Turkey: Cut!

This research project explores the impact of Western broadcasting on the public opinion of the Soviet audience in the Perestroika and Glasnost periods. Specifically, it focuses on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) contribution to changing attitudes of the Soviet public to the communist regime and ruling party, and constructing a positive image of Western democratic values during the relevant period of study. The theoretical approach to the investigation of RFE/RL broadcasting is based on media effects theories, particularly agenda-setting and framing theories. According to them, the media are not simply a conduit of information, but able to shape public opinion. By emphasising the salience of topics and particular aspects and characteristics of the issues, the media set public agenda and influence on people’s perceptions about these issues. The study to assess RFE/RL’s impact draws on audience research, quantitative and qualitative data analysis. It examines geographical reach and transmission frequencies of the Radio’s broadcasts and analyses the content of the most featured programmes to explore how they framed the reality. The findings from the quantitative and qualitative analysis, as well as the audience research data, demonstrate that RFE/RL’s programming set anticommunist agenda by framing events based on the premise that communism and Eastern ideas are negative against democracy and Western values are positive. The study further suggests that the RFE/RL influenced the Soviet audience’s perceptions and attitudes of the communist regime, by setting anticommunist public agenda and promoting Western ideas of freedom and human rights, leading to the Soviet people towards the Western model of democratic development.

Under the Radar: Tracking Radio Listeners in the Soviet Union, 2022

Western democracy is currently under attack by a resurgent Russia, weaponizing new technologies and social media. How to respond? During the Cold War, the West fought off similar Soviet propaganda assaults with shortwave radio broadcasts. Founded in 1949, the US-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty broadcast uncensored information to the Soviet republics in their own languages. About one-third of Soviet urban adults listened to Western radio. The broadcasts played a key role in ending the Cold War and eroding the communist empire. R. Eugene Parta was for many years the director of Soviet Area Audience Research at RFE/RL, charged among others with gathering listener feedback. In this book he relates a remarkable Cold War operation to assess the impact of Western radio broadcasts on Soviet listeners by using a novel survey research approach. Given the impossibility of interviewing Soviet citizens in their own country, it pioneered audacious interview methods in order to fly under the radar and talk to Soviets traveling abroad, ultimately creating a database of 51,000 interviews which offered unparalleled insights into the media habits and mindset of the Soviet public. By recounting how the “impossible” mission was carried out, Under the Radar also shows how the lessons of the past can help counter the threat from a once and current adversary.

BBG Watch, 2012

The Slavonic and East European Review, 2020

Radio took its star turn across the globe in the third quarter of the twentieth century. It was no new technology, of course; in many places, radio listening had become a staple of everyday life as early as the 1920s, and broadcasting figured prominently in the cultures of Depression-era capitalism, fascism, and Stalinism in the 1930s, as well as in the Second World War. But it was not until the 1960s and 1970s that radio broadcasting became a mass phenomenon worldwide, reaching not only urban populations, but rural ones, and not only in the 'First' and 'Second' worlds, but across the 'Third' as well. 1 And a substantial portion of that reach-in some areas, the lion's share-must be attributed to transnational broadcasters: the BBC,

Radio Liberty in the Context of EU-Russia-US Relations, 2010

The evolution of democracy in the EU’s eastern neighbor Russia is retarded and still struggling to gain traction in the face of stubborn resistance. The lack of a functioning civil society, rule of law, true market economy, pluralism, respect for human rights, and media freedom are in direct contrast to European Union policies. Questions of EU-Russia-US relations in areas of energy security, im- migration, criminal enterprise, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction all pose serious threats to regional stability and subsequent European security. United States foreign policy is an important actor in this sphere, using instruments such as the venerable Cold War-era Radio Liberty to project its values and interests. But therein lies the question: What is the role of Radio Liberty in the changing Russian media landscape and what impact does it impart to EU-Russia-US Relations?

When an authoritarian regime loses power, as happened in the USSR six years ago, new rules and practices for television have to be devised swiftly, and in the midst of crisis. As the primary structure for disseminating information, television has been a key factor in the changing political situation in Russia. The state monopoly on broadcasting collapsed in 1991, and a wide array of commercial private broadcasters then filled the air. Facing a drastic fall in budgets to finance their activities, the remaining state-run television companies also turned to advertisers and sponsors with the aim of selling air time to private companies. Despite the fact that there are about eight hundred broadcasters licensed to operate in Russia, most of them are entertainment-oriented: they do not broadcast news or current affairs programmes, children's or educational programmes, documentaries, etc. Their listings are simply menus of American B-movies, cartoons, and video pop-charts. Local news - wherever it exists - is of poor quality, and tends to editorialise on current events from the point of view of provincial administrators (in the case of state-run television) or the owners of private businesses. When it does not editorialise, television news turns to sensational crime stories, natural disasters, and accidents.

Russian Review, 2020

Central Asia Regional Data Review, 2016

Data collection and outline of report Data collection for the CADGAT media reports was carried out in August–December 2013, so the figures presented here reflect the situation at that point in time. This report is intended as an overview that can be updated later. Sources of information are listed in footnotes, with access dates. Background of report The development of mass media in the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan since independence differs considerably. All five countries have non-state media; and international organizations conduct workshops, trainings and various events. The media have high influence on local society. This data review presents some aspects of media and related topics in the Central Asian region. Key findings - The top radio stations are privately financed, except in Turkmenistan, where all radio stations are state-owned. - Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have the highest amount of broadcasting in Russian. In Kyrgyzstan, there is a near equal amount that is broadcasted in Kyrgyz and Russian; this has remained stable since independence. - In Turkmenistan, all national radio channels broadcast in Turkmen. In Tajikistan, a clear majority broadcast in Tajik. This has also remained stable since independence. Overall, there seems to be few changes as regards radio broadcasting language for all five countries over the years compared here.

Journal of Communication, 1991

Even before the violent takeover of Lithuanian television in January 1991 and the subsequent sharpening of the center-periphery conflict, television news broadcasts in 1987-1989 revealed a serious underreporting of non-Slavic ethnic groups and ethnopolitical issues. The approximately 130 different ethnic groups and languages that comprise the Soviet Union create an imposing challenge to television broadcasting. To some extent the needs of the various populations vis-à-vis the state are supposed to be reflected in the structure of the broadcasting system. But the increased political activity and incidents surrounding the demands of some ethnic groups have drawn critical attention to these groups' representation on national television news. This article reports an empirical study of these issues. Until 1991, television in the Soviet Union was centrally administered under the direction of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting (Gosteleradio) and its branches. A 1991 presidential decree, described below, detached the regional affiliates but essentially kept in place a hierarchical system, with a newly named, but very largely unchanged, central administration for State Television at the top. Like the Soviet political and economic system, television is organized on a territorial basis, from national (or All-Union) through republic, province (oblast), city, and district (or borough). 1 All 15 republics, with the exception of the Russian Republic, have their own television channels in addition to receiving one or both of the two national channels, headquartered in Moscow. Provinces and cities transmit their programs, but except for very large cities, like Moscow and Leningrad, they do so for only a few hours a day in "windows" on the second national television channel. Leningrad television (designed originally as a potential third national channel) can also be received in Moscow; its system is the most innovative in the country. National channels broadcast in Russian; other channels broadcast in Russian or the language of the local nationality. Although the future of cable television may be promising (a Soviet Cable Association was formed in 1990), its reach at present is very limited. 2 The amount of effective delegation of authority has varied over the course of Soviet history. During the Brezhnev period, television became significantly more centralized, and regional broadcasting at the subnational level consequently decreased 3. The Brezhnev policy also involved a more powerful and direct role for the Communist Party (3, p. 45). The political reforms of the Gorbachev era, however, have prompted substantive, rather than cosmetic, decentralization, especially in the media, where they began with the policy of glasnost. Although television is certainly more conformist and less innovative than such journals as Ogonyok (Little Flame) or such newspapers as Argumenty i fakty (Arguments and Facts), it is available to 97 percent of the Soviet population (and a prime-time audience of 150-200 million), while even the largest circulation newsprint is between 25 and 35 million. Television has successfully upgraded production values, admitted dissenting points of view, transmitted more pictures and fewer talking heads, and significantly increased response time in news broadcasting 4. Audiences have been extremely responsive to these changes. Vice President Lukyanov announced, for example, that the large audiences for the first live transmission of the Congress of People's Deputies caused a 20 percent reduction in labor productivity during the period 5. Although television programming in general, and news in particular, had, by 1991, come a long way from the stultifying images and scripts of the Brezhnev era, the sharp political disputation that marked the broadcasts of the late 1980s and 1990 were diminishing. Leonid Kravchenko, appointed head of State Television late in 1990, announced at that time that television had stirred up passions and exacerbated conflicts. His policy would be to provide more entertainment programming (which had been in relatively short supply, in any case) at the expense of public affairs. In addition, he would conceive of the First Program (the more widely received of the two national networks), as the "presidential channel" and structure the news accordingly. The prominence and decentralization of television that has taken place under Gorbachev was essentially ratified in a 1990 presidential decree that redefined the structure of the television industry 6. It recommended that the Supreme Soviet pass a law on broadcast regulation, including the status of Gosteleradio, and further asserted that state television and radio should be independent of any political party. This is particularly important since the legal monopoly role of the Communist Party ended with the repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution. Notably absent from this decree was the more liberal position of the 1989 Law on the Press, which permits individuals, not only public organizations or political parties, to found and operate media. Early in 1991, a second decree created the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, transferring to it the assets of Gosteleradio, as well as