Free Will and Illusion

This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences affect brains,” a target article for a special issue of JCS. I focus on the final question dealt with by the target article: how free will relates to preconscious and conscious mental processing, and I develop the case for preconscious free will.  Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile the commonsense view that voluntary acts are freely chosen with the evidence that conscious wishes and decisions are determined by preconscious processing in the mind/brain.  I consider alternative interpretations of how “conscious free will” might operate by Libet and by Mangan and respond to doubts about the extent to which the operations of mind are revealed in consciousness, raised by Claxton and Bouratinos. In reconciling commonsense attributions of freedom and responsibility with the findings of science, preconscious free will can be shown to have practical consequences for adjudications in law.

In order to find a convincing position in the ‘free will’ debate, two sorts of determinism are distinguished. The merits of encompassing determinism, which is determinism as it is usually understood, and individual determinism, which focuses on the agent, are brought to the fore. The existence of encompassing determinism cannot conclusively be proven, but it may be demonstrated, on the basis of individual determinism, that actions come about in a determined way, leaving no room for ‘free will’. In order to facilitate the discussion, recent scientific developments in such diverse fields as, e.g., quantum mechanics and neuropsychology are incorporated. Balancing the arguments, I aspire to a consistent and nuanced viewpoint, not eschewing divergent conclusions.

... Free Will: a historical and philosophical introduction jej autor, Ilham Dilman, przenikają karty najstarszych dzieł literatury greckiej [Dilman, 1999]. ... świadomej woli: „plany działania nie wydają się wymuszać zachowa-nia w tym sensie, iż jeśli pojawi się dany plan, dochodzi do ...

Determinism from the 1 st and 3 rd person perspective as well as the universal point of reference aee dealt with. This is to show the absence of free will in the last perspective and the illusion of it when seen from the first two perspectives. 'Free' choice is dealt with as well as the absence of free will and the consequences of determinism for law and court judgements are explored. So, what if any, is the place and the role of God in all this? Did s/he create determinism and the potential for or any semblance of choice and free will? Or is the existence of God, the fulfilling of prayer intentions and miracles impossible and redundant in a universe of determinism (laws of nature etc) or universal determinism?

In an earlier paper, 'Peter Geach on nonsense, confusion and sin' 1 , I suggested that what one can say in explanation of one's own actions suffers from a severe limitation: one can shed little light on the question why one acted on one's reasons for an action rather than on one's reasons against that action. In this paper I want to explore this suggestion further. One of my tasks will be to distinguish my question from three standard philosophical questions that have tended to overshadow it: the question of freewill and determinism; that of the relation between fact and value; and that of the possibility of weakness of will. On these I shall, on the whole, maintain a studied agnosticism.

Over a long period of time, the issue concerning free will (FW) has been a much debated topic. In general, being fully aware of ourselves, we are convinced that our conscious will can freely control a “voluntary” action. However, natural events that cannot be predicted, such as earthquakes, cyclones, etc., frustrate our self-esteem and affects the process of thinking in men. To address this concern, by comparing the action decision-making of voluntary actions owing to our inability to escape such “supernatural” events, Searle1 was of the opinion that: “The persistence of the problem of traditional free will in philosophy seems to me something of a scandal”; nevertheless, many have studied this issue and many papers have been written focusing on this area; however, it appears that limited progress in related research has been made.

Most of us take it for granted that we are free agents: that we can sometimes act so as to shape our own lives and those of others, that we have choices about how to do so and that we are responsible for what we do. But are we really justified in believing this? For centuries philosophers have argued about whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism or natural causation, and they seem no closer to agreeing about it now than at any time in the past. Many contemporary philosophers have come to the conclusion that the intractability of the old argument about free will and determinism is caused by deep rooted illusions and inconsistencies in our unreflective attitudes about moral responsibility and freedom to act. Kevin Magill challenges this view and argues that the philosophical stalemate about free will has arisen through lack of attention to the content of the experiences that shape our understanding of free will and agency and through a mistaken belief that the concept of moral responsibility requires a moral and metaphysical justification. The book sets out an original account of the various ways we experience choosing, deciding and acting, which reconciles the apparently opposing intuitions that have fuelled the traditional dispute.

Wegner’s analysis of the illusion of conscious will is close to my own account of how conscious experiences relate to brain processes. But our analyses differ somewhat on how conscious will is not an illusion.  Wegner argues that once conscious will arises it enters causally into subsequent brain processing.  I argue that while his causal story is accurate, it remains a first-person story.  Conscious free will is not an illusion in the sense that this first-person story is compatible with and complementary to a third-person account of voluntary processing in the mind/brain.

Wegner&…

Jeżeli zajmujemy się swoją osobą, badamy własne pragnienia, decyzje, przeżycia, uczucia itd., to wchodzimy w obszar psychologiczny. Pojawia się tutaj wymóg specjalnej przyczynowości psychicznej"pisał żyjący na przełomie XIX i XX wieku Władysław Heinrich, jeden z twórców polskiej szkoły "psychologii obiektywnej" [Heinrich, 1988: 39]. Chociaż "psychologia obiektywna", podkreślając metafizyczny charakter tradycyjnych pojęć psychologicznych, już od swego początku podważała istnienie determinizmu psychicznego jako odrębnej formy przyczynowości, niedostatki ówczesnej metodologii nie pozwalały na wyjaśnienie uwarunkowań subiektywnego doświadczenia sprawczości. Współczesne zaawansowanie prac eksperymentalnych, argumentuje Daniel Wegner, autor książki pt. The Illusion of Conscious Will, rodzi obietnicę wypełnienia tej luki poznawczej [Wegner, 2002]. Badania Wegnera oraz innych psychologów rzucają snop światła na podmiotowe źródła idei przyczynowości psychicznej.