Modern Irregular Warfare: The ISIS Case Study

Small Wars & Insurgencies ISSN: 0959-2318 (Print) 1743-9558 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fswi20 Modern Irregular Warfare: The ISIS Case Study Andrea Beccaro To cite this article: Andrea Beccaro (2018) Modern Irregular Warfare: The ISIS Case Study, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:2, 207-228, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2018.1433469 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2018.1433469 Published online: 20 Mar 2018. Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fswi20 Small WarS & InSurgencIeS, 2018 VOl. 29, nO. 2, 207–228 https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2018.1433469 Modern Irregular Warfare: The ISIS Case Study Andrea Beccaroa,b a Dipartimento di Studi umanistici, università del Piemonte Orientale, Vercelli, Italy; Scuola universitaria Interateneo di Scienze Strategiche (SuISS), Turin, Italy b ABSTRACT ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) has become a key political and military actor in the Middle East and in North Africa. This essay aims at outlining ISIS warfare through an analysis of its operations in the frame of hybrid warfare theory proposed by Frank Hoffman. Therefore, the paper deals with: the role of terrorist tactics in ISIS warfare and the relationship between terrorism and insurgency; ISIS use of technology, mainly with regard to suicide attacks and to drones; and the relevance of urban warfare. Finally, the paper highlights how ISIS operates and the most threatening features of its warfare. ARTICLE HISTORY received 3 march 2017; accepted 1 november 2017 KEYWORDS ISIS; hybrid warfare; irregular warfare; terrorism; insurgency; counterinsurgency; suicide attacks; urban warfare ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) has become a key political and military actor in the Middle East and in North Africa.1 Although it is currently in retreat, it has conquered, controlled and ruled vast areas of Syria and Iraq, and cities and villages in Libya. It operates in Sinai and has carried out attacks around Europe. Clausewitz once stressed ‘The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesmen and commander have to make is to establish […] the kind of war on which they are embarking’.2 For this reason, this essay aims at elucidating contemporary irregular warfare, and it has two main goals. The first one is outlining ISIS warfare through the analysis of its operations since 2016. Studying ISIS warfare is important because too often and too simply, the group is labelled as terrorist;3 true, the Islamic State makes use of terrorism yet it is not a terrorist group. Many scholars and experts might find it a commonplace, as numerous academic papers, essays and books take the correct stance. Nonetheless, the problem of agreeing on a shared definition persists especially in the case of media outlets, which keep labelling its operations as terror attacks. This is a very risky approach, as it promotes a terrorism and counterterrorism narrative which does not reflect reality. Experts, research centres and political CONTACT andrea Beccaro [email protected] © 2018 Informa uK limited, trading as Taylor & Francis group 208 A. BECCARO departments also too often describe ISIS as a terrorist group. For instance, the U.S. Department of State – which labelled ISIS a terrorist organisation as far back as 2004 – never changed its designation. In the meantime, the ‘Caliphate’ conquered Raqqa, Mosul and Sirte, establishing its own self-styled ‘state’. The IEP (Institute for Economics and Peace) Global Terrorism Index 2016 states that ‘ISIL was the deadliest terrorist group in 2015’.4 The International Crisis Group – a well-known think tank focussing on conflicts – published a paper in March 2017 which was titled ‘Counter-terrorism Pitfalls: What the U.S. Fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda Should Avoid’,5 and which considers ISIS a terrorist group. This approach is also widespread in academic literature on ISIS. Daniel Cohen states at the beginning of his essay on ISIS’ use of media and technology that the Islamic State is a contemporary form of terrorism.6 Stephen Saideman’s article seeks to understand the patterns of contributions to the effort to degrade and defeat the Islamic State, and claims that Operation Inherent Resolve is ‘against a terrorist movement’.7 Singh focuses8 on understanding how terrorist organizations learn and innovate and uses ISIS as a case study; Kettle and Mumford9 are also interested in the learning process of terrorist groups and define ISIS as a terrorist group as well. These are but a few examples. This paper will instead underline how ISIS is more similar to a protean organization and how its warfare can be better described as ‘hybrid’, which is a contemporary notion referring to irregular warfare. The second goal of this paper is to contextualise the notion of ‘hybrid warfare’ and elucidate the nature of irregular warfare using the ISIS case study. Therefore, the essay is focused on specific topics related to irregular warfare, such as the relationship between terrorism and insurgency, the use of technology and the use of complex terrain. However, it should be noted that some of those features could be used to describe even other irregular groups such as al-Qaeda10 and the Taliban. Focusing on irregular warfare is crucial in order to understand contemporary strategic landscape because since the end of Cold War several scholars have analysed contemporary conflicts concluding that the most prevalent form of warfare is somehow irregular, that is, non-state actors against State. Martin van Creveld was one of the first scholars to recognize this trend and provided the definition of LICs (Low Intensity Conflicts), a term widely used in the eighties to refer to a number of operations, from peacekeeping to counterinsurgency. Aside from the idea that LICs are fought by non-state actors, Creveld singled out three features of this type of conflicts: they are fought in underdeveloped countries, with low-tech weapons, and they blur the distinction between civilians and military.11 The latter is a central element of Kaldor’s ‘new wars’ notion based on ethnic identities and global economy. According to Kaldor, the main cause of the war change lies in the erosion of state prerogatives largely due to the effects of globalization. Therefore, compared to the ‘old wars’, ‘new wars’ differ in three fundamental elements: the purposes, because ‘new wars’ would not be SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 209 driven by ideological motives or geopolitical interests, but by identity politics, that is, the claim of power on the basis of an alleged identity; combat methods, because ‘new wars’ seek to achieve their goal not through fighting frontal clash between two conventional armies, but through controlling the population; the economy, because it is decentralized, with high unemployment and closely linked to external resources and criminal activities.12 Lind et al. have introduced the notion of ‘Fourth Generation Warfare’ describing modern irregular conflicts as the modern evolution of insurgency. Fourth Generation Warfare is characterized by five different elements: the battlefield includes the entire society; it emphasizes the operations of small contingents; it gives less importance to logistics; since forces are small, the manoeuvre is a central element; destroying the enemy morale becomes more important than doing it physically.13 Several other scholars have suggested different definitions to describe modern irregular warfare, such as Three blocks war,14 Open Source Warfare,15 Grey Wars16; however, the notion provided by Frank Hoffman of hybrid warfare epitomizes a clearer, more exhaustive and more adequate definition for the purpose of this essay because it points out three elements – relation between terrorism and insurgency, use of technology, urban battlefield – that represent crucial features of modern conflicts. Nevertheless, the notion of hybrid warfare has two main shortcomings. First, scholars have used it to refer to two very different kinds of conflicts. Russia’s operations in Ukraine and Crimea in 2014 have been labelled by some Western scholars as ‘hybrid warfare’. On the other hand, more than ten years ago, the notion of hybrid warfare was suggested in order to describe the way in which non-state actors fought: a mix of regular infantry tactics using modern anti-tank weapons, guerrilla tactics with small groups of fighters and terrorist tactics. The latter is the notion explored in this paper. Secondly, this second significance highlights one of the main problem of contemporary strategic thought, that is ‘historical illiteracy’, because hybrid warfare is just a new conceptualization of irregular warfare that, historically, has been the norm and even the so-called state-on-state conflicts from the Early Modern period had prominent irregular features.17 Therefore, the paper will also single out novelty and continuity of irregular warfare. While a variety of definitions of the term ‘irregular warfare’ have been proposed, this paper uses the definition suggested by Charles Edward Callwell, who defined it as ‘all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops’.18 Moreover, according to Carl Schmitt, the terms ‘regular’ and its opposite ‘irregular’ have to be understood within the framework of modern state regularity: ‘The distinction between regular and irregular battle depends on the degree of regularity [Präzision des Regulären]. […] the force and significance of his irregularity is determined by the force and significance of the regular that is challenged by him’.19 Accordingly, this paper uses the term ‘irregular warfare’, which, on the whole, refers to non-state actors’ warfare. 210 A. BECCARO According to the definition provided by Frank Hoffman, hybrid warfare incorporates a full range of different modes of warfare including – conventional capabilities, irregulars tactics, terrorist acts and criminal activities – uses different kinds of weapons – from small arms to more sophisticated missiles to propaganda and media coverage – and is based on four key elements that also describe well ISIS warfare.20 Firstly, in hybrid wars, regular and irregular elements blur into the same force and the irregular component attempts to become decisive.21 This essay does not purposely deal with this feature, because it will naturally come to light through the analysis of the other three features. Secondly, as hybrid warfare blurs regular and irregular tactics, terrorism can become the main fighting method. In the next paragraph, focus is placed on the links between insurgency and terrorism, defining ISIS warfare as a modern form of insurgency. Thirdly, hybrid groups use modern technology ‘to avoid predictability and seek advantage in unexpected ways’.22 As the paper shows in the second paragraph, ISIS has been able to use modern technology in order to build new kinds of weaponry and devise different ways of attack, mainly suicide attacks. Finally, hybrid wars, like every irregular wars, make good use of complex terrain. The paper takes into account why modern irregular fighters have preferred to use urban areas. ISIS Warfare: Terrorism as an Insurgency Tactic One of the major problems of defining ISIS is related to its nature. Too often, media, research papers, essays and books refer to ISIS as a terrorist group, but this definition is misleading; however, defining correctly their own enemy is a key step for Western governments in order to design proper and effective countermeasures. Although in the academic literature a precise definition of both terrorism and insurgency has proved elusive, they are very different kinds of threats that needs two very different sets of countermeasures. Despite the fact that ISIS uses terrorism as a tactic, it is a mistake to define ISIS as a terrorist group for at least two reasons. Firstly, from an historical point of view, ‘pure’ terrorist groups, such as Brigate Rosse and Rote Armee Fraktion, do not hold terrain as ISIS does. Secondly, insurgent groups have always used guerrilla tactics and terrorism interchangeably because insurgency includes both. These two topics are discussed in depth in the next two paragraphs, which help to describe ISIS as an insurgent group. ISIS and Control of Terrain ‘Pure’ terrorist groups generally have only dozens or hundreds of members, do not hold territory, and cannot directly confront military forces. In contrast, at its peak ISIS has had some 30,000 fighters, has held territory in Iraq, Syria and Libya, and has maintained extensive military capabilities engaging in sophisticated SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 211 military operations. As a result, according to Cronin ISIS ‘is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army’.23 Moreover, ISIS is well linked to local populations, and it represents a self-sustaining financial model24 thanks to its means of financing, which include: extortion, theft, bank looting, human trafficking (including kidnapping for ransom),25 control of oil and gas reservoirs, smuggling of cultural and historical artefacts, taxation of the local population and goods transiting territory controlled by ISIS and donations by private individuals or non-profit organisations.26 ISW (the Institute for the Study of War) describes ISIS control of terrain using three rings: The ‘Interior’ ring (i.e. Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq) is ‘where ISIS focuses its main effort to defend […] its so-called “caliphate”’. In Syria and Iraq, ISIS has used local resources (mainly water) to control the population and local geography (i.e. the desert) to improve its warfare. The desert between Iraq and Syria, where security forces have been scattered, has allowed ISIS to use its superior mobility both to defend itself against Western air power and to create the element of surprise due to its mobility and the good quality of the road network. With regard to water, between summer 2014 and spring 2016, ISIS used water as a weapon thanks to its control of almost the entire Euphrates Basin in Syria and of several square kilometres in the north of Iraq, and of several square kilometres of the northern stretch of the Tigris. Even if it was unable to maintain control over every piece of strategic infrastructure, it controlled several dams. ISIS used this control in different ways: reducing the flow of water to specific areas, putting pressure on the local population and to win their support and slowing down the enemy army. In addition, dry rivers and channels can be easily forded, allowing ISIS to move unpredictably around the battlefield and reducing the strategic role of bridges. Moreover, controlling dams allows ISIS to present itself as a proto-state because it offered services (water and electricity) to the population it ruled while it also gained taxes.27 The second ring, ‘Near Abroad’, is the area historically held by Arab rulers’ (from Morocco to Pakistan) where ISIS is attempting to expand its influence. ISIS operations in Libya and Sinai represent a good example of this kind of operations that could at times be transformed into a more steady presence, such as in Sirte between 2015 and 2016. The third ring is the ‘Far Abroad’ (Europe, the United States, Southeast Asia and cyberspace), where ISIS is carrying out sporadic but bloody terroristic attacks,28 such as those in Paris and Brussels. These three rings of political organization could represent a sort of overstretching for a relatively small and young group such as ISIS, but this is only partially true. First of all, even if ISIS does not have territorial continuity, except for areas in Syria and in Iraq, historically speaking, territorial continuity has not always represented a key element for political organizations, as the European colonial empires of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries have demonstrated. Secondly, ISIS is a true global organization, it does not define itself by geographical boundaries, and it asserts to represent a faith,29 i.e. Islam, 212 A. BECCARO not a territory or people, as the nationalism or communism did. Terrorism is functional for this kind of non-territorial organization that, regarding the whole world as a target, needs an effective and agile tactic. Terrorism as a Tactic ISIS has used terrorism extensively as a stand-off weapon in order to terrorize the population, to harass the enemy, to create insecurity and to project the power of the group outside the main theatre of operations. Examples of this use are the Paris and Brussels attacks, as well as the attacks in Baghdad, the attacks on 21 February 2016 that hit both Damascus (four blasts in the southern suburb of Sayyida Zeinab, killing at least 83 people) and Homs (a double car bombing that killed 57 people), and that on 12 November 2015 in Beirut, when two suicide attacks rocked a stronghold of Hezbollah, killing 41 people. As previously stated, the control of terrain is one of the key elements for distinguishing between a ‘pure’ terrorist group and an insurgent group that uses terrorism as a tactic. According to Seth Jones irregular groups need to decide on a strategy and employ a range of different tactics from guerrilla warfare to terrorism.30 However, this does not mean that the tactic of terrorism vanishes during an insurgency. Influential studies on insurgency have underlined the relevance of terrorism in such contingencies. It is crucial to understand the continuum between insurgency and terrorism, a link that is highlighted by the majority of distinguished scholars of insurgency. According to Trinquier, terrorism is the main weapon of an insurgency for two reasons. First of all, it permits insurgents to fight effectively with the few resources they have. Secondly, the most important element for victory is the unconditional support of the local population. Since only rarely does such support exist, and, in any case, insurgents need it to last, ‘it must be secured by every possible means, the most effective of which is terrorism’.31 Furthermore, Thompson32 underlined the key role played by ‘selective terrorism’ during a communist insurgency, and Kitson33 recognised the role of terrorism in low-intensity operations. According to Galula, the first step in an insurgency is blind terrorism such as bombings, arson, assassinations in order to achieve the greatest psychological effect at the cheapest price and ‘to get publicity for the movement and its cause, and […] to attract latent supporters’.34 From these ideas, two features descend that help better understanding of both links between terrorism and insurgency and ISIS warfare. First of all, the problem of resources: Irregular fighters have few resources and consequently choose terrorism because it is cheap. Resources are key elements for explaining irregular warfare, because, according to Kias, the distinction between different types of irregular warfare rests on ‘resources and the ability to translate them into effective capabilities’.35 Thus, terrorism is just one kind of warfare that a group could use in order to achieve its goals, and, depending on the context, terrorism SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 213 could be used either as the only kind of warfare aimed at starting an insurgency (this is, for example, the idea of theorists of terrorism, such as Bianco, Pisacane, Most and Heizen)36 or as a tactic during an insurgency. Indeed, ISIS represents the most modern case of the latter because it started as a terrorist group, and then it was able to transform itself into an insurgent group. The second feature is the use of terrorism as a means to gain support from the local population. From an historical point of view, in order to gain support from local communities, insurgent groups have resorted ‘to terrorism to compel such support. In the twentieth century, terrorism [became] an orthodox part of guerrilla strategy’.37 Therefore, terrorism is a tactic meant to serve a strategy of coercion38 and designed to demoralize the enemy, extort the support of the population and exact its unswerving loyalty. Whiteside has shown that ISIS used terrorism as a targeted killing tool in Iraq in order to remove ‘the links tying the government to the people’.39 He counted a total of 312 members of the Awakening movement (the Sunni and tribal movement that expelled al-Qaeda fighters from al-Anbar province prior to and during the Surge) killed between 2007 and 2013 in Baquba, the capital of Dyala province, and ISIS claimed responsibility for 153 of them. The same source analysed data from other Iraqi provinces and cities has found similar patterns. The exception is the city of Mosul because, there, an Awakening movement has simply never existed due to the fact that, since 2004, ISIS has had strong and deep roots in that area. However, ISIS launched a series of attacks in the area of Mosul against the Iraqi Security Forces, a campaign that scored the highest level of violence in the entire country. This was especially true of the so-called Soldiers’ Harvest Campaign in summer 2013, when ISIS targeted Iraqi Security Forces by using intimidation and displacement.40 Kalyvas has recognized that terror and terrorism are means that a group could use in order to enhance its ability to: establish order in an area where anarchy is dominant, police the territory and govern the territory offering goods to the local population.41 Terrorism remains a basic tactic used by insurgents whenever they need it, a method that ‘can be used in a variety of strategies, including a strategy of insurgency’.42 As a result, ISIS has not been innovative in using terrorism as a coercive tool, but its use has to be framed in the context of an insurgency without clear territorial boundaries. ISIS and Technology: From Bombings to Suicide Attacks Hybrid/irregular groups has always made an extensive use of existing and available technology. The problem lies in the ability of the irregular groups to learn and change their tactics in response of shifting circumstances.43 To explain the unconventional use of modern technology, Itai Brun has used the notion of Other RMA,44 that is, the use in unexpected ways of common and low technology to counterbalance Western superiority in technology. While the United 214 A. BECCARO States and Western countries use state-of-the-art technology and spend billions on research and development, hybrid groups use instead technology that could easily be found in the global market in order to avoid predictability and seek advantage in unexpected ways. Clausewitz warns that war is an interaction between two forces that try to overthrow each-other, it follows that war is ‘the collision of two living forces’.45 In contemporary hybrid warfare, one result of this interaction between living forces is a different use of technology, because in order to develop its global strategy and improve its fighting capabilities ISIS does not use the leading-edge technology, instead it uses existing, common and basic technology in several ways.46 One way is its extensive use of online media, such as forums, blogs, social media, online reviews, (e.g. Dabiq magazine) and videos.47 Although this paper cannot thoroughly deal with this topic, at least three elements are noteworthy: ISIS has been building its media capabilities for over a decade; unlike similar jihadist groups, ISIS has controlled territories, and this has given it the ability to speak directly to the local population, which explains why the majority of ISIS media products are related to governance, religion and similar topics48; finally, ISIS has been able to use Western mainstream media to spread its key messages, to attract foreign fighters, and its well-produced propaganda.49 Twitter seems to be the most used social network,50 but ISIS holds countless accounts on several social media platforms: Kik, Telegram, WhatsApp, Wickr, Zello. Consequently, ISIS has launched a psychological war of text, images and iconography that it has spread widely, pursuing a multiplier effect that seems to magnify and celebrate its exploits over its actual results on the ground.51 ISIS has integrated social media into a wider media strategy.52 A second sector where ISIS shows great ability to use modern technology in order to generate the element of surprise and to strike the enemy unexpectedly is linked to the extensive use of suicide attacks. According to Tosini, between 2003 and 2010, ISIS (at that time called al-Qaeda in Iraq and later ISI) conducted 1321 suicide attacks (another database counted 1729 attacks53). This is an astonishing record as, since 1981, the same source has counted 2713 attacks globally.54 In 2011 and 2012, the average was about 5–10 suicide attacks per month, but, along with the so-called Breaking the Walls campaign, the number increased to 30 attacks a month.55 Since April 2013, suicide attacks have increased significantly and have played a key role in ISIS warfare even during its most complex operations. ISIS’ extensive use of suicide attacks could be explained with two main reasons: they are an effective and low-cost weapon; they represent a low-cost way to strike the desired target with precision, however, explaining suicide attacks56 as a kind of PGM (precision-guided munitions) is not a new idea.57 The modern strategic environment requires weapons with good survivability, capable of going undetected and being failure-proof in striking a target precisely. The precision of the strike is a key feature because it represents a way SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 215 to obtain the desired result at lower costs. A suicide attack is less risky than any other attack methods because the fighter cannot be arrested or interrogated, giving the organization better survivability. From ISIS’ point of view, a suicide attack is a low-cost irregular version of a Western stand-off weapon, because a suicide attack cannot be defused by the enemy, and a suicide fighter can carry out a deep penetration, tactically similar to that of a cruise missile, allowing irregular fighters to strike areas far beyond the main theatre of operation.58 According to Lewis, suicide attacks appear to be a ‘technological solution to a practical problem’.59 Instead of installing high-tech devices in their bombs (as the United States does), irregulars use a ‘human guidance system’60 that may be even better than a technological one because the attacker can make adjustments based on the current tactical situation while travelling towards the target. Thus, the ‘human guidance system’ enables one to strike the target accurately and to hit difficult and well-protected targets. ISIS has used foreign fighters and even children as a ‘human guidance system’. The use of children is unfortunately not new in modern irregular conflicts, but, according to recent research, the use of children by ISIS ‘is more widespread than previously imagined. Indeed, the rate of youth deaths in the Islamic State’s name between January 2015 and January 2016 is more than twice the most regularly cited estimate’.61 During the same period, 89 children of different ages died in the name of ISIS. The majority of them (39%) died during vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) operations. Thirty-three per cent were killed as foot soldiers during ground battle, while 18% attacking the enemy position.62 Another key factor that explains the extensive use of suicide attacks by ISIS is that it is a low-cost weapon because the attacker does not need advanced and long training. Furthermore, ISIS can find suicide fighter without problem due to the huge flow of foreign fighters willing to sacrifice their lives.63 Moreover, components for suicide vests or vehicles can easily be found both in the theatre of war and on the global market. Recent research has shown how ISIS can manufacture ever more sophisticated bombs using components from countries around the world.64 Turning now to ISIS’ extensive use of SVBIEDs (suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device), it underlines ISIS’ ability to use low technology to create the element of surprise and improve its battlefield efficiency. SVBIEDs have the same advantages of suicide attacks, but they increase ISIS’ fire power. For this kind of operation, ISIS uses vehicles seized in and around battlefield, such as Humvees and other military vehicles that are very well suited because their protective armoured plating prevents defenders from killing the drivers before they can detonate their loads, while the vehicles’ capacity to carry enormous amounts of weight means the Islamic State can sometimes pack in a ton of explosives.65 Using vehicles as suicide attack tools is not a novelty. During the first stages of the war in 2003, such car bombs were very common. Then, the use of modified civilian trucks and cars with armour sheeting to create a sort of armoured vehicle 216 A. BECCARO arose because the suicide driver is protected from small arms fire, allowing him to approach his target before triggering the device. ISIS has developed a talent for modifying these vehicles66 by adding additional armour, grill defences in order to allow anti-tank missiles detonate before striking the vehicle and metal structures in front of the vehicle in order to break enemy defence systems. All of these modifications are the results of years of war and of military experience and serve to improve the defence capabilities of vehicles that, in this way, are then able to overtake enemy defence lines and explode where they have to. One of the best examples of the use of these vehicles is the battle for Ramadi in May 2015. Iraqi soldiers were attacked by a heavily armoured bulldozer. Having no anti-tank missiles, they were helpless against the bulldozer that started to remove the concrete barriers on the road to their base. When the road was clear, trucks, which had been armoured and transformed into vehicle-borne bombs, arrived and detonated, opening the way for ISIS foot soldiers.67 The protection derived from this armour sheeting is just one of the several reasons why ISIS uses this kind of vehicle and why it might prefer the military ones. The other reasons are: explosive force, because a Humvee’s payload can easily support a ton of explosives, which is much more than a civilian pick-up or lorry; mobility, because the Humvee was designed to carry troops and gear off-road, enabling a suicide driver to approach a target from virtually any angle.68 A third way to use technology in order to improve ISIS warfare fighting capabilities is related to drones. Despite the fact that the global market offers several kinds of drones, their operation capabilities are incomparable with those of Western military drones. However, ISIS and irregulars do not need the same level of technology, because they use it differently. Although, to date, the use of ‘irregular drones’ has not been so widespread, examples of their use by irregular groups exist. According to Bunker, since 2001, al-Qaeda and affiliated groups have used drones in six different operations, while Hezbollah leads this special ranking with seven operations. As ISIS is the youngest group, it has used drones only in four operations, but in a shorter period of time – the data collected by Bunker ended in spring 2015, and the first ISIS drone operation was in August 2014. ‘Such groups are still very much in an experimental phase of using these craft […]. Still, their use by terrorist and insurgent groups is increasing’.69 With regard to ISIS, Bunker reported four different operations in 2014 in Falluja, Raqqa and Kobani.70 Videos recorded during each of these operations were then used for propaganda. Although the most common use of drones, and probably the most efficient one at this technological stage, is for reconnaissance and surveillance, two recent incidents have raised questions about risks related to this kind of weapon. On 12 October 2016, two Peshmerga were killed and two French Special Forces soldiers were severely wounded when they tried to examine an ISIS drone that they had shot down near Erbil. Allegedly, this could be the first incident that involves a drone from an irregular group and Western military casualties. In June 2017, a US-led special operations force near SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 217 the Syria–Iraq border was struck by a missile fired from a drone. This marked an abrupt escalation from the usual ISIS attacks with off-the-shelf commercial drones dropping grenade-sized munitions. However, recent data suggest the increasing trend in the use of drones: in February 2017 alone, ISIS executed 15 drone attacks in Iraq in just two days.71 Even if the Pentagon has called for research on counter-drone systems, has already deployed a drone-jamming gun in Iraq and has instructed American troops to treat any downed drone as an explosive device,72 the threats remain, and those accidents could represent just the first step towards a ‘flying IEDs era’, as Hammes has explained.73 A fourth way of using modern technology is related to different kinds of missiles: anti-ship missiles used by Hezbollah against Israel during the war in Lebanon in 2006, rocket attacks by Hamas against Israel, ground-to-air missiles and anti-tank missiles in the Syria and Iraq wars.74 ISIS has used rockets and artillery during some of its operations and, to a lesser extent, missiles that could be used during urban battles or to degrade air superiority with some kind of MANPADS affecting the joint capacity of Western forces and their local allies. Needless to say, such capabilities related to both anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles could represent a game changer for a hybrid group; ISIS has used not only missiles, but also artillery in support of its offensive operations. It is a fact that, according to Knights, artillery barrages were used during the 3 August 2014 attack on Zummar and Kisik, west of Mosul and near Zowiya, between Baquba and Samarra, during the so-called Dhuluiya offensive in 2014.75 Finally, a fifth sector where ISIS was able to use modern technology to improve its military capabilities is related to rifles and machine guns. A recent study has revealed many different weapons, such as tele-operated rifles, developed by ISIS and other irregular fighters in Syria, Iraq and Libya in order to support and augment their forces in battle. ISIS has used at least four tele-operated sniper rifles in Iraq and Syria. The fact that ISIS has focused on sniper rifles is interesting because it could represent a way of adapting to its preferred battlefield, that is, the urban one, where the sniper is more effective and simpler to use.76 ISIS and Urban Warfare When ISIS fights in urban areas, it basically uses three different approaches related to its goals. In urban areas that ISIS does not want to conquer, it uses terrorism as a stand-off weapon, as has been explained above. When ISIS aims at conquering the targeted urban area, it uses two approaches according to city size: In smaller urban areas, it uses pinch manoeuvre with suicide vehicles attacking from two sides, followed by jihadists wearing suicide vests and then by a wave of lightly armed and highly mobile vehicles and foot soldiers. In larger cities, ISIS combines its local allies and dispersed units with a great level 218 A. BECCARO of freedom of manoeuvre to infiltrate urban areas and to attack and weaken security forces. Another very effective tactic during ISIS urban operations is sniping. Traditional sniping is a complex military operation that needs special weapons and training. However, as West has noted, the irregular urban sniper has at least two advantages: The shooting range is shorter allowing the sniper to not be highly trained; the sniper can use a regular rifle or gun; moreover, the shorter distance. The second advantage is that the camouflage is simpler because it is enough to dress as a normal civilian and to pass unnoticed.77 Furthermore, ISIS uses snipers as a propaganda tool.78 The extensive use of sniping also explains why the group has used several types of tele-operated rifles, as stated above. These rifles could be hidden in buildings to target the surrounding area and be controlled remotely from a safe location, thereby evading artillery fire or air bombings. Another typical ISIS tactic is saturating buildings with bombs and IEDs in order to slow down the enemy advance and to impede any quick return to normal life. In light of this, the experience of Chechen fighters is crucial, because they, due to their experiences in Grozny against the Russian army, learned how to defend a city and how to render its conquest very expensive for a regular army. During the Russian invasion, Chechen rebels built a concentric three-ring defence system, and then they dug trenches and created a complex underground tunnel system.79 ISIS is using similar defences around Mosul and Raqqa, and experience in Tikrit and Ramadi has only confirmed the difficulties in conquering this kind of defence.80 Knights has shown that, on the offensive, ISIS warfare is based on the element of surprise, probes, feints and shock. Consequently, mobility and deception allow ISIS forces to achieve local superiority.81 Surprise, unexpected actions and non-conventional use of known technology and weapons underline that irregulars fight with what they have, and the best way to do so is by using complex terrain and tricks or by using a well-known political metaphor, like being a ‘cunning fox’.82 Cunning is practical knowledge that mixes deception, good timing and surprise in order to take advantages.83 Cunning allows the weak to compensate for its inferiority in numbers and weapons and is a central aspect of the irregular warfare concept. Historically speaking, the cunning fox has used a broad range of tricks, like ambushes, surprise, speed, night operations, terror and a different use of time and space. For this paper, the most important trick is the use of complex terrain, such as urban areas, because they help the defendant to balance the forces. Today, the most common complex terrain is the urban one due to two aspects. There is the physical aspect because streets, buildings, tunnels and similar infrastructure create a three dimensional space with several places to hide bombs and snipers, and where it is difficult for a regular army to maintain unit cohesion. SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 219 There is the social aspect because, inside the city, there are civilians, criminals and reporters. This produces two problems: The Army has to maintain social order and, in so doing, to operate like a police force; it is really difficult to spot the enemy.84 Consequently, Spiller has described the urban environment as ‘dynamic’85 because it reacts to military operations. As far as the use of complex terrain is concerned two elements need to be considered: the physical aspect (kind of terrain, climate and transportation-communication system) and the human dimension (demography, socio-economic conditions, political culture and ethnic and religious factors).86 As for the human dimension, the essay has already tackled this topic in the paragraph on terrorism and counterinsurgency stressing that one key element of ISIS’ success has been its ability to tap into Sunni Arab fears and resentment of Shiite leadership in Iraq.87 As for the physical aspect, throughout history, every irregular warfare scholar has stressed the idea of using mountains, forests and swamps in order to impede the better equipped, better trained and better armed regular force. Terrain is a crucial factor in the evolution of an insurgency, along with human factor, supplies and outside support.88 Today, complex terrain is represented by urban areas for at least two reasons. First of all, as of 2010 the majority of the world population has been living in urban areas.89 This is a huge security threat because, and this is the second reason, urban areas represent a very favourable environment for terrorism. Although strategic thought has always warned conventional armies to avoid urban battles, cities have always been an important target in war because of their economic and political roles or because of their strategic and geographical positions. Theorists like Lawrence and Mao suggested leaving the control of cities to regular forces because cities are only a minor part of the entire country, and so irregular fighters could focus their efforts elsewhere. Counterinsurgency doctrine, instead, focuses on the control of cities for three reasons: strategic, because population control is fundamental and is simpler and cheaper to achieve inside the city thanks to curfews and checkpoints; economic, because cities are economic centres where it is easier to obtain taxes; political, because the universities and media offices are in the city. As a consequence, the insurgent’s strategy uses urban terrorism to distract regular forces and to leave them focused on cities while irregulars continue to grow outside.90 ISIS seems to follow the same pattern because ‘rural belts surrounding the city are often more actively contested by Islamic State’ than urban areas where ISIS has used snipers, mobile shooter teams and improvised minefields more to slow than to stop an advancing force.91 In contrast, during the battles in Mosul and Raqqa ISIS has defended fiercely its positions. However, this does not mean that hybrid fighters are not interested in urban warfare doctrine. On the contrary, throughout history, they have developed a huge bibliography on how to operate within urban areas. For example, the 220 A. BECCARO Italian revolutionary Carlo Pisacane (1818–1857) thought that irregulars had to exploit old districts and narrow winding streets by creating several and concurrent outbreaks.92 Carlos Marighella (1911–1969), a Brazilian Marxist revolutionist well-known for his Minimanual Of The Urban Guerrilla, stressed the importance of cities due to the presence of several soft targets (shops, banks, public offices), and he understood very well the importance of media and their ability to amplify every single attack. He suggested organizing units into small mobile shooter teams of four or five men able to use their mobility to launch attacks from every direction and with unpredictability.93 Abraham Guillén (1913–1993) considered the crucial role of unemployed youth inside big cities and thought that irregulars did not have to have fixed bases inside a city, but they had to keep moving and then fight together. To be effective, insurgents have to appear and disappear in order to create insecurity.94 From this brief history of strategic ideas on the relationship between irregular warfare and the urban area, it is possible to see how ISIS has used some of the same tactical concepts: unpredictability, great mobility, small groups and so on. As far as it is known, ISIS derives its urban warfare doctrine from books such as Practical Course for Guerrilla War, a sort of manual for jihadist groups to fight the modern guerrilla. Although much of its content is a simple re-statement of classic ideas on guerrilla warfare, it devotes several pages specifically to how to operate in cities where there is a plurality of targets, most notably economic ones. It indicates as many as 12 advantages of urban operations, including that of affirming the credibility of the group in the society, as the urban operations are witnessed by everyone, including the media.95 Conclusions It is impossible to completely describe ISIS warfare in a short essay, but this paper has shed light on some features that not only may represent the most dangerous ones, but also a possible trend in the evolution of irregular warfare in the light of modern technology and strategic landscape. Irregular groups throughout history have always used a combination of conventional and unconventional tactics, a mix of terrorism and guerrilla tactics.96 ISIS is just the most recent example of irregular groups using this kind of warfare, which refers extensively to terrorism because it is a cheap tool to achieve goals. However, terrorism has always been an integral tactic of insurgency, which includes terrorism, guerrilla warfare, mass protest or any combination of these determined by local, strategic, tactical, economic conditions of the irregulars rather than by their strategic conceptions.97 When regular forces extensively outnumber insurgents or the terrain is not favourable for guerrilla warfare, the only tactic that remains is terrorism. The latter is also a useful tool to compel the local population to collaborate with the insurgents, to eradicate the local government from the territory and, consequently, to rule the targeted area. SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 221 Another interesting feature of ISIS warfare is related to the use of modern technology in surprising ways – suicide attacks represent the best example. They have become the ISIS trademark, a kind of ‘hybrid’ PMG that can be used with high precision in different tactical situations, enabling ISIS to use terrorism tactics more efficiently and in a broader strategic and geographical context. The nature of warfare has always shifted over time, but the novelty of contemporary irregular warfare is related to the interconnectedness of the modern world (information technology and communication) that caused an escalation of the pace of change. In the past irregulars acted in isolation but today they could find strategic, operational and tactical lessons on the Internet. Finally, urban areas represent the modern battlefield, and ISIS has demonstrated itself as being very adaptive, using the advantages offered by this kind of battlefield and attacking and defending cities by using both terrorism and more conventional tactics. Hybrid warfare theory is interesting because it supposes the idea that regular and irregular elements blur. However, this study has shown that several features of ISIS/hybrid warfare are not real novelties because terrorism has always been integral part of an insurgency, because irregular groups have always used kind of complex terrain, even urban terrain and used technology in unexpected way. Consequently, the study helps to not fall into the trap of treating the present as if it was sui generis, something completely different from the past. It is beyond question that ISIS has some new elements, for instance the extensive use of terrorism and suicide attacks and of media and the Internet for propaganda purpose; however, it represents a contemporary evolution of irregular warfare, rather than a real new kind of threat, which has significant elements of continuity. Therefore, studying ISIS and hybrid warfare helps to increase our historical awareness about the nature of irregular conflicts. Moreover, studying ISIS warfare in the light of hybrid warfare theory the paper has helped to grasp some key trends in contemporary irregular warfare such as an increasing role of terrorist tactics and of urban space, and a more widespread use of modern technology regarding use of drones, suicide attacks and the Internet. ISIS is not the only hybrid group, but, so far, it has been probably the most successful one, especially in North Africa where it has conquered the city of Sirte and is waging an insurgency in the Sinai, and Middle East where it has conquered vast areas of Iraq and Syria. Therefore, studying its warfare helps us better understand its military capabilities and find the necessary and right countermeasures, which cannot be based just on counterterrorism, but they have to include counterinsurgency elements and a broader political approach. Notes 1. Lister, The Islamic State; Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State. 222 A. BECCARO 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. Clausewitz, On War, 88. Some examples of this approach are: Weiss and Hassan, Isis: Inside the Army; Stern and Berger, Isis: The State of Terror; Ryan, ISIS: The Terrorist Group that Would be a State; Davis, Women in Modern Terrorism. Global Terrorism Index, 50. ICG, Counter-terrorism Pitfalls. Cohen, “Between Imagined Reality”. Saideman, “The Ambivalent Coalition”. Singh, “A Preliminary Typology”. Kettle and Mumford, “Terrorist Learning”. Byman, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State. Creveld, The Transformation of War. Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Lind et al., “The Changing Face of War”. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal”. Robb, Brave New War. Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone. Echevarria, Operating in the Gray Zone. Callwell, Small Wars, 21. Schmitt, The Theory of the Partisan, 3. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century, 8. Ibid. Ibid., 16. Cronin, “ISIS is not a Terrorist Group,” 87–98. Johnston et al., Foundations of the Islamic State. Loertscher and Milton, Held Hostage. FATF, Financing of the Terrorist Organisation. Lossow, Wasser als Waffe. Gambhir, ISIS Global Intelligence Summary, 1. Barrett, “The Islamic State Goes Global,” 1–4. Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 8. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 39; see also Galula, Pacification in Algeria. Kiras, Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency, in Baylis et al., Strategy in the Contemporary World, 231–232. On this point, see: Beccaro, “Carlo Bianco and Guerra per bande,” 154–178; Garrison, “Defining Terrorism,” 259–279. Ney, Guerrilla Warfare and Modern Strategy, in Osanka ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare, 32 (my Italics). Betts, “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy,” 19–36. Whiteside, “The Islamic State and the Return of Revolutionary Warfare,” 743–776. Lewis, AQI’s ‘Soldiers’ Harvest’ Campaign. Kalyvas, “The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War,” 97–138. Metz, Rethinking Insurgency, in Rich and Duyvesteyn, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 38. Katagiri, Adapting to Win. Brun, “While you’re Busy Making Other Plans,” 535–565. Clausewitz, On War, 77. SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 223 46. Cohen, “Between Imagined Reality and Real Terrorism,” 3–21; Zelin, “Picture or it Didn’t Happen,” 85–97. 47. Ingram, “The Strategic Logic of Islamic State Information Operations,” 729–752. 48. Milton, Communication Breakdown. 49. Williams, Islamic State Propaganda and the Mainstream Media. 50. Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad,” 1–22. 51. Cohen, Digital Counterinsurgency: How to Marginalize the Islamic State Online, in Burns and Price ed. Blind Spot, 128. 52. Lombardi, “Islamic State Communication Project,” 99–133. 53. Seifert and McCauley, “Suicide Bombers in Iraq,” 803–820. 54. Tosini, Martiri che uccidono, 12. 55. Lewis, Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, 7. 56. The following paragraph is a brief excerpt of previous research: Beccaro and Bertolotti, “Suicide Attacks,” 21–62. 57. Hoffman, The Logic of Suicide Terrorism, in Howard, Sawyer, Defeating Terrorism. 58. Bunker and Sullivan, Suicide Bombings. 59. Lewis, “Precision Terror,” 223–245. 60. Ganor, The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon, in Ganor, Countering Suicide Terrorism. 61. Bloom et al., “Depictions of Children and Youth,” 29–32. 62. Ibid. 63. Dodwell et al., The Caliphate’s Global Workforce. 64. Conflict Armament Research, Tracing the Supply of Components; Bhojani, “How ISIS Makes IEDS”. 65. Naylor, “The Islamic State’s Best Weapon”. 66. Here are some original photos: http://spioenkop.blogspot.it/search/label/ The%20Islamic%20State%20going%20DIY. 67. Ollivant, “The Rise of the Hybrid Warriors”. 68. Naylor, “The Islamic State’s Best Weapon”. 69. Bunker, Terrorist and Insurgent Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. 70. Ibid. 71. Plaw and Santoro, “Reaping the Whirlwind”. 72. Schmidt and Schmitt, “Pentagon Confronts a New Threat”. 73. Hammes, “The Democratization of Airpower”. 74. Vinson and Caldwell, “Violent Nonstate Actors Missile Technologies,” 116–123. 75. Knights, “ISIL’s Political-military Power in Iraq,” 1–7. 76. Bunker and Keshavarz, Terrorist and Insurgent Teleoperated Sniper Rifles. 77. West, Fry the Brain. 78. Cavanaugh, “Islamic State Wants you to Fear its Snipers”. 79. For an explanation of Grozny defence, see: Thomas, “The Caucus Conflict and Russian Security,” 56–57; Kulikov, The First Battle of Grozny, in Glenn ed., Capital Preservation. 80. Barfi, “The Military Doctrine of the Islamic State,” 18–23. 81. Knights, “ISIL’s Political-military Power”. 82. Machiavelli, Il principe. 83. Holeindre, “L’astuzia della volpe,” 93–103. 84. DiMarco, Attacking the Heart and Guts: Urban Operations Through the Ages, in Robertson ed., Block by Block. 85. Spiller, Sharp Corners. 86. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 71. 87. Terrill, “Understanding the Strengths and Vulnerabilities of ISIS,” 13–23. 224 A. BECCARO 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. Sollom, Nowhere yet Everywhere, in Osanka ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare. Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains. Jardine, “The Insurgent’s Response to the Defense of Cities,” 1–15. Mello and Knights, “The Cult of the Offensive,” 1–7. Pieri, Guerra e politica, 199. Marighella, Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla. Guillén, Urban Guerrilla Strategy, in Chaliand ed., Guerrilla Strategies. Cigar, Al-Qaeda’s Doctrine for Insurgency. Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits. Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” 213–251. Disclosure Statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. Bibliography Arquilla, John. Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World. Lanham: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, 2011. 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