Meaning in Life

Objective: In the United States, 28.6 million people used illicit drugs or misused prescription drugs in the last 30 days. Thus, identifying factors linked with lower likelihood of future drug misuse is an important target for research and practice. Sense of purpose in life has been linked with better behavioral and physical health outcomes. Furthermore, a higher sense of purpose may reduce the likelihood of drug misuse because it has been linked with several protective factors including enhanced ability to handle stress, higher pain tolerance, and lower impulsivity. However, the association between sense of purpose and drug misuse has been understudied. Thus, we tested whether people with a higher sense of purpose at baseline had a lower likelihood of future drug misuse 9 to 10 years later. Methods: This study included 3535 middle-aged adults from the Midlife in the United States Study who were not misusing drugs at base-line. Using multiple logistic regression models, we assessed whether baseline purpose in life was associated with risk of misusing drugs 9 to 10 years later. Results: Among respondents not misusing drugs at baseline, people in the highest quartile of purpose (versus lowest quartile) had a substantially lower likelihood of future drug misuse in a model adjusting for demographic variables (odds ratio = 0.50, 95% confidence interval = 0.31-0.83). Associations remained evident after additionally adjusting for psychological distress, baseline health, and health behaviors. Conclusions: A growing knowledge base suggests that a sense of purpose can be increased. Additional research is needed to evaluate sense of purpose as a novel target in the prevention and reduction of drug misuse.

Since December 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused serious mental health challenges and consequently the Turkish population has been adversely affected by the virus. The present study examined how meaning in life related to loneliness and the degree to which religious coping strategies mediated these relations. Participants were a sample of 872 adults (242 males and 360 females) drawn from general public in Turkey. Data were collected using Meaning in Life Questionnaire, UCLA Loneliness Scale, and the Religious Coping Measure. Meaning in life was associated with more positive religious coping and less negative religious coping and loneliness. Positive religious coping was associated with less loneliness, while negative religious coping was associated with more loneliness. Religious coping strategies mediated the impact of meaning in life on loneliness. These findings suggest that greater meaning in life may link with lesser loneliness due to, in part, an increased level of positi...

As in every part of life, concept of meaning in life has an important place during adolescence as a determinant of well-being. In this research concepts of meaning in life of high school students have been investigated with the perception of self-determination, which is a motivation theory. The aim of the study was to test structural equation model in which the relationship between self-determination and meaning in life is mediated by basic psychological need satisfaction. The sample of the study consisted of 348 High School Student in İstanbul. In order to gather data, Basic Psychological Need Satisfaction Scale (BPNS), Self-Determination Scale (SDS) and the Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ) were used. The data were analysed by using SPSS 20 and LISREL 8.8. The results revealed that satisfaction of basic psychological needs fully
mediated the relationship self-determination between and meaning in life in high school students. However, results also showed significant negative relationship between selfdetermination and search of meaning in life. The results and limitations of the study were discussed and recommendations have been provided to the researchers.

2 I argue that the two ought claims Pereboom defends-the ought of axiological recommendation and the demand of hypothetical form-do not qualify as demands. I argue that the ought of axiological recommendation merely recommends a course of action to an agent, but does not demand anything from the agent. I argue the demand of hypothetical form's plausibility qua demand is achieved by illicitly shifting from contexts in which it is plausible that one agent is demanding something from another agent to contexts in which the agents lack alternate possibilities. I then argue that Pereboom's attempt to accommodate moral wrongness without obligations fails. I develop a manipulation argument against Pereboom's attempt to accommodate moral wrongness. I then argue that Pereboom faces a dilemma. If my manipulation argument is successful, then Pereboom's attempt to accommodate moral wrongness fails. If, however, my manipulation argument fails, then so does Pereboom's four-case manipulation argument against compatibilism-in which case a major motivation for free will skepticism would disappear, undercutting the need for obligation skepticism itself.

Given experimental evidence of enhancement of well-being as a result of brief exposure to nature, we sought to study the effect of ongoing nature involvement on well-being. Undergraduate participants (N = 84) were randomly assigned to either a nature intervention condition or a control condition. Results indicated that, at the end of two-weeks, net-positive affect and feelings of elevation were significantly higher, and meaning was marginally higher, in the nature intervention condition relative to the control condition. Self-concordant motivation was also higher for the nature condition, suggesting that the nature intervention was perceived as intrinsically pleasant. Levels of trait connectedness to nature did not moderate the impact of the nature intervention on well-being, suggesting that nature involvement is beneficial among a variety of individuals. High levels of nature involvement were voluntarily sustained throughout the two-weeks of the study. For the most part, participants engaged in simple activities involving nature close to home, indicating that drastic life changes need not be made in order to improve positive functioning and feelings. This research provides important empirical groundwork for future research concerning daily nature involvement as an effective positive psychology intervention.
https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/eco.2014.0023

The aim of the present study was to explore the relation between Death Attitudes and Meaning in Life. Besides this
exploratory approach, it was also hypothesized that ‘Search for Meaning’ would be significantly greater than ‘Presence of
Meaning’ in youth population. For this purpose, 60 males and 60 female students were conveniently approached in
University of Karachi to participate in the study. Two questionnaires were administered; Death Attitudes Profile – Revised
(subscales; fear of death, death avoidance, neutral acceptance, approach acceptance and escape acceptance) and
Meaning in Life (subscales; search for meaning and presence of meaning). Results revealed gender difference in two
death attitudes. Hypothesis regarding search for meaning being greater than presence of meaning was proved.
Exploratory analysis of death attitudes and meaning in life showed complex relation.

The positive psychology and experimental existential psychology movements have greatly advanced our understanding of the variables that augment and detract from the personal experience of meaning in life. In this chapter, we describe differences in these two perspectives. In our view, experimental existential psychologists have primarily examined variables that contribute to a sense of meaninglessness, whereas positive psychologists often place more emphasis on variables that augment one’s belief that his or her life is meaningful. For each of these perspectives, we further describe variables that relate to the experience of meaninglessness and meaningfulness, respectively. Namely, we argue that a lack of personal freedom, social isolation, and self-alienation are three fundamental threats to meaning that, if experienced, evoke a sense of meaninglessness, whereas personal goals and a grand sense of purpose help augment the feeling that life is meaningful. While we do not suggest that these are the only variables that influence perceptions of meaning, based on current findings in the experimental existential and positive psychology literature, we argue that each of these variables represent fundamental contributors to perceptions of meaning (lessness) in life. Overall, we believe psychologists from both existential and positive psychology perspectives have made great contributions to help us understand the causes and consequences of the experience of meaning in life. This brief chapter represents an initial step to help differentiate these two complimentary perspectives in hopes of generating research ideas for scholars across disciplines.

Absurdist accounts of life’s meaning posit that life is absurd because our pretensions regarding its meaning conflict with the actual or perceived reality of the situation. Relationary accounts posit that contingent things gain their meaning only from their relationship to other meaningful things. I take a detailed look at the two types of account, and, proceeding under the assumption that they are correct, combine them to see what the implications of such a combination might be. I conclude that another way of looking at the absurdity of life is to see it as a conflict between our dual beliefs that there exist intrinsically meaningful contingent things, and that contingent things may only gain their meaning extrinsically through their relationships to other meaningful things. In this way, I provide another lens through which feelings of life’s absurdity may be interpreted and analysed: as the conflict between the simultaneous beliefs in both intrinsically and relationally meaningful contingent things. Looking through this lens gives us an entirely different framework for analysing life’s absurdity than that which Nagel described in 1971, providing opportunity for more potential avenues of analysis and discussion.

What kind of life do people want? In psychology, a good life has typically been conceptualized in terms of either hedonic or eudaimonic well-being. We propose that psychological richness is another neglected aspect of what people consider a good life.

Numerous scholars have explored the notion that our relationship with nature is essential to our well-being, and some have suggested that we have an evolved inclination to affiliate with nature. A substantial body of research supports these hypotheses, and demonstrates both the restorative and additive capacity of affiliating with nature. This paper posits that experiences with the natural environment play a fundamentally important role in addressing the six existential anxieties of identity, happiness, isolation, meaning in life, freedom, and death—a perspective that we call Eco-Existential Positive Psychology. Moreover, we propose that affiliating with nature affords us the opportunity to be fully flourishing human beings. This paper provides supporting evidence for Eco-Existential Positive Psychology via an interdisciplinary literature review.
https://doi.org/10.1080/08873267.2014.920335

I present and try to defend the vital force theory of the meaning of life with particular focus on the transcendentalist dimension of the theory, on which an immanentist interpretation ultimately depends. I argue that the appeal to God as the ultimate guarantor of meaning follows from the recognition of the pessimism and nihilism a wholly naturalistic account of meaning engenders. Since the individual is not an absolute value and must ultimately surrender the life she so cherishes against the background of epistemic ignorance of the purpose of her existence, strong commitment to a naturalistic account of meaning must lead to the conclusion that human life is ultimately meaningless. Adopting an analytical and expository method, I explore ways that the vital force theory of meaning combats the idea that since the individual is the measure of meaningfulness and since she is not an absolute value, her life is ultimately meaningless, in the context of her location in a seemingly purposeless universe. I conclude that the pessimism that accompanies the naturalistic framework also compromises the transcendentalist framework of vitalism.

Key words: Vital force, African philosophy, meaning in life, meaning of life, absolute value

Counseling psychologists often work with clients to increase their well-being as well as to decrease their distress. One important aspect of well-being, highlighted particularly in humanistic theories of the counseling process, is perceived meaning in life. However, poor measurement has hampered research on meaning in life. In 3 studies, evidence is provided for the internal consistency, temporal stability, factor structure, and validity of the Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ), a new 10-item measure of the presence of, and the search for, meaning in life. A multitrait-multimethod matrix demonstrates the convergent and discriminant validity of the MLQ subscales across time and informants, in comparison with 2 other meaning scales. The MLQ offers several improvements over current meaning in life measures, including no item overlap with distress measures, a stable factor structure, better discriminant validity, a briefer format, and the ability to measure the search for meaning.

Some lives are more meaningful than others. Some lives are more important than others. What is the relationship between meaning in life and importance? Because both can be described as relating to significance, the two are often conflated. But these are rather different concepts and the meaningful and the important can easily come apart. They do, however, interact in important ways. When importance also meets the conditions for meaningfulness, it amplifies it, and importance on a large scale is a key, and perhaps the only, source of superlative meaningfulness. When contrasted with the quest for meaning, the desire for importance can seem shallow and egocentric. But the desire to make an important contribution reflects a legitimate existential concern. And, in their best form, both the desire for importance, and that for meaningfulness, similarly combine outward-looking and self-regarding aspects.

The present text deals with the question of the meaning of life in the existentialist theory of the Norwegian philosopher Peter Wessel Zapffe . In his book On the Tragic (1941), Zapffe sketched a theory of the human condition where the meaning of life plays a decisive role together with the human need for justice. This paper aims to reconstruct the central elements of Zapffe's analysis and to discuss them critically by focusing on his claim that human beings need a fundamental meaning of life as a whole that transcends meaning in life. I pay particular attention to Zapffe's claim that life is meaningless, since the meaning of life is fundamentally lacking. I conclude that Zapffe's analysis is problematic for reasons both internal and external to his theory.

What could Wittgenstein's work contribute to the rapidly growing literature on life's meaning? This book not only examines Wittgenstein's scattered remarks about value and 'sense of life' but also argues that his philosophy and 'way of seeing' has far reaching implications for the ways theorists approach an ancient question: 'How shall one live?'.

What kind of life do people want? In psychology, a good life has typically been conceptualized in terms of either hedonic or eudaimonic well-being. We propose that psychological richness is another neglected aspect of what people consider a good life. In study 1 (9-nation cross-cultural study), we asked participants whether they ideally wanted a happy, a meaningful, or a psychologically rich life. Roughly 7 to 17% of participants chose the psychologically rich life. In study 2, we asked 1611 Americans and 680 Koreans what they regret most in their lives; then, if they could undo or reverse the regretful event, whether their lives would have been happier, more meaningful, or psychologically richer as a result. Roughly 28% of Americans and 35% of Koreans reported their lives would have been psychologically richer. Together, this work provides a foundation for the study of psychological richness as another dimension of a good life. Keywords Happiness. Meaning in life. Psychological richness What kind of life do people want? Many psychologists conceptualize well-being in terms of hedonic (e.g., Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999) or eudaimonic well-being (e.g., Ryff, 1989). A happy life, which maps onto hedonic well-being, is best characterized by pleasantness, comfort, safety, and stability. People who say they have a happy life tend to have Handling editor: Phoebe Ellsworth Our studies were not preregistered.

This book is a collection of essays on the philosophy of life’s meaning in contemporary society. Topics range from antinatalism, meaning of life, the trolley problem, to painless civilization. I am now writing a comprehensive philosophy book on those topics, but it will take several years to complete; hence, I decided to make a handy book to provide readers with an outline of the philosophical approaches to the meaning of life that I have in mind.
Chapter One discusses the definition, history, and category of antinatalism. Antinatalism is the thought that all human beings or all sentient beings should not be born. Although I am not an antinatalist, I believe that antinatalism poses an important question about procreation and the meaning of our lives. This is why I presented an overview of antinatalistic thoughts in the past and the present and also performed an analytical examination of their arguments.
In Chapter Two, I take up Philosopher Thaddeus Metz’s argument on meaning in life, especially his fundamentality theory, and claim that “the heart of meaning in life,” which is the concept I propose in this chapter, cannot be compared with anything whatsoever.
Chapter Three deals with the concept of “birth affirmation,” which means that I can say “yes” to my having been born. I believe that birth affirmation is one of the most promising ideas that can contribute to contemporary philosophical discussions on meaning in life, and I call this approach “an affirmation-based approach to meaning in life.” The concept of birth affirmation has two dimensions: the psychological dimension and the philosophical dimension. I would like to show in this chapter that it is difficult to clarify what it actually means to say “yes” to my having been born.
Chapter Four discusses the relationship between the dropping of the atomic bombs and the trolley problem. I argue that the dropping of atomic bombs was a typical example of the events that contained the logic of the trolley problem in both their decision-making processes and justifications. I further argue that the trolley problem has its own unique problems, which I call “the problem of the trolley problem.” This problem has been overlooked in academic discussions of the trolley problem. I also refer to a religious aspect of this problem.
In Chapter Five, I talk about the “philosophy of life” as an academic discipline. We have the philosophy of language, the philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of history, but why don’t we have the philosophy of life in the field of philosophy? Of course, we have Lebensphilosophie, but it does not cover philosophical discourses in ancient worlds, nor current analytical approaches to the concepts of life and death. A new research field is required to advance contemporary philosophy.
In Chapter Six, I illustrate an outline of my “painless civilization” theory, a criticism of contemporary civilization that deprives us of a joy of life in exchange for eliminating pain and suffering. I also discuss the concept of “fundamental sense of security,” which is considered indispensable for us to be able to live a life without regret.

Nihilism poses grave problems for those who seek directives to lead their lives. In this article, the three most important ways to deal with nihilism are inquired, with an emphasis on their credibility. Both nihilism from a metaphysical perspective and the emphasis on pleasure from nihilistic considerations are given attention. The acceptance of nihilism can have far-reaching consequences, which are evaluated at various points. Nietzsche’s approach must also be considered. He accepts what he calls a sort of nihilism, but as a means to ‘new’ values. This alternative to nihilism is examined no less critically than the other two stances.

Methods: Data were collected through a questionnaire-based survey with a cross-sectional design. Based on a convenience sampling 237 employees of different companies that belong to different sectors answered the questionnaire. To analyze the data descriptive statistics, Pearson coefficient, regression analyses were applied. Results: Analysis showed that there is a positive relationship between meaningful work and meaning in life. Multiple regression analysis indicated that sub-dimensions of meaningful work: unity with others, inspiration and balancing tensions (being/doing, self/others) have positive contributions on experiencing meaning in life.

In response to Bernard Williams’ view that we would inevitably become bored with immortal life, John Martin Fischer has argued that we could continue to enjoy repeatable pleasures such as fine wine, beautiful music, and spiritual experiences. In more recent work on near-death experiences, Fischer has also explored the non-religious meaning of spiritual experiences in more depth. While joining this deeper exploration of spiritual experience, I also join Williams’ critics who question his view that character and desire are needed to explain the desirability of life, and expand on the growing suspicion that Williams’ way of valuing life is itself actually a cause of boredom with life. With an eye to spiritual experience, I indicate how we can distance ourselves even further from this kind of view, also exploring how a common attitude that life is good but death is not bad emerges from spiritual experience, as expressed in numerous religious and secular spiritual traditions. This lends support to the conclusion that radically extended life is desirable even if not actively desired.

The scientific worldview is often claimed to reveal a universe chillingly indifferent to human suffering. But it’s unclear what it means to describe the universe as indifferent, or what a non-indifferent universe would be like. I suggest that the relevant contrast isn’t simply that between God and His absence, nor is the complaint about indifference focused on the lack of a kind of cosmic concern. At its heart is the idea of a mismatch between world and value. Although the causal forces governing our world are ‘blind’, they nevertheless do partly align with value. Still, our world is so arranged that senseless suffering is depressingly common, and the rosy non-indifferent counterfactual won’t contain such evil. I argue, however, that it is a mistake to long for such an alternative: it must either involve an upside-down moral order, or would be a world from which we, and those who senselessly suffer, will be absent.

According to Susan Wolf's hybrid view about meaning in life, a life is meaningful in virtue of subjective attraction to objectively valuable pursuits. Recently, several philosophers have presented counterexamples to the subjective element in Wolf's view. We argue that these examples are not clearly successful and present a modified version which is even stronger in the face of them. Finally, we offer some positive reasons for accepting a subjective condition on a meaningful life.

Research has established nature connectedness as a reliable correlate of well-being. In the current research, we examined whether meaning in life mediated the association between nature connectedness and well-being. In Study 1, 311 undergraduates completed multiple measures of nature connectedness, multiple measures of meaning in life, and multiple measures of well-being. Mediational analyses revealed that meaning in life fully mediated the association between nature connectedness and well-being. In Study 2, we examined whether mediation of the association between nature connectedness and well-being by meaning in life could be demonstrated alongside a previously documented mediation of the association between religiousness and well-being by meaning in life. Undergraduates (N = 227) completed measures of nature connectedness, religiousness, meaning in life, and well-being. Mediational analyses revealed that meaning in life fully mediated both the association between nature connectedness and well-being and the association between religiousness and well-being.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-012-9403-x

We investigated whether regret predicted the motivation to act heroically. In a series of studies, we examined the relationship between regret, search for meaning in life, and heroism motivation. First, Study 1 (a and b) investigated the association between regret and search for meaning in life, considering regret as a whole, action regret, and inaction regret. As expected, regret correlated positively with search for meaning in life. In two additional studies (Study 2 and 3), we examined whether regret predicted heroism motivation and whether this effect was mediated through search for meaning in life. Study 2 confirmed this hypothesis for individual differences in regret, using a correlational design. Study 3 confirmed the hypothesis for temporary experiences of regret, using an experimental design. In addition, in Study 3 we found that heroism motivation was stronger for people with high self-enhancement needs than for those with lower self-enhancement needs. We discuss the relationship between regret and heroism in light of these results and explore their implications.

Connecting with nature has been described by some as an important psychological need. Indeed, research shows that a strong connection to nature predicts flourishing across a wide range of well-being indices. Engaging with natural beauty may be one route by which people satisfy this presumed need to connect with nature. Based on this reasoning, the purpose of the current research was to investigate whether nature connectedness mediates the relationship between engagement with natural beauty (i.e., the tendency to notice and be moved by beauty in nature) and well-being in three different cultures. Four cross-sectional surveys involving Canadian, Japanese, and Russian undergraduate students were conducted (N = 1,390). Engagement with natural beauty and nature connectedness were positively associated with a variety of well-being measures. Moreover, we found relatively consistent support for the indirect effect of nature connectedness in explaining the relationship between engagement wit...

Many believe that because we’re so small, we must be utterly insignificant on the cosmic scale. But whether this is so depends on what it takes to be important. On one view, what matters for importance is the difference to value that something makes. On this view, what determines our cosmic importance isn’t our size, but what else of value is out there. But a rival view also seems plausible: that importance requires sufficient causal impact on the relevant scale; since we have no such impact on the grand scale, that would entail our cosmic insignificance. I argue that despite appearances, causal impact is neither necessary nor sufficient for importance. All that matters is impact on value. Since parts can have non-causal impact on the value of the wholes that contain them, this means that we might have great impact on the grandest scale without ever leaving our little planet.

In contemporary secular societies, many people would acknowledge a concern for something called "spirituality," even if they are not "religious" in any conventional sense. There is a recognition that human beings have what might be called "spiritual needs," in addition to their "material needs," and that fulfilling these needs is important for living well as human beings. 1 This is perhaps most dramatically illustrated in the common phenomenon of someone having a "midlife crisis," i.e., the person who may be successful in material terms but nevertheless feels a sense of existential malaise: there is an experience here of a lack of a deeper sense of meaning in life. But this experience and the questions it involves can arise for anyone provided he or she has reached a certain level of reflectiveness and self-awareness. This collection of essays will examine the nature of spirituality and how it can contribute to "the good life" for human beings. 2 The editor's own general working definition of spirituality is that it is a practical life-orientation that is shaped by what is taken to be a self-transcending source of meaning, which involves strong normative demands, including demands of the sacred or the reverence-worthy. To unpack this definition some here (it is filled out more in Chapter 4): spirituality involves spiritual practicese.g.on retreats or pilgrimages, imitating saints, habituation in virtue, etc.that aim to direct and transform one's life as a whole toward increasing spiritual fulfillment, i.e., toward a more meaningful life. The meaning that makes for a meaningful life here is "strong evaluative meaning," i.e., meaning or value with which we ought 1 See J. Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension: Religion, Philosophy and Human Value (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3. 2 In speaking of how spirituality can contribute to the good life, I acknowledge that there may be forms of spirituality that do not so contribute and may even be harmful. I take up this concern in my contribution.

The purpose of the present study is to determine the relationship of meaning in life and subjective well-being among Filipino college students in both private and public institutions. It was hypothesized in this study that meaning in life and life satisfaction has a positive relationship. Three measures, namely, the Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ), Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) and the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) were administered to 969 college students in different schools in the Philippines. This study employed a descriptive-predictive design to measure the degree of correlation between variables. The Pearson Correlation was used to assess the relationship of meaning in life and subjective well-being. Results of the study show that meaning in life and subjective well-being has a positive relationship. A better understanding of the relationship between meaning in life and subjective well-being has implications relative to developing and/or achieving a greater sense of happiness and satisfaction in living. This could be developed by tapping emotional resources to diminish negative affective conditions and optimizing meaningful life situations.

At its heart, spirituality fosters a trusting attitude toward life. For those who believe in a soul separate from the body, spirituality can support an unshakeable faith in absolute eternal salvation. For those who believe in spirit beings or special psychic powers that help us along in life, more trust can be placed in the beneficial unfolding of one's worldly fortune. Yet even for those without belief in God or disembodied spirits or other paranormal phenomena, there is a kind of spirituality that can inspire a subtler feeling of trust in life.

I expound and assess two theories of meaning in life informed by the indigenous sub-Saharan African philosophical tradition. According to one view, a life is more meaningful, the more it promotes community with other human persons. According to the other view, a life is more meaningful, the more it promotes vitality in oneself and others. I argue that, at least upon some refinement, both of these African conceptions of meaning merit global consideration from philosophers, but that the vitality approach is more promising than the community one for capturing a wider array of intuitions about what confers meaning on a life. I further argue, however, that there are objections that apply with comparable force to both theories; neither one does a good job of entailing that and explaining why certain types of reason and progress can make a life more meaningful. Although these objections are characteristic of a “modern” Western outlook, I maintain that they are difficult for contemporary African philosophers to ignore, and consider some ways they might respond to the objections.

The relation between the meaning in life and depression, hopelessness, and suicide risk in a sample of Spanish Borderline Personality Disorder patients is analyzed. The hypothesis suggested that meaning in life is a significant nega- tive predictor of these variables. Participants were 80 Borderline Personality Disorder patients (75 women, 5 men) ranged 16-60 years old, M = 32.21, SD = 8.85, from a public mental health service. Spanish adaptations of the Pur- pose-In-LifeTest,theBeckDepressionInventory-II,theBeckHopelessness Scale, and the Plutchick’s Suicide Risk Scale were used. Analysis included descriptive, correlations, and simple linear regression. Results showed that meaning in life was negatively related to depression, hopelessness, and suicide risk. It is necessary to introduce the evaluation of the meaning in life in the assessment of patients with Borderline Personality Disorder and to include in the psychotherapeutic intervention elements to enhance their perception and experience of meaning in life.

Having a higher purpose in life has been linked to favorable health outcomes. However, little research has examined whether the purpose−health association persists across different levels of SES. This study assesses whether the association between higher purpose in life and lower mortality is similar across the levels of SES.

Potential antecedents to having a sense of purpose in life remain under-studied. As researchers begin contemplating purpose as a promising target of public health intervention, it is critical to identify its antecedents. Using prospective data from the Nurses’ Health Study II (2009–2016; N ranged from 3,905 to 4,189), this study evaluated a wide range of potential antecedents of purpose, including psychosocial well-being, psychological distress, employment characteristics, lifestyle, and physical health factors. In separate regression models, we regressed purpose in life on each candidate antecedent. In each model, we adjusted for the prior value of purpose, prior values of all exposure variables, and various other covariates simultaneously. Bonferroni correction was used to correct for multiple testing. The results suggested that positive affect and the number of close relatives were each associated with higher purpose (e.g., β = 0.14, 95% CI: 0.11, 0.17 for positive affect). Several psychological distress indicators were inversely associated with purpose, including depressive

This study aimed to investigate the extent to which two widely used psychometric instruments (i.e., MLQ-Presence and SoMe-Meaningfulness subscales) measure the same meaning in life latent trait. Participants were 3020 subjects (63.9% women), ranging in age from 18 to 91 years old (M = 33.92; SD = 15.01), sampled from 22 Brazilian states. Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) supported the unidimensionality of MLQ-Presence scale, but suggested that two distinct latent variables explained the items of SoMe-Meaningfulness scale. This result was further supported by a bi-factor exploratory structural equation modeling, which showed that items 4 and 5 of the SoMe-Meaningfulness scale were primarily influenced by a second latent trait rather than by MIL. Further analyses showed that this second latent trait was more closely related with self-transcendence issues (generativity and spirituality, specifically) instead of MIL.

I examine Wolf's hybrid theory of meaning in life and her recommendation of an important additional consideration for persons wishing to live meaningfully. Her advice is that we consider whether and to what extent our caring for something would create additional unique and transformative value. I call this fecundity. Wolf is correct to think that the prospect of fecundity matters to agents who wish to life meaningfully, though it is not a requirement on meaning like affinity and worth. Still the advice raises questions about her analysis. I pose the objectivists' query about the necessity of the subjective "affinity" condition, but also argue that key elements of the affinity condition are better captured by an emotional state theory of happiness.

The meaningful life is not only an issue in current philosophy but also in psychiatry and psy-chotherapy. For a long time, however, it has played a central role in the Existential Analysis and Logotherapy developed by psychiatrist Viktor E. Frankl. Frankl's independent theory of meaning in life is largely ignored in the current philosophical debate, however. The aim of this article is to end this state and to discuss Frankl within today's philosophical debate.

On the one hand, the goal is to understand and evaluate Frankl's theory of meaning in the light of current philosophical debate: What kind of theory does he represent? How should it be classified? What about its inner coherence, the plausibility of its assumptions and the quality of justifications? On the other hand, the aim is to examine to what extent Frankl's approach can advance the philosophical discussion: Are there theoretical elements that are given too little attention in philosophy? Can he give important impulses to philosophical theory of mean-ing?

The investigation follows essential elements of Frankl's theory of meaning from the funda-mental formal and meta-ethical aspects to the specification of meaning and the individual ap-proach to it. First, the central importance of meaning for human life is discussed, followed by questions of the meta-ethical classification, namely the subjectivist or objectivist orientation and the role of supernaturalism. The focus of consideration then turns to essential elements of the nature of meaning, namely self-transcendence and the value relation, as well as the three value categories. The results are summarised in the final chapter.

It turns out that the theoretical exchange can be fruitful in both directions, but Frankl's thinking also has some obstacles in store. His approach, with its objectivist character and the central role of self-transcendence and relation to values, is compatible with today's discussion of meaning, while the lack of justifications is a serious methodological weakness in which orien-tation to modern philosophical standards would be desirable. Repeatedly, the impression aris-es that his theory of meaning is decisively influenced by his practical, therapeutic interest. Some of his theoretical elements have the potential to enrich the philosophical theory of meaning; that is, his focus on the situativity and individuality of meaning as well as the ideas of givenness of meaning and of responsibility for its realisation.


German abstract:
Das sinnvolle Leben ist nicht nur in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie wieder verstärkt ein Thema, sondern auch in Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie. Bereits seit langer Zeit jedoch spielt es eine zentrale Rolle in der Existenzanalyse und Logotherapie, die der Psychiater Viktor E. Frankl entwickelt hat. Frankls eigenständige Sinntheorie wird in der gegenwärtigen philosophischen Sinndebatte allerdings weitestgehend ignoriert. Das Ziel dieses Artikels ist es, diesen Zustand zu beenden und die heutige philosophische Sinndebatte mit Frankl ins Gespräch zu bringen. Einerseits geht es darum, Frankls Sinntheorie im Lichte der philosophischen Sinndebatte zu verstehen und zu bewerten: Was für eine Art von Sinntheorie vertritt er? Wie ist sie einzuordnen? Wie steht es um ihre innere Kohärenz, die Plausibilität seiner sinntheoretischen Überzeugungen und die Qualität ihrer Begründung? Andererseits soll geprüft werden, inwiefern Frankls Ansatz die gegenwärtige philosophische Sinndiskussion voranbringen kann: Gibt es bei ihm theoretische Elemente, die in der Philosophie zu wenig Beachtung finden? Kann er der philosophischen Sinntheorie wichtige Impulse geben?
Die Analyse folgt in ihrer Struktur wesentlichen Elemente der Frankl’schen Sinntheorie, von den grundlegenden formalen und metaethischen Aspekten hin zu inhaltlichen Bestimmungen des Sinns und dem individuellen Umgang mit ihm: Zunächst wird die zentrale Bedeutung des Sinns für das menschliche Leben thematisiert, dann Fragen nach der metaethischen Einordnung, nämlich nach der subjektivistischen oder objektivistischen Ausrichtung sowie der Rolle des Supernaturalismus. Dann stehen mit der Selbsttranszendenz und dem Wertebezug sowie den drei Wertkategorien wesentliche Elemente der Sinnkonstituierung im Fokus der Betrachtung. Die Ergebnisse werden im Schlusskapitel zusammengefasst.
Es zeigt sich, dass der theoretische Austausch in beide Richtungen fruchtbar sein kann, Frankls Denken allerdings auch einige Hindernisse bereithält. Sein Ansatz entpuppt sich mit ihrem objektivistischen Charakter und der zentralen Rolle von Selbsttranszendenz und Wertbezug als an die heutige Sinndiskussion gut anschlussfähig, seine oftmals fehlenden Begründungen hingegen als gravierender methodischer Makel, bei dem eine Orientierung an modernen philosophischen Standards wünschenswert wäre. Wiederholt entsteht der Eindruck, dass seine Sinntheorie maßgeblich durch sein praktisches, therapeutisches Interesse geprägt ist. Einigen seiner Theoreme wird das Potential zugesprochen, die philosophische Sinntheorie bereichern zu können: Das sind die Situativität und Individualität des Sinns sowie die Gegebenheit der Sinnmöglichkeiten und die Verantwortung für ihre Verwirklichung.

Keynote 1
Thaddeus Metz (University of Johannesburg) "Is a Moderate Supernaturalism about Meaning in Life Possible?"
Keynote 2
Masahiro Morioka (Waseda University) "A Solipsistic and Affirmative Approach to Meaning in Life"
Keynote 3
David Benatar (University of Cape Town) "An Unexpected Route to Anti-Natalism"

What is it for a life to be meaningful? In this paper, I defend what I call Consequentialism about Meaning in Life (or CML for short), the view that (1) one’s life is meaningful at time t just in case one’s surviving at t would be good in some way, and (2) one’s life was meaningful considered as a whole just in case the world was (or will be) made better in some way for one’s having existed.