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Climate Change and International Security

2020, Electronic supplement to Russian Juridical Journal

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This paper discusses the complex relationship between climate change and international security, highlighting how climate-related issues serve as security threats and exacerbate existing global tensions. It emphasizes that climate change can lead to resource conflicts, economic disruptions, loss of territory, environmental migration, and increased instability in fragile states. Furthermore, it addresses the inadequacies of current governmental responses to climate change and the resulting implications for international security architecture.

Climate Change and International Security Timo Koivurova Introduction No environmental problem has captured more global attention than climate change. The first Working Group Report of the Fifth Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc), released in 2013, warned that climate change is unequivocal and accelerating. The report establishes that the average global temperature has increased by about 0.75 degrees, which constitutes the largest and fastest warming trend in history. Under most scenarios, global warming will continue to rise in dramatic fashion.1 The ipcc’s fourth assessment report (pending the release of other ipcc fifth assessments) notes that, among its other impacts, climate change will worsen the severity of droughts, accelerate land degradation and desertification, intensify floods and tropical cyclones, increase the incidence of malaria and heat-related mortality, and decrease crop yields and food security.2 These consequences of climate change can also be seen as security threats. In this vein, for instance, a policy paper from the European Union takes up the security concerns related to climate change,3 mainly viewing climate change as a threat multiplier ‘which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability. The core challenge is that climate change threatens to overburden states and regions which are already fragile and conflict prone’.4 1 See ipcc, ‘Headline Statements from the Summary for Policymakers’ (from the WorkingGroup I Physical Science Basis Report, 30 January 2014) <http://www.ipcc.ch/news _and_events/docs/ar5/ar5_wg1_headlines.pdf> accessed 22 December 2013. See also The Working Group I of the ipcc, ‘Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis’ (A report accepted by Working Group I of the ipcc but not approved in detail) <http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/ WGIAR5_WGI-12Doc2b_FinalDraft_TechnicalSummary.pdf> accessed 22 December 2013. 2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Climate Change 2007: Fourth Assessment Report: Synthesis Report’ (2007) 48. 3 Council Regulation (ec) 113/2008 on Climate Change and International Security, Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council (14 March 2008) S113/08. 4 Ibid. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004274587_012 172 Koivurova The policy paper goes on to present six cases in which climate change poses indirect security threats.5 According to the document, climate change may also have consequences for the international security architecture: Climate change impacts will fuel the politics of resentment between those most responsible for climate change and those most affected by it. Impacts of climate mitigation policies (or policy failures) will thus drive political tension nationally and internationally. The potential rift not only divides North and South but there will also be a South – South dimension particularly as the Chinese and Indian share of global emissions rises. The already burdened international security architecture will be put under increasing pressure.6 Notwithstanding the urgency of the climate change problem, and despite clear risks for humans, states and the international community, governments have not been willing or able to tackle climate change in an effective manner. Current national policies are clearly inconsistent with the ultimate objective of the climate regime, adopted back in 1992 with the conclusion of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (unfccc), of limiting the increase in temperature. In agreeing to this objective, governments committed themselves to the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’,7 a scenario that, as will be shown below, has not materialised. 5 Ibid. 1) Conflict over resources (The overall effect is that climate change will fuel existing conflicts over depleting resources, especially where access to those resources is politicized); 2) Economic damage and risk to coastal cities and critical infrastructure (Sea-level rise and the increase in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters pose a serious threat to these regions and their economic prospects); 3) Loss of territory and border disputes (Receding coastlines and submergence of large areas could result in loss of territory, including entire countries such as small island states); 4) Environmentally-induced migration (The un predicts that there will be millions of ‘environmental’ migrants by 2020 with climate change as one of the major drivers of this phenomenon); 5) Situations of fragility and radicalization (Climate change may significantly increase instability in weak or failing states by over-stretching the already limited capacity of governments to respond effectively to the challenges they face); 6) Tension over energy supply (One of the most significant potential conflicts over resources arises from intensified competition over access to, and control over, energy resources). 6 Ibid 5. 7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) 1771 United Nations Treaty Series 10 (unfccc) art 2 (objective).