Diogenes the Cynic

Başlıkta “toplum karşıtlığının etiği” ifadesinin geçmesi ilk bakışta
şaşırtıcı ve tuhaf bulunabilir. Ancak sonraki felsefe ve düşünce tarihine
yön veren Yunanca terminoloji göz önünde tutulduğunda
etik terimi ilkin “kullanım, kullanıma dayalı alışkanlık veya deneyim”,
ikinci olaraksa ilk anlamdan hareketle “yönelim, eğilim veya
ahlâki karakter” anlamındaki ἦθος (êthos) sözcüğünden türemiş
olan ve ἦθος’a aitliği ve özgülüğü belirten ἠθικός (êthikos) sıfatının
çağdaş dillerdeki “ahlâk ilmi, ahlâk felsefesi” anlamında kullanılan
isimleşmiş halidir. Bu yüzden “toplum karşıtlığının etiği” ifadesiyle
Kinik filozofların bu yöndeki yaşam deneyimlerini, bu deneyimin
ahlâki yönünü ve her ikisini kapsayan bir ahlâk felsefesini
dile getirme imkânını buluyoruz.

Este artículo intenta aproximarse a la figura femenina de Hiparquia de Maronea, identificando su lugar dentro del cinismo antiguo, movimiento filosófico contestatario de finales del siglo iv a. C. Su figura sería ejemplo de una mujer “extradoméstica”, opuesta completamente a la imagen de la mujer ateniense que permanece recluida en el interior de la casa, respetando celosamente las leyes del silencio. Al respecto, para descifrar las claves de Hiparquia, es fundamental y muy significativo considerar el “matrimonio de perros” (kynogamía) como la expresión más elevada del éros cínico. La kynogamía implica una ruptura radical con el matrimonio convencional, en cuanto institución religiosa, social y política que determina en el oîkos el lugar de las mujeres en la antigüedad, y constituye el punto culminante de la unión erótica cínica, al poner de manifiesto su “indiferencia” (adiaphoría) respecto al acto sexual. Hiparquia, comparada con Artemisa, se sitúa en los confines de lo salvaje, unida a su esposo, Crates de Tebas, vive en co-herencia según las leyes de la naturaleza.

With usefulness expanding and consuming more and more areas of our lives, the useless – philosophy and the humanities in general – are fighting a losing battle and gradually becoming extinct. In order to defend them I attempt to give uselessness a positive meaning. Trying to redefine the concept of usefulness in order to make it work for the useless is a bad strategy because it endues usefulness with qualities that are considered alien to it in the modern world. For something to be useful it has to be so in an obvious way and if it is not – it’s labeled useless. In our times usefulness reigns unstoppably – universities are turning into companies, students into clients, teachers into bureaucrats and knowledge into a product whose value is equal to the profit it brings. Anything that is perceived in terms of its usefulness or end-use is consequently subjugated to that end-use and therefore has no independent existence. In our consumer society of late capitalism this brings a great burden on individuals because by commercializing themselves they also internalize usefulness as it functions in commerce. The consequence of this is unfreedom, unhappiness and inability to connect with each other on a deeper level. In order to escape the dreadful world of usefulness individuals – as suggested by George Bataille –must try to re-connect with their violent and atemporal past that would help them transgress boundaries laid down by reason and experience a sovereign moment. On a similar note Diogenes of Sinope suggest a sovereign and useless life of a beggar and philosopher. Emil Cioran contends that we should only serve eternity in idleness.

In the corpus of apocryphal Cynic letters those attributed to Diogenes stand out: they form the bulk of the letters and they are the most humorous. This corresponds with representations of him as a provocateur elsewhere in imperial Greek literature. This article focuses on the topic of sex in Diogenes’ letters, and answers two main questions: first, whether the sexual humor of the letters is more risqué than what we find in the other sources; second, how this sexual humor con- tributes to the overall purpose of the apocryphal Diogenes letters. I suggest that even though in the letters euphemistic language persists, they treat the Diogenes anecdotes about sex in greater detail than anywhere else. The provocative, risqué humor contained in these anecdotes would serve to entice and entertain audiences in order to get them engaged in Cynic philosophy.

Michel Foucault's early writing on dreams and imagination is one of the often neglected aspects of his work. In this paper, I give an overview of his "Dreams, Imagination and Existence" essay, accompanied by a discussion of his writings on art and its role as a technique of existence.

Was Anacharsis a seasoned traveller, an occasional voyager, a Scythian tourist with a one-way ticket to Greece, or was he a globetrotter, a wanderer with no destination? Was his thirst for knowledge, a philosophical quest for the truth, a desire to see the world with his own eyes, that made him one of the proverbial Seven Sages, or did his attraction to Greece originate from a necessity to belong? Or was it none of all this, and his travels were motivated simply by an appetite for educated conversation? 1 The answers to these questions are as varied as the identities of Anacharsis that emerge from the ancient sources available to us. 2 Herodotus comes first, chronologically: "when Anacharsis, having seen much of the world (γῆν πολλὴν θεωρήσας) and showed much wisdom through that (ἀποδεξάμενος κατ' αὐτὴν σοϕίην πολλὴν), was coming back to the Scythian country, sailing through the Hellespont, he puts in at Cyzicus." (4.76.2). There is a clear connection here between 'seeing' and 'wisdom'; it is through his own perception of the world that he acquires and display wisdom. 3 Solon is portrayed in similar terms in book 1 of the Histories (1.30): '[we heard about] your wisdom (σοφίης) and your wanderings (πλάνης), that you have travelled far to seek knowledge and to see the world (γῆν 4 πολλὴν θεωρίης εἵνεκεν ἐπελήλυθας). Here are two key terms for the portrayal of the wise traveller in Greek historians: θεωρία 'contemplation' and πλάνη 'wandering'. Ionian thinkers, as invested in the pursuit of knowledge as their semimythical counterparts, uses the latter of themselves. Democritus portrays the Miletian Hecataeus, drawing a map of the world, as an ἀνὴρ πολυπλανής (FGrHist 1 T12a). The same Democritus says of himself that he wandered (ἐπεπλανησάμην) and saw skies and lands and heard most learned men (B 299, 6-8 D.-K.). 5 From Herodotus, we known where Solon travels to (he left Athens and visited Amasis in Egypt and Croesus at Sardis), but we don't know where Anacharsis travels to. The story fast forwards to the Cyzicus episode and his death, and we know nothing about his wonderings. However, he certainly does not seem to be a πλάνης 'a wanderer'; Herodotus makes it clear that his journey to Greece (namely, Athens and Sparta) had a precise reason, he 'had been sent by the king of Scythia' on some kind of political embassy; this piece of information seems trustworthy, given that he says he owes his information on Anacharsis' popularity among the Scythians to a deputy of the Scythian king Ariapeithes. The second longest and most detailed biographical profile of Anacharsis, of all sources with some pretence of historicity (so excluding Lucian and Plutarch's fictitious portrayals), is the

Este estudio se centra en un acercamiento a las corrientes filosóficas helenísticas que buscan una salida al panorama que dejó tras de sí Alejandro Magno en sus conquistas por la Hélade, el norte de África y parte de Asia. En concreto, nos sumimos en una época en la que los lazos identitarios de los ciudadanos de las respectivas polis se diluyen en una masa informe y unificada de todos los territorios, por lo que se ven obligados a repensar su propia individualidad, así como su puesto en el cosmos. Al no ser ya más corintio, tebano, espartano o ateniense, sino ciudadano del imperio alejandrino, se hace necesaria la exigencia de un replanteamiento de las bases éticas, filosóficas, sociales y culturales de la época. Es en este marco histórico en el que surgen diversas corrientes de pensamiento como respuesta a la sensación de desarraigo vital que se hizo patente en este periodo. Las principales aportaciones llegaron de la mano de los cínicos, los epicúreos y los estoicos, que afrontaron este problema desde diferentes perspectivas para dar solución a las inquietudes e insatisfacciones que se estaban gestando en el núcleo social. La idea del cosmopolistismo cobra aquí especial relevancia, y serán los estoicos y cínicos quienes promoverán con mayor éxito y desde posiciones distintas una nueva configuración de la vida en la polis, abarcando esta vez al mundo en su totalidad convirtiéndose en una cosmópolis.

Antisthenes (MÖ yaklaşık 445-365): Sokrates’in öğrencisi olan Antisthenes Kinik felsefenin kurucusu olduğu düşünülen iki filozoftan biridir. Ancak antik literatürde Antisthenes’i Kinik saymayıp Sokrates ile Kinikler arasında köprü oluşturan bir ön-filozof olduğunu belirten çok sayıda kaynak da vardır. Diogenes (MÖ yaklaşık 412-323): Kinik felsefenin kurucularından Sinoplu Diogenes Antisthenes’in öğrencisi ve bu öğretinin en meşhur filozofudur. Hazinedar Hikesios’un oğlu olan Diogenes anlatılanlara göre babasına teslim edilen “devlet parasının değerini düşürdüğü” için kentten sürgün edilmiştir. Platon Kinik felsefeden kaynaklanan aşırılıkları yüzünden Diogenes’i “delirmiş Sokrates” olarak nitelemiştir. Antisthenes ve Diogenes’in hiçbir eseri günümüze ulaşmamıştır, yaşamları ve düşünceleri ikincil kaynaklardaki doğrudan veya dolaylı alıntılar sayesinde bilinmektedir. Konuyla ilgili antik anlatıların çoğunu içeren Kinik Felsefe Fragmanları bu bilgileri bir araya getirirken dikkatleri söz konusu kaynaklara çekmeyi de amaçlamaktadır.

Vivimos en una época cínica, como denuncia Peter Sloterdjik, y profundamente ideologizada con no-ideologías, como señala Slavoj Žižek. Una manera de atacar estos problemas es volviendo a la Razón desfachatada y burlona, a la crítica socarrona y la filosofía vital de los quínicos antiguos, como Diógenes de Sínope, el quinismo medieval franciscano, la sátira renacentista y, en general, la argumentación no demostrativa, sino propositiva, del arte en general.

The article analyzes a crucial element of the Turkish folk tradition of laughter, the corpus of Nasreddin Hoca anecdotes, in terms of the narrative encounter between the powerful and the powerless. Examining the anecdotes about Tamerlane, it argues that the humorous folk representations of the relation of the common people with power revolve around what de Certeau calls the "art of making do with". Contrary to the argument that he is a colleague of Diogenes the kynic, Nasreddin Hoca does not selfconsciously oppose and challenge the power of Tamerlane. He rather strives to cope with it through a wide spectrum of behaviors including avoidance, trickery, simulation, and repartee. Given that the Hoca is a fictional character, such anecdotes are to be taken as narratives of the predominantly evasive stance of the subaltern social classes and groups vis-à-vis the state in the Ottoman Empire. The study also refers to the grotesque imagery embedded in the Turkish folk laughter.

Parmi les étranges personnages qui constellent l’antiquité, il en est un dont l’histoire fascinante se révèle par un certain côté en relation avec nos chères monnaies. Philosophe grec, né en 413 avant notre ère, Diogène de Sinope (colonie grecque de Milet implantée sur les bords de la mer Noire) est resté à jamais dans les mémoires de notre civilisation en raison de son esprit et de ses choix de vie !

Indice IntroduzIone 9 1. Aldo BrAncAccI, Gli studi di filosofia antica di Gabriele Giannantoni 13 2. leonArdo FrAnchI, Gabriele Giannantoni interprete di Parmenide 31 3. Aldo BrAncAccI, La domanda di Socrate 49 4. MArcello GIGAnte, Presentazione delle Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae di G. Giannantoni 65 5. MIchele AlessAndrellI, Giannantoni, logica di Aristotele e logica megarica 71 6. steFAno MeccI, Il Diogene di Gabriele Giannantoni 93 7. lucA sIMeonI, Giannantoni e il nesso tra filosofia e scienza in età ellenistica 109 8. FrAncesco Verde, La «grandezza che non sfigura»: gli studi epicurei di Gabriele Giannantoni 121 9. FrAncescA GAMBettI, Gabriele Giannantoni maestro 137 CoMMIAto 143 Cyrenaics, Durham: Acumen 2012. 5 Come mostra A. BrAncAccI, Il Socrate di Guido Calogero, «Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana», 96/98 , 205-226, 205: «Nell'ambito della produzione scientifica di Guido Calogero, Socrate occupa un duplice spazio, sul piano teoretico e su quello storiografico: ha fortemente segnato il Calogero filosofo, e ha intensamente occupato il Calogero storico della filosofia antica, svolgendo, in ciò un ruolo diverso, e unico, rispetto a quello svolto da Parmenide, il quale rimase sempre il punto di riferimento primario della visione della storia della filosofia, non solo antica, del pensatore italiano». A questo saggio rinvio in generale per una presentazione dell'interpretazione del pensiero di Socrate da parte di Calogero; per questa tematica mi permetto anche di rimandare alle considerazioni svolte in S. MeccI, Pluralità delle culture e coesistenza umana. La filosofia del dialogo di Guido Calogero, in M. PAGAno -L. GhIslerI (a cura di), I fondamenti dell'etica in prospettiva interculturale, Brescia: Morcelliana 2017, 132-139.

Intervention lors de la conférence d’Aurélie Ledoux, du 23 mars 2013, « Le cosmopolitisme »
"Je suis citoyen du monde" : le cynisme de Diogène et de Depardieu.
Atelier « Le monde », 2e année.
Cet article est né de la discussion qui a suivi la conférence de Mme Ledoux sur le Cosmopolitisme, le 23 mars 2013, à la Société Française de Philosophie.

The phrase ”Socratic irony”, which is principally used with reference to Socrates` philosophical method, is one of the biggest unsolved puzzles of Greek philosophy. Since the beginning of its occurrence, this type of irony has been a fertile ground for the abuse of exegetical tradition. But, despite the mysteries that surrounds the image of Socratic dissembling, it seems that the questioning technique of Socrates had a valuable influence on the entire Western thought. In this paper I discuss some types of comprehending and interpreting the specific irony that Socrates used in his provocative discussions. In this way, the present study starts with the analysis of the mistaken interpretation of the Sophists and continues with an inquiry of understanding how the concept of irony evolved from Antiquity to Friedrich Nietzsche. At the same time I will reveal the ethical issues involved in using the complex Socratic irony.

Irriverente, sfacciato, beffardo, Diogene il Cane è l’icona della critica del potere, delle istituzioni, delle vanità umane. La sua filosofia è azione: Diogene parla come se mordesse. La sua filosofia è performance, dal masturbarsi in pubblico al prendersi gioco di Alessandro Magno intimandogli di spostarsi perché gli fa ombra. I suoi oggetti di scena – la botte in cui viveva, la lanterna che teneva accesa in pieno giorno per andare in cerca dell’uomo ecc. – appartengono da sempre al nostro immaginario condiviso.

Per la prima volta in assoluto, questa raccolta delle principali testimonianze antiche su Diogene, ordinate secondo la cronologia degli autori, presenta una traduzione che non ha rinunciato a rendere comprensibili al lettore moderno i giochi di parole e le battute sferzanti tipiche dello stile del Cane.

sowie die beiden wichtigen Aufsatzsammlungen von M.-O. ) und R. B. Branham (1996 seien hier stellvertretend genannt. 2 Betrachtet man diese Untersuchungen allerdings genauer, so fällt auf, daß sie nicht nur literarisch, sondern auch philosophisch und historisch ausgerichtet sind. Außerdem beschränken sie sich nicht nur auf Sprüche, sondern beschäftigen sich ihrer Intention entsprechend mit allen erhaltenen literarischen Zeugnissen.

Book Description (from the publisher):

Squarely challenging a culture obsessed with success, an acclaimed philosopher argues that failure is vital to a life well lived, curing us of arrogance and self-deception and engendering humility instead.

Our obsession with success is hard to overlook. Everywhere we compete, rank, and measure. Yet this relentless drive to be the best blinds us to something vitally important: the need to be humble in the face of life's challenges. Costica Bradatan mounts his case for failure through the stories of four historical figures who led lives of impact and meaning-and assiduously courted failure. Their struggles show that engaging with our limitations can be not just therapeutic but transformative.

In Praise of Failure explores several arenas of failure, from the social and political to the spiritual and biological. It begins by examining the defiant choices of the French mystic Simone Weil, who, in sympathy with exploited workers, took up factory jobs that her frail body could not sustain. From there we turn to Mahatma Gandhi, whose punishing quest for purity drove him to ever more extreme acts of self-abnegation. Next we meet the self-styled loser E. M. Cioran, who deliberately turned his back on social acceptability, and Yukio Mishima, who reveled in a distinctly Japanese preoccupation with the noble failure, before looking to Seneca to tease out the ingredients of a good life.

Gleefully breaching the boundaries between argument and storytelling, scholarship and spiritual quest, Bradatan concludes that while success can make us shallow, our failures can lead us to humbler, more attentive, and better lived lives. We can do without success, but we are much poorer without the gifts of failure.

Dissertation analyses on the discourse used by ancient cynics, and a comparison with other Hellenistic philosophies such as Stoicism and Epicureanism, aiming towards recognizing Cynicism as a proper philosophical school equal to others of its time.

Der vorliegende Band initiiert ein interdisziplinäres Gespräch zu der Frage, unter welchen Bedingungen sich Formenrepertoires und Semantiken von statuarischen Darstellungen, Sarkophagen und anderen medialen Figurationen im Spannungsfeld von Persistenz und Wandel historisch tradieren. Dabei wird das Problem von Formkonstanz und Bedeutungswandel in Fallstudien aus der doppelten Persepktive der Archäologie und der Medientheorie behandelt. Im gemeinsamen Fokus steht die Aussage von Bildentwürfen und Figurentypen im Wandel von Zeit und Aufstellungskontexten, aber auch im Wechsel von Formaten und Medien. Wenngleich Figuren und Darstellungsschemata aus einem bestimmten Anlass, für einen bestimmten Kontext und mit einer spezifischen Bedeutung geschaffen worden sind, konnten sie in einer sekundären Verwendung neu kontextualisiert und dadurch mit neuen Bedeutungen aufgeladen werden. Gerade Übertragungen dieser Art, bei denen die ursprünglich intendierten inhaltlichen Bezüge sich verschoben oder sogar vollständig verloren gingen, sicherten vielfach die nachhaltige Rezeption der Werke.

De nos jours omniprésent sur la scène politique, le cynisme fut depuis son origine l’objet de polémiques. Le mode de vie scandaleux auquel il est associé pose la question de l’appartenance ou non de Diogène et des Cyniques à la philosophie. Par ailleurs, qu’a à voir le cynisme des sociétés actuelles avec celui que pratiquait Diogène ? Si des analystes situent au siècle des Lumières l’émergence d’une nouvelle conception du cynisme propre à la modernité, peu d’études historiques ont été menées sur la question. Il importe donc de retourner aux sources et de mesurer la validité de cette hypothèse.
Par une étude de l’histoire du cynisme et de sa transmission, nous retraçons l’évolution des enjeux au cœur du mouvement cynique et de sa postérité, et présentons une synthèse des significations du cynisme ainsi que des tensions qu’elles comportent. De nombreuses références permettent de définir la place qu’occupe le cynisme au XVIIIe siècle. Les auteurs des Lumières se sont réappropriés l’antique sagesse de Diogène et ont voulu concilier son impudique franchise aux exigences de la sociabilité. Ainsi, l’étude de la réception du cynisme au siècle des Lumières doit tenir compte des débats moraux de l’époque. Visant l’élaboration d’une morale matérialiste sur un fondement naturel, les Philosophes ont tâché de contourner les problèmes de l’amoralisme révélés par le constat de La Mettrie selon lequel il y a inadéquation entre bonheur et vertu. Pour ce faire, Helvétius réduit la portée des déterminismes liés à l’organisation, en soulignant l’importance des facteurs externes dans la gestion des comportements ; Diderot et D’Holbach mettent l’accent sur la sociabilité afin d’assurer l’inhérence d’un fondement moral chez l’être humain, renforçant un désaccord déjà profond entre le cynisme et les idéaux des Lumières. Or, cette approche est-elle généralisée ? Ou le cynisme des Lumières est-il sujet à des variantes selon les auteurs ? Cette thèse se propose d’étudier, par l’analyse des occurrences du cynisme dans les textes de la France des Lumières, les différentes acceptions du cynisme, pour cerner les enjeux auxquels elles s’attachent. Des textes tels qu’Aihcrappih de Godart de Beauchamps, Le Diogène décent de Prémontval, le Socrate en délire de Wieland, Le cynique moderne de Cœtlogon, Le désapprobateur de Castilhon, Le cosmopolite de Fougeret de Monbron, Le paysan perverti de Restif de la Bretonne et Arlequin Diogène de Saint-Just seront pris en considération. Ils s’ajouteront à une étude du cynisme chez Diderot, chez qui la thématique parcourt l’ensemble de l’œuvre et atteint son expression la plus achevée dans Le neveu de Rameau. Par ses doutes, Diderot trouve également sa place dans l’étude des critiques des Lumières qu’ont formulées Rousseau et Sade, chez qui l’on évalue la pertinence de l’enjeu cynique.
Il ressort de cette thèse que les acceptions moderne et contemporaine du cynisme comportent des distinctions conceptuelles qui nous interdisent de les amalgamer. Notre analyse du cynisme dans le contexte français des Lumières montre que l’on est, jusqu’à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, en présence d’une conception typiquement moderne du cynisme, laquelle met l’accent sur la redécouverte de l’impudeur de Diogène. Plus précisément, le cynisme se caractérise, au XVIIIe siècle, par un repli misanthrope et solitaire, lequel s’oppose à l’optimisme humaniste des Philosophes. Il est l’expression d’un rejet de la sociabilité mise de l’avant par ces derniers, en réponse au constat de corruption de la société. S’il est possible d’y situer l’émergence d’une nouvelle conception du cynisme, c’est donc seulement dans la mesure où les débats liés à l’élaboration d’une morale matérialiste, fondée en intérêt ou en sentiment, montrent que chacun de ces fondements comportent des failles, et non parce que certains auteurs des Lumières auraient entendu par cynisme ce que nous entendons aujourd’hui. Tout se passe comme si l’homme désabusé, qui tient pour acquis l’incorrigibilité de sa nature et de la société, choisissant d’en tirer profit malgré l’immoralisme que cela comporte, avait forgé le statut de cynique postmoderne. Cela rompt avec la tradition qui, jusqu’à la fin de l’époque moderne, tient le Cynique pour une figure d’un dire vrai fondamentalement désapprobateur du genre humain. Si l’impudeur poussée dans ses derniers retranchements conduit le cynique à n’éprouver aucune honte à mentir, il poursuit en cela la devise d’altération des valeurs initiée par Diogène, mais contribue désormais au maintien d’un statu quo sur l’état de corruption de la société qu’aucun cynique, ancien ou moderne, n’aurait accepté de taire.

Diogenes of Sinope, the main representative of ancient Cynicism, says in one of his works that « he preferred freedom above everything ». He does not mean here freedom in its political sense, but rather in its moral and individual meaning, which dates back at least to the sixth century BC and perhaps to the very root of the word ἐλεύθερος. Tracing the history of this notion reveals diverse influences on Cynicism, whether the figure of the « free slave » of the tragedians, or the correspondence between nature and freedom of the Sophists and Democritus. To reach self-sufficiency and apathy, the two characteristics of Cynic freedom, Diogenes must submit his body to physical training, it being the only way to break free from the chains of civilization. Socrates, especially in Xenophon and to a certain extent in Plato, had already made physical exercises a condition for acquiring freedom. However, with Socrates the emancipation of the individual ends in gaining knowledge that he deems necessary to virtue. Cynics, for their part, reject virtue-knowledge and limit their philosophical activity to the practice of a rigorous physical asceticism, so that freedom leads directly to virtue and happiness to the point of identifying with it. Therefore, Cynics differ from their Socratic predecessors by not extending their philosophical quest beyond the moment of liberation and thereby make freedom the true hallmark of their philosophy.

Diogène de Sinope, principal représentant du cynisme ancien, affirme dans une de ses œuvres qu’« il mettait la liberté au-dessus de tout ». Il n’est pas question ici du sens politique de la liberté, mais plutôt de son acception morale et individuelle, dont les origines remontent au moins au VIe s. av. J.-C. et peut-être à la racine même du mot ἐλεύθερος. Retracer l’histoire de cette notion révèle diverses influences sur le cynisme, que ce soit la figure de l’« esclave libre » chez les tragiques, ou la correspondance entre nature et liberté chez les Sophistes et Démocrite. Pour atteindre l’autarcie et l’apathie, les deux caractéristiques de la liberté cynique, Diogène doit soumettre son corps à un entraînement de nature physique, seul moyen de s’émanciper des chaînes de la civilisation. Socrate, surtout chez Xénophon et dans une certaine mesure chez Platon, avait déjà fait des exercices corporels une condition d’acquisition de la liberté. Toutefois, l’émancipation de l’individu débouche avec Socrate sur l’apprentissage du savoir qu’il juge nécessaire à la vertu. Les Cyniques, quant à eux, rejettent la vertu-connaissance et limitent leur activité philosophique à la pratique d’une ascèse corporelle rigoureuse, de sorte que la liberté mène sans détour à la vertu et au bonheur au point de s’y identifier. Les Cyniques se différencient donc de leurs prédécesseurs socratiques en ne prolongeant pas leur quête philosophique au-delà du moment de la libération et, par le fait même, font de la liberté la véritable marque distinctive de leur philosophie.

This translation is still unpublished. It has been presented to several publishers in Spain, but none of them wanted to print it. During 2018 and 2019 I have made this translation to Spanish language, one extremely rare edition printed in Cologne in 1781 in Italian language. The author, Christoph Martin Wieland (Oberholzheim, in present-day Germany, 1733-Weimar, 1813) published this work anonymously. The book, titled "Socrates crazy, that is, Dialogues of Diogenes from Sinope" includes a curious novel, titled “Combabus”, based on an ancient legend that the Roman historian Justin wrote between the second and third centuries, although some scholars attribute it to Luciano, who collects it in his text "The Syrian goddess".

A study of the various schools of ancient Greek and Indian philosophy from the perspective of Pierre Hadot, who emphasized philosophy not as abstraction, but as a concrete practice of life. For the Greeks “[p]hilosophy did not consist in teaching an abstract theory-much less in the exegesis of texts-but rather in the art of living. It is a concrete attitude and determinate life-style, which engages the whole of existence.” (Hadot, 1985:83)

Análisis, desde el punto de vista de la tradición clásica, de la escena relativa a los cínicos antiguos en la versión fílmica de El mundo de Sofía, coproducción noruego-sueca dirigida por Erik Gustavson sobre guión de Petter Slavlan basado en la novela del escritor sueco Jostein Gaarder (publicada en 1991), concretamente en la versión en forma de miniserie emitida por episodios en el año 2000.

Populism and cosmopolitanism are commonly regarded as antitheses, reducing populism to communalism and cosmopolitanism to elitism. This chapter develops a more nuanced view by turning to the early histories of both phenomena. In Diogenes the Cynic, cosmopolitanism’s ancient inventor, it finds evidence less for elitism than for resistance to politics as such. In the populares, populists of the Roman Republic, it finds the origins of a long history of inclusive popular politics. Drawing on a recent debate between Ernesto Laclau and Jacques Rancière, the chapter argues that populism and cosmopolitanism are essentially ambivalent. Insofar as populism can be inclusive or exclusive and cosmopolitanism elitist or popular, the two can overlap, and each can usefully be regarded as a check on the other.

Selección de poemas de Crates de Tebas, Cércidas de Megalópolis, Fénix de Colofón, Melagro de Gádara y Luciano de Samosata para el curso "Poesía del cinismo y de influencia cínica" impartido en la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras (UNAM) en el semestre 2015-2 (enero-junio 2015).

The paper deals with the disputed authorship of two iambic fragments, frr. trag. adesp. 284, 394 N.2 = Diog. Sin. frr. dub. 4-5 Sn.-K. On account of lexical, stylistic, and content affinities especially, the attribution to Euripides’ Telephus, among other Euripidean fragmentary dramas, is proposed.

Cuando, a principios del siglo IV a. C., un exiliado de Sínope llamado Diógenes llega a Atenas, una gran parte de la concepción antigua de la privacidad está a punto de tambalearse. En lugar de buscar una casa en la que vivir, Diógenes decide vivir en la calle, a la vista de todos sus conciudadanos, durmiendo donde la noche le alcance, sean soportales, templos o tinajas. Desde entonces, Diógenes está expuesto a la mirada de su sociedad, lo que le permite ejercer de maestro ante su público, exponiendo su filosofía de vida directamente en los actos que la conforman. Pero al tiempo su forma de vivir, permanentemente observada por sus contemporáneos, obliga a una radical forma de sinceridad y coherencia.

Comme de nombreux penseurs antiques avant et après eux et contrairement à Socrate, Calliclès et Diogène ont déclaré avoir fondé leur éthique sur l’observation de la nature. Et pourtant, les deux discours normatifs qui sont tirés d’une nature que l’on pourrait a priori croire être la même sont on ne peut plus opposés. Calliclès croit que l’homme est appelé à dominer autrui ; Diogène pense plutôt qu’il doit se dominer lui-même ; le premier est un hédoniste débridé, le second croit que le bonheur ne s’achète qu’au prix du sacrifice des désirs artificiels.
Comment expliquer cette dichotomie ? Nous empruntons deux routes explicatives. D’abord, nous montrons que pour Calliclès et Diogène, la notion de nature non seulement diffère, mais est observée sous un angle différent. La première est celle des tyrans et de dieux anthropomorphes, la seconde, celle de petits animaux et de dieux autarciques. La première concerne la relation des hommes entre eux ; la seconde, celle de l’homme avec lui-même. Ensuite, nous exposons la différence des présupposés normatifs qui précèdent ou accompagnent l’observation de la nature ; nous contrastons, pour ce faire, les formes d’anticonventionnalisme et d’anti-intellectualisme défendues par Calliclès et Diogène.

SUMMARY. Like many ancient thinkers before and after them and contra Socrates, Callicles and Diogenes said they based their ethics on the observation of nature. And yet, the two normative discourses that are derived from nature that we might a priori believe to be the same could not be more opposed. Callicles believes that people are called to dominate others, Diogenes rather thinks people must dominate themselves. The first is an unbridled hedonist, the second believes that happiness can be bought only at the price of sacrificing artificial desires. How to explain this dichotomy?
We take two explanatory routes. First, we show that for Callicles and Diogenes, the notion of nature not only differs but is observed from a different angle. The first one is the nature of tyrants and anthropomorphic gods, the second that of small animals and autarkic gods. The first focuses on the relationship between people, the second focuses on the relationship of a person with themselves. Secondly, we expose the difference in
normative assumptions that precede or accompany the observation of nature; in order to do so, we contrast anticonventionalism and anti-intellectualism forms proper to
both Callicles and Diogenes.

Antikçağda bütün toplumlar kendilerine özgü kültür ve düşünüş tarzlarıyla bünyelerinde barındırdıkları topluluklara yön vermişlerdir. Bu süreçte en önemli rol dönemin bilginlerine ve filozoflarına düşmüştür. Yaşadıkları çağın entelektüel eliti olarak nitelendirilen bu zümre, evrenin oluşumu ve insanlığın varoluşu gibi paradoks haline gelmiş sorunsallara kendi felsefi yaklaşımlarıyla cevap bulmaya ve evreni buldukları yanıtlar üzerine şekillendirmeye çalışmışlardır.