The Judiciary

2021

The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia regulates the existence of the Judicial Commission , the Judicial Commission has the authority regulated in the 1945 Constitution Article 24B paragraph (1) which states that the Judicial Commission has the authority to propose the appointment of supreme justices and has other powers in order to protect and upholding the honor, dignity and behavior of judges. The research uses normative legal research by using a kind of normative juridical approach. Based on the results of this study it is understood that the legal arrangements regarding the authority of the judicial commission in the perspective of enforcing the code of ethics in the judiciary have not fully provided enforcement of violations of the code of ethics and guidelines for judges' behavior to the Judicial Commission. Because the decision issued by the Judicial Commission itself is still a recommendation, which means that it must be discussed jointly by the Supreme Cou...

Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 50, No. 26-27, p. 42, 2015

The National Judicial Appointments Commission system for appointing judges is unconstitutional for four reasons. There is potential for its misuse as appointments to the higher judiciary will be controlled by the executive branch of the government. It suffers from the vice of arbitrariness as there is no way to determine who an “eminent person” is. The veto powers given to any two members also make it susceptible to misuse. Finally, there are concerns about maintaining the independence of the judiciary because the high courts and the Supreme Court examine the validity of actions taken by the executive branch as well as the legislature.

" India is the only country where judges select themselves, determine their own transfers and also discipline themselves "-K.P.S Gill, former DGP The National Judicial Appointments Commission is a constitutional body established to ensure transparency in the procedure of appointments of the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. This was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2015, saying that it challenged the independence of judiciary. The judgement brought back the collegium system which indeed has no constitutional provision. The objective of this research is to analyse the importance of a separate body for appointments of judges in our country and why our judicial fraternity is still uncertain on the procedure of appointment of the judges. The research is based on secondary sources which included online data, books, articles and journals. The researchers have focused on the ongoing vociferous debate on NJAC and the Collegium System and the benefits of having a separate body for the judicial appointments.

2009

Port Elizabeth (South Eastern Cape Local Division); Pretoria (Transvaal); and Thohoyandou (Venda). A dual approach using two types of research instruments, namely the survey questionnaire and the interview qnestionnaire, was used. In 1999 only two of the ten Constitutional Court judges were women (Sally Baden, Shireen Hassim and Sheila Mein~es, 1999). At that time there were only two female judges in the Labour Court and one in the Land Claims Court. Also, of the total of 186 judges, at the time, 156 were white males, 20 were black males, 7 were white women and 3 were black women. However, the racial and gender composition of the judiciary has changed dramatically since then (Seedat, 2005, page 5) and (Lewis, 2008, page 1). No random sample was taken, dne to the small population size of the judiciary and it was feared that it would further reduce the response rate. Both research instruments (the survey questionnaire and the interview schedule of questions) were sent to the entire population of judges, which at the time that the study was conducted, consisted of 213 judges in total. The main source of data was obtained from the research questionnaire developed by the researcher. This was posted to each of the respondents, together with a self-addressed envelope. The aforesaid data was obtained from the semi-structured face to face (alternatively telephonic) interviews conducted with the respondents, who were willing to participate and agreed to be interviewed. Amongst the judges surveyed and interviewed some were current judges, some were retired judges and some were acting judges, of the various superior courts (the interview questionnaire was also developed by the researcher), all of whom were spread across the whole of South Alrica. Due to distance and time constraints, a number of the judges agreed to be interviewed telephonically instead of face to face, which saved the researcher a great deal of expense, with regards to travelling and accommodation. The constant comparative method of qualitative analysis was used. Data reduction was carried out in three stages, each representing a progressively higher level of theoretical abstraction. The findings of the research are expressed as an integrated theory and a series of propositions, generalized within the boundaries of the study, relating legislative and executive interference with the judiciary and what the impact and effect these have had on the independence of the judiciary. v The conclnsions may be snmmarized in four statements. Firstly, there is political interference with the personnel of the jndiciary, through the Iudicial Service Commission being involved in the judicial selection and disciplinary processes. This has negatively impacted on the efficient functioning of the judiciary. Secondly, the judiciary has transformed and no further political inference is necessary to bring about transformation of its structures or its functioning. •lhirdly, there is executive interference, by the Department of Iustice, with the judiciary's finances and court administration, which has negatively impacted on the efficient functioning of the judiciary. Fourthly, the proposed judicial hills are an unnecessary intrusion and, if enacted, will increase the executive's power over the functioning of the judiciary, further undermining its independence and possibly eventually leading to its complacency. This will have adverse consequences for all South Africans, including the business community, as local and foreign investor confidence in the South African judiciary's ability to protect and enforce their rights. In light of the aforesaid, the recommendation is that all forms of political interference with the judiciary should be removed and that the legislature and the executive should support the judiciary and protects it from judicial criticism. The legislature and the executive should take steps where necessary to relnedy the abovementioned, for example to correct the imbalances in the composition of the Iudicial Service Commission and allow the judiciary to control its own internal processes thereby ensuring that it functions efficiently and independently.

International Journal Papier Public Review, 2020

The Supreme Court is a judicial institution that has existed since the Indonesian state was formed in 1945. This institution was formed based on the mandate of the constitution in article 24 of the 1945 Constitution, namely "judicial power is exercised by a Supreme Court and other judicial bodies according to law". But in fact, in the course of Indonesia's national and state life from its independence in 1945 to 1998, the judicial power exercised by the Supreme Court was not free and independent, both institutionally and independently of its judges. The influence of the executive power held by the president on the judicial power exercised by the Supreme Court can actually be observed in the politics of regulating judicial power through laws by the executive and legislative bodies during the old order government (President Soakarno 1945-1966) and the new order (President Soeharto 1967-1998). The judicial power law that was formed has actually subordinated the judiciary ...

Law and Contemporary Problems, 1990

27 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 53 96, 2007

ethics to the issue of administrative judge independence. 3 After a bit of background on role and rule in the analysis of ethics issues in Part I, Part II asks whether it is proper to call administrative judges ''judges." Concluding that such a designation is accurate, Part III gives background on judicial independence and distinguishes independence from another judicial attribute, impartiality. Part IV takes this discussion of judicial independence and applies it to the role of administrative judge, concluding that administrative judges, though properly called judges, are not meant to be independent in the judicial sense. The lack of judicial independence of administrative judges is no mark of failure or embarrassment. On the contrary, the role of administrative judge, properly understood, is critically important to our justice delivery system, although it simultaneously does not implicate judicial independence. Administrative judges have an important role to fill: they are meant to preside impartially over fair hearings that implement and administer agency policy. To perform this critical role in the most effective way, administrative judges are not to function in a judicially independent way. Instead, they must recognize that their role demands adherence to agency policy and goals. Judges of the judicial branch, acting independently of the executive and legislative branches, will apply contested legal principles and rules to executive agency action, including that taken by the administrative judiciary. I. ETHICS, ROLE, AND INDEPENDENCE Ethics issues are all about role and context. Once past the simplistic "don't lie, cheat, or steal" rule, and past just staring at the text of the rules themselves in an entirely formalist way, everything in professional ethics is about role and context. Role and context determine the appropriate actions and attributes of legal professionals. To be sure, the profession has produced a formalized version of the lawyer's and judge's roles by adopting sets of ethics rules, 4 the violation of which produces professional consequences. 3. With the range of agencies, each with its distinct mission, structure, history, and regulations, there are few absolutes and little consistency in terminology in administrative law, and, therefore, in the life of the administrative judge. Terminology is difficult to manage because of varied usages in varied agencies. Some statements that may seem in error to some readers may simply be a reflection of my focus on one agency structure or another that is inconsistent with the reader's knowledge base. Any real errors that remain in this piece are mine and do not belong to those from whom I have gained my modest level of administrative law knowledge. 4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2003); MODEL CODE OF Jun.

2017

European constitutional law review, 2024

Judicial councilsseparation of powersfourth-branch institutionsjudicial independencefour ideal types of judicial councilsa judge-controlled, politician-controlled, inter-branch and fourth-branch judicial councildanger of politicisation and corporativism of the judiciary I Judicial councils have become a global phenomenon. 1 These bodies, endowed with powers over judicial careers and court administration, can be found in Europe, Latin America, and Asia. 2 In some regions they have even become a predominant model of judicial governance. 3 The major motivation behind their establishment and constitutional entrenchment was to depoliticise the process of selecting and disciplining judges and professionalise court management. Despite