Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear
Projection Methods∗
Michael T. Gapen and Thomas F. Cosimano
Abstract
This paper applies nonlinear projection methods to solve Ramsey problems
in a stochastic monetary economy. The presence of nonlinear distortions in
the Ramsey problem requires the use of a solution procedure which captures
these effects. The nonlinear projection method, even with low-order Chebyshev
polynomials as employed in this paper, is able to capture a significant portion
of the Jensen’s inequality effects. As an example of the usefulness of nonlinear
projection methods, we examine Barro’s (1987, 1979) conjecture that welfare
gains are available from policy smoothing with debt. Increases in the volatility
of distortionary monetary policy are more than offset by declines in the volatility
of distortionary labor taxes so that introduction of debt is welfare enhancing.
∗ This
paper benefitted from comments by an anonymous referee and from participants at
the session on “Theoretical and Numerical Analysis” at the 12th Annual Symposium of the
Society for Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics, held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
in Atlanta, Georgia on March 11-12, 2004. Thomas Cosimano received financial support
from the Center for Research in Financial Services Industry and the Mendoza College of
Business at the University of Notre Dame. The views expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and do not represent those of the International Monetary Fund. Contact information:
Thomas F. Cosimano, Mendoza College of Business, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame,
IN 46556. Phone: 574-631-5178, Fax: 574-621-5255, E-mail:
[email protected],
Web Site: http://www.nd.edu/∼tcosiman/. Michael T. Gapen, International Monetary Fund,
700 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20431, Phone: 202-623-7527, Fax 202-623-5692, Email:
[email protected].
Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
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1. Introduction
This paper applies nonlinear projection methods to solve Ramsey problems in
a stochastic monetary economy. As an example of the usefulness of nonlinear projection methods, this paper examines whether the existence of debt is
welfare enhancing through smoothing the response of distortionary fiscal and
monetary policy to economic shocks, as suggested by Barro (1979, 1987). To
answer this question, the traditional general equilibrium framework of macroeconomics is combined with the public finance approach from Ramsey (1927)
to calibrate and simulate a stochastic monetary model under economies with
and without debt. The model employed is a combination of a cash-in-advance
model and a stochastic growth model where the household derives utility from
leisure and consumption while the government raises revenue to finance its
exogenous stochastic spending through distortionary means: a tax on labor
income and the ability to print money.1 The government also has the ability
to issue debt.
The model captures the loss from distortionary government policy within
the nonlinearity of the labor supply equation since the contemporaneous tax
on labor income and money growth are determinants of optimal household
labor supply in equilibrium. Therefore, the labor supply equation formalizes
the assumption of a quadratic loss function over distortionary taxes and inflation as discussed in Bohn (1988) and Barro and Gordon (1981). Shocks that
cause variations in fiscal and monetary policy are transmitted through optimal
labor supply to output, remaining household allocations, and the equilibrium
price system while feeding back into the government budget constraint through
tax revenue. Equilibrium decisions by households, firms, and the government
are then passed into future periods through the price level and interest rate
equations. When choosing a combination of fiscal and monetary policy, the
government must take into account the relationship between this policy mix
and household labor supply to minimize distortions. Optimal policies, or Ramsey policies, maximize consumer welfare while minimizing distortions within
the system.
The presence of nonlinear distortions to labor requires the use of a simulation procedure which captures these effects. As discussed in Kim and Kim
(2003), traditional log-linearization techniques may not produce accurate welfare computations since it neglects higher moments which are essential for
measuring overall risk and, therefore, estimation of welfare gains. In order to
1
See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) for a recent formulation of optimal monetary and
fiscal policy.
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capture these higher moments, this paper employs the projection method of
Judd (1992, 1998) to solve the Euler conditions for the optimal Ramsey policy
for money growth, taxes, and debt. While the baseline economy contains no
debt, the low-debt economy uses the prevailing debt-to-income ratio in the
United States and the high-debt economy uses twice this level.
Since the set of operator equations is nonlinear, the projection approach
begins by defining the policy functions in terms of Chebyshev polynomials.
Arouba et al. (2003) examine various solution methods for dynamic equilibrium economies and find that Chebyshev polynomials are stable, accurate,
and easier to implement than other techniques when the policy functions are
smooth.2 The set of operator equations also contains conditional expectations
which must be evaluated. Since the processes that govern the shocks to technology and government spending are assumed to be normally distributed, expectations are evaluated using Gauss-Hermite Quadrature. In this procedure,
the form of the policy function is assumed to be independent of the realization of the shocks. Expectations are found by integrating over the possible
realizations of uncertainty while treating the policy function as a constant.
Once properly specified and calibrated to match the general features of the
U.S. economy, the system is solved using a nonlinear equation optimizer in
Matlab. Based on an initial guess of the polynomial coefficients, the program
computes the residual functions and uses standard computational techniques
to iterate to the Ramsey equilibrium. Then using the optimal Ramsey plan
that defines policy choices of the government, allocations by the household,
and the resulting price system, each economy was simulated under the effects
of technology and government spending shocks in order to examine the affects
of debt on optimal policies and activity.
As suggested by Barro (1979, 1987), debt provides the government with
an additional degree of policy freedom relative to an economy without debt.
Initially, the government sets tax and monetary policy based on generating
an expected level of revenues to cover expected government expenditures. As
shocks to technology and government spending affect the government budget
2
In the competitive economy with distortions considered here, the policy functions for the
private sector are continuous and unique for a given specification of government policy. See
Coleman (1991) for a demonstration of the conditions necessary for the policy functions to
be continuous and unique in an economy with distortions. In our particular case we are able
to solve for explicit continuously differentiable equilibrium for the competitive equilibrium.
The Ramsey problem will not yield a unique strategy for the government and may be a
discontinuous bang-bang solution (Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, Chapter 16)). However,
in this work we only consider the commitment equilibrium which is a well defined solution
to a dynamic programming problem following Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990). As a
result, we characterize the equilibrium strategy with Chebsyshev polynomials.
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Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
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constraint, optimal policy responds by smoothing the impact of distortionary
taxes and money growth with debt. Simulations of the model economies indicate that volatility of distortionary policy in the economies with debt, as
measured by standard deviation in percent, are lower than the baseline economy without debt. For example, the standard deviation of the tax rate falls
from 2.85 percent under no debt to 2.46 percent under high debt. Declines in
the volatility of taxes, however, are offset by slight increases in the volatility
of money growth. Given that revenue policy is distortionary and the system is
nonlinear, the net gain from the introduction of debt will depend on whether
the reduction in tax volatility outweighs the loss from the increase in monetary
policy volatility.
A utility equivalence framework is used to measure the gain to households
from policy smoothing with debt. The gain is measured in terms of a lumpsum present discounted value of utility. Moving from an economy with no
debt to the economies with debt is welfare improving since increased utility
of consumption of the credit good and leisure more than offset the decline in
utility of consumption of the cash good. The calculated welfare gains from
policy smoothing are similar in magnitude to the gains from reducing business
cycle volatility (Lucas 1987) or eliminating the costs of moderate inflation
(Cooley and Hansen 1991).
2. A Stochastic Monetary Economy
The model is a combination of a cash-in-advance model and a stochastic growth
model.3 The economy is populated by a representative household, a representative firm, and a government. The household derives utility from leisure and
two consumption goods, a cash good and a credit good. Previously accumulated cash balances are needed to purchase units of the cash good. Output is
produced according to a production function that combines capital, labor, and
technology, where the process governing technology is assumed to be exogenous and stochastic. The government raises revenue with distortionary effects
to finance its exogenous stochastic spending through a tax on labor income,
printing money, or financing debt. The Ramsey equilibrium determines optimal fiscal and monetary policy given the equilibrium behavior of the private
sector. This Ramsey equilibrium may be reduced to four conditions for money
growth, taxes, equilibrium labor, and the multiplier on the government budget
3
This model is similar to models employed in Cooley and Hansen (1995), Chari et al.
(1991), and Lucas and Stokey (1983).
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constraint given the equilibrium behavior of interest and prices.4
2.1. Production
Aggregate output, Yt , is produced according to the following constant returnsto-scale production function,
Yt = exp(θt )Htα Kt1−α ,
0 < α < 1,
(2.1)
where Kt and Ht are the aggregate capital stock and labor supply, respectively,
and θt represents the available technology. Technology is assumed to be the
realization of an exogenous stochastic process and evolves according to the
following law of motion,
θt = ρθ θt−1 +
θ,t ,
0 < ρθ < 1.
(2.2)
The random variable, θ,t , is normally distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation σ θ,t and the realization of θ,t is known to all agents at the beginning
of period t. The portion of output that is not consumed is invested into
physical capital. Investment in period t produces capital in period t + 1,
Kt+1 = (1 − δ) Kt + Xt ,
0 < δ < 1,
(2.3)
where Xt is the level of investment in period t and δ is the rate of depreciation.
The capital stock is assumed to remain fixed throughout the analysis so
that Xt = X = δK. A constant capital stock can be justified, in part, by the
well established result from the literature on optimal taxation that tax rates on
capital should be close to zero on average.5 Furthermore, firms are assumed to
take depreciation charges before taxes are applied at the household level. If the
constant capital stock assumption were maintained but firms were not allowed
4
Assumptions of a fixed capital stock and logarithmic preferences enable computation of
closed form equilibrium solutions for the private sector given a particular government policy.
If the private sector is made more complex, these four conditions would need to be augmented
with equilibrium conditions for interest rates and prices. These additional conditions would
limit the accuracy of the projection method since additional equations would limit the
number of nodes the computer can solve. In order to focus on the distortionary effects of
labor taxes, a fixed capital stock is assumed. Thus, the optimal government policy will
account for its impact on interest rates and prices as well as the optimal behavior of the
household and firms.
5
For earlier work on optimal capital income taxes, see Atkinson (1971), Diamond (1973),
Pestieu (1974), Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), and Chari et
al. (1991, 1994).
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Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
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to take depreciation charges before taxes were applied, the government would
find it optimal to tax inelastically supplied investment and use the proceeds
to retire money balances.
Given a fixed capital stock, the representative firm seeks to maximize profit,
equal to Yt − wt Ht − rt K, by choosing labor supply. The first-order conditions
for the firm’s problem describe the wage rate in equilibrium as,
wt (θt , Ht ) = α
Yt
,
Ht
(2.4)
which is simply the marginal product of labor. The rental rate on capital in
equilibrium is,
Yt
(2.5)
rt (θt , Ht ) = (1 − α) ,
K
which is the marginal product of capital. Income from the production process
is then returned to the household net of depreciation. Given that the capital
stock is assumed to remain fixed and investment each period covers depreciation, income from the production process sent to the household each period is
closely related to the concept of net national product.
2.2. Households
Household preferences are summarized by the following utility function,
Et
∞
X
t=0
β t [η ln C1t + (1 − η) ln C2t − γHt ] ,
(2.6)
where C1 is the cash good, C2 is the credit good, γ is a positive constant and
0 < β, η < 1. The specification of linear labor supply is discussed in Hansen
(1985) and Rogerson (1988) and is derived from the assumptions that labor is
indivisible and allocation of labor is determined by employment lotteries.
The household enters period t with previously accumulated assets equal to
the stock of money holdings, Mt , and gross returns from government bonds,
Bt Rt−1 , where Bt is the stock of real debt and Rt−1 is the gross real interest
rate. These assets augment the income received from capital and the aftertax income from labor and are used to finance household expenditures during
the period. The current shocks to technology and government spending are
revealed at the beginning of the period. After the shocks are revealed, expectations are formed and the household then chooses labor supply, consumption,
money balances for the next period, and bonds. Overall, household allocations
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must satisfy the following budget constraint,
C1t + C2t +
d
Mt+1
Mt
+ Bt+1 ≤ (1 − ατ t ) (Yt − X) +
+ Bt Rt−1 ,
Pt
Pt
(2.7)
where Pt equals the price level and τ t is the tax on labor income, αYt . The term
d
is the demand for money balances and is aggregated across households
Mt+1
in relation to money supply in equilibrium. Previously accumulated money
balances are used to purchase the cash good in the current period and must
also satisfy the cash-in-advance constraint,
Pt C1t ≤ Mt .
(2.8)
Assuming money supply equals money demand in equilibrium, or Mt+1 =
d
, the first-order conditions from the household’s problem can be combined
Mt+1
to derive closed-form solutions for consumption which are as follows,6
³ ´
η
(Yt − X − Gt ) β 1−η
exp(−µt+1 )
³ ´
C1t =
,
(2.9)
η
1 + β 1−η
exp(−µt+1 )
C2t =
(Yt − X − Gt )
³ ´
,
η
1 + β 1−η
exp(−µt+1 )
(2.10)
where exp(µt+1 ) = Mt+1 /Mt is the gross growth rate of money and Gt is the
level of real government consumption. Inserting the solution for the cash good
in (2.9) into the cash-in-advance constraint in (2.8), which holds with equality
in equilibrium, produces the following closed-form equation for the price level,
³ ´
η
1
+
β
exp(−µ
)
t+1
1−η
Mt
.
³ ´
Pt =
(2.11)
η
(Yt − X − Gt )
β
exp(−µ )
1−η
t+1
The closed-form solution for the interest rate is found by inserting the solution
for the credit good in 2.10 into the equilibrium interest rate condition,
1
1
i .
h
(2.12)
Rt =
1
βC2t Et
C2t+1
6
See Appendix for details.
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Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
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The solution for the credit good in (2.10) along with the wage rate in (2.4)
can be substituted into the Euler condition for labor to solve for the equilibrium
quantity of labor. Doing so, and noting the specification for output in (2.1),
defines an implicit function,
¡
¢
Ht = h gt , θt , µt+1 , τ t .
(2.13)
This equation cannot be solved for Ht explicitly, but the implicit function
theorem allows for the construction of an implicit function which defines the
explicit function. Defined derivatives can be obtained since an implicit function
is known to exist under the implicit function theorem.7
Optimal household allocations and the equilibrium price system are all
functions of contemporaneous government policy and the exogenous shocks to
government spending and technology. However, the equilibrium price system
is also dependent on past policy and expectations of future policy and uncertainty. The price level is dependent on the choice of money balances during
the previous period which is a result of the cash-in-advance specification. The
interest rate in period t is also a function of the expectation over future government policy and labor supply decisions in period t + 1 since the interest on
the stock of debt chosen by the household in period t will not be available for
use until period t + 1.
The nonlinearity of the equilibrium labor condition defines a loss function
over government policy and shocks since the contemporaneous tax on labor income and money growth are determinants of optimal household labor supply.
In addition, the shocks to technology and government spending also induce
equilibrium responses by households. While not explicitly present in the equilibrium labor function, debt is indirectly present since the choices of taxes
and money determine the level of debt as a residual in the government budget
constraint, described in more detail in the next section. Equilibrium decisions
by households, firms, and the government are then transmitted across time
through the price level and the interest rate.
2.3. The Ramsey equilibrium
The goal of the government is to maximize the welfare of the household subject
to raising revenues through distortionary means. Real government consumption, Gt , is assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic process. Government
policy includes sequences of labor taxes and supplies of money, and bonds
7
See Appendix for details.
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Vol. 9 [2005], No. 2, Article 3
which must satisfy the government’s budget constraint,
Mt+1
Mt
+ Bt Rt−1 = ατ t (Yt − X) − Gt + Bt+1 +
,
Pt
Pt
(2.14)
where the initial stocks of money, M0 , and bonds, B0 , are given. The money
supply and government spending in period t are assumed to grow at the rate
exp(µt+1 ) − 1 and exp(gt ) − 1, respectively. Thus, the level of government
spending and money stock are defined as,
Gt = exp(gt )Gt−1 ,
(2.15)
Mt+1 = exp(µt+1 )Mt .
(2.16)
The random variable gt is assumed to evolve according to the following autoregressive process,
gt = ρg gt−1 +
g,t ,
0 < ρg < 1,
(2.17)
and g,t is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ g,t .
Like the shock to technology, the realization of g,t is known to all at the beginning of period t. After the shocks to the system are revealed, the government
selects a policy profile and households respond with a set of allocations. The
resulting equilibrium determines the state variables for the next period. Therefore, when choosing an optimal policy mix of taxes, money supply, and debt,
the government must take into account the equilibrium reactions by households and firms to the chosen policy mix. The government is also constrained
in its policy choices since it must choose a policy mix to maximize household
utility while satisfying the government budget constraint.
The Ramsey problem in the general equilibrium dynamic programming
setting incorporates many of the reputational mechanisms for credible government policies as discussed in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000).8 In general, the
government would find it optimal to deviate from its original set of policies if
allowed and some mechanism, reputational or otherwise, is needed to ensure
credibility of government policy. Under the assumption that an institution or
commitment technology exists through which the government can bind itself
to a particular sequence of policies, the government solves for the commitment
equilibrium by maximizing (2.6) subject to (2.14) while taking into account
the equilibrium specification for the price system in equations (2.12) and (2.11)
8
They use the analysis of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) to represent the government policy game as a dynamic programming problem.
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Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
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and the optimal response by households and firms in equations (2.1), (2.9),
(2.10), and (2.13).
Optimal policy is a mapping of state variables to labor taxes, money supply,
and the amount of debt so that the government’s budget constraint is satisfied.
Like the household’s problem, the government’s problem can be set up as a
dynamic programming problem whereby the government seeks to maximize,
V (st ) = Max
∆t
λgt
µ
η ln C1t + (1 − η) ln C2t − ¶
γHt +
ατ
(Y
−
X)
−
G
+
B
+
(2.18)
t+1
¢ Mtt
¡ t t
+ βEt V (st+1 )
exp(µt+1 ) − 1 Pt − Bt Rt−1
where ∆t = (τ t , µt+1 , ³Bt+1 ) is the set of choice variables
´ and st represents the
d
Mt
, θt−1 , gt−1 , τ t−1 , Rt−1 . Here the government
set of state variables Bt , Pt−1
takes consumption of the cash good as given by (2.9), consumption of the
credit good by (2.10), labor is given by (2.13), output satisfies the production
function in (2.1), the price level is given by (2.11) and the interest rate on debt
is (2.12). λgt is the Lagrange multiplier on the government budget constraint.
The first-order conditions for the Ramsey problem are,9
η ∂C1t
∂C2t
t
+ 1−η
− γ ∂H
+
C
∂τ
C
∂τ
∂τ
t
t
t
1t
2t
·
∂Rt−1 ¸
t
=
(2.19)
τt :
ατ t ∂Y
+
α
(Y
−
X)
−
B
t
∂τ
¡t
¢ Mt 1t ∂P∂τt t
λgt
− exp(µt+1 ) − 1 Pt Pt ∂τ t
¾
½
∂Rt
,
βEt λgt+1 Bt+1
∂τ t
µt+1 :
"
η ∂C1t
∂C2t
∂Ht
+ 1−η
− γ ∂µ
+
C1t ∂µt+1
C2t ∂µt+1
t+1
M
t−1
exp(µt+1 ) − Bt ∂R
+
ατ t ∂µ∂Yt − Pt+1
t
t+1
¡
¢ Mt 1 ∂P ∂µt+1
t
− exp(µt+1 ) − 1 Pt Pt ∂µ
t+1
λgt
½
·
¸¾
∂Rt
βEt λgt+1 Bt+1
,
∂µt+1
Bt+1 : λgt = βEt {λgt+1 Rt } ,
#
= (2.20)
(2.21)
where the Benveniste - Scheinkman condition (Benveniste and Scheinkman,
1979) is used repeatedly to replace ∂V/∂∆.
¡
¢
The first order condition for money shown here is ∂/∂ exp(−µt+1 ) for simplicity. The
optimal government policy for money balances can then be found by taking the − ln(x) of
the result.
9
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The distortionary effects of money and tax policy are evident through examination of the first-order conditions to the government’s problem. For example, the Euler condition in (2.19) describes the trade-off between taxation
and issuing debt. The first terms on the left-hand side reflect the change in
consumption of the cash and credit goods and provision of labor by the household from a change in taxes. A change in the tax rate enters consumption of
the cash and credit good indirectly via the equilibrium labor condition. The
partial derivative of the equilibrium labor condition with respect to taxes is
negative, so that ∂Ht /∂τ t , ∂C1t /∂τ t , ∂C2t /∂τ t are all negative. Higher labor
income taxes discourage labor supply, reduce output, and decrease consumption. The net impact on household utility is negative. The bracketed term
in (2.19) describes the change in the government budget constraint from a
change in taxes scaled by the multiplier. The first terms inside the bracket
represent the direct change in tax revenue from a change in tax policy, the
sign of which depends on the nonlinear response of labor supply to a change in
taxes. The next term results from the commitment technology and details the
change in the interest rate on debt during the previous period, respectively,
from a change in the one-period ahead tax rate. The remaining term inside
the bracket describes the price effect on nominal balances. In particular, an
increase in taxes increases the price level today since consumption of the cash
good falls, reducing the real value of money balances chosen during the previous period. These combined effects in the left-hand side of (2.19) must be
equal to the alternative policy of issuing additional debt carried into the next
period.
The trade-off between issuing money and debt is described in (2.20) and
is more complicated since money enters (2.20) directly through the money
growth term and indirectly through the equilibrium labor condition. The first
terms on the left-hand side detail the effects of money growth on consumption
and labor supply. Increases in money growth decrease equilibrium labor so
that ∂Ht /∂µt+1 is negative. Combined with the direct effects of money on
consumption, ∂C1t /∂µt+1 and ∂C2t /∂µt+1 are also negative. The bracketed
term, as in the tax derivative, details the impact of changes in money on
the government budget constraint scaled by the multiplier. The first term
describes the change in labor tax revenue based on the change in equilibrium
labor from changes in money growth. Increases in money growth that decrease
equilibrium labor result in lower output and reduced labor tax revenue. The
second term relates to seigniorage revenues. The next term arises from the
commitment technology and the remaining term describes the price effect on
nominal balances. Increases in money growth result in a higher price level,
reducing the real value of nominal money balances chosen during the previous
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Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
11
period. These combined effects on the left-hand side must be equal to the
alternative policy of issuing debt which matures during the next period.
The set of Euler conditions from the Ramsey problem, the labor equation
from the household’s problem, and the government budget constraint can be
generalized to a set of four operator equations N (f ) that define equilibrium,
¢
¡
(2.22)
Nτ Ht , µt+1 , τ t , gt , θt , Bt+1 , Rt , st = 0,
¡
¢
Nµ Ht , µt+1 , τ t , gt , θt , Bt+1 , Rt , st = 0,
(2.23)
¡
¢
NH Ht , µt+1 , τ t , gt , θt , Bt+1 , Rt , st = 0,
(2.24)
¡
¢
Nλ Ht , µt+1 , τ t , gt , θt , Bt+1 , Rt , st = 0.
(2.25)
The solution procedure described in detail in the section below optimally solves
for government policy, labor supply, and the multiplier on the government
budget constraint as functions of state variables including uncertainty in the
system. Consequently, the solution method applied in this paper differs from
the more traditional primal approach. The primal approach recasts the problem of choosing optimal policy as a problem of choosing allocations subject
to constraints which capture restrictions on those allocations.10 In practice
this means using an infinite horizon budget constraint with prices and policy substituted out using first-order conditions, commonly referred to as the
implementability constraint. The use of the implementability constraint often requires a search procedure that iterates across candidate solutions for
the multiplier (Chari et al., 1994) as opposed to endogenously solving for the
multiplier as is done in this paper. Furthermore, the multiplier on the implementability constraint has a different interpretation than the multiplier in this
paper. In this analysis, the multiplier on the government budget constraint
represents the shadow value of reducing debt or, equivalently, the value of the
ability to collect a lump-sum tax. A solution procedure which solves for the
multiplier as an endogenous variables is preferred in this instance since the
multiplier is a crucial element in determining the cost of distortionary policy.
3. Projection Method
The characterization of the policies that generate the Ramsey equilibrium theoretically is difficult since the system is nonlinear. Therefore, the system is
characterized numerically. Following the process in Cooley and Hansen (1995),
Hansen and Wright (1992), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Chari et al.
10
See Chari et al. (1994) and Chari and Kehoe (1999) for examples of the primal approach.
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Table 3.1: Parameter Values Corresponding to U.S. Economy.
Parameter Values
α
β
η
γ
δ
ρθ
σθ
ρg
σg
0.6 0.991 0.44 2.47 0.017 0.95 0.007 0.96 0.021
(1991), and Hansen (1985), the model is calibrated to match the general features of the U.S. economy. Parameter values are chosen such that elements of
the non-stochastic steady state match the average values from the post-Korean
War U.S. time series and are summarized in Table 3.1. In estimating the government spending process and the share of output attributable to capital and
labor, a gross capital concept is assumed so that the assumed constant investment includes government investment. Ratios relative to net national product
are used instead of gross domestic product, although either procedure could
be implemented. The ratio of the cash good to the credit good was estimated
using first order conditions from the household problem.11 The initial stock
of debt was calibrated from the NIPA database using federal debt held in the
hands of the public.12 Non-marketable government debt was excluded from
the sample. Based on this data, a ratio of debt to net national product of 0.49
is used to simulate the U.S. debt-to-income economy or “low” debt economy.
The “high” debt economy is calibrated to twice this level.
The computational solution procedure is based on the projection approach
as described in Judd (1992, 1998). The four operator equations in equations (2.22) - (2.25), are continuous maps where N : B1 → B2 , B1 and B2
are complete normed vector spaces of the functions f : D ⊂ Rn → Rm .
D is a compact subset of R and, as discussed below, will be defined over
D = [−1, 1]. The solution procedure will solve for the optimal set of policies
(Ht , µt+1 , τ³t , λgt ) as functions of the exogenous
shocks (gt , θt ) and state vari´
d
t
ables st = Bt , PMt−1
, θt−1 , gt−1 , τ t−1 , Rt−1 that set N (f) = 0 simultaneously
and hence satisfy the Ramsey equilibrium. In addition to the various allocation rules, price systems, and government policy which are based on current
or past information, the equilibrium interest rate function also includes condi-
11
See Chari et al. (1991), for example.
Based on the government budget constraint in this model, a more accurate measure of
debt would include combined federal, state, and local debt. However, many states have balanced budget amendments which restrict the ability of states and local governments to issue
debt for purposes other than infrastructure development and cash management operations,
limiting the ability of states to issue debt for policy smoothing purposes. Furthermore,
calibrating the level of debt is less important in this model since the initial level is set
exogenously and can be adjusted as is done in this paper.
12
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Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
13
tional expectations over future government policy and the shocks to technology
and government spending. Consequently, it is through the interest rate function that expectations over future policy are translated into current allocation
decisions.
3.1. Basis and degree of approximation
The solution to the system, N (f ) = 0, is represented by assuming that the
approximation, fb, to the true solution, f , is built up as a combination of
some function of the basis B1 .13 A good basis for the vector space is often
found among the family of orthogonal polynomials.14 The most useful of these
polynomials have a recursive representation in terms of eigenfunctions and a
weighting function such that the integral over [a, b] forms a complete orthogonal set of functions. Orthogonal bases are important since nonorthogonal
bases reduce numerical accuracy in the same manner in which multicollinearity widens confidence intervals in regression analysis.15 It is for this reason
that orthogonal bases are chosen.
In this paper Chebyshev polynomials are used to form the approximations
to the true policy functions. Chebyshev polynomials, Tn (x), are solutions to
the Chebyshev differential equation and form a complete orthogonal set on the
−1/2
interval [−1, 1] with weighting function (1 − x2 )
. A Chebyshev polynomial
at one point can be expressed by neighboring Chebyshev polynomials at the
same point using the following recursive formula,
T0 (x) = 0,
T1 (x) = x,
Ti+1 (x) = 2xTi (x) − Ti−1 (x) ,
(3.1)
(3.2)
where Tn (x) = cos(n cos−1 x).
Applied to the Ramsey problem described in this paper, the true optimal
13
A basis is a set of linearly independent vectors in a vector space such that any vector
in the vector space can be expressed as a linear combination of them with appropriately
chosen coefficients.
14
Examples of such families of orthogonal polynomials are Legendre polynomials, Laguerre
polynomials, Hermite polynomials, and Chebyshev polynomials. Each represents a complete
orthogonal set under different circumstances.
15
Standard solution procedures require an initial guess of the set of coefficients followed
by an iterative method which converges to the optimal set of coefficients. The accuracy
of the final solution to the system of equations depends directly on the non-colliniearity of
the rows and columns of the matrix of coefficients used in the iterative solution procedure.
In particular, the iterative process may rely on the Jacobian and an orthogonal basis will
reduce the likelihood of a poorly conditioned Jacobian.
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
14
Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics
Vol. 9 [2005], No. 2, Article 3
policy functions (Ht , µt+1 , τ t , λgt ) are approximated by Chebyshev polynomial
functions and the solution procedure will yield the set of coefficients (b, d, q, v)
that describe how policy will respond to the exogenous shocks to technology
and government spending. Given the choice of polynomial function, the approximation of the set of policy functions are,
µ
bt+1 (θt , gt , b) =
τ t (θt , gt , d) =
b
b t (θ t , gt , q) =
H
bgt (θt , gt , v) =
λ
ng
nθ X
X
bij Ψij (θt , gt ),
(3.3)
i=1 j=1
ng
nθ X
X
dij Ωij (θt , gt ),
(3.4)
qij Φij (θt , gt ),
(3.5)
vij Γij (θt , gt ).
(3.6)
i=1 j=1
ng
nθ X
X
i=1 j=1
ng
nθ X
X
i=1 j=1
The system is therefore reduced from an infinite-dimensional system to a finitedimensional system; the number of coefficients can be varied and the candidate
solutions can be tested using various standard tests of convergence until the
“true” solution is found.
Since the special properties of Chebyshev polynomials apply their restrictions over [−1, 1], a linear transformation is applied to the state space of θ
and g. The initial state space is [θ m , θM ] × [gm , gM ] where m refers to the
minimum value and M to the maximum value in the range. It is hoped that
the solution is a good approximation on [θm , θM ] × [gm , gM ]. Since θ and g
are both exogenously defined, the interval for each is taken as a multiple of
the standard deviation of the error process, θ,t and g,t , both of which are
normally distributed with mean equal to zero and variances which are determined by historical data. This procedure adds four additional parameters to
the problem θm , θM , gm , and gM . Using Chebyshev polynomials in (3.3) (3.6) along with the transformation to the [−1, 1] interval yields,
µ µ
¶
¶
¶
¶
µ µ
θ − θM
g − gM
Ψij (θt , gt ) ≡ Ti−1 2
− 1 Tj−1 2
− 1 , (3.7)
θM − θ m
gM − gm
¶
¶
µ µ
¶
¶
µ µ
g − gM
θ − θM
− 1 Tj−1 2
− 1 , (3.8)
Ωij (θt , gt ) ≡ Ti−1 2
θM − θm
gM − gm
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Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
15
¶
¶
µ µ
¶
¶
µ µ
g − gM
θ − θM
− 1 Tj−1 2
− 1 , (3.9)
Φij (θt , gt ) ≡ Ti−1 2
θM − θm
gM − gm
µ µ
¶
¶
µ µ
¶
¶
θ − θM
g − gM
Γij (θt , gt ) ≡ Ti−1 2
− 1 Tj−1 2
− 1 . (3.10)
θM − θm
gM − gm
3.2. Gauss-Hermite quadrature
The system of equations in (2.22) - (2.25) also contain conditional expectations
which must be evaluated. Since the processes that define θ and g are both
assumed to be distributed N (0, σ 2θ,g ), expectations are evaluated using GaussHermite Quadrature. As the form of the policy function is independent of
the realization of the shocks to θ and g, expectations are found by integrating
over the possible realizations of θ and g while treating the policy function as
a constant.
If θt ∼ N (0, σ 2θ ), gt ∼ N (0, σ 2g ), and ρθg = 0 where ρθg is the covariance
between θ and g, then Gauss-Hermite Quadrature specifies,
Et−1 [f (θt , gt )]
Ã
¡
¢2 !
∞∞
Z
Z
g − µg
(θ − µθ )2
−1
f (θt , gt ) exp −
= (2πσθ σg )
−
dθdg. (3.11)
2σ 2g
2σ2θ
−∞−∞
Next, implement a change of variables where,
¢
¡
g − µg
(θ − µθ )
xθ = √
, xg = √
,
2σ θ
2σ g
(3.12)
and use the following identity with the assumption of a mean zero process,
Z∞∞
Z
=
−∞−∞
Z∞∞
Z
−∞−∞
¢2 !
¡
g − µg
(θ − µθ )2
dθdg
−
f (θt , gt ) exp −
2σ 2θ
2σ 2g
Ã
(3.13)
³√
´
√
¡
¢
f
2σ θ xθ , 2σ g xg exp −x2θ − x2g 2σ θ σ g dxθ dxg .
Cancelling the appropriate terms yields the general Gauss-Hermite Quadrature
rule to evaluate expectations of functions of two normal random variables,
Et−1 [f (θt , gt )] = π
−1
∞∞
Z
Z
−∞−∞
f
´
³√
√
¡
¢
2σθ xθ , 2σ g xg exp −x2θ − x2g dxθ dxg
(3.14)
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Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics
16
=π
−1
rg
rθ X
X
lθ =1 lg =1
wlθ wlg f
´
³√
√
2σθ xlθ , 2σg xlg ,
Vol. 9 [2005], No. 2, Article 3
(3.15)
´
³
¢
¡
where wlθ = exp −x2lθ , wlg = exp −x2lg are the weights and xlθ , xlg are the
nodes under Gauss-Hermite Quadrature.16 This procedure produces a rθ ×
rg system of equations where the choice of rθ defines the weights and nodes
for the distribution of θ and rg defines the weights and nodes for the distribution of g. In addition, the choice of r can be on the interval of [−∞, ∞].
Therefore, a larger r produces a more accurate estimation, but increases computation time of the solution procedure. Fortunately, since the weighting
function is exp (−x2 ), most of the density is captured at a relatively low order
since exp (−x2 ) approaches zero as x passes 2. A modest selection of r will
enable an accurate solution to be reached without adding too much time to
the computational procedure. For the simulations in this paper, rθ = rg = 11
was used.
As an example of this procedure, the equilibrium solution for the interest
rate in period t is,
Rt =
1
βC2t
Et
·
1
,
¸
1
1+β ( 1−η
) exp(−bµt+2 (θt+1 ,gt+1 ,b))
α
b t+1 (θt+1 ,gt+1 ,q)) K 1−α −X−exp(gt+1 )Gt
exp(θt+1 )(H
(3.16)
where the equilibrium value of C2t is given by (2.10). Following the steps
outlined in (3.11) - (3.15), the computation of the expected value term in the
denominator involves,
h ³
´i
¡
¢
bt+1 (θt+1 , gt+1 , q) , gt+1
Et f exp −b
µt+2 (θt+1 , gt+1 , b) , θt+1 , H
= π
−1
rg
rθ X
X
wlθ wrg [z] ,
(3.17)
lθ =1 lg =1
where z is a function of,
µ
√
√
√
¡
¡
¢¢
¶
exp −b
µt+2 ρθ θt + 2σ θ xlθ , ρg gt + 2σg xlg , b , ρθ θ t + 2σθ xlθ ,
√
√
√
¢
¡
b t+1 ρθ θt + 2σθ xl , ρg gt + 2σg xl , q , ρg gt + 2σg xl
H
g
g
θ
(3.18)
and θt and gt are known when expectations are formed in period t.
16
For a table on Gauss-Hermite Quadrature weights and nodes, see Stroud and Secrest
(1966) or Judd (1998).
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Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
17
3.3. Galerkin and Chebyshev collocation
Inserting the Chebyshev polynomial approximations and Gauss-Hermite Quadrature for the expectation operators into the set of operator equations in (2.22)
- (2.25) yields the following stacked set of residual functions,
³
´
Rτ (θt , gt ; b, d, q, v) = N fbτ (θt , gt ) = 0,
(3.19)
³
´
b
Rµ (θt , gt ; b, d, q, v) = N fµ (θt , gt ) = 0,
³
´
b
RH (θt , gt ; b, d, q, v) = N fH (θt , gt ) = 0,
³
´
Rλ (θt , gt ; b, d, q, v) = N fbλ (θt , gt ) = 0.
(3.20)
(3.21)
(3.22)
These equations are referred to as residual functions since the object will be
to find the coefficients that yield the zero function, or minimize the residual
of each equation. The Galerkin approach uses the first n elements of the
basis, which determines the number of coefficients (b, d, q, and v), to form the
projection directions. The only assumption made here is that these elements
of the basis B1 lie inside B2 . Therefore, the Galerkin approach forms the nθ ×
ng projections, where b, d, q, and v are chosen for i = 1, ..., nθ and j = 1, ..., ng
to solve the following stacked set of projection equations,
P1ij (b, d, q, v) ≡
P2ij (b, d, q, v) ≡
P3ij (b, d, q, v) ≡
P4ij (b, d, q, v) ≡
θZM g
ZM
Rτ (θ, g; b, d, q, v) Ψij (.)Ωij (.)Φij (.)Γij (.)dgdθ,
(3.23)
θZM g
ZM
Rµ (θ, g; b, d, q, v) Ψij (.)Ωij (.)Φij (.)Γij (.)dgdθ,
(3.24)
θZM gZM
RH (θ, g; b, d, q, v) Ψij (.)Ωij (.)Φij (.)Γij (.)dgdθ, (3.25)
θZM gZM
Rλ (θ, g; b, d, q, v) Ψij (.)Ωij (.)Φij (.)Γij (.)dgdθ.
θm gm
θ m gm
θm gm
(3.26)
θm gm
While choice of n specifies the number of coefficients in each polynomial and
the accuracy of the approximation, it does not eliminate the need to integrate
over the possible realizations of the government spending and productivity
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Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics
18
Vol. 9 [2005], No. 2, Article 3
shock. Further specification is needed to define the solution procedure over
the [θm , θM ] × [gm , gM ] space.
Given these nθ × ng projections, a collocation method then proceeds by
choosing the coefficients so that P1ij (.), P2ij (.), P3ij (.), and P4ij (.) equal zero
simultaneously at a finite set of values for θ and g. Furthermore, orthogonal
collocation is a method whereby the finite choices for this state space, θk
and gk for k = 1, ..., m, are the k zeros of the k − th orthogonal polynomial
basis element and the basis elements are orthogonal with respect to the inner
product. Orthogonal collocation with Chebyshev polynomials as the basis is
referred to as Chebyshev collocation and the Chebyshev interpolation theorem
details the optimality of Chebyshev collocation.17 Thus, Chebyshev collocation
with the Galerkin method is used to solve the system of equations.
The Chebyshev collocation method starts with choosing mθ productivity
m
levels, {θk }m
k=1 , and mg government spending levels, {gk }k=1 , and uses these
to compute the projections. For i = 1, ..., nθ , j = 1, ..., ng , the solution is to
find the values of b, d, q, and v to solve the following system,
Pb1ij (b, d, q, v) ≡
m
Pθ
m
Pg
kθ =1 kg =1
¡
¢
Rτ θkθ , gkg ; b, d, q, v Ψij (.)Ωij (.)Φij (.)Γij (.) = 0, (3.27)
m
¢
¡
Pg
Pθ m
Pb2ij (b, d, q, v) ≡
Rµ θ kθ , gkg ; b, d, q, v Ψij (.)Ωij (.)Φij (.)Γij (.) = 0, (3.28)
kθ =1 kg =1
m
¡
¢
Pθ m
Pg
Pb3ij (b, d, q, v) ≡
RH θkθ , gkg ; b, d, q, v Ψij (.)Ωij (.)Φij (.)Γij (.) = 0, (3.29)
kθ =1 kg =1
m
¡
¢
Pg
Pθ m
Rλ θkθ , gkg ; b, d, q, v Ψij (.)Ωij (.)Φij (.)Γij (.) = 0, (3.30)
Pb4ij (b, d, q, v) ≡
kθ =1 kg =1
where,
¢
¡
1
(θ M − θ m ) zkmθθ + 1 , kθ = 1, ..., mθ ,
2
³
´
1
m
= gm + (gM − gm ) zkgg + 1 , kg = 1, ..., mg ,
2
¶
µ
(2k − 1) π
n
, k = 1, ..., n,
zk = cos
2n
θkθ = θm +
(3.31)
gkg
(3.32)
(3.33)
and zkn are the n zeros of the Chebyshev polynomials.
17
The Chebyshev interpolation theorem states that if R (x; a) is smooth in x and R (z; a) =
0 where z is the set of the n zeros of the Chebyshev polynomial Tn , then the zero conditions
force R (x; a) to be close to zero for all x ∈ D, where D = [−1, 1]. See Judd (1998) for
further details.
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Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
19
In sum, the projection approach begins by defining the policy functions
for taxes, money growth, labor, and the multiplier in terms of Chebyshev
polynomials. Each polynomial is a function of the two random elements in
the system, government spending and technology. The evaluation of expectations operators is done using Gauss-Hermite Quadrature and the choice of rθ
and rg determine the accuracy of the approximation since this choice determines the number of nodes the function is integrated over. Fortunately, the
weighting function is such that most of the density is captured at a relatively
low order. The “value” at each node is based on the standard deviation of
the error process and the optimally defined weight. The evaluation of each
expectation operator requires the computation of an rθ × rg system. The
Galerkin approach forms the nθ × ng projections while specifying the number
of coefficients. The larger the choice of nθ and ng , the more accurate the solution. However, this numerical approach is computationally constrained and
this procedure settles for the smallest number of coefficients where additional
coefficients yields relatively little in terms of approximation. Chebyshev collocation methods then divide the state space over θ and g into discrete grid
points, where the larger the choice of mθ and mg produces a more defined grid
space, and use orthogonal Chebyshev polynomials to optimally search for the
coefficients necessary to set the system of projection equations equal to zero
simultaneously.
Expectation terms formed in period t−1, Et−1 (.), are based on information
available in t − 1. Calibration determines the initial values of θt−1 and gt−1 ,
and the Gauss-Hermite Quadrature routine evaluates the rθ × rg possibilities
given these initial values. Subsequently, in period t, the values for θt and gt
are revealed based on the defined gridspace in mθ × mg . The system, however,
must be able to solve for the policy functions based on all possible realizations
of θt and gt , given θt−1 and gt−1 . The realizations of θt and gt determine the
deviation from the expected values of θ t and gt based on previous information,
defining the nonlinearity in the system and creating the necessary responses
by the remaining policy variables, including taxes, labor, and money growth.
Overall, the Gauss-Hermite nodes define a state space over θ and g in terms
of expectations while the collocation method defines a state space over the
realizations of θ and g.
3.4. A low-order example
In order to provide better insight into the projection method as applied to
this problem, a low-order example is briefly described. Some of the output is
displayed from the solution to the optimal policy functions derived under the
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics
20
Vol. 9 [2005], No. 2, Article 3
low debt-to-income case which is calibrated to the debt-to-income ratio of the
U.S. economy. Remaining parameter values were specified according to the
calibration techniques discussed earlier in the paper.
First, the projection approach begins by defining the policy functions in
terms of Chebyshev polynomials. For example, suppose that n = 2. This is often a good starting point for complex systems since low order polynomials will
capture a large portion of the nonlinearity within the system without adding
too much to the dimension of the system. Since each polynomial is a function
of two random variables, technology and government spending, each policy
function in (3.3) - (3.6) will have a total of nθ × ng = 4 coefficients. Consequently, under the Galerkin approach this defines 16 projection equations.
The solution procedure will optimally solve for four policy functions (Ht , µt+1 ,
τ t , λgt ) comprised of 16 total coefficients (b11 , b12 , b21 , b22 , d11 , ..., v22 ). In order to ensure that the system is properly identified, the Chebyshev collocation
methods dictate mθ = mg = 2 which results in mθ × mg = 4 combinations of
spending and technology shocks and uses these values to compute the projections. The evaluation of expectations operators is done using Gauss-Hermite
Quadrature and the choice of rθ and rg determines the weights and nodes of
the function integrated over. Setting rθ = rg = 11 requires the computation
of 121 possible future combinations of technology and government spending
values in order to evaluate the expectation operator.
The solution procedure begins with an initial guess for each coefficient and
the residual functions are computed. Since the entire set of projection equations must equal zero simultaneously, the set of residual functions is simply the
stacked vector of Euler conditions. The solution program evaluates whether
the system is sufficiently “close” to zero by comparing the norm of the residual
vector to some predefined criterion. In this case, a norm of 1.0x10−9 is used
as a minimum convergence criterion. Thus the norm of the residual vector
must be less than this before the solution procedure quits. If the norm of the
residual vector is greater than this stopping criterion, the nonlinear solution
program computes the Jacobian and uses the gradient information to adjust
the coefficients further. If the Jacobian is nearly singular, the accuracy of any
solution will be low and convergence will be slow, if not impossible. Choosing
an orthogonal basis will greatly reduce the odds of having a poorly conditioned
Jacobian matrix.
The nonlinear equation solver was run on a computer with 512 MB of RAM
and a Pentium III processor with 2 Ghz of processing speed.18 Each iteration
18
The nonlinear equation solver is a variant of the routine available on the website of Sims
(2000).
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Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
21
of the solution procedure took approximately 30 seconds and the number of
iterations until the solution was found depends largely on the accuracy of
the initial guess. The residual vector and coefficients listed below result from
solving the low-debt economy with a debt-to-income ratio of 49 percent. In this
case, the solution procedure required nearly 60 iterations for a total computing
time of about 30 minutes. The resulting residual vector is,
−0.08153149821943
−0.16691329429719
−0.04647413009984
−0.13309029989195
0.33068698612748
0.40442434956489
0.38097114352098
−8 0.45744165122485
1.0x10 ∗
,
−0.08688465016893
−0.15021170141072
−0.11757701756654
−0.18067903215235
0.28799174156546
0.10434484387645
0.08828937581029
−0.07808245161556
with coefficients on the optimal policy functions of
1.14608002432578
−0.16519570673541
bij =
−0.11173241474005 ,
0.14011942756373
0.38438668734576
−0.00108787280851
qij =
−0.07471316249354 ,
0.00078124074289
0.05724289844865
0.32378903289563
dij =
−0.03995604069151 ,
−0.15297339348807
−0.42051817069223
0.96449152940428
vij =
0.34835466487284 .
−0.75405756754003
The selection of the stopping criterion is important since it also determines
the accuracy of the final solution. Given the stopping criterion of 1x10−9 , a
mistake in the optimal policy function would cost the government less than
$1 per billion in nominal GDP. Consequently, the error in this solution is less
than $10,000 given the size of the current U.S. economy.
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics
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Vol. 9 [2005], No. 2, Article 3
Given the complexity of the system, a move to higher order polynomials
greatly increases the dimensionality of the problem and increases the computational time required, largely due to the need to compute the Jacobian matrix
during each iteration. For example, moving from second to third order polynomials means each policy function now has nθ × ng = 9 coefficients. Given the
four policy functions, this creates the need to solve for 36 coefficients across
36 projection equations. Each iteration in the solution procedure now requires
approximately 90 seconds to complete, which is triple the time necessary under
the lower order example above. Furthermore, given the size of the residual vector, it becomes more difficult to drive the norm of the residual vector “close”
to zero, meaning that the nonlinear solution procedure may require more iterations to reach the stopping criterion used above or necessitate an increase
in the stopping criterion to facilitate the higher order. Such a move would
decrease the accuracy of the overall solution. Therefore, while the additional
coefficients could capture additional nonlinearity within the model, they also
greatly increase the computational demands on the solution procedure and
may require a decrease in the overall accuracy of the solution.
4. Results
In order to test Barro’s idea (Barro 1987, 1979) that optimal policy smooths
the response of distortionary taxes and money growth to shocks by using debt,
the Ramsey problem was solved in economies with and without debt. The
baseline economy contains no debt while the low debt case uses the prevailing
debt-to-income ratio in the U.S. and the high debt case uses twice this level.
After finding the optimal coefficients of the polynomial approximations that
describe the Ramsey plan, each economy was simulated under the effects of
technology and government spending shocks. Statistics were computed by
running multiple simulations of 5000 periods in length, taking logarithms, and
filtering each simulated time series using the H-P filter as described in Hodrick
and Prescott (1997).
4.1. The steady-state and the role of debt
The values in Table 4.1 represents the steady state Ramsey equilibrium in levels or growth rates.19 Optimal household allocations smooth consumption and
19
While not the main focus of this paper, the properties of each variable under each of
the model simulations match some of the general characteristics of the overall U.S. economy
as discussed in Stock and Watson (1999) and Hodrick and Prescott (1997). The economies
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Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
23
labor supply with the constant η, the relative importance of the cash good to
the credit good in the utility function, determining the split between the two
consumption goods. In each model economy, optimal government policy sets
money growth equal to the rate of time preference as described in Friedman
(1969). According to Friedman, optimal monetary policy satiates the economy
with real balances to the extent that it is possible to do so. Government policy
that follows the Friedman rule results in a real return on debt and money balances equal to the inverse of time preference in the steady state. In enacting
this monetary policy rule, the government equates the real gross rate of return
across money balances and debt in expectation, satisfying Euler conditions.20
Monetary policy that follows the Friedman rule requires the government to
run a gross-of-interest surplus by setting equilibrium labor income taxes high
enough to cover government spending, interest on the debt, and the withdrawal of money balances from the economy. In addition to the optimality
of the Friedman rule, a similar feature of each model is the low volatility of
money growth. Almost all of the volatility in distortionary revenue generating
policy is accounted for through the volatility of labor taxes, suggesting that
preservation of the Friedman rule may take priority over distortionary impacts
of labor taxes. This result is the opposite of Chari et al. (1991), who find that
money growth should be more variable to preserve smoother taxes on labor
income.
The construction of a stacked system of residual equations describing equilibrium as opposed to the more traditional primal approach is illustrative in
that it allows for a complete examination of the trade-offs involved in government policy choices by maintaining the multiplier on the government budget
constraint as an endogenous “policy” variable. In the economy with no debt,
the multiplier reflects the fact that government spending has to be financed by
distortionary means. In the economies with debt, the value of the multiplier
increases since the interest cost of the debt is added to existing government
with and without debt are reported in Table 4.3. The models only generate about half of
the standard deviation of output as found in the U.S. economy, a common shortcoming of
most real business cycle models which is magnified here because of the fixed capital stock.
However, the autocorrelation of output is slightly higher than found in other studies.
The volatility of prices and inflation more closely match features of U.S. data. Since
the price level and the rate of inflation are determined by the cash-in-advance constraint
in equilibrium, volatility of the cash good imparts volatility into prices and compensates
for the lack of volatility in money growth. The correlations of inflation with the shocks
to government spending and technology have the expected opposite signs, leading to low
correlations between inflation and output.
20
As discussed in Chari, et al. (1991, 1996), the so-called Friedman rule turns out to be
optimal in a variety of monetary economies with distorting taxes.
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24
Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics
Vol. 9 [2005], No. 2, Article 3
Table 4.1: Selected Simulations: Steady-State Values.
Steady-State Values
Variable
Baseline
No Debt
Debt/Income Ratio
Low
High
(in levels)
Output
Cash Good
Credit Good
Labor
Multiplier
1.741
0.487
0.623
0.311
0.133
1.736
0.485
0.620
0.309
0.138
1.731
0.483
0.617
0.308
0.144
(in percent)
Inflation
Interest Rate
Money Growth Rate
Tax Rate 1/
Tax Rate 2/
-0.9%
0.9%
-0.9%
18.3%
30.5%
-0.9%
0.9%
-0.9%
18.8%
31.4%
-0.9%
0.9%
-0.9%
19.3%
32.2%
1/ In percent of income.
2/ In percent of labor income.
spending costs. As the debt-to-income ratio rises, the equilibrium tax rate increases to produce a gross-of-interest surplus necessary to cover the associated
higher interest costs with the higher stock of government debt. As a result,
the distortionary effects of taxation on utility increase as the equilibrium tax
rate rises with the level of outstanding debt. The higher welfare costs can
be seen in Table 4.1 through the value of the multiplier on the government
budget constraint. Overall, a higher debt stock requires higher equilibrium
labor taxes, which result in higher welfare costs.
While the ability to issue debt imposes welfare costs through higher steadystate taxes, debt has benefits through policy smoothing. As suggested by Barro
(1979, 1987), the existence of debt provides the government with an additional
degree of policy freedom which allows for a smoother path of distortionary
policy over time, thereby affording the household a smoother stream of consumption and leisure. The simulations of the model economies displayed in
the Table 4.2 indicate that volatility of government tax policy in the economies
with debt, as measured by standard deviation in percent, are lower than the
baseline economy without debt. Since the government is required to raise revenue from distortionary means, Ramsey policies smooth the response of fiscal
and monetary policy to various shocks that affect the economy and the government budget constraint. Initially, the government sets tax and monetary policy
based on generating an expected level of revenues to cover expected government expenditures. As shocks to technology and government spending affect
http://www.bepress.com/snde/vol9/iss2/art3
Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
25
Table 4.2: Selected Simulations: Standard Deviations.
Standard Deviation in Percent
Baseline
Variable
Output
Cash Good
Credit Good
Labor
Multiplier
Price Level
Inflation
1/
Interest Rate
Debt
Money Growth Rate
Tax Rate 2/
No Debt
Debt/Income Ratio
Low
High
0.79
1.38
1.38
0.23
4.64
1.38
1.04
0.78
1.41
1.36
0.22
4.98
1.41
1.05
0.79
1.45
1.34
0.21
5.29
1.49
1.06
0.00
2.85
0
0.07
0.07
0.07
2.66
0.06
0.07
0.15
2.46
1/ Gross rate.
2/ In percent of income.
the government budget constraint, optimal policy responds by smoothing the
impact of distortionary taxes and money growth with debt. For example, the
standard deviation of the tax rate falls from 2.85 percent under no debt to 2.66
percent and 2.46 percent in the low and high debt economies, respectively. The
volatility of monetary policy however rises slightly from no volatility under the
baseline economy without debt to 0.15 percent under the high-debt economy,
contributing to similar increases in the volatility of inflation and consumption
of the cash good. The volatility of labor also rises slightly, but its negative correlation with output implies that leisure is being used more optimally. Given
that revenue policy is distortionary and the system is nonlinear, overall gains
to the household are dependent on whether the gains from reductions in tax
volatility outweigh the loss from the increase in monetary policy volatility.
A utility equivalence framework is used to measure the gain to households
from the ability to issue debt. The gain is measured in terms of a lump-sum
present discounted value of utility necessary to make the household indifferent
between the baseline economy without debt and the economy with the selected
debt-to-income ratio. Since gains from consumption of the credit good and
labor more than offset losses in consumption of the cash good as shown in
Table 4.4, debt issuance for policy smoothing purposes is welfare improving
on the order of 0.4 to 0.7 percent of lifetime utility. Each of the three model
economies with and without debt have different steady-states as shown in Table
4.1. Steady-state utility is highest under the no-debt economy since steady-
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Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics
26
Vol. 9 [2005], No. 2, Article 3
Table 4.3: Simulated Economies with Technology and Government Spending
Shocks.
Economy without Debt
Cross-Correlation of Output with:
Variable
Output
Cash Good
Credit Good
Labor
Multiplier
Gov. Spending
Price Level
Inflation
Money Growth
Tax Rate
Cross-Correlation
x(-3)
x(-2)
x(-1)
x
x(+1)
x(+2)
x(+3)
Money
Growth
0.27
0.24
0.24
-0.08
-0.14
0.00
-0.24
-0.20
0.08
-0.09
0.47
0.42
0.42
-0.14
-0.24
-0.01
-0.42
-0.24
0.15
-0.16
0.72
0.63
0.63
-0.22
-0.36
0.00
-0.63
-0.28
0.22
-0.23
1.00
0.88
0.88
-0.30
-0.51
0.00
-0.88
-0.33
0.31
-0.32
0.72
0.63
0.63
-0.22
-0.36
-0.01
-0.63
0.33
0.22
-0.23
0.47
0.42
0.42
-0.14
-0.24
-0.01
-0.42
0.28
0.14
-0.16
0.27
0.24
0.24
-0.07
-0.14
-0.01
-0.24
0.24
0.08
-0.10
0.31
-0.17
-0.17
-1.00
0.65
0.94
0.17
0.06
1.00
0.79
Tax
Rate
Mult.
Shocks
Tech.
Gov.
-0.32
-0.73
-0.73
-0.80
0.98
0.95
0.73
0.27
0.79
1.00
-0.51
-0.85
-0.85
-0.66
1.00
0.86
0.85
0.32
0.65
0.98
1.00
0.88
0.88
-0.30
-0.51
0.00
-0.88
-0.33
0.31
-0.32
0.00
-0.47
-0.47
-0.95
0.86
1.00
0.47
0.18
0.94
0.95
Economy with Low Debt-to-Income Ratio
Cross-Correlation of Output with:
Variable
Output
Cash Good
Credit Good
Labor
Multiplier
Gov. Spending
Price Level
Inflation
Interest Rate
Debt
Money Growth
Tax Rate
Cross-Correlation
x(-3)
x(-2)
x(-1)
x
x(+1)
x(+2)
x(+3)
Money
Growth
Tax
Rate
Mult.
Shocks
Tech.
Gov.
0.26
0.24
0.24
-0.26
-0.15
-0.02
-0.20
-0.20
-0.25
-0.10
-0.11
-0.11
0.46
0.42
0.42
-0.46
-0.27
-0.02
-0.38
-0.25
-0.44
-0.24
-0.18
-0.18
0.71
0.63
0.64
-0.71
-0.40
-0.02
-0.61
-0.30
-0.66
-0.42
-0.27
-0.27
1.00
0.89
0.90
-1.00
-0.55
-0.02
-0.88
-0.36
-0.93
-0.63
-0.37
-0.37
0.71
0.63
0.64
-0.71
-0.40
-0.02
-0.64
0.32
-0.66
-0.88
-0.27
-0.27
0.46
0.42
0.42
-0.46
-0.26
-0.02
-0.44
0.27
-0.44
-0.63
-0.18
-0.18
0.26
0.24
0.24
-0.26
-0.15
-0.02
-0.27
0.23
-0.25
-0.41
-0.11
-0.11
-0.37
-0.75
-0.73
0.36
0.96
0.92
0.73
0.34
0.68
0.47
1.00
0.98
-0.37
-0.75
-0.73
0.36
0.98
0.94
0.73
0.34
0.67
0.46
0.98
1.00
-0.55
-0.87
-0.85
0.54
1.00
0.84
0.85
0.38
0.81
0.54
0.96
0.98
1.00
0.89
0.90
-1.00
-0.55
-0.02
-0.88
-0.36
-0.93
-0.63
-0.37
-0.37
Tax
Rate
Mult.
Shocks
Tech.
Gov.
-0.37
-0.76
-0.72
0.34
0.98
0.93
0.69
0.40
0.66
0.47
0.98
1.00
-0.55
-0.87
-0.84
0.52
1.00
0.84
0.80
0.44
0.79
0.55
0.96
0.98
1.00
0.88
0.91
-1.00
-0.54
0.00
-0.83
-0.38
-0.94
-0.65
-0.36
-0.36
-0.02
-0.47
-0.44
0.01
0.84
1.00
0.45
0.23
0.37
0.26
0.92
0.94
Economy with High Debt-to-Income Ratio
Cross-Correlation of Output with:
Variable
Output
Cash Good
Credit Good
Labor
Multiplier
Gov. Spending
Price Level
Inflation
Interest Rate
Debt
Money Growth
Tax Rate
Cross-Correlation
x(-3)
x(-2)
x(-1)
x
x(+1)
x(+2)
x(+3)
Money
Growth
0.27
0.23
0.24
-0.27
-0.14
0.00
-0.15
-0.20
-0.25
-0.10
-0.09
-0.10
0.47
0.41
0.43
-0.47
-0.25
0.00
-0.33
-0.26
-0.44
-0.24
-0.17
-0.17
0.71
0.63
0.65
-0.71
-0.39
0.00
-0.56
-0.32
-0.67
-0.43
-0.26
-0.26
1.00
0.88
0.91
-1.00
-0.55
0.00
-0.83
-0.38
-0.94
-0.65
-0.37
-0.37
0.71
0.63
0.65
-0.71
-0.39
0.00
-0.63
0.29
-0.67
-0.92
-0.26
-0.26
0.47
0.41
0.43
-0.47
-0.26
-0.01
-0.45
0.25
-0.44
-0.66
-0.18
-0.18
0.27
0.24
0.25
-0.27
-0.15
-0.01
-0.29
0.21
-0.25
-0.43
-0.10
-0.10
-0.37
-0.76
-0.71
0.34
0.96
0.91
0.69
0.40
0.66
0.47
1.00
0.98
http://www.bepress.com/snde/vol9/iss2/art3
0.00
-0.48
-0.41
-0.02
0.84
1.00
0.42
0.28
0.34
0.25
0.91
0.93
Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
27
state tax rates on labor are lower, resulting in higher steady-state labor supply,
output, and consumption. In order to estimate the gains from allowing policy
smoothing through the issuance of debt, an adjustment is made to each of
the steady-state utility measures with debt to compensate for this differential.
Therefore, the utility equivalence measures displayed in Table 4.4 should be
viewed as an estimate of utility variations around similar steady-states.
A confidence interval for the gain in welfare can be found to test the significance of the estimated gains in Table 4.4. This is done by first forming the 95
percent confidence intervals around the standard deviations to technology and
government spending.21 These intervals were then used to re-estimate welfare
gains. Based on this process, the 95 percent confidence intervals for the welfare gains are 0.3 to 0.5 percent of lifetime utility under low debt and 0.6 to
0.8 percent of lifetime utility under high debt. Therefore, while the lifetime
gains in utility under low and high debt are relatively small in magnitude, they
appear to be significant.
Furthermore, the welfare gains estimated from reducing policy volatility
are similar to those reported in Lucas (1987), who estimates the cost of business cycles. Using logarithmic preferences and post World War II data series,
Lucas (1987) reports that completely removing consumption variability entails
a lifetime increase in utility equal to 0.2 percent of consumption. However, the
author used a time preference parameter of β = 0.95. Using a calibrated value
equal to β = 0.991 as done in this paper would result in a lifetime increase in
utility equal to 0.9 percent. Furthermore, the welfare gains estimated here are
similar in size to those reported by Cooley and Hansen (1991), who estimate
the gains from eliminating moderate inflation. Employing a similar stochastic
monetary economy as the one presented here, the authors report that tran21
The calibrated values for the process governing technology and government spending are
based on Cooley and Hansen (1995) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), respectively.
The confidence intervals are formed based on the chi-squared distribution with (n − 2)
degrees of freedom where n is the number of observations in the sample. With 120 degrees
of freedom, the 95 percent confidence interval for σ2θ is,
(n − 2) (0.0837)
(n − 2) (0.0837)
< σ 2θ <
,
χ20.975
χ20.025
or,
0.012 < σ θ < 0.004.
Following the same process, the 95 percent confidence interval for σ2g is,
0.036 < σg < 0.013.
See Greene (1993) for additional information.
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Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics
28
Vol. 9 [2005], No. 2, Article 3
Table 4.4: Utility Equivalence.
Utility Equivalent Over No-Debt Economy
Debt-to-Income Ratio
Low
High
(Discounted present value in percent)
Total Utility
Consumption
Cash Good
Credit Good
Labor
0.4
-0.2
-0.6
0.3
0.8
0.7
-0.3
-1.3
0.7
1.5
sitioning from 5 percent and 10 percent inflation to zero inflation results in
gains in lifetime utility of 0.4 and 0.6 percent, respectively.
5. Conclusion
This paper has examined the usefulness of nonlinear projection methods in
solving Ramsey problems by investigating welfare enhancing properties of
debt. The presence of nonlinear distortions in the Ramsey problem requires
the use of a solution procedure which captures these effects. The nonlinear
projection method, even with low-order Chebyshev polynomials as employed
in this paper, is able to capture a significant portion of the Jensen’s inequality
effects. We estimate welfare gains from debt issuance and associated policy
smoothing. In an explicit monetary economy where cash and credit goods
are valued nearly equally in the utility function, increases in the volatility of
distortionary money supply are more than offset by declines in the volatility
of distortionary labor taxes so that introduction of debt is welfare improving.
http://www.bepress.com/snde/vol9/iss2/art3
Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
29
6. Appendix: Household Optimization Problem
The household chooses consumption of the cash and credit goods, the amount
of money to be carried into the next period, labor supply, and stock debt
to maximize (2.6) subject to the cash-in-advance constraint in (2.8) and the
budget constraint in (2.7). This can be set up as a dynamic programming
problem where,
³ d
´
M
η ln C1t + (1 − η) ln C2t − γHt + λ1t Ptt − C1t +
d
Mt
V (st ) = M ax
, (6.1)
(1 − ατ t ) (Yt − X) + Pt + Bt Rt−1
+ βEt V (st+1 )
χt λ2t
d
Mt+1
−C − C −
−B
1t
2t
Pt
t+1
¡
¢
d
where χt = C1t , C2t , Mt+1
, Bt+1 , Ht is the vector
of household choice variables
³
´
d
and st represents the set of state variables, Bt , MPtt , θt−1 , gt−1 , τ t−1 , Rt−1 .
Here, λ1t and λ2t are the Lagrange multipliers for the cash-in-advance constraint and household budget constraint, respectively. The resulting first-order
conditions are,
η
= λ1t + λ2t ,
(6.2)
C1t :
C1t
1−η
C2t :
= λ2t ,
(6.3)
C2t
¾
½
λ2t
λ1t+1 λ2t+1
d
,
(6.4)
Mt+1 :
= βEt
+
Pt
Pt+1
Pt+1
Bt+1 : λ2t = βEt {λ2t+1 Rt } ,
(6.5)
Yt
.
Ht
(6.6)
Ht : γ = λ2t (1 − ατ t ) α
Combining the first-order condition on the cash good in (6.2) with the firstorder condition on labor in (6.6) yields,
λ1t =
η
γ
Ht
−
.
C1t (1 − ατ t ) αYt
(6.7)
The multiplier on the cash-in-advance constraint is equal to the marginal utility of consumption of the cash good reduced by the marginal disutility of having to supply additional hours of labor for the equal amount of consumption
of the credit good.
The first-order conditions above can be combined to yield the following
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Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics
30
Euler equations,
d
Mt+1
¾
Pt
,
C1t+1 Pt+1
½
¾
1−η
1−η
= βEt
Rt ,
:
C2t
C2t+1
1−η
:
= βEt
C2t
Bt+1
Ht : γ =
½
η
1−η
Yt
(1 − ατ t ) α .
C2t
Ht
Vol. 9 [2005], No. 2, Article 3
(6.8)
(6.9)
(6.10)
Here the Benveniste-Scheinkman condition is used repeatedly (Benveniste and
t
= λ1t + λ2t . The Euler condition
Scheinkman, 1979). For example, ∂V /∂ M
Pt
on bonds can be used to derive the interest rate condition as,
1
1
h
i .
Rt =
(6.11)
1
βC2t Et
C2t+1
Maximization of expression (2.6) is subject to M d ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0, given
the initial stock of money, M0 . There is no similar restriction on debt since
a negative stock of government bonds would indicate household indebtedness
to the government, although transversality conditions will prevent debt from
growing without bound in either direction. Transversality conditions can be
derived by consolidating two consecutive household budget constraints yielding,
µ
¶
d
Mt+1
1 Pt
1
1−
≤ (1 − ατ t ) (Yt − X) +
(C1t+1 + C2t+1 ) +
C1t + C2t +
Rt
Pt
Rt Pt+1
·
¸
d
Mt+2
Mtd
1
+ Bt Rt−1 +
(1 − ατ t+1 ) (Yt+1 − X) −
− Bt+2 .
(6.12)
Pt
Rt
Pt+1
d
To ensure a bounded budget set, the term multiplying Mt+1
/Pt must be greater
than or equal to zero. If this was not the case, households could make infinitely
large profits by increasing money balances financed by issuing bonds. Since
money balances earn no interest, the gross real return on money from t to t +1
is just the inverse of the inflation rate, or RtM = Pt /Pt+1 . The result is that
real return on money must be less than or equal to the return on bonds,
1−
1 Pt
RM
= 1 − t ≥ 0,
Rt Pt+1
Rt
or the net nominal interest rate cannot be negative.
http://www.bepress.com/snde/vol9/iss2/art3
(6.13)
Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
31
If the process of recursively using successive household budget constraints
to eliminate successive indexed bond terms is continued, the present-value
budget constraint of the household can be derived as,
µ
¶
∞
d
X
Mt+i+1
1 Pt+i
1− L
−
(6.14)
qi [C1t+i + C2t+i +
Pt+i
Rt+i Pt+i+1
i=0
(1 − ατ t+i ) (Yt+i − X) ] ≤
where
q0 = 1 and qi = q0
Mtd
+ Bt Rt−1 ,
Pt
i
Y
1
R
n=1 t+n−1
,
(6.15)
and where the following transversality conditions have been imposed,
lim (qI Bt+I+1 ) = 0,
¶
µ
d
Mt+I+1
= 0.
lim qI
I→∞
Pt+I
I→∞
(6.16)
(6.17)
Households would not find it optimal to accumulate levels of money balances
or bonds that violate these conditions because alternative allocations exists
that would afford higher levels of consumption and higher lifetime utility.
The specification of log preferences causes income and substitution effects
to cancel, allowing equilibrium household allocations to be characterized for a
given set of government policy. Output can either be consumed by households
or used by the government resulting in the economy-wide resource constraint,
C1t + C2t + X + Gt = Yt .
(6.18)
The resource constraint can be used with (2.8) and (2.16) in the Euler condition
for money balances to yield closed-form solutions for consumption, prices, and
interest rates. Assuming money supply equals money demand in equilibrium,
d
, the closed-form solutions for consumption are as follows,
or Mt+1 = Mt+1
³ ´
η
(Yt − X − Gt ) β 1−η
exp(−µt+1 )
³ ´
,
(6.19)
C1t =
η
1 + β 1−η
exp(−µt+1 )
C2t =
(Yt − X − Gt )
³ ´
.
η
exp(−µt+1 )
1 + β 1−η
(6.20)
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32
Vol. 9 [2005], No. 2, Article 3
Inserting the solution for the cash good in (6.19) into the cash-in-advance
constraint, which holds with equality in equilibrium, produces the following
closed-form equation for the price level,
³ ´
η
1
+
β
exp(−µ
)
t+1
1−η
Mt
.
³ ´
(6.21)
Pt =
(Yt − X − Gt )
β η exp(−µ )
1−η
t+1
The closed-form solution for the interest rate is found by inserting the solution
for the credit good in (6.20) at time t and t + 1 into the Euler condition in
(6.11).
Finally, the solution in (6.20) can be substituted into the Euler condition
for labor in (6.10) to solve for optimal labor supply. Doing so yields,
Yt
γ (Yt − X − Gt )
³ ´
= (1 − η) (1 − ατ t ) α ,
η
Ht
1 + β 1−η
exp(−µt+1 )
(6.22)
which, noting the specification for output, defines an implicit function,
Ht = h(gt , θt , µt+1 , τ t ).
(6.23)
This equation cannot be solved for Ht explicitly, but the implicit function
theorem will allow for the construction of an implicit function which defines
the explicit function. The defined derivatives can be obtained as long as an
implicit function is known to exist under the implicit function theorem.
¡
¢
Proposition 1. The function F Ht , gt , θt , µt+1 , τ t = 0 defines an implicit
function Ht = h(gt , θt , µt+1 , τ t ).
¡
¢
The implicit function theorem states that given F Ht , gt , θt , µt+1 , τ t = 0,
if (a) the function F has continuous partial derivatives¡ FH , Fg , Fθ , Fµ , and
¢
Fτ and, (b) at a point (H0 , g0 , θ0 , µ0 , τ 0 ) satisfying F Ht , gt , θt , µt+1 , τ t =
0, FH is non-zero except when H = 0, then there exists a 4-dimensional
neighborhood of (g0 , θ0 , µ0 , τ 0 ), N , in which h is an implicitly defined function
of the variables g, θ, µ, and τ in the form of h(gt , θt , µt+1 , τ t ).22
The continuous partial derivatives of (6.23) are,
αYt
(1 − α) (1 − ατ t )
γ
³ ´
FH :
,
(6.24)
+
η
Ht 1 + β
Ht
exp(−µ )
1−η
22
t+1
See Sydsaeter (1981, p. 81)
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Gapen and Cosimano: Solving Ramsey Problems with Nonlinear Projection Methods
Fg :
Fθ :
Fµ :
−γGt
´
,
η
exp(−µt+1 )
1 + β 1−η
³
−γ
´
,
η
1 + β 1−η exp(−µt+1 )
³
γC1t
´
,
η
1 + β 1−η exp(−µt+1 )
³
33
(6.25)
(6.26)
(6.27)
Yt
.
(6.28)
Ht
Given that 0 < α, β < 1, and γ is defined as a positive constant, FH is non-zero
except when H = 0, where FH becomes undefined. Thus, around any point on
the¡ function, except H
¢ = 0, a neighborhood, N , can be constructed in which
F Ht , gt , θt , µt+1 , τ t = 0 defines an implicit function Ht = h(gt , θt , µt+1 ,
τ t ).
Further examination of the labor supply function shows that optimal labor
supply will be bounded away from zero and unique over the interval examined. Equation (6.23) acts as the difference function between the left and
right-hand sides of equation (6.22). The left-hand side of equation (6.22) is
upward sloping in labor supply while the right-hand side is downward sloping
in labor supply. The left-hand side contains the term for overall consumption,
(Yt − X − Gt ) and when calibrated to match the features of the U.S. economy
and examined over the interval [0, 1] in labor supply, begins below zero and
slowly increases. At low levels of labor supply, output is less than government
spending. As additional labor supply is added, output quickly outpaces government spending. The function is always upward sloping over the interval in
question. The term on the right-hand side contains the marginal product of
labor and is downward sloping in labor supply. The calibrated function begins
at higher levels with low labor supply since marginal productivity of labor is
high and slowly decreases as labor is increased. Consequently, the difference
function begins negative at low levels of labor supply (low total consumption
relative to high marginal product of labor) and turns positive as labor supply is increased (high total consumption relative to low marginal product of
labor). Since the difference function is continuous and maintains a positive
slope over the interval in question, the optimal labor supply which equates the
two sides and satisfies the Euler condition is strictly greater than zero and is
unique over the [0, 1] interval.
Fτ : (1 − α) α2
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Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics
34
Vol. 9 [2005], No. 2, Article 3
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