Varieties of normativity: Norms, values, goals

1 Forthcoming in Contemporary Phenomenologies of Normativity: Norms, Goals, Values, co-edited with Mirja Hartimo and Ilpo Hirvonen, London, New York: Routledge, forthcoming 2021. Varieties of Normativity: Norms, Values, Goals Sara Heinämaa Academy of Finland University of Jyväskylä Abstract The chapter begins with an overview of contemporary phenomenological theorization of normativity. In light of phenomenological contributions, the field of norms proves to be both multi-faceted and heavily layered. In order to organize the field, the paper turns to Husserl’s classical account, arguing that it provides an elegant and powerful manner of unifying the phenomena of normativity without disregarding or downplaying their plurality and layered character. On this basis, the paper then clarifies the difference between the normativity of the criteria of evaluation and the normativity of the rules of action or conduct. At the same time, it sheds light on the guiding function of values and paragons. Keywords Intentionality, normative science vs. theoretical science, ideality, essence, perfection, rule of action, criterion of evaluation, value, goal, paragon, Husserl, Scheler, Hartmann Several contemporary phenomenologists contend that classical phenomenology provides a powerful alternative to neo-Kantian, neo-Hegelian, Foucauldian, and naturalistic approaches 2 in the theorization of normativity.1 Phenomenology is taken to offer one or both of the following two advantages over competing approaches. First, it is argued that, thanks to its methodological resources, phenomenology is able to articulate differences between various forms of normativity without reducing them to one another. By distinguishing between types of experiences and types of experienced objects, and by analyzing their intentional and temporal structures, phenomenology can offer a richer, thicker, and more comprehensive understanding of the field of normative phenomena than most other approaches. On these methodological grounds, it is contended that phenomenological analyses of normativity respect the plurality of experiencing. In “Experience and normativity,” Sophie Loidolt formulates this insight by emphasizing the diversity of the noetic and noematic aspects as well as the doxic, axiological, and practical variants of intending: [N]ormativity is explained as emerging from different features and structures of experiencing and of that which is experienced. (...) All phenomenological claims about normativity can be traced back to the intentionality of experience (...) However, there are very different kinds of givenness: the way [in which] I experience the glass of water I have just been drinking from is different from the way I appreciate the value of freedom and again different from the way I experience the alterity of and responsibility for the other. Consequently, there are also different kinds of normativity to be gained from an analysis of intentional experience (Loidolt 2018, 1–2). 1 Neo-Kantian alternatives include, most importantly, Christine Korsgaard’s and John McDowell’s approaches. Neo-Hegelian alternatives include recognition-theoretical approaches as well as Robert Brandom’s inferentialistic neo-pragmatist approach. Naturalistic alternatives include neo-Aristotelian (e.g., Nussbaum 2006), neo-Humean (e.g., Slote 2007; 2010) and neo-Smithian approaches. 3 Second, on the basis of its in-depth account of the constitution of concepts (and universals of all kinds), phenomenology is also able to illuminate also pre-conceptual, pre-predicative, and pre-judgmental layers of experiencing and their relations to normative judgments and assessments (e.g., Loidolt 2018; Dreyfus 2017, 19–44; Doyon 2015a; Crowell 2013, 26ff., 127–128ff.; Dreyfus 1995). If one follows Husserl’s mature analyses In Experience and Judgment (1939) and Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Syntheses (1966, 2000), then these layers turn out to be affective; if one chooses the Heideggerian approach instead, then they are disclosed as proto-practical and/or existential.2 In both cases, normative judgments are established on the platform of non-judgmental experiences and world-relations. Moreover, by distinguishing between diverse modes of pre-conceptual and pre-predicative life – life in mood, feeling, desire, drive, and sensation – phenomenology illuminates crucial differences in the experiential bases of cognitive, emotive, and practical norms and normative judgments. In addition to arguing for these two strengths, contemporary phenomenologists have contributed strongly to the analysis of different forms of normativity and different types of norms, from epistemic to moral and institutional ones. In the following, I will first identify four discourses on normativity that are central to contemporary phenomenology and explicate their main arguments (section 1). What we have is a layered and segregated field of phenomena that are analyzed by several concepts, Husserlian and Heideggerian, but also Levinasian and Sartrean. In order to organize the field, I will turn to Husserl’s classical account and demonstrate that it provides an elegant manner of unifying the phenomenal field of norms without disregarding or downplaying its plurality or its layered character. We find 2 On Sacha Golob’s readings (2014), however, Heidegger’s analysis grounds normativity on non-propositional but still conceptual experiences. 4 an original account of the constitution of norms, but also experientially motivated distinctions between various kind of norms that figure in our practices. The aim of this exegetic account is to broaden and deepen the insights that help us traverse the field of normativity in a phenomenologically systematic manner. 1. Phenomenological Discussions on Normativity Contemporary phenomenology entails (at least) four central discussions of normativity. I begin by delineating these territories and identifying their thematic foci and analytical results. The point made in this section is merely preparatory: I will not yet suggest any explication of the meanings of “normative” and “normativity”; I merely want to differentiate between the main argumentative contexts in which these terms are used in phenomenology today. In sections 3 and 4 below, I will then move forward and offer explicatory and organizing concepts on the basis of my reading of Husserlian sources. 1.1. Normativity of Intending One dominant argument in contemporary phenomenology is that the structure of intentionality is teleological-positional and, as such, normative. This argument is based on the idea that all intentionality involves acts of intending which posit senses that are necessarily either fulfilled or disappointed in the course of experiencing. The fulfilment of the senses posited by intentional acts can be partial or total, adequate or non-adequate, but the tension between the intending and the fulfilment/disappointment structures intentional experience as such (e.g., Husserl [1950] 1973, 84/46; cf. Smith 2011, xiii; Crowell 2013, 16–20; Staiti in this volume). 5 In Normativity in Husserl and Heidegger (2013), Steven Crowell presents a powerful argument for such an account. Crowell equates intentionality with the categorial as-structure of intending, as defined by Husserl in Logical Investigations (Crowell 2013, 16). He then contends that, since phenomenological questions concern the implications built into such asstructures and their fulfilment conditions (Crowell 2013, 20), these investigations can be said to deal with the normativity of experiencing, and exclusively so: “The only justificatory questions that the [phenomenological] epoché leaves open are those first-order questions that arise within ordinary experience: are intentional implications that normatively structure the experience of an object fulfilled or disconfirmed by further experience of the sort demanded by precisely that kind of object” (Crowell 2013, 2). If this holds, then the subject matter of phenomenology would carry at its core normative structures, and the problem of normativity would concern all phenomenological inquiries, independently of their specific thematics, be they cognitive, axiological, or conative. In other words, a basic structure of normativity would be shared by all areas of intentional experience and conscious life, from believing and its modifications to valuing and willing in their various forms. 1.2. Perceptual Normativity Another central discussion concerns the intentional structures of perception; more specifically, the fulfilment conditions of perceptual experiences. The basic idea is captured by Maxime Doyon as follows: “If perception is normative for Husserl, it is not because it is 6 realized in the form of a judgment, but it is rather because it aims at its object” (Doyon 2015a, 283). This way of using the concept of normativity stems from Husserl’s early lectures on thinghood and spatiality, Thing and Space (1907). However, in a closer analysis, perception turns out to involve actually two different kinds of normative structures: In Thing and Space, Husserl distinguishes between the normativity of interested perceptions and the normativity of perceptual appearances as such, considered abstractly from the perceptions in which they figure. Whereas the fulfillment of a perceptual intention is a goal that can be reached in intuition, the adequate givenness of appearances as such is a regulative idea that cannot be intuited but can merely be entertained in thought (Husserl [1907] 1973, 130–132/109–110; cf. Doyon 2015a; 2015b; 2017). This is because the perceivable thing – any perceivable thing – is always endlessly richer than any particular perceptual intention and perception (e.g., Husserl [1907] 1973, Husserl 49ff./42ff.; 1950, 84/46). We cannot perceive or sensorily intuit material things from all possible angles, in all possible lightings and settings. Such a complete grasping is an operation of thought, illustrated by an endless series of partial perspectival acts of grasping or else repetition of perceptions ad infinitum (cf. Husserl 1976, 350–351[297–298]/342–343, cf. 13–14[10]/8–9). When perception is embedded in human (or animal) practices, it is guided and delimited by interests (Husserl [1907] 1973, 108–109/91–92, 128–129/106–107).3 This form of limitation is disclosed to us comparatively by the juxtaposition of interested perceptions and ideally by 3 The idea of animal practice is contestable. In the Husserlian framework, we can speak about animal goals, and also about animal practices and traditions, even if only in an anthropomorphizing way and on the basis of dismantling (Abbau) (e.g., Husserl 1973, 181; cf. Heinämaa 2013; Ciocan 2017; Ferencz-Flatz 2017a, 2017b). In the Heideggerian framework, this seems nonsensical (e.g., Crowell 2017). For the methodological aspects of this controversy, see Tuckett 2018; Staiti 2010. 7 the concept of the thing as such, independently of all interests. Husserl calls “optimal” the best possible givenness characteristic of interested perception. In other words, “optimal” is the appearance that maximally or best gives the intended object to interested perception (Husserl [1907] 1973, 125ff./104ff.). Accordingly, Husserl writes, perceptual optima do not belong to pure “appearances as such but to the interest” ([1907] 1973, 135/112; cf. Doyon 2017). Husserl thus contends that we must conceptually distinguish between the type of fulfilment that characterizes interested perception and the type of fulfilment that belongs to the essence of thing-appearances as such, as abstracted from interested perceptions. In his analysis, both can be said to be “normalizing” or “normative” in involving standards of certain types. However, whereas the norm of interested perception is realizable or achievable, the norm intrinsic in the essence of appearance as such is that of a limitless possibility of enrichment. In other words, the goal of optimal or maximum givenness in respect of an interest can be achieved, and so striving for fulfilment has a terminus in this case, but the goal of full enrichment of thing-appearances as such is a limit idea (Husserl [1907] 1973, 108/91, 119/99, 125–126/105–107; 1976, 350–351[297–298]/342–343).4 1.3. Moral Normativity and the Alterity of the Face The third context of discussion is fundamental-ethical in nature. Namely, contemporary phenomenological ethics includes a strong Levinasian line of argumentation that traces moral norms and moral normativity to the experiential face-to-face encounter between two persons, 4 Husserl calls such ideas “Kantian ideas” and “limit-ideas” (1976, 9[6]ff./xxiiff.; 1954, 23ff./24ff.; 2012, 56– 76). 8 oneself and a stranger. According to this Levinasian argument, the other’s face operates as a proto-normative command and a trace of the absolute (the third, God), and thus provides the grounds on which the properly ethical form “ought” and all moral principles and imperatives with their various contents can and must be established. An ample example of such argumentation is provided by William H. Smith in his Phenomenology of Moral Normativity (2011), where he argues on the basis of Heidegger and Levinas as follows: [T]he face-to-face instantiates my understanding of my being, it instantiates my understanding of meaning as meaning or my attunement to norms as norms, to normativity as such. I am a being that is responsive to norms – I act in light of norms – because I have been claimed by the face. The face baptizes me in the name of the normative (Smith 2011, 184; Loidolt 2018, 7; Crowell 2016, 72).5 The main idea here is that the proto-normative command, issued by the other’s face, constitutes us as responsible agents, and this fundamental responsiveness operates as the ground for all moral (and social) norms with their diverse contents. In other words, it is the other, the stranger, who constitutes us as moral agents with obligations, duties and responsibilities. 1.4. Social Norms and the Judgment of the Gaze Structures of social and institutional norms have also been illuminated by phenomenological methods. These analyses cover habituated rules and conventions but also social customs and 5 In “Why is ethics first philosophy?”, Crowell formulates the same basic idea as follows: “[W]hen he [Levinas] says that the face of the Other is language or ‘expression,’ he means precisely that its first word, that what constitutes it as a face, is a command: ‘thou shalt not commit murder’ (TI 199). A command does not merely resist my freedom but calls it normatively into question by creating an obligation” (Crowell 2012, 578). 9 juridical laws (e.g., Overgaard and Zahavi 2008; Loidolt 2009; Wehrle 2014; Salice and Schmid (eds.) 2016).6 In addition to clarifying the character of specific types of social and institutional norms, contemporary phenomenology also offers insights into the basic intersubjective relation that conditions the field in which social norms can be established in the first place. Sartre’s and Heidegger’s analyses, in particular, have been influential in articulating the idea that intersubjectivity is normative in its basic structures. More precisely, both reject empathybased approaches that identify a non-normative basic layer of intersubjectivity (or intercorporeality).7 In Sartre’s terms, the gaze of the other that first constitutes us as human subjects and social agents is not an impartial identification but a judgmental and incapacitating verdict. The other’s gaze frames us as social beings but, by the same token, also as subjects of, and respondents to, normative verdicts. Heidegger’s concepts of conscience and authenticity illuminate the fundamental-ontological conditions of normatively structured intersubjectivity. These accounts of social normativity are developed in several different manners in contemporary phenomenology. Some authors apply them in their philosophical critiques of prevailing social and/or political conditions. Others stay on the existential or fundamental ontological level of analysis and, clarifying its structures, generate arguments about the sources of all normativity. On this basis, contemporary phenomenologists have developed 6 The results offered by many classical phenomenologists have proven fruitful in this line of investigation; contemporary phenomenologists draw, for example, from the social philosophies of Roman Ingarden, Adolf Reinach, Edith Stein, Max Scheler, Alfred Schütz, and Gerda Walther. 7 Non-normative accounts of the basic layer of intersubjectivity are offered, for example, by Husserl (1950; 1952; 2021) and by Stein (1917). In line with these earlier contributions, Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1993) argues that the basic layer of intersubjectivity is inter-corporeal and affective but not normative in the sense of rules or impertatives. 10 challenging alternatives to the dominant neo-Kantian, neo-Hegelian, Foucauldian, and naturalistic paradigms. x x x In order to organize the multifaceted territory of normative phenomena, I turn to Husserl’s reflections on the topic. The point of this exercise is not to suggest that Husserl’s conceptualization would be the only organizing resource available in contemporary phenomenology. That clearly is not the case: powerful alternatives have been offered on Heideggerian, Levinasian, and Sartrean grounds (e.g., Crowell 2013; Schmid and Thonhauser (eds.) 2017). Nor do I pretend to demonstrate that Husserl’s account of normativity would be the best that phenomenology can offer. That would demand detailed and extensive comparisons between all alternatives available. My aim here is more modest, but still crucial, I believe: I want to explicate and clarify the particular type of order that Husserl’s approach is able to bring into the territory of normativity. For this end, I will tie his early epistemological arguments to his later axiological investigations, and compare his conceptualizations to those of two other early phenomenologists, Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartman, who both emphasized the fundamental role of values for our intentional lives. My hope is to contribute thereby to the discussion of the strengths of the phenomenological framing of the problem of normativity and the analytical tools that phenomenology offers. 2. Rules of Action and Criteria of Evaluation 11 Husserl’s approach to normativity is comprehensive and covers all subfields of philosophy – from epistemology and ontology to ethics, esthetics, and social philosophy. We find discussions of the cognitive norms, such as self-evidence, truth, clarity, distinctness, and elegance, but also detailed discussions of many other kinds of values, aesthetic and moral, that operate as criteria of evaluation but also directly motivate our action or conduct (e.g., 1988, 60). Husserl’s phenomenology of normativity is best known, however, for its epistemological arguments, or better, arguments that address problems central to philosophy of science.8 These arguments are developed already in Logical Investigations (1900–1901) where Husserl makes two far-reaching moves: first, he distinguishes conceptually between two fundamentally different kinds of sciences – theoretical and normative sciences – and second, he argues on the basis of this distinction that normative sciences depend on theoretical sciences. Simply put, the idea is that whereas the task of the theoretical sciences is to describe things or objects of different types and explicate the relations that hold between them, the task of normative sciences is to provide (i) criteria of evaluative judgments about things and objects, and (ii) practical rules that regulate concrete actions that aim at realizing values (Husserl 1975, 53/32; cf. 1988, 3ff., 27–29).9 8 Reasons for this focus on epistemic and cognitive norms are both external and internal to Husserlian phenomenology. An epistemological interest in, and focus on, cognitive intentionality was crucial to Husserl’s philosophy of science, and he only proceeded stepwise to study aesthetic, ethical, vocational, and personal norms, independently of their roles in the sciences. On the other hand, Husserl’s early distinctions in his Logical Investigations (1900–1901) were more generally accepted by his pupils and early critics than what we find in his later works, after the so-called transcendental turn. 9 This general thesis is later specified to explicate the dependency relation between a priori ideal sciences and empirical factual sciences. In a well-known form, it states that every a priori ideal science functions or serves as a norm for an empirical factual science or a set of such sciences (Husserl 1974, 28/31–32; 1976, 11[98]/118, 355[301]/346). On this basis, Husserl is able to argue that phenomenology too – as an a priori ideal science – operates as a norm for factual sciences of consciousness and the mind by providing (vorzeichnet) the possible senses that these sciences presuppose (1950, 106/72; Husserl 1976, 177 [159]/189; cf. Carta 2021a). 12 The main target of Husserl’s argument is the widely held view which considers logic and epistemology as practical sciences (Kunstlehre) and takes their determining tasks to be in the guidance, direction, and regulation of acts of thinking and reasoning. Such views have been developed by empiricist philosophers but also voiced by philosophers who attacked psychologism. Kant, for example, states that logic “is a science of the right use of the understanding and the reason generally (…) according to a priori principles, as to how [understanding] ought to think” (Kant 1885, 6).10 Against such normative definitions and framings of logic (and epistemology and ethics), Husserl argues that fundamentally both logic and epistemology, as well as ethics and aesthetics, are theoretical sciences without any normative or practical contents. In order to defend and develop this view, Husserl introduces a set of conceptual distinctions that identify different types and levels of epistemic normativity but, due to their principled nature, also cover norms of other kinds and point far beyond epistemology. Furthermore, his distinctions ground normative sciences, not only in theoretical sciences, but also in valuing and axiological intentionality. He developed the axiological dimensions of his analysis later in reflections dedicated to value theory and ethics (Husserl 1988; 2004; 2020; 2014). The early analysis, however, remains influential. It affected many of his contemporaries. Most importantly, Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann built on it in their own groundbreaking discussions of axiological intentionality. 10 Husserl, however, argues that Kant discussion of logic is ambiguous, entailing problematic formulations but also glimpses of the correct view of logic as a non-normative theoretical science: Kant “did not ultimately wish to regard logic as a normative discipline (in the sense of a discipline which measures adequacy [Angemessenheit] in relation to set goals). (…) Logic, in this Kantian sense can, no more than Aesthetics, count as a regulative discipline guided by goals” (Husserl 1975, 50/315, cf. 218/135–136; cf. Mulligan 2021). 13 In Logical Investigations, Husserl prepares for his distinction between normative and theoretical sciences by pointing out that the judgments of the former, but not the latter, operate by concepts of obligation (Sollen, Seinsollen),11 expressed by the deontic verbs “shall,” “should,” “may not,” and “must not.” Paragraph §14 of the Prolegomena to Logical Investigations, famously begins: [E]very normative and likewise every practical science depends on one or more theoretical disciplines, inasmuch as its rules must have a theoretical content separable from the notion of normativity (of the ought) [Normierung (des Sollens)], [a theoretical content] whose scientific investigation is the duty of these theoretical sciences. Let us first discuss the concept of a normative science in its relation to that of a theoretical science. The laws of the former tell us, it is usually held, what ought to be [was sein soll], though perhaps is not and cannot be under the actual circumstances. The laws of the latter, contrariwise, merely tell us what is (Husserl 1975, 53/33–34; translation modified; cf. 61/38–39, 159/101; cf. 1984, 2; 2001a, 11). Basing his reflections on this deontic characterization, Husserl then argues that normative sciences necessarily are grounded in theoretical sciences. This is because all normative generalizations depend on theoretical laws for identifying and understanding their normatively determined objects. The argument holds equally for the normative aspects of logic, value theory, and theory of action as well as moral theory, political science, pedagogy, pragmatic linguistics, theory of art, etc. In other words, all normative sciences and normative 11 The German terms “sollen,” “Sollen,” and “Seinsollen” are translated into English by several different terms. In Logical Investigations, J.N. Findlay translates “sollen” and “Seinsollen” by “shall be” and “should be,” (Husserl 1975, 53–54/33–34), and “ought [to be]” (Husserl 1975, 160/317, 231/145). Later translators and commentators have tried to add systematicity by using some of these alternatives consistently; Buckley and Moran, for example, use “ought to be,” and Steinbock operates with “should be.” 14 aspects of sciences depend, for the establishment of their thematic domains, on some corresponding sciences (actual or possible) that deal with beings of relevant sorts, such as propositions, meanings, values, artefacts, artworks, natural things, human persons, and communities or persons: “Every normative discipline demands that we know certain nonnormative truths: these it takes from certain theoretical sciences, or gets by applying propositions so taken to the constellation of cases determined by normative interests” (Husserl 1975, 61/39; cf. 1974, 28/31–32; 1984, 27/27). To clarify this dependency relation, and to argue for its universal character, Husserl distinguishes between two principally different ways of using the deontic terms “shall” and “should”: on the one hand, the common meaning of prescriptions and commands and, on the other hand, the deeper meaning that specifies criteria or conditions of evaluation or, more precisely, conditions of ascribing value-predicates to objects.12 Husserl argues that the latter meaning, the one that specifies conditions of evaluation, operates independently of any reference to anybody’s volition or willing (agent or patient) (Husserl 1975, 53–54/34, cf. 1988, xxx). The pedagogical principle “A teacher should be firm and kind,” for example, does not command anyone to be firm and kind, categorically or conditionally. Nor does it express the volition of any pedagogical authority, external or internal, dependent or autonomous (cf. von Wright 1963, 7, 12–13). Rather, the principle identifies two excellences or virtues – firmness and kindness – as the criteria or standards by which teachers, their actions, attitudes, and personalities, are to be assessed. Husserl’s own example, “A soldier should be brave,” analogously identifies an excellence by which good 12 The argument obviously concerns equally the terms “may not” (darft nicht) and “must not” (muss nicht) as the negative correlates of “shall” and “should” (Husserl 1975, 55/34–35). For a thorough discussion of the relations of axiological and normative concepts in Husserl, see Mulligan 2004, 204–207; 2017, 495–. 15 soldiers can be distinguished from less successful ones. Both examples concern professional norms, but Husserl’s argument is general: deontic language is generally ambiguous, allowing two alternative interpretations, one that refers to the wills of agents and another that identifies criteria or standards of evaluation that are independent of volition or willing.13 In Husserl’s analysis, it is the latter, criterial and value-identifying use of deontic terms that is crucial for the establishment of the normative sciences. To be sure, normative sciences generate practical prescriptions, rules, and technics that regulate decisions and actions of agents, individual and collective. However, the core of such a science is not in the regulation of the will or action of anyone but in a fundamental valuation that allows us to distinguish objects on the basis of their value/disvalue and thus reorganizes the domain of possible objects, delineated by some theoretical science or a set of such sciences.14 Accordingly, Husserl defines normative judgments, constitutive of these disciplines, as follows: [A]s regards the concept of normative judgment, we can […] describe it as follows: In relation to the general underlying valuation, and the content of the corresponding pair of value-predicates determined by it [good/bad, valuable/invaluable], every proposition is said to be “normative” that states a necessary, or a sufficient, or a necessary and 13 Deontic terms are, of course, not restricted to human beings or persons. We can also use obliging language for aesthetic and epistemic objects, such as artworks and theories. Husserl’s example of an aesthetic statement, “A drama should not break up into episodes,” requires unity and coherence from good literary works (Husserl 1975, 53–54/34). Analogous obligations guide the sciences: “Knowledge claims should be explicit,” “Concepts must be well-defined,” “A proof should be elegant,” and “A theory should be complete.” Husserl himself argues that phenomenology as presuppositionless science demands from us “the best possible intellectual conscience” (1974, 6/7). 14 Husserl’s argument concerns the dependence-relations between normative and theoretical sciences in general. The argument does not hinge on the question whether the valuations operative in the establishment of normative science are objectively valid or “merely subjectively” (Husserl 1975, 56/35). 16 sufficient condition for having such a predicate (Husserl 1975, 56/36, last italics mine).15 This means that the core of a normative science is in judgments that state necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the evaluation of the objects within some theoretically delineated domain of objects. We can encapsulate this pregnant sense of “normative,” crucial to Husserl’s argument, by saying that whatever is normative in this sense – a discipline, a generalization, a judgment – specifies necessary and sufficient conditions of, or criteria for, the evaluation of objects (cf. Husserl 1975, 55/35). So, for example, the “laws of thought,” offered by practical logic, do not command us to think rationally or correctly but rather presuppose the value of rationality and guide those who care for its realization (cf. Husserl 1988, 49). Analogously, the normative principles of aesthetics express criteria that artworks and natural formations must meet in order to be beautiful and to be correctly judged as such. Moral principles and obligations, for their part, specify the conditions for being a virtuous person, or an agent with good will, and to be judged as such. So, in summary, Husserl’s argument proceeds in two steps. First, he disambiguates the meanings of deontic terms by making a conceptual distinction between rules of action, on the one hand, and criteria of valuing, on the other hand. He then contends that it is the latter that are more fundamental to the establishment of normative sciences. So, in Husserl’s analysis, such sciences are first established by the identification and articulation of value-relations within theoretically delineated object-domains, and not by the introduction of any rules of 15 In Logical Investigations, Husserl calls “normative” only the value-identifying usage of deontic terms, but elsewhere he includes both rules of action and criteria of evaluation in the broad category of normativity (1975, 56/36; cf. Husserl 1988, 49). In the lectures on epistemology from 1902–1903, Allgemeine Erkentnnistheorie, he summarizes this latter, more comprehensive approach as follows: “Norms are rules of how to do something or criteria of how to judge” (Husserl 2001a, 193, my italics). 17 action and obligations of willing. Will-addressing rules and obligations are needed for the realization of values,16 but they are not adequate on their own to establish normative sciences on the basis of theoretical ones. Only values are. In Logical investigations, Husserl names “basic norms” (Grundnorme) the propositions (Sätze) that identify the general conditions of value or disvalue within some domain of objects delineated by non-normative theoretical concepts (Husserl 1975, 57/36; 1984, 27/27). Examples of such norms can be found in all realms of practical life. The idea of the best possible conscience and the categorical imperative, for instance, are basic norms in Kantian morality (Husserl 1984, 6/7; 1975, 57/36); and the command of neighborly love has the same role in Christian ethics (Husserl 1989; 2014). The so-called “golden ratio” expresses a basic norm in the art of architectonics; and the medical sciences have their analogues expressed in the Hippocratic oath. Basic norms allow identification of valuable instances within domains of objects and comparisons between more and less valuable ones. They establish value-orders within objectdomains and value-hierarchies between objects (Husserl 1975, 55–58/35–37).17 Thus they provide standards for evaluations or value-judgements. On the other hand, basic norms and the normative sciences organized around them, also serve or function as grounds for practical disciplines (Kunstlehre) and techniques of different sorts 16 For volitional intentionality and our interests in ideal and real possibilities, see Jansen 2020, and Jansen in this volume. 17 Thus defined, a basic norm is the noematic correlate of a definition of goodness/badness in respect of an object-domain. It identifies the basic standard or “measure” (Grundmaße, Grundwerte) on the basis of which all normative assessment, comparison, and ordering – normativization (Normierung), in Husserl’s terms – is to be performed within the domain at issue (Husserl 1975, 58/36–37; cf. 1988, 71, 83–89 ). 18 (Husserl 1975, 160–163/101–103; Mulligan 2001). The norms of the latter address volitional agents and regulate their actions, activities, and practices. Examples of such practical disciplines include: logic as the art of correct thinking, normative and applied ethics, and normative aspects of epistemology. Moreover, basic norms also allow us to identify excellent or outstanding individuals from all possible ones within a domain. Such perfections serve as models or paragons in practical circumstances and situations. Both individual agents as well as individual actions and products can have this function. Galilei’s hypotheses, Darwin’s documentations, Marie Curie’s experiments, and Sigmund Freud’s methods are well-known examples from the sphere of the positive sciences, epitomizing various epistemic values. The phenomenon of models and paragons is not restricted to scientific practices but is central in all dimensions of practical life, from professional to political, artistic, and religious: individual agents, actions, and products do not just exemplify general possibilities of being but can also serve as examples of excellence in axiologically organized domains (cf. Husserl 1989; 2014). Examples of openminded teachers, for example, range from Socrates to Descartes and Brentano. Both fictional and real individuals can operate as paragons. The power of Christ, for example, as the paradigm of caritas, is independent of the issue as to whether he was a real person from Nazareth or just a legend (cf. Husserl 1989, 100). Moreover, we can recognize the function of individuals as paragons without subscribing to the values that they epitomize. One does not need to be a militarist to distinguish Rommel and Leonidas from the general category of warriors; pacifists, peace-workers, and antimilitarists also recognize their excellences. Our insight into such excellences does not depend on scientific concepts or theorization. However, if we want to measure them in exact terms, 19 Husserl argues, then we need to resort to mathematical transformations (Husserl 2012, 56–76, esp. 63–71). The pre-judgmental basis of all value-consciousness is in valuation and emotion, which are axiological forms of intentionality that posit value rather than being (e.g., Husserl 1952, 8– 9/9–10). Emotions include not only sensory feelings, which disclose sensory values, such as pleasure and displeasure, but also the so-called “higher” emotions which allow us to grasp the values of goodness and beauty in their different forms. So, an important element of Husserl’s treatment of norms, goals, and values is the thesis that valuation has a crucial role in the establishment of normative and practical sciences, from logic to ethics. Normative disciplines can only be established by insights into values, and thus are intentionally dependent on value-intuition. Logical Investigations already state this dependency relation in explicit terms: “[E]ach normative proposition presupposes a certain sort of valuation or approval through which the concept of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (a value or a disvalue) arises in connection with a certain class of objects: in conformity with this, objects divide into good and bad ones” (Husserl 1975, 55–56/35). In the epistemological lectures from 1902–1903, Husserl clarifies this insight further: [T]he laws at which the final goal of the normative and practical disciplines is directed state, rather than a being, an ought to be [Seinsollen]. They say: it should be thus, it must be thus, when it shall be “correct,” or, more precisely, when it shall fulfil the requirements that are decisive or authoritative in the idea of the respective normative discipline. So, the normative laws express rules of measuring on [the basis of] an established normative basic measure, e.g., on [the basis of] the idea of truth, good, 20 beauty, on [the basis of] the idea of a good state, on [the basis of] the idea of a good soldier (Husserl 2001a, 11). In this analysis, all practical sciences, all their rules and regulations, are dependent on some criteria of evaluation, provided by the normative science(s) which, for their part, depend on some domains of things or objects, delineated by the theoretical sciences. This means, in short, that practical sciences depend on normative ones, and normative sciences depend on theoretical ones (cf. Husserl 1988, 127). These relations of dependency and founding can also be expressed in converse order by the language of transformations (Wandlung, Umwandlung) and becoming: a theoretical science can be said to be “turned into” a normative one by the introduction of criteria of evaluation, and a normative science can be said to be “turned into” a practical one by the introduction of the tasks of value-realization.18 In the lecture course on logic and epistemology from 1906– 1907, Husserl characterizes the latter transformation – from the primarily normative (axiological) to the practical – by writing: “[A] normative discipline becomes practical when it does not merely aim at criteria for setting standards, but also at rules of practical realization, namely at producing or furthering models conformable to these normative criteria” (Husserl 1984, 27/27; cf. 32–34/33–35, 1988; 48–49; 2001b, 35; cf. Carta 2021a; Mulligan 2021).19 18 Compare to Frege’s formulation in Foundations of Arithmetic: “Every law which says what is can be understood [aufgefasst] as prescribing that it ought to be that one thinks in agreement with it, and is therefore in this sense a law of thought” (Frege 1893, xv). 19 In his introductory lectures to ethics and value theory from 1920/1924, Einleitung in die Ethik, Husserl clarifies his position by arguing that the original sense of “normative,” “normal,” and “anomalous” belongs to certain kinds of posits (Sätze) (Husserl 2004, 268–269), but from there can be transposed or transformed to acts: “The normalization [Normierung] of acts as correct and incorrect does not deliver any new a priori disciplines, since this normalization is only a transformation [Umwandlung] of the normalization that is directed at posits [Sätze] as act-senses. (…) The acts, in which the norm characters genuinely appear and become intuitable, are the specifically rational acts, acts of reason (…)” (2004, 272). 21 Such turning or becoming is not any form of deduction, derivation, or inference, whether logical, conceptual, or semantic (e.g., Husserl 1975, 160/101). Rather, it is a constitutive step that requires additional intentional activity, and must be understood and analyzed as such. The intentionality needed for the establishment of practical rules and techniques on the basis of axiologically and theoretically organized domains is practical in kind; that is, the intentionality of willing. It is only the will in its different modalities, Husserl argues, which is able to posit what ought to be or ought to be done now and/or in the future, and thus able to constitute situational tasks and duties and concrete actions and series of actions that are able to realize values (e.g., Husserl 1988, 106–112, 225). 3. From Goodness to Beauty Husserl’s basic distinction between the normative (ought-to-be) and the practical (ought-todo) was expanded from epistemology into the analysis of other areas of practical life already at the beginning of the century, both by himself and by his followers and critics. The distinction was developed further primarily in the realm of moral reflections, but it turned out to have crucial implications for the analysis of all evaluation (cf. Mulligan 2004, 214–222; 2017, 495–496). Scheler and Hartmann both contended that values oblige us but do not regulate our actions directly. More precisely, values operate as obligations of being (Seinsollen) and, as such, they merely determine what ought to be without commanding or dictating what must be done (Tunsollen). Both Scheler and Hartmann argue that this practical “inertness” of values in respect to action is due to their intentional structure: values do not contain in themselves any reference to 22 volitions or acts of willing, integral to action. The value of beauty, for example, “demands” that beauty ought to be, but it does not thereby command any beautiful actions or actions approximating or pursuing beauty. Only when considered by a willing and reflective subject, Scheler and Hartmann contend, can an ideal value mobilize and direct action (Scheler 1913/1916, 187–188, 214; Hartmann 1926, 154–159, 171–172; cf. Hessen 1958, 83–84; von Wright 1963, 14–15; Kelly 2011, 110–112). In Hartmann’s analysis, a value essentially involves an obligation of being (Hartmann 1926, 154–156). Scheler, in contrast, contends that, as ideal objectivities, values do not involve any obliging moments whatsoever, neither obligations of being nor obligations of doing. They become obliging, however, when they are considered in relation to a possible reality. In Scheler’s analysis, this does not transform them to rules of action or doing. What is needed for such a transformation or modification, he agrees with Hartman, is a reference to striving or willing (Scheler 1913/1916, 187). Husserl’s own investigations into values are best known for the argument that axiological acts of valuing are founded (fundiert) on doxic acts of cognizing, believing, or representing (e.g., Husserl, 1976, 237–238[197–198]/231–232, 285–286[239]/277; 1952, 8–9/9–10, 187– 188/198; 1988, 72, 252, 255, 267–268, 338, 411; 2004, 226–227; cf. Drummond 2013; 2019; Jardine 2020; forthcoming).20 The main point here is that all valuing presupposes something to be valued. Husserl argues for this coherently thorough his work. In the later lectures on ethics and value theory from the 1920s, the thesis is formulated as follows: Valuing acts and acts of willing are founded on the acts of cognition (…), thus their sense contains a sense from the sphere of cognition, and through that [contained sense] 20 Scheler famously attacked this analysis arguing that values have their own original manner of givenness independent of all doxic or cognitive forms of intending (Scheler 1913/1916; cf. Kelly 2011; Steinbock 2014; de Monticelli 2021). 23 meant objects are there for the volitional and willing consciousness and are included in them. What I do not even represent, I cannot value. The perceived or in whatever way (represented), in this or that way thought about or posited object becomes valued in valuing (Husserl 2004, 274; cf. 1976, 266–275[239–247]/276–285). However, this general idea is specified by distinctions that Husserl makes in the 1920s. First, he carefully differentiates between various kinds of objects that are able to found valuing acts (e.g., external vs. immanent objects, real vs. ideal objects); and, second, he distinguishes between values of goodness and values of beauty, arguing that the latter are not interested in being but operate freely from all positing of existence. I will shortly illuminate both distinctions, and will do so separately: I start with Husserl’s discussion of the differences between various kinds of founding objects and proceed to his conceptualization of beauty as a value of non-interested intending. Husserl’s thesis about the doxic foundedness of axiological acts does not entail that all valuing would be based on realities or material things. On the contrary, he draws attention to a broad class of objects – irrealities – that can serve as the doxic foundations of valuing acts equally well as realities. These range from fictional entities and purely immanent objects, such as appearances and units of appearances, to essences of different sorts. In everyday life, we value many kinds of realities given in our environments. Examples of such valued realities include stimulants, such as cigars, wines, and chocolate (e.g., Husserl 1988, 409; 2020, 507–511); utensils, such as scissors and hammers (1952, 186–187/196– 197); and different kinds of valuables and goods, from horses and houses to paintings, books, properties, and even human beings. A horse, for example, can be valued for the sake of its 24 power and aptitude in warfare or forest work, but also for the grace and ease of its gallop, or for the beauty of its shape and coloring (Husserl 2020, 15–17). Husserl’s phenomenology offers philosophical tools for the study of how such valued realities are constituted for us in experience. At the same time, and by the very same means, it also allows us to inquire into the constitution of other kinds of valued objectivities that lack the type of existence that is characteristic of realities (cf. Mulligan 2004, 188ff.). Two cases of irrealities are especially central to Husserl’s analysis of valuing and values: on the one hand, eidetic objects or essences and, on the other hand, immanent objects. The class of irreal objectivities include eidetic objects of different kinds. Husserl calls such objects “essences,” or alternatively “eide,” for the purpose of avoiding traditional philosophical problems associated with the terms “idea” and “ideal object” (Husserl 1976, 9[6]/xxii, cf. 10/8, 40–41/40–41).21 This is not a unified class but entails several different kinds. Husserl distinguishes, for example, between material essences and formal essences; essential types and pure essences; general essence and individual or singular essences; morphological essences and the exact essences of mathematics (Husserl 1976; [1939] 1985; 2012). Moreover, material essences include several different types, for example, colors, such as redness shared by the robes of cardinals, the blooms of carnations, and the flag of revolution (e.g., Husserl 2004, 265–266; cf. Merleau-Ponty 1964, 172/131); geometrical eide, such as an exactly determined circle; and the singular essences that are identifiable in different manifestations of persons (e.g., Herculine Adélaïde Barbin /Abel Barbin, 21 Husserl wants to avoid both Platonic and Lockean assumptions about eidetic and irreal objects (e.g., 49– 50[41–42]/41–42). The additional advantage of using the terms “essence” (Wesen) and “eidos” for eidetic objects is that the term “idea” can then be reserved for technical use in the conceptualization of limit ideas, or “Kantian ideas”, as Husserl also calls them (Husserl 1976, 9[6]/xxii; cf. 1954, 23–36/24–37, 283–292/305–313, 350–362/343–351; 2012, 56–76). This is one particular type of an eidetic object, exemplified by geometrical objects, the physical thing as such, and the stream of lived experiences in toto (cf. Carta 2021b). 25 John/Joan). All these irrealities can serve as doxic foundations for axiological acts. To put it more concretely, we may admire, not just red flags and roses, but also Redness as an ideality that covers all red moments perceivable in various realities; and we may appreciate, not just well-cut triangular sandwiches and round cupcakes, but also exactly determinable geometrical shapes. In addition to essences of various sorts, the class of irrealities also includes objects that, in one way or another, remain dependent on our own operations. Examples of subjectdependent objects include rainbows, shadows, and phantoms of various sorts, that is, objects that are causally inefficient but have spatial locations and/or temporal duration, even though scattered or discontinuous (Husserl 1952, 21ff./23ff.). The class includes, as a limit case, purely immanent objects, that is, objects that are completely immanent to consciousness. Examples of such purely immanent objects include appearances and unities of appearances. Illusory and immanent objects can be valued on Husserl’s account, and in a similar manner as realities. Moreover, fictional and imaginary objects may deserve our axiological appreciation (Husserl 2020, 253–253). Even if imaginary characters, such as Gulliver, Sherlock, and Orlando, lack reality and existence, their inquisitiveness may deserve our respect and admiration (cf. Husserl 2020, 248). This entails that Husserl’s thesis according to which all axiological acts are necessarily founded on doxic ones does not imply that all valuing would presuppose and depend on things or realities. Essences, immanent objects, and fictional objects can also serve as the doxic grounds of valuing, and equally well as realities. In everyday terms, this means that we 26 are able to value rainbows and shadowy reflections as well as bridges made of steel and concrete, but also fairies and trolls, and geometrical shapes and topographical structures. On the basis of these reflections, Husserl works out a far-reaching distinction between two kinds of values, differently related to being. He calls them “values of beauty” (Schönheitswerte) and “values of goodness” (Gutwerte). The former are, in his definition, interested in and motivated by appearances as such, independently of the beings which may manifest or “announce themselves” in these appearances. The latter, in contrast, necessarily entail an interest in the appearing being as well as a desire for it (Husserl 2020, 225ff., 507ff.). This is not an empirical psychological distinction but a phenomenological one: it sets apart two different ways in which axiological intentionality can be motivated and interested. The working manuscripts on emotions and values from the 1920s, articulate the idea as follows: Thus, we need to distinguish in all cases in which appearances and the appearing have a role or where an appearing being can be meant in distinction from the being of appearances: (1) beauty-value as value of the appearance itself and as value transferred from the appearing as such without any consideration of any question of being; (2) goodness-value (desire-value) as value of the appearing as existing (Husserl 2020, 254). Whereas values of good are concerned with and interested in the being (real or presumed) of the valued objects and are informed by desire (a practical act), values of beauty are noninterested in being and are free from the directions of desire (Husserl 2020, 248–258). Thus, 27 we can genuinely value non-existent objects for their beauty, from fictional objects to units and manners of appearing and to essences and ideas. So not just our fellow men but also purely fictional characters may deserve our axiological appreciation. Gulliver, Orlando, and Scarlett O’Hara have no reality or existence, but we can value their courage, and be educated and guided by their virtues. Moreover, Husserl argues that realities owe their beauty-value to appearances: Thus, I am pleased by the beauty of the reality on the base of its appearance, such as the beautiful outline or coloration of a thing – nothing else than this, not the thing as far as it exists and whatever may belong to it in real truth. To be sure, the real actual thing can be dear to me only since it presents these appearances, and it offers beauty only in a special attitude, in a specific aspect. The thing is then dear to me thanks to the beautiful appearance and is called “beautiful” since it offers a beautiful appearance. (…) [T]he thing itself is beautiful “for the sake of”, in transmission (Husserl 2020, 251, cf. 253; cf. 1988, 74). The value of persons, central to Husserl’s mature ethics, turns out to be a particular combination of both types of values. What is crucial to such valuing is that the beauty of a particular being – a person – alone determines our desire and interest in her existence. We are, so to speak, not primarily interested in her existence and therefrom turned to the beauty of its manifestations; on the contrary, we are primarily impressed by beauty and then, for the sake of this beauty and its continuous appearing – and only that –, also value the related being. Husserl uses the Greek term “καλοκαγαθóν” (kalokagathos) for this special type of the valuing of the good solely motivated by the valuing of the beauty, and contends: 28 [T]he valuing of the good is founded on the belief in existence (and in modalities of belief); in this case the emotive act has the character of the interested, in the broadest sense; and the delight at the real existence is also to be included in this type (namely all satisfied desiring). When a good is good for the sake of its beauty, so when the existence-value is determined through the beauty-value, then we have the case of the καλοκαγαθóν (Husserl 2020, 12–34; first italics mine). Values of beauty are aesthetic values: they depend on appearances and are “subject-relative.” This does not imply, however, that they would be frivolous. On the contrary, they are crucial to our conscious lives since they participate essentially in the constitution of the most fundamental values: human persons and the infinities of their creations (Husserl 2014, 416– 418, 234–425; 2020, 507–512). Conclusion We have seen that Husserl’s reflections on the relations between normative and theoretical sciences led him to draw far-reaching distinctions between different senses of normativity and different types of values. First, he contended that we must keep separate two basically different senses of normativity: on the one hand, the normativity of the practical rules that regulate actions and behaviors and, on the other hand, the normativity of standards of evaluation that also concern being and becoming. Whereas the former necessarily entail a reference to volition or willing, the latter are independent of such practical contents. The distinction is not restricted to epistemological contexts or scientific practices but concerns all domains of life, vocational, professional, political, and moral. 29 On this basis, we can say, for example, that perceptual appearances as such are “normative” but only in the purely criterial sense: we can evaluate them on the basis of their stages of adequacy, but no “rules of perceiving” are built in them or can be derived from them as such. Accordingly, the complete givenness of the percept can be said to serve as a norm but merely in the sense that it operates as a criterion of evaluation, not in any regulative sense. In contrast, interest-driven perception, such as the perception of an architect or a builder, being informed by specific goals and modes of willing, can be said to be normatively regulated in the proper sense of the term. Similarly, we can also say that intentionality as such is “normative” but only in the purely axiological sense: we can transform our intuitions about the teleological structure of intentionality into normative statements that allow us to evaluate individual acts of intending – some being more or better fulfilled than others –, but in order to arrive at any kinds of “rules of intending” we would need to introduce interests and volitions, i.e., practical forms of intending. Second, we have also seen that Husserl argues that rules of action are dependent in their intentional sense on valuations, and ultimately, on axiological experiences in which values are given in an intuitive manner. The logical rule that prohibits contradictory statements, for example, makes sense for those who are capable of grasping the values of rationality, but remain frivolous or empty in the eyes of those who see no value in consistence or coherence; the aesthetic rule of the golden ratio presupposes the validity of the experienced value of beauty; and moral commands and imperatives are grounded on the valuation of persons. 30 In Husserl’s analysis, normativity is ultimately grounded, not in the autonomy of the will or the power of the intellect, nor in the structures of existential care, but in value-disclosing intuition and emotion. The most fundamental values are those of interpersonal relations which alone allow us to grasp and realize values in their full richness (e.g., Husserl 2020, 316–317). 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