British Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan

Since 2001, the international community has struggled to establish Afghanistan as a viable nation state. Among the many challenges facing this mission has been an ongoing insurgency conducted principally by the Taliban. In spite of the continuation of the American-led counter-terrorist campaign, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), it is currently estimated that half the country is now under the physical and psychological control of this insurgent group. A parallel mission, which had little or no bearing on the fortunes of the Taliban insurgency, at least initially, was the creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF was created in 2001 and is essentially a peacekeeping operation, which was intended to establish a secure environment behind which political, economic and social reconstruction of the state could commence. ISAF started slowly; its biggest problem at the start was getting states to contribute forces to it. Eventually, NATO assumed control in 2003 and its members make up the lion’s share of troop contributors. Because of these resource problems, ISAF’s initial security footprint was restricted to Kabul. Gradually, however, the force was expanded and its influence was extended to the north of the country with Phase 2 in 2004. Although this was deemed to be a success, the operation was carried out in a benign security environment and the population generally supported the efforts of the international community to help in the reconstruction of the area. More problematic and more dangerous was the proposed expansion of ISAF into the south of the country, which was seen as Taliban country. Phase 3 involved the deployment of 12,000 NATO ISAF troops in the southernmost six provinces: Day Kundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Urzugan, and Zabul. After much delay, caused in part by the time taken to raise the necessary forces from NATO, the organization began its deployment in the early summer of 2006. The largest contingent in this force was Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 201–225, June 2007