Chinese politics (Area Studies)

"Authors: Adam Horálek and Pavel Ptáček
"The book contains eight chapters in four major fields (each field contains two chapters) - environment, demography and population, economy, and geopolitics. As an introduction, the short outline of major reforms China took under the rule of Deng Xiaoping is used. In stead of conclusion, the vision of China in 2030 is incorporated according to the official plans and prognoses. The book is structured as a study text, including topics and questions for further reading and thinking about the topics. It is mainly focused on Chinese studies and Geography undergraduate as well as postgraduate students in Czechia (as it is in Czech).

Content:
Otec čínské transformace Deng Xiaoping
2. 1. Environmentální problémy současné Číny
2.2. Projekt jiho-severního transportu vody jako odpověď na deficit vody v severní Číně
3.1. Stárnutí populace Číny
3.2. Populačně-národnostní politika Číny
4. 1. Měnící se role Číny v globální ekonomice a její dopad na místní obyvatele
4.2. Rozvoj západu: analýza hlavní čínské regionální „kohezní“ politiky 21. století
5.1. Afrika jako sféra čínských zájmů
5.2 Energetická geopolitika Číny
Čína roku 2030
"""

Based on eight in-depth interviews, this article analyses the quandary faced by liberal mainland Chinese student migrants in Hong Kong. On the one hand, the liberal pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong are deeply intertwined with the rise of localism, which is based on a dichotomy between Hong Kong and mainland China. On the other hand, a rising, development-centric nationalism in mainland China reduces Hong Kong protesters to unemancipated British colonial subjects. However, in the context of this "double marginalisation," liberal Mainland students guard a form of liberalism that transcends both Hong Kong localism and Chinese nationalism. They debunk the stereotype of mainland Chinese students being apolitical and therefore provide an alternative definition of being Chinese. They challenge the view that mainland Chinese can only be emancipated outside mainland China to destabilise a Fukuyamian linear interpretation of history. They use four tactics to cope with double marginalisation: understanding localists, befriending expatriates, assuming professionalism, and becoming apolitical.

This article examines Xi Jinping's utilization of state propaganda since his rise as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012. Through a comparison of reportage on Xi and other national leaders and the consideration of case studies from the Mao and Xi periods, it argues that Xi has made more extensive use of propaganda in the People's Daily than any leader since the founding of the People's Republic, with the possible exception of Mao Zedong. By evaluating a 'Xi Jinping effect' in propaganda, this article suggests Xi has leant heavily on media power to project authority over the Party and beyond. Xi Jinping's ascent has also coincided with reduced emphasis on other leaders, providing evidence for the weakening of collective leadership in China.

A study of China's modernisation is arguably the most important research project that Sinologists could embark on in close collaboration with China oriented scientists from various quarters ready and willing to co-operate with each other. The big question is: CAN CHINA BECOME A MODERN NATION WITHOUT LIBERTY?

S.V. Dmitriev and S.L. Kuzmin. 2014. The Qing Empire as China: an Anatomy of Historical Myth. – Oriens (Moscow) (1): 5-17.
It is often considered that China is a unique state in the world which has been several times won by foreigners, but never became a part of any other state, thus retaining continuity of its history and statehood based on consecutive row of ruling dynasties. This view is based on ancient sinocentric model which does not satisfy testing by comparative historical approach. Our analysis revealed that the Qing Empire cannot be equaled to China. Although the latter term has been broadly used, it had different meaning at different times. Actually, China was only a part of the Qing Empire. Manchu declarations that their state is China (i.e. Middle State, most important in the world), are similar to those by German, Ottoman, Russian and other monarchs on their states' continuity from the Roman Empire. These declarations have only historical value and cannot be used for modern international law. The Qing and other "conquest dynasties of China" were actually different empires created by non-Chinese peoples. The Han nation-state: Republic of China and People's Republic of China (PRC) had acquired almost whole territory of the Qing Empire as a result of occupation of weaker neighbors, instead of continuity of one state. Modern concept of PRC as a multinational state of "one Chinese nation", that included "minority nationalities" at least from the Middle Ages, is a historical myth.

This book studies the survival strategies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Examining both the CCP's quest for popular legitimacy and its search for party cohesion, Zeng argues that ideological reform and the institutionalization of power succession are crucial factors in the party's retention of power. China's economic success has created a fundamental dilemma for the CCP: if a communist party does not deliver communism and class victory, why is it there at all? There is a potential contradiction between generating economic success by utilizing quasi-capitalist economic policies on the one hand, and the fact that this is a communist party that supposedly justifies its rule by being the vehicle to deliver a communist society on the other. This contradiction has proved a challenge to the CCP's rule, generating belief crises in Chinese society and ideological battles within the party. This book shows how the CCP has remained in power by continually revising the ideological basis that justifies its rule.

Digital technologies and Internet connectivity are enabling rapid mobilisation of large groups of individuals around a common cause. The defining feature of such a Radically Networked Society (RNS) is the scale and pace of its operations. Consequently, RNS movements pose a serious challenge for the hierarchically ordered state structures, which tend to lack the dexterity and speed to respond.

In this paper, we apply the RNS framework to the 2019-20 Hong Kong protests. We conclude that the protests were the product of underlying fissures over issues of identity and political autonomy. The region’s thriving Internet ecosystem and hyper-connected society enabled the development and expansion of networked communities around these issues. This fuelled sustained, leaderless mobilisation, resulting in large-scale disruption and electoral advances for pro-democracy activists.

Meanwhile, the state’s response was rooted in a strategy of attrition. This
minimised costs and proved somewhat effective in that the movement failed to achieve the broader objective of earning universal suffrage for Hong Kongers.

Yet, the protests have managed to fundamentally reshape state-society relations and shift the narrative around the region’s future.

China’s local governments are facing a crisis of public confidence and have struggled to handle political dissent and popular protests. In an attempt to promote political stability, local officials around the country have utilized Twitter-like microblog sites (微博weibo) to upgrade their capability to influence citizens and engage in rapid information management. Through the analysis of microblogging by prominent propagandists whose identities and professions are known to the public, this article finds some evidence that microblogging could be helping cadres to win hearts and minds, although such microblogging poses new risks to the state as netizens challenge propagandists and state policies in exchanges that reveal political pluralism and disapproval of state policies. While venting on weibo may enable people to blow off steam, the reluctance (or inability) of official microbloggers to engage their critics in meaningful dialogue suggests the limited utility of official microblogging as a means of furthering political stability through the improvement of state–society relations.

In March 2008, Tibet erupted in the biggest challenge to Chinese rule since 1959. While
Beijing and Dharamsala engaged in their familiar battle of representations, pundits
speculated on the causes of the uprising, ranging from conspiracy theories to informed policy
analysis. Applying the framework of the insecurity dilemma, this article argues that Tibetan
identity insecurity on account of the post-1989 hard-line Chinese policies was the chief cause
of the uprising. Largely peaceful protests and occasionally violent riots in Tibet have been
integral to Tibetan efforts to mitigate their societal insecurities provoked by Chinese
migration, ‘assimilationist’ policies and ‘cultural imperialism’. However, Tibetan protests
and riots heighten Chinese insecurities and harden Beijing’s policies both inside Tibet and
towards the Dalai Lama. This paper reveals the dynamic cycle of hard-line Chinese policies
provoking Tibetan uprisings; the resulting hardening in Chinese policies feeds back into
Tibetan insecurities and protests. The 2008 uprising was the most recent cycle in the longrunning
saga of the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma. The article warns that unless the
Tibetans and the Chinese find a way to break out of the insecurity dilemma, Tibet could
explode into another frenzy of violence and counter-violence in the near future.

On occasion, China’s international attitude still runs counter to expected
international attitude, understood as the dominant political values and their associated
modes of sociopolitical behavior in the conduct of foreign affairs. Yet, this means
that in the past China’s attitude was even more “erratic.” This raises the following
question: is the expected international attitude spatially and temporally universal?
Relying upon the tools provided by historical sociology we sought to historically
ground the European Nation-States’ and the Chinese Empire’s international attitudes.
Nearly two millennia separates the formation of the Chinese Empire’s and the European
Nation-States’ international attitudes. We identified two related but ultimately
different historical trajectories, which accounts for both the differences of attitude,
but also the rapid worldwide diffusion of the European attitude. If both went through
a process of modern State-building, only 19th century Europe went through a concomitant
transition to industrial capitalism, which radically transformed its domestic
environment materializing the threat of Revolution. Balancing the individual interest
of rival dynasties with their collective interest, the preservation of the Dynastic
Order, led to the materializing of the so-called “Westphalian system,” to which the
Great War put an abrupt end after a century of peace

At least, three “problems” will inflict Moscow’s future relationships with non-Western countries, and especially China. Russia’s repositioning in world politics will be, first, hampered by its weakening economy and growing international isolation. A Sino-Russian alliance is, second, hindered by lacking cultural ties and ideational foundations. Third, China’s growing engagement with and in Russia will encounter a number of specific challenges such as growing Russian xenophobia or the two countries’ increasing rivalry in Central Asia.

Еще два десятилетия назад основным источником глобального экологического кризиса виделся способ производства и потребления в развитых странах. Сегодня в ключевых экологических акторов превращаются быстрорастущие (формирующиеся рыночные) страны. Именно от их усилий по решению глобальных и региональных экологических проблем (разумеется, при содействии развитых государств) будет зависеть жизнь всего человечества. Китай и Индия среди стран бывшего "третьего мира" пользуются большим политическим влиянием, что вкупе со значительными масштабами воздействия экономик этих стран на окружающую среду позволяет говорить о них как об экологических сверхдержавах. Если уровень потребления в Индии и Китае приблизится к уровню потребления в развитых странах, то мир ожидает экологическая катастрофа. В то же время возможность сразу перейти к устойчивой модели развития, минуя негативные экологические последствия промышленного развития, представляется малореальной. Вопрос о том, будет ли найден компромисс между стремлением к экономическому росту и ограниченными природными ресурсами, остается открытым. От того, какой путь развития изберут эти страны в ближайшие годы, во многом будет зависеть развитие всего мира.

Yiching Wu's The Cultural Revolution at the Margins traces the emergence and suppression of a radical critique of state socialism during the Cultural Revolution, a critique that moved beyond the margins of Maoist political thought. While many of the key groups and individuals that Wu focuses on—for example, Yu Luoke (遇罗克 1942-1970), Shengwulian (省无联), and the Li Yizhe group (李一哲)—have received significant attention, Wu argues against teleological liberal interpretations of their work and situates them within a larger political narrative linking the socialist and postsocialist periods. In this narrative, the reform period finds its origins in the strategy of containment that the state developed to suppress these radical tendencies. By placing the Cultural Revolution at the center of PRC history, therefore, this book has important implications far beyond simply adding complexity to the story of the Cultural Revolution.

This paper puts the radical modernization of China between 1840-1970s in the perspective of Paul Tillich's theological reflection on utopianism, and argues that the rising of Neo-Confucianism in middle and late imperial China bears a strong resemblance to the event of China's radical modernization, and hence, there is an utopian root within the Confucian political thought for the event in question.

In contrast to its capital spending in Africa, Chinese Aid in Asia is significantly smaller in spite of growing tendency in regional trade and investments. Extraction of natural resources does not seem to be the dominant reason for trade and investment decisions. To a certain extent, Chinese financial presence in the Asian region can best be described as "softness". In this paper, I will talk about Chinese "soft power" which is a strategic component of Chinese trade and investment patterns as well as its development assistance policy, which is based on setting up harmonious and stable relations with neighboring countries rather than on the immediate hunt for natural resources as is evident in Africa. The exercise of soft power is crucial for China's overall goal to "stabilize the neighborhood" so that it can continue its economic transformation program in a context of peace and stability throughout the region. These investments can be viewed as an exercise in soft power that is central to China's overall foreign economic policy in the Asian region.

This paper seeks to explain the logic of Chinese regional planning pertaining to the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (粤港澳大湾区, hereafter GBA) and the challenges it entails for spatial development. Three questions guide the inquiry of this research: First, what are the institutional underpinnings of the GBA initiative, and how is the path dependency of regional integration in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) unique compared to that in China's other coastal macroregions? Second, how does Beijing's changing strategy toward Hong Kong inform the costs and limits of the GBA initiative, and what are their policy implications for the future development of the PRD? Third, why is regional planning uniquely favored by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) central leadership, and what does this tell us about the changing policy parameters that govern center-local relations in China?

Vocational education and training (VET) is the Achilles' heel of the restructuring of the Chinese economic model. With the “Made in China 2025” strategy, China wants to transform into an innovation-driven industrial nation. This can only be achieved with a highly qualified workforce.

Reform of the VET system is long overdue. Only if China succeeds in establishing a system that can be adapted to the changing requirements of companies will the dream of its political leaders to make the country an industrial superpower materialise. Elena Klorer and Matthias Stepan argue that China’s education system does not promote the abilities that are needed for an innovation-driven economic system. Particularly, standard setting and quality management in vocational training remain problematic.

Factionalism has, since the 1970s, been one of the key elements in explaining both Elite formation and leadership change in the People’s Republic of China. Despite becoming more “civilized” and bound by institutional constraints, factions and other factional groups still play an important role in Elite recruitment, even if Cadres have to go through extensive “field testing” in order to be promoted. In turn, this article focuses on one of the most important political forces present on the Chinese political scene since the 1980s: the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL). Through extensive use of statistical methods, the article tries to measure the “tuanpai effect” on career patterns since 1992 in order to see what, how and up until when the latter affects a Cadre’s promotability. Lastly, this research opens up a discussion on whether the CCYL is a clearly defined and cohesive “faction” or simply a self-repeating promotion channel being used by opportunistic Cadres.

Grand Mediation (GM) is a new conflict management mechanism initiated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to cope with rapidly growing social conflicts and maintain social stability. This article examines how GM operates in an urban grassroots environment and discusses its advantages for managing social conflicts as reflected in a cases study: the Li Qin mediation office. It concludes that GM may improve the capacity of the local government to engage in conflict resolutions, which confers greater resilience on the authoritarian regime. However, this mechanism is sensitive to changing socio–economic conditions, and its sustainability requires further examination.

In this article the thesis is submitted that there is something fundamentally wrong with Western Sinology, or 'Chinakunde', or 'Zhongguoxue' (as distinct from 'Hanxue', which is a kind of old-fashioned philology aggrandised with quasi- if not pseudo-philosophy). 'China experts' either pretend to be knowledgeable about everything related to China, in which case they cannot be taken seriously, or - eventually - admit not to be scientific all-rounders with respect to the country, in which case they cannot be called China experts. The author, who graduated in Sinology from Leyden University and in economics from Erasmus University Rotterdam, not only believes that the study of China has to be taken to a higher level (a belief, he expects, no tenured professor of Chinese Studies/History will share); he also explains how this long overdue task could be accomplished. The study of China should be neither mile-wide-but-inch-deep nor mile-deep-but-inch-wide; it should (and could!) be mile-wide-and-mile-deep. The heyday of Sinology is yet to come.

Under Xi Jinping, the cadre recruitment policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been adapted. What are the political implications of these adaptations? This paper argues that Xi has sought to consolidate his power among the political elite and strengthen grassroots governance by introducing a new cadre recruitment policy. We propose the concept of "dual elite recruitment logic" as an aid to interpreting the cadre recruitment strategy in the Xi era: the CCP's system for appointing and promoting cadres at the full provincial/ministerial level (, zhengbuji) and the grassroots follows' criteria that are different from those formulated under the previous "rejuvenation of cadres" principle. While China under Xi may be able to maintain political stability and promote socioeconomic development in the short term, the lack of a new succession mechanism is the biggest obstacle to China's future political development.

Günümüzdeki Türkistan (Şincang) Uygurları ile aynı kökten gelen, fakat dini inançtaki farklılıktan dolayı sürekli ayrışan Sarı Uygurlar, 1980’lere kadar hemen hemen Müslüman Uygurları bilmemekte ve ya iletişim kurmamakta idiler. Sarı Uygur bölgesinde yapmış olduğumuz saha çalışması sonucunda, Sarı Uygurların Şincang Uygurlarına yönelik tutumlarının olumlu ve müspet olduğu gözlemlenmiş, dini duygularının zayıflaması ve hızlanan Çinlileşme karşısında, Müslüman Uygur toplumuna karşı imrenme, kültürel olarak kendini yakın hissetme duygu ve tutumu içinde oldukları gözlenmiştir. Ayrıca, Sarı Uygur aydınlarında kendi kültürü ve dilini korumak için Şincang Uygurlarının dilinden ödünçleme aldıkları, bazı yemek kültürünü benimsedikleri bizzat gözlenmiştir.

Daha önce Yughur Culture dergisinde basılmış olan ilgili makale işbu Mülliyet Araştırmaları Külliyatı'nda tekrar basılmıştır.

Alternate members of the Chinese Communist Central Committee are often overlooked regarding elite formation or even when assessing Chinese elites in general. This article focuses on the case of alternate members of the Central Committee from 1992 to 2007 in order to understand why some individuals will eventually be promoted and why some will never be. Through extensive quantitative testing, I argue that these non-promoted individuals differ from their counterparts in many ways, most of which can possibly be traced back to the type of formation they received early on. As such, the article concludes that Party School attendance and the age factor, through threshold analysis, are a significant factor helping us understand the difference between promoted and non-promoted houbu.

This thesis inquires into the structure of contemporary knowledge production on China through a particular emphasis on the organization of academic expertise across the range of Area Studies and traditional disciplines, the functioning of and incentive structure within the academic field and consequences for the usefulness and consumption of knowledge. Conclusions include: that the compartmentalization into multiple communities of academic knowledge production on one subject area may harm the validity and quality of of conclusions about wider issues of importance when this makes falsification difficult; that the products of ‘Area’ and ‘disciplinary’ scholarship tend to feed into different theoretical discourses (if at all) and reach different audiences; that ‘Area’ and ‘disciplinary’ style scholarship thus have different implications for the public legitimacy and the academic legitimacy of the China field.

It has been argued that the time of political factions in China has ended due to societal dynamics. This paper maintains the contrary: China's political factions are like ghosts-they hide in the shadows until they come out to haunt the government. When attempting to analyse domestic and foreign politics in China, one needs to understand the specifics of China's two-line factionalism. This paper deals with three tasks concerning factions: First, it seeks a proper definition, taking into account the history of the concept. Secondly, it evaluates previous research on factionalism in China and suggests a social constructivist reading based on role theory. Thirdly, it concludes that neither the time of factional line struggle is over, nor should the research community misrepresent political reality by using fancy terms.

Vor welchen Herausforderungen steht die Faktionalismusforschung? Eine Problembeschreibung Zwei Jahre nach Xi Jinpings 习近平 (geb. 1958) Machtübernahme als Generalsekretär der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas (KPCh) erreichte die Ende 2012 von ihm initiierte Antikorruptionskampagne in der Volksrepublik China einen erneuten Höhepunkt. In der offiziellen Darstellung handelte es sich lediglich um Korruptionsbekämpfung im rechtsstaatlichen Sinne. Von einer politischen Säuberung im Wettstreit zweier nach Macht strebender Faktionen könne also nicht gesprochen werden. 1 Dem aufmerksamen Be-1 Diese Haltung begegnete mir während eines akademischen Austauschsemesters in China im Herbst 2014. Ich erhielt mehrfach den kollegialen Rat, besser nicht weiter über den gegenwärtigen Faktionsstreit zu sprechen. Für mich bestätigte sich in inoffiziellen Ge-sprächen mit Wissenschaftlern allerdings, dass eben diese politischen Faktionen ursächlich für das politische Geschehen sind und daher zentraler Bestandteil der politikwissenschaft-lichen Chinaforschung sein müssen. Im Sinne der freien Forschung ist eine auferlegte Beschränkung inakzeptabel. Gleichwohl ist es äußerst schwierig, einem indirekt aus-gesprochenen Verbot der Beschäftigung mit einem Thema oder einer von der Zielgruppe selbstauferlegten Tabuisierung nachzugehen. Diese können meist nur in einer Ex-post-Analyse retrospektiv belegt werden.

For any society to progress, there must be sensitive leadership that is willing to stir the affairs of the country towards the right direction, the provision of a good life, security, opportunity to exist peacefully, a functioning legal system, responsive government, economic prosperity are all fundamental elements for stability and progress in any society. With a strong leadership in China, it has grown to become the newest and emerging super economic power bloc of the 21 st century. Government adoption of philosophies such as the Mandate of Heaven, putting the people first, rule by virtue and deep economic reforms has not only bolstered it's authority to rule but has fortified the ruling party position as the only legitimate ruler of the greatest populated country in the world. This article develops a perception that Stability of any society can only be achieved when it is deeply rooted in the philosophical ideology of that society and pursuing the core interests of the people. This work sets out to explain and examine the nature of the Chinese Communist Party dynamics in ensuring political stability in China over the decades of its inception into the political stream of the nation state.

For nearly four years from mid 2008 to early 2012, a high profile and highly controversial mass red song campaign was powerfully mobilised in Chongqing by then Party chief of Chongqing Bo Xilai. In spite of its significance as a complex political-cultural discourse and immense media and public interest in it, there has been little critical academic research into case from a political communication perspective. The purpose of this study is to attempt to bridge this research gap.

The Chinese government seized on the 2008 Olympic Games as an opportunity to present a new and vibrant China to both its citizenry and the world. This chapter examines how China used the Games as a moment to stress the “civilizational” value of Chinese culture to its people and, in tandem, to promote what are deemed good civilized manners among its citizenry. It was part and parcel of the government’s effort to showcase a better image of China. As Beijing Mayor Wang Qishan remarked, “We have to have a good Olympics, otherwise not only will our generation lose face, but also our ancestors.”1 In this chapter, we analyze the Chinese government’ s visual promotional materials (e.g., posters) and Olympic manuals for volunteers and taxi drivers to map out the different discourses on the civilized behavior expected of its people during the Games.

Over the last five years, there has been a major expansion in the coverage and territorial reach of social programmes in China. Public social programmes are no longer a privilege of employees in cities but a de facto universal public good. At the heart of the reforms of China’s social security system is the establishment of social programmes for the rural Chinese and the urban irregularly employed. An example of the structure and relationship between the programmes is health insurance. Health insurance programmes for the aforementioned two groups are managed separately from one another as well as from the health insurance programme for the employees of free enterprises. Therefore, the special characteristic of the Chinese social security system remains its fragmentation, yet in a different form. While the previous disparity between the programmes for urban and rural Chinese has been narrowed down, regional differences persist and have allowed a new gap to open between individuals with an employer and those without. This fragmentation manifests in the diverging availability and quality of social services and the generosity of transfer payments.

China’s rapid economic growth and increasing political influence has caused great fascination within political science. The politics of China invites us to re-evaluate many existing concepts and theories that have been focused on the Western political experience. This includes theories of revolution, contentious politics, economic development, and state-society relations. This course consists of four sections. In the first section, students will gain a fundamental knowledge of the modern political history of China. Based on institutional and historical analysis, students will examine modern China on its own terms. Then, in the second section, students will investigate the political dynamics of contemporary China’s institutions of governance. In the third section, we will examine China’s periphery, which holds some of the greatest challenges for China’s future. Finally, we examine several areas of political change within China from a comparative perspective, drawing on the theories and concepts at the cutting-edge of academic research.

The public diplomacy of China has a dichotomy. On one side, its mastery in the use of soft power is exalted, especially through Chinese culture and traditions. On the other side, it is taken as an example because of the use of sharp power in the international sphere, the ideological model that privileges authoritarianism over attraction and influence, characteristics of soft power. This article, with interpretative lens, in the field of international relations, from the perspective of area studies, aims to contribute to a better understanding of the role of soft and sharp power in China’s public diplomacy.  The case study is its method, focused on the performance of three Chinese cities in the UNESCO Creative Cities Network.  The data collection was done by direct observation in visits to those cities between 2016 and 2019, as well as by document consultation.  The clustering method guided the data analysis, using indicators and variables from operationalized key concepts as categories.

This book chapter investigates the influence of the Beijing-based Global Times (a conservative tabloid daily newspaper) on China's public diplomacy. It argues that the recent rise of the newspaper represents a crucial strategic change in China's public diplomacy. The case of the Global Times also illustrates that public diplomacy should not be understood narrowly as just selling government-directed, one-dimensional, positive national image to the rest of the world. It should also mean vigorous international dialogue, communication and debate between different players and from different perspectives. And public diplomacy does have a significant domestic dimension as well.