Centrifugal and Centripetal Elements of Indian Federalism

Argumente und Materialien zum Zeitgeschehen 41 Subrata K. Mitra/Bernd Rill (Hrsg.) Indien heute Brennpunkte seiner Innenpolitik 2 Argumente und Materialien zum Zeitgeschehen 41 Subrata K. Mitra/Bernd Rill (Hrsg.) Indien heute Brennpunkte seiner Innenpolitik 3 ISBN 3-88795-266-9  2003 Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung e.V., München Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen Verantwortlich: Dr. Reinhard C. Meier-Walser Redaktion: Wolfgang D. Eltrich M.A. (Redaktionsleiter) Barbara Fürbeth M.A. (stv. Redaktionsleiterin) Verena Hausner (Redakteurin) Claudia Magg-Frank (Redakteurin) Christa Frankenhauser (Redaktionsassistentin) Kein Teil des Werkes darf in irgendeiner Form (durch Fotokopie, Mikrofilm oder ein anderes Verfahren) ohne schriftliche Genehmigung der Redaktion reproudziert oder unter Verwendung elektronischer Systeme verarbeitet, vervielfältigt oder verbreitet werden. 47 Centrifugal and Centripetal Elements of Indian Federalism Katherine Adeney 1. Introduction India's federal structure has always been the source of controversy; for experts of India's democracy, ethnic conflict regulation specialists and for comparative federal observers. At India's 50th anniversary of independence in 1997, journalists as well as academic observers noted that India's federation was changing radically. India's federation was designed in the context of, and managed within, a one-party system that was dominated by the Indian National Congress. It was also designed after the violence of partition, a war with Pakistan and within the institutional constraints of the Government of India Act of 1935. India is also extremely heterogeneous; it has one of the highest levels of religious and linguistic diversity in the world. Currently the constitution recognizes eighteen languages although there are hundreds more languages and dialects. India is also home to most of the world's major religions. There are also large numbers of tribes and castes. It is arguable that such a heterogeneous state could only be ruled as a federation. However, many of the de-colonized states of Asia and Africa rejected federal structures of government precisely because they were ethnically diverse 1 . The political scientist Eric Nordlinger argued that federations increase pressures for secession, the most centrifugal tendency a state can be subject to 2 . India certainly has not been immune from secessionist movements. However, the extent to which these secessionist movements were caused by the federal status of the state is disputable. In addition, many secessionist movements exist or have existed in states that are not federations. Examples include the Sudan, United Kingdom and Sri Lanka. That the Indian federation was very centralized should not surprise anyone. In addition to the pressures mentioned above, this centralized federation fitted with Nehru's notion of moulding the Indian state and nation into the modern era, influenced as he was by the Soviet federation and their system of planning. It was also compatible with Congress preferences before independence 3 . The Indian federation was not formed by previously independent states. The notion that federalism in India was a voluntary coming together, as classical scholars have defined federations, is therefore an erroneous notion. This is significant because if states come together and make a compact, then they usually have more input over the structure of that federation, and therefore more autonomy within it, than the states of India had. For this reason, one of the authors of the constitution, Ambedkar, deliberately styled the Indian federation as a Union. Federations are defined by the division of sovereignty between at least two territorially defined levels of government. India has been described as a quasi federation4 . Gangal went one 1 Mozaffar, S./Scarritt, J: Why Territorial Autonomy is not a viable option for managing ethnic conflict in African plural societies, in: W. Safran/R. Maiz (Eds.), Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies, London 2000, pp.230-253. 2 Nordlinger, E.: Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies, Harvard 1972, p.32. 3 Adeney, K.: Constitutional centring: nation formation and consociational federalism in India and Pakistan, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 2002, 40(3), pp.8-33. 4 Wheare, K.: Federal Government, London 1963, p.33. 48 step further, describing it as a unitary regime with decentralized features5 . This is misleading. Federations are not defined by the number or importance of powers that are allocated to the 'lower' level of government. In theory, a unitary state could be more decentralized than one that was federal. Although India's constitution does not describe it as a federation, rather as a Union of States, the division of sovereignty between two territorially defined levels of government classifies it as such. India also possesses a bicameral legislature in which twentyeight states and seven union territories are represented. Yet as said, India's federation is one of the most centralist in the world: it possesses many features deliberately designed to counter centrifugal tendencies. The constitutional division of sovereignty is challenged by the fact that the Governor of a state, a central appointee, can bring legislation to the attention of the President of India, thus rendering it unable to be passed until certified by the President (Article 200-1). This power has obvious potential for abuse. In addition, the upper house, the Rajya Sabha, can transfer the powers of the states to the centre with a two-thirds majority (Article 249). This is a definite challenge to the constitutional division of powers. However there is a time limit on the powers – of a maximum of two years. In addition, as the Rajya Sabha is indirectly elected by the state legislatures, the states have to consent to this amendment of their rights. This provision therefore does not threaten the federal status of the state. The central parliament also has the power to change unilaterally the boundaries of the states. It has to consult the parliament of the state concerned but it is not bound by its recommendation. This power has enabled it to accommodate tensions within the federation (three new states were created in 2000) but challenges the reality of the federal division of powers nonetheless. More seriously, the centre has extraordinary emergency powers. While all federal constitutions have some emergency powers, the Indian state has been noticeable in its abuse of these powers. It has declared an Emergency in the states and union territories 115 times since independence. Finally, the centre has the most efficient sources of revenue. The centre collects income tax, customs and excise. States can collect only land taxes and sales taxes. Despite this, the states are liable for an extended range of responsibilities: e.g. law and order, education, welfare and rural development programmes. To fulfil their functions, the transfer of resources from the centre to the states was necessary. The Finance Commission was set up to determine the distribution of centrally collected revenue to the states in the forms of grants and loans. This distribution of resources made the states dependent on the centre. In addition, the Planning Commission, an extra constitutional body, diminished the state's sphere of autonomy in economic matters by the allocation of discretionary grants as political handouts. Despite, or some might say, because of this bias in favour of the centre, India has seen movements for greater autonomy, and secession. In the 1990s authors such as Brass and Mitra questioned the relationship between centralization and secessionism6 . They counter intuitively; centralization may lead to secession, whilst conceding autonomy may lead to integration. Historically, the perception of the Indian elite has been that central control is essential to maintain the integrity of the federation. However, this is simplistic. Centralization does not always equal central control. Partially because of its geopolitical location but also because of the nature of the national identity articulated by the founding fathers, the Indian state has been obsessed with its territorial integrity. The high degree of heterogeneity in the state has increased 5 Gangal, S.: An approach to Indian federalism, Political Science Quarterly 77(2), 1962, p.248. 6 Brass, P.: The Politics of India Since Independence, New Delhi/Cambridge 1994; Mitra, S.: Subnational movements in South Asia: Identity, Collective Action and Political Protest, in: S. Mitra/A. Lewis (Eds.), Subnational Movements in South Asia, Colorado 1996, pp.14-41. 49 the sense of insecurity. Although all states are concerned to maintain their territory, India has been unusually paranoid in this regard. For example, it is an offence to advocate secession or to question the territorial integrity of the state under the 16th amendment to the constitution. The fact that many of the border regions have a different religious majority to that of the state as a whole has ensured that the Indian state's desire to protect its borders has expressed itself as anti-Hindu. It is no coincidence that a state divided along religious lines at the time of partition should have a high proportion of religious minorities on its borders. Interestingly there is no statistically significant relationship between the number of days that President's Rule has been imposed and the religious majority of that state although states such as Punjab and Kashmir have been subject to this provision for longer than the other states 7 . The Indian state has not hesitated to meet secessionist demands with extreme force. Yet the Indian federation has generally been remarkably resilient despite these noticeable exceptions, which, I argue, were avoidable. When the Indian state has been accommodative and recognized the demands of territorially concentrated ethnic groups (as it belatedly did in relation to the calls for the linguistic reorganization of states in the 1950s) then it has become more not less stable. This is despite authors such as Harrison predicting the dangers from adopting such an approach – precisely because he was concerned it would increase centrifugalism8 . However, when the federation has accommodated a politically mobilized identity, such as the linguistic demands in the 1950s and 1960s, it has enhanced the security of that identity. This security has provided the conditions for alternative cleavages to emerge. Rather than undermining ethnic accommodation, these cross-cutting cleavages have ensured that an identity does not continue to project itself as anti-centre. It has also ensured that dual identities are possible, e.g. it is possible to be a Gujarati and an Indian. The two are not incompatible 9 . The cases where anti-centre movements have proliferated have been in those states where the primary identity has not been secure e.g. Punjab and Kashmir. This is partially due to the fact that the centre has been less accommodating of those demands made on behalf of religious groups. However the fact that these are border states goes a long way to explaining the reticence of the Indian state to accommodating their demands. When the Indian state has been slow to accommodate demands for autonomy or has manipulated groups in an attempt to play one off against the other, conflict has ensued. In addition, although Kashmir and Punjab are well-documented examples of states in the Indian Union that experienced ethnic conflict, the conflict between these states and the centre was not inevitable. Despite the Indian state's record in Kashmir and the denial of democratic rights in most elections since independence, it took until the late 1980s for armed conflict to occur 10 . This demonstrates that accommodation was possible. This type of accommodation has enabled India's federation to survive. But to what extent will this be able to continue with the changes in the political scene? As said, India's federation entered a new phase in the 1990s. The changes were twofold. Firstly, coalition governments formed primarily of regional parties became the norm. Se7 Adeney, K.: Federal formation and consociational stabilisation: the politics of national identity articulation and ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan. PhD Thesis, Government Department, London School of Economics 2003, p.221. 8 Harrison, S.: India: The Most Dangerous Decades, Princeton NJ 1960, pp.135, 307. 9 Mitra, S./Singh, V.: Democracy and Social Change in India: A cross-sectional analysis of the national electorate, New Delhi 1999, p.161-2. 10 Manor, J.: Making Federalism Work, in: Journal of Democracy 9(3)1998, p.31 50 condly, economic liberalization increased the economic resources of certain states, while diminishing those of the centre. Those states with powerful regional parties as well as strong per capita income such as Punjab or Maharashtra thus became powerful bargainers. These cha nges have prompted many authors to question whether India's federal structures are still relevant for the India of the twenty-first century. Has India, a very heterogeneous state survived only as a centrist federation, either through having a dominant political party, financial control, or through the emergency powers of the centre? 2. Party system India's federation initially operated and was designed in an era when Congress dominated the party system, both at the regional and national levels. Many conflicts between the states and the centre were managed within the 'Congress System' 11 . The major exception was the mobilisation for linguistic reorganisation in the 1950s which was not contained within the party. Yet in the 1960s, partially as a consequence of the linguistic reorganization of states, the party system factionalized at the state level. For the first time regional parties came to power in the states of West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. These regional parties did not consolidate their position immediately, but in the 1990s, as the result of the organizational and electoral decline of the Congress Party, they secured significant levels of national representation. They were joined by caste political parties from the Hindi northern heartland as well as the Hindu Nationalist BJP. Many commentators have viewed this development with alarm, especially because of the high rate of government instability – national elections were held in 1996, 1998 and 1999. National parties' share of the vote has declined although it remains substantial – in 1980 national parties gained 85% of the popular vote, in 1999 they gained only 68% 12 . In 1999 state parties received 27% of the vote and 29% of the seats. This compares to 1991 where they received only 16% of the seats and 17% of the vote 13 . Although the proliferation of regionally defined parties can be viewed as a centrifugal tendency, it is important to remember that these political parties have partially emerged as a result of the security of the multiple linguistic groups in the federation. The linguistic reorganization of states in the 1950s provided the conditions for alternative identities other than language to emerge in the party system. As Horowitz argues, When groups are territorially concentrated, devolution may have utility not because it provides 'self-determination', but because once power is devolved it becomes somewhat more difficult to determine who the self is 14 . The best example of this was Tamil Nadu, a state in the very south of India. This was one of the first states in which a regional party came to power. This party, the DMK, espoused a secessionist agenda in the late 1950s/early 1960s, but called off its secessionist campaign after 11 Kothari, R.: The Congress 'System' in India, in: Asian Survey, 4 (12), 1964, p.1162. 12 Frankel, F.: The Problem, in: Seminar Magazine 459, 1997 (A Symposium on emerging is sues in centrestate relations), p.14. 13 Rudolph, L./Rudolph, S.H.: Iconisation of Chandrababu: Sharing Sovereignty in India's Federal Market Economy, in: Economic and Political Weekly 2001, p.1543. 14 Horowitz, D.: Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley CA 1985, p.617. 51 the Indo-China war of 1962. It split in 1967 and has continued to fractionalize. A plethora of Tamil parties have emerged – the DMK, ADMK and MAMDMK among others. This does not in itself indicate security, but the fact that so many of these parties have played prominent roles in the national coalitions of the BJP does 15 . Secondly, regional parties often do not articulate a specifically regional agenda despite their support being confined to one or two states. Examples of these types of regional parties are the caste-based parties in the northern states of India. Although the parties of the lower castes of India have challenged the notion of national identity articulated by the higher castes 16 , they are not secessionist. Thirdly, it has been fascinating to observe in recent years the way in which parties such as the Akali Dal of the Punjab, and the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, parties which have traditionally articulated the need for more autonomy from the Hindu majority Indian Union, have come into coalition with the BJP – a Hindu nationalist party identified with a unitary and homogenising agenda. One part of the explanation is that many of the regional parties, especially in the non-Hindu states, were the targets of political manipulation by the 'secular' Congress under Indira Gandhi – specifically the Akali Dal of the Punjab 17 . It is also arguable that it is easier for a Hindu nationalist government to make concessions to states with a non-Hindu majority than a party ostensibly committed to secularism. Another part of the explanation is that the BJP modified its agenda to come to power and is alive to the fact that it is unlikely to remain in power without the support of the regional parties. The regional parties are aware of this fact – it makes them rather more than less disposed to the BJP. Finally, the most potent way to assure that federalism will not become just a step to secession is to reinforce those specific interests that groups have in the undivided state 18 . Being part of a coalition at the centre is definitely one way of achieving this – therefore apparent centrifugalism leads to further integration of the regions into the centre. One exception to this is regional parties being members of a national coalition, which introduces regional conflicts, previously isolated in the states or contained within a national political party, into the central government, e.g. Jayalalitha's resignation from the NDA government in 1998 because the Prime Minister would not dismiss her rival in the state of Tamil Nadu. Her resignation from the NDA precipitated national elections. However, this did not damage federal stability, although it had severe political implications. 3. Economic liberalization Whilst I have argued that the changes in the party system do not pose as substantial a centrifugal threat to the Indian federation as is sometimes portrayed, those associated with economic liberalization arguably do. Given the incredible financial centralization that existed within the Indian federation, economic liberalization by definition moved power away from the centre. Before liberalization in 1991 the states controlled few sources of revenue. They relied 15 Wyatt, A.: The Federal Dimension of Party Politics in Tamil Nadu, in: Indian Journal of Federal Studies, 3(2), 2002, pp.127-143. 16 Varshney, A.: Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, New Haven/London 2002, p.57. 17 Singh, G.: Ethnic Conflict in India, Basingstoke/London 2000, p.192. 18 Horowitz, D.: Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley CA 1985, p.628. 52 upon the central government to allocate them the resources to carry out substantial public works and to ensure social and developmental equity between the states. Economic liberalization, dramatically undertaken by Prime Minister Rao in the wake of a foreign exchange and inflationary crisis in 1991 dismantled centralized industrial and economic controls. It eliminated export restrictions on intermediate and capital goods. This process ensured that ma rket forces would determine investment decisions. This liberalization provided the states, and the parties that controlled them, with the ability to 'attract investment directly. Regional state ministers have been flying the globe touting for investment' 19 – Chief Minister Naidu of the Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh is a prime example, attracting Bill Gates to Hyderabad. Since the beginning of the 1990s, private investment has been the principal engine of growth. This growth has primarily gone to those states with well-developed infrastructure. The ability of states to secure foreign direct investment from outside India potentially poses a threat to the unity of the federation. The centre had been responsible for distributing resources between the states to ensure approximate fiscal equity. After economic liberalization public investment declined. The danger to national unity is precisely that large differences have developed between the different states of the federation at the same time that the centre's financial leverage has become less important. Five major states; Gujarat, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka which constitute one third of the population of India, have secured two thirds of private investment proposals since 1991 and 60% of commercial bank credit. In contrast, seven states, which constitute 55% of the population of India, have secured only 30% of private investment proposals during the same period. These are the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and Assam20 . There are two points worth noting here. Firstly, as the Rudolphs identify, it is not the case that the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer. They point to the fact that both Punjab and Haryana, the richer states, have declined 21 . However, the gap in terms of per capita income has grown in recent years. This is arguably more important than which state is growing and which state is not. More optimistically, Saez argues that the poorer states have 'bounced' back in the late 1990s22 . As the Rudolphs have analysed, the states are beginning to cooperate with each other in attracting this external investment, to the extent of agreeing a common excise tax even though it would benefit them individually to compete in this regard 23 . Therefore the dangers of these centrifugal tendencies are less than they appear, although it would be unwise to dismiss them entirely. 'There is no major modern nation where such a large section of society is hopelessly at the margins as in the case of the major states in northern and eastern India' 24 . These states are primarily within the Hindi heartland. Where development lags in peripheral regions – there are likely to be more tensions. However, economic success can also breed centrifugal pressures – especially if it is perceived that the better off states are subsidizing their poorer cousins. It is too soon to be sure how economic liberalization will affect the federation. 19 Nicolson, M.: Guests at India's Party: The smaller regional parties will play a crucial role in the country's elections, in: Financial Times, 16th February 1998. 20 Kurian, N.: Growing Inter-State Disparities, Seminar 509, January 2002. 21 Rudolph, L./Rudolph, S.H.: Iconisation of Chandrababu, p.1545-1546. 22 Saez, L.: Federalism without a centre: the impact of political and economic reform on India's federal system, New Delhi/London 2002, p.17. 23 Rudolph, L./Rudolph, S.H.: Iconisation of Chandrababu, p.1546. 24 Kurian, N.: Growing Inter-State Disparities. Seminar 509, January 2002. 53 4. Conclusion Indian federalism has always been subject to centripetal and centrifugal tendencies. The cha nges in the federal balance of power in the 1990s are no exception. My concluding question is, are these changes going to permanently affect the operation of the federation, and if so, how? Most of the signs are positive. Regional parties from previously marginalized regions, especially those on the periphery who do not have a Hindu majority, are in coalition at the centre. Democratic elections, which were classified as fair by the international community, have recently been held in Kashmir in which the ruling National Conference, associated with election rigging in the past was defeated. The fact that the National Conference supports the BJP coalition makes this development even more encouraging – it appears to herald a 'sea change' in the thinking of the central elite with regard to this region. In addition, the abuse of President's Rule for political reasons appears to be on the wane. Following the Supreme Court's judgement in 1994, a state government now has an opportunity to prove its majority in the state legislature before the President allows its dismissal. It is too early to say whether the current President will act in a similar manner to his predecessor, but the constitutional precedent has been firmly established and it will be difficult to depart from it 25 . In addition, the imposition of President's Rule has to be approved by parliament. Therefore, even when President's Rule is imposed, the upper chamber may reverse it. As one-party dominance is unlikely to return, it is more likely that both chambers will not approve politically motivated dismissals. Therefore, although centrifugal tendencies are strong – they should not be seen as negative. The dangers are there, but Indian federalism has proved adaptable in the past. It is likely that it will do so again. Conversely, the centralized provisions have enabled it to be accommodative – e.g. in redrawing the political map of India. The fact that a new redrawing of the political map took place in 2000 is indicative of the security of the federation – three of the states of the Hindi heartland were divided. These demands were rejected in the 1950s on the grounds that the Hindi heartland had to remain strong. The reorganizations are also indicative of the fact that it is not only the economic disparities between states that pose a challenge to the federation – the disparities within the states are equally as important. Developmental issues were important in securing the recent creation of the states of Uttaranchal, Jharkhand and Chatisgarh. It is unlikely that these will be the last states to be created by the federation. The proliferation of units within a federation may be seen as a sign of security, but also as a feature promoting the stability of a federation – historically federations have survived if they have 25 President Naryanan was the first President to apply the rules of the Bommai judgement. He rejected the United Front’s October 1997 attempt to dismiss the state government of Uttar Pradesh, and also did so in September 1998 when the BJP Government attempted to dismiss the state government of Bihar. Also see Tummala, K.: The Indian Union and Emergency Powers, in: International Political Sci-ence Review, 1996, 17(4), pp.373-384. 54 had a large number of units – e.g. more than seven26 . The proliferation of these units also subdivides the dominant group – the Hindi speakers – who comprise 30-40% of the population, depending on how they are categorized in the census. This type of subdivision also makes the size of the units more equitable, and brings government closer to the people. Federal systems of governance do not automatically create good governance, but as long as they are adaptable, for a society as heterogeneous as India, they are indispensable. 26 Adeney, K.: Between federalism and separatism: India and Pakistan. Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts: Comparative Perspectives from Africa, Asia, and Europe, in: U. Schneckener/S. Wolff (Eds.), London, Ch.9.