonnement suivant : • les significations linguistiques ne peuvent être analysées adéquatement dans le cadre objectiviste parce qu'elles requièrent la compréhension humaine ; • elles sont par conséquent de nature conceptuelle et doivent être analysées intégralement par référence à des mécanismes mentaux. Nous voudrions montrer dans cet article que cette inférence ne s'impose pas, que le rejet de l'objectivisme ne nous réduit pas au mentalisme et qu'une autre linguistique cognitive est possible, si l'on entend par linguistique cognitive une approche : i) qui estime que toute signification est nécessairement relative à la compréhension humaine ; ii) qui se fixe pour objectif d'éclairer aussi précisément que possible les processus selon lesquels les sujets humains confèrent du sens aux unités, aux structures et aux énoncés linguistiques. Nous nous proposons deux objectifs complémentaires. Nous voulons d'abord faire état des très sérieuses objections que soulèvent selon nous les thèses de la sémantique cognitive actuelle, du fait, essentiellement, de leur mentalisme, autrement dit de la réduction univoque des significations linguistiques qu'elles proposent à des représentations mentales préexistantes. Nous prendrons essentiellement pour référence de notre analyse la grande construction théorique, véritable « système sémantique » à quatre mains, élaborée dans une étonnante synergie par Lakoff et Johnson dans leurs ouvrages respectifs de 1987, ouvrages qui présentent, bien plus que leurs La cognition humaine saisie par le langage : de la sémantique cognitive au mé... Corela, HS-6 | 2007 La cognition humaine saisie par le langage : de la sémantique cognitive au mé... Corela, HS-6 | 2007 10 Ce mentalisme est, à l'époque de Women…, essentiellement innéiste, à la fois nativiste et expérientaliste selon les propres termes de Lakoff 12 (XV, 146 et chap. 17). La cognition humaine saisie par le langage : de la sémantique cognitive au mé...

Discovering the power of architecture when purposefully design to deal with human mind.
By studying the phenomenon of human brain and translating the tricks and techniques of magic and mentalism into architectural language, spaces are designed to cater human senses in a way that influence human mind.

The subject of this paper is Kripkensteinˈs critique of mentalistic explanation of linguistic normativity, as well as his intersubjective conception of normativity. The author
argues against dominant interpretation of Kripkensteinˈs view on meaning as social metaphysics of normativity, the theory which reduces language rules to community consensus.
It is pointed out that Kripkensteinˈs rejection of mentalistic thesis that meaning is some
kind of mental state in the head of a speaker results in anti-reductionistic character of intersubjective conception of normativity, which describes how we speak about difference
between correct and incorrect uses of language in everyday life, but does not say what that
difference is, or what it consists of. Hence, it is concluded that, according to Kripkenstein,
community is the only normative tribunal in matters of language, but itˈs not the supreme
judge because, rather than passing irrevocable judgments on correctness of individual
speech acts, community actually constitutes a framework that enables the normative disputes between its members.
Keywords: Kripkenstein, normativity of meaning, understanding, language rules, skeptical argument, skeptical solution, semantic mentalism, intersubjectivity, language community, form of life.