Cyber Defence

The current development of a cyber defence policy by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is usually seen as exemplifying the alliance’s changing scope of intervention; as well as its broadened perception of security. From an institutional-liberalist perspective, it is said to illustrate the transformation of NATO from a defensive alliance into a security management institution. However, others have pointed out that NATO cyber defence policy has been developed with regard to seminal events, such as the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007 and on Georgia in 2008, and mirrors the persisting cold war logic in NATO current policy.

This dissertation aims to investigate if NATO’s cyber agenda exemplifies the alliance’s transformation into a security management institution; or rather if it displays the continuity of NATO’s self-perception as a defensive alliance. In order to address these questions properly, this dissertation is based on an interpretative approach, using discourse analysis as a method, and a theoretical framework drawing on constructivist accounts, as well as on various liberal institutionalist concepts.

The results of this analysis displayed mixed elements. However, it ultimately seems that NATO cyber defence policy exemplifies the continuous prevalence of NATO’s self-perception as an alliance, designed to defend its members against an external threat. Indeed, the analysis highlights that developments in NATO cyber defence policy are generally conceived as new facets of NATO’s original role – demanding adjusting NATO’s strategy and operational capacities. Yet, NATO cyber defence policy does not seem to represent a fundamental shift in NATO’s perception of its own purpose.

This analysis also highlights the need for further research including additional variables, such as the differentiation between different types of cyber security threats that NATO faces.

In 2013, Indonesia topped China and was acknowledged as the country with the highest rate of cyber attack traffic, in which with its 1,6 percent share of world Internet users, Indonesia contribute 38 percent of the total cyber attack in the world. Furthermore, as one of large emerging economic countries, Indonesia will definitely more rely on the use of Internet in the future. However, the current cyber security and defense policy of Indonesia has not adequately addressed the current cyber threats, so that leave vulnerability to its cyber environment. This policy brief identifies five inadequate cyber aspects of the contemporary policy and therefore recommends that the policy should have a larger strategy that covers all cyber possibilities, yet provide more detail and measurable approach. This recommendation contributes to the Indonesian national security and defense goals, as well as building regional collaboration, thereby supporting global cyber security resilience.

Concepts such as “hybrid threat” or “grey zone” are used to define the wide range of “political warfare” actions that countries such as Russia, China, Iran or North Korea employ for projecting their influence, plausibly denying their responsibility and hampering any response by not crossing the threshold of an armed conflict. Those characteristics allow many actors to project their power asymmetrically by hindering the attribution of their actions, preventing the allocation of legal responsibilities, making retaliation more difficult and compromising the credibility of deterrence. Although many of these actions are carried out in the physical world, the virtual domain seems the natural realm for these activities. This is due to the ambiguity, anonymity, asymmetry, economy and ubiquity of cyberspace. This contribution focuses on the “grey zone” activities in the cyber and information domains conducted by two relevant powers – China and Russia – and discuss the problems and prospects related to those

The purpose of the article is to analyse Operation “Olympic Games” including, in particular, to indicate the political background to the activities aimed at preventing the development of Iran’s nuclear programme, and to examine the preparation and conduct of the operation, the involvement of the US and Israeli intelligence services, and the use of intelligence methods and sources. An equally important objective is to indicate the real consequences of the cyberattack with the Stuxnet virus. In the research process, a critical analysis of literature in the field of Intelligence Studies and source materials (including legal acts, strategies, reports, and other official studies of the entities forming the US Intelligence Community) was carried out. The example of Operation Olympics Games shows that complex cyber-sabotage operations resulting in the destruction of critical infrastructure on a large scale require the involvement of numerous state resources and advanced cyber activities, a...

Information Warfare and Influence Operations are, in principle, intended to get
your own message across or to prevent your adversary from doing so. However, it is not just
about developing a coherent and convincing storyline as it also involves confusing, distracting,
dividing, and demoralising the adversary. From that perspective, cyberspace seems to be ideal
for conducting such operations that will have disruptive, rather than destructive outcomes.
The means through which influence can be exerted relies mostly on spreading information.
However, there are more intrusive ways to influence specific audiences that remain in the
information realm but are designed to change, compromise, inject, destroy, or steal information
by accessing information systems and networks. This paper aims to tackle the following
questions: when does influencing the behaviour of an audience become the primary effect of
a cyber operation, and which cyber operations might qualify as such? We introduce the term
Influence Cyber Operations (ICOs) to describe these actions in cyberspace.
In order to address these questions, and drawing from existing literature, this paper defines
ICOs as a specific subset of Influence Operations. ICOs encompass activities undertaken in
cyberspace affecting the logical layer of cyberspace with the intention of influencing attitudes,
behaviours, or decisions of target audiences. To illustrate the case for ICOs, we comment
on a broad range of techniques that can be used in order to conduct these, and discuss the
accompanying policy frameworks.

يسعى هذا التحليل لإلقاء الضوء على مفهوم الدفاع الإلكتروني من واقع الاستراتيجيات العسكرية المختلفة، وآليات تحقيقه، بالإضافة إلى الوقوف على أهم أهداف الدفاع الإلكتروني والمؤسسات المسؤولة عن تحقيقه في هذا المجال، وتحديد أبرز التطورات التكنولوجية التي أحدثت تقارباً بين المجالات المدنية  والعسكرية، وما فرضه ذلك من تحديات أمنية تسعى الدول لمواجهتها.

The emergence of the Internet has brought both advantages and threats. As countries become more border-less, cyber attacks or cyber-based threats are becoming more increased yearly, as easily as dropping a Trojan horse into a computer network, or crippling the entire service infrastructure of a nation. Cyberplanning is a method used to anticipate any cyber situation, be it pre-attack, during the attack and post-attack. This paper will look at the role of Cyberplanning in a nation’s resilience, and provide an idea or concept on national defense and security.

This study presents the context and measured results of cyber security joint cyber defense training exercises. Building on previously published work by the authors that introduced AGILE methodologies, this study analyzes the outcomes of that professional development and laboratory-supported environment. Analysis focuses on the development of specific individual skill levels and generally describes desired multi-agency collaborative capabilities. While all training events do not have sufficient pre-post data to isolate the particular causes of a rise in capabilities, competence in progressively harder levels of capabilities is observed over time in relation to the training components. A comprehensive Personalized Education Learning Environment (PELE) aggregate data of individuals is not presented here, indicators suggest that this would enhance outcomes.

Efforts to regulate cyber conflicts—and cyber-defence postures more generally— rose to prominence almost a decade ago, when the risks for national and international security and stability arising from the cyber domain became clear.1 As I argued elsewhere (Taddeo 2014), these efforts often rely on an analogy-based approach, according to which the regulatory problems concerning cyber conflicts are only apparent, insofar as these are not radically different from other forms of conflicts. Those endorsing this approach claim that the existing legal framework2 governing armed conflicts is sufficient to regulate the cyber battlefield. All that is needed is an in-depth analysis of such laws and an adequate interpretation of the phenomena. As Schmitt stresses.

Critical infrastructures are the physical and virtual systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and the government. Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is a critical agenda item for governments in the developed countries. In these countries, policies and procedures on CIP are already in place and required laws are in action as well. In Turkey, some official introductory studies have been performed in 2009. However, there are a number of steps that Turkey still has to take. In this study, key definitions are provided firstly. After the definitions, the efforts of USA, EU, OECD and NATO are summarized. The last two sections of the paper are dedicated to the steps taken by Turkey and the challenges still ahead Turkey.

In the field of cyber security, ill-defined concepts and inconsistently applied terminology are further complicating an already complex issue. This causes difficulties for policy-makers, strategists and academics. Using national cyber security strategies to support current literature, this paper undertakes three tasks with the goal of classifying and defining
terms to begin the development of a lexicon of cyber security terminology. The first task is to offer for consideration a definition of “active cyber defence” (ACD). This definition is based upon a number of characteristics identified in current academic and policy literature. ACD is defined here as the proactive detection, analysis and mitigation of network security breaches in real-time combined with the use of aggressive countermeasures deployed outside the victim network. Once defined, ACD is contextualised alongside two further approaches to cyber defence and security. These are fortified and resilient cyber defence, predicated upon defensive
perimeters and ensuring continuity of services respectively. This contextualisation is postulated in order to provide more clarity to non-active cyber defence measures than is offered by the commonly used term “passive cyber defence”. Finally, it is shown that these three approaches to cyber defence and security are neither mutually exclusive nor applied independently of one another. Rather they operate in a complementary triptych of policy approaches to achieving
cyber security.

O tema deste trabalho gira em torno dos impactos da securitização militar do ciberespaço na política internacional do século XXI. Escolhe-se como objeto de estudo a defesa cibernética, justamente por ela possibilitar inferências sobre a materialização politicoinstitucional de tal temática, buscando-se sustentação na teoria da securitização, proposta pela Escola de Copenhague. Nesse sentido, a presente Dissertação objetiva: (i) identificar as principais ameaças (ciber)existenciais para o setor militar, revelando o porque de esse processo se intensificar no século XXI; (ii) projetar quais as condições para tal securitização; e (iii) explicar os efeitos dela na política internacional, com fulcro nos casos estadunidense, brasileiro e canadense. Para tal, engendra-se o Espectro da Securitização Militar do Ciberespaço (ESMC), um framework de análise baseado na teoria da securitização com foco na defesa cibernética num determinado tempo e espaço. Quanto à revisão da literatura, autores brasileiros e estrangeiros de Ciência Política e de Relações Internacionais figuram majoritariamente no corpo deste trabalho. No que se refere à metodologia, utilizam-se a lógica dedutiva popperiana e o estilo qualiquantitativo de análise, no que pese à utilização de entrevistas, estudos de caso, análise de discursos e documentos, bem como o auxílio de softwares. Sua conclusão busca corroborar a hipótese de que, além de haver a securitização do ciberespaço pelo setor militar, tal processo tem reflexos na política internacional hodierna. Como consequência, é possível situar os três casos aqui selecionados no ESMC.

Cyberspace is a new challenge for the global security and stability and poses numerous threats for the protection of national critical infrastructures. This paper analyses the way the European Union adjusts to these threats, by adapting new policies and establishing the development of relative institutions regarding cybersecurity and cyber-defence. The aim is to critically assess the ability of the EU to act as a reliable security provider in cyberspace. Recent developments indicate that the EU needs to overcome its institutional fragmentation and become a resilient actor in cyberspace.

Csutak Zsolt: ÚJ IDŐK ÚJ HADVISELÉSE-KOGNITÍV BIZTONSÁG AZ INFORMÁCIÓS ÉS A KIBERHADVISELÉS KORÁBAN ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ: A 21. század posztmodern, globalizált és a számítógépes rendszerek uralta korában radikálisan megváltoztak az információszerzés, a kommunikáció, a társas interakció s így a hadviselés viszonyrendszerei is. A politikai és a gazdasági érdekérvényesítés súlypontja áttevődik a kibertérbe, az elektronikus online média hadszíntérré változik, és az információ fegyverré alakul. Állami és nem állami szereplők használják a propagandisztikus online mé-diabefolyásolás puha erőkifejtő eszközeit, amelyek ellen nagyon nehéz hatékonyan védekezni. A stratégia és a módszer tulajdonképpen évtizedek óta ismert, csupán a kibertechnológiai megoldások és forradalmi változások teszik újszerűvé az információs műveleteket, illetve a hib-rid hadviselés megnyilvánulási formáit. Az emberek és a társadalmak kognitív sérülékenysége a puha erőhatások és a hibrid befolyásoló hadműveletek célpontjában új stratégiai elemző megközelítést és alternatív hadviselési, szociálpszichológiai megoldásokat tesz szükségessé. KULCSSZAVAK: kibertér, információs és pszichológiai műveletek, hibrid, információs és elekt-ronikai hadviselés, kognitív biztonság, médiabefolyásolás, puha erőhatás, propaganda "A képzelet sokkal fontosabb, mint a tudás." Albert Einstein 1 BEVEZETÉS Közhelyszerűnek tűnő, ellenben igaz megállapítás, miszerint a 21. század elején új idők új szele fúj a társadalmi, technológiai és politikai, következésképp a katonai interakciók és viszonyrendszerek területén is. Az újszerű kihívások újszerű stratégiát és megoldási alternatívákat kívánnak, olyan új paradigmát, gondolkodásmódot, amellyel talán még nem is találkoztak sem a döntéshozók, sem digitális világunk hétköznapi polgárai. Posztmodern korunk meghatározó hívószavai lettek és az utóbbi évtized során alapfogalmakká váltak olyan kifejezések, mint információ, digitális, elektronikai, kiber, továbbá a velük szoros összefüggésben használt és értelmezett tág fogalmak, mint társadalom, biztonság, valamint a számunkra-a dolgozat témájánál fogva-különösen fontos hadviselés. Mindezen változások hátterében fellelhetőek a széles körű globális politikai és technikai átalakulások, trendek, amelyekre reagálni kénytelenek mind a katonai stratégiaalkotók, mind pedig az elhárításban, információszerzésben és-feldolgozásban érintett biztonsági szolgálatok. A dolgozat témáját, alapkérdéskörét tekintve a korlátozott formai és tartalmi keretek között kísérletet teszek a viszonylag új stílusú és koncepciójú pszichológiai, illetve informá-1 https://www.citatum.hu/idezet/15580 (Letöltés időpontja: 2018. 05. 05.)

En el presente trabajo se aborda la cuestión de la ciberseguridad, una disciplina que atiende las amenazas que surgen y se despliegan en el "quinto dominio" o ciberespacio. Su objetivo principal consiste en determinar si en esta cuestión de tanta importancia dentro de la agenda de la Seguridad Internacional contemporánea, la comunidad internacional ha desarrollado instituciones que permitan alcanzar acuerdos y reducir los niveles de conflictividad. Desde el punto de vista metodológico, se utilizó un abordaje lógico deductivo, el análisis fluctuó entre los niveles descriptivo y explicativo, y se utilizó información cualitativa obtenida de fuentes secundarias. El trabajo permitió identificar los aspectos centrales de la ciberseguridad, su grado de institucionalidad desde el punto de vista teórico de las relaciones internacionales y, finalmente, la situación de un área específica de la ciberseguridad: la ciberguerra. Se concluye que el grado de institucionalización en materia de ciberseguridad, en el plano internacional, es limitado. No existe una convención multilateral que aborde el tema de manera integral y se articulan mecanismos alternativos de gobernanza para mejorar la situación en diferentes aspectos de esa cuestión. En el caso de la ciberguerra, la utilidad de los mecanismos de gobernanza es controversial, pues no resulta claro si son empíricamente aplicables los consensos alcanzados en el plano nominal.

In this article we compare the main regulations employed by the United States and Brazil for their respective cybersecurity and cyber defence. From this comparison we produced four main conclusions. First, the absence of an effective public policy for cybersecurity and cyber defence in the United States left the country vulnerable to Russian cyber-attacks that influenced the course of the 2016 Presidential Election. Second, the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, which was supported by Barack Obama, who was President at the time, would have increased US protection against cyber-attacks. However, the bill did not become law because it was defeated in the US Senate. Third, if Brazil had enacted legislation similar to the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, the country would have prevented most of the fake news and cyber-attacks that occurred in its own 2018 Presidential Election. Fourth, the main initiatives of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 can still be implemented by both the United States and Brazil. To reach these conclusions, we compared intended purpose of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, with facts that highlight the consequent failures in cybersecurity and cyber defence in the United States and Brazil.
Keywords: cybersecurity; cyber defence; cyber-attacks; Cybersecurity Act of 2012; Internet regulation; cyber safety in the United States; cyber safety in Brazil.

Cyber security is one of the burning issues in modern world. Increased IT infrastructure has given rise to enormous chances of security breach. Bangladesh being a relatively new member of cyber security arena has its own demand and appeal. Digitalization is happening in Bangladesh for last few years at an appreciable rate. People are being connected to the worldwide web community with their smart devices. These devices have their own vulnerability issues as well as the data shared over the internet has a very good chances of getting breached. Common vulnerability issues like infecting the device with malware, Trojan, virus are on the rise. Moreover, a lack of proper cyber security policy and strategy might make the existing situation at the vulnerable edge of tipping point. Hence the upcoming new infrastructures will be at a greater risk if the issues are not dealt with at an early age. In this paper common vulnerability issues including their recent attacks on cyber space of Bangladesh, cyber security strategy and need for data privacy policy is discussed and analysed briefly.

Considering the advantages and conditions of launching and executing cyber warfare, an interesting question that arises and which we envisage as possible, is the potential formation of military cyber alliances. These cyber alliances may not only be formed between countries where everyone has cyber capacities, but also among countries where some have and others do not. They can established between countries already militarily allied, in a conventional form like NATO, or between any countries. Given that cyber weapons are not limited by geographic boundaries and much less by physical barriers and distances, these alliances could not only be formed between neighboring, border countries, as in the conventional military alliances, but with any countries. A perception that we understand, that in the future may be common, is the establishment of Cyber Alliances set up in a permanent way and with a common cyber defence perspective. In addition, in our perspective, all of the current conventional military alliances will evolve into cyber alliances with the current allies and the incorporation of other countries. We also envisaged the formation of cybernetic alliances to trigger cyber wars by proxy, in a way similar to conventional proxy warfare. These alliances have the objective of strengthening already existing cyber power, or endowing of such capabilities, even indirectly, the countries without these capacities. For these countries, without cybernetic capabilities, their association with countries with such capabilities is very important in the case of forthcoming cyber warfare. The creation of cyber alliances and the unleashing of cyber warfare by proxy is not only possible but it will be a reality in the near future.

The potential that cyber warfare seems to have, and the low economic costs required to implement a cyber army, when compared to the acquisition of means used in conventional warfare, can lead to the massive appearance of the first ones. This may also lead small countries to want to become "Cyber Military Powers", although they may not have the conditions, namely economic, to be "Conventional Military Powers" (A. Caldas, 2013; Barbosa, 2018).
There are some difficulties, which, however, they would have to overcome in order for it to be possible for them. The human resources necessary for the constitution of a cyber army are very different from those necessary for the constitution of a conventional army. The physical and athletic capacity of cyber troops is important, but intellectual and scientific capacity is fundamental. The knowledge and mastery of computer technology in its various subareas: software, hardware, programming, networks, databases, etc. must be of an excellent level. Obtaining these capabilities takes a long time and may not be possible for anyone to acquire. The propensity for information technology is fundamental, since the capacities and computer skills have much of innate.
There are many kinds of cyberwar actions but we consider the Cyberwarfare actions based in the exploiting of computer bugs, and, which may lead to the so-called loss of state sovereignty. In this cases, preferably, these bugs, vulnerabilities, should be unknown, Zero Day Vulnerability, ZDV. To exploit these failures, a program that executes some pernicious action based on exploiting the bug, Zero Day Exploit, ZDE, has to be developed and, in advance, placed on the target computer, (Clark & Knake, 2010), (Singer & Friedman, 2014).
Countries wishing to become future cyber military powers need: (1) Capacity to form cyber army whose cyber troops have the indicated characteristics, (2) Get ZDEs that can be used on your opponent’s computer systems and (3) Be able to exploit the ZDEs and use them to inflict damage on their opponents, (Barbosa, 2018), (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993).
These capabilities, perhaps, can be easily obtained in large countries, particularly in the highly technologically advanced ones, but in small countries, particularly in those less technologically advanced, they might be hard to obtain.

The possibility of using computerized means in offensive action against civilian or military installations from enemy countries is a real. Given the potential of this type of action, they can be seen by many countries as interesting. And as an alternative to conventional kinetic warfare. Despite its many theoretical advantages, obtaining the cyber capabilities needed to implement cyber military units is not easy and may not be within reach of any country. The necessary financial means may not be a major obstacle to this achievement because they are relatively low, when compared to those necessary to obtain conventional means. Similarly, obtaining a support infrastructure is also not theoretically difficult. However, obtaining both human and technological resources , other than those related to the support infrastructure, may not be available to any country, namely the designated Zero Day Exploits, ZDE, that are needed to explore computer vulnerabilities in informatics systems of the other countries. There are other types of constraints, time needed to prepare the means and the planning and development of cyber actions, type of targets to be attained, specificity of computer systems and even the possible need for cyber media com-plementarity with conventional means that can be limiting and impede their widespread use. Thus, cyber warfare is a very interesting alternative, but given these constraints and limitations, it may not be a real viable alternative to be used in all situations and by all countries.

Nel corso dei prossimi anni le innovazioni tecnologiche attuali e future avranno un crescente impatto sugli eserciti occidentali, in particolare quelle che riguardano le tecnologie dell'informazione e della comunicazione, l'intelligenza artificiale e il cloud. Il singolo soldato continuerà a rappresentare l'elemento fondamentale dell'esercito, ma dovrà essere connesso con i diversi assetti disponibili in modo sempre più esteso, efficiente e sicuro. Ciò andrà fatto tenendo conto dell'esperienza acquisita tramite precedenti e spesso insoddisfacenti sforzi volti all'ottenimento di capacità netcentriche. Le innovazioni in vista avranno effetti significativi in termini di letalità, mobilità, protezione ed efficienza energetica della fanteria, e rispetto all'addestramento. All'interno del più ampio contesto strategico e tecnologico, Stati Uniti, Francia, Germania, Italia, Regno Unito e Israele rappresentano importanti casi da esaminare, così come gli sviluppi interni alla Nato e all'Unione Europea. Le conclusioni dello studio delineano alcuni temi e sfide comuni, con lo sguardo rivolto ai possibili futuri passi, soprattutto per l'Italia e gli altri alleati europei.

Over the next years, ongoing and future technological innovations, especially related to information communication technology (ICT), artificial intelligence (AI) and cloud will have an increasing impact on Western armies. The soldier will remain the army’s primary element, but will need to be more and better connected in a secure way with the various assets at disposal, also learning the lessons from previous and often disappointing efforts towards net-centric or network-enabled capabilities. Moreover, innovations will be significant in terms of lethality, mobility, power generation and protection, as well as in training. Within the broader strategic and technological context, the US, France, Germany, Italy, Israel and the UK are important cases to consider, together with developments within NATO and EU frameworks. The conclusions outline a number of common themes and challenges, with a view to the way ahead particularly for Italy and other European allies.

Multifaceted nature of frameworks are growing bit by bit. This prompts a consistently expanding number of weaknesses in the Systems. Assailants utilize these weaknesses for abusing the arrangement of casualty. It is more brilliant to find these weaknesses early before the assailant do. The power of Vulnerability assessment is commonly barely cared about. While Penetration Testing and Vulnerability Assessment can be utilized as digital protection innovation for giving proactive digital safeguard. It exhibited Penetration Testing and Vulnerability Assessment in this paper as digital protection innovation and how it can give dynamic digital safeguard utilizing Penetration Testing and Vulnerability Assessment. It depicted complete life pattern of Penetration Testing and Vulnerability Assessment on organizations and frameworks and proactive move taken to handle that stop conceivable assault and weakness. In this paper it has portrayed regular Vulnerability appraisal systems and some mainstream open source VAPT instruments. It has portrayed full methodology of how to utilize Penetration Testing and Vulnerability Assessment as an unbelievable digital protection innovation

The term "hybrid" gained widespread use in military and political discourse; it grabbed the headlines and eventually reached the general public. We refer to "hybrid warfare" or "hybrid conflict", most likely without fully comprehending the term's meaning and ramifications. The question is whether and when hybrid warfare should be regarded an armed attackthat exceeds the threshold of damage and devastation caused by a kinetic action. The purpose of this article is to provide light on the consistency of the growing doctrine of hybrid warfare with current international (humanitarian) law, beginning with a lexical and logical analysis of the words.

Il Cyber Strategy & Policy Brief si pone come scopo quello di sensibilizzare ogni mese i lettori su questi argomenti, analizzando i principali avvenimenti a livello internazionale, al fine di desumere i trend della ‘minaccia cibernetica’ e le lezioni apprese utili alla salvaguardia della nostra sicurezza nazionale.

Parole chiave: Active Cyber Defence, Cyber Intelligence, Cyber Warfare, G7, Giappone, Iran, Nazioni Unite, Stati Uniti, Strategia, Supreme Council of Cyberspace, U.S. Naval Academy.

A wealth of data is generated by the Ministry of Defence’s IT networks which can be analysed to improve cyber threat detection and data centre operations.

In cyber defence, detection algorithms have advanced from static rules to machine-learning algorithms that can harness the rich amount of network data available to detect low signature anomalies in the environment. Similarly, statistical analysis on infrastructure logs can derive patterns in system utilisation and user behaviour to gain insights into increasingly complex operating environments, pre-empt incidents and optimise resource allocation.

This article shares how DSTA applies data analytics to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in cyber defence and data centre operations.

Güvenlik kavramı, insanoğlunun tarih boyunca hem en temel ihtiyacı hem de en önemli problemi olmuştur. Savunma ve saldırı stratejileri, savaş temelinde güvenlik politikalarını şekillendirmiştir. Savaş kavramı yüzyıllardır gelişerek asimetrik savaş ve günümüzde ise iletişim araçlarının ve bilişim teknolojilerinin hızlı gelişmesi ile birlikte bilgi savaşlarını gündeme getirmektedir. Savunma stratejilerinin gelişmesi ile birlikte insanoğlunun korunan şeylere olan merakının bir sonucu olarak, yeni saldırı stratejileri geliştirilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, şifreleme algoritmaları savunma amacıyla tarih boyunca, tüm iletişim kanalları için kullanılmıştır. Bu bağlamda şifreleme algoritmaları mesajın korunmasının ana unsuru haline gelmiş, gelecekte de bu özelliğini hiçbir zaman kaybetmeyecektir.

The state of development of the information society of a particular country can have a great influence on the outcome of a cyberwarfare in which it is involved. This influence, in the possible outcome of a war of this type, can be positive or negative. In addition, contrary to what might initially be thought, a low development of the information society can be advantageous to obtain a victory , if one strictly considers the scenario of cyberwar and the countries in confrontation. This way, we analyze this influence and relationship between the information society and cyberwarfare in the scope of security and defense. We designate this dependency as Cybernetic Dependency Capacity. This dependence is a very important factor in the results of cyberwarfare actions and can be positive or negative for both technologically developed and less developed countries. For these reasons, the destiny of any country, within the scope of a cyber-war, is very influenced by the dependence of this country of their information society. As a major development of the IT society in one country will not make it theoretically victorious in a cyber-warfare with a country less IT developed. This fact, which is apparently paradoxical, is because the larger information society of a country is more informatics systems have to exist. Then, if much more infor-matics systems exist, more cyber doors are open for cyber-attacks, because the probability of these systems will be unprotected, from the point of view of cyber-attacks, increases with the growth in the number of computers systems. For the same reason, the countries with less dependence on the information society, do not have this cyber permeability and may be more cyber resilient. In the limit, theoretically, the least dependent cyber country can be the winner and the most dependent and as such, technologically more developed, be the loser in a cyberwar between the two. These scenarios are also applicable to non-states and terrorist organizations and for these reasons should be analyzed and considered in the definition of the Cyber Defence Policies of any country, namely in the factors like a Cybernetic Attack Capacity and a Cybernetic Dependency Capacity.

Pada saat ini Indonesia masih kurang sadar akan keamanan informasi yang ada di dalam dunia digital. Hal ini terjadi karena banyak masyarakat yang masih berfikir bahwa dunia digital tidak terlalu penting bagi masyarakat Indonesia, padahal dunia digital merupakan patokan di era teknologi saat ini. Karena pentingnya dunia digital, maka keamanan informasi sangat dibutuhkan untuk menjaga atau melindungi informasi-informasi penting yang tersimpan dalam dunia digital.
Setiap negara di dunia, tentu membutuhkan rasa aman untuk menjalankan kegiatan pemerintahan dan memberikan pelayanan kepada warganya. Dalam hal tersebut diperlukan usaha-usaha bersama dengan melibatkan pemerintah dan juga warga negara (masyarakat), untuk saling membantu menjaga keamanan system dari berbagai ancaman dan gangguan yang ada didalam maupun di luar Indonesia.
Karena banyaknya ancaman yang datang dari luar maupun dalam negeri tersebut, maka kami merencanakan untuk membangun sebuah sistem yang dapat meningkatkan pertahanan keamanan informasi dalam pemerintahan maupun non-pemerintahan dan juga sekaligus meningkatkan kompetensi Sumber Daya Manusia (SDM) .

Within the last decade, the world has been more interconnected through the cyber world, which relies on internet connection. Nonetheless, such fact has also brought challenges which have shocked the world. There has been an increasing number of global cyber threats in the digital age recently. These include cyber attacks, as well as disruptions on government and electoral commission websites. Unfortunately, the attacks targeted critical infrastructures like hospitals which interrupted the service. Additionally, they also hindered the public from accessing government websites which provide information and online service. Furthermore, they also stormed the electoral commission website, which impacted on the democratic process. Thus, this paper attempts to outline the global cyber attacks experienced by both the developed and developing world. Through desk research, the paper identifies the key findings of current security problems in the digital policy-making era. Referring to the act...

The purpose of the article is to analyse Operation "Olympic Games" including, in particular, to indicate the political background to the activities aimed at preventing the development of Iran's nuclear programme, and to examine the preparation and conduct of the operation, the involvement of the US and Israeli intelligence services, and the use of intelligence methods and sources. An equally important objective is to indicate the real consequences of the cyberattack with the Stuxnet virus. In the research process, a critical analysis of literature in the field of Intelligence Studies and source materials (including legal acts, strategies, reports, and other official studies of the entities forming the US Intelligence Community) was carried out. The example of Operation Olympics Games shows that complex cyber-sabotage operations resulting in the destruction of critical infrastructure on a large scale require the involvement of numerous state resources and advanced cyber activities, and the use of many different methods and intelligence sources. Thus, strong states with well-developed intelligence capabilities are much more capable of effectively using cyber-sabotage on a large scale.

The current year has seen unprecedented amount of hacker/ransomware attacks on government as well as private enterprises spread all across the world. Shadow Brokers came in form this year by leaking alleged NSA tools, which included a Windows exploit known as EternalBlue. In May, WannaCry ransomware crippled hundreds of thousands of computers belonging to public utilities, large corporations, and private citizens. It also affected National Health Service hospitals and facilities in the United Kingdom. It was halted in its tracks by utilising its flaws and activating a kill switch. WannaCry rode on Shadow Brokers leak of Windows OS weakness EternalBlue and the fact that the Windows MS17-010 patch had not been updated on many machines by the users. In June, Petya (also known as NotPetya/ Nyetya/Goldeneye) infected machines worldwide. It is suspected that its main target was to carry out a cyber-attack on Ukraine. It hit various utility services in Ukraine including the central bank, power companies, airports, and public transportation1. In 2009, Conficker2 worm had infected civil and defence establishments of many nations, for example, the UK DOD had reported large-scale infection of its major computer systems including ships, submarines, and establishments of Royal Navy. The French Naval computer network 'Intramar' was infected, the network had to be quarantined, and air operations suspended. The German Army also reported infection of over a hundred of its computers. Conficker sought out flaws in Windows OS software and propagated by forming a botnet, it was very difficult to weed it out because it used a combination of many advanced malware techniques. It became the largest known computer worm infection by afflicting millions of computers in over 190 countries. It is evident from the above incidents, which have the capability to inflict damage to both military and public institutions, that the amount of data and the speeds at which processing is required in case of cyber defence is beyond the capacity of human beings. Conventional algorithms are also unable to tackle dynamically changing data during a cyber-attack. Therefore, there is an increasing opinion that effective cyber defence can only be provided by real time flexible Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems with learning capability. The US Defence Science Board report of 20133 states that " in a perfect world, DOD operational systems would be able to tell a commander when and if they were compromised, whether the system is still usable in full or degraded mode, identify alternatives to aid the commander in completing the mission, and finally provide the ability to restore the system to a known, trusted state. Today's technology does not allow that level of fidelity and understanding of systems. " The report brings out that, systems such as automated intrusion detection, automated patch management, status data from each network, and regular network audits are currently unavailable. As far as cyber defence in military is concerned, in the US, it is the responsibility of the Cyber Command to " protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information systems and computer networks " 4. The offensive cyber operations could involve both military and intelligence agencies since both computer network exploitation and computer network attacks are involved. The commander of Cyber Command is also the Director of National Security Agency, thus enabling the Cyber Command to execute computer exploitations that may result in physical destruction of military or civilian infrastructure of the adversary. AI utilizes a large number of concepts like, Machine Learning, Fuzzy Logic Control Systems, and Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs), etc. each of which singly or in combination are theoretically amenable for designing an efficient cyber-defence systems. The designed AI cyber defence system should proficiently monitor the network in real time and must be aware

Within the last decade, the world has been more interconnected through the cyber world, which relies on internet
connection. Nonetheless, such fact has also brought challenges which have shocked the world. There has been an increasing
number of global cyber threats in the digital age recently. These include cyber attacks, as well as disruptions on government
and electoral commission websites. Unfortunately, the attacks targeted critical infrastructures like hospitals which interrupted
the service. Additionally, they also hindered the public from accessing government websites which provide information and
online service. Furthermore, they also stormed the electoral commission website, which impacted on the democratic process.
Thus, this paper attempts to outline the global cyber attacks experienced by both the developed and developing world.
Through desk research, the paper identifies the key findings of current security problems in the digital policy-making era.
Referring to the actual facts, this paper recommends a move in raising awareness on potential global cyber threat. It also
proposes the formulation of legal measures. Lastly, it endorses the development of comprehensive and collaborative efforts
in tackling cyber problems.

This article discusses the development of the strategic communications of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, the EZLN, between 1994 and 1996. During this period, the Zapatista movement transformed from a group focused on armed struggle into a social movement. The EZLN used rhetorical and communications strategies, not only to construct group identity but as a way to pressure the Mexican government into guaranteeing their rights as citizens and as an indigenous minority. The article also reflects on the discursive strategies employed by the group's main leader, Subcomandante Marcos, and on the Zapatistas' narratives and the structure of the communications they disseminated to their worldwide network of committees connected through the internet.

Development of international norms and confidence building measures in cyberspace.Cyber operations can be described as operatives that run through a computer using a data system. These operations may have different purposes, to infiltrate a system, to collect, export, destroy, exchange information. There are numerous targets in real life that can be destroyed by these cyber attacks, infrastructure, industry, telecommunications or financial system can be hamped by these operations.The word "cyber" has managed to attract people's attention more and more in recent years. If we put the word "cyber" in front of any other term, we will be able to accomplish a new term for a new millennium. In the media and in public speeches more and more often appear as cyber attack, cyber warfare, cyber security and cyber crimes, these words lead to a new speech, debates and new analyses. Cyberspace is a complex area that requires a new expertise and a creative approach that can provide solutions to existing problems. Cyberspace influences more and more existential areas such as national security, international relations, political and legal field.Cyber activities and cyberspace are quite difficult to understand due to the complexity of the informational system and computer networks. The law plays an important role in many moments defining certain key concepts, cataloding certain behaviors, regulating the activities and obligations of the authorities or different actors. Decision makers and actors will try to avoid most of the time the specific warnings provided by law.In cyberspace, nothing is predictable, being a far too complex field in which the balance of power between states is balanced, and non-State actors play an increasing role. Cyberspace empowers the weak ones and leaves the technically advanced states particularly vulnerable. Moreover, due to specific characteristics of the internet, traditional Confidence Building Measures reffering to specific weapons, to geographic areas or to any kind of verification and control are not feasible. We also can assume that the development of CBMs for cyberspace is a very difficult task to complete because states do not have the monopoly or control over production and import of malicious sofware.