Mencius

In this chapter, I reflect on the implications of Mencius' conception of compassion for one of the most important problems that defines the Western philosophical tradition: the relationship between reason on the one hand and desire and emotion on the other, especially in the development of moral character. I articulate what philosophers working within the Western tradition could learn from the Mencius text, drawing from some contemporary scientific studies to support my suggestions that this text provides fruitful directions of thought. Western philosophers and many psychologists continue a tendency to construe reason, desire, and emotion in dichotomous and overgeneralized terms. I argue that we need to take a more particularized and discriminating approach to the phenomena covered by these terms. Finally, I discuss what I believe are some limitations in Mencius' approach and then show how the Analects and the Xunzi indicate ways the early Confucian tradition pointed beyond Mencius' limitations.

The character of the scholarly patronage community of Jixia in the Warring States (480–221 b.c.e.) polity of Qi has been hotly debated. Was it indeed an “academy,” as it has been retrospectively dubbed? What kind of activities did resident
scholars engage in? What teachings did they propound, what writings did they compose? Following the lead of research by Nathan Sivin and Andrew S. Meyer, the present article does not treat Jixia as an academy proper, but assumes that it was a patronage community sponsored by the Tian/Chen clan. Rather than indulge in more speculations about institutional arrangements and the activities of specific scholars, however, it is argued that intertextual relationships are more likely to shed light on the intellectual concerns of scholars at Jixia. To demonstrate the viability of such an approach, this article analyzes dialogues between King Xuan of Qi (319–301 b.c.e.) and Master Meng in the book Mengzi, demonstrating
that they can be divided into hostile and supportive ones, the latter propounding the principle of “sharing pleasures.” Dialogues included in other compilations that advocate the same principle are then shown to be almost invariably
associated with Jixia scholars. The notion of sharing pleasures, it is finally argued, was part of a wider political debate on princely wastefulness that was characteristic of Qi and is likewise reflected in such compilations as Guanzi,
Yanzi chunqiu, and Liu tao.

Just war theory is a prominent topic of debate today in international law, relations and humanitarian efforts, but almost no thought has been developed on the topic of a just peace. The "father of international law," Hugo Grotius, developed the theory of just war that has influenced the modern understanding use of the term in the modern United Nations and other multilateral organizations. He was, however, far from the first philosopher to contemplate the validity of a humanitarian invasion. St. Augustine is attributed with the founding of the theory in the Western world, and St. Thomas Aquinas with its codification. This essay argues that nearly one thousand years before these two Roman giants, Confucian philosopher Mencius developed an understanding of just war, though its differences from our current understanding should prevent us from referring to it as such. Instead, it should be regarded as a theory of just peace, and its tenets should be carefully considered in the context of both modern China and modern international relations as a whole.

This is the final author's draft version of a chapter published in: *Ethics in Early China*, C. Fraser, T. O’Leary, and D. Robins (eds.), Hong Kong Univ. Press, 2010. Citations should reference the actual chapter in the book. In this paper, I lay out the reasons for trying to understand Mencius by attributing a consequentialist moral theory to him. This is meant in part as an oblique criticism of readings on which he is construed as a “virtue ethicist.” However, the scope of my argument here will be limited to the positive argument in favor of reading Mencius as a consequentialist.

Durante el período de los Reinos Combatientes la reflexión sobre la guerra es de vital importancia para los pensadores chinos. En este trabajo analizaremos las posiciones de Mozi y Mencio al respecto comenzando, en primer lugar, con las diferencias filosóficas entre las propuestas de ambos, en especial en torno al rol de la utilidad o beneficio (li). Luego, con los argumentos que ambos exponen para oponerse a la guerra, en general en diálogos ante gobernantes de estados. Con esto intentaremos mostrar los vínculos entre teoría y estrategias persuasivas que aplicaban, y las similitudes y diferencias entre las posiciones de dos pensadores usualmente vistos como rivales. Palabras clave: MOZI, MENCIO, FILOSOFÍA CHINA, REINOS COMBATIENTES, GUERRA

歷來治《孟》者大多聚焦討論《孟子》〈知言養氣章〉中哲學概念之內涵，卻未曾著力疏通此章之文理。具體言之，此章開首討論「不動心」，結尾卻論孔子，兩段文字究竟有何關係？不少學者通過重新定義此章之篇幅範圍，強行將結尾一段從〈知言養氣章〉割裂出去，如此解讀方式實不理想。本文通過考察〈知言養氣章〉之修辭，指出此章通篇暗用《論語》〈吾十有五而志於學章〉立論，此即其一貫文脈。根據孟子的詮釋，孔子自四十歲起的精神境界，都與進退出處之抉擇相關。循此入手，並結合相關內證，本文指出〈知言養氣章〉章首「動心否乎」之問，只能解作「孟子去齊之志會否因獲得齊國卿相之位一事而動搖？」，而非趙岐所謂在登上卿相之位後才因畏行道之難而動心。本文同時發現，孟子不因卿相高位而動搖去齊之志的壯舉，已成他身後四百年間士人的共同文化記憶。在趙岐之前，每當士人提及不動心，即將之連系到不因權位而出仕，無一例外。可以說，趙注的流行中斷了戰國末年至東漢時期士人的一種文化記憶，也令此章文脈從此變得隱而不顯。
Scholars have tended to focus on the implications of such philosophical terms as “flood-like qi” 浩然之氣 and “unperturbed mind-heart” 不動心 in Mencius 2A:2, but have failed to identify the common thread of this rather long chapter. This article argues that Mencius 2A:2 frequently alludes to Analects 2.4, and that this allusion is precisely the common thread holding 2A:2 together. According to Mencius’s interpretation, Confucius’s achievements in different ages as stated in Analects 2.4 are all related to the political consideration of whether one ought to remain in a state and serve as its minister. In light of this, and with the support of other evidence from within the Mencius, it is argued that the question “would your mind-heart be perturbed?” at the beginning of the chapter can only mean “would your intention of leaving Qi 齊 be shaken by the fact that you had been appointed as its minister?” but not “would your intention of putting the Way into practice be shaken,” as suggested by Zhao Qi 趙岐 (?-210). Furthermore, it is shown that after the death of Mencius, his act of valor, namely leaving Qi despite having already been appointed as a Qi minister, had become a shared cultural memory of early Chinese intellectuals. Whenever mentioning “unperturbed mind-heart” in their works, early intellectuals consistently evoked Mencius’s unmoved determination to reject any inappropriate political appointment even though the position could bring them fame and material comfort. The rise of Zhao Qi’s misreading in his commentary to Mencius, however, has led to the loss of this cultural memory.

This paper brings a fresh, epistemic perspective to bear on prominent Confucian philosophers’ arguments for a hybrid Deweyan-Confucian democracy, or for an illiberal democracy with “Confucian characteristics”. Reconstructing principles for epistemic elitism and paternalism from the pre-Qin Confucian thought that inspires these advocates for Confucian democracy, it finds two major problems with their proposals. For those who abandon or modify this epistemic elitism and paternalism, the result is a philosophical syncretism that is either unconvincingly Confucian or unconvincingly Deweyan. For those who retain it more fully, the result is an illiberal democratic proposal that will probably lack legitimacy in increasingly pluralistic East Asian societies. In the end, there is a need for blended eastern and western  philosophical perspectives in a politically changing East Asia, but they would benefit from being less “Confucian”.

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This paper examines the Confucian concept of tian, conventionally translated into English as “Heaven.” The secondary literature on tian has primarily focused on the question of what tian is: e.g., whether tian is an anthropomorphic deity or a naturalistic force, or whether tian is transcendent or immanent. Instead, this paper locates tian with respect to the ethical life of human beings, and argues that the two conflicting concepts of “moral economy” and “contingency” are main characteristics of tian. This paper further investigates these characteristics in Kongzi’s and Mengzi’s ethical thought: how they conceptualized moral economy and contingency, and how their different conceptualizations shaped their respective ethical programs: Kongzi’s ethics of faith and Mengzi’s ethics of confidence.

《禮記•中庸》是儒家體系中一部重要著作，它一方面積極吸收和繼承了孔孟思想的精粹 ，另一方面也嘗試加強天道與人道之間的交流和溝通，為儒家思想的源遠流長做出了不可磨滅的貢獻。《中庸•第二十二章》中寫道：“唯天下之至誠，為能盡其性；能盡其性，則能盡人之性；能盡物之性，則可以贊天地之化育，可以贊天地之化育，則可以與天地參矣。”這段話中所提到的“盡其性”與孟子在《盡心上》所云的“盡其心”不僅在字面上非常相似，而且所涉及的內容和含義具有一定的相通之處。從這個意義上說，深入探討《孟子》的“盡心”與《中庸》的“盡性”之間的義理關係將有助於我們更深一層的把握和體會儒家所期許的修身之道。本文將綜合學術界歷來討論“盡性”與“盡心”的成果，試圖通過對各家觀點的分析和批評嘗試釐清“盡心”與“盡性”之間適當的義理關係。

Mengzi maintained that both benevolence (ren 仁) and rightness (yi 義) are naturally-given in human nature. This view has occupied a dominant place in Confucian intellectual history. In Mencius 6A, Mengzi's interlocutor, Gaozi, contests this view, arguing that rightness is determined by (doing what is fitting, in line with) external circumstances. I discuss here some passages from the excavated Guodian texts, which lend weight to Gaozi's view. The texts reveal nuanced considerations of relational proximity and its limits, setting up requirements for moral action in scenarios where relational ties do not play a motivational role. I set out yi's complexity in these discussions, highlighting its implications for (i) the nei-wai debate; (ii) the notion of yi as "rightness," or doing the right thing; and (iii) how we can understand the connection between virtue and right action in these early Confucian debates. This material from the excavated texts not only provides new perspectives on a longstanding investigation of human nature and morality, it also challenges prevailing views on Warring States Confucian intellectual history. In the well-known debate between Mengzi and Gaozi in Mencius 6A, Mengzi maintained that both ren and yi are naturally-given 1 in human nature. The figure 1 To say that ren and yi are naturally-given is not to say that they are fully-developed from the start. I use the phrase "naturally-given" throughout the paper to indicate where a particular capacity or resource (ren or yi) may be found, rather than its final polished state.

This essay offers an experimental interpretation for Mengzi’s孟子ren-yi仁義 discourses, reading them as strategic prescriptions akin to those presented in classical strategic manuals. However, rather than arguing that it is the correct interpretation of Mengzi, I use it to highlight the ambiguity of Mengzi’s discourses. This ambiguity, I argue, motivated Zhuangzi’s 莊子criticisms of moral language abuse and rationalizes some early narratives about Mengzi.

In this paper, I argue that in Mengzi 2A2 Mengzi proposes his method for cultivating righteousness (yi), by showing that upon the way of achieving yi do ultimately converge such topics as the unperturbed hearts, cultivating courage, Gaozi’s maxim, and the flood-like qi. For this aim, first, I argue that Mengzi’s short remark “必有事焉而勿正, 心勿忘, 勿助長” can be read as his maxim for achieving yi that structurally parallels with the previously cited Gaozi’s maxim. It tells us that neither our blind obedience to the words nor our impetuous boost of qi is helpful for achieving yi, but instead that we should concentrate on the heart’s moral sentiments and perform righteous actions. Second, I argue that Mengzi believes that qi is crucial in one’s proper self-cultivation. The centrality of moral sentiment in his teaching redirects our attention to qi’s positive aspects—exemplified by the flood-like qi—though qi’s impulsivity often makes it appear negative. If the four sprouts are to accompany the spontaneous movement of qi, it can be said that properly expressed qi signals the moral health of one’s heart. Moreover, I show that strong positive qi not only constitutes moral sentiment that serves as a fair standard for self-examination but also leads the will to perform moral actions without delay.

Many passages in early Confucian texts such as the Analects and Mengzi are focused on virtue, recommending qualities like humaneness (ren 仁), righteousness (yi 義), and trustworthiness (xin 信). Still others emphasize roles: what it means to be a good son, a good ruler, a good friend, a good teacher, or a good student. How are these teachings about virtues and roles related?

In this article, I investigate Confucian views on the father-­‐child relationship in the Lunyu, and uncover four difficulties with the position: 1) asymmetry between the responsibilities of the child and those of the father within the relationship; 2) there is a breakdown of the parallel between the ruler and the father drawn in the Lunyu, on the basis of the asymmetry mentioned in (1); 3) the position is open to a Zhuangist criticism of ritual on grounds that it alienates people and undermines relationships; and 4) it conflicts with intuitions concerning fatherly care that are not only held by contemporary thinkers, but were also held by many in early China. I investigate Kongzi's relationships with his son and daughter, as well as with Yan Hui, to uncover these difficulties. Finally, I consider Mengzi's reformulation of the basis of the father-­‐child relationship in mutual affection rather than ritual, and suggest that it can and was intended to solve the problems of the views found in the Lunyu on this topic.

Early Chinese texts make us witnesses to debates about the power, or lack thereof, that humans had over the course of events, the outcomes of their actions, and their own lives. In the midst of these discourses on the limits of the efficacy of human agency, the notion of ming 命 took a central position. In this article, I present a common pattern of thinking about the relationship between the person and the world in early China. I call it the reifying pattern because it consisted in thinking about ming as a hypostasized entity with object-like features. Although external and independent, ming was not endowed with human qualities such as the capacities for empathy, responsivity, and intersubjectivity. The reifica-tion of fate implied an understanding of ming as an external, amoral, and determining force that limited humans without accepting inter-communication with them, thereby causing feelings of alienation, powerlessness, and existential incompetence. I first show that the different meanings of ming hold a sense of prevailing external reality, and hence can be connected to the overarching meaning of fate. Then, I offer an account of the process of reification of fate in early China and its consequences, theoretical and practical, through cases study of received (Mengzi 孟子) and found (Tang Yu zhi dao 唐虞之道) texts. I end with some reflections on the implications of ming as a nonpersonal and nonsubjective type of actor for both early Chinese and twenty-first-century accounts of agency. Overview Early Chinese texts make us witnesses to (sometimes implicit) debates about the power, or lack thereof, that humans had over the course of

Mencius, referred to as second sage in Chinese philosophy history, grounds his theory about original goodness of human nature on psychological components by bringing in something new down ancient ages. Including the principles of virtuous action associated with Confucius to his doctrine, but by composing them along psychosocial development, he theorizes utterly out of the ordinary that makes all the difference to the school. In his argument stated a positive opinion, he explains the method of forming individuals' moral awareness by means of inseparable integrity of feelings and thoughts, saying human being are born innately good. According to Mencius, heart-mind correlation is the motivational complement of inner incentives. Knowledge and virtue, which are extensions of inborn goodness, comprehended intuitively; then affective motives respond to circumstance, what is learned transmits to cognitive process and eventually behavior emerges. Comparing during the years of Warring State period he lived, in western geography Aristotle, who is one of the pioneers of Greek philosophy, argues deductive and inductive methods in mental activity. On the other hand, Mencius uses analogical reasoning throughout his self-titled work. This essay is an attempt to assert that most postulates of developmental theories, which have been considered an integral part of modern psychology, begin with Mencius in early era. Secondly, this study also aims to discuss the main paradigm of Mencius across emotivist-rationalist opposition, which keeps emotion above thought as well as reason above emotion.

Confucian economic ethics is centred around the relationship between moral rightness and economic and other external benefits. It is a consensus that Confucianism gives priority to rightness over benefits. Scholars disagree on whether this is because Confucianism regards rightness as an intrinsic value independent of, even though not necessarily inconsistent with, benefits or because it sees rightness as the best instrument to produce benefits. The former takes Confucianism as a deontological theory, while the latter a consequentialist or even utilitarian one. In contrast, this chapter argues that it is a virtue ethical theory, concerned with a flourishing human life, consisting of both external and internal well-being. Benefits are indispensable for external well-being, while the virtue of rightness is essential for internal well-being. Although these two aspects, each of which has its own intrinsic value, are mutually instrumental, conflicts between the two may arise, and when they do, Confucianism puts rightness ahead of benefits, as it is what makes human life different from other forms of life.

This paper gives a reading of the philosophical position found in the Wu xing 五行 (Five Conducts) text excavated at Guodian and Mawangdui. The first part of the essay analyzes the distinction between goodness and de 德. The second part examines how the various forms of correct behavior are linked to the internal, pointing out the similarities and differences from Mengzi's approach. The paper aims to determine more precisely what the Mengzi and Wu xing have in common, while also making sense of the ways in which they diverge.

This article introduces and analyses the debate between Mencius and Xunzi on xing 性 (human nature). While Mencius claims that xing is good, Xunzi claims that xing is bad. A common way of interpreting these two different claims is to determine the scope of xing. It is generally agreed that, for Mencius, it is the heart/mind that falls within the scope of xing, for Xunzi, the sensory desires. This article also explores a different way of approaching Mencius's and Xunzi's different claims about xing. It is suggested that Mencius's and Xunzi's different views on xing can be understood in terms of their different views on the heart/mind (xin 心). While Mencius thinks that the heart/mind has a morally good natural tendency, Xunzi thinks that the heart/mind has a morally problematic tendency.

孟子見梁惠王的年歲看來只是一個小問題，但是錢穆在《先秦諸子繫年》中由其考證出發，提出孟子在齊威王時遊齊之說，還涉及了告子、匡章，宋鈃、莊周、惠施、白圭的年歲以及遊仕等諸多問題，可謂牽一髮而動全身。學界雖有反駁其說者，但是在孟子見梁惠王年歲的問題上論證不力。今專門論證此一問題，兼及告子、匡章，宋鈃、莊周、惠施、白圭的年歲、時代等問題。不難發現，孟子見梁惠王時只有五十餘歲，其年歲當小於宋鈃，甚至也晚於莊周。

The years of age of Mengzi 孟子 when he had the audience with King Hui of Liang 梁惠王 may seem trivial; however, after an attempt to verify the date in question in his seminal work Xian Qin zhuzi xinian 先秦諸子繫年 (A Chronology of the Pre-Qin Masters), historian Qian Mu 錢穆 (1895–1990) postulated that Mengzi visited the state of Qi during the reign of King Wei, and suggested a series of related hypotheses on the ages of Gaozi 告子 , Kuang Zhang 匡章 , Song Xing 宋鈃 , Zhuang Zhou 莊周 , Hui Shi 惠施 and Bai Gui 白圭 , and their respective years of travelling around and serving at the court of various warring states. Hence, such dating is not to be treated lightly. Although some scholars have refuted Qian’s propositions, they have not provided solid evidences with regards to how old Mengzi was when he first met the King of Liang. This paper tries to tackle this very question and suggests some alternatives to the dates related to other pre-Qin Masters. I conclude that Mengzi was in his fifties when he had the audience with King Hui of Liang, meaning Mengzi was probably younger than Song Xing, and perhaps even Zhuang Zhou.

Surveys and contextualizes recent New Zealand artists' cinema by genre including, Landscape, Psychodrama, Identity Politics, Visual Music, Installed & Expanded Cinemas, and Animation. Touches on aspects of Asian and Western philosophy that resonate with cinema, art, perception and consciousness. From Diary of a Viewer, Part Three
Includes updates and revisions covering some work produced after the initial publication of this article in Illusions Magazine.

See also: Before Artists' Cinema

In the continuity of our 2018 book Rousseau au Japon the present article provides the results of a radically new approach of Nakae Chômin ideas by focusing, the translations of Chômin but also the translations made with and by his disciples, published as books and articles in the reviews (Ôbei) Seiri sôdan and Ôbei seiten shûshi. These sources have been completely forgotten. Our new approach demonstrates, beyond Rousseau, the crucial role of French republicans (Jules Barni, Etienne Vacherot, Jules Simon, Alfred Fouillée, Emile Acollas, Alfred Naquet and Charles Renouvier), who read Rousseau and introduced Kant in France in order to create a new philosophical discourse on democracy and republicanism. Another key thinker in the formation of Chômin’s philosophy is Victor Cousin, who also deeply influenced a part of the French republicans. Following Cousin, Chômin created an eclectic philosophy of liberty, by combining Rousseau, Kant, Alexander Bain’s psychology and Mencius. Chômin tried to formulate his philosophy through all texts, writings and translations. He expressed his philosophy of liberty with the Confucian notions of the Mencius. Among them, rigi can be identified as the central concept of Chômin’s philosophy, and was as the same time a notion taken from the Mencius and a word of translation for “reason” and “justice”. Previous researches already pointed out the presence of the word rigi in Chômin’s thought, but we demonstrate here that this word was not only much more used than imagined before, but was also mainly linked with Rousseau and Kant. The reason why Chômin focused on Alexander Bain’s psychology and Mencius rigi can be explained as following : in order to overcome the opposition between materialism and spiritualism, body and spirit, Chômin tried to find in the human body the roots of moral freedom. Bain and Mencius were the main tools for such goal. Such strategy was very similar to Alfred Fouillée’s philosophy. Thus, we can say that Chômin not only expressed his ideas in his own writings but also through the translation.

Key words : Nakae Chômin, Emmanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Mencius, Liberty/Freedom

The aim of my paper is to analyze the debate between Mencius and Xunzi from the perspective of their views on the nature of the historical process. The Mencian approach embraces not only elaboration on the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven, resulting in a cyclical vision of history, but also strong idealization of the past. I will show that ren (benevolence), treated as a historical principle, could link two dimensions of his historical thinking: the moral and ontological. Xunzi rejected the possibility of the intervention of Heaven in history, however, his theory of rituals and belief in moral use of history made his philosophy of history much more conservative, embalming the idealization of the past. In short, I will look for the main common points and differences between these two major figures of Confucianism regarding their views on history, attempting to answer which beliefs could constitute a unique Confucian philosophy of history.

This article analyzes Mencius 7B.23, a concise passage that offers complex ethical dilemmas. It provides a close reading of the passage, along with relevant passages elsewhere in the text and, occasionally, in other texts. The narrow goal of the article is to present a coherent reading of the passage within the context of the Mencius as a whole. This reading suggests that while the passage touches upon a wide range of topics, including personal credibility and political responsibility, the overarching concern is on being a morally superior person, on the difficult dilemmas such people may face, and on how they would respond to them. More broadly, the article shows that while the philosophical practice of "weighing circumstances" (quan 權) allows moral agents in exceptional cases to break certain moral or ritual rules, Mencius seems unwilling to apply this discretion when morality as a whole, or the integrity of the person who embodies it (shi 士), are involved.

In a 1967 article, A. C. Graham made the claim that 情 qing should never be translated as "emotions" in rendering early Chinese texts into English. Over time, sophisticated translators and interpreters have taken this advice to heart, and qing has come to be interpreted as "the facts" or "what is genuine in one." In these English terms all sense of interrelationality is gone, leaving us with a wooden, objective stasis. But we also know, again partly through the work of Graham, that interrelationality was of fundamental importance in the early Chinese cosmology and that qing, by later carrying the meaning of "emotions," expressed that interrelationality. I take as my project in this article the recovery of an emotional adumbration in the qing of early Chinese texts, notably the Mencius, from which Graham begins his discussion. With an eye to explicating qing in the Mencius, and with a sensitivity to an implied notion of interrelationality in early texts, I survey early literature from the Shu Jing to late commentaries on the Yi Jing. I find that usages of qing and contexts in which qing is used inevitably illuminate it as key term in the evocation of interrelationality, shading it with emotional overtones. Emotions, of course, are inherently interrelational, and even more so in a Chinese world in which the internal and the external are in constant communication by way of a cosmic interchange of arousal and response among all things. That qing, as a term which later comes to explicitly mean "emotions," should have a centuries old convention of emotional connotation prior to its explicit definition should come as no surprise. The corroboration of this supposition entails a complex investigation and analysis, however, and it is a preliminary step in this investigation and analysis that I undertake here.

This paper examines the structural position of Mengzi’s heart of compassion (ceyin zhi xin 惻隱之心) within his theoretical goal of teaching moral self-cultivation. For this aim, I first investigate Myeong-seok Kim’s account that views ceyin zhi xin as a higher cognitive emotion with a concern-based construal. I argue that Kim’s conclusion, drawn from an inductive reasoning, is not sufficiently supported by the text of Mengzi, but is also tarnished by the possibility of constructing a non-cognitivist counter-theory of ceyin zhi xin. Instead, I suggest that David Hume’s causation-based approach to sentiment provides an alternative route to reach the theoretical core of Mengzi’s ceyin zhi xin. People’s uniform moral sentiment as the effect of mental causation implies that there is its natural cause universally engraved in the human heart. As Mengzi’s practical teaching of moral self-cultivation begins with recognizing this heart of compassion, his focus is placed not upon the characteristics of the expressed emotion, but upon the universal presence of its natural cause in the human heart which demonstrates our moral potential to care for others.

In this paper, I explore Mencius's moral epistemology, arguing that he thinks moral knowledge is ‘internally’ available to humans because it is acquired through normative dictates built into the human heart–mind (xin). Those dictates are capable of motivating and justifying an agent’s normative categorizations. I then interpret Mencius's discussion of courage and qi in 2A:2 as illuminating this idea of internal justification. The epistemology of courage is intimately related in 2A:2 to its practice. Finally, I indicate at the end in outline the ways in which Mencius and Gaozi are engaged in a dispute about moral epistemology that pits each of them against Xunzi and also against Zhuangzi.

The attitude toward li 利 is often identified as a key difference between the Mencius 孟子 and the Mozi 墨子. A common view is that for the Mencius, rightness (yi 義) and li are incompatible; but for the Mozi they are not necessarily so. In this paper I argue that the Mencius and the Mozi are in broad agreement on the issue of li, and their attitudes toward li are not as different as may seem at first glance. If we take a finer-grained understanding of li in two ways, namely the self-regarding li and the other-regarding li, then both the Mencius and the Mozi would criticize the former but encourage the latter. The term li in the Mencius has a range of meanings, and it is not clear whether the Mencius actually opposes all li-pursuing activities. Mencius would agree with Mozi that, at least in some cases, one is obligated to seek li for others. Furthermore, despite their criticism of self-regarding li, both Mencius and Mozi allow that in some cases it is morally permissible to act from the motive of self-regarding li, as long as this motive coexists with the motive of rightness. That is, self-regarding li and rightness are not always mutually exclusive, even for Mencius, who seems to be more critical of li.

Appeals to human nature in normative enquiry have fallen out of favor among contemporary philosophers. In this paper I examine reasons for believing that the notion of human nature has an indispensable role to play in ethics by looking at Alasdair MacIntyre’s views on human nature in light of two diverging conceptions of human nature found in the works of two ancient Chinese philosophers, Mencius and Xunzi. Examining their conflicting accounts, I contend, helps illuminate the development of MacIntyre’s position on human nature, and offers reasons for taking the notion of human nature seriously in moral enquiry.

The French Jesuit mission in Shanghai in the mid-nineteenth century created a unique musical workshop with the construction of a pipe organ with bamboo pipes in 1856-57. Destroyed in the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the 'Bamboo Organ of Tungkadoo' nonetheless had a kind of legendary status and remained an artifact of cultural memory into the 1990s. This article, relying on unpublished documents found in archives in France, reveals the full story of the instrument, and the many other bamboo organs constructed during the era of the Taiping Rebellion and the Second Opium War, and identifies the one surviving example, now in Paris. It also explores the symbolic importance of these cross-cultural instruments and offers a new perspective on aesthetic and musical exchanges in an age of imperialism.

The Scottish sentimentalist Francis Hutcheson and the Chinese Confucianist Mencius give benevolence (ren) a key place in their respectivemoral theories, as the first and foundational virtue. Leaving aside differences in style and method, my purpose in this essay is to underline this similarity by focusing on four common features: first,
benevolence springs from compassion, an innate and universal feeling shared by all human beings; second, its objects are not only human beings but also animals; third, it is sensitive to proximity; and finally, it has to be constantly cultivated in order to become a character trait. I will conclude with some brief remarks as to how this  understanding of benevolence as rooted in feeling rather than reason, and in personal rather than impersonal
relationships, helps to illuminate part of the discussion in moral philosophy today.

The current meaning of the term " justice " is basically twofold: first, it refers to the administration of the law, taking into account the human rights of all citizens. In the second place, it refers to the interpersonal relations of reciprocal fairness and equity.