Hong Kong History and Politics

Two Systems, Two Countries is an unabashedly heterodox addition to a growing body of critical work on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) suppression of local identity and political freedoms in Hong Kong. What Carrico’s contribution uniquely provides is a penetrating analysis of the various schools of thought that make up the diverse landscape of Hong Kong nationalism.

This paper adapts Salamon, Sokolowski and Anheier's (2000) social origins theory to argue that the nonprofit regime in Hong Kong can be characterized as statist-corporatist. This statist-corporatist regime displays the hybrid character of both a statist and a corporatist regime: its statist character can be seen in the high degree of autonomy of the state, its tendency to limit freedom of association, and the low commitment to social provision. Its corporatist character is evident in the high level of participation by designated nonprofit organizations in selected areas of social provision under state funding. I shall review how the development of this nonprofit regime was historically shaped by four factors, namely, the interest of the colonial state in maintaining domination, the economic and public financial policy, the historical formation of the welfare system, and political regime change. The findings illustrate the distinct historical forces and the path of development in an Asian state that might affect nonprofit development.

Neoliberal economists, notably Milton Friedman and Friedrich A. Hayek, frequently lauded Hong Kong as a model of a free market society, where individuals could pursue their economic ambitions untrammeled by government restrictions or directives. In September 1978, Hayek’s Mont Pèlerin Society of likeminded economists and businessmen even met in Hong Kong to honour their founder’s eightieth birthday. One journalist covering this gathering rather hyperbolically described the territory as “the most libertarian major civilized community in the world today.” For decades, Hong Kong was the much admired poster child for neoliberals, who viewed its lack of democratic institutions as the epitome of a system that maximized profits while minimizing political pressures for social welfare provisions. Yet this arrangement was the product of very specific circumstances, the result of effective cooperation among the British colonial authorities, business interests within Hong Kong, and not least, if at first tacitly, the Beijing government. It also rested on the capacity of the system to function at a level that permitted the delivery of tangible if modest prosperity and the promise of additional future incremental improvements to the majority of the population. Postwar Hong Kong was never a worker’s paradise, but it offered its largely immigrant labour force stability, a certain level of security, and hope of a better tomorrow. The fundamentals of that implicit bargain have now dissolved, leaving Hong Kong polarized and bitter, with many of its once famously pragmatic residents harboring sullen resentment toward the status quo. Winning hearts and minds and attracting instilling enthusiastic loyalty are tasks that seem beyond the capabilities of Hong Kong’s current rulers, be they homegrown or from over the border. Present-day Hong Kong seems trapped in a blind alley. One is left wondering whether its state foreshadows the ultimate outcome of the free-market, anti-regulatory paradigm of globalization that around the world for several decades became a virtual economic mantra.

This set of four articles, focusing on cases in Hong Kong, offer rich materials for studying the evolution of ritual practices in Chinese religion, within a local social context. Scholarship on Daoism and Chinese religion has identified a number of broad categories of religious specialist and organization: the non-monastic “householder priests” 活居道士 typically of the Zhengyi 正一 order, and other, “vernacular” ritual masters; the monastic Daoist monks of the Quanzhen 全真 order; lay spirit-writing groups often called “phoenix halls” 鸞堂; salvationist movements and redemptive societies, and so on. Each of these represents a specific type of religious lineage and organization, and of relationship between religious professionals and lay clients and practitioners. But these categorizations are merely convenient abstractions: as these four articles show, the boundaries between them are blurred, negotiated, and evolving. Over time, a single group may evolve from one type to another, or one type of group may replace another as the dominant provider of a specific set of local rituals. The content and significance of rituals also evolves within a shifting ecology of religious providers, community organizations, socio-political contexts and spacial transformations.

1. 李祖喬 (2009)。〈從維多利亞公園看香港的殖民空間政治 〉馬傑偉篇《中國城市研究探索》。香港：香港中文大學亞太研究所。
LI, Cho Kiu (2009). “Colonial Spatial Politics in Hong Kong: A Study of Victoria Park”, Eric MA, ed. Exploring China Urban Studies. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009.

2. 李祖喬 (2014)：〈從維多利亞公園看香港的殖民空間政治 〉《感／觀日常：跨文化研究讀本》。香港：中文大學文化研究學部+進一步。
LI, Cho Kiu (2014). “Colonial Spatial Politics in Hong Kong: A Study of Victoria Park”. Feeling/Viewing Ordinary: An Intercultural Studies Reader. Hong Kong: CUHK Cultural Studies Division and Stepforward.

https://www.routledge.com/Building-Colonial-Hong-Kong-Speculative-Development-and-Segregation-in/Chu/p/book/9781138344655

Planning, History and Environment Series, Routledge (2022)
ISBN 9781138344655

In the 1880s, Hong Kong was a booming colonial entrepôt, with many European, especially British, residents living in palatial mansions in the Mid-Levels and at the Peak. But it was also a ruthless migrant city where Chinese workers shared bedspaces in the crowded tenements of Taipingshan. Despite persistent inequality, Hong Kong never ceased to attract different classes of sojourners and immigrants, who strived to advance their social standing by accumulating wealth, especially through land and property speculation.

In this engaging and extensively illustrated book, Cecilia L. Chu retells the ‘Hong Kong story’ by tracing the emergence of its ‘speculative landscape’ from the late nineteenth to the early decades of the twentieth century. Through a number of pivotal case studies, she highlights the contradictory logic of colonial urban development: the encouragement of native investment that supported a laissez-faire housing market, versus the imperative to segregate the populations in a hierarchical, colonial spatial order. Crucially, she shows that the production of Hong Kong’s urban landscapes was not a top-down process, but one that evolved through ongoing negotiations between different constituencies with vested interests in property. Further, her study reveals that the built environment was key to generating and attaining individual and collective aspirations in a racially divided, highly unequal, but nevertheless upwardly mobile, modernizing colonial city.

After 1960, the year in which the 81 so-called Communist Parties (including Mao's) demonstrated their unanimity on the programme of Krushevite opportunism, a de facto break occurred between Peking and Moscow. We have analysed various documents in which China outlines its own national variant of Stalinism, but unlike the other "national socialisms" of Arab, Cuban or Yugoslav stamp, Chinese "socialism" insists on calling bourgeois Russia to account, on setting itself up as defender of Marxism and reconstructing under its aegis the ranks of the world proletariat. It is this claim, more than the inevitable antagonisms between the Russian and Chinese States, which requires our response, since neither the social practice nor the official political ideology of the Peking leaders is directed toward victory for the Communist programme.

Democratization in Hong Kong has come to a dead end following the rejection of an electoral reform proposal by the Legislative Council on June 18, 2015. The measure was voted down because pan-democrats had been deeply disappointed by the fact that the reform proposal by the Chinese government would have only allowed pre-screened candidates and thus denied Hong Kongers a true choice. This followed more than two months of street occupations in which protesters demanded real universal suffrage to no avail. This paper seeks to demonstrate how the “China factor” has inhibited the democratization process in four distinct phases of political development. Since World War II, one of the main reasons for the lack of democratization was opposition by the Chinese government. In the late 1980s, the prospect of political reforms in China raised hopes for political change in Hong Kong. This was, however, crushed in 1989, which empowered a democracy movement in Hong Kong. Since the transfer of power from Britain to China in 1997, despite protests for democracy, there has been very little progress toward meaningful democratization. Moreover, in recent years, there has even been a slow process from liberal to illiberal authoritarianism which is accompanied by growing conflicts and even violence as political freedoms are being curtailed.

Leo Suryadinata's The Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas: A Study of Beijing's Changing Policy in Southeast Asia and Beyond is a very welcome addition to the discussion of ties between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and ethnic Chinese living beyond its borders. Suryadinata makes the case in the book that as the PRC becomes more globally prominent, it is increasingly blurring lines in its treatment of PRC citizens and non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese overseas. This claim comes amid allegations of growing PRC efforts to mobilize ethnic Chinese communities abroad to serve its national interests, be they economic, political, or strategic. These concerns are not new and are in fact a throwback to the past. They give the book an added timeliness and importance.
For much of the Cold War, ethnic Chinese communities in non-communist parts of Southeast Asia faced the suspicion of being a possible subversive fifth column for the PRC, especially if they seemed left-leaning. Such perspectives diminished as the PRC engaged in economic reform from the late 1970s, eschewed radical revolution, and passed a nationality law in 1980 clearly demarcating non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese abroad from PRC citizens. Recent reports of PRC efforts to lobby and police opinion in foreign countries using members of local ethnic Chinese communities ranging from Europe and North America to Oceania and Southeast Asia have again brought these long-dormant issues to the fore.1 This is an issue on which Suryadinata has previously written, and he provides readers a brief reminder of these themes in Chapter 3.2 [End Page 151]
An Awkward Closeness
Suryadinata organizes the book into four parts. Part I (Chapters 1–3) discusses the PRC's rise to prominence from the 1980s till the present, changes in ethnic Chinese communities outside the PRC, and the organization of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO). The OCAO is the government body responsible for managing official ties with ethnic Chinese communities outside the PRC, be they PRC citizens abroad or ethnic Chinese who do not hold PRC citizenship. Within these pages, Suryadinata introduces his main observation—that Beijing seems to be reverting to its older policy of reducing distinctions between PRC citizens and non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese in foreign jurisdictions. The key motivation behind this move, according to Suryadinata, is PRC efforts to advance and protect its interests and concerns overseas.
Part II (Chapters 4–8) examines how the PRC responds officially to events outside its borders that affect ethnic Chinese and PRC citizens. Each chapter contains a case where ethnic Chinese come under threat from developments outside China and assess the PRC position. Beijing's reaction to the 1998 anti-Chinese race riots in Indonesia and violence in the South Pacific, Middle East, and Africa indicates a willingness to evacuate PRC citizens, especially those who work for PRC state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 2014 anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam, triggered by a Beijing-initiated escalation in its maritime dispute with Hanoi, suggests that the PRC is not above placing its citizens overseas in danger for the pursuit of more important interests.
However, contrasting PRC responses to incidents involving ethnic Chinese in Malaysia and Myanmar point toward an evolution in Beijing's position. Beijing responded to alleged ill-treatment of its citizens by Malaysian police in 2005 as well as political pressure, even violence, toward ethnic Chinese Myanmar citizens in the Kokang region along the PRC border in 2015 with diplomatic entreaties. Such actions resulted from Beijing's desire to maintain positive official relations with Malaysia and Myanmar. Threats against ethnic Chinese Malaysians in 2015, in comparison, saw the then-PRC ambassador to Malaysia publicly expressing an intention to protect these co-ethnics even though this was tantamount to intervention and divided local opinion. This step appears to portend an effort by Beijing to extend influence over non-PRC citizen ethnic Chinese communities overseas, even at the risk of upsetting foreign governments.
The next four chapters in Part III examine the ways domestic considerations in the...

Chinese revisionism betrays the international proletariat and the Chinese proletariat interests, as it serves the national interests of the Chinese state and, under the mask of alliance policy, allows the bourgeois forces to develop freely, as was not possible during the China's subjection to the foreign imperialism. On the international stage, it puts abominable theoretical abortions around, giving only the result of increasing the proletariat ideological confusion, extending capitalism and imperialism lifetime.

Chang Cheh is one of the most influential directors in Hong Kong martial-arts cinema, and his film Da cike/The Assassin is a significant work produced at a key moment both in Chang’s early career and in the development of the increasingly violent 1960s swordplay (wuxia) genre that led ultimately to the appearance of the kungfu film in the 1970s. The Assassin was made during the Leftist Riots of 1967, a ‘watershed’ in Hong Kong’s modern history. In order to understand the changing fantasies of violence in Chang’s wuxia cinema during this period, this article makes a close reading of The Assassin in relation to the 1967 riots through Frantz Fanon’s account of the effects of violence on the colonial subject. It argues for a close relationship between Chang’s cinematic violence and the real-world political violence which was erupting at the moment of its production and first reception.

Digital technologies and Internet connectivity are enabling rapid mobilisation of large groups of individuals around a common cause. The defining feature of such a Radically Networked Society (RNS) is the scale and pace of its operations. Consequently, RNS movements pose a serious challenge for the hierarchically ordered state structures, which tend to lack the dexterity and speed to respond.

In this paper, we apply the RNS framework to the 2019-20 Hong Kong protests. We conclude that the protests were the product of underlying fissures over issues of identity and political autonomy. The region’s thriving Internet ecosystem and hyper-connected society enabled the development and expansion of networked communities around these issues. This fuelled sustained, leaderless mobilisation, resulting in large-scale disruption and electoral advances for pro-democracy activists.

Meanwhile, the state’s response was rooted in a strategy of attrition. This
minimised costs and proved somewhat effective in that the movement failed to achieve the broader objective of earning universal suffrage for Hong Kongers.

Yet, the protests have managed to fundamentally reshape state-society relations and shift the narrative around the region’s future.

This article explores the ambiguous role of coastal smuggling during the first decade and a half of Communist rule (1949–65). Fearing that the illicit flow of commodities siphoned critical revenues and undermined foreign policy, Communist China repurposed and expanded Nationalist China's war on smuggling while employing novel tactics of mobilization. Yet smuggling was not just a threat; it was also a lifeline that alleviated widespread material shortages and supplied the everyday needs of individuals and firms during the tumultuous transition to central planning. Businesses from 'underground factories' to state-owned enterprises relied on black markets to meet ambitious production targets and circumvent bottlenecks in official supply channels. Smuggling was thus more than just 'corruption' practised by officials—it was also a 'creative accommodation' employed by broad swaths of social actors coping with the enormous changes. This article argues that the nascent command economy and the vibrant underground economy existed symbiotically rather than antagonistically. Exploration into this complex relationship reveals many cross-border connections between Communist China and the capitalist world that both complemented and undermined domestic state consolidation.

Full text also available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X16000688

中國與新加坡在建交前，雙邊關係發展就已有良好勢頭，然而去年圍繞南中國海主權爭議、美國「重返亞太」戰略等區域關鍵議題，中國與新加坡各自立場顯現分歧，雙方外交摩擦也較以往頻繁。原本計劃在2016年底召開的兩國最高級別合作機制會議「中新雙邊合作聯合委員會」被推遲至本月召開，這被外界視為中新關係步入低谷的反映；適逢美國新任總統特朗普履職，其尚不明朗的亞太政策也為地區局勢平添了更多變數。本次訪談邀請了新加坡國立大學政治學助理教授莊嘉穎博士（Dr. Chong Ja Ian），莊博士對東亞比較政治、亞太地區國際關係、中星（新）雙邊外交等領域有深入研究，在訪談中他就新加坡對特朗普政府外交政策的預期，及中星（新）雙邊關係發展等問題分享了獨到見解。

http://www.takungpao.com.hk/finance/text/2017/0217/60595.html

In this chapter, Vickers examines how public representations of Hong Kong’s conquest and occupation by Japan have evolved over the period since Hong Kong’s “handover” to China in 1997. While focusing mainly on the war’s portrayal in two major local museums, the Hong Kong Museum of History and the Hong Kong Museum of Coastal Defence, he also discusses the broader context for portrayals of Hong Kong’s post-war history, involving cultural and education policy in the years before and since the retrocession. In analyzing how official portrayals of the war – in museums and school textbooks – differ from those seen in other Chinese societies, this chapter especially highlights the representation of the local Chinese elite. It argues that the fundamental continuity of this elite, and its close relationship with the political authorities – British, Japanese, or Chinese – accounts for peculiarities in the local handling of the issue of collaboration. Vickers concludes that the selective treatment of this issue reflects tensions inherent in the state’s attempt to promote a vision of Hong Kong as both an apolitical capitalist utopia and a staunchly “patriotic” Chinese community.

The cultural commons which foregrounded an aesthetically pleasing and affective commitment to Hong Kong's pro-democracy movement's comprised, in addition to urban graffiti juxtaposed with posters and post-it notes on Lennon Walls, a variety of consumable artworks including food items. This work introduces the notion of visceral citizenship and discusses how, through creative art forms, the identity and 'figure' of the Hong Kong protestor is (re) produced through its capacity to engender raw, affective feelings and orientations towards China through sensorial embodiments. In the aftermath of a recently introduced national security legislation creating a fresh climate of fear, cultural artefacts popular with prodemocracy Hong Kongers encourage the material consumption and (re)production of a localist identity and politics of belonging to Hong Kong that engenders visceral and affective responses from viewers. Visceral forms of belonging, it is argued, have the potential to not only create creative forms of activism but provide an important substrate to Hong Konger identities in the body.

Si en théorie la stratégie géopolitique d’ensemble de la République populaire de Chine (RPC) connaît des failles, la Chine fait montre d’une certain assertivité qui ne rencontre pas toujours de résistances, et est parvenue à établir une influence marquée sur Hong Kong et qui va croissant sur Taiwan, en dépit des statuts de ces deux régions. Compte-tenu de la tension actuelle dans l’ex-colonie britannique, et de l’imbrication des questions géopolitique entre la Chine, Hong Kong et Taiwan,  la Chine prépare-t-elle, dans l’un et l’autre des deux régions, une intervention militaire à terme ? En préambule, indiquons le cadre conceptuel de l’analyse que nous  allons proposer : Hong Kong comme Taïwan doivent être considérées comme tout sauf des « marges ». Elles sont plutôt « liminales », au sens où  ces deux entités, qui résistent ou ont pu jusque-là résister à l’imperium chinois, sont des lieux où se révèlent des fondamentaux de la géopolitique chinoise. Elles sont pour la Chine des points focaux de sa défense et de la projection de sa puissance. En décryptant ces dossiers, nous y voyons en effet plus clairement les perceptions qu’a la Chine de la souveraineté internationale, son approche du territoire et de la nation, mais aussi les compromis qu’elle accepte pour l’instant de faire entre entre objectifs politiques à long terme et la réalité des contraintes stratégiques dans le présent.

Despite demonstrating a versatility of output typical of Hong Kong filmmakers, each of these auteurs is strongly identified with types of subject matter prohibited by mainland China's state censors. On the eve of the handover, for instance, Stanley Kwan directed Yin + Yang: Gender in Chinese Cinema (1996), a groundbreaking documentary described by Kwan as "my coming-out project." Two years later, he exploited the latitude of Hong Kong's ratings system with Hold You Tight, a frank exploration of sexual awakening laced with depictions of penetrative gay sex, male masturbation, and gay cruising. The acclaimed homosexual melodrama Lan Yu, filmed illegally in mainland China, followed in 2001. While Kwan is not exclusively a director of gay subject matter (though one might regard even his 1988 masterwork Rouge as a queer text), there is no denying his pioneering contribution to Hong Kong gay cinema. But as mainland co-productions dominate Hong Kong filmmaking, what are the prospects for LGBQT filmmaking under a notoriously repressive political regime-one that in 2016 banned depictions of gay people on mainland television, the better to purge Chinese culture of "vulgar, immoral and unhealthy content"? If the China co-production model affords few outlets for Hong Kong queer filmmaking, so, too, does it preclude the region's singular tradition of exploitation cinema. Herman Yau, despite a varied career, is probably best known as Hong Kong's chief purveyor of so-called Category III movies, his serial-killer drama The Untold Story (1993) being a landmark of the genre. (Category III is roughly equivalent to an NC-17 rating in the United States.) Much Category III product revels in bad taste, flaunting images of shocking physical horror and sexual depravity-ingredients vetoed by mainland China's censors, who remain rigorously opposed to depictions of horror, the supernatural, and carnality. In the face of such restrictions, the Category III tradition stands out as a peculiarly local institution, a vehicle through which Hong Kong filmmakers may assert local identity. Pang Ho-cheung's iconoclastic comedy Vulgaria (2012), for instance, fully embraces the transgressive elements of Category III cinema-sexual taboos, offensive slang, gross-out humor-as if in defiance of mainland Chinese oppression and encroachment.

The presentation is based on my two-week long field research conducted among the protesters in Hong Kong in the Central and Mong Kok areas. The paper discusses more widely the grounds for contemporary civil disobedience in Hongkong in frame of PRC's policies towards Hong Kong, British colonial practicies, electoral system, basic law of Hong Kong and also focuses on the dichotomy of the quest for democracy and/or freedom among Hong Kong students. The lecture was part of the course Blok expertů (Block of Experts) at the Faculty of Sciences, Palacký University in Olomouc.

Since Hong Kong’s retrocession the Government has endeavoured to strengthen local citizens’ identification with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – a project that acquired new impetus with the 2010 decision to introduce ‘Moral and National Education’ (MNE) as a compulsory school subject. In the face of strong local opposition, this policy was withdrawn in 2012, and implementation of MNE made optional. This article seeks to elucidate the background to the MNE controversy of 2012 by locating the emergence of a distinctive Hong Kong identity in its historical context, and analysing successive official attempts (before and after the 1997 retrocession) to use schooling for purposes of political socialisation. We argue that the school curriculum has projected and reflected a dual sense of identity: a ‘Chineseness’ located mainly in ethno-cultural qualities, and a ‘Hongkongeseness’ rooted in civic attributes. While reinforced by schooling, local civic consciousness has been intimately r...

This article looks at identity constructions of mainland
Chinese undergraduate students in a Hong Kong university. These
students shared a “Hong Kong Dream” characterised by a desire for
change in individual outlooks, a yearning for international exposure,
and rich imaginations about Hong Kong and beyond. However,
when their Hong Kong Dream met Hong Kong’s “anti-mainlandisation
discourse,” as was partially, yet acutely, reflected in the recent
Occupy Central movement, most students constructed the simultaneous
identities of a “free” self that was spatially mobile and ideologically
unconfined and an “elite” self that was among the winners of
global competition. This article argues that the identity constructions
of these mainland Chinese students shed light on global student mobilisation
and provide a unique, insider’s perspective into the integration
process between Hong Kong and the rest of the People’s Republic
of China.

Le 25 décembre 1953 est déclenché à Shek Kip Mei l’incendie le plus important de l’histoire de la colonie de Hong Kong. En moins de cinq heures, le feu embrase le bidonville et plus de 50000 réfugiés chinois perdent leur maison. L’administration britannique sous Alexander Grantham détient peu de moyens pour régler les problèmes engendrés par l’incendie et au lendemain de celui-ci, le régime risque de tomber en pleine crise de légitimité. Cet article explore les mesures entreprises par la colonie britannique pour subvenir à l’aide aux réfugiés. Que ce soit au niveau du logement ou de la charité, l’administration Grantham est forcée de changer ses pratiques si elle désire conserver le pouvoir. Le cas contraire, les sinistrés risquent de s’agiter.

All rights reserved The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Whilst Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 has influenced education in various ways, major reforms perceived as promoting mainland control have been resisted. For two decades, Hong Kong’s educational autonomy under the ‘one country, two systems’ formula was thus largely maintained. This changed radically with the response to the protests of 2019–2020, culminating in the introduction of a National Security Law. This has drastically constrained Hong Kong’s civil society, enhanced central government control of education and accelerated efforts to reeducate Hongkongers as loyal PRC citizens. We trace how this transformation has been enacted and justified, and reflect on its consequences. We analyse the current situation through the lenses of ‘internal colonialism’ and securitisation, which have characterised governance of China’s restive periphery under Xi Jinping. We argue that analytical perspectives in Comparative Education, relating to postcolonialism/decolonisation and globalisation, obstruct or distort understanding of Hong Kong’s present predicament.

A major impetus for the flourishing of Cultural Studies in Asia in the early 1990s was the phenomenal economic growth in East Asia. One of the major consequences of this was a massive expansion of consumer culture. As a result, there emerged a significant transnational regionalization of media culture, including film, television drama, variety show, and pop music, engendering a rich body of academic research in East Asian pop culture. In contrast, as the East Asian developed economies enter a new phase of global capitalism, one characterized by recessions, the disappearance of jobs and outsourcing, stagnant wages and unemployment, asset hyperinflation, and rising income inequalities, the region has witnessed the emergence of an important form of extra-parliamentary street-level " politics of the popular " in the form of " occupy " movements. These movements provide Cultural Studies practitioners in Asia with the opportunity to return to the analysis of the " popular " as a cultural political concept.

respectively, as well as an M.A. in Ethnomusicology from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research interests include: Chinese popular music in relation to identity construction, media and new media development, and political influences in post-colonial Hong Kong; Mandarin popular and rock music in Taiwan; and music-related educational issues. David C. Lam Institute for East-West Studies (LEWI) Hong Kong Baptist University (HKBU) LEWI Working Paper Series is an endeavour of David C. Lam Institute for East-West Studies (LEWI), a consortium with 28 member universities, to foster dialogue among scholars in the field of East-West studies. Globalisation has multiplied and accelerated inter-cultural, inter-ethnic, and inter-religious encounters, intentionally or not. In a world where time and place are increasingly compressed and interaction between East and West grows in density, numbers, and spread, East-West studies has gained a renewed mandate. LEWI's Working Paper Series provides a forum for the speedy and informal exchange of ideas, as scholars and academic institutions attempt to grapple with issues of an inter-cultural and global nature.

After the Tiananmen uprising and ensuring crackdown in 1989, the Chinese art world nosedived in a stark and different direction. Some artists left the country or abandoned their art practice, while others withdrew into self-imposed exile. The optimism of the previous years (discussed in part one of this article) vanished. The second section of the inaugural exhibition of the M+ Sigg Collection of contemporary Chinese art at ArtisTree concerns the post-Tiananmen era where the government, while still maintaining control, encouraged urbanization and consumerism, and opened up to the wider world. Collectors in the United States, Australia, and Europe also began to slowly support artists by purchasing their works.