Intelligence Analysis

The project is a follow-up to Libel and Shpiro's (2015): "the perceptions of the Israeli intelligence community towards Palestinian terrorism, how these perceptions have changed over time, and how perceptions have influenced intelligence assessments and structural changes in the intelligence community" .

Network forensics is the study ofanalyzing network activity in order to discover the source of security policy violations or information assurance breaches. Capturing network activity for forensic analysis is simple in theory, but relatively trivial in practice. Not all the information captured or recorded will be useful for analysis. Identifying key features that reveal information deemed worthy for further

Time characterizes every aspect of our life and its management when storing and querying data is very important. In this paper we propose a new temporal query language, called T4SQL, supporting multiple temporal dimensions of data. Besides the well-known valid and transaction times, it encompasses two additional temporal dimensions, namely, availability and event times. The availability time records when information is known and treated as true by the information system; the event times record the occurrence times of both the event that starts the valid time and the event that ends it. T4SQL is capable to deal with different temporal semantics (atemporal aka non-sequenced, current, sequenced, next) with respect to every temporal dimension. Moreover, T4SQL provides a novel temporal grouping clause and an orthogonal management of temporal properties when defining the selection condition(s) and the schema for the output relation.

The aim of the proposed paper is to review the development of Israeli economic intelligence collection and analysis. The paper's main focus will be on Israel's leading analysis unit, the Analysis Department of the Military Intelligence Directorate (which is responsible for National Intelligence Estimates). The paper will put three main arguments. Firstly, the emphasis during the Cold War on military and political intelligence (so on armed forces and political leaderships) led to the marginalization of economic intelligence. Secondly, the focus of collection efforts on secret intelligence resulted in the neglect of many open-source materials, which are both crucial for economic intelligence and draw attention to the economic dimensions of social and political developments. Thirdly, the importance given to secret sources (especially Sigint) made political and military analysis predominant, thereby marginalizing economic intelligence and restricting analysts' development. The paper relies on information that has recently become publicly available in official histories, formally commissioned academic studies, media exposes, autobiographies and official biographies. The paper will conclude with a discussion of lessons that can be learned from the Israeli experience for contemporary economic intelligence collection and analysis.

Subscales of the Empowerment Scale (Rogers, E.S., Chamberlin, J., Ellison, M.L., Crean, T., 1997. A consumerconstructed scale to measure empowerment among users of mental health services. Psychiatr. Serv. 48, 1042-1047 were examined to see whether they fit a model of consumer empowerment that distinguishes self-and community orientations. In addition, the relationship of these two superordinate factors to several psychosocial factors was examined. Thirty-five participants in a partial hospitalization program were administered the Empowerment Scale and measures of quality of life, social support, self-esteem, psychiatric symptoms, needs and resources, global functioning, and verbal intelligence. Analysis of the subscales of the Empowerment Scale yielded two factors consistent with self-and community orientations to empowerment. Correlational analyses revealed that the two superordinate factors were associated with different sets of psychosocial variables. A self-orientation to empowerment was significantly associated with quality of life, social support, self-esteem, and psychiatric symptoms. Community orientation was correlated with self-esteem, resources, verbal intelligence, and ethnicity. The implications of these findings for a model of consumer empowerment are discussed.

Human security issue remains an empathetic approach towards comprehending the security environment in Sahel region as there is strong connection between the environment and human survival. Though, it remains indisputable that every region of the global world has one issue or the other bedevilling it at a particular point in time. The Sahel region is not an exception as it is faced with diverse environmental problems, impacting heavily on her survival and global security. The study therefore examines the various environmental problems and insecurity confronting Sahel region, and effects of the decadence on the region and global security. Various concepts are clarified for thorough comprehension of the study while the study adopts the use of primary and secondary sources for data gathering with adequate reliability index. The study also portrays the various causative-factors of environmental problems confronting the Sahel region which include: human activities such as: over-farming, over-grazing, climate change, overpopulation of marginal lands, natural soil erosion, among others, resulting into serious desertification, and thus making shelter construction activities difficult respectively. The study, however, recommends the need for crafting and effective policy and as well full implementation of such, embellished with adequate intelligence, critical analysis and expertise for the states: Niger, Mali, and Chad among others to retain their landmass. In the same vein, the modest technique to achieve this is dependent on focused and collaborative efforts of global system towards ensuring a more secured, peaceful and prosperous Sahel region and the world at large.

Nel corso dell’elaborazione di un prodotto intelligence, ed in particolare durante l’analisi, l’analista giunge a definire delle ipotesi alternative ovvero delle possibili spiegazioni o conclusioni di un problema o di un fenomeno oggetto di studio che vanno testate attraverso la raccolta e la presentazione di prove concrete. Quando lavora su temi complessi, l’analista deve, quindi, scegliere tra diverse ipotesi alternative. Quale, tra le tante possibili, è la spiegazione giusta ? Quale, tra le tante possibili conseguenze, è quella più probabile ?

Intelligence analysis is a decision-making process rife with ambiguous, conflicting, irrelevant, important, and excessive information. The U.S. Intelligence Community is primed for psychology to lend its voice to the "analytic transformation" movement aimed at improving the quality of intelligence analysis. Traditional judgment and decision making research serves as a starting point, though recent developments in decision science advance additional relevant perspectives that are critical to improving intelligence analysis. Naturalistic decision making offers insights into the challenging information world of intelligence analysis and expert judgment. Research on group decision making shows that group processes are often dependent on the distribution of information within the group, while information foraging theory suggests that intelligence analysts may be viewed as "informavores" who use adaptive strategies to form key judgments efficiently. Psychologists should capitalize on these advances in research and theory to engage the intelligence community on its own grounds and take the lead on intelligence analytic reform. A potential research agenda and recommendations to optimize intelligence community effectiveness are offered.

The appropriate proximity of analysts and policymakers is contested.  Analysts must be close enough to understand the needs of the policymaker to deliver an appropriate and tailored intelligence product.  However, the analyst must be removed enough that they are not convinced to conform their analysis to support policy.

Abstract:
As technological advances accelerated changes in the security paradigm, the rise and unpredictable
alterations of hybrid warfare strategies and rise of terrorism gained significant terrain on the global scene,
often proving to be difficult to identify and neuter in a timely matter.
Moreover, as the European space saw an increase in threats’ number and severity, members signalled the
need for an EU security mechanism that answer to NATO blindspots.
The present paper argues that enhancing the activity of specialized EU intelligence-sharing bodies would
strengthen regional security, ensure the defense of non-Nato EU states, and complement NATO mandate.
Key words: intelligence-sharing, security blindspots, EU-NATO Complementarity

http://www.codrm.eu/conferences/2019/Carte%20CODRM%202019.pdf

Perhaps unsurprisingly, last year’s 75th anniversary of the D-Day landings saw a bevy of new books published on the subject. One of these is David Abrutat’s Vanguard: The True Stories of the Reconnaissance and Intelligence Missions Behind D-Day. An imposing tome, Abrutat’s 400-page history attempts a daunting task: to tell the comprehensive story of how reconnaissance and intelligence supported the planning and execution of Operation Overlord.

Public safety and security agencies face a range of current and emerging threats. These range from conflicts, strategic crime, terrorism, disease, and natural hazards, as well as the confluence of any or all of these occurring at a given point in time. A number of intelligence disciplines and agencies are needed to address these threats and various phases of operations (i.e., pre-, trans-, and post-event). Intelligence fusion or the production of intelligence to anticipate and understand these complex threats is essential. This paper describes the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) model developed in Los Angeles. It includes an overview of adaptive red teaming, the Transaction Analysis Model, Transaction Analysis Cycle, and Intelligence Preparation for Operations (IPO) as ways to scan the horizon for indicators, monitor evolving threat potentials (i.e., alternative hypotheses), and forecast risk related to novel and emerging threats. Warning intelligence, strategic foresight, operational net assessment, and the coproduction of intelligence for interdisciplinary response are also discussed.

In order to win in the information domain, the Department of Defense requires a new capability-an information fires team, engaged to combat disinformation. Working at the operational level, such a team will include military members skilled in global geopolitics, predictive analyses, metacognitive tools and theory, open-source information collection, and internal and external communication and messaging.

Intelligence analysis, like any other field of human endeavour, relies on and is shaped by discourse. However, the extent to which discourse affects the process of intelligence analysis has seldom been tackled in research on this issue. The present article contends that critical discourse analysis would be a vital tool for intelligence analysis in two respects: firstly, in desciphering the cultural and ideological mechanisms at work in the discourses that analysts receive from the field, and, secondly, in the production of intelligence reports themselves. The article then focuses on the errors that might arise in the production of these reports and identifies two main categories to which they pertain: those related to the analysts' cognitive limitations and those pertaining to the discursive level per se. The aim of the article is to identify the means by which critical discourse analysis could be used to alleviate the effects these errors may have on the intelligence analysis process and suggests several coping mechanisms and techniques for analysts in this field.

A new trend that will change the dynamics of the intelligence industry? In the Knowledge Age, traditional intelligence organisations have been disenfranchised from holding the monopoly over their core intelligence function: forewarning. In fact, the intelligence "space" has expanded with stakeholders and role-players like NGOs, transnational organisations and companies, private knowledge broker firms, as well as interest and pressure groups representing communities, concepts and ideologies… This "democratisation" of intelligence will have a profound impact on the way intelligence is conducted. Dalene Duvenage (2010) need2share W hen one looks at the landscape of intelligence analysis the last few years, it seems as though the lone analyst in her cubicle is gradually replaced by teams of analysts to provide either operational or strategic analysis support to intelligence functions. The trend is definitely more evident in the US and Europe where intelligence problems have forced disparate agencies to collaborate, than here in Africa where most organisations agencies have not yet matured to that extent. Team analysis is more the exception than the rule and many agencies still rely on the expert advice of the individual analyst. This is especially evident in law enforcement intelligence and in other national security agencies with minimal analytical resources. Since 2008, analysts in the US had the privilege of collaborative opportunities and tools like A-space and Intellipedia. The rest of the world is sadly trailing far behind. We are all well aware of the cognitive and bias challenges faced by these lone analysts, in addition to the overwhelming deluge of information. Collaborating with other analysts might lighten some these burdens, but the team effort can also fail if the associated complex dynamics and inherent challenges are not managed effectively. The main obstacle to collaborative intelligence remains tight production schedules and the prevailing secret organisational culture. The following few pages take a snapshot of what intelligence organisations are doing to exploit the collective "wisdom of the crowds". 1 First we glance over what these terms might mean in an intelligence context, before we look at different examples of the two main components of collaboration in intelligence namely collaborative collection or sourcing and collaborative analysis. Collective intelligence has developed in a distinctive discipline with proponents and critics in the last few years with numerous applications in natural sciences, psychology, economy, digital media, software development etc. Our focus here will be a very shallow but hopefully engaging perspective on developments and possible applications in the intelligence analysis realm. The graphic on the next page depicts the fluidity of collaboration modes within intelligence analysis. I have used some creative license with Dave Snowden's Cynefin model and a previous model of mine to create this continuum. Of course, this framework is not absolute and only attempts to provide a provisional framework. There is limited collaboration in the knowable domain. Those of you familiar with the puzzle and mysteries analogy, would understand that in this space, the analyst would seek for missing puzzle pieces to complete his understanding of an intelligence problem that many of us are familiar with: election results of a stabile country with few role players, an organised crime syndicate involved in human smuggling, a patent analysis of a competitor or an analysis of a new weap-

Con questo articolo mi propongo di far conoscere al lettore generico, così come al professionista del settore, un ulteriore strumento di analisi che può essere utilizzato per quantificare una nostra valutazione della minaccia, il risultato di un’analisi del rischio, trasformando un concetto labile ed aleatorio in qualcosa di universalmente conosciuto (come un valore numerico o di immediata lettura e comprensione come nel caso di un grafico).

Come far percepire al Decisore l’importanza, il peso delle nostre affermazioni? Come rappresentare in maniera chiara il fatto che sia ‘verosimile’ che possa accadere uno specifico evento in risposta ad una nostra precedente azione?

Attraverso l’esame storico-metodologico di alcuni documenti statunitensi declassificati verificheremo come l’analisi bayesana può essere di aiuto nell’analisi delle informazioni  eliminando, basandosi proprio su criteri logico-matematici, l’indeterminatezza dell’analisi tradizionale causata dalla dinamicità degli eventi e dalla disponibilità di insufficienti ed incomplete informazioni.

https://www.alphainstitute.it/2019/11/11/il-teorema-di-bayes-e-lanalisi-intelligence/

Team approach to intelligence analysis has been touted as one of the panaceas of intelligence analysis. This paper therefore examines the impact of team approach to intelligence simulation exercise conducted at Brunel University, London in 2014. It concludes by noting that as much as the team approach is desirous, it is much more important to lay emphasis on team dynamics and cognitive biases which can have negative impacts on intelligence analysis exercise.

Според Юрий Курносов и Павел Конотопов видовете анализ се характеризират с голямо разнообразие и включват такива видове като: анализ на показателите за ефективност, контент-анализ, графичен, дискриминативен, дисперсионен, експертен, клъстърен, концептуален, корелационен, лингвистичен, логико-лингвистичен, логически, причинно-следствен, ресурсен, ретроспективен, семантичен, сравнителен, статистически, структурен, теоретико-вероятностен, факторен анализ и др. Авторите отбелязват, че независимо от тяхното многообразие, при отделните видове анализ се използва сходен методологически апарат, като различията помежду им често се изразяват само в терминологията (Курносов, Конотопов 2004: 28-29).

Към техниките на оформяне на крайния аналитичен продукт може да бъде причислено безкрайно множество от начини за оформяне на аналитичния материал като документ (според предназначението му) и като изложение (според структурирането на текста). При това в специализираните източници по методология на разузнавателния/ стратегическия анализ няма единен формат на този продукт.
Крайният аналитичен продукт е синтетичен израз на възприетия конкретен модел на анализ и този резултат трябва и може да отговори на няколко задължителни критерия: краткост, яснота, целенасоченост и степенуване на вероятностите. Първото изискване за краткост произтича от това, че по правило потребителят на разузнавателна информация обикновено е на относително високо ръководно равнище, ангажиран с широк кръг проблеми и разполага с малко време. Второто изискване за яснота предполага достъпен език и подходящо представяне на аналитичния продукт. Целенасочеността означава третиране на проблема по същество и без отклонения към други теми, а степенуването на вероятностите – ранжиране на изводите и препоръките с оглед невъзможността да бъде постигната абсолютна категоричност (Търкаланов 2003: 78–79).
Основните видове аналитични продукти са базисните проучвания, разузнавателните оценки, текущата информация и сигналната информация. Съществуват също така и по-особени аналитични продукти като психологически профили, контент-анализи, технологически анализи и др. (Търкаланов 2003: 79–80). Аналитичните продукти могат да бъдат създавани ad hoc (по конкретен повод), по график (периодично), по инициатива на анализатора или на потребителя (Krizan 1999: 41). Аналитичният продукт трябва да представи въз основа на наличната информация придобитото знание.

The phenomenon of will has been studied from both ontological and epistemological perspectives for centuries by experts in disciplines including philosophy, psychoanalytic psychology, sociology, geopolitics and military theory. Notwithstanding this effort, the nature of will and the role it plays in conflict remains a topic that is elusive to define and difficult to analyze. The motivation behind this thesis begins with a deep regard for the lives lost in conflicts that range from the earliest recorded battles such as the Battle of Thermopylae, to the most recent global struggles such as the War on Terror. The purpose of this research is to establish a coherent approach toward the analysis of will in a conflict system and a subsequent greater understanding of the effect of associated intelligence operations. Founded indirectly on established theory from various disciplines, this thesis primarily assumes a traditional approach that stands on prior knowledge, history, expert opinion, as well as inductive and abductive reasoning. The findings of this research are generally supportive of the proposed “Homeostatic Cycle of Will-Power”, and conclude that it is a viable starting point for future analysis of the phenomenon of will in conflict and effective estimation of that will as it relates to intelligence operations.

Concepts and ideas within this document, the CISC Integrated Threat Assessment Methodology, are gathered from a wide variety of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, academic publications and open source research, both domestic and international as well as CISC Central and Provincial Bureau best practices. These techniques and ideas are intended as a resource for the broader intelligence community as well as individuals involved in the integrated threat assessment process.

Counterintelligence (CI) analysts serve a wide variety of customers across a spectrum from national-level policymakers to tactical commanders. That variety, however, is at the core of confusion, even among CI analysts themselves, surrounding the nature and purpose of CI analysis. This article proposes a typology of CI analysis to define the discipline more clearly, differentiating it by the customers it serves, the targets it pursues, and the nature of the resulting analysis.

Разузнавателният анализ преобразува информацията относно средата за сигурност, вкл. потенциалната или реална несигурност в нея. Обектът и предметът са дадени в разузнавателния анализ не непосредствено, а чрез информацията. Информация съществува само тогава когато носи за онзи, който я получава, някакъв смисъл (Герджиков 2010: 169–170). Целта на разузнавателния анализ е придобиването на ново знание, т. е. разкриването на смисъла на придобитата информация.

Могат да бъдат обособени различни видове информация, но в сферата на сигурността и особено в контраразузнаването от най-съществено значение е т. нар. разузнавателна информация. Разузнавателната информация е целенасочено придобита информация за подпомагане на вземането на определено решение.

Since 9/11 American intelligence has evolved in a changing atmosphere of modern tactics and techniques of information collection. This atmosphere, coupled with massive leaps in technological advancement such as social media, mobile communications, processing analytics, large-form solid-state data storage and novel computational hardware and software equipment, has thrust the Intelligence Community into a strange new world of multi-dimensional intelligence.  With the implementation of new technologies and the expansion of those technologies to public access whereas they were once reserved specifically for governments or major conglomerations, intelligence collection methods have increased far beyond than the traditional human intelligence capability. In addition, the incorporation of science and technology into a loosely termed ‘Technical Intelligence’ (TechInt) has become a major contributor to both data and strategy.  While science and technology and human capability both remain valuable facets of the same overlapping intelligence construct, there is a growing trend of diametrically opposed camps setting one method over the other. This article explains how in terms of field application and intelligence information processing/analysis, both HumInt and TechInt are maximized by a mutual cooperation that at present does not exist.

Υπάρχουν πολλά παραδείγματα όπου η λανθασμένη ανάλυση των πληροφοριών έχει οδηγήσει σε σημαντικές αποτυχίες εκτίμησης της πραγματικής κατάστασης και των προθέσεων του αντιπάλου, με μεγάλο κόστος για την πλευρά που έκανε τη λανθασμένη εκτίμηση. Βασικός παράγοντας που οδηγεί σε εσφαλμένες αναλύσεις είναι οι γνωστικές προκαταλήψεις (Cognitive Biases), σε βαθμό που να θεωρούνται ως οι κύριες αιτίες αποτυχίας στον χώρο των υπηρεσιών πληροφοριών (αλλά και σε κάθε υπηρεσία ή φορέα που δραστηριοποιείται στην ανάλυση πληροφοριών). Στην παρούσα εργασία καταγράφονται και αναλύονται οι αρνητικές συνέπειες που έχουν οι γνωστικές προκαταλήψεις στην ανάλυση πληροφοριών και στη λήψη αποφάσεων.

Timely and accurate intelligence is not always possible to glean from complex conflict areas. Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) is the newest “INT” to the intelligence discipline and it adds a robust resource to the existing, traditional “INT” toolkits. The real-time, firsthand accounts of the ground situation that social media provides constitute an effective indications and warning (I&W) provider for dynamic ground situations where traditional intelligence collection methods are challenged. The research in this area is still in its infancy, however, studying the 2015 actions in the Syrian Arab Republic by the Russian Federation military offers an opportunity to study SOCMINT’s capability to provide I&W and compare its content with that of conventional news outlet reports. This study is quasi-experimental, employing qualitative methods using non-random samplings of Twitter posts and news reports from Al Jazeera (English) and Washington Post outlets. The research finds that SOCMINT has positive potential for providing I&W in these situations and that, in aggregate, reliability is on par with traditional news outlets. The success of SOCMINT as an intelligence collection field requires systematic analysis processes that exploit the best aspects of automated and manual analysis procedures.

Metoda scenariilor presupune analiza prospectivă și modelarea probabilistică a implicațiilor posibile ale unor ale unor evenimente actuale și/sau anterioare asupra viitorului. Selectarea, conturarea și proiectarea de scenarii asupra viitorului – bazate pe elemente cunoscute și validate din trecut sau prezent – constituie, de fapt, procese și mijloace prin care se încearcă minimizarea gradului de incertitudine ce planează asupra unor evenimente posibile și/sau probabile din viitor. În cadrul acestui studiu, am încercat să arăt de ce metoda (sau tehnica analizei) scenariilor contribuie semnificativ la identificarea și structurarea unor posibile repere de interes ale viitorului, în scopul acumulării sau fundamentării cunoașterii necesare luării deciziilor și limitării pe cât posibil a neprevăzutului.
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Beyond doubt the humanity has entered an age of data dominance. As the need for safety and predictability grows, it becomes increasingly difficult to balance security and individual civil liberties. Therefore, the balance between security and these liberties is not constant and perfect, given that the expansion of security challenges tends to be inversely proportional with the broadening of individual freedoms in cyberspace. Information and knowledge is much greater today than it ever was. Under these conditions, maintaining a proper balance between cyber security and users rights might be challenging and difficult to achieve. Hence in this paper I underscore the need for extended transparency and cooperation in cyber early warning in order to increase the quality of cyberspace governance through public private policies focused on open and transparent intelligence collection.

The Eastern Roman, or Byzantine, Empire endured almost a thousand years longer than its Western Roman counterpart. Central to the longevity of the Byzantine Empire was its state intelligence gathering capabilities; but what were those capabilities and how were they organized? Answering these questions will require discussion of the challenges conducting Byzantine studies using secondary sources, literature review of English-language intelligence sources and qualitative analysis to summarize the structure and function of the Byzan-tine state intelligence apparatus. The Empire endured as long as it did due to a decentralized intelligence apparatus that could never-theless be undermined by corruption and treason.

The operations and overall endeavors of the Intelligence Community (IC) are supervised by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).  Within 17 agencies that compose the IC, five main intelligence collection disciplines are currently recognized: Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT), and Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT).  Each intelligence discipline supports the IC’s mission to produce finished intelligence products that assist senior leadership in making decisions about potential domestic and international threats.  It is important to note that information does not have to be classified in nature to be valuable to the IC.
As an illustration, OSINT is intelligence obtained legally and ethically from public sources such as: regulated print and online publications, magazines, government reports, official records and online user-generated content.  Once retrieved, this data is reviewed and processed by trained analysts and then converted into intelligence reports.  An important subset of OSINT is Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT).  SOCMINT expressly focuses on data collected from social media networking sites and other internet based applications.  It provides OSINT a copious and diverse range of data in comparison to traditional intelligence gathering resources, as well as the ability to make plausible and timely data connections.
Social media is the continuously evolving collection of internet based applications, mobile devices and online networks by which individuals create, discover, and share news, content and information through assorted media (blogs, videos, message boards, podcasts, and social networking sites).  The impressive progress of social media technology, and rapid growth of end-user activity, has formed massive data sets of detailed information and actionable intelligence.  These data sets contain real-time, relevant data for intelligence collection and security purposes.  With the use of SOCMINT, analysts are able to review and compile large volumes of web content obtained from a myriad of social networking sites in real-time in order to advise senior leadership and policymakers of impending domestic and international threats.  Though potentially less reliable, SOCMINT is a resource multiplier, complements traditional intelligence collection methods, and is available at low cost. 
In view of the aforementioned it is essential to (a) examine the value SOCMINT brings to OSINT, (b) review how social media data is currently collected and utilized within the IC, (c) aid in identifying parameters and guidelines for the use of SOCMINT, and (d) to evaluate how procured data sets can be leveraged for quality intelligence reporting.  The research herein explores these and additional topics in order to illuminate the need for a greater commitment with in the IC towards the development and utilization of SOCMINT as a sixth and separate intelligence discipline for everyday intelligence gathering.

Evoluția mediului internațional de securitate obligă serviciile de informații să se adapteze de așa manieră încât să poată răspunde coerent, eficient și în timp util amenințărilor. Schimbările nu trebuie să vizeze doar modul în care acționează structurile de intelligence, ci și modul în care operează analiștii de intelligence. Hărțile mentale sunt instrumentele potrivite, menite să facă lumină în chestiuni complicate, să găsească soluții creative pentru probleme cu un grad ridicat de complexitate. Scopul acestui articol este acela de a evidenția avantajele dezvoltării gândirii euristice în procesul de analiză a informațiilor și de a expune motivele pentru care analiștii de intelligence ar trebui să recurgă frecvent la utilizarea acestei tehnici.

Cu toate că schemele euristice pot să pară, la o primă vedere, drept o metodă cu prea puțină relevanță în domeniul intelligence-ului, acest articol își propune să demonstreze exact contrariul.

Recently—after the release of the 9/11 Commission and WMD Commission Reports--a substantial amount of money and attention has been devoted to the identification and development of structured analytic techniques for capturing, presenting, and evaluating data more effectively; deriving patterns from the data; understanding what those patterns mean; and communicating them to others. But less attention has been focused on the utility of structured methods, their fit with the reigning analytic culture, and when they should be used, or not used, by analysts. This article addresses these issues using medical practices to illustrate how the same kinds of dynamics can play out in the field of intelligence analysis.