Changing Facebook's Architecture

19 Changing Facebook’s Architecture SKY CROESER Curtin University There are increasing pressures on tertiary-level educators to adopt Facebook in their teaching, or at the very least to acknowledge its role in informal learning. At the same time, commentators are expressing concerns about Facebook’s use, many of which focus on issues relating to social privacy, our ability to limit access to personal information to specific groups of people (Raynes-Goldie, 2010). This chapter argues that in addition to considering potential violations of social privacy, educators need to be aware of risks associated with institutional privacy: threats to Facebook users posed by institutions, including Facebook itself, other commercial organizations, and government agencies. As a corollary to this, educators should be addressing the ethical implications of using a platform that sells users’ data and that sells users themselves as an audience to advertisers. In considering these issues, it is important to consider Facebook’s architecture—the user interface and affordances of the platform—as well as Facebook’s statements of policy. For example, although it is technically possible for users to have fine-grained control over their privacy settings, in practice the location of these settings in a menu structure separated from content discourages users from doing so. Similarly, although users are able to limit the amount of information they share with Facebook, many aspects of the platform’s design encourage users to share information about others, as well as about themselves. Educators’ responses to Facebook therefore need to consider ways to engage with—and disrupt—the platform’s architecture directly. Browser extensions offer one avenue for doing this, as they allow users to disrupt Facebook’s mechanisms for gathering information, and Facebook’s targeted advertising. Facebook’s Use in Tertiary Education: Benefits and Concerns Facebook has become an increasingly popular service, with over ninety percent of students at some universities reporting that they have accounts (Hew, 2011, p. 633). The service now holds a unique position in the online information ecology, offering an all-encompassing experience which incorporates an 185 6241-343.indb 185 2/14/2014 1:09:09 PM 186 • Croeser increasing range of services, such as online chat, e-mail-like messaging, groups, and the sharing of content (Allen, 2012, p. 214). These features and Facebook’s popularity are prompting a number of educators to suggest that teachers explore ways to use the service for tertiary education (see Bosch, 2009; Munoz & Towner, 2009; Roblyer, McDaniel, Webb, Herman, & Witty, 2010). However, clear frameworks for Facebook use at university have not yet been developed, and many educators are unsure of how to approach the platform. To date, there is very little work exploring the formal incorporation of Facebook into tertiary education, barring the chapters in this volume, with more work focusing on informal use. Although some scholars have taken the dearth of literature on formal use of Facebook to mean that Facebook has limited educational value (Hew, 2011, p. 668), others have argued that it is precisely Facebook’s ability to blend formal and informal learning that gives it its value. Allen (2012, p. 218) argues that concerns about the ways in which Facebook weakens boundaries between formal and informal behaviors are misplaced: pedagogical research tends to suggest that blurring formal and informal learning strengthens, rather than undermines, learning. At the very least, Roblyer et al. (2010) suggest that Facebook can serve as a practical way for teachers to contact students (p. 135). Even when teachers do not actively engage with Facebook, students may create their own groups to support their learning (particularly for online study). Ties formed through these groups, “can last far longer than any single unit, and seeing online students self-organise social and support opportunities that persist is highly significant in them helping each other enjoy learning online with the same opportunities as campus based face to face students” (Leaver, 2012, p. 107). Not only does Facebook offer new possibilities for supporting students’ learning, but students are also likely to use Facebook as an informal support structure for their studies whether teachers encourage its use. Educational use of Facebook necessarily raises concerns, many of which relate to the ways in which Facebook’s architecture undermines the boundaries and hierarchies traditionally taken for granted in the classroom. As Baran’s (2010) research suggests, students are unlikely to make a clear distinction between their informal, social communication on Facebook and more formal learning and communications on the platform. Furthermore, Facebook’s attempts to encourage the use of real names and significant sharing of personal content mean that any use of Facebook will necessarily confront both teachers and students with the fact that, in an online environment which is so closely entwined with real identities, real places and persistent communication, they are always explicitly negotiating the boundaries between formal and informal. (Allen, 2012, p. 223, emphasis in original) This overlap between offline and online space, and between in-class and external identities, may have educational benefits, but it also leads to uneasiness about privacy for both teachers and students. 6241-343.indb 186 2/14/2014 1:09:09 PM Changing Facebook’s Architecture • 187 On the whole, privacy concerns among users relate to social privacy, rather than institutional privacy: threats to privacy from Facebook itself. Social privacy has also been the primary concern of educational scholars writing about Facebook, who worry that students may share information on Facebook that is inappropriate for other students, teachers, or future employers to see or that teachers may expose more of their lives to students than is desirable. Acquisiti and Gross (2006, p. 16), for example, worry that a significant proportion of users do not know whether privacy controls exist on Facebook, or how to use them, whereas Hew (2011) notes that students’ concerns about “unwanted Facebook audiences (e.g., current or future employers, university administrators, and corporations) showed no relationship with information revelation” (p. 666), and Grimmelman (2009, p. 1165) discusses the potential consequences of authority figures having access to students’ Facebook profiles. Concern about teachers’ privacy is often linked to the idea of maintaining distance between teachers and students in order to reinforce teachers’ authority. Some scholars recommend that teachers limit self-disclosure online in order to “maintain a level of professionalism that does not cross the boundary of the teaching-student relationship” (Munoz & Towner, 2009, p. 8). These issues are important. Students have faced serious penalties when information shared on Facebook reached unintended audiences (Johnson, 2010; Jones, 2012; Mytelka, 2013), and even teachers who wish to challenge the traditional role of teacher-asauthority-figure will need to navigate Facebook carefully. However, more attention needs to be paid to the institutional aspects of privacy on Facebook. Concerns about the volume of information shared with Facebook and the ways in which this information may be used need to be put in the context of Facebook’s architecture. As Peterson (2010, p. 22) notes, Facebook makes its money from users’ data, and it is in the company’s interests to build an architecture that enables and facilitates sharing. Facebook provides people with powerful privacy settings that allow users to divide their Friends into groups, and control access to particular statuses or content, but this happens within the context of an environment which does not privilege privacy or facilitate the use of these settings (Peterson, 2010, p. 29). Whereas Peterson (2010) considers this to be “strange” and against the interests of Facebook itself (p. 36), RaynesGoldie (2012) has demonstrated that a persistent pressure towards increased disclosure is both in the financial interests of the company and is an ideological goal of Mark Zuckerberg, the founder and CEO of Facebook, who still plays a significant role within the company. Insofar as privacy settings exist on Facebook, they are there precisely to facilitate sharing. As Raynes-Goldie (2012) notes, the “feeling of safety and closedness” (p. 161) initially provided by e-mail verification combined with school networks helped early users to feel safe sharing their information, and this (false) sense of boundedness has continued to support the sharing of users’ content on the platform. Facebook’s architecture consistently provides people with “signals suggesting an intimate, confidential, and safe setting” (Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 1160), encouraging a systematic misunderstanding 6241-343.indb 187 2/14/2014 1:09:09 PM 188 • Croeser of privacy risks. Privacy settings, although finely grained, are mostly located separately to content, making it difficult to easily adjust who can see a particular photo, for example (boyd, 2008). In addition to this, Facebook’s architecture is constantly changing in ways that causes sudden privacy lurches: sudden shifts in the audience that can access users’ content, or in the audience’s likelihood of being ‘pushed’ content that previously required concerted effort to find (Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 1169; Peterson, 2010, p. 20). Although this is, in part, inspired by Zuckerberg’s conviction that more openness and sharing will lead to a better world (Raynes-Goldie, 2012, pp. 148–152), it is also linked to the Facebook business model. Facebook’s immense success as a company is reliant on the data shared by users, as well as by the time users spend on the site. Data are sold to marketing services, whereas Facebook sells advertisers a customized audience, which will allow them to “reach the right audience for your business and turn them into customers” (Facebook, 2013a). Facebook’s architecture and defaults encourage users to share large amounts of information about their interests and lives, while the structure of the pages even facilitates this self-categorising by providing a preset selection of categories. The value of this pre-categorised data for marketing analysis is obvious, and Facebook allows marketers to access much of it so they can create “SocialAds” targeted to the individual user. (Hendry & Goodall, 2010, p. 6) None of the privacy settings control Facebook’s access to one’s content (Hendry & Goodall, 2010, p. 7; Raynes-Goldie, 2012, p. 105), although some of the settings listed under “Adverts” do limit the ways in which Facebook can share that content. This means that even if a person is careful about his or her social privacy on Facebook, successfully navigating the complicated privacy settings in order to limit content to intended groups, one is still sharing all his or her data—including information on Friends and on how one communicates with them—with Facebook. A user is also, by extension, sharing his or her information with third parties. In 2013, Facebook announced that it would be building partnerships with data brokers in order to help marketers “reach their current customers with relevant ads on Facebook” (Facebook, 2013c). Data brokers match non-Facebook data (such as marketing data based on a user’s purchases) with Facebook data in ways that may be unsettling for users: While Facebook may be taking steps to limit identifiable data flowing back to the data brokers, the result for users could be eerie. Users might find themselves seeing advertisements that are based on actions they took in the real world as well as personal facts about their life and circumstances that they have been careful not to put on Facebook. (Opshal & Reitman, 2013) 6241-343.indb 188 2/14/2014 1:09:09 PM Changing Facebook’s Architecture • 189 In other cases, Facebook data will be matched with information gathered from online tracking services so that “websites you visited when you were not logged into Facebook will be used as the basis for showing you advertisements on Facebook. This will happen whether you are logged in to Facebook or not, and regardless of whether you consent to tracking or not” (Opshal & Reitman, 2013). The links being made between online and offline data have important implications for privacy, especially as it becomes increasingly likely that this data is also being shared with government agencies in the United States and elsewhere (Opshal & Reitman, 2013; Rushe, 2013). These issues play a remarkably small role in the academic literature on Facebook’s potential role in tertiary education. Although some attention is being paid to the potential problems with using cloud services and other commercial platforms in schools (see SafeGov.org & Ponemon Institute, 2013), there is no work directly addressing the serious ethical questions surrounding encouraging, or even requiring, university students to use a service that enables the sharing of personal information (and is structured to undermine informed consent for that sharing) and that packages that information for reselling, and then creates targeted advertising for users. Targeted advertising may not only unsettle users by demonstrating the extent to which our information is accessed by marketers; it may also cause problems for the ways in which it pinpoints our insecurities. One popular article discussed the psychological toll of repeatedly seeing weight-loss advertisements and hinted at the stress that couples trying to get pregnant could feel when subject to advertisements suggesting they might be infertile (Beckman, 2008). Similarly, whereas the place of advertising more generally, including online advertising, in schools has received some attention (see Molnar, Boninger, Harris, Libby, & Fogarty, 2013; Molnar, Boninger, Wilkinson, & Fogarty, 2009), there seems to be very little concern about advertising within tertiary education spaces. Specific commercial relationships (Liptak, 2013) and kinds of advertising, such as advertisements for payday loans (Kennedy, 2013), have been questioned or banned, but there are few, if any, pushes for “commercial-free” campuses in the same way that some schools have been declared “commercial-free” (Molnar et al., 2009, p. 18). The focus among educators on social privacy issues involved in Facebook use has completely overshadowed attention to institutional privacy and to the ethics of turning our students’ data into a product for Facebook’s commercial gain. Even when writing on Facebook’s use in tertiary education directly gives advice to educators or raises questions about the use of Facebook (Greenhow, Robelia, & Hughes, 2009, p. 253; Munoz & Towner, 2009; Roblyer et al., 2010, p. 138), advertising and institutional privacy receive no mention. Responding to Facebook: Tactics and Strategies for Educators Discussions about how to use Facebook in tertiary education have tended to focus on how to manage personal privacy, or on other issues such as pedagogical approaches to informal learning on the platform. While this work is 6241-343.indb 189 2/14/2014 1:09:09 PM 190 • Croeser valuable, it predominantly fits within the scope of what de Certeau (1984) called “tactics”: hidden, “clever tricks, knowing how to get away with things” (p. xix). Tactical responses do not change Facebook’s architecture, rather they respond to it, attempting to “cheat” by not following the Terms of Service, or by using the platform in ways discouraged by the architecture. One of the most common tactics advocated is for teachers to limit the amount of information shared on the platform, and recommend that students do the same. This draws on existing “subversive privacy practices,” which Raynes-Goldie (2010) describes some users as engaging in, such as “wall cleaning” (periodic deletion of content). The most extreme form of this is the suggestion made by some university administrations that students delete Facebook profiles entirely before applying for jobs (Peterson, 2010, p. 8). More moderate advice from Munoz and Towner (2009, pp. 8–9) recommends that teachers cultivate a “professional” Facebook profile, both for pedagogical purposes and to set an example for students, which implicitly suggests limiting which kinds of information are shared on the site. Much of the advice suggesting that both students and teachers pay careful attention to information shared with Facebook is useful, particularly for addressing concerns over social privacy. However, it is important to remember that the architecture of Facebook continually encourages more sharing, and that Facebook’s agreements with data brokers mean that privacy threats related to the site do not only originate with content shared on Facebook. Another tactic suggested by the literature is for teachers and/or students to take steps to separate their offline identities from their Facebook profiles. Raynes-Goldie (2010) discusses the use of aliases on Facebook as a subversive privacy practice which potentially allows users of the platform to remain “invisible” to unwanted observation: teachers may prevent students from being able to see their personal profiles; students may prevent university authorities, employers, classmates, or other unwanted audiences from being able to access potentially damaging information (such as photographs that suggest heavy drinking). Related to this, Munoz and Towner’s suggestion that teachers create a completely separate professional profile implies using an alias to “hide” their professional profile. Presumably, students could also create a personal profile that is hidden by use of an alias or privacy settings and could use a different profile for educational purposes. Anecdotally, there are already many teachers and students using aliases and/or multiple accounts to hide their Facebook profile from an education setting or to separate out educational and personal profiles. There are, however, several problems with these tactics. First, they are contingent on Facebook’s unwillingness or inability to enforce its terms of service, which prohibit both the use of aliases (Facebook, 2013b) and the creation of multiple accounts (Facebook Help Centre, 2012). Second, they may be ineffective. The huge amount of data which Facebook is able to access and analyze, in combination 6241-343.indb 190 2/14/2014 1:09:09 PM Changing Facebook’s Architecture • 191 from the data available through data brokers, means that Facebook identities are often verified through e-mail addresses, phone numbers, and networks of Friends, rather than merely through the profile name. Facebook’s recent acquisition of a facial recognition start-up (Van Grove, 2012) creates further potential for our “real” identities to be matched with aliases. As well as the implications for institutional privacy, Facebook’s ability to create links between our profiles and other aspects of our identity can create important breaches of social privacy. Even with an alias, it is quite possible that Facebook will suggest a person to unintended audiences in the “people you may know” selections. The most common tactic educators advocate when it comes to Facebook is, unsurprisingly, education. Acquisti and Gross’s (2006) comparison of visible user profiles on Facebook before and after a survey was administered on privacy issues notes that even without specific instructions, the survey itself motivated some users to change their privacy settings (p. 20), suggesting that even minimal interventions can be meaningful. Some authors advocate specific instructions to students about privacy settings (Munoz & Towner, 2009, p. 9), whereas others suggest a form of education about potential harms of Facebook, and responses that make fuller use of privacy settings, that is, based on discussion and rooted in the experiences of students’ Facebook use (Greenhow, Robelia, & Hughes, 2009, p. 253; Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 1204). Although these tactics are useful, they are necessarily limited. As noted earlier, privacy settings relate only to social privacy and do not allow users to limit Facebook’s access to their information. Additionally, education about privacy on Facebook must contend with the fact that the platform’s entire architecture is geared toward sharing, and frequent ‘privacy lurches’ make it difficult even for informed users to keep track of their privacy settings. The limitations to tactical responses to privacy issues on Facebook suggest that it makes sense to complement these with more strategic responses. de Certeau (1984) distinguishes tactics from strategies: whereas tactics respond to existing architectures, strategies relate to the structure of systems and totalizing discourses, the way in which spaces are organised and controlled (p. 38). Although de Certeau sees strategies as primarily deployed by those in power and as relating to physical spaces, the configurability of software means that even those who do not control Facebook as an institution have some freedom to engage in strategies that reconfigure their experience of its architecture. Browser extensions provide one way to do this, as they can help to create significant changes to users’ experience of the web. Educators who are concerned about the ethics of requiring or encouraging students to expose themselves to targeted advertising in the course of their education may suggest the use of Adblock Plus or other extensions that stop advertisements from appearing within the browser. Some extensions, such as Flashblock, NoScript, and Better Pop Up Blocker, target particular scripts or 6241-343.indb 191 2/14/2014 1:09:09 PM 192 • Croeser software types, such as all Javascript or Flash objects. Adblock Plus relies on a combination of techniques, including subscription lists and manual blocking of objects, to block advertisements. This can radically change users’ experience of the web, including Facebook: switching between ad-blocked and normal browsing of Facebook should demonstrate this. However, the creator of Adblock Plus has explicitly stated that he hopes the extension will go beyond changing individual’s browsing experience, eventually making the use of intrusive online advertising economically inefficient (Palant, n.d.). This is unlikely to come about at current usage levels: Adblock Plus, the “most popular extension for Chrome” (Gundlach, 2012), is only installed by approximately 10 per cent of Chrome users, and only around 9 per cent of users across browsers have some sort of ad-blocking extension, although this is higher for visitors to technology-related content (ClarityRay, 2012). Nevertheless, using extensions that block advertising goes beyond a tactical response to Facebook’s architecture, fundamentally undermining one of the central pillars of the platform’s design and purpose. Also a number of browser extensions address some of the privacy concerns related to Facebook’s partnership with data brokers. Educators who are currently opening discussion with students around social privacy may wish to complement this by including mention of anti-tracking browser extensions that help to protect institutional privacy, such as Disconnect, Ghostery, DoNotTrackMe, and Priv3. These browser extensions block cookies, scripts, widgets, and other means of gathering users’ data and have a less noticeable effect on users’ experience of the Web, although they may cause problems by blocking features of some sites. Many of these extensions also display a list of the tracking services that access particular websites, which can be useful in building students’ understanding of the extent of online data gathering by marketing organizations. As in the case of ad-blocking extensions, anti-tracking extensions challenge the underlying architecture of Facebook and its reliance on gathering and selling large amounts of user data to advertisers. Other browser extensions may also help to deal with educators’ concerns about the use of Facebook or other platforms. Leechblock, for example, can be used by students to limit their use of Facebook and other social media or to create clearer demarcations between study-related and recreational Internet use. HTTPS Everywhere is also strongly recommended for more secure browsing. The extensions mentioned here can also be useful in dealing with threats to institutional privacy by other corporations: many concerns have been raised about the myriad of Google services many people use every day and the extent to which this may affect our privacy. There are also other strategies and tactics educators may explore, such as disabling cookies (Auerbach, 2012), to deal with the commodification of users’ data and the extensive advertising on platforms which we use. 6241-343.indb 192 2/14/2014 1:09:09 PM Changing Facebook’s Architecture • 193 Conclusion We should remain aware that none of the strategies or tactics here, alone or in combination, wholly address concerns about use of the platform in an educational setting. It is worrying that so little of the writing about Facebook’s use in education, tertiary or otherwise, has addressed the ethical issues involved in the commodification of users’ data and attention on the platform. Concerns about social privacy need to be matched by an understanding of the challenges to institutional privacy that Facebook’s architecture and business strategy pose. This is particularly pertinent as more information emerges about the extent of Facebook and other social networks’ collusion with the US National Security Agency. Tactical responses that urge students to be careful with their Facebook use can, in this vein, usefully be complemented by strategic use of browser extensions that create radical shifts in users’ experience of and relationship to Facebook. This is likely to raise questions about the ethics of using a service while simultaneously undermining the fundamentals of its business model. Unfortunately, it is not possible for educators to remain neutral: if we wish to either actively or tacitly use Facebook in our teaching, we need to grapple with the complex power relations involved in using a commercial service. References Acquisti, A., & Gross, R. (2006). Imagined Communities: Awareness, Information Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook. In G. Danezis & P. Golle (Eds.), Privacy Enhancing Technologies (pp. 36–58). 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